Diplomarbeit

Titel der Diplomarbeit
„Changes in Pashtun tribal structures since 1978: the influence of war, foreign militaries and militant political Islam.“

Verfasser
Roland Martin Kraml

Angestrebter akademischer Grad
Magister der Philosophie (Mag.phil.)

Wien, 2012

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A307
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Diplomstudium Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie UniStG
Betreuerin: Ass.Prof. Mag. Dr. Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek
Changes in Pashtun tribal structures since 1978: the influence of war, foreign militaries and militant political Islam.

May 21, 2012
Contents

1 Preface & Introduction 4
   1.1 Preface ................................................. 4
   1.2 Introduction ........................................... 6

I Definitions & Theoretical Framework 9

2 Ethnic Boundaries and the Definition of Ethnic Groups 9
   2.1 Tribe & Traditional Tribal Structures ...................... 18
       2.1.1 Islam in Pashtun tribal society ....................... 28
   2.2 Pashtun Identities, Ideals and the Pashtunwali ............ 32
       2.2.1 Pashtun Identities .................................. 32
       2.2.2 The Pashtunwali as an idealized code of conduct among Pashtuns ........................................... 35

II Foreign Interventions, The Soviet Occupation, Tribal Warfare, Migration & Exile 47

3 A Brief Look into Afghanistan’s History 48
   3.1 The Beginnings of the Afghan State ........................ 50
   3.2 The Durand Line ......................................... 57
   3.3 Preliminary Events to the Soviet Intervention ............. 60

4 The Soviet Intervention, 1978 - 1989 64
   4.1 Traditional tribal warfare and its adaption under the influence of the Soviet occupation .............................. 75
   4.2 Migration, exile and changes in Pashtun tribal society ........ 84
   4.3 Cold War strategies, foreign money, and the growing influence of Islam and its political repercussions ....................... 89


5 Civil War, the Origins and the Rise of the Taliban 95
   5.1 The rise of the Taliban ....................................... 98
   5.2 The Islamic extremist ideology of the Taliban ............... 104
5.3 The organizational structure of the Taliban .......................... 108
5.4 Traditional tribal structures and the Taliban ......................... 114

6 The Fall of the Taliban and the US and NATO intervention 117
6.1 The New Taliban .......................................................... 123
   6.1.1 Cohesion and unity of the (New) Taliban in a factionalized
         society ................................................................. 126
6.2 Tribal structures under the influence of post 9/11 government
         policies ................................................................. 132

IV Conclusion 135

7 Conclusion 135

V References 140

References 140

VI Appendices 153

8 Abstracts & Curriculum Vitae 153
   8.1 English Abstract .................................................... 153
   8.2 German Abstract ................................................... 155
   8.3 Curriculum Vitae ................................................... 157
Preface & Introduction

1 Preface & Introduction

1.1 Preface

This work aims to find explanations for current developments in Pashtun tribal society under the influence of war, foreign militaries and militant political Islam. For many years anthropologists have worked on understanding and explaining the highly complex and inhomogeneous structures of Afghan society. Outside the realm of ethnographic research, the culture, tradition and organization of tribal communities have been prone to oversimplified and prejudiced (positive as well as negative) representations. Considering the public and media interest in the ongoing war, simplifying narratives seem to have taken a strong hold in Western public discourse. Since Al-Qaeda established a strong network in Afghanistan under the Pashtun-dominated Taliban-regime, terrorist attacks in various countries and the US-led ‘War on Terror’, the general (media-) depiction of Afghans has often tended to portray them as archaic, medieval, bellicose and „invincible“ in the sense of Afghanistan being „the graveyard of super-powers“ (Shahrani, 2002, p.715).

It might be fair to say though, that the enormous complexity of so many interrelated developments exacerbates any discussion and, in many cases, only allows for simplification: the decades – if not centuries – of war, from the Mongolian khans to the Anglo-Afghan wars, the geostrategic importance during the era of ‘The Great Game’, strongly interfering neighbouring countries such as Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iran and others like India, Saudi-Arabia or the USA, oftentimes supporting various opposing factions, the Soviet invasion in 1979, the civil wars furthering ethnic factionalism, the absence of state-institutions, the growing influence of various Islamist groups and, since 2001, the effort of the USA and NATO – who still struggle to define a comprehensive goal for their missions\textsuperscript{1} – were all part in forming the current situation. The social structures, tribal loyalties, the arbitrary drawing of national borders, economic reasons, a steady influx of weapons, opium production and consumption, widespread analphabetism, the presence of (transnational) militant networks of political Islam,

\textsuperscript{1}A somewhat narrow “definition” of success, coined by the Obama administration was sometimes worded as “disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaida” (Kipping, 2010, p.1 and p.3).
and many other factors play into a regionally very diverse set of problems.

Still, some substantial and credible explanations for current processes might already be out there since quite a while. In my view, the genuine anthropological perspective applied in the ethnographic work which I am going to bring into bearing in this paper, allows for a thorough and worthwhile understanding of a multi-faceted, multi-level state of affairs.

In no way do I want to insinuate that anthropology as a discipline holds all the answers to every problem. As I will show in the following chapters, some ethnographic observations might only give clues why certain strategies of Western involvement do not work the way they are supposedly intended to – depending on the given aim or perspective of various key stakeholders. The question why the vast fund of the anything but new anthropologic knowledge did not take a stronger hold in the general discussion about Afghanistan will not be discussed in a satisfactory fashion in this paper. Yet a specific goal of this paper is to ask what new light can be shed on certain developments in Afghanistan by anthropology.

There could be many reasons coming into play for anthropology not having a bigger part in past attempts to understand Pashtun tribal cultures: the above mentioned complexity, the comparatively small reception anthropology enjoys as compared to other disciplines (for example economics or political science) may be two of them. However, there is another possible reason that has to be mentioned in this context: a compelling case can be made that in the last decades many anthropologists have shied away from taking on issues like modern warfare and its political implications (Gusterson und Price, 2005, p.39). The anthropologic expertise misused by colonial powers to subdue so many peoples around the world might have contributed to this reluctance (see also Canfield, 1988, p.100).

Yet, in recent years, quite some anthropologists have been engaged in consulting the British and the American2 armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as quite some private military companies (PMCs) on their counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies – adding yet another layer of complexity to the issues discussed. This „weaponization of anthropology“ hast triggered two reso-

---

2The US launched the so-called Human Terrain System (HTS) in February 2007, embedding anthropologists in combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan (AAA, 2007). It is run by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and aims at providing a better understanding of local socio-cultural conditions to the military and thereby avoiding and reducing unnecessary violence. First suggested and designed by cultural anthropologists Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson the project was funded with $41 million (Kipp u. a., 2006).
olutions of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) condemning these kind of endeavours as unethical and potentially dangerous for other anthropologists around the world and the persons they study (AAA, 2007; Gonzalez, 2007, p.17f).

In this context, it is very important to clarify that the paper at hand is, not on any account, intended to function as a guide on „how to win a war against Pashtuns“ by analyzing changes and adaptions in their organizational structures over the past decades. In my opinion such an attempt would be destined to fail anyway. Conventional military approaches to a social and cultural conundrum are simply inappropriate to provide for societal changes like developing democratic structures and advancing human or women’s rights - which, next to avenging acts of terror, seemed to be desired by Western nations. The only way a military “solution” could ever achieve that, would be at the high cost of using brutal force, bloodshed and subjugation which would not only require extensive manpower and treasure but is clearly not an option for Western militaries. Nevertheless, the available ethnographic data can always be used or misused which seems to be the crux of not only this discipline.

Various terms will need to be clarified. A short chapter defining the most important terms in this paper will be followed by an almost equally brief look into Afghanistan’s history. The vast scope of events and developments in the last hundred-fifty years alone dictates a very narrow focus on the most significant issues that have set the parameters for current events. The main question and focus will be directed at changes in Pashtun tribal structures since 1978.

1.2 Introduction

This paper wants to examine the possibility and extent of structural societal changes in Pashtun tribal systems since 1978. The question I aim to answer is, in how far tribal structures have changed and what has triggered those changes. The relevance of this question lies in its potential to elucidate the societal and cultural dynamics at play in this conflict, as well as to determine some causes for the course of events in a persisting struggle. The underlying hypothesis is that influences like war, foreign interventions and the impact of militant political Islam have caused an ongoing disarrangement in the traditional tribal organization of Pashtuns.

In this context, I will attempt to define whether the structures in question
have actually changed or just express themselves in a new way. A specific focus will be directed at the following influences on Pashtun tribes: war, foreign militaries and (transnational) networks of militant political Islam. Therefore, I will mainly focus on the connections of the Afghan Islamist parties to the Arab world and to Pakistan and on the connections of the Taliban’s networks of support in Pakistan and their policies towards, and influence on tribal organization. The analysis will also take into account the effects of the exilation of a large proportion of Afghanistan’s population to Pakistan. Furthermore, I will examine which effects the newly established social structures of refugees and/or their homecoming as fighters, mujahedin or later as the so-called Taliban, had on their tribal organization. Doing so, this paper aims to find out about changes in the relationship between different groups of political, religious, and military leaders, their amalgamation or possible separation with tribal leaders, elders and landlords, and whether it is possible to explain the rise of the Taliban in terms of tribal structures - all this under the influence of foreign military interventions.

In order to establish the ascertainment of structural changes, it will be necessary to first take a look at how the Pashtun tribal systems are described in ethnographic data from before 1978. This will provide for a guiding frame upon which later developments can be interpreted. As for a proper assessment it is necessary to choose the compared subjects, structures and actors in a transparent manner, I attempt to examine specific groups of Pashtuns in certain contexts and I will only use generalizing descriptions of Pashtun culture if comparison proves them valid. Some Pashtun groups will be referred to only in order to clarify differences and similarities among them, but will not be included in the final considerations of the aforementioned main questions of this paper. This is intended to draw a bigger picture of the existing variations in tribal organization and its factionalism, and to underline the heterogeneity in these segmentary and at least formerly acephalous communities.

In the first chapter I will include a short discussion of an anthropologic argument about the appropriateness of the used nomenclature as well as a discussion of the definition of ethnic groups, their creation, perpetuity and maintenance. I will also provide several definitions of tribe and a more thorough explanation of my understanding of Pashtuns as a descriptive ethnonym. This will help to understand not only how the word tribal is used in this paper and to clarify how processes of interaction, exchange, exclusion and creation of boundaries can be interpreted. These definitions also provide a basic framework of understanding upon which the following chapters will be built. They serve as the theoretical
framework to explain how certain changes, if found to be of substance, can have occurred. Furthermore, it will be necessary to distinguish between what can be seen as an ideal model of the social system of an ethnic group and their actual behaviour. In order to do so a short description of the *Pashtunwali* (the code of conduct describing the ideal Pashtun demeanor, way of life, and traditional values), and its relevance today will be discussed in chapter 2.2. Subsequently, a short treatise of Afghan history aims to give a more thorough understanding of the Afghan political sphere and illustrate the constitutive power tribes have held (and fought over) for centuries. This basic information will then serve as a point of departure for a more detailed examination of events since 1978. I will provide an analysis of the effects of certain occurrences on traditional tribal structures in each chapter and interpret them, though complex, as a causal chain in time. In answering the main question of this paper in the conclusion, I will also attempt to address the question of how anthropology can make sense of and shed some new light on the current situation in Afghanistan.
Part I
Definitions & Theoretical Framework

2 Ethnic Boundaries and the Definition of Ethnic Groups

As I will compare and analyze possible changes in Pashtun tribal structures, it is imperative to first take a look at the theoretical framework that constitutes the lens through which we will be looking at these structures. Therefore I will discuss what constitutes an ethnic group, its relations and interactions with “others”, and how changes in structures do not equal changes in culture. I will emphasize a view which portrays culture as “something characterized by variation and flux” and, following this strain of thought, showing “cases of relative stability in ethnic and other social relations as being as much in need of explanation as cases of change.” (Barth, 1998, p.5).

Here I will rely, to a large extent, on the works of Frederik Barth and Richard Tapper. I am using the reprinted version of “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries” from 1998 in this chapter and in some later chapters also the original version of 1959. Except for some additional explanations the content did not change much. Of course the debate about ethnicity has evolved since the early 1960s. Many other scholars, such as Thomas Hylland Eriksen with his book “Ethnicity and Nationalism” from 1994 and the re-edited version of 2009, have contributed much to the topic. The academic debate has expanded to many new foci such as “the commercialisation of identity, […] the significance of the internet […] globalisation, hybridisation and the need of a more inclusive concept of identity politics” (Eriksen, 2010, preface, viii). The reasons why I rely, encouraged by the 1998 reissue, so heavily on Barth are that his work was groundbreaking and still is very valid, significant and of high explanatory power. He studied Pashtun society and culture in various areas at a time which seems relevant to the approach I want to use in this paper. By using much of his work from the 1960s I intend to create a basic analysis of what life and social organization in Pashtun areas was like back then. This should provide the necessary background to identify the magnitude of changes that took place in the later years of war.
and also gives an idea of the structures which persist. I will then use Barth’s and Tapper’s theoretical and empirical findings (the latter’s publications used in this paper range from the late 50s to the early 90s) to look at the more recent research done on different Pashtun tribal groups, the Taliban and the so-called New Taliban (see Giustozzi, 2009a).

To start with, let me clarify some points concerning underlying assumptions which frequently rest subconscious but still influence our perceptions and interpretations. Anthropologists and researchers of other disciplines have an important role in defining and creating identities. The presumably objective results of our research “are used by policy makers to create order, both classificatory and political.” (Tapper, 1988, p.30). To understand why such a subsumption into clear cut groups with different names, occupying different territories and allegedly sustaining distinct fundamental characteristics can only represent a small portion of the actual facts on the ground, we have to dig a little deeper. Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of populations in Afghanistan “according to relatively objective criteria” such as “language, religion or sect, local or tribal affiliation, productive activity, wealth, and so on” it “is not so easily established” what exactly these categorizations “mean for people so classified” (Tapper, 1989, p.232). Already Frederik Barth stated that even most anthropological analysis is based on the misleading presupposition that cultural variation is discontinuous and that, in essence, there are groups of people who share a common culture that differentiates them from all others (Barth, 1998, p.8f).

To explain this, Barth reasons: “Since culture is nothing but a way to describe human behaviour, it would follow that there are discrete groups of people, i.e. ethnic units, to correspond to each culture. The differences between cultures, and their historic boundaries and connections, have been given much attention; the constitution of ethnic groups, and the nature of the boundaries between them, have not been correspondingly investigated. […] this leaves untouched the empirical characteristics and the boundaries of ethnic groups, and the important theoretical issues which an investigation of them raises” (Barth, 1998, p.9).

The main argument of this starting point is to realize that in general there never were geographically or socially totally isolated groups of people. Furthermore, the view that such a separation would be necessary to continuously conserve cultural diversity seems to last, even though empirical analysis proofs the contrary. Of course such a limiting view, even if not consciously articulated, makes it much easier to do research and to describe a group as special,
as a kind of single organism, distinct from others. Barth argues to the contrary that “ethnic distinctions do not depend on the absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built.” (Barth, 1998, p.10).

He goes on to state: “Interaction in such a social system does not lead to its liquidation through change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence.” (Barth, 1998, p.10). In the following paragraphs I will examine how exactly this process can be explained.

Barth considers it necessary to examine empirical data concerning a wide range of cases in order to adapt theoretical concepts which fit to give thorough but also easily approachable explanations. In doing so, he starts by emphasizing that the categories of ascription and identification of ethnic groups are chosen by the members of the groups themselves and therefore serve to organize interaction between them. In anthropological writings the term *ethnic group* is, according to Barth, often understood as describing a people which can sustain itself biologically, agrees on basic cultural values, provides a commonly accepted frame for communication and interaction and identifies certain traits and patterns as a sign for membership and can also be identified as such by others (Barth, 1998, p.10f). Even though in the past this approach came close enough to explain ethnographic data without totally distorting the results he considers this to be a limiting and too stiff of a view and equates it to the outdated “ideal type definition” which declared “a race = a culture = a language” and “a society = a unit which rejects or discriminates against others.” (Barth, 1998, p.11). The actual limiting factor in this view is called out by Barth as a preconception about the formation, role, organization and function of ethnic groups which allows to assume the maintenance of ethnic boundaries as unproblematic. This would then lead to reducing the number of possible parameters to explain cultural diversity. Inter alia it would also lead to wrong conclusions about the nature of continuity in time of such ethnic “entities” (Barth, 1998, p.12).

To solve the problems this view poses, Barth proposes to look at “the sharing of a common culture [...] as an implication and result, rather than a primary and definitional characteristic of ethnic group organization.” (Barth, 1998, p.11). To prove the validity of this approach empirically, Barth and his co-authors (of 1969) focused on those diverging individuals who convert their ethnic identity. They advocate a concentration of anthropologic research on “the ethnic *boundary* that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” because this allows for an analysis of “the social organization of culture differ-
ence” (Barth, 1998, p.6, p.15). Furthermore, this approach helps to make sure that it is not the researchers idea about a group that is used for definition, but that the described ethnic identity is self-attributed by members of the group and created in and through interaction. Barth also states that the cultural characteristics with the highest significance are those diacritica which signal membership in an ethnic group. The cultural norms “that actors themselves use to evaluate and judge the actions of co-members, implying that they see themselves as “playing the same game”” reflect this fact (Barth, 1998, p.6). This view obviously implies, as Richard Tapper elucidated, that ethnic boundaries are a construction which is cultural in nature and not depending on territory. Therefore “the ascription of an ‘ethnic’ identity to a group or individual varies with the speaker, his audience, and the context.” Tapper (1988, p.22). The construction of these identities always happens in, sometimes competitive, relations to others and constitutes a political expression or declaration which defines the relations between the speaker and his audience (Tapper, 1988, p.22).

Barth urges that it is also important to understand that different cultural traits or manifest cultural forms depict the effects of ecology. By that he does not mean a history of adjustment to environment but rather spontaneous changes conditioned by altered ecological circumstances. He declares it fair to assume that the “same group of people, with unchanged values and ideas, would surely pursue different patterns of life and institutionalize different forms of behaviour when faced with the different opportunities offered in different environment” so that an “ethnic group, spread over a territory with varying ecologic circumstances, will exhibit regional diversities in overt institutionalized behaviour which do not reflect differences in cultural orientation.” (Barth, 1998, p.12). Therefore it would not be appropriate to consider apparent institutional forms as constructing the cultural features which differentiate an ethnic group. To exemplify this, Barth recounts a story from southern Pashtuns who, judging from their life in a mountainous environment and their social organization in lineages do consider the Pashtuns of Swat in the north to be “no longer Pathan” (Pashtun) because “their overt pattern of organization seems much closer to that of Panjabis” (Barth, 1998, p.13). Nevertheless, Barth discovered that by clarifying under which conditions the northern Pashtuns lived, their “southern brothers” would concur they were indeed Pashtuns and unwillingly even admitted they might behave the same way under similar circumstances.

These observations directly lead to the next very important question: why and when are distinct cultural features a valid marker for different actors and
when aren’t they? Barth has clearly shown, that “some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied.” (Barth, 1998, p.15). It appears, there are two different kinds of cultural matter in the sense of ethnic contrariness: on the one hand there are overt markers and indicators that can portray identity, such as language, clothing, house-form and general life-style, on the other hand, something Barth calls “basic value orientations” by which he means “standards of morality and excellence by which performance is judged.” (Barth, 1998, p.14).

This brings us back to the aforementioned question of the maintenance of boundaries. The different ways in which a group preserves its boundaries and its identity involves a somewhat sophisticated organization of behaviour and social ties. When a particular distinguishable ethnic group lives through different transformations, the cultural features that constitute the boundaries may change, the cultural peculiarities of the members may change and even the form of social organization of the group may change. Still, a persisting differentiation between members and others (outsiders) permits to elucidate the nature of continuity in ethnic groups and to quest the varying cultural form and content (Barth, 1998, p.14). The aforementioned focus on ascription, as a decisive factor in sustaining an ethnic group as a category, also solves another problem: “Socially relevant factors alone become diagnostic for membership, not the overt, ‘objective’ differences […]” (Barth, 1998, p.15). It does not matter in that case how different their overt behaviour may be, if they proclaim their loyalty and commitment to a shared culture - which also implies that they are “willing to be treated” and that they “let their own behaviour be interpreted and judged” according to this shared culture (Barth, 1998, p.15). Having said that, this also entails that the dichotomy between members and their understanding of outsiders (or members of another ethnic group) indicates the acknowledgement of a restriction concerning mutual understanding, idiosyncrasy “in criteria for judgement of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest.” (Barth, 1998, p.15). So what happens exactly when individuals of dissimilar cultures interact socially?³ Ethnic groups need to contain articulate distinctions in behaviour in order to

³Just to clarify I want to say that I mainly talk about stable inter-ethnic relations up until now. Other relations (for example some that occur in conflicts and otherwise (colonization, hybridization, incorporation, annihilation etc.)) will be mentioned later on in context with specific events.
persist. One could anticipate a reduction of these differences through interaction with other groups - simply because interaction necessitates and brings about matching values and codes. The mutual consent about these values and codes does not need to expand farther than is necessary for the social situations in which members of different groups interact (Barth, 1998, p.16). The nature of continuity of ethnic groups in interaction suggests that there are not only characteristics and signals for the classification of membership, but that there must also be an organization of interactions that permits the continuation of cultural differences (Barth, 1998, p.16). Barth underscores and explains further: “The organizational feature which […] must be general for all inter-ethnic relations is a systematic set of rules governing inter-ethnic social encounters.” (Barth, 1998, p.16). This set of rules may, for instance, prohibit inter-ethnic interactions in certain areas in order to seclude particular sections of the cultures from engagement, conflict and alteration. By the same token, ethnic identity also indicates a number of limitations concerning the roles some body is empowered to play within his group or in inter-ethnic interactions (Barth, 1998, p.16f). As goods and institutions of the industrialized countries extend their reach to the furthest corners of the world, they also have an impact on cultural contacts and changes. In this respect it is, as Barth points out, of availing to understand that even “a drastic reduction of cultural differences between ethnic groups does not correlate in any simple way with a reduction on the organizational relevance of ethnic identities, or a breakdown in boundary-maintaining processes.” (Barth, 1998, p.33).

The next question to further advance in this topic analytically should be about what causes ethnic differences to evolve in a given area. According to Barth, the adequate answers are “the organizational requirements […] a categorization of population sectors in exclusive […] status categories” and the acknowledgement that the principles employed to one such classification may differ from that employed to another (Barth, 1998, p.17). Intrinsically this does not yet allow to fully explain why cultural differences arise. Nonetheless, it helps to clarify how they persist. The status categories can then be linked to an independent set of value standards: the more notable the differences between these value standards are, the more limitations on inter-ethnic interactions do they encompass (Barth, 1998, p.18).

Occasionally of course there are factors like migration, conflict, defeat or subjugation which (re-)define inter-ethnic relations. Yet, following Barth’s argument, the focus on some other processes promises to be more insightful in
this context - if brought to the light of anthropologic analysis. Namely those processes which cause individuals or even whole groups to alter or trade their identity. Even though the mentioned social mechanisms have the tendency to preserve dichotomies and boundaries, there may, despite the continued existence of given boundaries, be a process which “may figuratively be called the ‘osmosis’ of personnel through them [. . .]. Examples of stable and persisting boundaries that are crossed by a flow of personnel are clearly far more common than the ethnographic literature would lead us to believe.” (Barth, 1998, p.21). So even if the persistence of cultural features connected to a certain ethnic group implies a high degree of intransigence as far as inter-ethnic interactions are concerned, it does not imply the same inflexibility in the practice of recruiting new members or ascribing membership to them (Barth, 1998, p.21).

What are the reasons for individuals or groups to alter their identity? First there have to be some cultural mechanisms in place that allow for such an incorporation into another group, from the changing party as well as the receiving party. If this prior condition is given, for instance the idea of fulfilling the duty required by a higher power (gods, ancestors or institutions of high status), it is usually a practical consideration. Typically, the ones changing their identity might expect a better livelihood and the assimilating, receiving group might be motivated by apparent gains to the group, or at least its leader(s). Barth observed this especially in connection with “the role of households as productive units and agro-managerial techniques that imply an optimal size of 6-8 working persons, and the pattern of intra-community competition between household leaders in the field of wealth and influence.” (Barth, 1998, p.22). He also observed southern Pashtuns changing their identity to become Baluch, but not the other way around. This happens along a “clearly demarcated territorial border”, particularly when various influences cause the Pashtun identity to be seen as less attractive (Barth, 1998, p.123). Sometimes individuals or little groups would embrace this change and accept loosing their status granted by their rather strictly genealogical and segmentary organized social origins and integrate themselves into the centralized and hierarchical system of the Baluch. These changes are therefore affecting the whole ethnic identity, people who underwent them call themselves Baluch and portray themselves as such4. The

---

4There is in fact a certain statistical variation to the effect that it is heard of some Baluch saying under particular circumstances they were indeed Pashtuns (Barth, 1998, p.29). Still, this does not disprove the diacritical categorization of identity ascriptions in boundary maintenance. These cases will be addressed on p.34.
factors contributing to these changes and accounting for this border being only semi-permeable are found in different values and political organizational structures of Pashtuns and Baluch. By embracing Baluch identity a Pashtun “man may, by the same performance, score quite high on the scales that then become relevant”, meaning the motives to change one’s identity are founded in the possibility to ameliorate one’s social status and general environment (Barth, 1998, p.25).

“Baluch tribes are based on a contract of political submission of commoners under sub-chiefs and chiefs.” (Pehrson, 1966 in Barth, 1998, p.124). That allows for integration of other people solely depending on the “ambition and opportunism of Baluch political leaders.” who “compete for influence and tax income by incorporating new members into the tribe [...]” (Barth, 1998, p.22, p.124). The southern Pashtuns on the contrary are aligned in territorially bound segmentary descent groups. Even though some of them have a chief, which are usually the leaders of a descent segment, their political deliberations were traditionally produced in egalitarian councils from which non-descent members are ostracized. There can not be a full incorporation into the Pashtun tribe, though one can become a client with an “inferior, non-tribesman serf status, attractive merely as a last resort.” (Barth, 1998, p.124). In addition, such an arrangement is not very appealing to the political patron neither: the patron’s liabilities for the client are extensive, not only when it comes to protecting and defending him, but the patron would also be held responsible for any problem the client might cause (Barth, 1998, p.124). Furthermore, the ecological circumstances of the region Barth describes do not allow for the client to create a big enough surplus as to be a valuable asset for the patron. The egalitarian organization “where security springs from a man’s ability to rally communal support, the political advantages of controlling a few clients are very limited” so that “[...] people seeking attachment are turned away from Pathan groups due to the inability of that structure to incorporate them.” (Barth, 1998, p.124). Some more information about why these changes of ethnic identity take place and the Pashtuns would not simply work for the Baluch but still remain Pashtun will be provided on p.34. At this point it is necessary, especially with regard to Afghanistan, to emphasize that the processes of boundary maintenance by ethnic groups are strongly influenced by local security. When people live in fear of violence outside of their primary group, this insecurity itself functions as a limiting factor on inter-ethnic interaction (Barth, 1998, p.36). These primary groups tend to accentuate conformity of their members within and the
cultural differences in outward interactions. The conformity within is necessary for the individuals in order to identify themselves as members and to constantly manifest, (re-)confirm and corroborate their membership, specifically when a person’s security has to be confided on the other members’ immediate and voluntary assistance (Barth, 1998, p.36). Any demeanor diverging from common value standards of the group “may be interpreted as a weakening of the identity, and thereby of the bases of security.” (Barth, 1998, p.37). However, regional safety conditions can be subject to swift transformations which is why purposeful long-term predictions about these processes are hard to produce.

So why is all this relevant for this paper? Because it lays the foundation to understand the interactions between different Pashtun tribes and their interactions with outsiders. I will examine different aspects of Pashtun and tribal identities and, as I have tried to point out above, it is important not to understand these as necessarily rigid or static, but rather as potentially fluid and exploitable by the involved actors.

To summarize, let us keep in mind that the denotation ‘ethnic group’ in itself should not be allowed to represent a concrete value in itself which depicts a generally valid rationale for human behaviour, that the meaning of a social identity changes depending on context, that a person may assert various ethnic identities depending on circumstances, that a single or several ethnic identities maintained by an individual depict a negotiable reality, that members of the same family might not share the same ethnic identity, that a single ethnic identity can manifest vastly different traits and, last but not least, that there are of course factors other than ‘ethnic’ which constitute an identity (Tapper, 1988, p.31).

The distinctions portrayed above will also be clarified more thoroughly when it comes to interpreting possible changes in tribal structures. The question to answer will be of what nature these changes really are and how they affect the described groups.
2.1 Tribe & Traditional Tribal Structures

“Tribe, I suggest, is rather a state of mind, a construction of reality, a model for organization and action.” (Tapper, 1990, p.56).

In 1977, Godelier asked if the difficulties surrounding the definition of the concept of tribe indeed revealed a crisis of “the empirical foundations of anthropology itself” (Godelier in Ahmed, 1983a, p.142). One of the main lines of anthropological discussion was the question if tribe should be interpreted as an independent category or rather as a stadium in an evolutionary sense, viewing “tribal society as a phase in social progress” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.143). Today there seems to be much less argument about the usage of terms such as tribe or tribal in anthropologic circles than 20 or 30 years ago. In part this might be caused by resignation, admitting that anthropologists would probably simply not be able to agree on a dominant definition, in part it may also be caused by a broader acceptance of various definitions depending more on context. Additionally, it seems somewhat infeasible to find analytic terminology which considers indigenous categories in their specificity while being broad enough to allow for scientific comparison and classification of these categories (Tapper, 1990, p.50).

These speculations aside, I will try to provide a definition which not only reflects my perspective, but seems applicable in the context of this thesis and will help to shed some light on the questions posed herein. Doing so, I will (again) rely on Frederik Barth and Richard Tapper and others. Also, this chapter is intended to lay the foundation and set up the framework for interpreting and understanding the following chapters. Choosing from divergent possible definitions, I will concentrate on some general anthropologic classifications on the one hand and some specific analysis of Afghan, especially Pashtun tribes on the other hand. As a consequence, these definitions might not be suitable for tribes in other regions of the world. When discussing tribes, I will provide a distinction between tribes and confederacies. In this paper I will follow the example of the sources above and not apply the term tribe to groups numbering

---


Or as Richard Tapper has put it: “[…] it would seem essential not so much to agree on definitions as to examine the assumptions behind different usages and indeed the sources from which they derive.” (Tapper, 1990, p.49).
more than some thousand individuals (Tapper, 1990, p.53). Yet again, it is important to recognize that tribes are, be it for the influences of states or other factors, not static in nature and have shown over time to be dynamic, changing social systems (Tapper, 1983, p.43). More specifically, also tradition is no static, immutable force but it is changed, “revised, lost, revived, corrupted - as people use it to interpret and respond to the problems they face.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.88).

Quite often in anthropology when we talk about tribes, we also talk about states and the conflicts between these entities. I would go even further and claim that sometimes we define tribes partly through their interactions with others, especially with institutions of a state, and tend to see them in this dichotomy. As illustrated above, it is imperative to keep in mind that in the last centuries no tribe existed untouched by any state, reflected also in literature where “the role of states in creating, transforming, or destroying tribal institutions and structures” is a predominant theme (Tapper, 1990, p.52). In this context it is also interesting to follow Barfield’s observation on relations between tribe and state:

“Ironically, the relationship between tribes and states was most problematic under dynasties of tribal origin. To the extent that they claimed kinship with the ruling dynasty, the tribes posed a threat to its stability by assuming an active role in politics.” (Barfield, 1990, p.177)

Intra- and intertribal rivalries dominated succession struggles, and frequently members of the same ruling family engaged in protracted civil wars in their fight for supremacy (Barfield, 1990, p.177, see also Azoy, 1982, p.21). Therefore it is also consequential not to understand state as a single monolithic entity but as “a thing of parts on a field of parts” (Anderson, 1983, p.144).

Afghan tribalism has continued to play a big role in politics over the centuries. The political force of Afghan tribes was not entirely founded on pastoralism and nomadism, yet the tribal confederations of the Ghilzai (uncommonly also referred to as Ghalzi) and the Abdali (which were later called Durrani, see also p.50) which “provided the basis for central, expanding leadership in the eighteenth century included large pastoral nomadic elements.”7 (Tapper,
The majorities of both confederations though have been sedentary farmers (Glatzer, 1983, p.212f). Tapper states that the politically active tribes or, in other words, those “causing troubles” were rarely pastoral nomads, but more frequently the settled villagers (Tapper, 1983, p.43). This description also clarifies that it would be a mistake to think of tribes as equal, per se comparable units and helps to understand that they vary greatly in scale and function (Tapper, 1990, p.51). Indeed large tribal groups are settled cultivators with little or no inclination to nomadism and pastoralism, or as has been theorized by Tapper and Barth, “tribalism is more necessary to nomadism than nomadism to tribalism.” (Tapper, 1990, p.54). In Afghanistan pastoral nomadism occurred as an economic adjustment. Tribal and ethnic identities were traditionally more relevant as a decisive factor for political and cultural membership than nomadic or settled lifestyle, which “was rarely of any social or cultural relevance” at all (Tapper, 1983, p.44 and Tapper, 1989, p.242). Glatzer argues that this model of genealogical segmentation along the lines of patrilineal descent is used by the nomads to uphold “social relationships with the settled society, and for stressing their membership in the Pashtun nation”, even if their actual social organization is rather based on “common economic interests and close affinal and cognatic kinship bonds” (Glatzer, 1983, p.221).

One of the important and recurring questions in defining tribes is, to which extent tribal systems are “necessarily segmentary, egalitarian, decentralized, autonomous, and hence opposed to the state as the source of inequality, central authority, and government”(Tapper, 1990, p.49). Here again I have to point out that due to the complex nature of social and cultural idiosyncratic organizational forms in Pashtun societies there are no unambiguous, simple answers to this question. There are, for instance, cases in which egalitarian tribes resort to alternative ideologies, accepting the concept of centralized leadership under certain circumstances, usually in order to pursue a certain goal and only for a limited amount of time (Tapper, 1990, p.64). One could retreat to defining a tribe vaguely as “a localised group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organisation, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins)”, characterized by descent as a mainstay of dichotomization (Tapper, 1983, p.9 and Tapper, 1990, p.50).

open for negotiation and manipulation. The Babozai, for example, are considered to be a subtribe of the Hotak in the Ghilzai confederation as long as they are in Zabul province. In the province of Uruzgan “they are seen as a Nurzai sub-tribe in the Durrani ‘confederation’” (Ruttig, 2010, p.6).
Since such a rather unspecific definition does not seem sufficient in order to proceed analytically, we have to investigate the various forms of political and social organization found in different tribal groups. There is yet another obstacle: the question of who defines the cultural characteristics and boundaries used to describe the distinctiveness between tribes and thereby creates, invents or produces them. E.R. Leach cautioned already 40 years ago:

“I would claim that it is largely an academic fiction to suppose that in “normal” ethnographic situations one ordinarily finds distinct “tribes” distributed about the map in orderly fashion with clear-cut boundaries between them... My own view is that the ethnographer has often managed to discern the existence of a tribe because he took it as axiomatic that this kind of cultural identity must exist.” (Leach, 1959 in Tapper, 1990, p.51).

Nevertheless, I will proceed to describe tribal ways of life as specific as possible in the given context. Keeping Leach’s warning in mind will purvey a greater openness and limit the risk of all too static interpretations. Even though the nomenclature can not be the basis for explaining human behaviour, it will help to compare different tribal structures, especially when combined with suitable translations of local classifications and local apprehension.

Furthermore, some comments will have to be made on Islam influencing tribal society or maybe even being a foundational part of Pashtun tribal identity (see also p.28). Here the main goal is not to explain and understand religion, but to explore how religion is seen in society and how religion is used to form political and social organizational patterns (see Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). Notwithstanding the strong penetration of Islamic symbols in Muslim societies, many anthropologists have written about them without specifically or overtly referring “to the Islamic framework” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). In this chapter I will offer some basic information about Islam in the context of traditional Pasthun tribal systems. In parts II and III a more thorough depiction of recent developments, specifically concerning the influence of transnational Islamic networks, will be offered. After discussing some relevant descriptions of tribe and its organizational structures in anthropological literature I will later go into further detail about possible changes observed in recent years. (See p.95.)
Usually tribes are politically unified, consisting of communities which “are typically localized ‘subtribes’ of 100 to 150 families [...] with the head of the households claiming “descent from a common recognized ancestor without necessarily being closely related to each other.” (Tapper, 1989, p.242 and Tapper, 1984, p.259). However, having a central leader is not a prerequisite and was most frequently not the case in Pashtun traditional structures\(^8\), even when they formed larger regional confederations with neighbouring tribes (Tapper, 1983, p.9). These confederations are alliances of tribal groups which can encompass up to several millions of people. They are formed in order to pursue common interests and political purposes and sometimes they are based on alleged common descent (Tapper, 1990, p.68). The smallest organizational unit being the family, the traditional intra-tribal authority, was produced by a so-called jirga, an egalitarian forum in which “ideally all male members of a certain tribe find consensus about a certain conflict.”\(^9\) (Ruttig, 2010, p.2). (More information about jirgas can be found on p.44, the question about the (loss of) importance of jirgas over time will be discussed starting from p.98 and p.123.) The characteristics used to describe membership to a tribe or sub-tribe are manifold. Customarily the indigenous self-ascriptions encompass a wide range of exchangeable terms (for instance among the Durrani tribe of the Saripul), thereby causing an insufficient exactness which baffles anthropologists but which brings about “many advantages for the actors” (Tapper, 1991, p.46). These ambiguous, polysemic terms are not inevitably used as synonyms, even if they basically refer to the same group of people, but “often they describe nuances of social structure and/or organization” (Tapper, 1991, p.46). Nancy Tapper illustrates this by the examples of three different indigenous terms of the Durrani: aulad (Arabic: offspring of) and the suffix -zai (Pashto: offspring of) can be applied to a distinct group of agnatic descendants as well as to any other group, up to all mankind. Tayfa (Arabic: clan, tribe, family) can be used to attribute tribes or tribal divisions but can also be a categorization for sub-divisions “of any larger category of animate creatures such as insects or jinns” (Tapper, 1991, p.46). It comprises historic developments, accentuates a “particular location in time and space”, implies territoriality and interaction with other tayfa (Tapper, 1991, p.67).

---

\(^8\)The issue of when and where commanders (qumandán) assumed authority and how this took place will be discussed in part II of this paper, see also p.80.

\(^9\)Besides this egalitarian type of political and social organization in jirgas there were also "'democratic' villages with elected headmen and little or no influence of landlords and/or Khans" and "'autocratic' villages where the headman represented the landlord and/or Khan." (Janata, 1990, p.67).
Thirdly, *wolus* (Turkish: *ulus*: people, nation, tribe) is applied to indicate “the political nature of social groups at a variety of levels” and its basic idea is “that all its members should stand together in confrontations with outsiders” (Tapper, 1991, p.47 and p.51). The potency of a *wolus* is not only based on its size and capabilities as a fighting body but also on its proficiency to raise big amounts of money to bribe government agents, to pay for reparations for injuries or other disbursements\(^{10}\) (Tapper, 1991, p.51).

