„Austrian Foreign Policy under Alois Mock:
A Security Analysis Applied to the Relations between Austria and Hungary
during the Dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and to Austria’s Quest for European Union Membership.‘‘

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Danke!
Index

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................6
   1.1 Hypothesis ..........................................................................................................................................7
   1.2 Method ...............................................................................................................................................8
   1.3 Structure ..........................................................................................................................................9

2. Alois Mock ...........................................................................................................................................11
   2.1 Biography .........................................................................................................................................11
   2.2 Mock’s International Career .............................................................................................................28
   2.3 The Foreign Minister from 1987-1995 .............................................................................................29

3. Austrian Relations with Hungary in 1989 .........................................................................................31
   3.1 Historical Outline of Hungarian History in the 20th Century .........................................................32
   3.2 Hungary’s Relations with Austria ....................................................................................................37
      3.2.1 Relations before 1989 .................................................................................................................38
      3.2.2 1989 – Annus Mirabilis ............................................................................................................43
      3.2.3 The years following the Annus Mirabilis ..................................................................................51
   3.3 Summary .........................................................................................................................................59

4. The Quest for European Union Membership ..................................................................................62
   4.1 It all began with the ECSC... ............................................................................................................62
   4.2 The European Free Trade Association ............................................................................................64
   4.3 The European Community & Austria before 1987 .........................................................................67
   4.4 The European Community & Austria from 1987 until the application in 1989 ..............................71
   4.5 The Path to the Beginning of Actual Negotiations ..........................................................................87
   4.6 Actual negotiations with the EU .....................................................................................................96
   4.7 The Final Steps to Membership after the Successful Negotiations ..............................................102
   4.8 Summary .........................................................................................................................................104

5. Security Studies as a Mean to Explain the Empirical Events ...........................................................106
   5.1 Definitions .......................................................................................................................................106
   5.1.1 Security .......................................................................................................................................106
   5.1.2 Actors .........................................................................................................................................107
   5.1.3 Referent object .............................................................................................................................108
   5.2 Development of Security Studies ...................................................................................................108
   5.2.1 The birth of Security Studies .....................................................................................................108
   5.2.2 Realism .......................................................................................................................................111
   5.2.3 Liberalism ...................................................................................................................................114
   5.2.4 Comeback of Security Studies ..................................................................................................118
1. Introduction

“The diversification within the international security-political spectrum also has to be seen in connection within the light of the new security concept, in which the military security is only seen as a component in a broader definition of national and international security, which includes economical, social, ethnical, religious, national and human aspects.” ¹

The 1993 Annual Report by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs paid tribute to the diversification of the understanding of security. Security and security related studies have changed significantly since the Cold War, when the bipolar world order came to an end. It was during this time that the Copenhagen School was founded. This theory within the field of Security Studies, tries to interpret new developments by integrating components other than the traditional security aspect.

From 1987 until 1995, several events took place which could have been existential threats for Austria. Existential threats, which could endanger the survival of a state, are the focus of Security Studies. Major events that occurred in this timeframe were the dissolution of the communist Eastern Europe, the War in the former Yugoslavia and the Austrian European Union (EU) membership and all have a common denominator - Alois Mock. As Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time he was very much involved in these events.

Of these three major events, two are being discussed here: the dissolution of Eastern Europe, and Austria’s European Union membership. In the preface of the Annual Report from 1987, Alois Mocks states that Austrian foreign policy consists of two pillars. He notes that one pillar is European policy, which redefines Austria’s relationship with the European Community. Neighborhood policy, in particular relations between East and West, forms the second pillar and in this area Austria sees itself in a unique role due to its permanent neutrality.²

¹ Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. 355 (All citations, originally in German, are translated by the author.)

² Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. XI
Based on this statement by Mock, these two pillars are the focus of this thesis. By doing so it is not intended to say that the War in the former Yugoslavia is not worth taking a closer look. It was a rather unforeseeable event that very much influenced Austria’s security. It could not have been crueler and took place at a time when the concept of war crimes on European soil was unthinkable. Nevertheless, it would not be possible to cover the time of the War in former Yugoslavia in a decent manner, which this dark chapter in European history actually deserves.

The common denominator, from an Austrian point of view, is Alois Mock. He was a politician in recent Austrian history. He has not often been referred to as an important figure. Hardly any books and articles have been published about him or his active years as a politician. His dedication to work for Austria’s interest, especially during his time as Foreign Minister, and his ability as mediator brought him some prominence on the international stage, especially in the Balkans. To achieve much more on international level (maybe a prestigious job in an international organization) would have been possible for him if it was not for his Parkinson’s disease. This illness forced him to resign as Foreign Minister, and it made him incapable to take on new challenges.

### 1.1 Hypothesis

The central question, which is discussed in this work, is: Were the two events - the dissolution of Eastern Europe with a special focus on Hungary, and the Austrian membership to the European Union - framed as security issues through an act of securitization? Was the securitization successful according to the definitions by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, who are the founders of the concept of securitization?

What is not intended to be discussed here is, whether Austria’s security was ever really threatened during this time. As Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde argue it is not possible to say if a state’s security is really at stake, since there are no parameters to measure such a ‘real’ threat.

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3 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 263

4 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 30
In order to be able to deal with the great variety of information provided here, the work is separated in three parts. The first part is dedicated to Mock’s life and his becoming the Foreign Minister, the role for which he is known. Because his time as Foreign Minister is important for the understanding of the context, his international career will also be emphasized. The second section deals with the dissolution of Eastern Europe and Austria’s EU membership. It is intended to describe how these were viewed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and what its reaction was. The third part then deals with Security Studies in general and elaborates the Copenhagen School and the concept of securitization before it is applied to the two concrete issues broadly discussed earlier.

1.2 Method
From a methodical point of view, a great part of this work is based on primary literature such as the Annual Reports by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s Security, A New Framework of Analysis, in which they founded the so called Copenhagen School. The reports by the Foreign Ministry are very useful as they portray the different events from the Ministry’s point of view. Additionally, they provide background information. The reports are all published in German, therefore a translation of the original text is more appropriate as literature on this issue in English is either not published by the Ministry or already one step away from its original text. All of these translations are made by the author. Additionally, original texts such as the memoranda and notes on the Foreign Ministry’s official position as well as memos for briefings for Foreign Minister Mock concerning EU membership. Speeches by Alois Mock, which he gave in Parliament, provide a comprehensive understanding of the issues. A personal interview with Mock was not possible, so it was very helpful to fall back to previous interviews with him.

In addition to primary literature, secondary literature is used. This includes books which have been published by people who were either involved in the processes (as members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in some way) or by people that were very close connected to Alois Mock during his time as Foreign Minister. This literature provides an inclusive view of the time that is being discussed, as well as valuable ‘behind the scenes’ information.
Discussions with people from Mock’s hometown Euratsfeld were helpful\(^5\) in developing a deeper understanding of who he was as a person. None of this information is used in the following text though. Rather it is useful background knowledge.

The thesis first presents the relevant historic events before it goes on to elaborate the theory. Through a theoretical lens it then tries to answer the hypothesis of whether Austria was successfully securitized or not. This order is chosen to support a better understanding of the complex issues and follows a logical structure. With the knowledge of what happened in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs between 1987 and 1995, one is better equipped to understand the further work.

1.3 Structure
The first chapter of this work deals with Alois Mock on a personal level. The biography in the beginning provides an impression of the person Alois Mock, and attempts to not focus on his political background exclusively. Background knowledge can be helpful for a better understanding of the context. In the case of Alois Mock it also helps to understand why he became the kind of politician he is still known to be.

The second part is a detailed report on Austro-Hungarian relations with a focus on the time period from 1987 until 1995. Since the transformation in Hungary cannot be explained without at least some knowledge of the dissolution of Eastern Europe in general, the whole transformation process is also tackled. This overview is provided in order to be able to understand where Hungary stood when Mock started his career as Foreign Minister in 1987, and how it had been formed by 20th century events.

The chapter *The Quest for European Union Membership* provides extensive insight into the time period when Austria applied for membership to the EC,\(^6\) as well as providing a glance at the time previous to the 1989 application. The focus though is set on the period in time

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\(^5\) These discussions were rather informal. I also grew up in Euratsfeld and went to school there so it was easy to talk to people that either knew Mock as a child, or to those who worked with him when he was mayor in his hometown. He still has family in Euratsfeld so he never lost touch with his roots.

\(^6\) The name European Communities (EC) is the used term for the time from 1958 (the Treaty of Rome) until 1993 (when the Treaty on European Union entered into force). This Treaty created the European Union (EU) and is therefore the used term from 1993 onwards.
when Alois Mock was Foreign Minister. It concludes with the successful referendum, and the resulting EU membership.

The final chapter deals with the field of Security Studies. An overview of the development of the subfield of International Relations is provided and the two leading theories within Security Studies—realism and liberalism—are elaborated. Following that, the Copenhagen School and its concept of securitization are explained. This concept is then used to help analyze the two historic events, which were discussed earlier in order to determine whether these events had been successfully securitized by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
2. Alois Mock

Alois Mock was perhaps one of the most important and dedicated Foreign Ministers in contemporary Austrian history (1987-1995). During his time in office he led the country through difficult decisions that had to be made, and through events which changed Austria and its foreign policy forever. In a 1994 interview he told the interviewer that he kept telling himself: “You had a lot of luck in your political career, you had tremendous political chances and you took use of them.” He was the longest serving Foreign Minister in the history of the Second Republic of Austria and his eight year term included significant changes for Austria; some of those were predictable whereas others came as a surprise even to people closely involved with foreign policy.

This part of my thesis tries to provide some insight to Alois Mock as a person focusing on his time in office as Austria’s Foreign Minister from 1987 until 1995. It will seek to address his aforementioned statement; that is, whether he really made use of the opportunities presented to him during his time in office. Therefore, two significant political changes are looked at more closely – the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Austria’s becoming a member of the European Union.

2.1 Biography

Alois Mock was born on 10 June 1934 in Euratsfeld, a small, typical Austrian village in Lower Austria close to Amstetten. His father, whom Mock was named after, had a fatal motorbike accident shortly before his first son was born. Mock’s mother Mathilda was left alone with a deeply in debt dairy business that she founded together with her husband after they were married in 1933. August Mock (Mathilda’s brother-in-law) supported the young widow, and they were married in 1936; five more children followed.

Alois Mock was born during troubled times; Engelbert Dollfuß, Austria’s authoritarian chancellor at the time, was killed by the Nazis just a few weeks after Mock’s birth, then in

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7 Wachter 1994, p. 23
1938 the National Socialists occupied Austria.\textsuperscript{8} Both of these events directly influenced Mock’s family since they opposed the National Socialists. These developments were also the reason why the family had to give up their dairy business. Against his wife’s wishes August Mock became a candidate for membership in the Nazi Party and by doing so they were able to start a transport company. However, after the war this led to complications in that August Mock was not able to lead his business for several months because he was involved with the Nazi Party as a candidate during the war. So Mathilda Mock acquired a driving license and kept the company afloat, which was rather uncommon for a woman at that time.\textsuperscript{9} Looking at his childhood one can see how these experiences shaped Mock as a person and a politician.

Another factor that influenced Mock significantly was his education. He went to the \textit{Volksschule} (elementary school) in Euratsfeld. After that he attended the \textit{Hauptschule} (middle school) for two years, before he was sent to the \textit{Gymnasium} (high school) in Amstetten. Among his classmates in the \textit{Hauptschule} he stood out as a very good student and a bright pupil and because of this he was transferred to the \textit{Gymnasium}. There his life became difficult. Not only was the distance he had to walk to school every day – about ten kilometers by foot – excessive, but his teachers and classmates gave him a hard time. That was reason enough for his parents to put him into a boarding school in Seitenstetten.\textsuperscript{10} Also a \textit{Gymnasium}, but led by Benedictine monks, this boarding school was a much better environment for Mock and allowed him to explore and cultivate his interests and provided numerous opportunities for him to develop as a person.

After his graduation from the \textit{Gymnasium} a new period of Mock’s life started, the life of a student in Vienna. All of his friends from the \textit{Gymnasium} had enrolled to study law and although Mock had always planned to study international trade and get a job within the export field,\textsuperscript{11} he nevertheless succumbed to peer pressure and enrolled to study law at the University of Vienna.\textsuperscript{12}

\begin{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{8}] Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 16
  \item [\textsuperscript{9}] Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 16
  \item [\textsuperscript{10}] Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 16f
  \item [\textsuperscript{11}] Wachter 1994, p. 39
  \item [\textsuperscript{12}] Wachter 1994, p. 40
\end{itemize}
Through the company of these colleagues he had become involved with and joined the student fraternity Norica. This group’s membership included some notable ÖVP politicians, such as Leopold Figl (Austria’s first chancellor after the Second World War) and Julius Raab (Austrian Chancellor from 1953-1961). The late Franz König (Archbishop of Vienna) was an honorary member, and most recently Norica’s Michael Spindelegger who was appointed Foreign Minister in 2008 and has been Vice Chancellor since 2011. The fraternity was a perfect match for Mock since they shared similar Catholic and political views. In some sense the student fraternity became a political nurturing ground for Mock; not only did he get to meet well known and insightful politicians during his time at university, but also became involved in the representative student bodies of the university. Within this organization he was also active during the crisis in Hungary in 1956, founding a committee that would organize and collect basic goods for the Hungarian refugees. In June 1957 Mock finished his law studies. Only during the final semesters of his studies he learned topics that were of great interest to him, specifically economic history, constitutional law and international law. He once mentioned that studying law was not such a bad idea after all knowing that he might have chosen a whole different career in the field of international trade.

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13 Norica is a member of the ÖCV (Österreichischer Cartellverband), the Austrian catholic student organization.

14 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 19

15 The ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) is Austria’s Christian democratic and conservative political party.

16 Norica, http://norica.org/geschichte

17 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 20

18 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 20

19 The revolution in Hungary from 23 October to 4 November in 1956 broke out after students from the Technical University in Budapest requested changes concerning the relationship between the Soviet Union and Hungary. These demands included for example free elections, a multi-party system, a new government and distraction of the Soviet troops from Hungarian soil. A lot of other Hungarians felt sympathy for the students’ requests and joined the movement. After civil war-like days in Budapest the revolution was ended with the use of military force by the Soviets. What followed were years of Soviet suppression. A lot of Hungarians fled from their home country; most of these refugees’ first stop was Austria.

20 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 23

21 Wachter 1994, p. 40
Following his graduation from university, Mock was admitted to study at John Hopkins University in Bologna, Italy. Because he had received a scholarship from the Austrian Ministry of Education to study in Italy, during the Christmas break in 1957 he was asked to talk about his first experiences in Bologna. After a short talk with the head of the department for scholarships, he was introduced to Heinrich Drimmel, who was the Minister of Education (ÖVP) at the time. He offered Mock a position with the Ministry. At first, Mock had no interest in accepting this job offer or in becoming a civil servant, and rather wanted to go back to Bologna and finish his studies. Although he was not sure whether it was the right choice, he nevertheless accepted a position as consultant for the exchanges of professors and students on 1 February 1958. His experience studying abroad and his knowledge of English and Italian made him an ideal candidate for this job. It was also at the end of 1958 that he got to meet his future wife Edith Partik, who applied for a scholarship to study History and English in London.