So what are in fact the social and cultural units in which Pashtun tribespeople coalesce and which factors account for their composition? Canfield described these units as “segmentary systems based on agnatic relationships” and as “nested systems of obligation based upon degree of relationship through male ancestors” implying that “the more closely related people are, the stronger their obligations to cooperate, help, avenge, and so forth.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.77). Constitutive conditions for social organization are also of material nature: the terrain with “its dramatic features, drastically affects spatial relations”\(^{11}\), climate and ecology “which influence the production systems” and the geographic location, determining geopolitical, strategic factors (Canfield, 1988b, p.83). Based on the topographic conditions many “rural populations are relatively inaccessible” and their “loyalties and interests remain local” (Canfield, 1988b, p.86).

Compared to other tribal groups in Afghanistan the Pashtuns had the most permeant and definitive system of segmentary lineage organization, being maintained “not only in written genealogies but also in the territorial framework of tribal distribution” (Tapper, 1983, p.43). One example for such a structure persisting for a long time are the Ghilzai (see p.24 and p.48). Each tribe of the Ghilzai was described by Anderson as “continuously segmented in localised patrilineages (*khel*), identified by forefathers whose patrilineal descendants constitute a *quwm*\(^{12}\). This latter term applies to any level of inclusion above the

---

\(^{10}\)The term is also used to describe governors who are called *woluswal* (Ruttig, 2010, p.8).

\(^{11}\)As Canfield put it only few “regions of the world are topographically more various and abrupt than Afghanistan”: with the Hindu Kush mountain range and its highest peaks well over 7000m also including “abrupt cliffs” and “alluvial plains of varying shapes and sizes” which are “well watered by the runoff from melting snow and ice” and are “suitable for settled human habitation” (Canfield, 1988b, p.85).

\(^{12}\)The term is derived from the Arabic *quwm* (nation, tribe, group, family, sect) and indicates a primordial unity as well as “mutual support of group members and the desirability of intermarriage between them” (Tapper, 1991, p.46 and Tapper, 1989, p.243). See also: (Anderson, 1983, p.126).

There is another Pashto word for sect (*mazhab*) and some authors have argued it “is the prior basis of identity” (Tapper, 1989, p.236). Yet it is used only in particular regions, mainly in the context of conflicts between Shiites and Sunnis.
household (*kor*) and combines kinship and ethnicity “into a single category of common patrilineal descent in contrast to all other relations” (Anderson, 1983, p.125, accentuation added). That means, *qaum* is a rather expandable term and can define any group of people, a family, a clan, a tribe or even a nation, yet it is always stressing the main focus on common descent (Rzehak, 2011, p.7). *Qaum* is a “highly ambiguous and flexible concept, allowing scope for strategic manipulations of identity” (Tapper, 1989, p.236). The term *qaum* “may sometimes be applied to persons not related by any semblance of patrilineality, implying, through the use of kinship idiom, [...] moral obligations as strong and enduring as the bonds of kinship” (Canfield, 1988a, p.187).

Interestingly enough, according to Jon W. Anderson, among Pashtuns the Ghilzai traditionally did not see tribe and state as opposing autonomous entities in their inter-relations or even as competing influences but rather perceived the state as acting only at the periphery of tribal life in the center\(^\text{13}\) (Anderson, 1983, p.121). More specifically they looked at state and tribe as being in a temporal and ephemeral relation, “in a continuous play of integration and disintegration”, perceiving opposition between the two mainly through the terms *hukumat* (the place where there are governors and governed) and *yaghistan*, “the lands of freedom or unrestraint [...] where no man is above another”, which reflects their more or less acephalous organizational structure (Anderson, 1983, p.125).

Eastern Pashtun tribes hold a similar view, calling their inaccessible and remote tribal areas *ghair ilaqa* or “area outside government control” and opposing it to *ilaqa sarkar*, the “government area” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.143). From this viewpoint the antipode to ‘tribe’ is the ‘city’ (*shahr*), where the *atrapi*\(^\text{14}\), an expression that is translated by Anderson as ‘country people’, are opposed to the “anonymous, urban (*shahri*) ways and people” (Anderson, 1983, p.126). For most Afghans their homeland (*watan*) is a very strong component contributing to identity. Yet *watan* “is ambiguous both as to place (village, valley, district, province, region, etc.).

\(^{13}\)Anderson describes this view as common among the Ghilzai whose home-territory (*wetan*) lies south of the Kabul river bordered by the Hazarajat and Kandahar and who are constituted by seven major tribes: Hotak, Tokhi, Nasir, Taraki, Kharoti, Suleyman Khel and Ahmadzai. Today the term ‘Ghilzai’ has more of a historical value: “Ghilzai rose to prominence in the eighteenth century when they overthrew the Safavid empire, but were subsequently eclipsed by Durrani Pashtuns”(Anderson, 1983, p.124). See also p.48. Since the time of Abdur Rahman Khan (1880 - 1901) the term Ghilzai is not really used anymore to define an identity and the confederation ceded to exist. Yet, the tribes and subtribes that constituted it still have the same names, they are thus identifiable as such and sometimes enormous in size (Anderson, 1975, p.596).

\(^{14}\)The term is borrowed from Arabic as well: *atraf* means *directions* and signifies that *atrapi* have space to move in all directions (Anderson, 1983, p.126).
nation) and time (place of origin, or of residence)\textsuperscript{15}, an ambiguity which allows for manipulations to adapt the identity according to personal or group interests (Tapper, 1989, p.236).

While \textit{qabail} and \textit{atrapi} are the conventional denominations for \textit{tribesmen}, the word \textit{quomi} stands for fellow-tribesman. It comprises the notion of shared patrilineal descent and of “homogeneous unity […] continuously subdivided through time into replicas of itself” (Anderson, 1983, p.126). Yet again things are a little bit more complicated than this description might lead to believe: most settled groups accept the existence of designated rights of individuals to territory, which leads to jealousy, rivalry and competition to bordering land holders, be it brothers, camps, lineages or tribes (Tapper, 1983, p.49), to the rivalries of paternal cousins (\textit{taburwali}, also \textit{tarboorwali}).\textsuperscript{15} These rivalries may “involve such intangibles as leadership but are commonly property disputes” over “unresolved issues of succession to indivisibles formerly belonging to the common grandfather or other ancestor” (Anderson, 1975, p.588). This frequently results in “a short raid, usually at sunrise or sunset, culminating in the capture of the village or booty like cattle.” (Yapp, 1983, p.197). Yapp describes the glory of taking part in such a venture as the main motivation for the fighters who are not themselves concerned with the underlying struggle. He attributes these raids a “blitzkrieg nature” followed by a swift disintegration of the war party (\textit{lashkar}, also: militia) due to the fact that Pashtun warriors would “simply pack up and leave after a hard day’s fighting, without co-ordination with or command from the lashkar.” (Yapp, 1983, p.197). Furthermore, tribal wars are ‘seasonal’, which means that they are linked to “the pattern of crops and cultivation” causing campaigns to be mainly “fought before or after the harvest” as “many a leader has discovered to his dismay that his followers have melted away at the climax of a battle if the current crop has to be harvested.” (Ahmed, 1983b, p.198). These agnatic rivalries are therefore circumventing the development of dynasties, creating profound factionalism even when confronted with an outside threat, and as Tapper lines out, defying segmentary ideology (Tapper, 1983, p.49). Barth has related this agnatic rivalries to the cycles of redistribution of land (\textit{wesh}, see also p.38) and Ahmed stated in this context that conflict between “male siblings and cousins is a common Islamic phenomenon

\textsuperscript{15}The \textit{tarboorwali} is a significant feature of Pashtun tribal and social structuring: the “patrilateral parallel cousin is uniquely separated from all other cousins and siblings” in terminology by the word \textit{tarbooran}, which implies enmity or at least “unfriendly relations” (Barth 1969b, p.11 in Ahmed, 1980a, p.44).
based on agnatic jealousy and rivalry for inheritance” (Ahmed, 1980a, p.43). Compared to other Islamic tribal and lineage based groups Pashtuns tended to use marriage between “close agnatic collaterals” as a means of avoiding “conflict between agnatic cousins” much less often, because, as Pathan chiefs would explain to Barth, “it is never very successful.” (Barth, 1959a, p.40). They considered it more useful to use the marriage of their sisters and daughters to strengthen their ties with groups which pursue congruent political goals and who would in turn support them “in the inevitable conflicts with close agnates” (Barth, 1959a, p.40). In more general terms it could be said that “political power and demography interact in a close fashion” (Salzman, 2004, p.121). Or as Nancy Tapper has put it: “[. . . ] an ambitious household must, in making marriages, maintain a calculated balance between extending its reach of affinal ties as widely as possible and consolidating its existing agnic and affinal links by further marriages” (Tapper, 1991, p.51). As far as terminology is concerned, marriage provides the opportunity for different groups such as tayfa to coalesce “separate kin groups for reasons of political expediency” and become qaum “while retaining their separate membership of different named tribal divisions” (Tapper, 1991, p.50). Among Durrani Pashtuns exchange marriages are used to acknowledge the identity of the groups involved as in fact Durrani, thus “it authenticates male claims to identity”16 (Tapper, 1989, p.242). Since I will not go into great detail about the highly complex variations, indications and levels of interaction included in marriage such as forming social relations, I want to refer to Nancy Tapper’s extraordinary in-depth analysis of marriage, keeping her final conclusion in mind that “any discussion of marriage based on classification into particular modes (such as bride-price marriage or direct exchange) or in terms of ties it creates within or between groups [. . . ] is bound to be simplistic” (Tapper, 1991, p.278). In order to offer meaningful analysis of marriage one has to take into account the specific social, cultural, economic and political implications which can vary greatly from one case to another and which occur in countless combinations.

Another aspect of tribal organizational patterns should be mentioned: Pashtun tribes, tending to designate territorial rights to greater groups, are seen by Tapper to be more inclined to partake on larger scale political endeavors facing and confronting outsiders (Tapper, 1983, p.49). Caused by the non-appearance

16There are some Pashto-speaking tribal groups which mainly follow Durrani customs, yet they are considered to be “fakes” by the Durrani, since they “are said to give daughters even to Shi’ites” (Tapper, 1984, p.258).
of a prevailing political authority also those groups tend to “maintain relations of hostility” with their neighbors and align themselves with “their neighbours’ neighbour, forming a larger pattern of two coalitions or blocs throughout or even beyond the region.” (Tapper, 1983, p.49). This pattern can be imagined like the one of a chess board with neighboring opposing factions which associate themselves with allies, following the idea that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ (Ahmed, 1980a, p.40f). The systems of bloc-opposition regularly occurred between small, closely related segments of a bigger descent group, especially in Swat (Pakistan) and among Pashtuns in southern Afghanistan (Ahmed, 1980a, p.41). It can be said that “disputes between closely related household heads are the principle cause of divisions within a local descent group” (Tapper, 1991, p.48). These conflicts between neighbors are reinforced by the periodic process of redistribution of land (wesh, see also p.38). Sometimes though whole groups might defect such an affiliation and join the opposing party, thus causing imbalances within this system (Tapper, 1983, p.49). This illustrates that the formation of these non-permanent alliances does not follow a solid “pattern along pre-determined segmentary lineages” but that they are created supplementary to “the segmentary alignment and may cut across the segmentary structure.” (Ahmed, 1980a, p.41).

There has been quite some criticism within anthropology concerning the segmentary theory, classifying the organization of social groups into segments, originally voiced for example by Clifford and Hildred Geertz, Dale Eickelman and Lawrence Rosen (Ahmed und Hart, 1984, p.3). The main critiques, partly substantiated through examples about the fluidity in formation of alliances on the last pages, are that the “segments are neither balanced nor is there equality between the segments; on the contrary, there is disparity in political resources, which is exacerbated with the emergence of lineages claiming seniority” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.145). In addition, groups do not necessarily constitute themselves along a segmentary pattern in cases of political crises (Ahmed, 1983a, p.145). Nevertheless, a comprehensive alternative to the segmentary theory, bearing its explanatory utility has not yet been put forward - especially when dealing with egalitarian, acephalous societies (Ahmed, 1983a, p.145).
2.1.1 Islam in Pashtun tribal society

As announced earlier in this paper, I want to provide some context concerning the interplay between Islam and Pashtun tribal society. As I will point out also in the following chapters, Pashtuns are and consciously perceive themselves as Muslims of the very first hour and take pride in having embraced Islam when most Arabs were still fighting Islam (see also p.49). Pashtuns follow the Hanafi school of Sunnism, as do 90% of Afghans. It is the “most liberal of the four Sunni schools of thought” (Ahmed, 2000, p.83). The other 10% are made up by Shiite Hazara, Farsiwan and Qizilbash as well as little bit more than 10.000 Ismailis (Janata, 1990, p.65). The Pashtuns claim that Qais Abdurrashid, the apical forefather of all Pashtuns, received Islam directly from the Prophet Mohammed and was one of his first converts (Glatzer, 2000, p.100 and Tapper, 1989, p.241). Pashtuns accept the Sharia besides their customary legal system though in the past an inclination to preferably use traditional tribal law (which is transmitted orally) was a rather widespread phenomenon (Rzehak, 2011, p.16f). On the national level and in urban centers “Sharia law governed the legal process until 1925” (Ahmed, 2000, p.83). Pashtuns consider their traditional ways to be their expression of Islam and do not see the two as contradictory - even as other Muslims may not agree to this perspective (Glatzer, 1998, p.92). “To the tribesman, Islam provides specific political and socioreligious formations within which” his Pashtun identity operates (Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). The basic values of the Pashtuns such as honor and shame (see chapter 2.2.2) do not contradict Islam, Pashtun tribesmen perceive them as “in harmony”, “as a logical construct” and therefore do not dichotomize them (Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). Yet traditional tribal values set some other priorities: in Islam a battle is to be waged only on the basis of religion and should not serve the glory of an individual whereas among Pashtuns the latter is a desired implication (Glatzer, 2000, p.100). Other discrepancies, such as not allowing inheritance or property to women and taking interest for loans, are admitted frankly and accounted for as Pashtun “riwaj (custom) as if by such an explanation the guilt would be extenuated or even exculpated.” (Ahmed, 1984, p.312). This attitude somewhat reflects the idea of many Pashtuns to be Allah’s favorite

---

17 Folklore has it, that Qais Abdurrashid (Abd al-Rashid) came from Ghur in central Afghanistan and went to Medina, where he met one of the Prophet Mohammed’s generals, Khalid ibn al-Walid, whose daughter he married after joining the new faith of Islam in a meeting with the Prophet (Hart, 2001, p.153).

18 Arab mercenaries criticizing the religious practice among Pashtuns has resulted in bloody conflict more than once (Glatzer, 2000, p.100).
and such minor transgressions could not impair their “Muslimness” in the least (Ahmed, 1984, p.313). This “complete confidence in” their own “Muslimness” combined with a “sociologically all-pervasive” brand of Islam “constrains the role of religious groups” (Ahmed, 1984, p.313). In addition, it rationalizes the perpetuity of Pashtun traditions containing non-Islamic components. Besides the Pashtun’s pervading belief in the five foremost pillars of Islam (accepting God and his Prophet, praying, fasting, to pilgrimage, and to support the poor) Pashtuns “attach great importance to” jihad “for it emphasizes their martial tribal tradition and expresses their enthusiasm for Islam.” (Ahmed, 1984, p.314).

Islamic symbols are omnipresent in Pashtun tribal societies. Yet “their religious meaning in the ecclesiastical sense may not appear relevant or even comprehensible” to tribesmen (Ahmed, 1984, p.311). The “social significance” of these symbols “is established by frequent recurrence.” (Ahmed, 1984, p.311). The use of religious symbols thereby frequently aims at increasing one’s social prestige.

Among Durrani Pashtuns the “practice of orthodox Islam is dominated by the” politically and economically “successful and the privileged” (Tapper, 1984, p.262). Their religious gatherings proceed relatively sober, “extreme emotion or ecstasy are never displayed”, women “have no part in mosque-centered rituals and must pray at home” (Tapper, 1984, p.260f). The Islamic practice of Durrani Pashtuns achieves “both to declare the theory of equality” of all Durrani Pashtuns “and to stress the reality on inequality” (Tapper, 1984, p.262). The economically and politically less successful Durrani “pursue ecstatic experiences associated with Sufism, shrines and spirit possession.” (Tapper, 1984, p.262). Especially in tribal conflicts the opponents would accuse each other of not truly following Islam. Particularly rivalries for resources are oftentimes expressed in the assertion of religious superiority, “whether in terms of religiosity or of orthodoxy” (Tapper, 1984, p.263).

Going on I will follow Ahmed’s argumentation that Islam and segmentary Pashtun tribal identity “coalesce and overlap” and present some more detailed information in this respect in parts II and III of this paper (Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). It has to be noted though, that some authors perceive bigger tensions between the Pashtunwali and Islamic law, the Sharia (Caron, 2007, p.319). Nazif Shahrani in a 2005 publication (see references) and Caron in his paper of 2007 argue that “tribes feared that rigorous Islamic law […] would interfere with their tribal practice” (Caron, 2007, p.319). Even though these authors do make some valid points in this respect I disagree with the stated premise. In my view
the tribes rather feared the exertion of government control disguised in Islamic terms (see also Edwards description of Abdur Rahman Khan’s prescriptions for the accurate practice of religion (Edwards, 1996, p.83)). As shown on the previous pages I rather adhere to the explanation that Pashtuns exhibit great flexibility to maneuver (and the ability to rationalize) potential contradictions between scholarly Islam and traditional tribal values.

Muslim societies exhibit a strong understanding of community, ummah, “which transcends national and tribal boundaries” and “dominates Muslim political thinking in cycles every few decades” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.149). The pervasion of Islamic symbols in Muslim societies in general and in Pashtun tribal societies in specific manifests itself in the frequent invocation of religious rationales by tribesmen on a great variety of occasions, or as Ahmed has put it: “The strength and ubiquity of Islamic symbols in Muslim society cannot be challenged.” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.141). What can be and is contested though are the way these symbols are used and the implicit assertion of theological validity.

There is no central religious authority in sunni Islam and there are also different ways by which religious leadership expresses itself (Janata, 1990, p.65). Generally speaking there are three main categories: the first category called ulama, characterized by legal and religious learnedness, usually educated in a madrasa, represents an “orthodox, bureaucratic, formal, and legalistic tradition in Islam” comprises maulana, maulvi, qazi and mufti; the second is constituted by mystic or unorthodox circles of Sufis, mainly present in “rural areas” and “shunning worldly pursuits”, and thirdly there are religious leaders who claim their status based on “religious genealogy and descent” which includes the titles of pir, shaykh, or rahani, “sharif or sayyid (descended from the Prophet) and mian (descended from holy men)” and who “command a vague and generalized respect, especially if they live up to idealized behavior, which is pacific, dignified and neutral between warring groups and clans.” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.92f, accentuation added; Canfield, 1988, p.81 and p.90, Lindholm, 1986, p.4). Members of the first two categories are entitled according to a social function whereas the third is defined by their holy ancestry (Ahmed, 1983a, p.92, Lindholm, 1986, p.4). The mullah on the contrary is not easy to place in this taxonomy, mostly due “to the ambiguity and elasticity surrounding his social role.” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.93). Most Pashtun villages have their own mullah, and usually they create their social function in combining different aspects of the aforementioned three categories. Yet, the term mullah (at least in the Afghan context) does not necessarily entail a higher status: a mullah holds a “junior position in the religious
hierarchy” and is seen to be “a lesser member of the religious classes” (Algar, 1969, p.264 in Ahmed, 1983a, p.93). Janata would even say that the mullah “is virtually a servant, and his social status is not much higher than that of the village barber.” (Janata, 1990, p.66).

The mullah customarily restrains his activities “to the village level of social and political life”, still he may try to expand his influence into the realm of politics under certain circumstances and “appears to thrive in crisis” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.93f). This might be caused by the appeal of the original, and for Muslims maybe the most authentic, model of societal organization in which a caliph unites “the functions of tribal elder, government spokesman, and religious leader”, addressing worldly issues as well as such of faith (Ahmed, 1983a, p.149).

Ahmed claims that among eastern Pashtuns a mullah “remains subordinate to the lineage elders” who “see political activity as their preserve and restrict the role of the [...] mullah to specific religious functions” such as “to organize and supervise the local mosque and the rites de passage based on Islamic tradition.” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.94). Yet it has happened that mullahs would, “on a weak theological but strong sociological base”, call for jihad against tribal leaders (Ahmed, 1983a, p.98). Commonly though, Muslims leaders had “no coercive power of their own to wield” and they “had to rely on their charisma and powers of persuasion to [...] ingratiate themselves with” political leaders (Edwards, 2002, p.173). Routinely mullahs were paid by local leaders or the government in order to demonstrate loyalty and to help in mobilizing warriors for the Islamic cause (Canfield, 1988b, p.93). In times of internal struggle and factionalism tribal leaders used “their” mullahs “to help calm the storm of discontent” and “redirect it against” another tribe, the government, ethnic minorities, the British or Pakistan (Edwards, 2002, p.173). Even though in a strict interpretation jihad can not be waged against other Muslims the term might be employed by each of the opposing parties, for instance in inter-sectarian struggles, and can easily be invoked by simply declaring the opponent takfir and kafir (unbeliever, infidel) or even shaitan (satan) (Ahmed, 1983a, p.6, p.8, p.98, p.140f). This happened quite often over the centuries, even before and during the foundation of the state and continued up until today (Canfield, 1973, p.1521). According to records the described allocation of roles between mullahs and tribal elders was prevalent at least up to the end of the twentieth century (compare a large number of sources cited in (Ahmed, 1983a, p.94)) - whether the social functions and roles are still distributed in this fashion today will be discussed in chapter 4.1 and chapter 5.1.
2.2 Pashtun Identities, Ideals and the Pashtunwali

2.2.1 Pashtun Identities

Here again I want to start the chapter by explaining a general approach to the analysis and description of Pashtun identities before going into detail. First it is important to question and clarify the use of ‘Pashtun’ as an ethnonym. As already mentioned in this paper I want to caution against understanding such an ascription as static or homogeneous, meaning that the ascription of being Pashtun would hold “the same meaning wherever it is used”, and that it “represents a ‘real’ unity of origins and culture.” (Tapper, 1988, p.24). Even though it seems to be common wisdom today that there are profound tribal divisions among Pashtuns there appears to be a tendency to impute deeply ingrained characteristics to such an identity. Going on, I intend to shed some light on diversity, distinctiveness and similarities in various Pashtun identities who, nevertheless, share “the same range of diverse forms” in their political traditions, “the same forms of economic livelihood, religious beliefs and ethos” in most of ‘Pashtun country’ (Edwards, 1998, p.712). Noticeably, Pashtun identities and tribal systems have successfully transcended and integrated “the stereotypical divisions of society, nomad versus sedentary, urban versus rural” as, in general, Pashtuns consciously stay Pashtuns “whether nomad or sedentary, urban or rural” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.143). In general it is important to remember that “identities, whether ‘ethnic’ or otherwise, make sense only in social contexts, and they are essentially negotiable subjects of strategic manipulations” because social actors “present their selves, in different ways in different contexts” - depending “particularly on power relations, on the policies of the state and on local hierarchies.” (Tapper, 1988, p.29).

A discussion of the Pashtunwali, the “code of the Pukhtuns” which describes the ideal Pashtun behavior, and a consideration of its significance today will follow the deliberations mentioned above (Ahmed, 1983a, p.24). In this chapter I will mainly focus on anthropologic research from recent decades, depicting different traditional Pashtun identities as researchers described them before the possible changes I want to examine might have taken place. This will provide for a more thorough understanding upon which later events can be interpreted and will be analyzed.

19 Besides the typical nomadic livelihood, quite some nomadic tribes were also active in trading and were “everyday conductors of the commercial relationships” along the Silk Road and especially between the economic centers of Kandahar, Kabul and Peshawar (Hanifi, 2008, p.16).
At least since the middle of the eighteenth century the idea of ethnic unity among all Pashtuns has been used to attempt political unity. The proclaimed oneness included the realms of “religion, genealogy, language, custom, especially features like Pashtunwali, jirga, seclusion”\textsuperscript{20} and was a frequent topos, even when at the same time the Pashtun “tribes were predominantly characterized by endemic inter-tribal hostilities and by diffuse political organisation” (Tapper, 1983, p.43). Later on, in the nineteenth century three main forms of socio-political organization could be found among Pashtuns: first the autonomous, egalitarian communal social groups living in fairly isolated mountain valleys with scarce opportunities to pursue an agricultural and pastoralist livelihood. Likely there were recurrent shortfalls of provisions which were compensated for “by trading or raiding or long-distance labour-migration” (Tapper, 1983, p.43). The second main form could be found in similarly remote areas but living in richer environmental circumstances; fertile valleys with sufficient water supply that allowed to produce large surpluses through agricultural cultivation. There Pashtuns manifested social stratification, customarily “with a leisureed class of martial Pakhtuns owning the land and dependant groups working it” (Tapper, 1983, p.44). One of the most famous examples for this structure might be the Yusufzai of Swat, described by Frederik Barth (see Barth, 1959a). The third form was found predominantly in territories closer to urban centers or at least susceptible to the influence of centralized rule administrated from these centers. When farming allowed for moderate surpluses, the authority of the state produced a feudalistic form of stratification “involving a chiefly class with limited powers, a broad mass of tribespeople, and a sizeable substratum of dependants”\textsuperscript{21} (Tapper, 1983, p.44 and Ahmed, 1983, p.196). For example, Pashtuns in Kandahar Province, the Durrani as well as the Ghilzai, are structured in a more hierarchical way than the eastern Pashtuns. “Already during the 18th century a small landowning aristocracy had emerged within each tribe, which managed to seize the economic resources and control local decision-making processes, while ordinary tribesmen often ended up as their clients (\textit{hamsayagan})” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.141). Therefore, the tribal cohesion was not only based on a shared tribal identity, “but also on the access to economic resources, patronage and protec-

\textsuperscript{20} Seclusion is called \textit{parda} in Pashto (Glatzer, 1998, p.87).

\textsuperscript{21} Katkov differentiated organizational forms of Pashtun tribes between \textit{qawmi, rubbavi} and \textit{kuchi}. The first being egalitarian, there are leaders but they do not have real power and have to rely on a \textit{jirga} (see also p.44). The second being hierarchical “with a tendency towards feudalisation and usurpation of the power of the tribesmen by leaders” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.35). The third being “nomadic and very egalitarian” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.35).
tion” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.140).

For a big majority of Pashtuns “the defining criteria” of their identity “are not language or religion, which one can change, but recognized descent from the ancestor of all Pashtuns and the practice of endogamy.”22 (Tapper, 1989, p.238). One of the foremost attributes of Pashtun values has its foundation in giving predominant significance to the autonomy of male actors. This autonomy is to be understood as a sort of self-determination which manifests itself politically through “one’s escape from influence and vulnerability through kin relations.” (Barth, 1998, p.132)23. The reason for the importance “of autonomy and independence that we find as central features” among groups who “are organized in a decentralized, segmentary fashion” is the fact that “governance and security” are “in the hands of each and all” which “both requires and guarantees a wide range of individual agency” (Salzman, 2004, p.125). During the time of Pashtun dynastic rule (see also p.50) the urban elites and middle classes who were exposed to central control through their geographical proximity to power centers could not “exhibit the autonomy and independence that their identity and position demand.” (Barth, 1998, p.129). Being unable to consummate this important component of Pashtun identity they “have shown a strong tendency to Persianization in speech and culture, representing [. . .] a sophisticate’s escape” (Barth, 1998, p.129). Durrani Pashtuns24 who dominated “political and administrative life” over the centuries claimed “a position of social superiority to members of all other ethnic groups except Sayyids” - a superiority that even “the poorest nomad or peasant is able to maintain, at least in the eyes of fellow-Durrani” (Tapper, 1984, p.257).

Before moving on to discuss Pashtun identities more thoroughly I want to address the aforementioned statistical variations concerning cases of Baluch claiming they were indeed Pashtuns in this context (see p.15). As described before, some former Pashtuns who switched their identity to Baluch would still claim being Pashtun under certain circumstances. These cases are to be found among the serfs of some Baluch tribes who abandoned their Pashtun identity because

22 For information about the ‘common forefather’ of all Pashtuns see also p.28 and p.38. Anderson argued that one reason for this endogamy, besides the obvious also described in this paper, is that “outsiders introduce complications by their own individual extra-community ties” and that Pashtuns “abhor pluralism in inverse proportion to social distance” (Anderson, 1975, p.591).

23 Ahmed accused Barth of overrating the importance of autonomy, but the latter’s standpoint was corroborated by many writers. In return Ahmed has been criticized to overvalue “Islamic unity and mechanisms of social control” (Lindholm, 1980, p.350).

24 See also p.19 and p.50 for explanation.
they could not succeed to live Pashtun ideals such as autonomy and uphold their status as free men while being subordinates to Baluchs. For this reason the trading of identities is more convenient and provides for more favorable conditions than the costs of a failure to perform as a Pashtun would imply: it would entail, at the least, ridicule and disrepute among other Pashtuns and function as a constant reminder of utter failure (Barth, 1998, p.132f). Nevertheless, their original identity is sometimes invigorated by their Baluch masters as “a kind of shame identity: the Baluch patrons enjoy the triumph of having Pathan serfs” in which case the serfs have to admit their true origin, yet the Baluch are not denying the restraint that “the ‘Pathan’ serfs do not have access to Pathan fora and would not have their identity confirmed by Pathans.” (Barth, 1998, p.133). This process is not only interesting as a special case or exception, but it also shows that the Pashtun identity maintains its character because a large number of actors alters their ethnic label due to a failure to perform as Pashtuns (measured by Pashtun standards), and only seldom they keep the Pashtun label under such disadvantageous circumstances (Barth, 1998, p.134).

2.2.2 The Pashtunwali as an idealized code of conduct among Pashtuns

The Pashtunwali is often cited as the longstanding traditional code of conduct, the ideal honorable Pashtun behavior, regulating social interactions and setting standards for various aspects of life. The act of doing Pashtu as opposed to only speaking Pashto “is what constitutes the core of the” Pashtunwali (Hart, 2001, p.156). The Pashtunwali has been held sacred and transmitted orally for centuries, thus representing an ethnic self-portrait. Since the 1950’s Afghan writers and poets who were searching for “guiding principles for a modern Afghan nation” produced written accounts of the Pashtunwali (Rzehak, 2011, p.1). In modern publications Pashtunwali is commonly described in connection with the prevailing war. There are some older written sources in which first attempts to determine standards of Pashtun behavior can be found. One of them was written in 1815 by Mountstuart Elphinstone, a writer, researcher and officer for the East India Company, who, in his

somewhat sympathetic depiction, painted an idealized picture of Pashtuns, comparing them “with Scottish clans and with Greek-Roman republicans” (Glatzer, 1998, p.85).

Another, even earlier account was written by the “Pashtun poet Khushhal Khan Khattak (1613-1689) […] in Pashto prose” which listed “twenty abilities (hanaruna) and twenty virtues (khislatuna) which a Pashtun man must own to become worthy to wear a turban” (Rzehak, 2011, p.3f). Among these values are bravery, respect for the elders, consultation, ambitiousness and modesty, among the abilities are hunting, playing chess, poetry, making music and painting (Rzehak, 2011, p.4).

It is important to understand that the virtues and standards depict an ideal and might not inevitably coincide with actual behavior, or correspond with Western interpretations of the terms (Rzehak, 2011, p.3). At this point it is also of avail to remember Barth’s statements on groups maintaining their boundaries through the promotion of conformity and about how group members constantly reaffirm their membership by acting in terms of common values and standards (see also p.17). There are different interpretations concerning the extent of variation in Pashtunwali from one tribe to another, one obvious variation being the amount of blood money which has to be paid for certain offenses. Yet this does not necessarily imply structural differences (Rzehak, 2011, p.2). The Pashtunwali is an ethnocentric concept and encompasses tribal law, code of honor and, in a broader sense, the whole range of customs and traditions (Glatzer, 2000, p.94).

However, not all Pashtuns are familiar with the word Pashtunwali or the idea that there is a system of values and standards which profoundly differentiates them from others (Glatzer, 2000, p.93). Bernt Glatzer argues that it is less well known in the west and northwest of Afghanistan, even among Durrani who speak exceptionally “pure” form of Pashto (Glatzer, 2000, p.93). Nevertheless at least two different Pashtun tribes not knowing about the Pashtunwali would express the same values and standards enshrined in this code when asked about what it means to be Pashtun (Glatzer, 2000, p.93). Amongst other things (like faith in Islam and commitment to “the tribal spirit”), the central concept

---

26 See also: Mountstuart Elphinstone: “An Account Of The Kingdom Of Caubul, And Its Dependencies In Persia, Tartary, And India.” (Munshiram Manoharal Publishers, New Delhi, 1998, originally published in 1815.)

27 Khushhal Khan Khattak’s writings are also the oldest discoveries of textualized Pashto language (Hanifi, 2008, p.11).
and term of *gheyratman*\textsuperscript{28}, which unites all noble and honorable attributes of a Pashtun was of great importance also to these tribes (Glatzer, 2000, p.93). Traditionally the ideals of the Pashtunwali were reproduced through story-telling in which archetypal, heroic role models personify these ideals, through play-fights between fathers and their three to ten year old sons, through encouraging play-fights among young boys and through the presence of kids in *jirgas*, where the portrayal of such ideals was particularly important (Glatzer, 2000, p.97).

The basic values perpetuated through these norms (such as honor, shame, pride, masculinity, battle and war) are rooted in and pervade the genealogical organization which structures thousands of patrilineal descendant groups, all of whom invoke the origin from one single forefather (Glatzer, 2000, p.94). The central concepts comprise *nang*\textsuperscript{29} (honor, dignity, bravery, audacity), *tora* or *turá* (courage) and *sharm* (shame, disgrace) - also meaning that a *nangalai* brings fame and glory to his tribe and someone called a *benanga*, which means ‘dishonorable’ and is of course a serious insult, loses his social status and can only restore *nang* through the death of the offender, revenge which is considered adequately reciprocal or the public humiliation of the offender (Glatzer, 2000, p.94, p.98). Rzehak brings forward the argument that such honor based cultures commonly have their basis in nomadic peoples “who have no recourse to law enforcement or government when they traverse geographically remote areas in search of pastures, carry their most valuable property with them, risk having it stolen […]”\textsuperscript{30} (Rzehak, 2011, p.5). He substantiates this claim by explaining that to nomads private land ownership was alien, and that, to the contrary, nomadic groups claimed communal traditional rights to use (as opposed to possess) a certain pasture for a particular time of the year. Therefore it was necessary to redistribute the land within the groups according to certain rules. Rzehak’s statement implies that Pashtuns conserved this practice for a longer period of time also in settled groups. “No particular household had an

---


\textsuperscript{29} The Pashtunwali reflects two different kinds “of socio-economic organisational settings […]: the *qalang* group amongst sedentary tribes where large, irrigated private landholdings exist and which, as a result, is socially stronger stratified” (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). *Qalang* is the word for the rent or tax paid to the landowner. The relationship between client and patron is one of mutual obligations. And “the *nang* group amongst pastoral hill Pashtuns which are socially more egalitarian” (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). A Pashtun proverb says: “Honour (*nang*) ate up the mountains; taxes (*qalang*) ate up the plains” (Goodhand, 2005, p.196).

\textsuperscript{30} I am not entirely convinced whether this is a claim which can be validated by anthropologic data, nevertheless Rzehak’s further reasoning seems somewhat plausible.
individual claim to a particular parcel of land” (Ahmed, 1980a, p.36f). They would rather be redistributed annually, sometimes also in cycles of several years, in the aforementioned process called *wesh* (Ahmed, 1980a, p.36f). *Wesh* amplifies the rivalries between land “owning” neighbors also because the “traditional re-allotments followed the segmentary scheme of unilineal descent”, thus exacerbating rivalries between collateral agnates, specifically the *tarboorwali* (see also p.25) (Barth, 1959b, p.108).

This procedure could be based on different kinds of reasoning: the allocation of land could be accounted for by the number of members of a given household, by “the military strength of a household [. . .], or according to genealogical links” (Rzehak, 2011, p.6). This practice was upheld until the end of the nineteenth century, in some parts of the country until the middle of the twentieth century and is seen by Rzehak as a cause for private ownership of land still being heavily restricted and organized through patrilineal descent groups (Rzehak, 2011, p.6). His argument seems to be that processes like this redistribution were important in shaping the concept of ideal behavior and a code of honor, so that members of a group would merit participation. Since they are organized in patrilineal descent groups, honor or *nang* is also of great importance in Pashtun tribal groups when it comes to genealogy. An individual can only find enduring security and help within the lineage or the tribe, which is why a life “outside the tribal structure is almost unimaginable because a person without a genealogical tree is a person without a descent group, and [. . .] without allies or supporter” (Rzehak, 2011, p.9). As an ideal concept a Pashtun should be able to name all his forefathers back to “Qais Abdurrashid, the common ancestor of all Pashtuns”\(^\text{31}\), usually though a Pashtun knows his ancestors “for about seven or eight generations as a minimum” and turns to the knowledge of elder men when deeper genealogical knowledge is required (Rzehak, 2011, p.8). Traditionally, Pashtuns would review their genealogical background in a first encounter. Finding common ancestors would then turn their relation into one of reciprocal obligation and assistance (Rzehak, 2011, p.9). If fitting the purpose of the concrete actors, a common ancestor can also be invented or denied. However, Nancy Tapper described some divergence to this behavior among Durrani tribes: only a few people in each subtribe would carry knowledge of “pedigrees and skeleton genealogies extending some six to ten generations back”, and “normally there is

\(^{31}\) The belief in a common ancestor is generally shared among Pashtuns though not all of them know his (alleged) name, some also know him under the name of Khaled Baba or Daru Nika or some other names (Glatzer, 1983, p.220).
little call for this kind of information and little interest in it” with most individuals conscious about their genealogical tree only “two or three generations back” (Tapper, 1991, p.45). The “descent ideology” has more importance for them in the classification of their own ethnic group and the political alliances they forge. The fact that it is not so important on a lower level of organization might be caused by the scattering of Durrani groups “and their mobility throughout the country” (Tapper, 1991, p.46).

Pashtunwali also defines the position of a woman through patrilineal descent and differentiates clearly whether a relationship is based on descent or on marriage. Among other things women are excluded from the apportionment of inheritance, which is why many Pashtuns prefer to marry within the patrilineage, usually producing arranged cross-cousin marriages (Rzehak, 2011, p.10). A woman remains in their father’s descent group after marrying, yet without retaining any “legal rights in her natal family”, even though “authority over her is transferred from her father (or guardian) to her husband.” (Barth, 1959a, p.39). When a woman’s honor is impaired “both her husband and her blood relatives can take vengeance” (Rzehak, 2011, p.11). About 80% of all marriages among Durrani are bride-price marriages, implying that the wife-taker holds a stronger position than the wife-giver, reinforced by virilocality and the practical absence of divorce. In order to resolve this contradiction to the basic notion of equality among Pashtuns the agnates of the wife have the right “to repossess her body for burial” which is at first enigmatic since “there are no compelling affective or religious reasons why a woman should be buried beside her own agnates rather than with her children” (Tapper, 1991, p.53). Usually, when a wife dies she is “buried in the section of the village cemetery used by her husband’s patriline”, but actual local customs are quite diverse (Barth, 1959a, p.39). Yet to transfer a woman’s remains to her natal origins is a generally acknowledged reverence to her descent group and can best be “understood as the final ritual episode of marriage” (Tapper, 1991, p.53).