After some time, Mock felt the urge to study abroad once again and to learn French. He was offered scholarships to study in Nancy, France and at the College d’Europe in Ghent, Belgium, however he turned both opportunities down after the Ministry insisted that they did not want him to leave. Nevertheless, he did not give up, and applied for yet another scholarship in Brussels in 1960, where he was also accepted. This time he was not going to miss the opportunity, though the decision to go to Brussels cost him his job as a consultant. Mock then took one of the next trains and went to Brussels to start his studies at the Université Libre de Bruxelles.

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22 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 24
23 Heinrich Drimmel was Minister for Education from 1954 to 1964.
24 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 24
25 Wachter 1994, p. 33
26 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 24
27 Wachter 1994, p. 52
28 Wachter 1994, p. 33
29 Wachter 1994, p. 34
Back in Vienna, after living abroad for half a year, he worked for the Federal Chancellery as a consultant in the Department for Economic Coordination. Much of Mock’s work in the Federal Chancellery required him to collaborate with the Austrian national representatives of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC)\textsuperscript{30} and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)\textsuperscript{31} and other such organizations.\textsuperscript{32}

In 1962, Alois Mock started working at the Austrian OECD-Mission in Paris a much coveted job which many young men attempted to get. Thomas Klestil, President of Austria from 1992 until 2004, was working with him in Paris at the time and had described the job as a possibility to improve someone’s knowledge of French, get to know the customs of international conferences, and learn about the rules of international politics and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{33}

Mock worked and lived in Paris for four years and it was during this time abroad that he married his wife Edith in 1963. They became engaged after she graduated from university to become a high school teacher in History and English, but it was not until after the wedding that Edith moved to Paris to live with her husband.\textsuperscript{34}

Carl Bobleter, Alois Mock’s boss at the OECD-Mission in Paris, changed jobs in 1964 to become the secretary for the new Chancellor, Josef Klaus. It was also Bobleter who mentioned Mock’s name when Klaus was looking for a second secretary.\textsuperscript{35} In the spring of 1965, Mock moved back to Vienna and switched jobs with Michael Graff. Mock took over his job as second secretary in Vienna, whereas Graff took Mock’s position in Paris.\textsuperscript{36} This was not the only time that the career paths of these two young men would cross.

\textsuperscript{30} The OEEC was the predecessor of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which was founded in 1948 and renamed in 1961.

\textsuperscript{31} The EFTA is a free trade organization in Europe, which was founded in 1960.

\textsuperscript{32} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 25

\textsuperscript{33} Klestil 1997, p. 13

\textsuperscript{34} Wachter 1994, p. 64

\textsuperscript{35} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p.26

\textsuperscript{36} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 27
In 1966, Klaus’ head of the Federal Chancellery, Franz Karasek, quit his job and the Chancellor was looking for a qualified person to take over the vacancy. He was especially impressed by Mock’s work effort, straight forwardness, and lifestyle.\textsuperscript{37} That was reason enough for him to ask Mock if he was interested in this job. Even though Mock was not quite sure whether to take the opportunity or not, he accepted the offer in the end.\textsuperscript{38} In this position he functioned as a link between the Chancellor and the Foreign Ministry. Despite accepting the position, he always kept the idea of starting a diplomatic career in the back of his mind.

It was not until 1966 that Mock became an official member of the ÖVP – the Austrian People’s Party.\textsuperscript{39} Up to this point, his career seems even more impressive for people who are familiar with the Austrian party system. During this period people typically belonged to the ÖVP or the SPÖ – the Socialist Party; in fact, your work place and your status often indicated which party you belonged to. Therefore, it is rather surprising that a person with no official party membership got as far as Mock did, however his supporters did not care about these formalities, but instead appreciated his work effort. It is also important to note that his association with the student fraternity Norica characterized the political setting he felt most comfortable in.

While Mock carried out his new job as head of the Federal Chancellory, he continued to seek a career as a diplomat. In order to become a member of the Austrian diplomatic staff one has to pass a test, the so-called \textit{examen préalable}. He prepared for this rather difficult test while working a full time job and passed it flawlessly, an outstanding achievement, and thus became a civil servant within the Foreign Ministry; however, he did not give up his job in the Federal Chancellery.\textsuperscript{40}

In 1969, the ÖVP formed the \textit{Ausschuss für Internationale Beziehungen} (a committee for international relations), of which Alois Mock became a member next to Foreign Minister

\textsuperscript{37} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 27
\textsuperscript{38} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 28
\textsuperscript{39} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 31
\textsuperscript{40} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 30
Kurt Waldheim. This committee was put in charge of dealing with three developments, the first of which was to regulate relations with the European Economic Community (EEC). The second was to bring the deal with South Tyrol to an end and, the third, to work on the Chancellor’s policy regarding Eastern Europe. Two of these three fields - the EEC and Eastern Europe - would not only be significant during this specific time, but these would be two major fields Mock would have to deal with again during his time in office as Foreign Minister. At that early point in his career he worked on the diplomatic foundations of these matters thus gaining useful knowledge.

The year 1969 was a major cornerstone in Mock’s career when he was unexpectedly made Federal Minister of Education; he was at least as caught by surprise by this development as were other people who were very close to him. The ÖVP had formed a majority government after the elections in 1966, the first majority government in the Second Republic after a series of grand coalition governments since 1945. The ÖVP received 48.35% of the votes, which was 5.79% more than the SPÖ, who came in on second place. Shortly after forming the government in 1966, polls indicated that the upcoming elections in 1970 were not going to turn out too good for the ÖVP. There were a lot of disputes within the ÖVP itself, which made voters turn their back on the party. Additionally, a dispute over a proposed school reform broke out. The Minister of Education at the time was Theodor Piffl-Perčević, who was in favor of adding another compulsory school year at the Gymnasium before graduation,

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41 Kurt Waldheim was Minister of Foreign Affairs for the ÖVP from 1968 until 1970. He later became the 4th Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1972 until 1981. After that, he was the Federal President of Austria for one period from 1986 until 1992.

42 Austria pursued an agreement with the ECC. This agreement should grant Austria a special status in the relation with the ECC and was intended to eliminate tariffs and abandon import restrictions. This issue will be tackled in more detail later on. (See Meier-Walser 1988, p. 194; cf. Kapitel V: Die Bemühungen Österreichs um ein Abkommen mit der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft p. 197-242.)

43 In 1969 an agreement between Austria and Italy was signed that once again (after the Gruber – De Gasperi Agreement from 1946) redefined the autonomy status of South Tyrol. (cf. Kapitel VI: Die Südtirolfrage in Meier-Walser 1988, p. 243-291.)