Further central terms of Pashtunwali terms sharm (shame) and tor (which in a literal translation means black and is also used as invisible or to describe women) are mainly connected to the control of women through men and the maintenance of female honor. Concerning women, a Pashtun man sees himself responsible for the honor of his “wife or wives, daughters, and his unmarried or widowed sisters”, but sometimes namus, the defense of female honor, can encompass all female associates of a household (Rzehak, 2011, p.9). The protection and strict control of women (namus, which can also be equated with homeland)
is justified through the allegation that women are generally unreasonable and prone to a lack of self-control, especially with regard to sexual activity (Glatzer, 2000, p.95). Glatzer asserts that the fear of a bad reputation and gossip among fellow tribesmen and neighbors surmount the fear of actual inaccurate demeanor of women. Hiding and corraling them helps to avoid such chatter in the first place (Glatzer, 2000, p.95). This is also backed up by Rzehak who states that for Pashtuns a person’s demeanor “is honourable or shameful when it is honourable or shameful in the eyes of other people” and that “seclusion is seen as the best way to defend a female’s reputation” since a “female who is almost invisible to the eyes of other people cannot disgrace herself in the eyes of other people.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.9f). As a consequence the guiding principle of any behavior is the question how it might be judged by others. If a woman has not been faithful, her husband feels obligated to reconstitute his honor through instantly killing her and her paramour. Divorces almost never occur and are rejected, but in the rare cases that they come about, it is due to the husband not being able to kill his adulterous wife and her lover, “but that doesn’t free him from his shame” and is “an admission that he wasn’t man (nur) enough” (Tapper, 1991, p.214). Occasionally infidelity and other misdemeanor can be hushed up to avoid blood feuds, following the maxim “that ‘a shame is not a shame as long as nobody is aware of it’.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.10).

Among Durrani Pashtuns for instance, men and women agree on the inferiority of women, seeing them as imperfect and foolish, and their “supposed helplessness and fearful attitude to life are explicitly thought to be disabling, while their bodily functions make them unclean.” (Tapper, 1991, p.52). According to Nancy Tapper these views are based “almost entirely on religious grounds” and, through perpetuating the idea of a demonic potential and ungodly nature of women, also provide the head of the household (mashar) with the “literal powers of life and death […] over the women of that household as well as to debar women from all formal control of produce and capital goods” (Tapper, 1991, p.52). Yet there is also another aspect to the control of women and the interdependence of this control with shame and honor: namely the knowledge of women about their capacity “not merely to put pressure on their menfolk but actually to ‘ruin’ them” through subversive actions like purposefully behaving in “dishonoring” ways which bring shame upon the household (Pitt-Rivers, 1977, p.80 in Tapper, 1991, p.23). These subversive acts can encompass flirting, adultery or general disrespect for the male head of the household. This usually only happens when women consider a man to be weak in character or of poor
social and economic influence (Tapper, 1991, p.24f).

A household usually does have a female head too (generally the spouse of the male head) who is in authority to organize internal labour division among the women of the household and who “may even participate with the men in discussions of more far-reaching decisions about economic and political activities.” (Tapper, 1991, p.212). Within the “nuclear family, men and women confront one another in a continuous struggle for dominance” (Lindholm, 1981, p.148). Newly wedded wives try to maintain their lineage honor by gaining control in the new household, the husbands “task is to subdue the wife, of failing that, to humiliate her” through taking a second wife and “thereby shaming the first and all her lineage”32 (Lindholm, 1981, p.148). The husbands “are permitted and encouraged to beat their wives regularly” and solely “if bones are broken is a woman allowed to flee to her family” (Lindholm, 1981, p.148). Still, even in this case she has to return after some time and sometimes a woman reacts to humiliation and violence and “may vindicate herself by poisoning her husband” (Lindholm, 1981, p.148). Cases of husbands who murder their wives are rare, because her lineage would seek revenge, but if a woman acted dishonorable “her own patriline will reject and even shoot her” (Lindholm, 1981, p.148.).

Nancy Tapper has shown that that “different Pashtun peoples from Swat to Sistan would seem to use the same ideology of control to define and support ostensibly” the “very different social structures” they might live in (Tapper, 1991, p.23). There are insular cases through among nomads and Pashtuns in the north of the country which deem a strict confinement of women weakness: they consider themselves as being even more manly for not having to lock up the women in order to dominate them33 (Tapper, 1991 in Glatzer, 2000, p.95). In short, the honor of men also depends on their ability to control women and their behavior (Glatzer, 2000, p.95).

Further core values are badal (revenge or ‘exchange’), melmastia (hospitality, generosity), nanawatee (which signifies the “generosity to a defeated adversary supplicating for peace”), to adhere to the jirga and tarboorwali, the already mentioned cousin-rivalry (Ahmed, 1983a, p.24). Being accused of greediness “can seriously damage a reputation of honor” as it is “considered antisocial and destructive” (Grima, 2004, p.35). Allegations of greed “are often used to denigrate

---

32 There are quite some variations to this behavior and its perceptions among Pashtuns, this particular description depicts especially eastern Pashtuns.

33 Yet sometimes older women are highly respected and can use their appreciation as honorable members of a tribe to reconcile a blood-feud peacefully (Rzehak, 2011, p.10).
and harm people” (Grima, 2004, p.35). Also turá (being a warrior, in a literal translation: sword) is an important aspect of nang, meaning that a turialai embodies the features of turá through individual heroic deeds such as fighting for his personal honor and autonomy, for his family and for his clan (Glatzer, 2000, p.96). “In the concept of turá it is a holy duty to oppose an enemy face-to-face and fight until the last breath” (Rzehak, 2011, p.11). Flight from combat is considered a great dishonor and brings about the same shame to a Pashtun as being betrayed by his wife (Rzehak, 2011, p.11). The concept of turá is supplemented by aql, the notion of rationality and social responsibility. Both aspects of nang (turá and aql) are attributed to different ages of a Pashtun: a young man is rather expected to display turá, reacting aggressively at the smallest instigation, the elders act rather on the basis of aql and have to be respected and obeyed by the young men - particularly concerning the decisions of the jirga (Glatzer, 2000, p.97)34. The demand for honorable and mannerly comportment toward seniors regulates the interactions between tribal leaders and the young as well as between “fathers and their sons, between brothers, cousins, etc.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.12). Senior in this case does not always mean someone who is older in age, but can refer to status obtained through prestige, knowledge, leadership skills, one’s marital status or whether one keeps one’s own household (Rzehak, 2011, p.12).

To unite the aspects of turá and aql is a precondition for becoming an elder or a tribal leader. Depending on social functions there are two different kinds of tribal leaders. First there are khans or maliks, respected and honorable men whose words carry weight in jirgas and whose importance is also measured by the number of followers who regularly sit in their hujra (guesthouse) and who would support them in case of conflict35. Being a khan or malik also implies generosity, hospitality (as a special form of generosity), economic success and the willingness to let guests and wards have part in this success (Glatzer, 2000, p.99). It also requires “considerable economic resources. Followers must be

---

34 This obedience towards elders “does not contradict the egalitarian principle”, the elders are understood as representing “the collective will of the clan/tribe” and have to make sure that the basis for their decisions, the traditional values and customs, “are understood by the younger as just” (Glatzer, 1998, p.88). It is a question of honor for the younger generation to show “restraint, sobriety, subservience, and obedience” in the presence of the elder (Grima, 2004, p.37). This applies also, for example, in the presence of an older brother or, even for adult men, in the presence of their fathers.

35 Among the Durrani in the Kandahar area khan is attributed to “any landowner, however small the holding” and is customarily attached as a polite form of address to the name of an older man, the Ghilzai however “reserve the term for more singular individuals” (Anderson, 1983, p.133).
feasted for their loyalty from time to time.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.13).

According to custom the rules of Pashtunwali include treating a guest with special honors for three days not only in a khan’s house, but also in an ordinary household. After that period of time they are treated like everyone else in the household. To share a meal is an “expression of equality, and the degree to which one is fed […] is a rough but public measure of alliance to the host” and can also be used to end hostilities or enmities (Anderson, 1983, p.134). This act “is morally loaded” and to “have ‘eaten another’s salt’” makes any possible future infraction or offense against the host doubly condemnable (Anderson, 1983, p.134).

Guests are obliged to “give the host the opportunity to show generosity” and “can leave the host’s house only with the host’s permission.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.15). Almost every house provides an extra room for guests “which is strictly separated from the house’s family part.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.16). A host has to protect his guest and is obliged to confer asylum, no matter who the other party is and what the reason for the guests’ persecution might be. Noticeably, a Pashtun could not even deny asylum to his enemy if solicited, though it might not be a frequent course of action for a persecuted man to ask his enemy for asylum (except if he is haunted by even bigger problems and the asylum granting enemy has an interest in his survival) (Rzehak, 2011, p.16).

A khan is also called upon to mediate in conflicts, to serve as a speaker for the interests of his followers and to represent his tribal group or village in consultations with other tribal groups or government agencies (Rzehak, 2011, p.12). In a plurality of cases the status of a khan or malik is inherited and is connected to land ownership and economic power. Yet khanship does not represent “a clear-cut or structurally given position” but rather “an on-going achievement” (Anderson, 1983, p.133). It needs “continuous reaffirmation” through the ‘right’ demeanor and a demonstration of the “ability to attract followers, mainly by offering economic advantages” (Glatzer, 1983, p.224). Being a khan does not imply exercising direct power as a leader, and the actual way by which leadership is “exercised by khans is as temporal and as ambiguous as the ephemeral realisations of tribal structure that are their actual subjects” (Anderson, 1983, p.134). Commonly, decisions are founded in consultation with followers, also when co-ordinating the appropriation of pastures or the usage of an irrigation system (Rzehak, 2011, p.13).

The second kind of tribal leaders are elders whose standing and authority are based solely on “personal attributes and on the knowledge and experience
they have gained during their long lives.” (Rzehak, 2011, p. 13). They are highly respected and considered to be wise men, so-called spinzhiri (sing.: spinzhirai), which is translated as “white beards” or “white-bearded men” (Rzehak, 2011, p.13). In order to become a spinzhirai, economic strength is less important. They are counselors for all of life’s situations and possess a profound knowledge of the Pasthun ways and customs. The spinzhiri hold “numerous privileges that enable them to act as intermediaries in cases of conflict.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.13).

As mentioned before, the requirement for agreement through council decisions has been institutionalized in Pashtun tribal structures through the jirga. In broader terms any get-together by Pashtun men which aims at discussing and solving problems of shared interest can be called a jirga. Most frequently such a gathering is convoked spontaneously, whereupon the group of participating actors is constituted by all people affected by a certain problem. (Rzehak, 2011, p.13). When the jirga is held on the level of the village, all men who have established their own household and hold at least a small piece of land have the explicit right to participate. The egalitarian principle of a jirga also “forces effective leaders to build a consensus in support of their decisions” (Barfield, 1990, p.162). The jirga can take on an advising role, it can function as a conflict resolution mechanism through providing a forum for peace talks, and it can handle criminal acts as a court. “In all cases, decisions are made by consensus”, which implies that deliberations, until “there is no longer any opposition to a particular position”, can last very long (Rzehak, 2011, p.14). If no agreement can be reached, the jirga is recessed until a new jirga is called in - in case the problem still exists. It is a question of honor to respect the decisions of a jirga. An infringement of this obligation can lead to a tribal penalty (nagha) which, in serious cases, can include burning down the offender’s house or expelling him from the village or tribe (Rzehak, 2011, p.14).

In the following I will discuss some rules and modes of compensation processed by jirgas in order to further elucidate the Pashtun concept of honor and the attempts of its restoration following an offense. The word badal, nowadays

36In some regions (i.e. Paktia) the jirgas are not longer open to everyone, only elders can participate, yet they are still called jirgas. Many Pashtun tribes sustain their own militias or ‘tribal police’ (arbaki, lashkar) whose functioning traditionally rely on the understanding of the generational roles mentioned above. Their duties include the protection of the elders while in a closed jirga and the enforcement of the decisions determined therein (Rzehak, 2011, p.13f). Members of a lashkar participate on a voluntary basis and are not paid any salaries but have the right to a share of the captured booty (Ahmed, 2000, p.100). One of the questions in chapter 7 will be wether the traditional system of compliance from the younger to the older generations on which jirgas rely, is still intact.
often translated as *revenge* or *retaliation*, originally stood for *exchange*. In some Afghan written records it is clearly laid out that ‘good’ acts as well as ‘bad’ acts necessitate appropriate responses (Rzehak, 2011, p.14). For instance it includes the obligation to thank for any courtesy or help provided and to reciprocate “when the opportunity arises”. Not compensating would be considered sinful and, interestingly, “the feeling of indebtedness to someone who has done you a favor is considered unmanly and cowardly” (Rzehak, 2011, p.14). On this basis countless networks of mutually obliged actors are created, meaning that benefactors would sometimes after years collect a favor, payment or help in some kind\(^{37}\). If someone’s honor is infringed upon or physical harm has occurred, reciprocation is intended to restore the status quo ante in order to restore one’s honor. Usually this is achieved by applying the principle “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”, which in turn can lead to “a cycle of retaliatory violence” or a so-called *blood feud*\(^{38}\). (Rzehak, 2011, p.15). According to Rzehak the Pashtunwali regulates retaliation in a way that allows or demands for the patrilineal kin of a wronged, wounded or killed person to administrate revenge on the offender or his patrilineal relatives, thus recreating a kind of balance which is a precondition for peace talks between enemy parties (Rzehak, 2011, p.15). These conflicts can, of course, also occur within a patrilineage and Pashtuns “do not consider violence between near patrilineal relatives to be abnormal” (Lindholm, 1981, p.150). The revenge itself does not necessarily involve courageous acts of fighting, but is in many cases “accomplished by stealth or betrayal” (Lindholm, 1981, p.150). The courage that is associated with such a vengeance is not rooted in the killing of the offender, but in the acceptance of possibly ruinous and dangerous retaliation from the offenders affiliates (Lindholm, 1981, p.150).

Nevertheless, such a revenge does not have to be taken instantly, it can be postponed and the responsibility for taking vengeance can actually be transferred to the next generation. Sometimes these suspended feuds “explode with unpredictable violence” (Dupree, 1984, p.270). To illustrate this, Rzehak cites “a popular proverb” which “says: […] ‘A Pashtun took his revenge after one hundred years and he said that he was in a hurry.’” (Rzehak, 2011, p.15). Sometimes feuds may also be sustained over “several generations, and current

\(^{37}\)This frequently causes confusion, especially in Western perception, concerning the topic of corruption: very often acts that are interpreted as corruption are not based on the intent of personal enrichment but on the obligation to reciprocate (Rzehak, 2011, p.15).

\(^{38}\)The name *blood feud* does not imply that such feuds inevitably include bloodshed but is based on the fact that the dispute is conducted “by kin groups which are related by blood, i.e. descent groups of different genealogical depth.”(Rzehak, 2011, p.15).
participants may have forgotten the original cause” (Dupree, 1984, p.270).

The compensations for most delicts include money that has to be paid for “moral harm”, this money is also called *sharm* (shame). Money can also be paid for offenses which curtailed the physical integrity of an individual in order to avert bloodshed which then is called *khunbaha* (blood money). The amount of blood money that has to be paid is usually calculated on the basis of local bride prices: if a Pashtun man has been killed, the killer or his relatives typically have to pay double the local average bride price, a unit which “is called one *khun* (literally ‘blood’) or one *nek* (literally […] ‘good man’), to avoid revenge. (Rzehak, 2011, p.18). The underlying idea is that the money allows the family of the victim to pay for a girl/bride to marry into the family, who then gives birth to a son who in turn would replace the killed individual (Rzehak, 2011, p.18f).

As an alternative it is also possible for the tribal group associated with the offender to “give one or several marriageable girls to the victim’s family instead of paying money.” (Rzehak, 2011, p.19). The Saripul Durrani for instance would, in theory, compensate for a killed man by giving seven women to the *qaum* of the victim. In practice though the killer might offer two girls and “then take the Koran to the victim’s house and ask to be freed of the obligation to give more”, which is, when combined with additional monetary compensations, frequently accepted (Tapper, 1991, p.48). If the victim did not belong to the Durrani however, no girls will be given in compensation but only money: the Durrani ascribe their women superiority, higher status and value as non-Durrani women and men (Tapper, 1991, p.48 and p.54).

A Pashtun woman being killed demands for the payment of $\frac{1}{2}$ *khun* which equates the average bride price. Killing highly esteemed elders requires the payment of larger amounts of blood money. Several other factors in the killing can contribute to a negotiable increase of the price: the victim being unarmed or defenseless, the victim being mutilated after its death or the killer stealing the victim’s weapon are such components. Once “blood money has been paid […], the blood feud must be stopped.”39 (Rzehak, 2011, p.19).

In its totality the Pashtunwali is a quite complex system which evolves over time and takes different shapes in different places (Ruttig, 2010, p.4). Being unwritten it is preserved and transmitted by *spinzhiri* and the *jirgadar* (those who have the knowledge about the jirga) (Ruttig, 2010, p.5). The differing local versions of the Pashtunwali are called *nirkh*, which is also the word for ‘price’,

---

39 For many eastern Pashtuns blood money “or even the donation of a woman, is never adequate compensation for death. Blood demands blood,” (Lindholm, 1981, p.150).
referring to the compensation that has to be paid in order to settle blood feuds. When distinct versions of the Pashtunwali manifest in an inter-tribal conflict, the parties first agree on whose nirkh to apply (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). Furthermore, the actual judgment about the shame a specific action brings upon the actor is highly contextual. An act usually seen as shameful might not be considered as such if it was the reaction to an even more shameful act, it was unavoidable or brought about by suffering and hardship (Grima, 2004, p.40).

It is not easy to definitively say how important the Pashtunwali might be in Afghanistan today. Its usage and implementation may vary greatly regionally as well as depending on context. Some examples for the utilization of the Pashtunwali in recent years (see chapter III) will help to elucidate questions about its significance today. It is important to remember that the Pashtunwali is set to be an ideal which people strive to reach but sometimes may not even come close. Or as Frederik Barth puts it:

“It is of course perfectly feasible to distinguish between a people’s model of their social system and their aggregate pattern of pragmatic behaviour, and indeed quite necessary not to confuse the two.” (Barth, 1998, p.29).

This implies that the right course of action for the creation of anthropological knowledge is not to dichotomize ‘ideal’ and ‘actual behavior’ as opposing blocs, but to investigate the interdependencies of both (Barth, 1998, p.29). Also other value systems and different interpretations of Islam influence the multifaceted Pashtun tribes in different ways. Some answers to the question how these influences affect traditional tribal structures should be found in chapter III.
Part II
Foreign Interventions, The Soviet Occupation, Tribal Warfare, Migration & Exile

3 A Brief Look into Afghanistan’s History

Afghanistan in its borders today occupies an area total of about 650,000 square kilometers, sharing its longest border with Pakistan (2430km) an its shortest with China (76km). It geographically includes low basins and plains in the north (where the lowest elevation at the Amu Darya or Oxus is about 260m), south and west. Mountainous areas are dominant in central, northeastern and eastern Afghanistan with elevations of up to well over 7000 meters (Wakhan Corridor; Noshak: 7485m) (Rathjens, 1986, p.15). In ancient history seminomadic Indo-Iranians populated large areas, with the earliest archaeological artifacts proving urban settlements dating back as far as 3000 BCE. Later on the Persian Empires incorporated the area. Alexander the Great briefly occupied it, followed by the Seleucid Empire. King Ashoka of India then brought Buddhism to the region, again followed by several centuries of Persian, Hellenistic and Indian conquests. This “history of invasion and immigration” also resulted in a “diverse ethnolinguistic heritage”, with Dari and Pashto being the main languages nowadays there are several dozen other languages, sometimes only spoken by a few thousand people (Canfield, 1988b, p.89).

The region became then known as Khorasan, though its size varied greatly in different descriptions and was also depending on which groups used the term. It mainly included eastern regions of todays Iran, Balkh, Ghazni and Herat in

---

40 In this long record of imperial “conquest, from Achaemenid, Bactrian, Kushan, Sassanid, Umayyad, and Abbasid, to Ghaznavid, Mongol, Timurid, Safavid and Mughal […] Pashtuns commonly fought or intrigued with both sides, even when the opponent was a Pashtun regime.” (Hager, 1983, p.93, Hyman, 2002, p.301).

41 Dari and Pashto are Indo-European languages from the Iranian sub-family. Further prevalent languages are Uzbek and Turkmen and minor languages include Balochi, Nuristani, Brahui, Kyrgyz, Hindko, Pashayi and many others.

42 Pashto-speaking populations customarily referred to the region as Pakhtunkhwa or Roh, southern Afghanistan was called Zabulistan and the area between the Indus and the Hindu Kush carried the name of Kabalistan (Schetter, 2005, p.55).
todays Afghanistan, Bukhara and Samarkand in todays Uzbekistan and bordering Hindustan in the east with the stretch between Kabul and Kandahar grossly defining this border. The Islamization started from the 7th century on and Khorasan, after being mainly Buddhist, Zoroastrian and Hindu, acquired an important role as a religious and cultural center in the Muslim world during the Islamic Golden Age. The term *Afghan* was first used in Persian texts around the year 1000CE and can also be found in “Delhi Sultanate (c. 1100-1300) historiography when both Afghans and Turks were primary actors as militarily potent slave troops who could and would also rule in the mold of other medieval Islamic mamlat populations” (Hanifi, 2008, p.10). *Afghan* referred to all the inhabitants of the area but was widely interchangeably with *Pashtun*.

In the beginning of the 13th century Genghis Khan forcefully conquered the region, destroying major cities, towards the end of the 14th century Timur founded the Timurid dynasty during which architecture and literature flourished. Then for about 200 years the area was divided among three to four kingdoms (Khanates). A dominant role was held by the shiite Safavid Empire, with its center in Isfahan, which claimed sovereignty over big swathes of what is modern Afghanistan. In actuality big parts of the Safavid Empire were autonomous and at the beginning of the 18th century many sunni tribal groups revolted which resulted in the Ghilzai making “themselves independent at Kandahar in 1709 and the Abdali followed by taking control of Herat in 1715” (Tapper, 1983, p.12). At the same time, “raids and incursions by Baluches in the south-east, Uzbeks and Turkmens in the north-east, and Lazgis and Kurds in the north-west” strongly increased (Tapper, 1983, p.12). Mahmud Ghilzai, son of the founder of the Hotaki dynasty Mirwais Khan Hotak, also known as Mirwais Ghilzai, gained control of Isfahan in 1722. His victory against the Safavids in “a rapid military campaign, aided by sheer good luck and the enemy’s incompetence […] brought about the demise of this once powerful dynasty” (Barfield, 2004, p.269). After seven years Mirwais Ghilzai was defeated by Tahmasp Quli, later known as Nadir Shah, who “restored nominal Safavid rule under a puppet Shah”, reconquered every territory lost to Afghans, Ottomans and Russians and devastated several provinces causing “much of the settled population to emi-

---

43 The *Islamic Golden Age* is the historical era between 750 CE and 1250 CE. During this time, architecture, engineering, scientific knowledge, philosophy and arts flourished in the centers of the Islamic world.

44 Also in the following centuries *Afghan* was habitually used synonymous with *Pashtun* and other ethnic groups were called Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara and so on, when a distinction was intended by the speaker (Hyman, 2002, p.302)
grate” (Tapper, 1983, p.12). His power was based on the “military discipline” of his followers “and a common interest in plunder” (Tapper, 1983, p.12).

### 3.1 The Beginnings of the Afghan State

After Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1747 the empire quickly fell apart, the eastern half of it was held by Ahmad Khan Abdali (later called: Ahmad Shah Durrani), one of Nadir Shah’s generals. “The Abdali were the most important Afghan tribal group” composed of several different tribes⁴⁵ (Tapper, 1983, p.13). The “most powerful and numerous” element of this tribal confederation were the Barakzai, whose leader was Hajji Jamal Khan (of the Muhammadzai branch). He agreed in a *jirga* to elect Ahmad Khan Abdali, who was a member of the “less powerful but more aristocratic” Sadozai branch of the Popolzai tribe, the Afghan leader (Tapper, 1983, p.13). The installation of his kingdom is regarded as the founding of modern Afghanistan, even though his factual position was rather that of a primus inter pares who, in a feudalistic and tribal government, had to consult with tribal leaders in what rather “resembled a confederation of tribes and khanates than a centralised monarchy.” (Tapper, 1983, p.14). The new ruler established Kandahar as the kingdom’s capital (Hyman, 2002, p.301). Ahmad Khan Abdali “could rely on the military and political strength of the tribes [. . . ] as long as he did not offend their feelings and interests” (Rzehak, 2011, p.6). Other writers have put the relationship between the king and local “leaders, potentates, tribal leaders and governors” in more blunt terms, saying the latter “certainly acknowledged” Ahmad Khan Abdali’s “rule when he was present; but as soon as his back was turned they would again behave as though themselves were entirely sovereign.” (Schetter, 2005, p.55). In fact the Pashtun tribes were granted various privileges, such as tax exemptions and the right to self-government (Rzehak, 2011, p.6). Ahmad Shah changed the name of the Abdali to Durrani and managed to sustain tribal unity by creating revenue surpluses through conquering Kashmir, Sindh, the Sikh Maratha Empire in Punjab, Delhi, and several other regions⁴⁶ and thereby establishing an Afghan empire. His son Timur Shah became king in 1773, moved the capital from Kandahar to Kabul and transformed the city into *the* political center of the Afghanistan (Hanifi, 2008, p.11). He was followed by his own son Zaman Shah in 1793, who, like his father and grandfather, did not manage to centralize government despite several

---

⁴⁵Most importantly the Nurzai, Ishaqzai, Alizai, Atskzai, Barakzai, Popolzai and Alikozai (Tapper, 1983, p.16).

⁴⁶Inter alia the Iranian provinces Khorasan and Kohistan.

The intense rivalry between the “Sadozai Popolzai and the Muhammadzai Barakzai branches of the Durrani” continued for decades (Tapper, 1983, p.31). Additionally, there were internal struggles among the Muhammadzai, who comprised about 30,000 families at the time. Sometimes this internal struggle for power even took the form of a civil war with a highly complex alternation of varying alliances, puppet leaders (sometimes also Sadozai supported by Muhammadzai), assassinations and executions as well as exilation to and return from India of several leaders (Noelle, 1997, p.7f). These rivalries were even an issue during the British engagement in Afghanistan as part of The Great Game against the Russian Empire. “In 1809 Mountstuart Elphinstone made the first official colonial contact with” Timur Shah’s “son Shah Shuja” at Peshawar, which then was the Durrani winter capital (Hanifi, 2008, p.1).

The British and Russian Empires quickly realized that “advance through Afghanistan means hard fighting with Afghans by whomever it is undertaken” (Curzon, 1892, p.236 in Hager, 1983, p.101). Therefore both empires considered Afghanistan to be of great importance as a buffer state between them and tried to influence the state and the tribal leaders with benefits such as subsidies (Hager, 1983, p.104). The tribes however did not perceive themselves as playing the Russian or the British game but “simply playing their own game” which

---

47 The population in the Durrani kingdom around the year 1800 is estimated to have counted about “14 million, of which no more than five million dwelt within the present frontiers of Afghanistan” while half of them were Pashto-speaking tribespeople, the other groups were Hazaras, Kafirs, Aymaqs, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Baluches and Tajiks. (Tapper, 1983, p.16).

48 The Russian Empire wanted to gain access to the southern seas and control the land route to India. The British Empire wanted to protect its ample Asian domains against those advances. In 1864 Prince Gorkachov, who was the Russian Chancellor, stated the necessity and explicit goal to secure the borders, international trade and Russian influence through the subjugation of ‘anarchic’ nomadic tribes, “who make ‘the worst neighbours possible’”, by the more civilized and thus superior Russian state, progressing its civilization through “commercial relations” (Hager, 1983, p.103f). Russia took Tashkent in 1865, Samarkand in 1868 and Bokhara became a “subsidiary ally” (Hager, 1983, p.104).

49 Kabul, Peshawar and Kandahar are “ancient market” places “between one and two thousand years of age” and are connected through an ancient network of trade routes, generally known as the Silk Road (Hanifi, 2008, p.2). In 1849, with “the colonial creation of the Punjab province”, Peshawar “came under formal British India rule” (Hanifi, 2008, p.6).
“was certainly played with the brilliance of born tacticians, and enabled them to remain independent at a crucial period” (Ahmed, 1983b, p.193). Tribal warriors were able to match heavy artillery “with dated but deadly .303 rifles, could stop and destroy entire battalions sent by the imperial powers” and caused military planners of the empires to despair over the tribes’ chaotic, individualistic, uncoordinated and unforeseeable approach to battle (Ahmed, 1983b, p.197). Since praise for the virtue of tribal warfare was also a means to embellish many a defeat inflicted upon an empire, the following source should be qualified with caution (more information about the workings of tribal warfare will be provided in chapter 4.1). Still a British officer engaged in fighting Pashtun tribes provided an interesting account:

“Attacking the Afghan tribes is like making swords thrust into water. You meet with no resistance but you also do no injury... Each separate tribe is, as it were an independent center of life, which requires a separate and special operation for its extinction... The only way in which we could hope to enforce our authority throughout Afghanistan would be a simultaneous occupation of the entire country.” (Dacosta, 1891, p.125 in Hager, 1983, p.112).

Considering the difficult terrain and the tribesmen expertise in guerrilla warfare such a task was estimated to require at least one million ground troops, which was an infeasible approach (Hager, 1983, p.112). Eventually, the Russian and the British empires’ struggle for influence in Asia also determined the territorial boundaries of the Muhammadzai emirate (Hager, 1983, p.101).

Dost Muhammad Khan, a grandson of Hajji Jamal Khan, had begun to slowly consolidate the Afghan provinces and to expand his rule from 1826 on to 1839 (Tapper, 1983, p.32). During the First Anglo Afghan War (1839 - 42) the British occupied Kabul in 1839. Soon though “they discovered to their dismay” that “securing the capital tended to inflame rather than behead the resistance”

---

50 Many colonial writers overly romanticized the ‘noble, courageous Pashtun warrior’. Fewer but even popular writers attributed “all that is sinister, cruel and corrupt in the subcontinent” to Pashtuns (Lindholm, 1980, p.350).

51 Further British accounts pictured the Pashtuns as “perhaps the best [...] natural shots in the world” and ‘the country they inhabit [as] the most difficult on the face of the globe’ [...] concluding that the Pashtun tribesman is ‘on his own ground probably the finest minor tactician in the world’” (Hager, 1983, p.112). Other accounts decry the cruelty of the Pashtuns. They are recommending soldiers who were left behind wounded to kill themselves because after battle Pashtun women would come forward, hack off their genitals, “cram them in their mouths, the lips of which will be sewn over them.” (Dupree, 1984, p.275).
They unsuccessfully attempted to reinstall the Sadozai Shah Shuja, who had already been ousted to Indian exile by the Muhammadzai in 1809 and whom the British already had supported financially in a 1832 military campaign against Dost Muhammad Khan and the Muhammadzais (Noelle, 1997, introduction, p.15 and p.43). Dost Muhammad Khan had also tried to gain support from the British, especially for his raids against the Sikh in 1834 and 1835. When his attempts were turned down he transitionally strengthened his contacts with Iran and Russia (Noelle, 1997, p.43). Following an eventful period at the beginning of the First Anglo Afghan War with many battles, defections and changing alliances he went to Bukhara with about 2000 of his loyal followers where he was de facto imprisoned by Nasrullah Khan, the emir of Bukhara (Noelle, 1997, p.44). After fleeing he reentered the political scene in Afghanistan and united with some eastern tribal leaders, but gave up and surrendered to the British after some heavy battles not only with them but also with Sadozai Durrani rivals - even though he decisively won the last big battle of Parwan on November 2nd, 1840. Researchers do not agree about the reasons for his surrender, but Noelle states that he might not have believed to be able to unite enough tribes into an enduring alliance “beyond links of kinship” in order to present a “widespread and sustained resistance strong enough to remove the British and Shah Shuja’ from power” (Noelle, 1997, p.45). The British decided to cut subsidies to Durranis, Ghilzais and the ulama in Kabul by 200.000 rupees in order to reduce the costs of their endeavor. This caused major revolt across large areas. The British reaction oscillated between panic and pure denial and might have contributed to their fading willingness to engage in internal Afghan affairs (Noelle, 1997, p.49).

Dost Muhammad Khan was eventually released and emerged, after a prolonged period of civil war between Muhammadzai and Sadozai, with the “new role as Defender of the Faith against the infidel invaders” (Tapper, 1983, p.33). He also justified his opposition to Shah Shuja on religious grounds, portraying “his rival as a puppet of unbelievers” and “extricated a fatwa from the ulama of Kabul which denied the legitimacy of Shah Shuja’s claims to power” (Noelle, 1997, p.43). Prior to the encounter with the British, “Islamic reservations about the so-called unbelievers had been quite unclear for many Pashtuns” but through their experience of the colonial aggressors and the danger of being conquered “their struggle for independence turned into a struggle for their faith” (Rzehak, 2011, p.10). After many ups and downs on January 6th of 1842 the British decided to retreat from Kabul, leaving only some hostages behind, and moved
about 16,000 mostly Indian troops and civilians back to their garrison in Jalalabad. Almost all of them were killed by the eastern Ghilzai (who controlled the mountains between Kabul and Gandamak) in a several day long winterly onslaught (Noelle, 1997, p.49). Only one British officer, Dr. Brydon, survived and managed to return to the besieged garrison in Jalalabad\(^{52}\). After this devastating defeat of the British, Dost Muhammad Khan ruled again from 1843 to 1863 and “succeeded with British assistance in reuniting the Afghan realm” (Tapper, 1983, p.33). He died in 1869 and another civil war ensued. The same year Russia and Great Britain started negotiations about the borders of their Asian territories in St.Petersburg. They came to a successful conclusion in 1873, thus creating Afghanistan’s borders without the knowledge of Afghans and limiting Russia’s military reach to Afghanistan’s neighbors north of the Amu Darya (Hager, 1983, p.105). “The frontiers thus defined were purely strategic and did not correspond to any ethnic or historical boundary.” (Roy, 1986, p.17). This agreement shifted the contest between the two empires from being focused on territory and military to diplomacy and the attempts to influence the tribes within the new state (Hager, 1983, p.105). Afghans allowed the Russians to open a representation in Kabul and refused the same to the British, which prompted the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878 - 1880). Great Britain, still wary after their unforgotten defeat, used better trained army soldiers this time, and installed Abdur Rahman Khan (later also known as “The Iron Emir”), a grandson of Dost Muhammad Khan, in power\(^{53}\). The most respected religious leaders of the Kandahar ulema issued a _fatwa_ “urging the population to rise against Abdur Rahman”, the British puppet, but Abdur Rahman swiftly defeated those who obeyed the _fatwa_ in battle (Ghani, 1978, p.273).

“Hated by many as tyrant” he “ incurred the wrath of his subjects for his brutality” (Edwards, 2002, p.19, p.179). Abdur Rahman “nevertheless forged the basis of governance in Afghanistan.” (Edwards, 2002, p.19). Furthermore, Afghanistan’s foreign affairs would be managed by the British, “while Afghans proceeded to deny both empires influence or even access to its internal

---

\(^{52}\) The British started a punitive expedition in fall of 1842, burning the Kabul bazaar and liberating some British prisoners which were held in Bamyan. Subsequently, they retreated back to British India (Hymans, 2002, p.304).

\(^{53}\) Between the enthronement of Abdur Rahman Khan and death of Dost Muhammad Khan, three of the latter sons had held the throne. Amir Sher Ali Khan, who established the first postal mail service in the country ruled from 1863-1866 and from 1868-1879, his brothers Amir Mohammed Aziz Khan and Amir Mohammed Azam Khan from 1866-1868. Abdur Rahman Khan had resided in Samarkand from 1867 to 1878 where he also received a Russian pension (Hanifi, 2008, p.7).
affairs” (Hager, 1983, p.105). The considerable annual subsidies paid by the British (£120,000 in the beginning, later raised to £180,000) to Abdur Rahman Khan allowed him to strengthen central government and build a potent military (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.98). Parts of the subsidies were “recycled back into British Indian […] hands through” Abdur Rahman Khan’s “purchase of heavy industrial equipment and technical expertise” (Hanifi, 2008, p.6). This underlined his intention to build an industrial complex modeled on the industrialization in Europe which was inspired by “mercantilist economic policies […] associated with modern absolutist states” in the West (Hanifi, 2008, p.6).

By the end of the century “The Iron Emir” had installed comparatively expedient provincial administrations and governorships which “were strong enough to exert a significant force upon the affairs of the rural populations.”54 (Canfield, 1988b, p.92 and Edwards, 1996, p.84). Furthermore, he fought four wars to subjugate opposing groups, which was seen by some authors as a continuation of the conflict between Shiites and Sunnis (see also Safavids versus the Ghilzai, p.49) (Canfield, 1988b, p.90). Abdur Rahman Khan actively sought support from religious authorities and accused his opponents of heresy. The conflict along sectarian lines became most visible in his third war against the Shiite Hazara (1891 - 1893): he had “won support of essentially all the Sunni authorities; the Hazaras, on their side, had gained the support of all the Shi’ite authorities”, including substantial support from Iran 55 (Canfield, 1988b, p.90). This sectarian conflict had, for the first time, united most of the Emir’s Sunni subjects behind him (Canfield, 1973, p.1520). Besides the intense revival of sectarian conflict, the nineteenth century had also brought about a heritage of xenophobia “which was defined in Islamic terms.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.90). The struggle against the menacing foreign powers (Britain and Russia) was defined by many, especially by the Afghan government, “as clashes between Muslim believers and infidel outsiders” (Canfield, 1988b, p.91). This usage of religion as uniting factor “drew large numbers of warriors from varying tribal backgrounds, and the Afghanistan peoples became known for their fanatical Muslim zeal” (Canfield, 1988b, p.91f) (see also: the role of Islam in transcending tribal orders on p.71)56. In order to change the ethnic composition of some dominantly non-

54Abdur Rahman Khan provided military contingents at the disposal of governors and drew provincial and sub-provincial boundaries corresponding with the dispersion of tribes and their subsegments. Thereby he made specific local communities accountable to the respective government unit (Canfield, 1988b, p.92).

55The sectarian struggle is still prevalent today and manifests “in the discriminating practices of the Sunnis against the Hazaras.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.90).

56In 1897 Sir Winston Churchill, then a young cavalry officer, joined the British campaign
Pashtun areas, Abdur Rahman Khan began to forcibly resettle many Pashtun tribes in those regions, especially in the north (Edwards, 2002, p.175).