44 Eichtinger und Wohnout 2008, p. 30


46 The authenticity of Chancellor Klaus was questioned; an increase of taxes on wine, a fee after an acquisition of a car and the great loss of voters at the local elections in Vienna in April 1969 did have a negative effect on the party’s polls.
however, others within the ÖVP did not agree. In fact, a significant number of party members who formed the voter base were also not in favor of Piffl-Perčević’s advocated change. This lack of support became obvious after a petition for a referendum was held.47 Piffl-Perčević let the party choose – either they back the reform or he would to resign. The consensus was against the reform and thus against Piffl-Perčević, or at least that was how he interpreted the process; in the end Theodor Piffl-Perčević resigned despite being asked to stay on.48

That Mock filled a position for which he had not been the first choice seems to be typical for his career. He often was not among the favorite candidates; he rather seemed to be the perfect compromise. That, at least, is the impression one gets from a recent book about Mock by Eichtinger and Wohnout. When Piffl-Perčević left, his position as minister needed to be filled. Klaus’ first choice was Josef Krainer, an up-and-coming young man from Styria, but he rejected the offer. The second choice was Professor Hans Tuppy, for whom Klaus could not find enough supporters. It was Hermann Withalm who suggested Alois Mock for the first time on 29 May 1969 and Klaus soon became a strong supporter of this idea that Mock would fill the vacant post. When Mock was nominated he was about to turn 35, very young indeed in Austrian politics, so it did not come as a surprise that his nomination caused skepticism in the Austrian media landscape.49 It was no secret that he was not the party’s first choice. So the media was unsure whether it was Mock’s qualifications that helped him get this job or if it was his friendship with the Chancellor. All this uncertainty did not create the best environment for the beginning of a new chapter in Mock’s life.50 On 2 June 1969, Mock was inaugurated by the Austrian President Franz Jonas; however, his term only lasted approximately ten months.

In his short term as Federal Minister of Education he dedicated a lot of effort to university policy. He also fought for better and more opportunities for educating children on the countryside. Mock gave his first speech as the new Minister of Education in Parliament on 10

47 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 33
48 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 34
49 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 34f
50 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 36
July, 1969. His fiery speech caught the Chancellor’s attention, and it became obvious that Klaus had taken Mock under his wings. The new Minister of Education represented the contemporary circumstances much better than his predecessor, who had been very old fashioned. Mock was, as Eichtinger and Wohnout put it, “a modern and reform-oriented conservative,” who more or less allowed a smooth transformation within this sector between Piffl-Perčević and Leopold Gratz from the SPÖ.

As previously mentioned Mock’s term in office did not last very long and ended with the formation of a new government after the 1970 election. This resulted in the SPÖ under Bruno Kreisky forming a minority government with the support of the FPÖ – the Austrian Freedom Party. It was not until 1971 that the SPÖ started its phenomenal career as majority government after an electoral reform. For the ÖVP this meant 17 years of opposition.

During that time Mock held several positions that helped him become the Foreign Minister as he is known for. After the formation of a new government in 1970, Mock had to leave his office in the ministry, but still held a seat in Parliament. Within his position as a Member of Parliament he participated in several working groups, especially as an active member of the Foreign Policy Committee.

At the same time one important fact became obvious to him: if he wanted to become a successful politician one day, he had to build a base of voters that would support him no

51 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 42
52 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 43
53 The SPÖ (Socialist Party of Austria from 1945-1991 and Social Democratic Party of Austria from 1991 onwards) is, next to the ÖVP, Austria’s major party. The SPÖ is strongly connected with Labor Unions and the Austrian Chamber of Labor.
54 The FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party) is a right-wing populist party in Austria. The FPÖ was founded in 1956 and is the successor of the VdU (Federation of Independents), which existed from 1949-1955.
55 Gehler 2006, p. 40
56 The electoral reform increased the number of seats in Parliament (from 165 to 183). That the electoral reform was favorable to small parties was a concession the SPÖ had to make to the FPÖ, in order to be able to carry out the electoral reform.
57 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 51
matter what. The local elections in Lower Austria in 1970 were the perfect opportunity to do so. The local ÖVP in his home town Euratsfeld nominated him as mayor, but he did not fill this position for the whole five year term. Instead, he resigned in July 1971,\footnote{Wachter 1994, p. 77} almost one year later, in order to become the leader of the ÖAAB.\footnote{The ÖAAB is part of the ÖVP, and as a sub-organization represents the interest of employees. The ÖVP is structured in 5 different sub-organizations; one of them is the ÖAAB. The other sub-organizations represent the interests of farmers, retirees, women and the youth. If one is a member of either one of these sub-organizations, he automatically becomes a member of the ÖVP.} Nevertheless, he was able to build a base of voters that supported him throughout his political career. Alois Mock’s hometown Euratsfeld took much pride in the politician’s origin and to celebrate his 60\textsuperscript{th} birthday a square was named after him.

That Mock became the head of the ÖAAB was, again, a compromise and definitely nothing planned. The organization was torn over the question of who was best suited to be Alfred Maleta’s successor as head of the ÖAAB. Two men, Georg Prader and Karl Glaser, were seen as the most likely candidates, both of whom could count on their own group of supporters.\footnote{Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 52} However, some time before the ÖAAB elections were held, Prader backed down. He himself then brought Alois Mock into the game as a suitable candidate for this position. In the beginning it did not look too good for Mock, but he was able to change the atmosphere in his favor. In his newly acquired position he was, suddenly back at the top of the party where he soon became known as a person that fights and stands for certain values. He was also a strong supporter of ‘social responsibility’\footnote{Wachter 1994, p. 81} and within the party fought for more flexible working hours, especially for women,\footnote{Wachter 1994, p. 80} and pursued several other topics that were not that popular, even within his own party.

In 1975, Alois Mock was included among the so called ‘young lions’. They were supposed to fight next to ÖVP leader Karl Schleinzer for a better result after the next elections, which were to be held on 5 October.\footnote{Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 63} Unfortunately, everything that had been planned up to that
point changed 19 July, when Schleinzer died in a car accident. Since the election was just
around the corner, a new party leader was desperately needed. In addition to Josef Taus,
Alois Mock was also seen as a potential candidate and it was not until Mock assured Taus
that he would not run against him that Taus retained his nomination. Just after Schleinzer’s
funeral, Taus was formally elected as the new party leader. However, the hoped-for result of
the elections was not achieved and once again the SPÖ was able to assure a majority.\textsuperscript{64} It
became obvious to the ÖVP that the fight of ending the role as opposition had just begun.
Since Taus did not bring the anticipated form of success for the party, one can assume that it
did not take too long until his suitability for the position was questioned.

In 1978, the position of the chairman of the ÖVP parliamentary club needed to be replaced.
Stephan Koren, the former chairman, was appointed as President of the Oesterreichische
Nationalbank, the central bank of the Federal Republic of Austria.\textsuperscript{65} Once again Mock was
used as a stopgap when it was about time to find a new person for the position of the
chairman. Nevertheless, this was the last time that he had to fill a gap.\textsuperscript{66} Josef Taus, the
party’s chairman, wanted to become chairman of the parliamentary club as well however,
the sub-organizations of the ÖVP did not share his opinion. Rather they wanted Michael
Graff to become the new chairman. On top of that, the ÖAAB saw that its time had come to
finally increase its influence and, therefore, nominated Alois Mock. The most promising
candidate was definitely Graff, who after all, lost the internal elections. Mock got nine more
votes than his opponent Graff (57 against 48 votes).\textsuperscript{67} From this moment on Mock was seen
as the ÖVP’s new star, and was able to play on the same level as the strong SPÖ. In addition,
the media shared this feeling and had very high expectations of him. He was already seen as

\textsuperscript{64} The SPÖ won the elections with 50.4% before the ÖVP, who got 42.9% of the votes. Voting results 1975

\textsuperscript{65} Stephan Koren was more or less surprisingly appointed by Chancellor Bruno Kreisky after an internal dispute
in his own party (SPÖ), especially with Hannes Androsch, who was initially supposed to get the job.

\textsuperscript{66} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 69

\textsuperscript{67} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 72
the new party leader. For his new job as the chairman of the party’s parliamentary club, Mock left his position in the ÖAAB and was succeeded by Herbert Kohlmaier.

At first it looked like the duo Taus (chairman of the party) and Mock (new chairman of the parliamentary club) would increase the party’s chances in the 1979 elections; however, the election ended with the biggest success for the SPÖ with 51%. Taus wanted to reform the party, but was not given an opportunity to do so and resigned in June 1979, nearly a month after the elections.

This time the pattern seemed to change; Mock was not a compromise for the position as party leader and next to Erhard Busek he was a serious candidate from the very beginning of the discussion. Busek’s time had not yet come and it would not be until 1991 that he became the party’s leader. Interestingly, Alois Mock did not publicly announce that he would like to become the new party leader. In fact, he supported Busek until the very last minute just before the meeting where he then was officially nominated for this position. Whether this was really how he felt or was solely for tactical reasons is unclear. Also during the meeting he took a reserved position, an attitude which granted him the approval of other top-class politicians towards future reforms. Furthermore, he was able to keep Sixtus Lanner as secretary-general, for whom he could not find a major support at first. On 7 July 1979, Mock was officially elected by party representatives as the new party leader with a majority

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68 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 72
69 Wachter 1994, p. 90
71 Wachter 1994, p. 91
72 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 78
73 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 79
of 97.5%^4 of the votes.\textsuperscript{75} At this point, he was not only the party’s leader, but the parliamentary club’s chairman as well.\textsuperscript{76}

In the beginning, Mock dedicated most of his work to end the SPÖ’s absolute majority in Parliament. He also intended to be the first to begin raising political awareness of certain topics. Being thematically ahead of one’s opponent was seen as a key element to success. He also wanted to reform his own party, in order for it to appear more united in the eyes of the voters. Hence, such a reform was of major interest for him. He once mentioned that the party no longer reflected its own ideology, had ceased to debate current affairs, and by the 1950s it had already lost its drive towards transforming society; as a consequence it had become less attractive to potential voters.\textsuperscript{77}

The first years in his new position can be described as laying necessary ground work. The next general elections opened a window of opportunity for the party; in the past thirteen years, no poll before an election had been this positive for the ÖVP. The 1983 elections, theoretically, allowed a participation of the ÖVP in the government, however the party was again left with the role as opposition. Critics might argue that they could not use the opportunity in 1983, because the SPÖ was still too strong. A coalition with the FPÖ helped them stay in power, even though scandals had started scratching the flawless surface of the party under Kreisky. The ÖVP stayed in opposition, but the party under Mock was able to move towards ending the SPÖ’s absolute majority government and for the first time was able to gain votes (43.2%) since the 1966 elections.\textsuperscript{78}

After the 1983 elections, Bruno Kreisky resigned and Mock’s strategy became clear. He declared the SPÖ as the major opponent, was willing to use all of the party’s resources, and

\textsuperscript{74} Although 97.5% seems to be a really high approval rate, it is a rather normal phenomenon within the elections of party positions in Austria. A high approval rate is always pursued to portrait unity to the outside, so that the party is not a target of negative comments.

\textsuperscript{75} Wachter 1994, p. 93

\textsuperscript{76} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 81

\textsuperscript{77} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 83

indicated that the FPÖ was not worth it fighting against. Mock tried, as is the nature of a politician in opposition, to harm the parties in government (particularly the SPÖ) as much as possible, especially on topics such as the planned erection of a hydro-electrical power plant in Hainburg (Lower Austria), the launching of the already built nuclear power plant in Zwentendorf (Lower Austria) and the bankruptcy of state-owned businesses. Right after the general elections in 1983, polls saw the ÖVP in front of the SPÖ. However, the mood changed again in favor of the SPÖ in 1984 and for the first time while holding this position Mock was questioned as party leader.

Another topic that attracted domestic attention was the presidential election in 1986. As early as in 1981, the ÖVP first considered nominating Kurt Waldheim as a candidate, after it became clear that he was not going to be elected as Secretary General of the United Nations for a third term. It was planned to officially nominate him in the fall of 1985. However, Waldheim had also talked to the SPÖ because he wanted to see if he could be nominated by both parties. The SPÖ decided differently though, and nominated the popular Minister of Health, Kurt Steyrer. The polls indicated that without a question Waldheim would win the elections; that was until the Austrian magazine profil published an article about Kurt Waldheim’s past during the Second World War. At first, it looked like the ÖVP’s candidate would lose the elections, however Michael Graff was able to flip the cards in favor of the ÖVP and Waldheim won the elections on 8 June after the second ballot with 53.9% of the votes.

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79 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 96
80 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 99
81 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 104
82 Some party members also pushed the idea that Mock himself should be nominated for the elections, but this kind of career was not attractive for him.
83 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 105
84 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 107
85 Graff was the ÖVP’s secretary-general at that time and, therefore, in charge of the election campaign.
86 Voting results Austrian Presidential election 1986
The so called *Waldheim Affair* began on 3 March 1986 with the publication of an article in the Austrian magazine *profil* by journalist Hubertus Czernin.\(^{87}\) The article pointed out that Waldheim’s autobiography highlighted omissions in Waldheim’s past during the Second World War. Information that he had provided before the presidential election regarding his role during the war were inaccurate, such as his role in the mounted corps of the SA, and the role he played in the Army Corp E in Saloniki, Greece. Later on Waldheim was also accused of war crimes. A committee of historians was formed by the Austrian government, in order to deal with the accusations. The committee concluded that Waldheim was not involved in any war crimes but, he had nevertheless lied about his military record. In 1987, the United States of America put Kurt Waldheim on a watch list, which limited his possibilities to visit several countries during his presidency and did not allow him to enter the USA.\(^{88}\)

After the presidential elections the changes came thick and fast. Eichtinger and Wohnout even describe this time as a political turnaround in Austria that followed the presidential election. A day after the elections Fred Sinowatz resigned as SPÖ leader, and Franz Vranitzky replaced him in this position. In addition, Jörg Haider was elected as FPÖ leader in September, which was reason enough for Vranitzky to end the coalition between the SPÖ and FPÖ, and call for elections a year earlier as initially planned.\(^{89}\)

All of a sudden, the political state of affairs in Austria experienced some major changes within a very short timeframe. Mock had to deal with two younger, new opponents and that created a very different environment for the election campaign. Already in 1984, at the celebration of his 50\(^{th}\) birthday, Mock was perceived as the future Chancellor after the 1986 elections. That optimism, though, was hard to find at the end of the campaign.\(^{90}\) The campaign had started off well, but a statement by fellow party member Rudolf Sallinger pushed the spotlight to possible coalition formations and this caused negative headlines. He

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\(^{87}\) cf. *profil* Nr. 10, 3 March 1986, p. 16-20


\(^{89}\) Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 110

\(^{90}\) Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 113
said that his party should form a coalition with the SPÖ regardless of the election outcome. This statement only helped the two other parties (SPÖ and FPÖ). One can argue this contributed to Mock losing the election. He knew that the election in 1986 would most likely be his last chance to become Chancellor and because of this he fought hard to win. It is, therefore, not surprising that his personal disappointment was very high at the end of the Election Day, when it became obvious that the party would come in second. The fact that the SPÖ was only ahead by 1.8% was no consolation. Mock was the party’s representative in talks with the SPÖ as well as to the FPÖ regarding the possibility of forming a coalition. It quickly became apparent that more supported a coalition with the SPÖ, even though Mock suggested one with the FPÖ. He thought that this formation would leave the ÖVP in a better position since his party would be the ‘number one’ and as such it would be able to implement its political ideas better, rather than being in a subordinate position within a coalition. Talks with both parties took place, but, as expected, a coalition with the SPÖ was formed at the end.