The path of using subsidies in order to strengthen the military and the central government was continued during Abdur Rahman Khan son’s (Habibullah Khan) reign from 1901 to 1919. Some of the institutions they established still existed in the 1970’s (Hager, 1983, p.105 and Canfield, 1988, p.92). Habibullah Khan was assassinated during a hunting trip. His third son Amanullah Khan (1919 - 1929) controlled the army and was thus able to imprison family members loyal to his elder brother who had also claimed his right to succession. Shortly after his enthronement he saw his chance to gain full independence from Great Britain, sent troops to the eastern border, crossed it at several occasions and engaged in battles. This took the British by surprise and thus caused the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919. They were still weakened from World War I and again fully engaged in their contest with the Russian Empire since their entente broke following the Russian Revolution of 1917. Great Britain reacted with aerial bombardment and achieved a tactical victory which allowed them to dictate the conditions of the following armistice (Rawalpindi Agreement). Yet they had to grant independence to Afghanistan, where the end of the war was rather perceived as an Afghan victory.

Amanullah Khan was inspired by Western technology and progress and “intended to turn Afghanistan into a modern state in the European sense.” (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.99). He built factories, schools for boys and girls, abolished the strict dress-code for women and created the first written constitution of Afghanistan which emulated European ideas of equal rights. Amanullah generally tried to exploit his initial popularity by modernizing the country. He had earned the respect of a “vast majority of the Afghans, who honored his anti-

under General Bindon Blood against the “Mad Mullah” Saidullah of Swat. The latter had gathered a following and promised to start “a holy war in which he would be aided by supernatural forces.” (Edwards, 1996, p.177). When Churchill heard about the following uprisings along the Durand Line during furlough to England from his Bangalore regiment, “within a matter of hours” he “booked return passage” (Edwards, 1996, p.175). Corroborating his earlier proclaimed stance that, especially in the light of “the Diamond Jubilee marking” Queen Victoria’s “sixtieth year on the throne”, the “British people […] must continue to pursue” the path of the Empire and carry out the “mission of bearing peace, civilisation and good government to the uttermost ends of the earth.” (Edwards, 1996, p.175). Edwards provided not only a brilliant analysis of the events at the time, but also of the characters involved and the later writings of Churchill about the campaign. See also (Caron, 2007, p.317).

57 The “number of provincial governments increased from four at the turn of the century to twenty-eight in 1970.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.93).

58 A more detailed description of this border is provided in chapter 3.2.

59 He even travelled to Europe later on in 1927 which, in fact, might not have helped his popularity among traditionalists.
British colonial stance and his victory over the British in the third Anglo-Afghan War” (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.99).

Yet, already at the national jirga of 1924, which was held in order to approve the new constitution, he “received notice of the discontent with his policies” and was forced to amend the new legal code (Tapper, 1983, p.36).

“Amanullah sought a revolution from above through his comprehensive plans for change; his modernising legislation was perceived as impinging on tribal and religious jurisdiction” (Tapper, 1983, p.36). Through gaining independence he had also lost the subsidies from the British. He was not able to replace them by other sources of revenue and thus could neither satisfy the financial needs of his clients nor retain “military superiority over the tribes” (Hager, 1983, p.105, Shahrani, 1990, p.43, Tapper, 1983, p.36). As a consequence of these circumstances and the fact that Amanullah had angered traditionalist tribal leaders through his modern ways, he “was overthrown as a result of tribal rebellions” in 1929 (Hager, 1983, p.105)\textsuperscript{60}.

There was one more consequential event during Amanullah’s grandfather’s (Abdur Rahman Khan’s) reign which should be mentioned at this point: namely the drawing of the eastern Afghan border along the so-called Durand Line.

3.2 The Durand Line

Sir Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of the British colonial government of India, wanted to create a set of various administrative approaches to the tribal areas in the borderland. Since Afghanistan was already considered a buffer state vis à vis the Russian Empire, the British wanted to create a buffer to this buffer (Ahmed, 1983b, p.194). They planned to let the tribes which were furthest away from the British colonial administrative centers govern themselves. The closer the tribes were to these centers, more and more layers of control and bureaucratic reglementations would be laid upon them (Ahmed, 1983b, p.194).

“Britain was not so much interested in setting Afghanistan’s eastern boundary as in reorganizing its own administration of what would later become the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)” which “was designed to provide a separate unit of administration for British India’s Pashtun population” (Barfield, 2007, p.4).

\textsuperscript{60}However, he was not deposed by Pashtuns (they just did not come to his aid), but by a Tajik bandit, Amir Habibullah II, who shortly ruled in Kabul but was soon removed through and executed by tribal forces led by Nadir Khan (Tapper, 1983, p.37).
In 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand wrenched an agreement of Abdur Rahman Khan to this administrative border and guaranteed rich subsidies in return (Barfield, 2007, p.2). The Durand Line, about 2440 kilometers long, would cut ‘Pashtun country’ more or less in half. It is probably safe to assume that Abdur Rahman Khan did not intend this line to become an international border between nation states but rather a partition of administrative responsibilities. The Durand Agreement was signed in Kabul in November of 1893 and proclaimed under point 2: “The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this Line on the side of Afghanistan, and his Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this Line on the side of India” (Ahmed, 1983b, p.194). Nevertheless the treaty was regularly ignored by both sides. Keeping in mind that Kabul was only 80 kilometers from the tribal areas of the Indian side, British India could always deny involvement in tribal cross border raids, even when they were planned and paid for by their very own political agents. The British thus instigated troubles for Kabul along and across the Durand Line in many cases (Ahmed, 1983b, p.195). In addition, the actual status of the Durand Line also remained unclear because of the British perception that their dealings with Afghans were indeed internal colonial affairs as opposed to international ones (Barfield, 2007, p.4). Conditions in the tribal areas were also of strategic importance to Great Britain in the Great Game with Russia: tribes along the border had held a decisive “role in determining who was to hold power in Afghanistan” but proved to be “a mixed asset to the British” which “kept them anxious and alert.” (Ahmed, 1983b, p.195).

Rooted in their lasting cultural, political, economic and kinship relations, the Pashtuns who lived in the regions along the Durand Line viewed this arbitrary division “as illegitimate” (Barfield, 2007, p.2). Afghanistan de facto concurred with British India to the Durand Line as its border when the country reached full independence after the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. Yet they fundamentally rejected the borders validity when Pakistan was founded in 1947. “Afghanistan’s most radical objection was that the Pashtun regions should not have had to choose between joining India or Pakistan, but should have been offered the additional options of becoming an independent state or

---

61 It was plotted along “a topographic ridgeline that could be held at strongpoints blocking key mountain passes” (Cullather, 2002, p.516).
62 I would speculate that Pashtun leaders just did not care much about the British drawing some lines on paper, knowing about the conditions on the ground and about the limited influence the British had on their fellow Pashtuns in the tribal areas.
joining with Afghanistan.” (Barfield, 2007, p.2). Furthermore, Afghans held the view that compacts signed with British India would, after the British gave up their engagements in South Asia, naturally be destined to lose their validity (Cullather, 2002, p.519). Even though they might not have shared many other political views, all “Afghan regimes in Kabul (monarchist, republican, communist, Islamist, and democratic) have [. . . ] maintained the policy of refusing to grant de jure recognition to the existing border with Pakistan” (Barfield, 2007, p.2f). These arguments have further complicated the already strained relations between the two countries over the last 65 years and, especially between the 1950s and the 1970s, have “brought both countries several times to the brink of war” (Schetter, 2005, p.59).

On the ground the Durand Line is far less apparent than political maps might lead us to believe. It runs through rocky, mountainous areas mostly inhabited by subsistence farmers in remotely dispersed villages. Since government authority has mostly been “non-existent in the area of the line”, “since it is poorly demarcated in most places, and not demarcated at all in others” the “local populations have never paid much attention to it” and “cross the border at will and do not treat it as a boundary.” (Barfield, 2007, p.3).

Barfield argues that the underlying modern day conflict is in fact caused by a variety of social, economic and political problems that affect both countries (Barfield, 2007, p.6). Furthermore, the fact that in the last ten years the area had become a sanctuary for Islamist non-state actors who want to overthrow both governments in Kabul and Islamabad and the intensification of violence has considerably increased instability in the region. In recent years Pashtun nationalism seems to become less important in Afghanistan but to be flourishing in Pakistan’s NWFP: the call for the creation of Pashtunistan appears to be driven not least by the fact that Pashtuns in Pakistan “are a minority group in a much larger population” and see themselves as “disadvantaged politically” whereas Afghan Pashtuns constitute the “dominant ethnic group that controlled the government there for more than two centuries” (Barfield, 2007, p.8). The earlier Afghan nationalism was originally invigorated by “newly-emerging Pashtun intellectual circles” which were “influenced by a German National Socialist ideology, which gained momentum in Afghanistan during the 1930s and the early 1940s” (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.100). Based on this ideology also the Afghan press described Pashtuns as being “the “Aryans of the East”, as “the sole civilized nation” amidst a “sea of barbarian people””. (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.100).
The more recent Pashtun ethno-nationalist assertions are directed not only against Islamabad but also against radical Islamists who “have undermined ethnic and tribal unity through their emphasis on a global pan-Islamic identity” which conflicts the Pashtun nationalists’ notion “that Pashtun identity is rooted in traditions older than Islam.” (Barfield, 2007, p.8).

Advocates of the creation of a Pashtun nation see the Indus as being its natural eastern boundary, a claim that would carve out “more than half of Pakistan’s territory.” (Barfield, 2007, p.18). Pakistan has claimed legal title to the lands east of the line since its very foundation, stating the prerogative as a legal successor of British India. Therefore Pakistan is not inclined to negotiate the border at all, although, like the British, they never prevailed to impose any direct governmental authority or national state laws “in the old Tribal Agencies, now renamed the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)” (Barfield, 2007, p.4). In short: the fact that Pakistan is unable to exercise state power over the FATA region or its people further complicates the border issue since “the recognition of a state’s legal title to a territory assumes it has both the will and the ability to exert its authority over it.” (Barfield, 2007, p.5). On the other hand, locals seem to be somewhat satisfied with the border issue not being resolved since this discord facilitates their repudiation of state authority in general - no matter where it is intended to be exercised from (Barfield, 2007, p.6).

3.3 Preliminary Events to the Soviet Intervention

Throughout the decades leading up to the Soviet invasion Afghanistan was ruled by members of the Muhammadzai branch of the Barakzai who were related to Dost Mohammed Khan (1826 - 1839 and 1843 - 1863). Nadir Shah (1929 - 1933), a successful commander during the Third Anglo-Afghan War, proclaimed a new constitution in 1931, defining Afghanistan as a constitutional monarchy. He founded the first Afghan university in Kabul in 1931/32, invested in infrastructure and continued some of Amanullah’s reforms. His influence was based on the tribes who first enabled his ascendency to the throne and on the “urban classes” who were “most interested in the development of a secular state” (Tapper, 1983, p.37). Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1933 and succeeded by

---

63They include “seven semi-autonomous agencies previously created by the British (Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, South Waziristan, and North Waziristan) as well as the NWFP tribal areas adjoining Peshawar (Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan) (Barfield, 2007, p.4).

64His great grandfather was Dost Mohammed Khan’s brother.
his 19-year-old son Zahir Shah whose reign lasted until a successful coup against him in 1973 removed him from power. He was ousted by his first cousin and brother-in-law Muhammad Daoud Khan who had served as secretary of defense, ambassador to France, commander of the Afghan armed forces and prime minister (1953 - 1963) (Shahrani, 2002, p.719). The coup took place while Zahir Shah received medical treatment in Italy. Muhammad Daoud ended the monarchy, proclaimed Afghanistan to be a republic and himself to be its president. King Zahir Shah, officially resigned in order to avoid a bloody civil war.

To explain these events, which will turn out to set the parameters for the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, let me go back in time once more: Afghanistan joined the United Nations in 1946 and due to the British withdrawal from India after the Second World War, Afghans sought to gain economic assistance from other sources and turned to the United States, “who reluctantly became involved” (Tapper, 1983, p.37f). Daoud, holding influential positions also before becoming prime minister, tended to rely less on tribal diplomacy in order to control tribes but rather on modern weapons and a strengthening of the armed forces. He tried to spur revolts in western Pakistan, contesting the Durand Line and promoting a greater Pashtunistan, attempts which all in all failed. After some fruitless efforts to gain military aid from the United States he turned to the Soviet Union. They willingly provided not only military equipment but also advisors and training programs for the armed forces and built a strong influence particularly “in the tank corps and the air force” which would “grow and eventually surface as political power in 1978” (Tapper, 1983, p.38). Even though his alignment with the Soviet Union was dubious to many (except for very meagre pro-Soviet leftist groups) he was widely respected by Afghans for his accomplishments “in attracting subsidies and aid for public projects” and for his ability to preserve public order, notwithstanding the sometimes brutal repression he employed (Tapper, 1983, p.38). In 1963 he had to leave power: Zahir Shah wanted to ease tensions with Pakistan and decided to sacrifice Daoud.

Born in 1915 Zahir Shah was the last king of Afghanistan. He died in 2007 after reentering Afghan politics in 2002. He had spent 29 years in exile in Italy and was considered to be a rival candidate to the US-backed Hamid Karzai, ready to be appointed king again by a loya jirga, or to lead the nation as president. Though highly respected by many he could not garner enough support to really threaten Karzai’s rise to power.

Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah and Daoud Khan formed “the so-called Musahiban-dynasty” (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.100).

The Great Game had swapped actors and turned into the Cold War, now the US and the Soviet Union battled for influence throughout the world. The US provided agricultural aid since the Truman era, a policy that was intensified, especially for Helmand province under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (Cullather, 2002, p.530).
the outspoken and militarily active opponent to the Durand Line as Pakistan’s western border. The following decade was strongly influenced by Zahir Shah’s new constitution, “marking a shift of power from the monarch to the urban elite, together with an accommodation to traditional tribal and rural leadership in the elected parliament.” (Tapper, 1983, p.38). The king actively sought to establish a stronger involvement of the United States in order to counterbalance growing Soviet advances. Bureaucratic inefficiencies, increasing corruption and the nonperformance of food aid to central and north-western parts of the country which were stricken by droughts and subsequent famine (1970 - 1972) did not suffice to create major political opposition to Zahir Shah. It was the political left which had used the new freedoms provided by Zahir Shah’s constitution to build a powerful organization. By these means it was able to pass on ample subsidies received from the Soviets and to maintain its strong influence in the armed forces. Yet, the left’s power was unproportionally sparsely reflected in other government institutions or the parliament, where it held a numerically fairly negligible amount of seats. With its leverage expanding, the left managed to install Daoud as president in the almost bloodless 1973 overthrow, which is described by Tapper as more of a palace coup than a revolution (Tapper, 1983, p.39). The political climate was tense: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had become Pakistani prime minister the same year (after already being president since 1971) and Pakistan had lost the Indo-Pakistani winter war of 1971. This embarrassing defeat might have contributed to the aggressive posturing of Bhutto along the Durand Line and coincided with renewed Afghan calls for the creation of a Pashtunistan, abnegating the lawfulness of the border and its engagement in covert operations in the NWFP - which, as mentioned above, matched with Daoud’s long held position on the topic (Tapper, 1983, p.39). The frontier issue taking center stage in a foreign policy conflict also facilitated the Soviet Union portraying itself as Afghanistan’s staunchest ally, countering the strong relation between Bhutto and US-President Nixon. Soon though Daoud attempted to reduce his satellization from the Soviets and dependency on the Afghan left by starting negotiations with Bhutto. Their first of several meetings in Kabul and Pakistan was facilitated and negotiated by Shah Reza Pahlavi (Wahidi-Wardak, 68). Pakistan had started the war with a preemptive strike against Indian airbases in the so-called ‘Operation Chengiz Khan’. The war lasted only for 13 days and resulted in 2 to 3 million dead civilians, 8 to 10 million people fleeing to India and the secession of eastern Pakistan, called Bangladesh from then on. Pakistan’s population was reduced by almost 50%, one third of the military was imprisoned by India and the Pakistani surrender had become even more humiliating due to the relative ease with which India had so outright defeated them.
The Russians and Indians were wary of the rapprochement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The former particularly because Daoud tried to get rid of communist Parchamis in influential positions at the time (Wahidi-Wardak, 1990, p.98). Shortly before arriving at an agreement Bhutto was overthrown by Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. Daoud attempted to Pashtunize Afghanistan. For example he “prohibited the use of ethnic surnames and ethnonymes, and put an end to a modest plurilingualism on the national radio, where only Pashtu and Dari were to be used” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 2000, p.421). Minority groups were regularly exposed to suppressive government authorities. Yet in the 1970’s some easing of this policies acknowledged the right to cultural self-expression for Uzbeks and Baluchs for a brief period of time (Tapper, 1988, p.26). Daoud hoped to achieve something like a ‘national integration’ of Afghanistan’s “heterogeneous populations” based on the concept that “economic and political development would bring the withering of cultural, regional and tribal distinctions.” (Tapper, 1988, p.25). At the same time he was “avoiding direct political involvement at local levels” and, as his predecessors, “tried to create a consensus [. . .] with the Pashtun tribal chiefs, the ulema and leaders of the various non-tribal groups” (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2004, p.100).

It is important to remember that in Afghanistan “the state’s finances remained primarily dependent upon foreign subsidies” (Hager, 1983, p.106). Daoud therefore tried to reach out to Americans again but “post-Vietnam, post-Watergate America gave no diplomatic priority to Afghanistan and made little effort to counter growing Soviet influence.” (Tapper, 1983, p.39). This would change in 1979 under President Jimmy Carter, especially through strategies developed by his still famous national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (Prados, 2002, p.467). Until then though, Daoud turned to the American proxy in the region, Shah Reza Pahlavi, who was willing to assist in curbing the left’s influence and allocate some of Iran’s oil wealth to this cause. Soon the Persian Shah was “forced to cut back expenditure” (Tapper, 1983, p.39). In early 1978 Iran was already caught up in the beginnings of its own revolution-to-come. Being abandoned by the Shah amidst worsening political and economic circumstances in Afghanistan further isolated Daoud internationally and within the country.

---

69 After Zia-ul-Haq had gained control over the court judging Bhutto in a homicide case, the latter, while still very popular among Pakistanis and thus a potential danger to the new leaders, was sentenced to death and executed in April 1979.

70 Henry Kissinger’s priorities were apparently set on Latin and middle America as well as East-Timor.
At the end of April 1978, as a reaction to mass demonstrations incited by the communist people’s party (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan; PDPA), Muhammad Daoud decided to try to curtail the left on his own. This caused “the armed forces, led by the Soviet-dominated tank corps and air force” to strike against him in the so-called Saur Revolution71, killing Daoud and his entire family within their Kabul palace and thus bringing to an end nearly 250 years of Durrani rule.

4 The Soviet Intervention, 1978 - 1989

For the last 250 years Afghanistan “has known hardly any periods of peace”, but this new conflict resulted “in an unprecedented level of violence” (Monsutti, 2010, p.55). Afghanistan was now officially called the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The new government was formed by the PDPA which consisted mainly of a small urban elite which was soon entangled in internal rivalries. The party might have had 10,000 members at the most, “roughly comparable to a smaller border tribe” and “no more than 3,000 troops were actually engaged in fighting on both sides during the two-day coup.” (Hager, 1983, p.110). The part of the armed forces loyal to the PDPA was, from a military organizational point of view, clearly not able to control the country and was soon reinforced by about 6000 Soviet military and civilian advisors (Hager, 1983, p.110). The two main opposing factions inside the PDPA were formed by rather radical students and non-Durrani Pashtuns of the so-called Khalqi faction, claiming a ‘true proletarian revolution’ under the lead of Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin on the one side. On the other side there was the Parchami faction, headed by Babrak Karmal and constituted by “middle-class intellectual Tajiks and Persian-speaking Pashtuns” who “followed their Soviet mentors’ line in labeling the revolution ‘national democratic’.” (Tapper, 1983, p.40)72. They split the most important posts among them. Amin became prime minister and Taraki president, and Karmal was neutralized through his nomination as ambassador to Prague.

71 It was called Saur Revolution because it took place in the lunar month of Saur (Taurus) which is the second month of the Iranian calendar, 21st of April - 21st of May (Gossman, 2001, p.9).

72 There were also some minor factions or ‘sects’ like the Setami Milli, who kidnapped the US-ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubs, in 1979 in order to free their political leader Badruddin Bahes. The government refused to negotiate and Dubs was killed in the Kabul Hotel where he was held. Setami Milli was marginalized for some years but their militias later played an important role in fighting Ahmad Shah Mahsud in the north (Prados, 2002, p.467).
According to Richard Tapper some commentators perceived this Afghan revolution as another manifestation of an enduring conflict between Durrani and Ghilzai. Many members of the new cabinet where Ghilzai, as well as Taraki and Amin, a fact which was also “used to canvas support in the Ghilzai homeland between Kandahar and Ghazni” (Tapper, 1983, p.40). There is some evidence though that the alleged tribal conflict was not a dominant factor: even though also these new actors would assign numerous family members to important posts (which by the way brought forward mutual charges of nepotism which was considered inconsistent with a socialist agenda). Their almost entirely urban political base ideologically “rejected tribal organisation as backward or ‘feudal’” (Hager, 1983, p.108). Government officials, always dressed in Western, modern clothes “did not hesitate to express their feelings of superiority” and considered the “traditionally dressed, turban-wearing residents of rural Afghanistan” to be an embarrassment in their “backward” ways (Barfield, 1981, p.161).

The revolution enjoyed substantial popular approval at its very start, fueled by peasants and laborers working for supressive Pashtun landlords becoming increasingly cognizant of common class interests. The communist party began an extensive propaganda operation aimed at casting “traditional khans and religious leaders as ‘feudal’ lords responsible for keeping the Afghan masses enslaved and impoverished” (Edwards, 1998, p.716). Until then “objective class positions (based on occupation or relation to the means of production) had not commanded “loyalties stronger than those to qaum, watan, or mazhab” (Tapper, 1989, p.237). The new government put some reforms in place, pursuing secularization, “land reform, cancellation of rural debt, and abolition of brideprice” as well as an emphasis on education, building schools for boys and girls, raising the age for marriages and many other changes they hoped would prove popular (Tapper, 1983, p.40). PDPA-leaders, notably Taraki, avoided to speak

---

73 There are some reliable numbers from 1986 indicating that 69% of the 111,000 party members were from Kabul (Giustozzi, 2000, p.11).

74 One reason why this strategy might not have worked out is that “it was common for the wealthy [ . . . ] to reinvest their profits in [ . . . ] maintaining a cohort of allies and followers” (Edwards, 1998, p.717). The wealthy khans were obliged by tradition to redistribute parts of their wealth, for example through maintaining a guesthouse for the village, “various ritual acts of redistribution” and through supporting allies in need (Edwards, 1998, p.718). Being a khan itself already implies generosity “and so long they fulfilled societal expectations [ . . . ] few begrudged them their good fortune” (Edwards, 1998, p.718). See also p.42 and p.43 for more information.

75 David B. Edwards argues that a “far more radical” innovation than these policies was the notion “that kinship didn’t matter, that literally anyone could lead the nation.” (Edwards, 2002, p.22). The pedigrees of the new leadership were unknown to most Afghans. “In a society where family background mattered a great deal” and was constitutive for a man’s identity this
of ‘communism’ since it was viewed to be irreconcilable with Islam and preferably used the label ‘socialism’ and “paid lip-service to both Islam and tribal values” in order to attenuate the growing alienation with key players (Hager, 1983, p.108). Otherwise the government was “fatally ignorant of affairs in the countryside” and of tribal power balances (Tapper, 1983, p.39). “Despite offers of free land and the government’s promise to cancel outstanding debts” the rural populations grew increasingly dissatisfied with the new leaders and “village after village initiated attacks against government offices, schools, and military posts” (Edwards, 1998, p.716). What is seen as women’s rights issues nowadays was perceived by tribesmen as an infringement on their namus (see also: p.39)\textsuperscript{76}. More specifically, Glatzer stated his sources would claim not opposing girl schools or education for women per se, but objected to the force applied in the implementation and decried the latter as contradicting their obligation to protect female and household honor (Glatzer, 2000, p.95). Or as Glatzer put it: “the state’s transgression of the line between the public and the private (namus) meant war.” (Glatzer, 1998, p.5). Ironically, the PDPA and their Soviet patrons had calculated on expanding their social base by enabling female emancipation\textsuperscript{77} (Giustozzi, 2000, p.20).

Due to the unapologetic fashion displayed while introducing these reforms, the exceeding brutality in the communist’s handling of opponents and due to the increasing Soviet presence, resistance augmented. The old monarchistic, urban elites on the contrary “were more likely to flee to the West than to engage in resistance.” (Barnett, 1995, p.185). Though notoriously disunited, opposition groups formed in urban centers as well as in rural areas all over the country (Tapper, 1983, p.40). Coming from different backgrounds they pursued quite distinct goals: the frontier tribes of the Afghan-Pakistan border received extensive coverage in Western media, fighting in the name of Islam and with the ambition to restore Pashtun dominance (Tapper, 1983, p.41). Other Pashtun tribes have sought to accommodate with the regime and displayed a rather ambiguous attitude in face of the new rulers in Kabul. Despite some of the fiercest...
Islamic opposition groups, namely Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks received considerable aid from several Muslim countries and especially (since 1979) from Iran, according to Tapper, there was not a great appetite within Afghanistan to establish an Islamic Republic (Tapper, 1983, p.41). Yet the explicit goal to roll back the Soviet atheism was an important rallying cry. Edwards interpreted these events in a slightly different way. He disagreed with Tapper and Ahmed who said the presence of menacing, foreign, infidel intruders had caused the occurrence of an “atavistic” Islamic spirit (Edwards, 1998, p.719). Instead he stated that conversations with his informants lead him to believe that “a deep sense of dread and uncertainty” was “generated by the sudden appearance of helicopters, MiG jets, and artillery barrages.” (Edwards, 1998, p.719). The modern military hardware and the “realities of high-tech modern warfare” caused a “crisis in confidence” (Edwards, 1998, p.719). Old but still strong ideals of heroism and behavior in battle did not make sense anymore. “Islam helped to fill this void” and particularly “the promise of immortality and eternal paradise” resonated forcefully among fighters (Edwards, 1998, p.719).

In 1979 a tribal rebellion started and spread from Nuristan, “one of the least accessible regions of Afghanistan” in the northeast of Kabul, and “spread to neighbouring Pashtun tribes and other parts of the country, eventually forcing the PDPA to call in substantial reinforcements of Soviet troops.” (Hager, 1983, p.110). Meanwhile, the government was embroiled in extensive infighting. Over the years several thousand officials of the rivaling parties were arrested and later reports accounted that “gunfights have taken place in high-level government and party meetings” (Collins, 1990, p.182). Assassination attempts and intrigues involving the factions’ competition for Leonid Brezhnev’s and the Moscow Politburo’s support were the order of the day. This climate resulted in Taraki being assassinated “by his former disciple and successor Hafizullah Amin” in October 1979. Finally Amin, who had asked for sup-

---

78 For instance the Shiite Hazara were strongly supported by Iran but not “doctrinally committed to” Khomeini (Tapper, 1983, p.41). There were many more opposition groups, such as maoist union members, supported by China, Baluchs, Brahuis and others which I can not fully list or describe in this paper.

79 Taraki had just come back from a trip to Cuba and the Soviet Union, where he had met Brezhnev. Amin had been afraid for a while, that Taraki would conspire against him. When an informant within the Taraki camp, Sayyid Daud Tarun, told Amin that Brezhnev had agreed to form a new coalition between Taraki and Karmal, which would have meant the ouster of Amin, the latter saw the time come for a political killing. Shortly after Taraki’s return to Kabul, Amin was summoned to a meeting at the Politburo in a Kabul palace. The suspicious Amin agreed to go there only after Soviet adviser and the Soviet ambassador had assured him it was safe. It turned out to be a trap anyway. Amin escaped an intense gun battle, returned with some units of the armed forces and the Interior ministry and managed to
port through Soviet armed forces, and 200 of his personal guards were killed by Spetsnaz, the Soviet special forces, during Operation Storm-333 at the end of December 1979. Soviet ground forces had begun to move into Afghanistan from the north, with an initial force level of 80,000 soldiers. It was soon raised to 100,000 by massive air transportation of military hardware and troops directly to Kabul. Later on troop levels would be raised to 120,000 Soviet army troops (complemented by 40,000 Afghans), supported by “another 50,000 air force and support troops in the southern part of the Soviet Union” (Collins, 1990, p.183).

Babak Karmal was called back to Afghanistan and installed as president and prime minister while resistance increased and the communists’ Afghan and Soviet troops fully engaged in war against the mujahedin guerrilla (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.71). Karmal had the circumstances of Taraki’s death published, resulting in the latter achieving the status of a ‘martyr’ for the revolution and Amin being described as ‘hangman’ (Edwards, 2002, p.56). In this “very first period of the Soviet intervention a sense of relief prevailed among the Afghan population, as at least the bloody dictatorship of Amin had ended” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.10). Still, the resistance across most parts of the population was soon to increase.

The US administration under President Carter had already been alarmed about the developments of the recent months and had started funding and equipping mujahedin groups by July of 1979, a program in which they would invest billions of dollars over the next decade. The secret CIA program to fund, train and arm mujahedin was called Operation Cyclone and was intensified under President Reagan. Estimates about the total cost range from 4 billion to 40 billion dollars. The CIA even provided (more than two thousand) Stinger

secretly arrest Taraki. The Soviet ambassador, Mr. Puzanov was warned to leave the country and was later replaced by Moscow with Mr. Tabeyev (Wahidi-Wardak, 1990, p.101). Amin spread rumors that Taraki was seriously ill, soon thereafter newspapers reported he had died after long suffering. Sayyid Daud Tarun disappeared as well, besides informations about his burial in a family graveyard nothing is known about the circumstances (Edwards, 2002, p.56). Some sources claim, Tarun was killed when he threw himself in front of Amin to protect him from gunfire during the ambush at the palace (Wahidi-Wardak, 1990, p.101). An account of the officer who was charged with killing Taraki, Lieutenant Muhammad Iqbal, can be found in Edward’s 2002 publication which depicts the murder in great detail. Nevertheless, the Soviets wanted to pursue their plan of a coalition with Karmal, which meant they had to get rid of Amin (Edwards, 2002, p.56). Amin was still convinced that the major concentration of Soviet military forces at the northern border was “nothing to worry about as the Soviets were good friends of Afghanistan” (Wahidi-Wardak, 1990, p.102).

80 The Reagan Doctrine “increased US support of anticommmunist insurgencies against Soviet-backed regimes in various parts of the Third World”, the president referred to the mujahedin mainly as “freedom fighters” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.342).
missiles\textsuperscript{81} and cooperated with MI6 and SAS from Britain, with Saudi Arabia, but first and foremost with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) - which also provided training facilities\textsuperscript{82}. Over 100,000 mujahedin were trained that way. General Zia ul-Haq “was more than eager to oblige the Americans, not only to obtain US economic aid but also to bolster the legitimacy of his military rule” after ousting the “democratically elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.343). In addition, Pakistan was now locked between enemy powers along its two longest borders (more than 2400 km with Afghanistan and over 2900 km with India), and confronted with an adversarial or even hostile Shiite Iran. Therefore the control of the Afghan resistance was also in Pakistan’s geostrategic interest not only as fighters who would cause trouble for any enemy but also increasing their leverage in diplomatic confrontations\textsuperscript{83} (Matinuddin, 1990, p.220, and Kepel, 2002, p.3, p.11). Saudi Arabia is said to have contributed at least 3 billion dollars, coming up to their reputation of being “lavish funders of anti-leftist forces around the globe” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.342).

The whole effort was lead by a Cold War mentality which aimed at harassing and containing the Soviets at all cost (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.342). “While the war was waged in Afghanistan, it was in fact an international conflict between superpowers which ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union” (Rzehak, 2011, p.21). The Islamic groups had been very successful “in gaining foreign support or recognition” and subsequently “no foreign power […] supported secular or nationalist leaders.” (? , p.193). The constant flow of aid and resources to Islamist groups might have contributed to the growing identification and alignment of resistance fighters which formerly did not care so much about religious ideology, with those groups. “Pressures of the war also led some commanders who had been traditionalists to defect to the Islamist parties.” (Barnett, 1995, p.228).

Several attempts by Pashtun-dominated monarchists and secular nationalists to establish a Loya Jirga (see

\textsuperscript{81}Americans later grew alarmed by the extremity that they had helped to create and arm and tried to get the missiles back. They invested 65 million dollars and got about 200 of them back (Prados, 2002, p.471).

\textsuperscript{82}Besides Pakistan’s geostrategic interest, many observers viewed its engagement in the insurgency as part of a larger ‘proxy war’ between Sunni Pakistan and Shiite Iran (Shahrani, 2002, p.716).

\textsuperscript{83}The Soviets, aware of and discontent with Pakistan’s role, threatened that there could be a military confrontation if Zia ul-Haq’s government continues its support of the mujahedin. Mr. Kapitsa, then Deputy Foreign Minister said that “if they continue to support the ‘bandits’, Pakistan will be taught such a lesson that it will not forget it for a hundred years” (Matinuddin, 1990, p.227). At the same time the Soviets financed “individual tribal people to sow the seed of hatred among the refugees and the people of Pakistan’ and to have infiltrated refugee camps as well as Pakistani security forces (Weinbaum, 1990, p.205, p.211).
in Pakistani exile failed and ultimately “dissolved when the Saudi religious establishment prevailed upon King Fahd to maintain support only for the Islamist groups” (Barnett, 1995, p.195). The internationalization of the conflict gave mujahedins the feeling to be “global players” of tremendous importance (Rzehak, 2011, p.21). For more information about the implications of this massive influx of military and economic aid to Islamists see also chapter 4.3.

The PDPA-government continued to lose legitimacy among more and more tribes. Especially the presence of foreign troops provoked strong reactions among the Afghan population (Giustozzi, 2000, p.10). Yet, not only the fact that the PDPA had called in foreign troops contributed to the resistance, particularly the “unprecedented destruction in the tribal areas” forced local populations to react (Hager, 1983, p.109). Additionally, the regime in Kabul had to rely increasingly on the Soviet troops, since its own army was “being depleted by defections and desertions, besides the attrition of war.” (Hager, 1983, p.109). Especially the officer class of the army suffered massive desertions. “For they were more nationalist than Islamist” most officers “had been comparatively loyal so long as” they received their orders from an Afghan government (Roy, 1986, p.119). They strongly opposed the invasion and could not stand “the idea that in the future they would have to be advised by arrogant Soviet officers.” (Roy, 1986, p.119).

There are indications that the Soviet leadership initially attempted to achieve political accommodation with influential tribes. However, their “perceived hostility to Islam” and their failure to emulate British strategies which combined “occasional show of force in punitive expeditions, subsidies and tribal politics conducted through political agents” and which maintained “a tolerable modus vivendi with the tribes on their side of the Durand line for nearly a century” prohibited a constructive rapprochement (Hager, 1983, p.109). Especially the brutality and “ruthlessness with which the Soviet military” acted and which “seemed aimed at rapid pacification” (compare the modern shock and awe strategy) would backfire “badly in a protracted conflict with tribesmen, for whom the blood feud is a cultural imperative.” (Hager, 1983, p.114).

---

Wealthy Arabs were impressed by Afghan Islamic leaders such as Abdur Rasul Sayyaf, who sympathized with Wahhabism, and were “eager to bankroll the Afghan jihad” with their oil money (Edwards, 2002, p.154). Inter alia they used the Saudi Red Crescent to channel funds to Afghan and Pakistani Islamists. Later on economic support for the “nonmilitary needs of the fighters” especially from Norway, Denmark, Sweden and France increased, and “the USAID effort ultimately dwarfed the others.” (Barnett, 1995, p.231f).
The *jihad* now proclaimed not only by Afghans but by most Muslim countries, no matter if Sunni or Shi'ite, facilitated the traditional role Islam performs in “transcending the tribal order” (Hager, 1983, p.113). Yet, “the bulk of the jihadi movement was initially represented by local notables, naturally disinclined to accept the ideologisation of jihad as Islamic revolution, sponsored by the Islamists” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.43).

The Afghan *jihad* soon became the banner of a newly formed transnational political Islam. Muslim fighters from many Arab countries joined the cause. Despite “their intense devotion to Islam, Afghans, by and large, had no great fondness for Arabs” and their cooperation in *jihad* did not change that (Edwards, 2002, p.156). They were perceived as “overbearing and insensitive” to tribal traditions and loyalties such as respecting elders or being considerate of civilian populations in combat zones (Edwards, 2002, p.156). Furthermore, the Arab mujahedeen were ill-reputed among Afghans for being extraordinarily ruthless and they were seen as “zealots who had come to Afghanistan to prove a point and build their movement” but “had no particular affection or respect for the people living in the country where they were fighting” (Edwards, 2002, p.156). Afghans portrayed a strong preference “for homegrown versions of Islamic radicalism” and rejected religio-political influence of foreign Islamic ideologues, “particularly those branded as Wahhabis” (Edwards, 2002, p.157).

Among Pashtuns the ideology of *jihad*, functioning as a lubricant for the temporal display of outward unity, quite effectively protected tribal organizations from being penetrated and manipulated by the communists’ intelligence services which attempted to use traditional rivalries between *qāum* (see p.23 for definition) to turn tribes on each other (Roy, 1986, p.178). The official Islamic terminology also superseded the traditional terminology of the *Pashtunwali*. Since it was no more a battle of only Pashtuns, the fighters were not called *arbaki* or *tur'ialai* (see also p.44 and p.42) anymore (Glatzer, 2000, p.100). Instead they called themselves *mujahedin* (literally: ‘those who fight the jihad’). Not only the fighters who were killed, and who in Islamic view became martyrs, obtained religious titles such as *shahid* (‘the one who attested to his faith’) but also refugees and their hosts housing them were called *muhajer* (like the prophet during his emigration to Medina) and *ansar* (like the prophet’s friends in Medina) (Glatzer, 2000, p.100). Even though the *shahid* is promised to enter paradise without disquisition of his sins, the Pashtun mujahedeen preferred to portray themselves as *ghazi* (victorious fighters and conquerors for Islam) because their traditional concept of *turā* (being a warrior, courage, sword, see also
p.42) rather corresponds with being confident of victory than with self-sacrifice (Glatzer, 2000, p.101). The jihad, as a holy war for Islam, has “to be conducted irrespective of success” and represents, according to Prophet Mohammed’s words in the Koran, the highest stage of being a Muslim, which “only the best of them attain” (Ahmed, 1983a, p.94 and p.97). Evidence for the growing politicization of Islam was produced by Muslim leaders from many countries, one of the most powerful, Ayatollah Khomeini, stated in view of the Afghan war that “today Islam is confronting the super-powers” (Hager, 1983, p.113). Notwithstanding this growing influence of a potentially uniting Islamic political ideology, the Islamists were split in various rivaling factions. The “challenging geography of the country [ . . . ] made command and control of insurgent groups difficult” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.43). The Islamist parties were able to improve control over the battle groups associated with them with the “introduction of long-range radios in the early 1980s” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.43).