On 21 January 1987, the new government formed by the SPÖ and ÖVP, was sworn in. During the negotiations, in order to come to a coalition agreement, Mock was able to use his experience to get the most for his party. He even received acknowledgment by Vranitzky that the ministerial posts would be divided in half between the two parties. He was, therefore, able to finally get the ÖVP back in the game, after being out of the political league for seventeen years. Mock became Vice-Chancellor, and also managed to become Foreign Minister. This meant an extra work load for him, but he was aware that he needed a ministry in order to be able to take use of the infrastructure that comes along with it. Mock’s time as Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs will be outlined later in this work. A focus on his career path apart from his ministerial work is, therefore, pursued in this part.

After the election in 1986, rumors surfaced that the party might be better off with a new leader. Its number of voters had decreased again under Mock. It was possible to stop the

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91 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 118
92 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 120
93 Cabinet Vranitzky I-V http://www.bka.gv.at/site/5957/default.aspx
94 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 124
questioning voices. However, Mock knew exactly that from this moment on, it would be a matter of time until he had to vacate his post for somebody else.\textsuperscript{95} Because there was nobody that could follow Mock in his position as party leader, it was argued as to be the only reason why a deeper discussion on that matter did not take place.\textsuperscript{96}

Not only was Mock dealing with problems concerning his role as leader but the coalition was also going through troubling times. A final report on President Waldheim’s past, written by the commission mentioned earlier, caused serious arguments between the two parties in government. Fights about a tax reform in 1988 and the application for membership in the EC added up to a less than harmonic relationship.\textsuperscript{97} On top of that, his Defense Minister Robert Lichal was publicly criticized by his own party in 1988,\textsuperscript{98} and the grand loss of votes at the provincial elections in Salzburg, Tyrol and Carinthia in March 1989 added to the problems.\textsuperscript{99}

However, Mock was not willing to give up that easy. He arranged a party meeting in May, which was supposed to be held in June. He used the opportunity there to make it very clear that he would run again as party leader.\textsuperscript{100} However, shortly after that Mock realized that his time had come to an end when fellow party members made him confront the truth. So on the eve of 17 April 1989, Mock resigned voluntarily as party leader and became \textit{Ehrenparteiobmann} (honorary chairperson)\textsuperscript{101} of the ÖVP\textsuperscript{102} but retained his post as Foreign Minister of Austria.

\textsuperscript{95} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 121
\textsuperscript{96} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 129
\textsuperscript{97} Wachter 1994, p. 138
\textsuperscript{98} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 134
\textsuperscript{99} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 138
\textsuperscript{100} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 139
\textsuperscript{101} The position as \textit{Ehrenparteiobmann} still grants Mock rights in the party up until today. He does not take use of them, but formally he has a vote in decision making bodies within the party.
\textsuperscript{102} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 141
Mock’s career as party leader ended after 10 years, making him the longest running in this position. After changes in the government Josef Riegler replaced Mock as Vice Chancellor on 24 April 1989 and on 20 May he officially succeeded Mock as party leader. From that point onwards, Mock was even more dedicated to his duties as Minister for Foreign Affairs. However, as time went by, it became obvious that Parkinson’s disease had used up almost all of his strength.

Despite his failing health, Mock never allowed himself time to rest, especially at the end of his career as Foreign Minister when negotiations about EU membership came to a close. In 1995, he resigned as Foreign Minister, and Wolfgang Schüssel took over his position. Until 1999 he remained a Member of Parliament, but after the elections in 1999 his political career ended, mostly due to his illness. Nonetheless, he still tries to participate at as many events as his state of health allows him to do.

2.2 Mock’s International Career

1979 was not only the year in which Mock started his career as party leader, he was also elected President of the European Democrat Union (EDU). The Union was founded one year earlier, and Mock was its President until 1998. In 1983, he was among the founders of the International Democratic Union (IDU), in which he also served as President from its foundation on until 1987.

The EDU was a special platform put together by like-minded parties from EC member countries and non EC members. The non EC members profited very much from this relationship because they got first hand information about developments in the EC. During the 1980s, one task, among others of the EDU, was to support opposition groups in

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103 From today’s perspective Wolfgang Schüssel filled this position the longest, starting on 22 April 1995 until 21 April 2007.
104 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 143
105 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 145
106 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 150
107 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 152
the Eastern Bloc. This also explains the fact that Mock was widely known and appreciated among politicians in these countries after 1989. In the middle of the 1990s, the EDU started to lose influence as an organization and was absorbed by the European People’s Party in 2002.

Mock’s interest in foreign relations did not form as a result of becoming Foreign Minister in 1987. It had been an area that caught his interest a long time ago, particularly matters relating to European integration. He recalled himself wondering as a student why Europe was not a single state similar to the USA. His time abroad both studying and while working in Paris were also influential. Before he was elected President of the EDU, he was active within the European Christian Democrat Workers (EUCDA). He had been involved at the international stage from an early point on and, therefore, had formed relationships with like-minded foreign politicians. Mock was able to cultivate relationships that eventually helped him, especially before and during the EU membership process.

2.3 The Foreign Minister from 1987-1995
As previously mentioned, Alois Mock became Foreign Minister in 1987, after the elections in 1986 gave his party the opportunity to leave the opposition and form a coalition with the SPÖ. At the time he was not only Foreign Minister, but also Vice Chancellor. In addition to that, he was party leader until 1989. All of these different jobs created a significant workload, which he was only able to manage because of his willingness to sacrifice almost anything. Starting in 1989, he was able to focus more on his ministerial post and from that point on he did not have to fill as many positions.

While Alois Mock was Minister for Foreign Affairs, two general elections for the Nationalrat (National Council) were held; one in October 1990, and the second in October 1994. At the

108 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 153
109 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 146
110 Wachter 1994, p. 38
111 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 148
112 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 149
election in 1994, which was held after EU membership was finalized, he received 46,000 preferential votes.\textsuperscript{113} This massive support can be interpreted as a sign of appreciation and thanks for Mock’s tireless effort. During both general elections it seemed as if Mock’s qualifications as Foreign Minister were never questioned. In addition, he also filled the position as Minister of Defense when the actual minister, Robert Lichal, was elected Second President of the National Council. Mock was in this position only for a few weeks, starting from 6 November until 17 December 1990. Even though he knew that this was a temporary task, Mock fulfilled this job with the same dedication and passion as any other.\textsuperscript{114} One gets the impression that he had the ability to unify all sides of the political spectrum and was therefore honored and appreciated by a great variety of people for what he did.

During his time in office, world politics and Austrian politics experienced major changes. The end of the Cold War had a significant effect on Austria, since the country was surrounded by satellite states of the Soviet regime in the north and east, as did the independence movements and the War in the former Yugoslavia in the south, especially the conflict in Slovenia. In addition to that, the conflict with South Tyrol had still not been settled, which was another issue Mock focused on during his time in office, although this issue was settled in 1992. Finally, on 1 January 1995 Austria experienced a historical event, when it became a member of the European Union. These events stand out during Alois Mock’s eight year position as Austria’s Foreign Minister.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{113} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 262

\textsuperscript{114} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 163

\textsuperscript{115} Alois Mock is, until today, the person who served the longest time as Austria’s Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Second Republic.
3. Austrian Relations with Hungary in 1989

In this section I focus on Austria’s relationship with Hungary and how it changed from 1987 to 1995, the years that Alois Mock was in office. In 1987, international relations was still characterized by a bipolar system, with the USA as the dominant Western actor and the USSR dictating actions in the East, and the neutral states of Europe in between the two blocs. A situation everyone was used to, but which was absolutely different to what the world looked like in 1995. Arguably, Mikhail Gorbachev becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985 would bring about changes; however the sheer enormity and extent of these changes were unforeseen. Indeed, the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union significantly altered global dynamics and resulted in alterations of most international political relationships, including that of Austria and Hungary, as we shall see.

Hungary and Austria have been connected by a special bond for a very long time. As part of the Habsburg Empire, Hungary was granted special standing in 1867 and this made the country different from other regions of the Empire and in its relationship with Austria. This unique relationship is one reason for a closer examination of the case. One might argue that a friendly nation, or a country which is not considered hostile, has to go to great lengths for an ally to feel threatened or to create a situation which again induces key actors to make a security issue out of that particular situation. In fact, the changing international dynamics that occurred had the potential to create a threatening environment between Austria and Hungary as we shall see in the coming paragraphs.

This chapter is divided into two sections, the first of which outlines Hungary’s recent history. This brief summary is necessary in order to highlight Soviet influence on the country and how changes came about at the end of the 1980s. The second part is then dedicated to how the Ministry for Foreign Affairs perceived the situation, how it dealt with the major changes in 1989, and what kind of consequences came out of them. Most of this information will be used to analyze whether Austria’s security was actually threatened, or if the situation was

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116 The Compromise in 1867 established the dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, and granted Hungary freedom of decision making in all political fields, except foreign affairs, defense and finance. Hungary was also governed by its own parliament, the Hungarian constitution was set in power and Franz Joseph was crowned as King of Hungary.
perceived as threatening and how the circumstances changed from having a potential threat waiting just next door, to eventually building relationships with new democracies after the fall of the Iron Curtain. In order to achieve this, a close look is taken at Annual Reports of the Foreign Ministry (*Jahrbuch der österreichischen Außenpolitik*) over a period of the nine years from 1987 to 1995. Additionally, relevant Parliamentary speeches given by Alois Mock are included in the examination. How Austria, represented by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dealt with the changes at its Eastern border is necessary for a better understanding of the theoretical explanation offered in an upcoming chapter when the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization will be applied to how the issues were handled. This theory will be elaborated in chapter 5.3.

### 3.1 Historical Outline of Hungarian History in the 20th Century

The Treaty of Trianon (1920) reduced the territory of Hungary to 28% of its pre-World War I size with only 36% of its citizens remaining there; after the treaty many Hungarians suddenly found themselves living in foreign countries. The Treaty significantly harmed Hungarian national identity and is still a relevant topic in Hungarian politics.

Before World War II broke out in September 1939, Hungary was already one of Nazi-Germany and Hitler’s supporters. After the *Anschluss* of Austria into the Third Reich in 1938, Hitler granted Hungary dominion in the territories that it had lost after World War I (Treaty of Trianon). It was not until the end of World War II that Hungary was occupied by German troops after initiating secret negotiations with the Allies. The Hungarians were afraid to become occupied by the Red Army and, therefore, turned towards the West. Although with little success, since they only were told to negotiate with the Soviets. After World War II Hungary was occupied by Soviet troops and fell under Soviet rule.

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117 The report from 1986 was also published during Mock’s time in office. He cannot be held responsible though, since his term as Minister had not started until 21 January 1987. Therefore, the research starts with the reports published in 1987 going on until 1995.

118 Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 81

119 Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 92

120 Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 94f
Following the war, Hungary found itself in a very difficult situation. While other countries were renewing and strengthening their interwar political and party systems, Hungary could not as “the political elite and parties in the interwar period had been in favor of the war.” As mentioned earlier, Hungary was occupied by the Red Army in April 1945, which led to the fact that the Communist Party was the first party to be reorganized after the war. But “out of respect towards the western Allies a pluralistic party system was endorsed.” Nevertheless, communists were placed in key positions and slowly took over.

In November 1945, Hungary had held the first democratic election in its history, and on 1 February 1946 the country proclaimed itself a republic. A gradual process, also known as ‘salami tactic,’ had led towards the unification of the Communist Party and the Social Democrats. The proclamation of the People’s Republic of Hungary followed in August 1949. Only one party – the Communist party – was left over at that point. Hungary became a satellite state of the Soviet Union with Mátyás Rákosi appointed its new prime minister; the country would experience a harsh regime in coming years, in which dissidents were prosecuted and killed. The construction of the so-called Iron Curtain also started in 1949 and lasted until 1963. The death of Stalin in 1953, brought with it harsh changes to Hungary. Rákosi was forced to leave his position, and was succeeded by Imre Nagy. Nagy started enforcing a new way of policymaking, which made him very popular with the Hungarian people. However, Nagy did not gain any popularity in his own party and had to resign from all positions in March 1955. Rákosi was put back in power, but only for one year until he also became too much of a burden for the party. Ernő Gerő then took over for only three months, right up until the Revolution of 1956.

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121 Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 98
122 Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 99
123 Göllner, Lengyel, Puttkamer 2009, p. 425
124 Salami tactic is a term especially used to describe the process in Hungary and other countries that experienced growing Soviet pressure. Political parties were cut into pieces just like a salami until only one piece – the Communist party – was left over and had single rule in these countries.
125 Göllner, Lengyel, Puttkamer 2009, p. 425
126 Oplatka 2009, p. 20f
127 Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 109
The October 1956 uprising started as a small protest led by students and, quickly escalated into a revolution within days, with a significant portion of Budapest’s population taking part. This soon led to an invasion by the Red Army. On 22 October 1956, students had published a proclamation in which they demanded several political changes. The following day, a protest was planned by these students and other people impulsively followed them, expressing their support. The protest was spontaneous, far from organized and began to gain momentum. By the time the protestors had reached and occupied a radio station in order to publicly announce their demands, the first shots were fired; however, it is unclear, by whom – the army or the protesting crowd. Either way, the revolution had claimed its first victims. As word spread of the revolution, protestors began to gather in other Budapest locations. At one site they took down a statue of Stalin, while elsewhere, people requested that Imre Nagy talk to them, as they wanted to see him back in office as Prime Minister. Nagy responded the following day, and begged the people to end the violence. Hungary experienced other significant changes during this time. Other parties were permitted in addition to the Communist party; a new government was formed; and Nagy began negotiations with the Soviet Union. Now under the leadership of Imre Nagy, Hungary began to move towards exiting the Warsaw Pact and becoming a neutral country. Nagy also negotiated with the Soviets regarding the departure of Soviet troops from Hungarian soil. What Nagy and the Hungarian people did not know was that the Soviet Union was in secret negotiations with János Kádár, whom they intended to return to power after successfully reestablishing their dominance in the state. On 4 November, the Red Army began a military attack against the revolutionaries, and by the eve of the year 1956, the Soviet Union was back in control and it appeared as if the Revolution had never taken place.

Because of the instability created by the Revolution, many Hungarians had fled with approximately 180,000 refugees migrating to Austria. Imre Nagy was among those, and sought shelter at the Yugoslav Embassy, where he was again betrayed. Although he had been granted free passage by Kádár, Nagy was arrested by the Soviets as he left the Embassy, and later charged with treason. He was sentenced to death and hanged in June

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128 Kádár served as First Secretary of the Communist Party at that time.