The factional struggle within the ruling PDPA continued despite the Moscow Politburo’s calls for unity (Giustozzi, 2000, p.81). The Khalq and Parcham factions were competing for influence especially in the security sector since this granted “control over means of violence” (Kipping, 2010, p.10). With the Khalqi dominating the army and police, the Parchami (led by Karmal and later his successor Najibullah) decided to build a security force they could control exclusively: under the patronage of the KGB they established “the notorious secret service KhAD (Khedamat-e ettela’at-e doulat or ‘State Information Service’)” which “progressively grew to become the most effective and feared security force of the regime” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.99). The KhAD not only controlled potential opposition in urban centers but it likewise “infiltrated mujahedin groups, provided military intelligence, and directly participated in fighting” in a way that caused mujahedin groups to fear “KhAD more than they feared the Soviet army” (Kipping, 2010, p.10). In its function as a “political police”, the KhAD activities led to the arrest of at least “150,000 people before 1990” and the execution of more than 8,000 until 1988 (Giustozzi, 2000, p.99). The Parcham-faction of the PDPA did not even shy away from derailing the Soviets numerous attempts to “decisively strengthen the Afghan army” in order to prohibit a growing influence of their rivaling faction, the Khalq (Kipping, 2010, p.10). The Afghan army’s infantry divisions were mere “paper entities: the different subunits did not have any contact among each other and not contact existed between them and the

85In its best times it was estimated to be at a force level of 40,000 men (Collins, 1990, p.182).
divisional command either” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.77). In short, the Afghan army suffered from a “high degree of internal disorganization […] coupled with low morale” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.76). Therefore the Afghan “military operations were particularly ineffective before 1983” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.71). Nevertheless, the Afghan army was somewhat recovering and “the military situation stabilised around 1983 and remained relatively unchanged until the Soviet withdrawal” (Kipping, 2010, p.7).

The implication of an effective counter-insurgency strategy “in such a large and rugged country was in itself a difficult task” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.76). At the time, “neither the Karmal government nor the Soviets had the skills or the ground knowledge to deal successfully with the grassroots”, tribal uprisings (Giustozzi, 2000, p.120). The original strategy of the Soviets “seems to have been to cleanse district by district with more or less massive military sweeps, a tactic of doubtful appropriateness to guerrilla wars” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.71). This decision was based in the fact that a permanent presence in the countryside would have required enormous manpower and would have implied not only a heavy financial burden but also an immense strain on the military. The strategy did not work out. After the Soviets moved out of a district, the insurgents would come back in and take power again. Until that moment about half of the foreign troops had been “busy with garrison duties and with the protection of economic assets” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.71). These circumstances soon led to a change in strategy. The Soviet leadership then engaged in a so-called “enclave strategy”, concentrating their military and civilian capacities on urban population centers (Kipping, 2010, p.15). Contemporaneously, they tried to strengthen their influence by financing and arming local militias in rural areas, totaling an estimated maximum number of 200,000 men countrywide (Giustozzi, 2000, p.199). These militias proved to be quite unreliable though, oftentimes acting independently and ignoring orders from the regime. Soon the “payments were stopped and the militias were asked to return the weapons, but they refused to comply” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.199). Many militiamen then joined the mujahedin resistance movement which was directed by Islamist parties in Pakistani exile (see p.89 for more information) (Giustozzi, 2000, p.199).

It is not clear though whether this approach was a “genuine strategy” or simply an adaption to limited resources (Kipping, 2010, p.2 and p.10). Yet, whatever the Soviet and Afghan military activities achieved “depended mostly on the sheer display of brute force and on the attrition which derived from it” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.72).
The socialist regime controlled about 20% of the Afghan territory during the day. At night their grip “shrunk to the 25 largest cities, the main transport routes, and industrial areas” (Kipping, 2010, p.7). A little bit more than 30% of the territory were contested and the mujahedin controlled about 50% of Afghanistan. This translated to about 5,500 villages out of 35,500 being controlled by the regime (Giustozzi, 2000, p.17). These villages were mostly those which were located close to “the main towns and roads” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.17). “Thus, by far the largest part of the territory stayed beyond control of the government.” (Kipping, 2010, p.7). Already by February 1980 most of the roads throughout the country were under control of the resistance (Giustozzi, 2000, p.10). This lack of control over large areas also expressed itself in a steep decline of tax revenue. Until 1978, the government had taken in about 280 million Afghanis in tax revenue per year. The amount had fallen to 16 million Afghanis in 1981, which is why “the government was not even able to pay its provincial employees” (Giustozzi, 2000, p.10).

The government tried to secure order in cities and maintain support from urban populations by applying “generous social policies”, subsidizing “energy and water supply, health services, public transport”, as well as a very popular “coupon system” providing “access to subsidised food and consumer goods from state-run cooperatives” and by providing “public housing for government employees” (Kipping, 2010, p.8). To relieve some of the military strain of the government and the Soviets, the PDPA sought to accommodate with mujahedin leaders by producing so-called ‘protocols’: this policy consisted of cease-fire agreements “and a commitment by the respective mujahedin commanders to deny other mujahedin groups” which “were still fighting access to their territory.” (Kipping, 2010, p.9). In exchange the government provided money, “military hardware and granted de facto autonomy to the respective area.” (Kipping, 2010, p.9). This practice was amplified under Mohammad Najibullah’s leadership who had succeeded Babrak Karmal in 1986 and who established it as a main pillar of his ‘Policy of National Reconciliation’. By the summer of 1988 the commanders of about “50,000 mujahedin fighters had signed” those protocols and “commanders of another 60,000 fighters were about to sign”86 (Kipping, 2010, p.9). The combination of this accommodation, rich social subsidies and

---

86 After the Soviet withdrawal Najibullah continued this policy which contributed to the fact that his regime could stay in power after the Soviet withdrawal. By the turn of the year 1991/’92 about three quarters of commanders had signed on to this approach (Kipping, 2010, p.9).
“high military expenditures” enabled the regime to “consolidate […] in the urban areas”, though at the cost of relinquishing the control of a substantial part of the Afghan territory (Kipping, 2010, p.9).

The nations supporting the mujahedin (most notably the USA, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan) relied to a great extent on Pakistan to function as an intermediary. Pakistan had not fully established its new military rule, was wary of its own inner potential for uprisings and the constancy of US-support. They allowed the stream of weapons to take its route but imposed “a quantitative and qualitative limit” on them. This meant that weapons “must not exceed a certain calibre (14.5mm for machine-guns and 82 mm for mortars) and were limited to “a ceiling […] on the degree of technological sophistication” - which barred certain kinds of missiles and state-of-the-art, modern weaponry (Roy, 1986, p.122). Whether the usage of this dated accoutrement necessarily implied a big disadvantage for the mujahedin could be disputed: most of these arms were robust, battle-tested, easy to use (requiring virtually no training), handle and repair and ammunition was more easily accessible due to their widespread circulation.

4.1 Traditional tribal warfare and its adaption under the influence of the Soviet occupation

During the two months after the Soviet invasion there was virtually no armed resistance in the rural areas of Afghanistan. The Soviets first targeted urban centers and parts of the national army still loyal to the old order and the regime-to-be did not immediately establish its most oppressive functions. Also the fact that the occupation had taken place in the middle of winter contributed to the lack of armed resistance. Even if, as mentioned, urban resistance declined from 1980 on, in “the provinces, the whole country joined the resistance except for a few pockets of supporters of the regime” (Roy, 1986, p.118). Babrak Karmal was generally perceived as a Soviet puppet, which spurred strong nationalist feelings even among people who had not become actively involved until that point. In February of 1980 the Russians started their first offensive against the resistance in order to keep supply routes open and Afghanistan entered “the classic spiral of repression followed by more resistance” (Roy, 1986, p.119).

At that time, “while the Afghan tribes had still been able to teach careless British imperialists a lesson or two […] during the 1978-1989 war the military inadequacy of tribal warfare became obvious” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.49). The
resistance of the Pashtun tribes was characterized by its organizational form, namely that of tribal warfare. It is a people’s war in which every adult is an active member and the framework of military activity is that of civil society.” (Roy, 1986, p.176). The army of the government proved to be unable to deal with the “mass uprising of fighting men” which followed each of its intrusions into the tribal areas (Roy, 1986, p.177). Tribal warriors were part-time soldiers who returned to their villages for harvest and family visits. This explains the regular explosion of violence during ‘fighting season’, usually the time window between winter and harvest, “followed by the break-up of the battle formations (lashkar) as the troops disappear back into the countryside” (Roy, 1986, p.176).

In some ways tribal warfare is also a kind of symbolic warfare that has to be distinguished from other military activity. It is not necessarily the goal of warring tribesmen to accomplish a specific strategic military objective, but to find a stage for exhibiting their prowess, “to obtain glory and the recognition of the prerogatives of the tribal group.” (Roy, 1986, p.177). This explains the somewhat “bizarre displays” of tribesmen in front of enemy military compounds, “taking pot-shots at a post that” they are “not actually trying to capture” (Roy, 1986, p.177). Tribal warfare is used as a warning, “a means of dissuasion and is carried out against a background of constant negotiation.” (Roy, 1986, p.177). Military activity, to the contrary, is clearly aimed at gaining booty and comes only second to the main purposes of tribal warfare. Traditional tribal warfare had the function of channelling “potential in-group violence over property rights and mate-preference toward out-group elements, usually neighboring tribes or subtribes within a tribe” (Dupree, 1984, p.270). Or in other words, this kind of warfare helped “drain off the sexually oriented, culturally induced, in-group aggressions” in a “seasonal process of externalising internal aggression” (Dupree, 1984, p.270). This “simply means shooting the hell out of strangers rather than one’s kinsmen.” (Dupree, 1984, p.270). The aforementioned codes of honor and shame as well as badal (revenge or “exchange”, reciprocity; see also p.39 and p.41) demand for an approximately equal amount of “blood spilled and property looted” on both sides and therefore allows either party to claim victory (Dupree, 1984, p.272). Dupree further stated that in combination with female infant-
cide the tribal warfare functioned as a population control mechanism (Dupree, 1984, p.281). He also stressed that tribal warfare had an “entertainment aspect”. During periods of relative leisure, namely the off-times from agricultural or herding activities from late fall until spring, widespread boredom set in, especially in very remote areas. These long periods of inactivity, monotony and ennui contributed to the tribesmen’s inclination to embark in bellicose endeavors (Dupree, 1984, p.267 and p.281). Typically this kind of warfare produced only a limited number of casualties. “Enough are killed, however, to keep everyone’s adrenalin up, and contesting groups remain emotionally tuned for the next round.” (Dupree, 1984, p.270).

Tribal warfare was confronted with internal obstacles when it came to ‘adequately’ responding to Soviet aggression, namely the forms of tribal societal organization, which, as we will find out in this chapter, also proved to be the tribes biggest asset. In order to wage war against an occupier like the Soviets, tribes had to act on a regional or even national level, as opposed to them traditionally being tied to the local level. Yet, only few organized resistance movements “extended beyond the immediate” qaum (see p.23 for definition) and were able to establish supra-regional “political or military leadership” (Barnett, 1995, p.195). Normally armed tribal groups would not leave their own territory except for “attacking ‘detribalised’ targets, such as large bazaars which are not situated in any specific tribal territory, and which are not run by any clearly recognisable group.” (Roy, 1986, p.173). These limitations are predefined by the concept of qaum with its potential to contribute to internal tribal disunity. There are for instance numerous possibilities for misapprehension if an armed tribal group becomes active in the territory of another tribe. They might be perceived as members of a rivaling qaum rather than of the ummah (see p.30 for definition). Furthermore, it is not possible to sustain a tribal army under weapons for longer periods of time. As soon as the actual fighting against a common enemy was over “the traditional rivalries between” different qaum surfaced. Most lashkar (see p.25 and p.44 for definition) avoided these rivalries and further internal struggle through a swift post-battle disintegration and simply going back home. Traditionally there was a “clear separation” between civil and military tasks. A lashkar would not interfere in social matters of its village and as soon as a fighter returned home he did so as a member of his family and not as “a representative of the resistance movement” or a distinct warring party.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{90}Also in the long history of Afghan regime changes the reintegreation of urbanized government officials in their original rural and tribal communities mostly went about “smoothly and
The tribes operated within a dichotomized framework which clearly defined the time for peace and the time for war as well as the place for battle (sangar) and the “place of sanctuary (the village)” (Roy, 1986, p.177). The way Pashtuns traditionally approached war generally implied that villages are safe and battles are waged far away from the civil society which keeps going about its business. It was imperative to them that “women and children are left alone, farming and trading continue as if nothing has happened.” (Roy, 1986, p.177). The Soviets of course did not care much about this “precise space-time framework” (Roy, 1986, p.176). If they decided to become active at all, they rather engaged in an all out war, burning harvests and carpet-bombing villages which not only constrained replenishment of supplies of the resistance fighters but also had a devastating effect on their morale. This caused many of the Pashtun tribes which were unable to adapt to flee the country. Those who were able to spare their villages of Soviet attacks usually did so by retreating fighters into remote mountain areas which they subsequently held under their control. In general though, traditional Pashtun tribal warfare was not well suited to compete against an enemy army engaging in this kind of modern warfare.

The response to this military challenge was the establishment of ‘permanent battle groups’. “The ideology of tribal warfare” with its emphasis on booty or individual heroism, was replaced by the ideology of jihad. In the beginning some mujahedins “heard various leaders in Peshawar declare jihad over the BBC or on tape cassettes, but they had few organizational links to these voices.” (Barnett, 1995, p.195, see also Guistozzi, 200, p.121). Yet those ties would grow and intensify over time. The battle groups were still mainly organized along the lines of tribal loyalties, but exhibited some distinct features to the traditional tribal warfare (beyond being permanent).

The new demands in warfare and the battle groups brought about a military class of full-time fighters, as opposed to the usual part-timers, called “specialists in violence” by Giustozzi (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.47). “This phenomenon of full time combatants was key to both the formation of a military class and the future ‘political economy’ of Afghanistan, as they would not smoothly re-integrate as the part-timers could” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.47). Prolonged insecurity consolidated the new permanent military leaders as wealthy families sought protection against cash payments and even “longer-term alliances, such as marriage strate-
gies” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.47). Many of these local military leaders would later turn from venerated mujahedin to feared warlords and dictators of petty “empires”.

The permanent battle groups usually consisted of thirty to fifty members and “a reserve double the size” which could “be mobilised at a moment’s notice” (Roy, 1986, p.176). These groups were usually linked to a local base and the “network of local bases” was “very close-knit”, encompassing a minimum of 4000 bases countrywide (Roy, 1986, p.176). They mostly acted autonomously and did not need any coordination beyond their immediate level of organization.

“The ubiquity of this bases” was “the true strength of the resistance movement in the country” (Roy, 1986, p.176). Its members were mainly of a poor peasant origin and in their headquarters they enjoyed a lifestyle superior to what they were used to before (especially richer diets, frequently including meat) (Roy, 1986, p.174). Group members could take a leave to visit their family and/or to till their fields, but had to take care for a replacement, normally a brother or another close family member. The battle group’s leader was “usually older than the soldiers under his command”, but his leadership would be limited to his military role (Roy, 1986, p.174)91. In other domains officers and ordinary soldiers were mostly equals. Most of these permanent battle groups did not engage in actual battle that often. This led to widespread boredom in bases far from the front lines or those who were “unable to fight outside their own communal territory” due to tribal organization (Roy, 1986, p.174). Everyday routine was somewhat offset by the better livelihood attained through joining the group and daily collective prayer frequently was the only activity. Yet, Roy stated at the time that “they are always ready and their morale is high” and that there “is never any shortage of recruits” and battle groups “are forced to refuse some volunteers because there are not enough weapons to go round.” (Roy, 1986, p.174). Bases closer to Soviet troops engaged in daily patrols and “routine ambushes”, but real skirmishes would be uncommon (Roy, 1986, p.174). Islam had such a central role in everyday life of ordinary Afghans and mujahedin, that the would pause and “break off from fighting to pray” (Ahmed, 2000, p.82). Those mujahedin habitually exhibited an increasing level of professionalism and sophistication in their approach to battle as opposed to their counterparts in remote, tranquil areas. The latter were considered “rather amateurish” and the most significant event in their routine seemed to be “the selection of night sentries” (Roy, 1986, p.174).

91 Except for Shiites who, as Roy put it, “as usual, are keen on hierarchy” (Roy, 1986, p.174).
Roy found that even though “some bases are better organised than others […] the dominant impression one gets is of a reliance upon improvisation and a generally relaxed attitude.” (Roy, 1986, p.184). Commanders of bases under “increased military pressure” formed “ad hoc coalitions within localities”, alliances and forums which they called shura\(^{92}\) (Barnett, 1995, p.229). There were basically two different types of shuras. First the councils of commanders, which determined conjoint military activities and discussed political and economic issues. “Military action would then be organized through traditional organizational structures, such as the tribal lashkar (army)\(^{93}\) (Edwards, 1998, p.718). Secondly the councils of the ulema (see p.30 for definition) which “functioned sometimes as a judicial committee or department of the commanders’ shura, and sometimes as a separate organization.” (Barnett, 1995, p.229).

Due to these adaptive changes traditional leaders, the khans, lost influence in favor of commanders (qumandán) and of the ulema as a religious force which promulgated jihad. Furthermore, jihad “was opposed to” the khans’ “economic interest in stability” and they were wary of the growing influence of “their religious rivals for leadership”\(^{94}\) (Barnett, 1995, p.187). The ulema were able to combine politic Islamist ideology with the cohesive forces of tribal loyalty and thus ensured the cooperation of armed groups. This resulted in a decline of the rivalries between khans and different qaum, which had been “the primary channel by which government influence was” exerted on tribes (Roy, 1986, p.178). Commanders exhibited different and much needed leadership qualities than khans. Access to weapons, money and food became a prerequisite to leadership, as well as access to foreign militaries and organizations mainly from Pakistan and Iran (Rzehak, 2011, p.13). Many traditional khans could not provide that, fled to

\(^{92}\)The usage of the term shura instead of jirga even in Pashtun dominated tribal areas was evidence for the increasing Islamization of politics (Barnett, 1995, p.229). Contrary to the egalitarian jirga, the shura is normally “convened by new strongmen” and it only “gives advice to a leader who then decides whether to make use of it or not” (Ruttig, 2010, p.8). Besides the decline of egalitarianism also population growth had an impact on this process: the increasing population had made “it physically impossible that, as traditions demand, all males gather in a jirga” (Ruttig, 2010, p.9). With an annual increase of 3.5 per cent, Afghanistan “has one of the highest levels of demographic growth in the world” (Monsutti, 2010, p.56). The United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) estimates that the population in Afghanistan will triple until 2050, growing from 32.3 million to 97.3 million (Monsutti, 2010, p.56).

\(^{93}\)For more information about the tribal militias or lashkar see also p.25 and p.44. For a detailed description of the inner workings of a lashkar, a jirga or shura, their struggles and organizational mechanisms at the time, as well as interviews with mujahedins see Edward’s 2002 publication, listed in the references and available online.

\(^{94}\)Contemporaneously, the Soviet counterinsurgency strategy involved the destruction of “local resources, control of which was a primary source […] of the khans’ power.” (Barnett, 1995, p.227).
Pakistan and left their positions to the new generation of leaders (Glatzer, 2000, p.99). Furthermore, the new leaders “had to be physically able to march long distances on foot, because the fronts were constantly moving” which was another reason for the tribes’ elders frequently not being able to perform this role (Glatzer, 1998, p.9). As the khans also the qumandán were mostly perceived as primus inter pares, though people respected their combat experience and their tactical and logistical knowledge. Probably every mujahedin saw himself on the way to become qumandán, so that, in absence of a military hierarchy to rely on, the commanders constantly had to prove their superior skills and abilities in order not to be replaced (Glatzer, 2000, p.99). Shortly after the start of the Soviet invasion traditional tribal leaders who had fled to Pakistan “tried to revive the Pashtun-based traditions of Afghan national identity and resistance, such as the Loya Jirga”, a jirga on a national level\(^\text{95}\) (Barnett, 1995, p.193, accentuation added). However, Afghan Islamists and members of non-Pashtun groups successfully opposed such an approach (Barnett, 1995, p.193).

The permanent battle groups also served a political purpose. Even when their bases were “militarily insignificant” they provided a “visible symbol of the resistance for the local people” (Roy, 1986, p.176). Every so often, battle groups would find “a modus vivendi with government posts: the latter provide food and ammunition and are very careful not to get involved in any sorties” (Roy, 1986, p.175). The mujahedin would return the favor by only staging “symbolic attacks which make it possible for the commander of the post to justify the expenditure of ammunition which he has, in fact, handed over to the resistance”\(^\text{96}\) (Roy, 1986, p.175). Encounters with Soviet troops were very different and the mujahedin would normally avoid direct confrontations with them\(^\text{97}\). The bases of the permanent battle groups rarely suffered Soviet counterattacks. The Russians shied away from using helicopters because of the bases’ prevalent anti-aircraft armament and preferred “either to use precision bombing, or to engage in a massive operation” (Roy, 1986, p.175). The tribal fighters did not have the means to confront the Soviet army once it started a bigger operation including armored vehicles and helicopters. Resistance fighters were swiftly alarmed about the imminence of a Soviet attack prompting them to abandon their bases and to

\(^{95}\)“The institution of the Loya Jirga developed out of the state’s attempt to modify Pashtun tribal traditions in order to create a tribal-nationalist legitimation for state power.” (? , p.193).

\(^{96}\)Sometimes also Soviet soldiers would trade “military equipment, ammunition or weapons” in exchange for drugs (Collins, 1990, p.186).

\(^{97}\)Only at some locations, such as Kandahar, there was “a real exchange of fire from fixed locations” (Roy, 1986, p.175). 
disperse in the surrounding terrain - only to regroup once the offensive was finished. Therefore it was “the civilians who” had to “bear the brunt of Soviet counter-attacks.” (Roy, 1986, p.175). The regrouping usually happened along kinship ties and not along political alliances.

Tactically the battle groups relied heavily on ambushes. Within their territory the more active bases would stage “attacks against government posts or on vehicles traveling along the road” (Roy, 1986, p.175). Decisions about the operations were usually made in a democratic way and only in the last minute. Since the mujahedin knew the terrain and attacks would usually follow the same scheme, there was no necessity for training or “preliminary instructions” and improvisation was “the order of the day” (Roy, 1986, p.175). The battle groups in the proximity of towns also targeted enemy patrols, police posts, administrative buildings and government groups (Roy, 1986, p.175). The routine ambushes were usually carried out by one or two groups who planted roadside bombs or mines a long a road after informants from villages spread the news about enemy military convoys. One or two fighters equipped with RPGs (usually a Russian RPG-7; Rocket-Propelled Grenade) move in on the road while the other fighters provide cover. Once the first vehicle is blown up by the mine, one or two anti-tank grenades per fighter are launched at the first and/or last vehicle of the convoy. Immediately after the RPGs are fired the fighters retreat back to their group which provided cover during the operation, then “everyone withdraws in no particular order and without taking many precautions” (Roy, 1986, p.183). This procedure proved to be quite effective mainly because of the somewhat unwieldy nature of Soviet military hardware and because of the Soviet soldiers tendency not “to take any military initiative, preferring to wait inside their transport vehicles until reinforcements arrive” (Roy, 1986, p.183).

Apparently the Soviet forces “had no effective counter-ambush drills” and often even preferred “to let the resistance have the vehicles that they” had “disabled and move the rest of the convoy to safety” (Collins, 1990, p.187). Many of the initially deployed Soviet troops were “poorly trained and in some cases politically unreliable” central Asian reservists, which were replaced after the Soviet leadership had identified them as a risk (Collins, 1990, p.186). Yet, also the regular Soviet troops lacked morale and suffered from “widespread discontent [. . .], a condition aggravated by the terror and boredom of combat operations, poor pay and the availability of drugs” as well as disease “and poor sanitation”

---

98 They were also “harassing government posts” and used “political terrorism” (terur) in the cities (Roy, 1986, p.183).
which may have “caused more casualties than the resistance” in the first years of the engagement (Collins, 1990, p.186).

Among the resistance there were not many well-trained, specialized groups for other tasks such as sabotage or terrorism against government officials (which was, in order to avoid blood-feud, only carried out when that person did not have family ties to locals or a fatwa allowed to do so). The egalitarian attitude implied that every member should be able to carry out every task, which also has had the effect of a broader rotation of personnel actively engaged in fighting by providing a bigger pool of available actors. “By Afghan thinking it is better to have twelve groups fighting once a year than one group fighting” twelve times a year (Roy, 1986, p.184).

The “normal course” revolts took though, usually was a “mass uprising preceded by preaching and followed by an attack on the government post of the principal town of the district” (Roy, 1986 in Barnett, 1995, p.187). These attacks were frequently successful but they involved significant blood shed and casualties on both sides. Subsequently, “the communist activists were executed, non-communist soldiers and officials allowed to go” and uprisings spread in the region as far as there were tribal loyalties (Roy 1986 in Barnett, 1995, p.187). “When the frontier of the territory of the” qaum “was reached, the dynamic phase was over” because most fighters did not attempt to mingle in the affairs of neighboring groups (Roy, 1986 in Barnett, 1995, p.187).

Again the Pashtuns’ individualistic, decentralized and sometimes chaotically unorganized approach to battle posed significant problems for Soviet military strategists: not only were the Pashtuns’ operations unpredictable, but when one mujahedin commander was eliminated several others would be able to take his place (Glatzer, 2000, p.100). Mujahedin groups would often split, regroup and change alignments with other groups as they saw fit their own interests best and, in general, exhibit an astounding flexibility and mobility, geographically as well as politically. In this context Canfield (contented for anthropology having kept these findings from the Soviets by simply not investigating the subject at the time) states that one of the great failures of the Soviet strategists was to heavily underestimate “the scope and strength of the implicit and potential coalitions of the rural populations.” (Canfield, 1988b, p.100).
4.2 Migration, exile and changes in Pashtun tribal society

The ethnic and social fabric of Afghanistan was subjected to profound changes due to the Soviet invasion. About 6 of the 18 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran\(^99\), 75% of them were women and children, and 3 million Afghans were displaced within the country (Monsutti, 2010, p.47, Kipping, 2010, p.7, Schetter, 2005, p.60, Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002, p.345, Kushkaki, 1990, p.115, Matinuddin, 1990, p.221, Weinbaum, 1990, p.195). The Pakistani NWFP was the main goal of Afghan refugees. About 70% of all Afghan refugees in Pakistan lived in the NWFP where they represented “one in six members of the local population”, while in some districts they outnumbered the native population (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.72). Since more than 80% of the refugees in Pakistan were Pashtuns, this “ethnically selective migratory flow has had an impact on the ethnic composition of Afghanistan as well as of Pakistan” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.73). Referring to Pakistani statistics the country received more than one million refugees by July 1980, two million by May 1981 and three million by summer 1983 (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.72). Most refugees did not come from the cities under direct government control. They rather came from the circumjacent rural areas which oftentimes were the actual combat zones, which were stricken by insecurity and famine and which suffered “the destruction of the very conditions necessary for survival” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.74). In particular “the wealthy members of rural society were [...] more likely than the poor to seek refuge in Pakistan, apparently because they could afford the costs of the journey.” (Barnett, 1995, p.227). Not only the intensification of direct aerial bombardments, which were aimed either at the mujahedin directly or at the civilian populations which were considered to support the resistance, contributed to the flow of refugees. Also the compulsory military service for all men between sixteen and forty-five years of age and the “destruction of crops in the field or in threshing areas and the machine-gun massacre of flocks and herds in regions not under Kabul’s control”, the latter depriving people of their livelihoods, were important causes for the enormous migratory flow.\(^{100}\) (Centlivres

\(^99\)About 4 million fled to Pakistan, the rest fled mainly to Iran but some also to Australia, the United States and Europe. Pakistan had a population of about 80 million at the time, compared to its 180 million today. Considering urbanization in Afghanistan at the time (about 5 million people of the remaining 12 million lived in cities) this translated to about a little less than half the population being under the socialist government’s authority. See also p.74 for details about the division of influence between government and resistance.

\(^{100}\)Until ’1986 yields decreased by about 50 percent for dry-land wheat and 33 percent for irrigated wheat, while at least one third of the land was abandoned. The numbers of sheep,
Islamic ideology and Pashtun traditional values contributed to the mechanisms at play between the refugees and the receiving host population. As mentioned before, the refugees and their hosts were honored by receiving religious titles (See also p.71). The former were called

\textit{muhajer} (like the prophet during his emigration to Medina), the latter \textit{ansar} (like the prophet’s friends in Medina) (Glatzer, 2000, p.100). Yet, the \textit{mujahedin} enjoyed a significantly higher status than the \textit{muhajer}, which is why many refugees preferred to call themselves \textit{mujahedin} “even if they have not been engaged in resistance for years.” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.86). Furthermore, the Pashtunwali, as a code of honor, allowed for “a person or group” to “ask for hospitality and assistance from a neighbouring group during temporary conflict.”

(Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.74). Many of the refugees indeed considered themselves to be “temporary guests in Pakistan, and, according to tribal law such a status does not render them internees or defenceless” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.87). Therefore they saw no need to disarm, to the contrary, this implied they would also fight to defend their hosts from any aggression.

The massive inflow of people caused some foreseeable problems, such as anger over wage dumping through refugees which could afford to accept a smaller pay due to receiving aid and free housing (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.89). Some contention arose because of the “more than 3 million head of livestock” the refugees had taken with them (Azhar, 1990, p.105). Their “uncontrolled grazing has ruined the sparse grazing grounds” and the “destruction of forests used by refugees as firewood” angered locals (Azhar, 1990, p.105). Nevertheless it seems that there were no major conflicts between the two groups and many locals were able to profit from the increased business opportunities and government contracts. The common language, religion and culture of the Pashtuns of both sides of the Durand Line surely facilitated their coexistence under these demanding circumstances (Boesen, 1990, p.161). Many refugees were brought to so-called Afghan refugee villages, first equipped with tents from the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Then in-
habitants began “building earth houses with materials found on site” until most of these camps looked “like large villages composed of earth houses” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.75). Most of these houses were surrounded by earth walls for privacy and seclusion of women (Pedersen, 1990, p.156). These villages were quite extensive, counting between 5,000 and 12,000 people, and thus much bigger than the Afghan villages most refugees came from. When the lands on which these camps were built were not state-owned, the government of Pakistan compensated the owners (tribes or great land owners) through development programs rather than paying rent (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.75). Alimentation was provided by the UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP), ensuring a diet with “a minimum of calories and protein” for each refugee (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.76).

Islam and Pashtun traditions were ubiquitous and amplified, and people struggled to re-establish their former ways of life at their best. Driven by “ideological commitment”, the refugees adopted “an appearance judged true to Islamic tradition: turban, beard and kamiz o shalwar (shirt and trousers)” in opposition “to the European suits and unbearded (though moustached) young citizens who have rallied round the regime in Kabul.” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.77). One of the first acts of the Pashtuns in their designated villages was to reinforce the seclusion (parda) of women and thereby, according to Pashtun values, take back their honor103 (Boesen, 1990, p.163). This was achieved by erecting mud walls around the area designated to women in the earth houses or at least installing some cloths or screen to prevent strangers from intruding with their gaze. Many Pashtuns would refuse to expose their wives, daughters and sisters to “visiting experts or foreigners” and “functionaries charged with administering the village” and also rejected schools for girls104 (Centlivres und

---

103Traditionally, a Pashtun man calls out prior to entering his home “to see if any women are visiting, in which case he will not enter” (Grima, 2004, p.37).

104In 1986 there were 555 schools (255 of them were tents) for about 100,000 children (out 1.4 million of school age) (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.88, Kushkaki, 1990, p.119). Only fifty schools were for girls, they were restricted to the primary level and a total of 6,214 girls attended school by 1986. There were about 3000 teachers. Almost $\frac{2}{3}$ of them were Afghans, most of them had no training (Kushkaki, 1990, p.119). For a lack of sanctions, attendance was generally low. Many young boys had to contribute to the families’ livelihood, too. There was “an especially strong antipathy” towards “secular schools” which were thought to be “responsible for the rise of Marxism and ideologies” which facilitated the overthrow of 1978 (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.88, Kushkaki, 1990, p.119). Edwards argues that the low attendance levels were caused by the fact that “these schools had more to do with social control than with education, and few who attended them had their life chances expanded as a result” (Edwards, 2002, p.170).

About the same number of pupils (100,000) officially attended religious schools, the so-called madrassas. In total these numbers would surpass by far the levels of education in pre-
Also only very few boys went to school, many of the educated elite had fled to Western countries and the refugees were “raising a generation of illiterate and uneducated youth” (Kushkaki, 1990, p.118).

The refugees followed the course of the war through radio programs (BBC, Voice of America, Afghan, Pakistani and Chinese radio stations reporting in Dari), while mujahedin visited their families in the camps after a campaign as they pleased. Qamandán, who transported weapons and supplies to Afghanistan, reported from the combat zones (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.81). Yet, the traditional tribal structures were no longer in place. Either they were “destroyed or else could no longer offer the security they had provided in the past.” (Schetter, 2005, p.60). Pashtuns tried to regroup with their families and people from the same qaum (see p.23 for definition), but many of them were torn apart, men died, were still in combat or were working in Pakistani cities. Wherever the regroupment of people along family lines worked, the common “experience of war and exile” strengthened relations between relatives who would otherwise not have had entertained ties as close. For example a family head at the time would “not only welcome his brothers, their wives and children […] but also his daughters and his sisters with their husbands, and his widowed sisters and daughters.” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.82). Contradicting Pashtun custom, married or widowed female relatives were no longer obliged or expected to live with their husband’s family.

Some anthropologists have argued that the massive exilation of large proportions of the Afghan people “has not always had the traumatic dimension which humanitarian agencies and the media tend to attribute to it” and that a “longterm historical perspective leads” them “to relativize its exceptional character” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). The main underlying argument consists of taking into account the long history “of mobility in all its forms” prevalent in Afghanistan (nomadism, labor migration, pilgrimage, resettlements etc.) (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). The migratory movements of Afghans to neighboring countries as well as to North America, Europe, the Arab Gulf, Iran and to Australia revolutionary Afghanistan, yet absenteeism was significant also in the latter kind of schools.

In Afghanistan schools were rare in rural areas. At that time illiteracy rates ranged between 80% and 90% of the population. At the turn of the century this had not changed much, about 90% of women and 60% of men were illiterate (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.345, Goodson, 2005, p.93).

They profited though from an “extraordinarily efficient” oral information network, “functioning between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the one hand, and between various refugee villages at the other”: driven by “the desire to be together” as “part of the struggle for survival and the preservation of” one’s identity, everyone knew the whereabouts of their relatives (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 1988, p.81).
is not exclusively a reaction to poverty and insecurity (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). Monsutti argues that the “war has been an opportunity for a deep redefinition of social organization rather than the cause of a massive but reversible exile.” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). The social groups which constituted under these changed circumstances were no longer structured by common residence “but by links of solidarity and mutual assistance which cross international borders.” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). Monsutti goes on to explain that the spatial spreading and “economic diversification” stem from kinship ties and permit groups “to spread risk” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). Therefore “mobility is often a planned strategy” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). The refugees entertain very strong relations to their home country and frequently share “a collective memory, vision, or myth about their homeland - its physical location, history, and achievements” (Safran, 1991, p.83 in Monsutti, 2010, p.48). Most refugees return to Afghanistan from time to time and “almost all family groups have at least one of their members abroad” (Monsutti, 2010, p.47). Refugees usually do not return to Afghanistan for permanent residence, they also do not live through “a process of integration in the host country”, but their “movement is continuous and a truly transnational community is ultimately created.” (Monsutti, 2010, p.48). The conclusions Monsutti derives are that mobility can be seen as a structural feature of the Afghan’s “way of life, it is not mere coercion or imposed by external circumstances” and that the strategies Afghans employ “blur the distinction between forced and voluntary migration.” (Monsutti, 2010, p.48).

After the fall of the Najibullah regime about 3 million of the total 6 million refugees returned to Afghanistan. The flow of returnees slowed drastically when the Taliban emerged as a military force and in the following years Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran in massive numbers again (Rasuly-Paleczek, 2001).
4.3 Cold War strategies, foreign money, and the growing influence of Islam and its political repercussions

The political organization of the refugees was dominated by seven big Islamic parties (the ‘Peshawar Seven’), each of which commanded several warring parties and militias inside Afghanistan from their offices in the Pakistani city of Peshawar106 (Ruttig, 2010, p.11). “Initially the ceiling was established at six parties, but later, under Arab pressure, it was raised to seven to accommodate Professor Sayyaf’s Ittihad” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.44, accentuation added). The parties were in competition for influence, money and weapons from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and some Western nations and entangled in intense internal rivalries and sometimes even feuds dating back to their time in Afghanistan (Edwards, 2002, p.140). At the same time more than hundred smaller parties, some of them nationalist or with a regional, ethnic or tribal background had opened offices in Peshawar. In 1981 the Pakistani government decided that only Islamic parties would be allowed “to receive assistance from Pakistan and other international donors, and all refugees would have to receive a membership card from one of these parties in order to live in registered camps and receive tents, rations and further assistance” (Edwards, 2002, p.155). This further undermined the importance of tribal organizations and more moderate political groups. Already from 1979 on about 75% of US financial support was provided “to the most extremist of these opposition groups” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.343). The explicit goal of the United States was to “set a Vietnam-like deathtrap for the Soviet forces” (Kepel, 2002, p.8).

A group of widely respected Muslim clerics who called themselves ulama dayun convinced the leaders of the Islamic parties to unite, reminding them of the Prophet Mohammed’s words “that if two Muslims met sword in hand with the intention of killing one another both would be condemned to eternal damnation” (Edwards, 2002, p.155). Hence the ‘Islamic Union of Afghanistan Mujahidin’ was founded107. Even though the infighting would continue on different levels and in varying intensity, those groups formed the backbone of the

---

106 Ironically, Islam was so important to Afghans that even communist ministers in Kabul would pray in their offices (Ahmed, 2000, p.82). Lindholm argues that the strong Pashtun presence also shaped the Pakistani party system as a whole (Lindholm, 2001).

107 Due to personal animosities the alliance was soon left by three of the parties which formed their own alliance which was also called ‘Islamic Union of Afghanistan Mujahidin’. Four years later, in 1985, they reunited after being pressured to do so by Saudi and Pakistani supporters, yet a “persistent pattern of discord in the jihad” lingered on (Edwards, 2002, p.155 and p.158). Edwards compared the difficulty of the task of uniting the “Peshawar parties” to “merging a U.S. political party with a religious sect and a Mafia family” (Edwards, 2002, p.158).
Islamic resistance. Edwards explains this factionalism by describing them as being not only political parties, but hybrids which included other levels of organization beyond the political, depending on the background of their respective leaders. They had distinct views of their leaders and the roles they should play as well as how decisions should be made, or as Edwards calls it, conflicting “corporate cultures” (Edwards, 2002, p.158). “Add to these differences in educational backgrounds, ethnicity, and language, generational divisions, the ambitiousness of the leaders, as well as the interference of outside powers, and it becomes more apparent why alliances in Peshawar were continually breaking up” (Edwards, 2002, p.158).

At the beginning the main factions were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami and another faction of Hezb formed when Yunus Khalis split from Hekmatyar to found his own Islamist group (Barnett, 1995, p.192). Hekmatyar, “a man known for throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.343), received up to 50% of the total US funding\textsuperscript{108} and temporarily up to “90 per cent of the military aid from ISI” (Ahmed, 2000, p.91). Abdur Rasul Sayyaf’s organization Ittihad (see also p.70 and p.95) developed substantial leverage through the robust financial backing by Saudi Arabia, even though it did not command many loyal fighters in Afghanistan. His supporters were “a mix of disgruntled Islamists and fundamentalists, who had left other parties, and of mercenary groups attracted by the abundance of Arab money on offer” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.45). Furthermore, the influential mullah Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani, who received substantial support from the CIA and Arab countries and had been a supporter of Osama bin Laden already in the 1980s, waged his own jihad\textsuperscript{109}. The enormous influx of weaponry through the US

\textsuperscript{108}When asked about why the US would only support extremist Islamist mujahedin, and especially Hekmatyar, “a CIA official in Pakistan explained, ‘Fanatics fight better’” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.343).

\textsuperscript{109}The Haqqani network is still active today. Jalaluddin Haqqani formally accepts Mullah Omar, the former leader of the Taliban regime, as the leader of the movement but acts independently or at least “semi-autonomous” (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). His family and clan network are commonly described as a radical Muslim Mafia. His son Sirajuddin Haqqani is believed to be a leader of the Quetta-shura, a regrouped unit of the former Taliban leadership. They engage in terrorism, kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, drug trafficking, assassinations, public executions and mass beheadings in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. One of their most recent coordinated attacks occurred on 16th of April 2012, when they staged simultaneous assaults at seven different locations, mainly heavily secured NATO and government buildings in at least five different cities, as part of their so-called ‘spring offensive’. The Haqqani network is widely believed to be a ‘strategic asset’ of the Pakistani intelligence service ISI in the Afghan theater and to be closely aligned with Al-Qaeda. Their base is a save haven in the Pakistani town of Miranshah, where they maintain their own courts, tax authorities and madrassas.
- ISI - mujahedin connection “turned the region into one of the most heavily armed areas in the world” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.344). “In fact, the over abundance of munitions may well have had the perverse effect of removing any incentive for the jihadists to develop their political organisation and set the trajectory of the movement towards warlordism at the expense of political legitimacy” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.48).

Creating further sources of revenue the mujahedin required populations in ‘liberated’ areas to grow poppy (Papaver somniferum) and thereby support the resistance. “Under CIA and Pakistani protection, Pakistan military and Afghan mujahedin “opened heroin labs on the border between the two countries” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.344, Kreutzmann, 2007, p.609). In 1981 Afghanistan supplied more than 60% of the US demand for illegal opiates, mostly heroin (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.344). In the following years the mujahedin would be able to increase production to 80% or even 90% of the worldwide demand110 (UNODC u. a., 2009, p.16, p.36, Goodson 2005, p.92, Peters, 2009, p.7, Kreutzmann, 2007, p.608).

In 1987 rumors had spread about a possible withdrawal of the Soviets. The rumors were reinforced by the Soviet government under Gorbachev, which had started to reevaluated “the basic direction of future Soviet foreign policy”111 (Collins, 1990, p.177). By summer 1988, a quarter of the 120,000 Soviet troops had departed and aspirations for and end of the war were high (Collins, 1990, p.177). Field commanders, sick of the disunity of their Islamic party leaders, had “a passionate desire for greater structural unity amongst” themselves (Ahmed, 2000, p.96). Ismael Khan112 organized several meetings of field commanders, the

(ERIC SCHMITT, 2012, AND NEW YORK TIMES 2012). Jalaluddin Haqqani became minister under the Taliban regime but did not wield much power and was intentionally excluded from decision-making by Mullah Omar (Ruttig, 2010, p.14).

110 The number of heroin addicts rose dramatically, not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also in Iran and throughout Central Asia and Russia. Crimes related to drug-trafficking increased dramatically as well (UNODC u. a., 2011). Under Taliban rule the overall Opium production first increased in order to then dramatically decrease in the last two years before the US intervention. Three years after the US invasion from 2001 Afghanistan again produced 87% of the world’s opium and accounted for at least 40% of the country’s GDP (Goodson, 2005, p.92, Goodson, 2004, p.17). Today about 3.3 million Afghans “derive an income from poppy” (growers, harvesters, traffickers etc.) (Goodhand, 2005, p.207). For more information about poppy cultivation under the Taliban regime see p.101.

111 This reassessment was in part forced upon the leadership since other measures, such as to gain “concessions from Pakistan, increase the firepower and effectiveness of Soviet forces and re-energize their leadership”, had failed (Collins, 1990, p.190).

112 Ismael Khan (born in 1946) was a powerful mujahedin commander and became a key ally in Ahmad Shah Massoud’s and general Dostum’s Northern Alliance against the Taliban. After the fall of the Taliban he became governor of Herat and later served as minister for water and energy in Hamid Karzai’s administration. His son, Mirwais Sadiq, Minister for Civil Aviation
first of which in Ghor province was attended by more than 1,200 commanders (Ahmed, 2000, p.96). “They adopted 20 resolutions of which the most important was the demand that they, rather than the Peshawar leaders, dictate the political movement” (Ahmed, 2000, p.96). Ethnic and personal animosities as well as the competition and urge to be first and seize the capital Kabul debilitated their agreement and the usual factionalism prevailed (Ahmed, 2000, p.96).

Professor Bauhauuddin Majrooh, who had been a dean at the University of Kabul and professor of philosophy and literature during Zahir Shah’s reign (while his father, Shamsuddin Majrooh, served as minister of justice), and who then operated a rather neutral news outlet, a bulletin113 for Afghan refugees, demanded a return of the king in order to achieve peace114. This should only be an interim step. Zahir Shah, still in Italy since his ouster in 1973, was seen by many as the only person who could unite the Afghans. He was not aligned with any party and “the abuses of his own regime were not only long ago […] but also trivial compared with what had happened since.” (Edwards, 2002, p.165). When Majrooh collected data about the political preferences of Afghans in 106 of the 249 Afghan refugee villages, 72% of the 2000 respondents favored Zahir Shah.0.45% named one of the resistance parties’ leaders from Peshawar and 12.5% favored a purely Islamic state (Edwards, 2002, p.165). Of course the explanatory power of such a survey might be very limited. Nevertheless, the level of support for the former king “combined with the direct rebuke of the resistance leaders, indicated that the majority of Afghans remained unmoved by the Islamic political rhetoric with which they had been relentlessly assailed” for almost ten years (Edwards, 2002, p.165). The support for Zahir Shah may have been rooted in a “nostalgic” memory of a brighter past, when government did not interfere in local issues and people’s affairs or maybe the refugees were just tired of intrigues and infighting among the Peshawar parties. Zahir Shah “broke his usual silence on exile political affairs” and gave an interview to the BBC in which he declared to be willing “to serve the Afghan people if called on to do so” (Edwards, 2002, p.165). He asserted that he would not attempt

113Magazines were extremely important to Islamic parties such as Hezb-e Islami too. They used them to spread their propaganda. Through the use of “bright graphics” and “photographs of martyrs, magazines have also attempted to broaden the party’s reach to the illiterate masses that had previously been immune to the blandishments and persuasions of their written publications” (Edwards, 1995, p.181).
114It was not so much that he supported Zahir Shah as a qualified leader or person, but rather as someone the Afghan people could rally around and who, with public support behind him, could control the various factions of the Islamists and prevent a civil war.
to restore the monarchy. All the major radical Islamic parties strictly opposed such a course of action, proclaiming they would not even accept Zahir Shah if he was democratically elected. They demanded the institution of an Islamic state “and that the head of state should be selected by a council of qualified Islamic scholars and leaders from among those who had played an active part in the jihad.” (Edwards, 2002, p.165). The point of this explanation is to show that the radical Islamic parties prevailed in shaping the public discussions about Afghanistan’s future. They pushed aside more moderate interest groups, as well as the majority of the refugees115 (Edwards, 2002, p.165). Yet, they failed to “produce reality-based theories of change”, a realistic offer to ordinary people, based on facts on the ground, in which direction future developments should lead them (Ahmed, 2000, p.87). This lack of a comprehensive set of theories “is a widespread phenomenon in the Muslim world” (Ahmed, 2000, p.87). The “french scholar Olivier Roy has dubbed it ‘the failure of political Islam’” (Ahmed, 2000, p.87).

The infighting and factionalism among Islamists increased even more after the Soviets had left Afghanistan in February 1989, as various parties competed for dominance in “what was expected to be a short endgame to the war”116 (Edwards, 2002, p.168, Edwards, 1998, p.721, Anderson, 1990, p.256). With the Soviet withdrawal also the resistance’s foreign funding dried up more and more and the Islamic parties lost their political influence again. Especially the US, becoming wary of what they had helped to produce, quickly terminated all aid (Kepel, 2002, p.217). To the astonishment of not only Afghans but also foreign observers, the Najibullah regime in Kabul managed to cling to power for three more years, despite the emerging of a bitter civil war. The disunity of the resistance definitely facilitated this accomplishment and once “again it was Afghan facing off against Afghan, without any outsiders interposing themselves” (Edwards, 1998, p.721) Najibullah capitalized on this split. Still receiving ample funds from Moscow, he further augmented factionalism by providing financial assistance to local militias in exchange for friendly behavior towards Kabul. Islamabad tried to counter these efforts and sustain its influence by allocating

---

115 The Islamists were not that satisfied with Majrooh publicly challenging their claim to power. Especially his public statements that many commanders, even of the Islamist’s parties, supported Zahir Shah could prove potentially dangerous to them. Hence Majrooh was assassinated in his house in Peshawar shortly after these incidents.

116 I will not go into much further detail on the differences between the numerous Afghan Islamic parties, coalitions, its leaders and their struggles. I take the liberty to refer the more profoundly interested reader to David B. Edward’s exceedingly instructive and detailed publication “Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad.” of the year 2002 (see references).
significant bribes to party leaders and commanders but was heavily outspent. Contemporaneously, a massive reduction of foreign financial contributions to the Islamic parties after the Soviets’ withdrawal contributed to the local units and lashkar being “increasingly disconnected from central control”, and they “intensified their attacks against one another” (Edwards, 2002, p.168 and Edwards, 1998, p.721, Anderson, 1990, p.254). The local military leaders had become “addicted to the plentiful resources” and the power that came with them (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.48). Many local commanders turning to other sources to finance their troops simply engaged in criminal behavior, taking possession of the resources they needed wherever they found them. In local terms this time is known as “topakeyano daurai, the time of the gunmen” and “in people’s eyes, the once venerated mujahidin, the warriors of God, had become simply men with guns, intent on their own selfish goals” (Edwards, 2002, p.168).

In the course of the last decade the relation of Islam and political leadership had fundamentally changed. In the past, religious leaders had derived their power from their association with powerful tribal leaders or the kings in Kabul. They had never really had significant influence solely based on their religious bona fides but to endear themselves to tribal strongmen or the royal court, which both kept jealous watch over their political spheres of power (see also p.31). Since taking refuge in Pakistan the mullahs, clerics and other religious figures “gained leverage from the patronage of Pakistan, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and China, and they were successful as long as they had massive infusions of financial and military assistance from these sources” (Edwards, 2002, p.173). The religious leaders became “equally potential agents of disruption and injustice” and “effectively negated the possibility that religion could act as a force of moderation and peace”, a role which it often had held in previous centuries (Edwards, 1998, p.722).

On paper the seven major Islamic parties established a common interim government which was supposed to take power in Jalalabad as an alternative capital to Kabul. Yet their offensive failed to dislodge the government army and this failure “exacerbated frictions within the resistance coalition” (Edwards, 2002, p.168, Anderson, 1990, p.254).
Part III
Militant Political Islam, Tribal Structures & The Taliban - A Generational & Structural Divide?

5 Civil War, the Origins and the Rise of the Taliban

In April 1992 the socialist Najibullah regime in Kabul fell and soon a brutal civil war ensued. Arrangements between the Parchami, Ahmad Shah Massoud (“Rabbani’s deputy and strongman in Panjshir Valley” who had the status of a folk hero among his followers) and General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a powerful warlord and leader of Uzbek militias in northern Afghanistan, permitted Massoud to take Kabul in an almost bloodless coup “and assume the role of defense minister and strongman of the new government” (Edwards, 2002, p.168). However, his “inability to compromise with Pashtun commanders [. . .] badly dented his political reputation” and Massoud “was never to regain the trust of the Pashtuns, until after the Taliban had conquered the north in 1998” (Ahmed, 2000, p.96). Beginning in the last two years of Najibullah’s rule and further aggravating until the Taliban conquered most of the country, Afghanistan had “collapsed into hundreds of petty empires [. . .] which were ruled by a myriad of warlords” (Schetter, 2005, p.60). By the end of the 1980s there were about 6,000 local military leaders “each with a complement of full-time fighters ranging from four to hundreds” (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.47).

The Islamic parties agreed to rotate the presidency and important posts among them periodically. This agreement, and with it peace, were “predictably short-lived as leaders refused to relinquish their formal posts at the end of their allotted turns, and each tried to improve his military position at the expense of the others.” (Edwards, 2002, p.168). Extensive fights ensued between the main opponents, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami and the still Saudi-financed Ittihad of Sayyaf. Thus, the country was drawn into civil war.

117 Ahmad Shah Massoud was a member of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami. Rabbani and Sayyaf had both been professors at Kabul university. Sayyaf was imprisoned after
Relentless rocket attacks in Kabul caused many civilians to flee the city. A fragile agreement between the factions installed Rabbani as president and Hekmatyar as prime minister in the winter of 1993. The feud between Hekmatyar and Rabbani was “proved to be one of the defining fault lines of the Afghan jihad and the subsequent civil war” (Edwards, 2002, p.140). The younger Hekmatyar was influenced by the political confrontations which dominated Kabul University at the end of the 1960s. Rabbani was focused on studying and only got involved in politics after his return from Egypt, where he had been exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood. He was “more open to compromise”, travelled to other countries, learned other languages and had “wider experience in and awareness of a world larger than Afghanistan” (Edwards, 2002, p.141).

At the same time ethnic tensions rose, mainly for the not unsubstantiated fear of Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks that the institution of an Islamic republic under the current power brokers would again lead to Pashtun domination and suppression of their minorities. Yet, the leaders of the Islamic parties “were as willing as ever to make opportunistic deals across ethnic boundaries” in order “to exploit vulnerabilities of their rivals” (Edwards, 2002, p.169). In February 1993, Massoud and Sayyaf joined forces to attack the Shiite Hazaras who had a stronghold in western Kabul. In January 1994, Hekmatyar and Dostum began an offensive to oust President Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud. This attack continued with varying intensity for the whole year and caused tens of thousands to flee the capital. It was “halted only when Hekmatyar himself was forced by the emergent Taliban militia to flee” from his camp in “Charasiab and set up a new base at Sarobi, on the road between Kabul and Jalalabad” (Edwards, 2002, p.169). The rapid advances of the Taliban who had started their offensive from Kandahar and soon reached the outer districts of Kabul prompted another “power-sharing agreement” between Massoud, Rabbani and Hekmatyar. The Taliban quickly secured vast areas of the country, which permitted them to gather further resources and suffered their first major military defeat when they attempted to take Kabul in March 1995 (Harpviken, 1997, p.280). After taking Herat the same year, in the last quarter of 1996 the Taliban took Kabul and forced all the leaders of the Islamic political parties “to flee for their lives”.

Daoud’s coup d’état and released only when the communists took power. “It is believed that he escaped execution because he was a Kharoti Ghilzai and cousin of Hafizullah Amin; these connections kept him alive long enough to benefit from Babrak’s gesture of clemency” (Babrak Karmal had declared a general amnesty after being installed in Kabul by the Soviets) (Edwards, 2002, p.154).

Charasiab is located in the south of Kabul.

The former socialist President Najibullah did not manage to escape. He and his brother
(Edwards, 2002, p.169). These events ultimately set in motion their transformation from a non-state military actor into a more permanent government entity (Harpviken, 1997, p.271). The Taliban thus instituted the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’. Massoud was able to defend his stronghold in Panjshir but he “became increasingly isolated and his struggle seemingly ever more quixotic”120 (Edwards, 2002, p.169). The other Islamic figureheads “had to content themselves with fulminating to the press, and when the press stopped listening, they mounted websites to continue their efforts to prove that they alone should rule Afghanistan” (Edwards, 2002, p.169).

Some consider the civil war to have been even more destructive than the Soviet occupation. Divides along ethnic lines and religious sects deepened and even many parties with the same ethnic and religious background became bitter enemies. One massacre followed the other, regional mujahedin commanders turned into warlords and frequently terrorized even their own people. In this environment also the role of Islam changed dramatically again.

Historically, Islam in Afghanistan had been quite tolerant “to other Muslim sects, other religions and modern lifestyle”, despite the deep devotion of most Afghans (Ahmed, 2000, p.82). The Sunni Hanafi school of thought which was followed by 90% of Afghans was “essentially non-hierarchical and decentralized”, which is why many mullahs refused to join and to subordinate to the radical Islamic parties in Peshawar. Many of them rather affiliated themselves with more moderate and “traditional tribal-based parties” which never gained much influence because foreign funding was not available to them. Also Sufism was a moderating factor in Afghan Islam. Its tremendous popularity, especially but not only among the poor, lasted for centuries. Until 1992, Jews, Hindus and Sikhs “played a significant role in the country’s economy” (Ahmed, 2000, p.82). They controlled the urban money markets “and when Afghan kings went to war they often borrowed money from them” (Ahmed, 2000, p.82). But the civil war and the rise of the Taliban changed this. These religious minorities fled the country, and consequently important parts of the economy were crippled. A

---

120Massoud was assassinated in his Panjir fief ‘by two North Africans carrying Belgian passports’ in 2001, just 3 days before 9/11 (Kepel, 2002, p.3). The killers claimed to be journalist and carried “journalist’s cards issued by a radical Islamist news organization based in London” (Kepel, 2002, p.3). They died “with Massoud when their booby-trapped camera exploded” (Kepel, 2002, p.3). In retrospect this was clearly seen as a successful effort to eliminate the most viable candidate for leadership in Afghanistan. His killing also indicates that the responsible operatives anticipated an American military attack on the country as response to 9/11 and, subsequently, the possibility of a disempowerment of the Taliban (Kepel, 2002, p.4).
new creed of Islamic extremism was created. An extremism in this radicalness did not exist anywhere in the Muslim world before and “fitted nowhere in the Islamic spectrum of ideas and movements that had emerged in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1994” (Ahmed, 2000, p.87). The “Taliban represented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own” (Ahmed, 2000, p.88).

5.1 The rise of the Taliban

“From Holy War to Holy Terror” (Shahrani, 2002, p.716)

Only very few observers had even heard about the Taliban movement before they engaged in their rapid offensive and triumphal march out of Kandahar in 1994. In fact, they had not even existed as a real military force before 1993. Even though students from madrassas, who were already known as Taliban long before, fought alongside various (also opposing) mujahedin commanders, they never had formed a coherent movement. Most of them went back to their madrassas after the fall of the Najibullah regime. Many of the Taliban claimed that they only got engaged when they saw Afghanistan sliding into chaos ever deeper (Ruttig, 2010, p.11).

Their instantaneous success was even more surprising since “no other military force had been able to accomplish” such an advance “in the preceding eighteen years of war” (Edwards, 2002, p.170). Markedly, the Taliban encountered almost no resistance in the Pashtun areas. The factionalism among the resistance and the rampant spread of warlordism had created “a total vacuum of leadership” in “the Pashtun areas” (Ahmed, 2000, p.96). In addition, many mujahedin commanders were frustrated by the constantly changing alliances, “the ease with which they were held hostage over funds and weapons supplies”, and in general by the way jihad was waged under the control of the various Islamic parties (Ahmed, 2000, p.96). Yet, at the same time they also capitalized on the dramatic factionalism. Local jihadi leaders “always had the option of realigning their allegiance to a different group whenever they faced pressure to follow a particular behaviour or strategy”, political expediency dictated it or increased financial and military support could be expected from another faction (Giustozzi, 2009b, p.44).

However, the capture of non-Pashtun regions by the Taliban involved significant bloodshed on both sides.
In part the Taliban were a creation of the Pakistani intelligence service ISI which “played a substantial role in organizing, arming, training, and financing” them (Edwards, 2002, p.170). Two of the most prominent patrons of the Taliban movement were the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army, General Aslam Beg and Hamid Gul, head of the ISI (Ruttig, 2010, p.15). Still, the size of the movement and the magnitude of their fierce motivation can not be fully explained through the machinations of the notorious ISI alone.

The term Taliban means ‘religious students’ (talib ul-elm). Already in the nineteenth century madrassa students had founded several political movements which were considered to be “especially dangerous by the British colonial authorities” (Edwards, 2002, p.170). Tribal uprisings could always be answered with negotiations and with concessions to the economic interests of tribal leaders and khans, or, if need be, with the obliteration of the revolting villages (Edwards, 2002, p.170 and Edwards, 1998, p.724). However, the disciples of madrasas “were everywhere and nowhere; they were often destitute and generally had much more to gain by keeping people in an agitated state than by allowing a conflict to die down” (Edwards, 2002, p.170). In the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century “becoming a taleb was one of the few ways” an individual could escape poverty, improve social status and flee “the - for some - claustrophobic world of the tribe and the village” (Edwards, 2002, p.170, accentuation added).

Also during the Soviet occupation the madrasas opened the possibility of upward social mobility to many of the underprivileged Afghan refugees in Pakistan, a majority of them Pashtuns from rural regions. Most madrasas managed to stay independent of the Islamic political parties, whose factionalism contributed to their decline in prestige (for more information about the Taliban’s madrasas see p.106).

As mentioned before (see p.94) the role of Islam in Afghan politics had fundamentally changed. Since the foundation of the state, religion has always had the function of supporting the various rulers. Now Islam had become “identical with state rule”, and a power in its own right (Edwards, 2002, p.173).

Probably the most important cause for the Taliban’s swift advance throughout the country was simple fatigue of a war-worn people. In addition, many

---

121 The Pakistani support and the non-tribal stance of the Taliban may have been the two reasons why they never demanded the institution of a greater Pashtunistan which includes the areas between the Durand Line and the Indus and could have bolstered their relation with Pakistani Taliban.
areas had sunk into poverty and many areas were affected by a persevering drought. The rural Pashtun populations, fed up with the mujahedin-turned-bandits, thieves and rapists, “were willing to give the Taliban the benefit of the doubt” even if many of the locals did not even know yet what “the Taliban were or what they represented” (Edwards, 2002, p.171). Or at least, “tired of the status quo”, they “weren’t willing to risk their own lives to defend those” who had betrayed their interests and security, even if they were “from the same tribe or ethnic unit” (Edwards, 2002, p.171f). When the Taliban movement gained momentum in 1995, the news that they kept security spread from one region to the next. In order to escape the constant encroachments of gunmen, most Pashtuns were “willing to accept new leadership, despite its promises of certain austerities and purist doctrines that deviated from established custom” (Edwards, 2002, p.172). The basic security provided by Taliban rule meant unhindered travel for persons and goods. People were freed from being at the mercy of predatory commanders, paying exorbitant bribes at checkpoints, being searched and harassed and, maybe most importantly, the number of rapes dramatically declined. For the war-weary Afghans this constituted a change of great importance which brought about a general feeling of relief. The joy over the new-found peace was not long-lived though. Initially many Afghans were “impressed by the fact that […] the Taliban did not demand power for themselves” but claimed that after “restoring law and order” they would “hand over power to a government which was made up of ‘good Muslims’” (Ahmed, 2000, p.95). Many Afghans hoped “the Taliban would bring about territorial reintegration of the country” since “the territorial shape of Afghanistan” had also become “a defining symbol of national identity” (Schetter, 2005, p.61). Later on it turned out, as we know, that the Taliban and Mullah Omar\(^\text{122}\) were to cling to power, arguing that “Islam is against all political parties” and therefore only a purely Islamic leadership, which they claimed to provide, was agreeable to God (Ahmed, 2000, p.102).

Some authors argue that the “Taliban’s success story is […] linked to their early occupation of valuable poppy cultivation areas in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, which enabled them to pay higher wages to their followers and to their mercenaries” (Kreutzmann, 2007, p.610). Even though it was officially denounced as un-Islamic, poppy cultivation strongly increased especially around the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar in 1996 and 1997 (Goodhand, 2005, p.200).

\(^{122}\text{His full name was Mullah Muhammad Omar Akhund.}\)
Goodhand stated that the “Taliban’s attitude towards” drugs “was marked by a curious mixture of religious principles, ambiguity and expediency” (Goodhand, 2005, p.200). Only after two edicts of Mullah Omar from 1999 and 2000 in which he declared poppy cultivation as haram (un-Islamic, sinful) and after the Taliban began to rigorously enforce the ban, production declined from 3,330 tons of opium p.a. to 200 tons (Kreutzmann, 2007, p.613, Goodhand, 2005, p.200). There are mainly three different theories about why the Taliban instituted this ban. First, it really happened for religious reasons and/or for the negative social effects increased drug abuse had brought about (Kreutzmann, 2007, p.612). Second, it was an attempt to bolster Mullah Omar’s struggle for international recognition and to appease to Western powers. Third, “the market price had dropped significantly due to high stockpiles of opium and the ban was implemented to reduce supplies” (Kreutzmann, 2007, p.613). Kreutzmann conclusively tries to disprove the first two theories: “theological and diplomatic initiatives were contradicted by other actions such as earlier tolerance of poppy cultivation and the blasting of the Bamiyan Buddhas” (Kreutzmann, 2007, p.613). The third theory, to the contrary, is bolstered by the fact that even major drug traffickers had pressured the Taliban to intervene against the low prices, and a ten-fold increase of the opium price occurred during the following year (Barnett und Sherman, 2008, p.18, Kreutzmann, 2007, p.613). Nevertheless, the Taliban “consistently tried to convince the United States to recognize it as Afghanistan’s legitimate government” (Tarzi, 2008, p.304). A rapprochement that seemed to have gained the Clinton administration’s approval when the California based company UNOCAL, together with Saudi Delta Oil, engaged in the preparation to construct a gas and oil pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, right through Afghanistan’s ‘Pashtun belt’ (Tarzi, 2008, p.304, Rashid, 2004, 125).

123Thereafter the Afghan opium and heroin production swiftly reached enormous heights again, surmounting global demand and creating stockpiles in the size of the annual worldwide demand. The distribution of earnings is estimated to be as follows: Afghan farmers earn about 440 million dollars per year, Afghan traffickers about 2.2 billion dollars a year, the Taliban tax both of them and thereby create an annual revenue of about 170 million dollars (UNODC u.a., 2011, p.12).

124Reportedly the Afghan Taliban were not really interested in the destruction of the Buddha statues. However, their Arab donors exerted pressure and threatened to reduce funding if the Taliban would not comply and destroy this world cultural heritage (Tarzi, 2008, p.306).

125Al-Qaeda was afraid to be pushed to the sidelines because of this cooperation between the US and the Taliban. The former’s terrorist attacks the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam in 1998 were attempts to disrupt the relation between the United States and the Taliban. Zalmay Khalilzad, the later US ambassador in Kabul, and Hamid Karzai worked for UNOCAL and were tasked to bribe the Taliban in order to establish security along the route of the pipeline (Rashid, 2004, p.89). The US launched some cruise missiles against assumed Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan as a response to the terror in Africa. UNOCAL cancelled
While the regime had provoked many hostilities in Pashtun areas, the divisions with other ethnic groups, already deepened during the Soviet war, had further increased. The Taliban claimed to purely follow Islam, “to be Muslims first” without attaching “any importance […] to ethnic or tribal belonging” and therefore being “above tribal and ethnic divisions” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 2000, p.425). The Taliban’s claim that ethnic affiliations of the Afghan peoples had no importance in their view, a claim that was doubted by many non-Pashtuns, was underlined by their exclusive recognition of only their form of “rigorous Islam”, whose norms are the Taliban’s “own interpretation of the Shariat” (Centlivres und Centlivres-Demont, 2000, p.425). After initial hopes that favoritism for Pashtuns would end had faded, the non-Pashtun peoples of Afghanistan saw the Taliban movement as a new form of Pashtun hegemony. The Taliban’s claim to fight a jihad “in the spirit of the Prophet” and that they only attack “corrupt, evil Muslims” such as “rapacious warlords” was interpreted by many as being simply a religious “cover to exterminate non-Pashtuns” (Ahmed, 2000, p.87). Uzbeks, Hazaras and Tajiks had controlled almost half of the country at the end of the Soviet occupation. They showed “little willingness to relinquish their hard-earned autonomy” and to abandon their “often considerably more liberal traditions […] with regard to female veiling and the right of individuals to worship as often and with whom they please” (Edwards, 2002, p.175). As Janata has put it: “They never again will accept Pushtun hegemony.” (Janata, 1990, p.69).

One obvious sign of this development was, that due to the disappearance of the educational system and the majority of the refugees being Pashtuns, most Afghans of other ethnic groups did not learn the two main languages of the country, Dari and Pashto, anymore. They were more likely to only speak in

its pipeline project and the country “was now seen as a pariah” (Tarzi, 2008, p.305). However, the gain for Al-Qaeda did not last long. As soon as the smoke had cleared, the US tried to strengthen its ties to the Taliban again (Tarzi, 2008, p.306). The Al-Qaeda attack against the USS Cole in 2000 was further testament to this. Arab pressure finally “convinced” the Taliban to take a more isolationist stance (Giustozzi, 2008, p.12). Also their rigid adherence to the Sharia made “contacts with the rest of the world difficult and impractical” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.12). Organizationally, there are no Afghans in Al-Qaeda’s leadership and “no Arabs in the Taliban command structure” (Ruttig, 2010, p.18).

126 In some areas local populations fought back when the Taliban tried to impose their rigid ways of, “for example, how to celebrate a marriage or a circumcision” (Edwards, 2002, p.175). There were uprisings in the eastern Pashtun provinces of Khost and Kunar, but also in Mazar-i Sharif (in 1997) where thousands died, in Herat and the Hazarajat. Many Pashtuns “resent the Qandahari ascendance almost as much as Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Shi’a Hazaras do” (Edwards, 2002, p.175).
their native tongue and, if at all, to learn Urdu as a second language. In the 1990s Afghanistan presented itself as ethnically more divided than ever. While Pashtuns controlled the country south of the Hindu Kush, Tajiks and Uzbeks were competing for dominance in the north, and Hazaras were “holding out against both sides in the center” (Edwards, 2002, p.175).

Many social and cultural restrictions pronounced by the Taliban soon reminded rural tribal populations of various ethnic backgrounds of the communists’ overreaches. The Taliban adroitly substituted “tribal or regional identities in favor of what might be called ‘village identity’” (Edwards, 2002, p.171). This was achieved by proclaiming their goal to reinstate a ‘purified culture of Islam’ modeled after the Islamic traditions practiced in rural villages as opposed to the corrupted, elitist deviations of Islam pursued by the former Islamic party leaders who had been products of an aloof, urban culture at Kabul University. Most Taliban never knew what life in Afghan villages was like, “but this was still an effective position to take, given the nostalgia people felt for the world they remembered or at least imagined before the war” (Edwards, 2002, p.171). The “idealized [...] ordinary village existence [...] had been absent for twenty years and [...] was longed for all the more for that reason.” (Edwards, 2002, p.172). Many tribes grew increasingly suspicious towards the Taliban’s attempts to institute “religious mores that are more parochial and conservative than those of the vast majority of Afghans [...] from rural areas” and especially doing so “under the cover of ‘village morality’” and perceived it to be a foreign moral code, as they did when confronted with the communists’ ideology (Edwards, 2002, p.174). A “morality” that not only forbids all kinds of amusements, traditional games, playing music, “Western” haircuts and so on, but that is also impractical in every day life. Particularly, when it comes to the division of labor between men and women and in its conflict with “everyday realities of tilling fields, tending flocks, and raising children” this “morality” did not have much connection to the traditional real village life127 (Edwards, 2002, p.174).

---

127Ironically, the villages around Kandahar which produced Mullah Omar and many of the top Taliban cadres “are famous throughout Afghanistan for their enjoyment of music, dancing, and games of various sorts” (Edwards, 2002, p.174). Only some northern Pashtuns were already traditionally known not to dance - and to shave their heads, something southern Pashtuns did not do (Hart, 2001, p.155).
One of the most astonishing conclusions Edwards draws from his analysis of the Taliban regime is that they did not “rule through fear but [...] out of fear. The fear that grips the regime more than any other is the fear of having any intercourse with the larger world; an intercourse, with its sexual connotations, is the appropriate word to use in this context, for in the Taliban vision of the world all relations with outsiders, particularly non-Muslims, carry the taint of the licentious and forbidden” (Edwards, 2002, p.178).

Even though most Pashtun’s dedication to Islam is, as mentioned at several occasions in this paper, extraordinarily strong, many of them resented the orthodoxy of the Taliban and the fact that a government would dictate behavior in these matters128. So in general it can be said that the Taliban were not welcomed with enthusiasm and were “a product of exhaustion” rather than “excitation”, a product “of nostalgia for an uncomplicated past more than hope for a glorious future” (Edwards, 1998, p.726). Soon though, the Taliban were resented by many Afghans. Not only for their extreme ideology and its brutal implementation, but also because they were perceived “as a puppet regime dominated by Pakistan and al Qaeda Arabs” (Barfield, 2004, p.289).

5.2 The Islamic extremist ideology of the Taliban
The Taliban “instituted an uncompromising moral severity and inflexibility that, abuses aside, does not mesh well” with core Pashtun traditional values, “especially the valorization of individual autonomy”129 (Edwards, 2002, p.174). Their actual ideology is “much less clear-cut” than a first look might lead us to believe. Glatzer “described it as an ‘eclectic ad hoc’ mixture full of ‘contradictions, breakouts, gaps, alterations and highly idiosyncratic interpretations’” (Ruttig, 2010, p.16). One could say that the broad mass of the Taliban just obey the leadership and especially Mullah Omar. The Taliban never created any form of “sophisticated political programme” and simply claimed that “‘Islam is the way’ and Quran and sharia make further programmatic explanations superfluous” (Ruttig, 2010, p.22).

---

128 The Taliban tried, for example, to abolish the common practice of Sufi traditions and shrine visitations and to drive people into mosques on Fridays (Barfield, 2004, p.289).
129 For more information about the importance of autonomy see also p.34.
In addition, most Taliban foot soldiers do not know much about the Sharia, the Koran or Islamic and Afghan history and simply follow and believe the movement’s leaders, whatever they proclaim (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). This leadership though has been exposed to definable and traceable influences of militant political Islam.

The belief system of the Taliban is influenced by Wahabbism and Deobandism. Wahabbism, a tradition within the Sunni Hanafism, founded by Abdul Wahab (1703 - 1792) in Saudi Arabia, is a strict and austere form of Islam. In Afghanistan it did not have any significant support before the war. Wahabbi Afghans, who were also referred to as Salafis\(^{130}\) and some Arab mujahedin like Osama bin Laden\(^ {131}\) “won a small Pashtun following, largely due to the lavish funds and weapons at their disposal” (Ahmed, 2000, p.85). Arabs were not very well liked among Pashtuns in general and the Taliban in particular - except for providing financial means. There seem to be widespread mutual racist prejudices between them which have limited “the potential for cooperation” and the Arab fighters were renowned to resort to extreme and inappropriate levels of violence\(^ {132}\) (Ruttig, 2010, p.18).

The Deobandi branch of Sunni Hanafism had a long history in Afghanistan but it has never been as extreme as in the Taliban’s practice - a radicalness “the original Deobandi would never have recognized” (Ahmed, 2000, p.88). Deobandism was founded in the middle of the nineteenth century in the central Indian city of Deoband and was taught in a madrassa of the founders\(^ {133}\). “They aimed to train a new generation of learned Muslims who would revive Islamic values based on intellectual learning, spiritual experience, Sharia law and Tariqath or the path” (Ahmed, 2000, p.88). Their school of thought expanded constantly over a century and was inspired and well connected to the “Ikhwan ul Muslimeen or the Muslim Brotherhood which was set up in Egypt in 1928 with the aim of bringing about an Islamic revolution and creating an Islamic state” (Ahmed, 2000, p.86, accentuation added). By 1967 “there were 9.000 Deobandi madras-

\(^{130}\)The term *Salafist* is used for radical Islamists from various backgrounds all over the Muslim world. The “Salafi family includes most of the militant groups” from Afghanistan to Algeria and commands a strong presence in some European countries, particularly in Britain (Roy, 2004, p.234).

\(^{131}\)Osama bin Laden came to Afghanistan first in 1981, in order to fight the Soviets. After his return to Saudi Arabia he organized protests against the government and the US and was forced to exile in Sudan. In 1995, the Pakistani intelligence service “brokered a deal to move bin Laden and his entourage from Sudan [...] into Afghanistan” (Shahrani, 2002, p.720). The US unofficially approved of the deal, hoping that they would get rid of him that way.

\(^{132}\)See also p.71 and p.109

\(^{133}\)Mohammed Qasim Nanautawi (1833-1877) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905).
“madrassas across South Asia” and in 1971 the number had emerged to 900 madrassas in Pakistan (Ahmed, 2000, p.88). In 1988 the number of madrassas in Pakistan funded by Zia ul-Haq’s regime and through donations of more than 45 Muslim countries had skyrocketed to 8,000 official madrassas “and 25,000 unregistered ones, educating over half a million students” (Ahmed, 2000, p.89). With no central hierarchy in place the Deobandis split into several groups, most of them being extremist\footnote{There were also some pro-Western, liberal Deobandis who taught arts and sciences in their madrassas in order to catch up with the elites. Yet, those were soon pushed to the sidelines by the more orthodox and radical ones (Ahmed, 2000, p.88).}

One of the most important factions was led by Maulana Samiul Haq, whose madrassa, the Haqqania, was to educate many of the later Taliban ministers, governors, judges and administrators. 80% of the military commanders from the Pashtun areas had studied there as well (Ahmed, 2000, p.90). Haq, born in 1937, takes pride in advising Mullah Omar and the Taliban leadership who would consult him in important strategic or religious questions. He is one of the most active recruiters for Pakistani Taliban. When the Taliban suffered a devastating defeat in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997 (see also p.112), Mullah Omar called Haq for help. “Haq shut down his madrassa and sent his entire student body to fight alongside the Taliban” (Ahmed, 2000, p.91). Samiul Haq and his Deobandi followers also demanded and advanced efforts to establish a Taliban regime in Pakistan and he was convinced that “the Islamic revolution comes to Pakistan”\footnote{In 1997 Pakistani Taliban rioted in Karachi. By 1998 they “were banning TV and videos in towns along the Pashtun belt, imposing Sharia punishments such as stoning and amputation in defiance of the legal system, killing Pakistani Shia and forcing people, particularly women, to adapt to the Taliban dress code and way of life” (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). Samiul Haq is also an influential politician and served in the Pakistani Senate.} (Ahmed, 2000, p.91). Pakistan's financial aid for the madrassas and the Taliban was “thus coming back to haunt the country itself” but the country’s leaders, ignorant and unable to cope with the challenge, “continue to support the Taliban” (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). Possible explanations for this strategy could be that they hope to sustain a minimum of influence by further funding these extremist groups, or they are afraid of mass uprisings if funds run dry.

Over the time there have been some discussions whether there is a divide between “moderate” and “hardline” Taliban. Yet, this categorization proved to be misleading and failed to explain the controversies within the movement. There simply “is no organised or recognisable ‘moderate [. . .] faction’ [. . .] to counterbalance the ‘religious’ hardliners” (Ruttig, 2010, p.24). There is more
explanatory power in a differentiation of the approach various actors might favor. “On the one side, there are pragmatic, politically thinking, pro talks” Taliban who prefer a political solution to a protracted bloodshed and who are “concerned about the indiscriminate slaughter of Afghan civilians”, but are still ultra-orthodox extremist Islamists (Ruttig, 2010, p.15, p.24). “On the other side are those who favor a purely military approach, often combined with a hypertrophic recourse to terrorist means” (Ruttig, 2010, p.24). The former are dissatisfied with the extent and the consequences of the latter’s use of suicide bombers. The majority of the fatalities in these terrorist attacks are Muslims, a fact that is considered to be a sin by the first group. The second group prefers a violent victory, whatever it costs. These differences have surfaced already during civil war but came to the foreground when the Taliban regrouped as a guerrilla movement after their ousting by US troops. Still, even if their methods differ, they both have the same aim of reintroducing a Taliban-led emirate.

Deobandi groups, mostly sympathetic to Saudi Wahhabism, established a number of military training camps (for example in Khost under the guidance of Osama bin Laden). Their madrassas sent fighters not only to Afghanistan but also to “Kashmir, Chechnya and Bosnia” (Ahmed, 2000, p.92). Many of the Deobandi leaders were Durrani Pashtuns from the Kandahar area and from Chaman, a Pakistani city 100 km from Kandahar and right at the border of the two countries. Yet, the Deobandi tradition is strictly opposed to tribal organizational structures, a stance expressed in the Taliban’s mistrust of tribal leaders and their subsequent elimination, either physical or from their leadership roles (Ahmed, 2000, p.92). Furthermore, Deobandis as well as Taliban strictly opposed the Shiite creed of Islam and therefore also Iran. The Taliban massacred Shiite Hazaras and other Afghan Shiite minorities so bloodthirstily that it “had no precedent in Afghan history” (Ahmed, 2000, p.83). Kepel put it into more drastic words, describing the Deobandis as “paramilitary groups who specialize in butchering Pakistani Shiites” (Kepel, 2002, p.3). The new kind of extremism “clearly debased the Deobandi tradition of learning and reform”, and the Taliban’s stiffness was “accepting no concept of doubt except as sin and considering debate as little more than heresy” (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). ‘Heresy’ and ‘apostasy’ were the grounds on which the Taliban asserted the right to kill whoever was in their way (Barnett, 2003, p.570).

They do not even debate with slightly differing extremist, radical Muslim groups as only their own way is acceptable and they reject “all Muslim ruling elites as corrupt” (Ahmed, 2000, p.93). This constitutes a standpoint that
has resonated across the Muslim world “and inspired a younger generation of Islamic militants” who oppose their respective leaders (Ahmed, 2000, p.94). The Taliban rigorously object to modernism “and have no desire to understand or adopt modern ideas of progress or economic development” (Ahmed, 1983b, p.93).

The imposition of the burqa on women is, according to Edwards, “the best symbol for the fearful spirit that animates Taliban rulers” (Edwards, 2002, p.178). They try to maintain a strict division of the male and the female, the public and the private. Forcing women to wear a burqa seeks to eliminate “situations of insecurity and ambiguity” and “speaks to [. . .] men’s need to maintain control over uncertain circumstances whatever the costs to themselves and their dependents” may be (Edwards, 2002, p.178). He goes on to compare the atmosphere of departure among young Afghan students in the 1970s who were curious and had a great appetite to see the world as well as to create a modern country, modeled after Western examples, to the Taliban:

“Now the youthful faces of the Taliban, faces that have known mostly war, refugee camps, and the cloistered confines of all-male madrasas, stare back with unblinking negation. Nothing outside their own world is good, nothing outside their own experience and their scriptural lessons is worth emulating or caring about. The world for them is closed.” (Edwards, 2002, p.178).

5.3 The organizational structure of the Taliban

The Taliban are a “network of networks” and their most coherent alliances are built around the Kandahari faction of Mullah Omar and the clans of the Haqqani, Mansur and Khales from southeastern and eastern regions (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). Nevertheless, the latter three networks are rather “regional than ‘tribal’” (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). Some of them include fighters from very distinct backgrounds. For example Mullah Dadullah,136, who became known for his “extensive use of suicide bombers” and his strong connections to Saudi Arabia, united fighters from many tribes as well as foreign fighters under his command137

---

136Mullah Dadullah was killed by NATO forces in May 2007 (Ruttig, 2010, p.8).

137Quite some Taliban commanders did not allow foreign fighters into their territory because of their inclination and reputation to act exceedingly brutal. Avoiding this brute force was necessary in order to preclude cycles of retaliatory violence (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). When local commanders “behave too ‘softly’ with the population” Kandahari Taliban are brought in...
In recent years though also the Haqqani network expanded into “Wardak, Logar and Kabul provinces” (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). The local commanders are integrated in a centralized hierarchy, and their rank depends on the size of the territory they control.

In general terms there are three different kinds of networks, and their common cohesive force is comradeship (andiwalli, habitually originating in the common resistance to the Soviets) (Ruttig, 2010, p.14). They are either religious and thus created in madrassas and mosques, or they are political or tribal. The Taliban leadership can draw from all of these three networks (which frequently overlap) “when mobilisation, support, solidarity, etc. is needed” (Ruttig, 2010, p.14). These networks complement each other in a vertical and in a horizontal organizational structure. The vertical structure is expressed by the strict compliance to Mullah Omar and the “supra-tribal and supra-ethnic” ultra-orthodox Islamist ideology (Ruttig, 2010, p.22). The horizontal structures reflect the movement’s “strong roots in the segmented Pashtun tribal society” and are advantageous for recruitment and the legitimacy or authority of local commanders (Ruttig, 2010, p.22). The vertical structure provides a cohesion which is remarkable for Afghan standards, a country where factionalism was the everlasting norm. The “horizontal dimension” allows for an organizational elasticity which gives a small but evidently “sufficient degree of autonomy” to “local commanders, and prevents them from feeling over-controlled” (Ruttig, 2010, p.23).

The Taliban grew up in Afghan refugee villages in Pakistan. Many of them were too young to remember what Afghanistan was like before the war and many of them were orphans. Loyalty to watan, “to descent group, to tribal ancestor, even to family” lost much of its former importance (Edwards, 2002, p.171). After having spent years in “quasi-monastic” schools and being disillusioned by the corruption and infighting of the political Islamic leadership, the Taliban movement offered the possibility to realize “what they had been discussing in theory” for a long time: the establishment of a ‘truly’ religious Islamic state (Edwards, 2002, p.171).

The transformation of the Taliban from student group to military movement was almost flawless. Furthermore, the leaders of the movement remained largely (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). Almost all Taliban commanders use the title “Mullah”, even though only few are mullahs in the conventional sense (Ruttig, 2010, p.23).

Because they lacked social ties which bring about social control and mutual obligations, orphans and men who were not integrated in a family structure were “the most feared members of society” (Grima, 2004, p.36).
invisible and decisions were made in a council of Islamic clerics in Kandahar that “was nominally headed by the rarely seen and seldom heard” Mullah Omar\(^{139}\) (Edwards, 2002, p.171). Mullah Omar’s “simplicity of lifestyle and participation in the military activities” contributed to his reputation among fighters who attributed to him “almost legendary qualities” (Tarzi, 2008, p.291).

Edwards concludes that the leaders’ policy to keep a low profile, which proved to be a success, was a response “to the people’s disillusionment with the all-too-visible” ambitious Islamic party leaders who were eagerly seeking to be in the limelight, battling for fame and power (Edwards, 2002, p.171). In addition, this approach helped to sustain “the appearance of unity”, which was a great accomplishment compared to the fighting among their predecessors (Edwards, 2002, p.173). In the beginning the Taliban’s decision making processes were based on “consensus building” by the shura (see also p.80 for explanation), a “collective political leadership”, in Kandahar (Ahmed, 2000, p.95). The functioning of this council was modeled after the traditional Pashtun jirga (see p.44) and claimed to represent a “consensus amongst ‘the believers’” (Ahmed, 2000, p.95). Ahmed attended one such early shura in Kandahar, but already back then final decisions were usually taken by Mullah Omar. It is not clear though, how exactly Mullah Omar attained the status as a leader. His leadership quickly took the form of a “highly centralized, secretive, dictatorial and inaccessible” rule (Ahmed, 2000, p.95). Ahmed went on to describe the organization as that of a “secret society run mainly by Kandaharis”\(^ {140}\) (Ahmed, 2000, p.98).

The Taliban did not include any “Afghan intellectuals and technocrats” in their administration, “as they considered them the spawn of a Western or Soviet-style educational system which they detested” (Ahmed, 2000, p.97). They “replaced all senior Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara bureaucrats with Pashtuns, whether qualified or not” (Kepel, 2002, p.234). Through the loss of expertise many government agencies “ceased to function”\(^ {141}\) (Ahmed, 2000, p.101). The “students

\(^{139}\)After the fall of the Taliban following the US engagement, parts of the Taliban’s leadership around Mullah Omar regrouped in Quetta, Pakistan, roughly 50 km from the Afghan border, and formed the so-called Quetta-shura. It is widely believed that a majority of the Quetta-shura’s leaders is under more or less direct control of the Pakistani intelligence community, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is actively protected by current ad retired intelligence officials (Giustozzi, 2008, p.25). One of the shura’s leaders is Sirajuddin Haqqani, member of the powerful Haqqani network. See also p.91.

\(^{140}\)It is said that before being ousted by the USA in 2001, Mullah Omar had left the city only once in order to visit Kabul in 1996 (Ahmed, 2000, p.98).

\(^{141}\)Government offices were opened at 8 a.m. for four hours. Then the Taliban would pray, enjoy a long siesta and then prepare for long council meetings at night. Most people did not
of religion" simply “had no interest in state machinery” (Kepel, 2002, p.234). Except for “war, commerce, and religion, they couldn’t care less about what happened under their rule” (Kepel, 2002, p.234). This also meant that they did not pursue or implement any social policies. Food and basic health services were preferably provided by Islamist humanitarian organizations, but they could not deliver everything which was needed. In order to avoid uprisings of the deprived and hunger-stricken masses, Western NGOs were allowed in. The relationship between the Taliban, the West and the NGOs became strained, when one of the NGOs was accused of “Christian proselytism - a major crime under the sharia, since Muslims who convert to another faith are dubbed apostates and condemned to death” (Kepel, 2002, p.234). Some Afghans and foreign NGO staff were jailed and awaited trial under “Islamic justice” (Kepel, 2002, p.235). This event cost the Taliban the last sympathies they had enjoyed in some powerful US political circles (Kepel, 2002, p.235).

Even major mujahedin commanders who surrendered were not allowed ascension in the Taliban military hierarchy, since they were discredited for their former party affiliations and warlordish behavior. Most of the traditional tribal leadership had already been eliminated by events during the Soviet occupation (see also p.80) and “what little of the old Pashtun leadership was left” could easily be annihilated by the Taliban (Ahmed, 2000, p.97). Thereby they also eliminated the possibility of any political threat from inside the Pashtun realm.

The Supreme Shura in Kandahar consisted of old friends of Mullah Omar, almost all of whom were Durrani Pashtuns. It never included any Ghilzai Pashtuns. It had ten permanent members and could be extended to up to 50 people, including military commanders or members of the subordinate shuras in Kabul and the provinces. The two shuras of Kabul, one being a council of the acting ministers, the other being the military council, had to cede all important decisions to Kandahar. Sometimes even minuscule edicts of Kabul were revoked by Mullah Omar (Ahmed, 2000, p.98). Questions of military strategy, “key appointments and the allocation of funds for offensives” were decided by Mullah Omar (Ahmed, 2000, p.100).

Also the administrative officials and members of shuras in the provinces, including those with non-Pashtun majorities, were almost exclusively Kandahari turn to government institutions anymore because they knew it would be to no effect (Ahmed, 2000, p.101).

142 The 17 members of the Kabul Shura comprised “at least eight” Durrans, three Ghilzais “and only two were non-Pashtuns” (Ahmed, 2000, p.98).
Pashtuns. They did “not speak Dari, the lingua franca” of non-Pashtun areas or spoke it poorly (Ahmed, 2000, p.99). Furthermore, there were “no prominent local citizens in any of these local Shuras” (Ahmed, 2000, p.99).

Mullah Omar kept watch that none of the governors or ministers was able “to build up a local power base” and regularly shifted them all around the country or sent them to battle as front commanders “at a moment’s notice” (Ahmed, 2000, p.99, p.101). Close to all members of the Kabul and Kandahar shuras, “except for those with physical disabilities, have acted as military commander at some time or the other” (Ahmed, 2000, p.101). It lead to major consternation among international aid agencies and the UN, when the ministers they had been negotiating with about humanitarian aid suddenly left office for some months in order to command a punitive expedition, a massacre or to be directly involved in fights at the front. Also, while the ministers were engaged at the front, the ministries were unable to take any decisions (Ahmed, 2000, p.101). These frequent shifts, combined with the all-encompassing control Mullah Omar wanted to exert over his ministers, which sometimes delayed even insignificant decisions for months, resulted in chaos, confusion and eventually in the total absence of state governance. At the same time there were enough resources for thousands of Taliban cadres and bureaucrats (mostly “young zealots”) to patrol the streets “with whips, long sticks and kalashnikovs” and to “force the male population to grow long beards” and the women to obey all kinds of extreme rules (for example to not make any sound with their shoes while walking) (Ahmed, 2000, p.101, p.105). This ‘religious police’ was called “Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi An al-Munkar, or the Department of the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice” and was probably the most active government agency, busily enforcing ever new radical edicts (Ahmed, 2000, p.105).

Even though he did not hold a formal position, Mullah Omar was the absolute leader of the military forces. After the Taliban defeat at Mazar-i Sharif in 1997, where they had “lost some 3,000 of their best troops” and “3,600 were taken prisoner”, some Ghilzai commanders who provided the bulk of the fighters, criticized the military leadership. They were angry about “not being consulted on military and political issues”, being excluded from the Supreme Shura and increasingly refused to be “used as cannon fodder by the Taliban” (Ahmed, 2000, p.99). This forced the Taliban to fall back on less experienced Pakistani fighters (for example from the Haqqania madrassa, see also p.106). In 1999 about 30% of the Taliban’s roughly 30,000 fighting troops were provided by Pakistani madrassas. These numbers could be augmented dramatically before certain mil-
itary raids. In its organization the Taliban army resembled that of a traditional *lashkar* (see also p.25 and p.44), except for their ties not necessarily being based on kinship and the Taliban being prohibited to loot (one of the main purposes of a tribal *lashkar*). Until their defeat at Mazar-i Sharif in 1997, the Taliban were relatively disciplined in this respect (Ahmed, 2000, p.100). Most of the Taliban fighters did not receive fixed, regular salaries but their commanders decided about “an adequate sum of money” they would receive “when they go on home leave” (Ahmed, 2000, p.100). The only ones who were to be paid on a regular basis were professional soldiers who were recruited from the former communist army (Ahmed, 2000, p.100). Most of them were Pashtuns who worked as “tank drivers, gunners, pilots and mechanics” and were rather simple mercenaries fighting for whoever controlled Kabul and provided an acceptable income (Ahmed, 2000, p.100).

Mullah Omar confided the implementation of his decisions increasingly on the Kandahari ulusma (see p.30 for definition) and the religious police in Kabul. He did not even consult the Supreme Shura in Kandahar anymore, but no one was willing or able to contest his leadership. All the shuras accepted him as the highest authority, the “*Amir-ul Momineen*” (Commander of the Faithful), to rule in line with the Sharia. Any deviation from or criticism of his rulings was considered contradicting Islamic law (Ahmed, 2000, p.102). Mullah Omar relied only on a very small and secretive circle of friends. The most prominent member of this group was Maulvi Said Mohammed Pasanai, “the Chief Justice of Kandahar’s Islamic Supreme Court, who had taught Omar the basics of Sharia law during the jihad” (Ahmed, 2000, p.102).

Deteriorating economic conditions and an intensifying alienation with large parts of the population, combined “with massive military losses” in the north “led to increasing internal divisions” (Ahmed, 2000, p.103). A revolt arose in the Taliban’s heartland around Kandahar as a result of forced conscription. “Taliban recruiters were killed by villagers who refused to join the army” (Ahmed, 2000, p.103). Ahmed reports from interviews he conducted in 1998 that village elders pronounced their anger saying that the “Taliban had promised peace, instead they have given us nothing but war” (Ahmed, 2000, p.103). Mullah Omar could once again rely on the manpower of Pakistani madrassas but soon “acts of looting and robbery by Taliban soldiers” multiplied, “reflecting the growing indiscipline caused by economic hardship”\(^\text{143}\) (Ahmed, 2000, p.104).

\(^{143}\)Taliban fighters who were caught in such incidents had their right arms and left feet amputated by authorities. They then “hung the amputated limbs from trees in the city centre
Behind the scenes there was a struggle between different groups of Taliban. It is said that Mullah Rabbani, the head of the Kabul Shura, co-founder of the Taliban movement and acting prime minister\textsuperscript{144}, got involved in adapting a more “moderate” stance in order to gain access to much needed foreign humanitarian aid. However, foreigners in general and UN staff in particular were labeled as infidels and spies by the leadership surrounding Mullah Omar who therefore obstructed most of these attempts. Rumors have it, that Rabbani built a power base among the influential traders of Jalalabad who saw their commerce and smuggling activities suffer under the Taliban’s strictness. Many of his decisions were overturned by Mullah Omar. After Mullah Rabbani had made some concessions to US special envoy Bill Richardson in 1998. He disappeared “on one of his periodic long leaves”, and many believed he was arrested.

In the end though these tensions never really rose to surface, no Taliban leader was “willing to contradict Omar or oppose him” and Mullah Omar surely kept total control of the movement (Ahmed, 2000, p.104).

Other tensions, respectively “a high level of mutual mistrust”, arose between the Kandaharis and Pashtuns from the Paktia province since the latter saw themselves excluded from the inner leadership circles (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). Further rivalries were continuations of “traditional” conflicts, for example between Durranis from Kandahar and Ghilzais from Zabul, who competed for influential posts in the Taliban hierarchy (Ruttig, 2010, p.14).

\section{5.4 Traditional tribal structures and the Taliban}

As described in the previous chapters, tribal structures have been confronted with challenges on many levels. Even if the Taliban have presented themselves as supra-tribal and in some ways anti-tribal movement (since they strictly oppose traditional tribal rivalries and claims to power) in a variety of ways they rely on some tribal structures which are still functioning. The Taliban often have failed to contain inner tribal divisions and frequently the “parochial interests of a local commander overrode the non-tribal attitude of the leadership” (Ruttig, 2010, p.14). The tribal features of the Taliban are more pronounced in the periphery and where the control of its central leadership is weaker.

The massive migratory movements of the past have “narrowed the urban-rural gap” and “gradually undermined and transformed the traditional relation-

\textsuperscript{144}Not to be mistaken with Burhanuddin Rabbani of Jamiat-e Islami.
ships of village, tribal and ethnic communities” (Ruttig, 2010, p.8). One of the core values in Pashtun tribal organization, the respect for the elders (see also p.36), has lost much of its importance during the decades of war. Young men “questioned the authority of the ‘elders’ whom they held responsible for these conflicts or, at least, for their inability to solve them with their traditional means”\(^5\) (Ruttig, 2010, p.8, see also Rashid, 2004, p.23). The warlords of the anti-Soviet jihad, drug barons and other militarily and economically powerful newcomers can “ignore jirga decisions with impunity” and nowadays “might often trumps pashtunwalai and even Islamic law” (Ruttig, 2010, p.8). With the decreasing importance of the jirga “the major conflict-resolving mechanism of the Pashtuns” was gone (see also p.44 and p.80) (Ruttig, 2010, p.8). Also the post-9/11 governments of Afghanistan have done little if nothing “to support initiatives of key Pashtun tribes” to strengthen their structures even if they were willing to renounce or fight the Taliban (Ruttig, 2010, p.9). Kabul’s attempt to reinforce tribal military power by paying local militias (arbaki see also p.44) backfired when funds dried up. Sometimes the allocation of these means was impeded by difficult relationships between local governors and the central administration. The arbaki remained unpaid for longer periods of time, not only giving an opening to the usually well funded recruiting efforts of the Taliban but also lowering “the enthusiasm of individual tribesmen to join” such a militia as well as producing undesirable effects: “To pay the arbaki means to render it uncontrollable when the payment stops” (Ruttig, 2010, p.10).

The madrassas and mosques the Taliban networks evolved from were located in territories of particular tribes. Nevertheless, these tribal identities “were not the primary reference of these fighting Taliban” (Ruttig, 2010, p.11). The Taliban also strengthened the role of the village mullahs who had only held a marginal role in the political realm for centuries (see also p.31). The mullahs became “the eyes and ears” of the Taliban in the villages and further augmented their influence through the increased collection of religious taxes (ushr and zakat)\(^6\) (Ruttig, 2010, p.12).

Most of the Taliban foot soldiers, contrary to their leadership, are rather driven by dire economic circumstances than by ideology. The Taliban networks

---

\(^5\)I would argue though, that the tribal traditions, though they heavily structured violence among themselves, were simply unable to deal with the excessive level of violence which occurred in the wars. For sure the disappearance of the khans (see also p.80) and jirgas strongly contributed to this.

\(^6\)Some of their traditional influence was based on the fact that the mullah often was “the only literate person in a village” (Ruttig, 2010, p.12).
in themselves are sectioned in a way that reminds of tribal segmentation (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). On the local level the Taliban fronts (fighting groups) are strongly rooted in tribes and subtribes. “Recruitment, operations and succession patterns follow tribal lines in a majority of cases” (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). Most individual Taliban identify themselves with and are strongly connected to their tribe or subtribe. They rarely ever sever this connection since this “would mean a loss of status, identity and protection” and one’s tribe provides a fallback structure to rely on, should it be necessary in times of crisis (Ruttig, 2010, p.23).

The Taliban foot soldiers mostly do not fight outside the area of their tribe, which is in line with traditions of tribal warfare\textsuperscript{147} (see also p.75). Ruttig presents estimates that today 80% to 90% of all Taliban “fighters operate in or close to their communities, not least because most Taliban fighters are part-timers” (Ruttig, 2010, p.13). However, even if tribal rivalries sometimes surfaced, generally the ultra-orthodox Islamist ideology of the Taliban created sufficient “cohesion amongst the fighters from segmented Pashtun tribes” (Ruttig, 2010, p.19).

\textsuperscript{147}When local commanders want to engage in “out of area” endeavors they “must notify the commanders in the particular province and must ‘obey their orders’” (Ruttig, 2010, p.13).
6 The Fall of the Taliban and the US and NATO intervention

“And when people are entering upon a war they do things the wrong way around. Action comes first, and it is only when they have already suffered that they begin to think.”

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 431 BCE

The US-led military campaign, Operation Enduring Freedom, began on October 7, 2001. Initially, it was carried out through aerial bombardments and missile attacks from US and British war vessels and submarines. Subsequently, a “limited number of Special Forces [. . .] in coalition with the Northern Alliance” managed to oust the Taliban regime\(^{148}\) (Kipping, 2010, p.4). A majority of Afghans was relieved that the strict and brutal oppression of the Taliban had ended, and they welcomed the US intervention (Kipping, 2010, p.5). Following a period of relative calm, the unpreparedness and ignorance of the US military about their enemy and the country in general led to increasing support of the insurgency\(^{149}\). “Despite vastly superior training, leadership, and weaponry, the American military was gradually losing its grip, and one of the weaknesses of American efforts has been their lack of knowledge of the social context in which they were fighting” (Edwards, 2010, p.1). In addition, the intervention coalition jeopardized its very own efforts by strengthening local warlords who claimed to fight Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but more often simply pursued their own interests (Kipping, 2010, p.2). The United States were also very skeptical towards the capabilities of its Western allies and delayed the expansion of ISAF (NATO’s International Security Assistance Force) beyond Kabul until midyear.

---

\(^{148}\) In the first successful stage of the Afghanistan war, the United States did not have more than 300 to 500 troops on the ground and increased troop levels to about 1300 in the first weeks. By the end of 2003, about 10,000 US soldiers were in Afghanistan and until the end of 2008, US troop levels slowly augmented to a little more than 30,000. In the following one and a half years troop numbers were more than tripled to around 100,000 Americans (another 29 countries provided about 30,000 troops) who are in the country up until today. In addition, the US Department of Defense employs more than 110,000 private military contractors in the country.

\(^{149}\) As late as August 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, (then head of the Afghanistan operations and later fired for public insubordination, because he awkwardly criticized the political leadership in Washington in an interview with *The Rolling Stone*) submitted a report to Defense Secretary Robert Gates in which he stated: “our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem” and in order to succeed “the operational culture” has to be changed, seeking to connect with people (McChrystal in Edwards, 2010, p.3).

The United States military learned up on those issues years later and adapted their approach in the so-called counter-insurgency strategy (COIN), which is considered being “the most important and influential doctrine in the history of the US Army” (Edwards, 2010, p.17). However, it remains to be seen whether this approach can still bear fruits and correct the initial mistakes.

The implementation of so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) was another attempt to gain a favorable viewing among the Afghan population. Particularly the Pakistanis and Arabs which were seen to be “imported” by the Taliban were widely resented by the Afghans (see also p.71, p.109 and p.125). Under these circumstances, “using a non-Muslim power to rid the country of unwelcome Muslims was deemed acceptable”, specifically since “Americans could be counted upon to leave the country at some point, while it was widely feared that Pakistanis and Arabs would not” (Barfield, 2004, p.290). At the same time, the tribes which are located near the border or are dispersed across the border tend to see Pakistani involvement favorably. Most Pashtuns in the area believe “that being on the pro-Pakistan side in the conflict was wiser, as Pakistan was going to be involved in Afghanistan much longer and more effectively than the United States” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.27).

The military reaction of the United States to Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks of 9/11 was anticipated by some informed key players in Afghanistan even before the airplanes were hijacked (see also p.97). Still, the speed with which the Taliban movement fell, surprised even its own leaders. On November 13, the Taliban left Kabul without a fight as the city was overrun by Tajik fighters of the Northern Alliance. “Among demonstrations of joy and liberation, residents of Kabul rushed to barber shops for a clean shave and waited in long lines to reclaim old TV sets, as Kabul television programming was soon to be back on the air” (Kepel, 2002, p.19). Afghans were far “from rising up against the infidels and demanding the foreign troops leave, the Afghan population was now asking

150 “COIN represents a seismic shift not only in how we organize and deploy our military force, but - whether we notice or not - in how we conceive of the military's and, by extension, America's role in the world” (Edwards, 2010, p.18). See (Petraeus und Amos, 2006) for more information.

151 Successes and failures of these PRTs are an exceedingly fascinating topic which I can not respond to in a satisfactory manner in this paper. I take the liberty to refer the more interested reader to the abundantly available specialist literature on this topic.

152 The Northern Alliance was a military-political alignment of groups from various ethnic backgrounds. Tajiks, Hazara, Pashtuns, Uzbeks and Turkmen fought against the Taliban regime. Their most famous leaders were Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was killed 3 days before the 9/11 attacks, and the Uzbek warlord and general Abdul Rashid Dostum.
for a larger international force to prevent the return of the warlords and provide basic security for the country’s reconstruction.”153 (Barfield, 2004, p.289).

Already a few days after the beginning of the US strikes, Mullah Omar recognized their effectiveness and send his family to safety to Pakistan (Tarzi, 2008, p.277). Yet, he still seemed to believe that his troops would be able to hold their ground, as reinforcements from Pakistani madrassas joined the fight. Soon though he realized that his movement was falling apart. For fear of being traced by US intelligence, Mullah Omar terminated all communications with his field commanders. This “absence of commands from Mullah Omar reportedly led to countless casualties among Taliban forces” (Tarzi, 2008, p.277). By December the Taliban surrendered. On December 6, the Taliban cabinet met in Kandahar, led by Defense Minister Mullah Obsidullah, “and decided that the Taliban would transfer power to the tribal council headed by Hamid Karzai” (Tarzi, 2008, p.278). The leadership had learned that their forces in Uruzgan Province, next to Kandahar, had been annihilated by troops of Hamid Karzai. Additionally, powerful local tribes wanted to use “the opportunity to regain power and expel the Taliban from Kandahar” (Barfield, 2004, p.289). Mullah Omar ordered to surrender Kandahar and the Taliban leadership “scattered, fleeing Afghanistan for the save havens nearby” (Tarzi, 2008, p.274). Kandahar, the last major urban center under Taliban control, the heartland of their movement and the starting point of their conquest throughout the country, came under the control of the tribal council on December 7th. Karzai declared “a general amnesty for all of the Taliban forces” from his base in Uruzgan (Tarzi, 2008, p.278). Western intelligence officials thereafter observed what they dubbed “the great escape” (Tarzi, 2008, p.278). Taliban leaders who had been jailed were released, many of them fled to Pakistan where they reportedly were “living in luxury”, others “promised that they would not participate in politics” and stayed (Tarzi, 2008, p.279). The United States unofficially supported this policy and an official of the tribal council reasoned: “Those men who have surrendered are our brothers, and we have allowed them to live in a peaceful manner” (Tarzi, 2008, p.279).

The power vacuum created by the collapse of the Taliban was “immediately filled by large numbers of militia commanders as well as tribal and religious leaders” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.137). Some of this strongmen possessed legitimacy among the local populations, yet many of them based their

153 Only ten weeks later many Afghans started to say, that they had felt more secure under the hardline regime than “under the power-sharing interim administration that has replaced it” (Hirschkind und Mahmood, 2002, p.346).
power solely on controlling the means of violence (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.137). Their position was further strengthened by “the US-strategy to use Afghan militias in their fight against remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.137). These militia leaders were commonly called warlords (jang salar in Dari), for years “virtually no influential political figure in Afghanistan could avoid this label” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.138).

Hamid Karzai was named head of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) which was to take power on December 22nd 2001, in the so-called Bonn Agreement. Karzai later claimed to distinguish two different kinds of Taliban. On the one hand, “the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest sons of this country”; and on the other those, “who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and security in the country” (Tarzi, 2008, p.279). This was clearly aimed at reducing the risk of major resistance and an offer to accommodate the political needs of the large part of the population which previously had joined the Taliban. Furthermore, Karzai did not have a strong base of supporters even within his own tribe. By issuing the amnesty he hoped to gain the backing of southern Pashtuns and wanted to create a political counterbalance to the growing strength of the Northern Alliance (Tarzi, 2008, p.282). Yet, many Pashtuns saw Karzai “as an impotent figurehead surrounded by foreigners and non-Pashtuns” and blamed him for the ascendency of the mostly non-Pashtun Northern Alliance, especially the powerful Tajiks (Tarzi, 2008, p.286). In 2002, the new administration convened a Loya Jirga (see also p.81) to transfer power from the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) to the Transitional Administration. Many Pashtuns wanted the former king, Zahir Shah (see also p.61 and p.92), to take a leading role in the Transitional Administration in order to ensure Pashtun influence at the top level. However, Karzai managed to garner enough support to become leader again. The “unceremonious manner in which” Zahir Shah “was shown the exit [. . .] created the impression that the Loya Jirga was a rubber-stamp”

---

154 In December 2001, a group of Afghan leaders, UN officials and politicians had met in Bonn, Germany. One part of the agreement dealt with establishing NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under the UN-Resolution 1386. The official name of the compact was Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions.

155 The Karzai family has been influential for quite some decades in the Kandahar region. The Karzais are “one of the leading families of the Popolzai tribe, to which the king’s [Zahir Shah] family also belongs” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.142). More specifically, they are from the Qaranagh sub-tribe (Ruttig, 2010, p.7). Ahmad Wali Karzai, Hamid Karzai’s brother, is governor of the region and a powerful warlord who controls “a big share of the drug trade in the region” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.142).
for the AIA, which was seen to be dominated by the Northern Alliance (Tarzi, 2008, p.290). Rasul Amin, minister for education under the AIA, said: “The perception that Karzai had betrayed his ethnic Pashtuns is now firmly in the minds of the Pashtuns” (Tarzi, 2008, p.290). Resistance against the new government augmented. Simultaneously, the new leaderships clemency towards the old regime deeply angered many in the Northern Alliance who had fought the Taliban at high costs of blood and treasure. They interpreted it as an attempt to restore Pashtun hegemony and marginalize other ethnic groups156 (Tarzi, 2008, p.280). In fact, even if many Pashtuns might not have identified with the extreme ideology of the Taliban, “they appreciated the position of power the Pashtun-dominated Taliban held over the population” (Tarzi, 2008, p.285).

Karzai continued to include former Taliban in the political process, excluding only those who demonstrably had had ties to Al-Qaeda (Tarzi, 2008, p.281).

At the same time, Karzai urged Islamabad repeatedly over several years to arrest top Taliban cadres, especially those who reentered the resistance and were known terrorists. Pakistan generally ignored those pleas. In some cases they arrested several hundred Taliban and handed them over to Afghan authorities. However, most of those Taliban were unimportant and unknown foot soldiers. They had to be released by the Afghans since no one had any proof of their involvement in illegal activities157. The Taliban leadership remained mainly untroubled and deepened its contacts with the Pakistani military and the ISI. They received “intelligence and tactical information” and the ISI assisted the Taliban in adopting “a relatively sophisticated strategy”, especially for “a Taliban leadership which was never known for being well read or sophisticated” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.25). General James Jones informed the US Senate about these ties in 2006, yet there was only little evidence for the transfer of “large amounts of weaponry” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.25). If the Pakistani authorities also arm the Taliban, they do not provide everything which is needed by the insurgents, a fact that is mirrored by a twentyfold increase of prices on the weapons black-market in the Pakistani Northwest Frontier Province in recent years (Giustozzi, 2008, p.26). In some cases Pakistan’s aid to the Taliban has worked against

---

156 An influential northern newspaper described Karzai’s approach as “a betrayal of Islam, betrayal of the nation, betrayal of humanity” (Tarzi, 2008, p.280).

157 Until 2006, Pakistan had only arrested a handful of Taliban. The described alibi-mass-arrests took place in July 2006, shortly after a visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Just hours after a visit of Vice President Cheney in February 2007, Mullah Obaidullah, a key Taliban commander and former defense minister, was arrested. Even if Pakistan seemed to give in to US pressure this time, they freed Obaidullah after the smoke had cleared (Giustozzi, 2008, p.24).
them since the idea of creating a greater Pashtunistan was clearly suppressed by the interest groups behind these efforts. In addition, some Taliban “resented the pressure of Pakistani security services, accusing them of forcing the Taliban to attack schools and development projects to prevent Afghanistan from progressing as a country” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.27). So even in this alliance there are different factions following various diverging interests.

The spectacularly swift military victory of the US engagement and the Northern Alliance in 2001 opened a small window of opportunity “for Afghanistan to free itself from the grips of extremism and the scourge of international isolation” (Jalali, 2002, p.174). Nonetheless, relatively peaceful conditions and the absence of resistance did not last long. Killings, rapes and kidnappings increased in areas where the Pashtuns were a minority. The atrocities against Pashtuns in those areas, where they sometimes generally were ‘stigmatized’ as Taliban, was widely seen as retaliation for Taliban brutality (Tarzi, 2008, p.288). Particularly during the initial phase of the US military engagement Pashtuns felt that they were sought out “based solely on their ethnicity” and unjustly targeted “as threats to the new governing process”

In December of 2002, reports about the regrouping of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda surfaced. Shortly before, the United States had declared to end the phase of conventional battle and shifted “to the reconstruction phase of engagement”, claiming that three quarters of the country had been pacified (Tarzi, 2008, p.282, see also, Giustozzi, 2008, p.11). At the beginning 2003, attacks against “aid workers, Afghan officials, and the U.S.-led coalition forces became more customary” (Tarzi, 2008, p.283). By the middle of the year, the security situation had worsened throughout the country, especially in areas close to the Pakistani border. Attacks on military targets as well as terrorist attacks against civilians increased dramatically (Tarzi, 2008, p.284). In general though, there seemed to be little or no coordination between these attacks and frequently no one claimed responsibility (Tarzi, 2008, p.284).

---

158The US special forces division Task Force 121, was assigned to eliminate ‘high-value targets’. They used 19th-century British anthropology which focused on Pashtuns to prepare for their mission. One Special Forces operative, assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence admitted: “We literally don’t know where to go for information on what makes other societies tick, so we use Google to make policy” (McFate, 2005, p.46).
6.1 The New Taliban

Questions arose about who initiated those attacks. Many groups claimed to be Taliban, but the authenticity of these assertions was doubtful. Were these “the same Taliban emerging from defeat to reassert their hold on power, or were other groups attempting to capitalize on the Taliban name and legacy [...]?” (Tarzi, 2008, p.275). Contrary to the Taliban’s first rise to power, this insurgency “did not emerge as a cohesive group with a uniform mission” (Tarzi, 2008, p.291). There did not seem to be a central leadership which was directing operations. The various actors shrouded themselves in a veil of secrecy, acted mainly independently and seemed united only in their motivation to oust the foreign powers (Tarzi, 2008, p.291). Even “members of the Taliban acknowledge that at this stage there was no coordination among the various local groups” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.11).

Subsequently, the labels Taliban, neo-Taliban159 or New Taliban have been used to describe the movement which had emerged in 2002. All those labels are often used interchangeably and many groups called themselves mujahedin, further adding to “the confusion over the identity and makeup” of this movement (Tarzi, 2008, p.275). Identifying oneself as Taliban can be a powerful tool in Afghanistan, it “instills fear and anger in some while uniting others” (Tarzi, 2008, p.276). The new violent resistance showed certain characteristics of the old Taliban movement, and parts of it certainly maintained connections to the ousted leadership, at the same time though they portrayed significant differences. They had “evolved beyond the old regime to encompass new groups with new agendas” (Tarzi, 2008, p.277). The fact that no one claimed responsibility for many of the initial attacks, the intangible organizational structure and the “chameleon-like operations [...] further heightened outsiders’ confusion” regarding the identity of the insurgents (Tarzi, 2008, p.284).

Soon though the attacks started to be increasingly coordinated and some well-known figureheads of the old regime reappeared. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the extremist Hezb-e Islami, who had also been prime minister in the mujahedin period, recipient of major US and Pakistani aid, and initially an enemy of the Taliban, reportedly supported Al-Qaeda (see also p.90 for more information about Hekmatyar). He managed to accommodate himself with Mullah Omar, and though their relationship was strained at times, formally accepts [159]The denomination neo-Taliban was introduced by an article in The Economist in 2003 (Tarzi, 2008, p.276).
him as leader of the insurgent movement and rightful leader of Afghanistan (Tarzi, 2008, p.300, Giustozzi, 2008, p.91). Some assumed insurgents turned out to be “warlords settling old accounts”, fighting over the control of poppy cultivation (Tarzi, 2008, p.284). However, most of the other attacks could be related to either Hekmatyar, the old Taliban leaders, Jalaluddin Haqqani (see also p.91) and Al-Qaeda. Discontent with his policies, some of Hamid Karzai’s supporters of the very first hour turned against him and joined the insurgency. Also some other opposition groups became more and more violent and began to align themselves with the old regime (Tarzi, 2008, p.285). “Something new and very violent had arrived on the scene” (Tarzi, 2008, p.285). Again, there still were many other factions which, at the time, did not necessarily follow any central guidance or leadership and mainly pursued their own, sometimes local goals. Yet, the old guard of the Taliban regime seemed to be able to control sizeable funds from their Pakistani hideouts. Thereby they attracted a growing following and seemed to slowly regain control over quite some insurgent groups. Mullah Obaidullah, the Taliban regime’s defense minister, was instructed by Mullah Omar to organize the insurgency against Hamid Karzai and the United States (Tarzi, 2008, p.293). The reasons why it took the old leadership quite a while to organize the insurgency were caused by “the need to re-adjust, to find secure hideouts, and possibly to recover psychologically from an unexpectedly fast collapse of the regime” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.11). Some leading Taliban cadres claimed that they were “waiting for some ‘offer’ from Kabul (presumably for power-sharing)” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.11). When this hope turned out to be to no avail, the leadership tried to mobilize its commanders. These attempts did not work out that well, only very few of the former rank-and-file joined the fight in 2002 (Giustozzi, 2008, p.12).

In 2003, Mullah Omar issued a fatwa against all foreigners present in the country and the Afghans who supported them. He claimed the fatwa was supported by 1,600 “prominent scholars from around Afghanistan” (Tarzi, 2008, p.297). In it, he asserts that it is every Muslim’s duty to engage in jihad and that everyone who “helps the aggressive infidels and joins their ranks under any name or task” should be killed (Tarzi, 2008, p.297). According to the fatwa, the people who work with the foreign coalition or the Afghan government would “be considered as Christians” and would have to face punishment160 (Tarzi, 2008, p.297). Mullah Omar issued several other fatwas with the same tenor. For example on April 1st 2003 he publicized: “I also issue a fatwa ordering the murder of anyone who cooperates with the Americans” (Tarzi, 2008, p.298). He repeatedly stressed that anyone who supports the
The neo-Taliban have “absorbed from their foreign jihadist allies a more flexible and less orthodox attitude towards imported technologies and techniques” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.13). Whereas the old Taliban had strictly enforced a ban of images in various forms (photography, videos, movies, television) and music, they now produced tapes with jihadist songs (without any instrumental accompaniment) and propaganda videos (Giustozzi, 2008, p.13).

Especially in the context of the internationalization there are “significant differences between the ideology of the former Taliban and those presently operating under this label” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.144). The neo-Taliban are much more integrated in international jihadist movements and adapted their ideology and rhetoric to reflect that. They express solidarity with jihadists around the world and stress the unity of Islam in the global war against Christians (Giustozzi, 2008, p.13). The old Taliban to the contrary had followed a policy that had focused solely on Afghanistan, had denounced other Muslim leaders as impure and corrupt and had been isolationists. There is not a big constituency for pan-Islamist propaganda in Afghanistan. Yet, such a rhetoric facilitates access to foreign financial support (Giustozzi, 2008, p.14). Still, the relations between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are ambivalent. They profit from one another, yet generally Al-Qaeda seems to need the Taliban more than the other way around161. In addition, mutual racist intolerances complicate sustained cooperation. Many Taliban resent Al-Qaeda’s extremely brutal methods and their lack of consideration towards Afghan civilians. Many Arab fighters on the contrary viewed the Afghans as backwards and still vividly remembered the images of locals who molested and slaughtered Arab fighters after the fall of the Taliban (Kepel, 2002, p.19). However, the major bone of contention between the two organizations is the fact that many Taliban blame Al-Qaeda “for the fall of their emirate and the loss of power in 2001” (Ruttig, 2010, p.18). The Taliban believe that they would still be in power, had it not been for Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks of 9/11162 and hold them responsible for all the suffering and killing that resulted from their acts. Many of the Taliban foreigners or the government does “not remain Muslim” (Tarzi, 2008, p.299). The frequent repetition of the same fatwa in slightly different words could be interpreted as sign for Mullah Omar’s discontent with the extent of its implementation.

161This is reflected in the fact that Osama bin Laden gave “an oath of allegiance (bay’a) to Mullah Omar, not the other way round” (Ruttig, 2010, p.18).

162Shortly after 9/11, a religious shura tried to convince Mullah Omar to request Osama bin Laden to leave the country voluntarily in order to avert an attack by the United States (Ruttig, 2010, p.18).
still have no big interest in international politics or a transnational jihad and just want to impose their radical and oppressive ideology on their own people (Kepel, 2002, p.223).

The actual ideology of the neo-Taliban does not seem to matter that much anymore and does not need to be expressed in a coherent, explicit manner. Still, it seems to be important that the movement has “a substantial base of ‘true believers’” who “are often ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause”163 (Giustozzi, 2008, p.15). The neo-Taliban have established a shadow administration and shuras in most of the Afghan provinces, including local sharia courts and other institutions people frequently turn to, in order to settle conflicts. Their growing influence on the population, even in areas where there are no or almost no military activities, can not be denied. Most of the higher ranks in the insurgency are confident that final victory is just a matter of time. Therefore “the reconciliation offers of the government […] attract little interest” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.15).

To summarize, it can be said that the Taliban have maintained something like a ‘corporate identity’ which heavily relies on its old leadership. At the same time, they are “becoming more and more an umbrella for heterogeneous actors such as militant Islamists, drug barons, tribal elders, warlords and unemployed youth” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.144).

6.1.1 Cohesion and unity of the (New) Taliban in a factionalized society

The reason why the different factors of cohesion among the Taliban are relevant in the context of this paper is, that none of the mechanisms they employ rely on tribal structures. To the contrary, the strategies utilized by the Taliban specifically aim to limit and undermine tribal organizational structures or prevent their re-emergence. The Taliban organize hierarchy and cohesion through their radical ideology, the centralized control of financial means and armament, through the ruthless enforcement of shura decisions and elimination of potential foes. In the Taliban’s sphere of influence, the tribal organization, at least as far as the economic and political activities are concerned, can not unfold its primary qualities of structuring social life as it used to.

163 Since 2002, the Taliban have had an estimated annual loss rate of about 13% of their fighters. This rate stayed about the same, even as the fighting force of the Taliban markedly increased and almost quadrupled between 2002 and 2006 (Giustozzi, 2008, p.33). Their “resilience in the face of such heavy losses” and the fact that they did not even show signs of “cracking” surprised quite some observers (Giustozzi, 2008, p.15).
The neo-Taliban did not present themselves as a united body in the first years after their emergence and there are questions about the cohesiveness of the movement. Many self-proclaimed ‘official spokesmen’ for the Taliban appeared, frequently contradicting each other, claiming and denying involvement in various attacks (Tarzi, 2008, p.294). The inner circles of the old leadership again followed two different approaches (see also p.114). Some attempted to gain political influence, participating in the official process. Others opted for jihad and terrorism. Still, this fissure did not cause any major split within the inner circle. The fact that local commanders who started to get too powerful and refuse the leadership of Mullah Omar are frequently killed speaks for a strong cohesion of the movement. There are some reports about rivalries between the Ghilzai dominated Peshawar Shura and the Durrani dominated Quetta Shura of the Taliban, mainly about the allocation of resources. Nevertheless, these conflicts do not appear to have the potential to split the movement (Tarzi, 2008, p.300).

NATO ended some of the personal rivalries within the old Taliban leadership. Mullah Dadullah (see also p.108) was disdained by many Taliban because of his strong ties to the Arab world, “his extremist attitudes”, and the excessive use of suicide bombers, killing mainly Muslims (Giustozzi, 2008, p.84). Conflicts with one of his main rivals, Akhtar Osmani, allegedly led to physical confrontations between the two men who were in charge of controlling the Taliban’s military operations. Osmani was killed by NATO forces in December 2006 and “sources from within the Taliban claimed that Dadullah had tipped the enemy off about Osmani’s location” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.84). Dadullah was killed by NATO in a raid in May 2007. Rumors have it that opponents within the leadership have used the same method employed in the elimination of Osmani. More important than this personal struggles is the fact that both men were killed inside Afghanistan. This shows that “the leadership travels often to the zone of operations” and thereby maintains “a sufficient degree of cohesion in the field” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.84). With their presence on the front lines, the Taliban leaders strengthen “the ideological commitment of their ‘cadres’ and the [...] legitimacy” of their leadership (Giustozzi, 2008, p.84).

At the end of 2004, the ‘pro-politics’ faction among the Taliban seemed to gain the upper hand as many Arab donors and Osama bin Laden dramatically reduced their funding for the Taliban in order to channel more money to Iraqi insurgents (Tarzi, 2008, p.306). This trend was soon to be reversed though. As the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda was strengthened, it engaged in infiltrating,
supporting and training the neo-Taliban\textsuperscript{164} (Tarzi, 2008, p.306). Pakistan was and probably still is the biggest state-sponsor of the old Taliban cadres. The viewpoint that continued support of Mullah Omar and his followers constitutes a strategic asset which is serving Pakistan’s security interests seems to have prevailed so far\textsuperscript{165} (for more information about Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and other extremist Islamists see also p.69, p.91, p.98, p.106, and p.106). Some of their aims include making sure that Afghanistan does not develop all too friendly relations with India and securing continued US military aid. In short, Islamabad sees the neo-Taliban as allies who can promote their regional policies and geostrategic interests (Tarzi, 2008, p.308).

An important potential for medium-term fragmentation of the movement lies in the fact that its recruiting efforts rely heavily on local communities. The latter “could one day quit” the Taliban, “once their interests start diverging” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.85). The Taliban try to minimize this risk by fostering their relations beyond financial support through intermarriage and the training of local youth in madrassas (Giustozzi, 2008, p.85). This speaks to the fact that, even if tribes as a socio-political entity do not have the influence they have held for a long time anymore, the societal organization along patrilineal descent lines is still strong and important. In addition, they have the ability to micromanage local communities: they “rely on village mullahs to identify friends and potential foes and subsequently ruthlessly eliminate the latter” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.85). The former US-tactics like ‘sweep and clear’\textsuperscript{166} and “air bombardments […] might also have helped bring the different components of the insurgency together in the common hatred of the ‘foreigners’” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.85, see also Schetter and Glassner, 2009, p.143). General Petraeus’ counter-insurgency

\textsuperscript{164}At the time, a CIA station chief apparently tried to analyze the insurgent groups and dubbed them “pissed-off Pashtuns” (Tarzi, 2008, p.306).

\textsuperscript{165}Since Osama bin Laden was killed in the garrison town Abottabad, Pakistan, on May 2nd of 2011, the anti-US sentiments in the Pakistani security apparatus increased. The United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, formerly known as SEAL Team Six), the Joint Special Operations Command and the CIA entered Pakistan without the knowledge of its authorities in the Operation Neptune Spear. The US had assumed for quite some time, that Bin Laden was protected by parts of the Pakistani authorities. The latter were embarrassed not only by Bin Laden’s presence, but also by the fact that they did not gain knowledge about the raid until the US forces had left Pakistani territory again.

\textsuperscript{166}The approach, which was already employed in Vietnam, was called ‘find, fix and destroy’ or ‘search and destroy mission’ before. It means that troops would enter a certain area, kill as many ‘enemies’ as possible, and then leave again. This caused trouble in Afghanistan mainly because large numbers of civilians were killed during these efforts which prompted many villagers to join the Taliban. In other cases the coalition forces took out militias who were not aligned with the Taliban on the basis of bad intelligence. When the coalition forces left, those areas were easily captured by the Taliban.
(COIN) strategy\textsuperscript{167}, which also includes embedding anthropologists in Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), tries to address these problems, but it remains to be seen whether this change in policy has not come too late. It focuses on an approach that is called ‘secure-the-population first’ and thereby “gaining their support” (Edwards, 2010, p.2).

The Taliban leadership established rules of behavior for its fighters, written down and distributed in the so-called Layeha (Rulebook). These rules include guidelines about how to treat prisoners, about not recruiting fighters who are known for their bad behavior, the ban of looting, the fair distribution of weaponry and the places in which fighters are allowed to engage (only within their district, except the commander of another district allows it)\textsuperscript{168} (Giustozzi, 2008, p.84). The fact that “Taliban throughout Afghanistan tend to respect these rules” is another important indicator which “suggests the continuing functionality of a unified chain of command” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.85).

Another policy, already employed by Mullah Omar when the Taliban were still in power (see also p.112), included the frequent rotation\textsuperscript{169} of field commanders in order to “prevent the development of personal fiefdoms” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.92). In addition, the commanders were obliged to form “mixed groups of combatants”, meaning that individuals from various tribes and provinces had to serve in units with locals (Giustozzi, 2008, p.93). This was also intended to prevent locals from uniting against the central leadership. Ruttig argues that from 2008 on, an inclination to ‘re-tribalize’ local units could be observed in core Taliban “areas like Helmand, Zabul and Uruzgan” (Ruttig, 2010, p.14). This was a response of locals who perceived the ‘out-of-area-Taliban’ as disproportionately brutal towards local civilian populations (Ruttig, 2010, p.14). I would argue though, that it was rather a re-localization than a re-tribalization, since tribal structures have had lost much of their relevance already.

The actual ‘every-day-operations’ were carried out autonomously, without direct central orders and based on the commanders’ “understanding of the strategic and political aims of the Movement” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.93). When direct

\textsuperscript{167}The strategy was encoded in the Joint Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24. See also (Petraeus und Amos, 2006).

\textsuperscript{168}There were made some amendments over time. In recent years the leadership has asked its fighters to refrain from beheadings, since this practice has caused bad press even in friendly countries. Instead they should simply shoot people.

\textsuperscript{169}Hamid Karzai attempted to employ the same strategy with warlords who had gained a “position in the state apparatus” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.139). He was less successful though in limiting their power base. They would simply not comply with any unwanted relocation and threaten to react violently to any such attempts.
orders were necessary for specific operations, they were transmitted by a messenger. The use of satellite phones or other telecommunication “had to be abandoned relatively early in the conflict, due to US monitoring” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.93). In the appointment of commanders, the commitment to the extremist Islamic ideology was “privileged over skills”, and tactical “mistakes were often forgiven as long as ideological purity was demonstrated” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.93).

The cohesive force of the extremist ideology should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, other factors like the funding of the neo-Taliban are immensely important for the cohesion of the movement too. Any localized sources of revenue can contribute to rivalries and factionalism and advance the field commanders’ independence from the central leadership. On the other hand, a diversification of external sources almost certainly leads to splits “within the leadership if they are managed by different individuals or factions” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.86). The absence of such challenges to his power suggests that Mullah Omar has been able to “maintain a unified control over revenue” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.86). The main sources for the Taliban’s financing are drug money, Pakistani political and militant religious networks, the Pakistani military and intelligence community, jihadi sympathizers throughout the Arab world, “Saudi oil men, Kuwaiti traders” and wealthy businessmen from Karachi and Peshawar (Giustozzi, 2008, p.86). The notorious Mullah Dadullah capitalized on his connections to the United Arab Emirates, even traveling there for fundraising. Reports over the last years suggest “that the Taliban were awash with cash” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.86). The Pakistani shuras have appointed ‘officials’ who are responsible for the control of funds and who “prevented field commanders from establishing their own independent sources of revenue” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.86). The fact that various external sources have not led to a fragmentation of the movement suggests that they are centrally channeled to the Taliban’s top leaders by Pakistani authorities (Giustozzi, 2008, p.89). Circumstantial evidence implies that a certain “degree of control over revenue” through parts of the Pakistani government is “a pre-condition for letting the Taliban operate from their country” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.89).

Though different circumstances throughout the country make it hard to generalize, a pattern of influence of tribal organization can be observed. The various

---

170The Taliban even offered financial compensation to poppy farmers who were targeted by Western eradication programs in exchange for their support (Giustozzi, 2008, p.87).

171However, Taliban cadres lament that the financial support is insufficient to “acquire sophisticated anti-aircraft [...] weaponry” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.89).
insurgents and the Taliban gain more support in areas where the tribal codes and structures are weakened or extremely fragmented, as compared to areas where they are more stable. This is also mirrored by the fact that members of tribes which were not able to protect individuals who had formerly fought alongside the Taliban from being arrested or killed by government and US forces, were forced back into the movement (Ruttig, 2010, p.9). The tribes which preserved their ways and traditions still seem to generally dislike outside intervention. Consequently, in the rare cases where tribal traditions are still dominant in daily life, neither the government nor the Taliban have gained much influence (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.147).

As yet, “a pronounced rift between pro-government and pro-Taliban tribes and sub-tribes cannot be observed” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.150). This is especially true for tribes which have managed to maintain their traditional leadership and decision-making structures. One such region is the province of Paktia. There the Pashtunwali and its norms of behavior, honor, justice and societal organization are still “binding for everybody” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.148). Decisions are still made in traditional, egalitarian jirgas by consensus building, and tribal *arbaki* (see also p.44) take care of security and enforce jirga determinations. There are still long lasting tribal feuds and blood feuds (for example between the Ahmadzai and the Totakhel), but they are dealt with in the traditional fashion and by the rules and the modus operandi of traditional tribal warfare (see also p.25 and p.75). The tribal leaders in Paktia have not accepted any outside interference and their *arbaki* are strong enough to hold their ground.\(^{172}\)

Additionally, their egalitarian structures have obstructed the emergence of warlordism from within their own ranks, as it has happened in so many other tribes (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.149). This case constitutes an exception though, particularly considering the respectable size of the territory. Generally it can be said that “tribal ‘encapsulation’ is stronger in mountainous” and remote areas (Ruttig, 2010, p.12). Nevertheless, this does not mean that tribes which had their traditional structures in tact did not participate in the insurgency independently from the Taliban. In fact, many of them might resent the presence of foreigners as much as the Taliban. And sometimes, tribes which had rather been indifferent to what had happened politically outside their sphere of influence, participated in the insurgency after their villages had been targeted.\(^{172}\) They allowed all warring parties to transit their territory as long as they would leave them alone.

\(^{172}\)
by aerial bombardments or other military raids. In some cases, even ‘former left-wingers stated that they would be bound to tribal solidarity if their tribe ‘decided to join the uprising against the Americans’” (Rutting, 2010, p.15).

6.2 Tribal structures under the influence of post 9/11 government policies

The Karzai government and the US-led coalition co-opted “regional warlords and strongmen into the central government and the subnational administration” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.16). As mentioned in other contexts in this paper, “the well established notable families” had progressively lost their influence “as security became the primary concern”173 (Giustozzi, 2008, p.16). The fact that tribal organization had lost much of its regulatory force led to the emergence of “tribal entrepreneurs” or warlords who, based on their command of small militias, claimed tribal leadership and attempted to unify the manifold tribal factions (Giustozzi, 2008, p.16).

The policies pursued by the United States, the Karzai government and also those of the Taliban (see chapter 6.1.1) have undermined the relevance and functionality of what was left of tribal organizational structures. Many of the local strongmen had been disempowered by the Taliban in the second half of the 1990s. They reappeared as the Taliban regime imploded. In many provinces and districts “local strongmen, militia commanders, tribal leaders and local notables who had somehow established a relationship with either Karzai or the Americans were appointed to positions of responsibility, influence and power” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). Considering that their followers were frequently not bound by tribal loyalties, their base of support was habitually “shaky at best” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). Their incorporation in government structures somewhat legitimized and fostered their leadership roles as they enabled them to distribute resources. Another consequence of this policy was that the government administration was “often negatively affected by the need of these strongmen to reward their followers with jobs and positions of influence in order to consolidate their leadership” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). The warlords who had become governors or police chiefs “had the legal power to make appointments in the structures they were leading”(Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). Soon most provincial administrative posts, even those of the ministries (for example the Ministry of Defense) were

173See also p.87.
filled with “close associates of the strongmen”, who were often incompetent and corrupt\textsuperscript{174} (Giustozzi, 2008, p.17). Taking into account that only few of them were “skilled and committed administrators, the consequences in terms of governance become obvious” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.19). As another consequence Kabul was not able to consolidate its influence throughout the country. To the contrary, the central government was and is often held hostage to local interests. Regional strongmen simply refuse to comply with orders from Kabul and do not accept outsiders in local administrative positions. If the Karzai government insists on such an assignment, the locals threaten to create an uprising and to destabilize the region. The local strongmen mobilize their clients, organize demonstrations and usually force the central government to backpedal and withdraw their candidates. The same is true for any legislation or other government decisions which are unwelcome, though sometimes these can be handled in a less confrontational manner by simply not implementing the new rules (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.140). Furthermore, the local elites are often enough connected to “decision-makers in Kabul by family ties” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.140). They are able to use those ties to influence policies which affect the local level to their favor and thereby frequently impede reforms (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.140). It can be said that the “concentration of power on the local level is so strong, that even the core institutions of the state are under siege to local interests” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.153). In addition, many of the strongmen used their newly gained power to “face off against each other in a local power struggle, which opened up a space for the Taliban to re-emerge” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.21). They frequently did so by denouncing their opponents and thus using Afghan and foreign troops to settle the problem for them. In many areas the dominance of strongmen and their families depend heavily on the opium economy. The “financial resources connected with the drug economy contribute to the strengthening of the hierarchical structures” in society and diminish the relevance of traditional tribal organization (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.152). Depending on the sphere of influence, the drug lords and warlords accommodate either with the Taliban or government officials\textsuperscript{175} who are either corrupt or related by kin (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.144).

\textsuperscript{174}A frequent practice was to take goods from shops without paying. In addition with the general weakness of government, these practices delegitimized “the government, paying the way for the insurgency to spread” (Giustozzi, 2008, p.19). Also the fact that operations of foreign troops, “such as house searches and arrests, were not usually communicated to the local authorities […] humiliated and discredited” them (Giustozzi, 2008, p.19).

\textsuperscript{175}See also: Ahmad Wali Karzai, p.120.
These developments and policies are consequential because they show that the warlords and the government are not diametrically opposed, mutually exclusive entities. Customarily the emergence or warlordism is seen as being connected to a lack or the absence of state power. Yet in Afghanistan, warlords and government authorities are inextricably interwoven and each side attempts to strengthen its influence by using the other (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.138). Warlords capitalize on the resources and power the state provides and the state can exert some influence on the local level, or at least sustain the illusion of doing so (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.153). “Warlordism is very strong in exactly those regions where the state, at least in the notion of elites, is regarded as important” (Schetter und Glassner, 2009, p.153). In addition, warlords and local elites seek to foster their relations and influence on the central government through intermarriage. This speaks to the fact that kinship still plays a major role in political organization and power structures. “However, ‘closeness’ fosters conflict as well as co-operation, and people continually express regret at the degeneration of the times, such that nowadays even one’s agnates cannot be relied on, brother fights brothers, father fights son - all, moreover, regarded as signs of the impending end of the world.” (Tapper, 1991, p.48f).

Since 2007, Afghanistan finds “itself again facing a fierce armed struggle throughout most of its territory” (Tarzi, 2008, p.310). The task for the international forces and the Karzai government are complicated by the fact that the current insurgency is not only a “resurrection of the Taliban regime”, but also an insurgency of countless groups, Arab terrorists, drug lords, warlords, “disenchanted political personalities, centuries-old tribal rivals, and the foreign players” (Tarzi, 2008, p.310). If the Afghan government proves to be unable to ensure a minimum of security, the general population will turn against it. That is the calculation of the Taliban.
Part IV

Conclusion

7 Conclusion

As the disquisitions of the last chapters have shown, many aspects of Pashtun tribal organization have been subject to profound changes over the last decades. Though, again, it is unfeasible to give a generalized answer for all Pashtuns of Afghanistan due to the locally very diverse circumstances. Some substantial comments, whose validity might apply to a majority of Pashtuns described, can be made.

Evidently, a crisis in tribal leadership has negatively affected the intra-tribal social cohesion and the formerly prevalent concept of equality. Through the vicissitude Pashtun culture experienced, it was subjected to profound structural transformations. This crisis resulted in the emergence of new leaders in an increasingly hierarchical system, yet these new strongmen command only a deficient degree of legitimacy. Subsequently, the new leadership based its exertion of power on control over the means of violence and economic supremacy, or in other words, on political and economic dependencies. Since also tribal leadership has often been contested and subject to negotiation, interpretation and change in history, this might not seem to be such a great change in itself at first glance. However, the factors which have accompanied this change are indeed profound for several reasons. The new leaders often lack legitimacy, yet they are able to cling to power. Traditional tribal leaders who lacked legitimacy to the contrary were exchanged rather sooner than later. Many of the new strongmen did not abide by traditional rules of conduct, norms and values anymore. Though changes in value systems are harder to detect and prove than those in outer organizational forms, they do reflect on one another. Increasing and consolidating social stratification, violence and insecurity, access to modern weapons and new sources of revenue through crime, drugs, and foreign funding have pushed traditional structures to the sidelines. Furthermore, the geographic dispersal of tribal groups through war and unprecedented levels of violence, flight and economic migration impeded the re-establishment of the structures for consensus oriented decision-making in a prewar fashion in most cases.
Howbeit, not all tribal structures are necessarily affected through the new forms of leadership. Several tribal organizational features still persist, though they are portrayed in a vast variety of combinations, strength and shape, and they are subject to change in space and time. For example, tribal networks of solidarity and support may still function and expand across various nation states’ borders. Some of the mentioned research has shown that tribal solidarity can even transcend mutually exclusive, competing ideologies of individual tribesmen, prompting them to fight alongside one another if either is attacked. However, proceedings on the local level have been lastingly altered.

Urban classes, communists, Islamists and various other groups contested tribal power in Afghanistan. In addition, alternative value systems and ideologies have become more readily available even in rural areas. Various currents of Islamist ideologies, emphasizing a global pan-Islamic identity, and the ultra-orthodox Islamic creed of the Taliban and the Deobandi madrassas compete for dominance, as well as some Western ideals and a free market wartime economy. Particularly religion has substituted much of the tribal identity. Weakened tribal structures have made it easier for the Taliban to gain influence, and the latter further diluted the power and relevance of tribal organization. To use the concepts of the theoretical part of this paper, it can be said that the traditional boundary maintenance of tribal groups through differential patterns of identification has been softened or rendered impossible by adopting these new ideologies. Contemporaneously, these ideologies and beliefs have brought about new levels of politicization. Modern telecommunication has closed the urban-rural gap with respect to the spread of ideas and social and political control. Both disperse more easily to the most remote areas and local warlords have become participants in a globalized world of arms trade, drug trafficking and Islamist extremism.

From the literature analyzed in the creation of this paper, it seems clear that kinship ties are still exceedingly important in structuring social and political organization. The Taliban seek internmarriage with local power-brokers to foster their ties and the latter do the same with respect to government elites and decision-makers in Kabul and elsewhere. Though tribal networks of loyalty (and surely of information) still play an important role in many cases, the alliances which are created through these marriages seem to be confined to a lower level of organization, namely that of powerful families or patrilineal descent groups. One could argue that this fact constitutes nothing more than an augmented fragmentation or a more pronounced ‘micro-segmentation’. However, the tribal
cohesive forces have been weakened to such an extent in many cases, that it is questionable, whether they still exist at all. In analyzing the fieldwork and research of many, much more experienced and knowledgeable colleagues than myself, I tend to agree, that the new hierarchical structures of Pashtun leadership do not merely constitute a new expression of the same old organization, even if some features may persist. Nevertheless, under some circumstances the tribal organizational structures seem to provide a fallback system. In cases of a power vacuum or upheaval, tendencies to reassert traditional tribal organization can be observed. This speaks to the fact that a process of ‘detrabilization’ is not irreversible and ‘retribalization’ may occur under certain conditions. When individuals or groups fail to excel and perform within the frame of a given system or identity, they tend to redefine their identity. They commit to other available identities in order to increase performance or at least ameliorate its valuation.

The role of anthropology in Afghanistan has changed a lot throughout history. First, the British used the disciplines’ knowledge to influence the Afghan tribes according to their interests. Then, during the international conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century, suddenly the research of remote areas, which was expected to be of a highly localized focus, developed a global significance. The implementation of the Human Terrain System (HTS) by the United States Army, embedding anthropologists in their units at Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), caused anthropological knowledge to take an exposed role in a military endeavor once again. This has been heavily criticized by many in the discipline not necessarily only because anthropologists are used to gather intelligence and thereby potentially endanger other colleagues, but also because they engage in Psychological Operations (PsyOps, today commonly referred to as IO, or Information Operations). Many colleagues have declined to participate in the project for moral objections or fear of being black-listed and therefore not being able to find a job in academia.

In my view, this discussion within the discipline is a little overrated. Usually, anthropologists embedded in Western armies do not carry out scientific research during their employment simply because it is impossible to do that in such a setting. Therefore, their influence on the production of scientific knowledge seems to be limited to the fact that their engagement might increase mistrust of local individuals towards anthropologists. Whether this incorporation of anthropologists in various armies will actually add to the insecurity of other researchers for the fear of local individuals of spies or military agents is not yet entirely clear to me. However, anyone who carries out research in war zones has to be
aware of the risks which come with such a task. In fieldwork, the access a researcher gains to local individuals has always depended on the level of openness and trust he or she has been able to generate. My personal viewpoint is, that overcoming potential mistrust is just one of many hurdles in fieldwork and is best achieved by being authentic and willing to learn from more experienced anthropologists. In addition, I would argue that anthropology will also play an important role in future armed conflicts, no matter how many scholars oppose such an utilization. Whether individual scholars approve of such a practice or not will probably depend on the context of those conflicts and, in any case, provide for an ongoing debate within the discipline. It is possible though, that anthropology loses some of its clout in military approaches. If the armies which try to employ the discipline’s findings, and especially the US Army, prove to be unable to implement strategies which incorporate anthropologic knowledge (a viewpoint which seems not to mesh well with a military culture), other approaches will take its place. Doing anthropology and doing fieldwork in highly volatile places like Afghanistan has become ever more difficult and dangerous for researchers independent of programs such as HTS. Even researchers who have decades-long relationships with local populations might find security risks too ubiquitous to stay there for several months. There has been quite some work done in and about war zones in recent years, but the decreasing opportunities to do research on-site will probably negatively affect the quantity of anthropologic output for a while.

In the introduction I asked what new light anthropology could possibly shed on the current situation in Afghanistan. I think that already many of the questions posed in this paper reflect an anthropologic perspective on recent developments and forcefully establish the disciplines’ relevance. How did Pashtun tribal systems change? What is the relation between local strongmen, Pashtun tribal elders and the Taliban? How does the generational divide between various political leaders express itself? How can we make sense of the coexistence of tribal structures and transnational networks of militant political Islam? In collecting insights from distinguished authors, I hopefully was able to deliver at least some possible answers to these questions and thereby demonstrate the explanatory power which lies in this discipline.

Future research will for sure engage in the question, how Pashtun tribal organization develops over the next decades. Time will tell, if a broad tendency to reestablish tribal structures, be it in a traditional or in a new fashion, will prevail. Anthropology will play its role, and the genuine and profound way
of the discipline to look at the world will probably and hopefully continue to elucidate the fundamental dynamics of this conflict, and its findings resonate ever more in public perception.
Part V

References

References


143


144


147


[Schetter 2005]  **Schetter, Conrad:** Ethnoscapes, National Territorialisation, and the Afghan War. In: *Geopolitics* 10 (2005), S. 50–75

[Schetter und Glassner 2009]  **Schetter, Conrad; Glassner, Rainer:** Neither Functioning, Nor Failing Of The State! Seeing Violence in Afghanistan From Local Perspectives. In: **Collmer, Sabine (Hrsg.): From Fragile State to Functioning State. Pathways to Democratic Transformation in Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, and Afghanistan.** LIT, Transaction Press, 2009, S. 137–156


150


Part VI

Appendices

8 Abstracts & Curriculum Vitae

8.1 English Abstract

This paper examines the possibility and extent of structural societal changes in Pashtun tribal systems since 1978. The question I aim to answer is, in how far tribal structures have changed and what has triggered those changes. The relevance of this question lies in its potential to elucidate the societal and cultural dynamics at play in this conflict, as well as to determine some causes for the course of events in a persisting struggle. The underlying hypothesis is that influences like war, foreign interventions and the impact of militant political Islam have caused an ongoing disarrangement in the traditional tribal organization of Pashtuns. In this context, I investigate whether the structures in question have actually changed or just express themselves in a new way. The analysis will also take into account the effects of the exilation of a large proportion of Afghanistan’s population to Pakistan. Furthermore, I examine which effects the newly established social structures of refugees and/or their homecoming as fighters, mujahedin or later as the so-called Taliban, had on their tribal organization. Doing so, this paper aims to find out about changes in the relationship between different groups of political, religious, and military leaders, their amalgamation or possible separation with tribal leaders, elders and landlords, and whether it is possible to explain the rise of the Taliban in terms of tribal structures. A short treatise of Afghan history aims to give a more thorough understanding of the Afghan political sphere and to illustrate the constitutive power tribes have held (and fought over) for centuries. This basic information serves as a point of departure for a more detailed examination of events since 1978.

Many aspects of Pashtun tribal organization have been subject to profound changes over the last decades. Though, again, it is unfeasible to give a generalized answer for all Pashtuns of Afghanistan due to the locally very diverse circumstances. Some substantial comments, whose validity might apply to a majority of Pashtuns described, can be made. Evidently, a crisis in tribal leadership has negatively affected the intra-tribal social cohesion and the formerly
prevalent concept of equality. At the beginning of the 1980s, this crisis resulted in the emergence of new leaders in an increasingly hierarchical system, yet these new strongmen command only a deficient degree of legitimacy. Subsequently, the new leadership based its exertion of power on control over the means of violence and economic supremacy, or in other words, on political and economic dependencies. However, the factors which have accompanied this change are indeed profound for several reasons. The new leaders often lack legitimacy, yet they are able to cling to power. Many of the new strongmen do not abide by traditional rules of conduct, norms and values anymore. Though changes in value systems are harder to detect and prove than those in outer organizational forms, they do reflect on one another. Urban classes, communists, Islamists and various other groups contested tribal power in Afghanistan. Various currents of Islamist ideologies, emphasizing a global pan-Islamic identity, and the ultra-orthodox Islamic creed of the Taliban and the Deobandi madrassas compete for dominance, as well as a free market wartime economy. Contemporaneously, these ideologies and beliefs have brought about new levels of politicization. In addition, alternative value systems and ideologies have become more readily available even in rural areas. Modern telecommunication has closed the urban-rural gap with respect to the spread of ideas and social and political control. Both disperse more easily to the most remote areas and local warlords have become participants in a globalized world of arms trade, drug trafficking and Islamist extremism. Weakened tribal structures have made it easier for the Taliban to gain influence, and the latter further diluted the power and relevance of tribal organization. Increasing and consolidating social stratification, violence and insecurity, access to modern weapons and new sources of revenue through crime, drugs, and foreign funding have pushed traditional structures to the sidelines. Furthermore, the geographic dispersal of tribal groups through war and unprecedented levels of violence, flight and economic migration impeded the re-establishment of the structures for consensus oriented decision-making in a prewar fashion in most cases.

The role of anthropology in Afghanistan has changed a lot over time, from being used by the colonial powers in order to control various tribes, to relative obscurity and a comeback to the public spotlight with its utilization in Western armies. Current developments and questions which arise from the conflict in Afghanistan underline the disciplines’ relevance and provide the opportunity to demonstrate its explanatory power.
8.2 German Abstract


Das methodische Vorgehen basiert auf einem Vergleich der Beschreibungen traditioneller paschtunischer tribaler Organisationsstrukturen vor 1978 mit späteren anthropologischen Quellen. Weitere berücksichtigte Aspekte umfassen die Auswirkungen der Flucht eines großen Teils der afghanischen (insbesondere der paschtunischen) Bevölkerung auf deren tribale Gesellschaftsordnung und die Organisationsstrukturen der Mujahedin und Taliban.


Aktuelle Entwicklungen in Afghanistan und die Fragen, die sich aus dem Konflikt ergeben, untermauern die Relevanz anthropologischer Forschung und bieten eine Möglichkeit die Erklärungsmacht der Disziplin zu demonstrieren. Das Verständnis der sozialen, kulturellen und politischen Dynamiken, die dem Konflikt in Afghanistan zugrunde liegen, lässt gegenwärtige Entwicklungen in einem neuen Licht erscheinen und bietet Erklärungen für die andauernde Gewalt und Instabilität.

156
8.3 Curriculum Vitae

Curriculum Vitae

Roland Kraml
Eduard-Suess-Gasse 17/13
1150 Wien
Tel.: +43 676 92 64 625
Mail: roland.kraml@gmx.at

Qualifikationen

• Sprachkenntnisse: Deutsch, Englisch & Französisch in Wort und Schrift
• Erfahrungen in verschiedenen Berufen: Erwachsenenbildung, Verkauf, Marketing, Musik, Gastronomie, Organisation und Leitung von Bildungsseminaren u.v.m.
• Ausbildung als Sanitäter und Einsatzlenker
• Ausbildung zum Trainer in der Erwachsenenbildung
• Ausbildung in Konflikttransformation und gewaltfreier Kommunikation
• Erfahrung als selbständiger Unternehmer
• Graduiert des "International Civilian Peace-keeping and Peace-building Training"

Geboren am

• 23.03.1981 in Linz, Oberösterreich

Ausbildung

• 2009 Absolvierung des „International Civilian Peace-Keeping And Peace-Building Training Program“ (IPT), am Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschlaining.

• 2008 Studienprogramm am UNO-Hauptquartier, New York.

• 2004-2005 Ausbildung zum Trainer in der Erwachsenenbildung.


Berufserfahrung


• 2009-2011 Berater für das deutsche Telekommunikationsunternehmen SIMSA (www.simsa.de), Berlin/Wien.


• 2008-2010 Selbständiger Unternehmer in der Erwachsenenbildung, beruflichen Fortbildung, Kursleiter, Wien.


• 2005 Übersetzung wissenschaftlicher Fragebögen ins Französische für die Südwind-Agentur Wien.
• 2005 Organisation einer Workshop-Reihe um StudentInnen der Kultur- & Sozialanthropologie mit möglichen Berufsfeldern für AnthropologInnen vertraut zu machen.

• 2005-2006 Projektleiter für die Organisation von Erstsemestrigentutorien für über 400 StudentInnen des Institute des Kultur- & Sozialanthropologie (Universität Wien), sowie Verantwortlicher für die Ausbildung der TutorInnen.


• 1999 Mitgliederwerbung für das Deutsche Rote Kreuz in Baden-Württemberg.

• 1996-1999 Diverse Feraljobs in der Gastronomie, im Kulturbereich (Brucknerhaus Linz) und beim Radio (Freies Radio Oberösterreich).

Vorträge und Veröffentlichungen

• 2008 Verfassen eines Handbuches im Rahmen der Tätigkeit in der Erwachsenenbildung (Schnellesetechniken und Lerntechniken).


• 2006 Vortrag über Kriegsursachenforschung am Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR). Der Vortrag wurde publiziert und ist unter http://www.aspr.ac.at/sak2006/safran03.pdf einsehbar.