129 Oplatka 2009, p. 20
1958, then buried in a mass grave. His execution was intended to serve as a warning to leaders in other countries under Soviet influence.

Kádár eventually changed his policies and later during his rule Hungarians experienced a rise in their standard of living and were even allowed to travel. He became an eponym for a very specific system called ‘Kádárism’.\textsuperscript{130} This system tried to find “legitimation not solely through political means, but instead through economical, socio-political [means] and social welfare.”\textsuperscript{131} Kádár is to this day perceived by some as one of Hungary’s most successful and popular politicians.\textsuperscript{132}

Later on Kádár changed his policies. He was also the eponym for a very specific system called ‘Kádárism’.\textsuperscript{133} This system tried to find “legitimation not solely through political means, but instead through economical, socio-political [means] and social welfare.”\textsuperscript{134} In this time Hungarians also experienced a rise of the standard of living and were even allowed to travel. Janos Kádár is still until today one of Hungary’s most successful and popular politicians.\textsuperscript{135}

In the following years the Hungarian economy became more and more unstable. Foreign debts had a strong negative influence on the economy as did the international oil crisis, and the change of Soviet policy.\textsuperscript{136} By the middle of the 1980s it became obvious that a significant transformation was about to happen, the extent of which was unforeseen. An opposition started to form in Hungary, and was even permitted to make public appearances in 1987.\textsuperscript{137} That the Communist Party was in a crisis was undeniable. Kádár had to leave the

\textsuperscript{130} Another term that is used to describe this system, which was developed under Kádár, is ‘Goulash Communism’.

\textsuperscript{131} Göllner, Lengyel, Puttkamer 2009, p. 426

\textsuperscript{132} Lendvai 2006, p.249

\textsuperscript{133} Another term that is used to describe this system, which was developed under Kádár, is ‘Goulash Communism’.

\textsuperscript{134} Göllner, Lengyel, Puttkamer 2009, p. 426

\textsuperscript{135} Lendvai 2006, p.249

\textsuperscript{136} Göllner, Lengyel, Puttkamer 2009, p. 426

\textsuperscript{137} Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 125
party and the ongoing process could not be stopped anymore. Historic parties, prohibited since 1949, started to reorganize as did other political organizations.\textsuperscript{138}

Changes in 1989 were substantial, fast and unpredictable. On 2 May the official deconstruction of the Iron Curtain began.\textsuperscript{139} In June, negotiations commenced between the Communist Party, a delegation from the opposition, and representatives of different organizations. They agreed on how to organize the peaceful transformation of the current system, on laws that would amend the constitution, on a different electoral system, and also that other parties would finally be permitted.\textsuperscript{140} In the same month Imre Nagy was reburied, and was officially reinstated as the hero of the Revolution of 1956.

On 19 August 1989, the so called pan-European picnic was held at the Austria-Hungary border near the town of Sopron. The border crossing was opened for a couple of hours and hundreds of East Germans took advantage of the opportunity to flee into the West, unimpeded.\textsuperscript{141} Clearly, a significant number of East Germans took this as an invitation; on 10 September the border to Austria was permanently opened for East Germans.\textsuperscript{142} That Hungary let East Germans leave the East, is often referred to as the triggering event in history that eventually led to the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. On 23 October 1989,\textsuperscript{143} Hungary was declared a republic and, from that point, the Soviets made no attempt to maintain their political and military domination.

On 25 March and 8 April 1990, the first democratic national elections were held since 1945. At this time, Soviet troops were still stationed in Hungary, but this did not have any impact on national politics.\textsuperscript{144} A coalition of conservative parties had formed after the elections. In 1991, Hungary finally gained full independence for the first time in 47 years, following the

\textsuperscript{138} Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 126

\textsuperscript{139} Oplatka 2009, p. 15

\textsuperscript{140} Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 127

\textsuperscript{141} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 194

\textsuperscript{142} Oplatka 2009, p. 229f

\textsuperscript{143} One can see that the day of the declaration of the republic corresponds with the day when the Revolution of 1956 broke out. It was the last time that Hungarians tried to gain independence from a higher authority.

\textsuperscript{144} Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 131
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in February and after the last Soviet soldiers left Hungarian soil on 19 June. Hungary has since become a stable democracy and has successfully bonded with the West after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; in 1999, Hungary became a member of NATO and, in 2004, a member of the European Union.

3.2 Hungary’s Relations with Austria
When referring to the relationship between Austria and Hungary, it is essential to not only focus on the two countries. Instead it is important to take a wider perspective on global politics in order to be able to understand interactions between the smaller players. The 1980s can be seen as the decade that brought numerous changes to world politics. In the beginning, the world order similar to that during the 1960s and 1970s. The bipolar relationship between the two superpowers world dominated almost every aspect of politics during this era; if not directly, then via other states that were sometimes reluctantly forced to choose an alliance with one or the other. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the USSR and ushered in an era of change. Not only within the USSR, but globally, the words ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’ are intimately connected with him. This new way of thinking increased the flexibility and willingness of communist countries in international relations to increase their commitment to the resolution of common global issues.

One of these was nuclear disarmament. In 1987, the leaders of the USA and USSR, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, signed the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, which regulated the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. It is a cornerstone in disarmament, which was preceded by years of escalating nuclear capabilities, coercive policy and distrust. The hostile relationship which had characterized East/West relations for a number of decades had changed into a more amicable one; it had become an atmosphere in which successful talks were possible, were followed by agreements, and where a growing mutual trust could be observed.

145 Kurtán, Liebhart, Pribersky 1999, p. 147
146 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 2
147 Citation of the INF Treaty, 1987: “...requires destruction of the Parties’ ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures and support equipment within three years after the Treaty enters into force.”
In regard to Austria, the significantly improved relationship between the East and the West had an immense effect on the state. This was not only because of Austria’s geographical position in Europe, which was partly surrounded by communist states. It was also due to Austria’s neutrality, which had been enacted in 1955 by the Austrian Parliament in order to end the Allied occupation after World War II. The country saw itself as an important player and agent between these blocs and had tried to gain influence through active participation in the 1980s in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).148 Austrian leaders realized that their influence was limited, however, they also realized that the country did not have to play a passive role in international relations; it was up to Austria to pursue an active role in international affairs.149

3.2.1 Relations before 1989

The 1987 Annual Report of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs illustrates how relations between the East and West dominated Austria’s foreign policy at that time. In the report’s preface Alois Mock described its neighborhood policy as one of the two pillars of Austrian foreign relations.150 This continued for a number of years, until the country’s priorities were slowly reordered and the upcoming European Union integration began to dominate the discussion. Austrian security policy in 1987 was mostly dictated by global politics. There was little possibility that Hungary and Austria could develop a common policy as the two countries belonged to different blocs and this significantly limited their options.

There was no need for Austria to adjust its security policy in 1987 since the situation in terms of security and new threats had not changed, between Austria and Hungary compared to the past years. Thus, 1987 can rather be seen as a continuation of the policy of the previous years, in which the tense atmosphere between the blocs started to be a less stressed one.

Austria’s security policy in 1987 was primarily focused on fulfilling its neutrality obligation. Austria was, according to its declaration of neutrality, obligated to maintain this status - with

148 Today the CSCE is known as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

149 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p.35

150 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. XI
armed means if necessary. The Annual Report states that a country’s security can only be granted when its territory would not become a military vacuum. In order to avoid such a situation, the state is obligated to keep its armed forces active.\textsuperscript{151} The Ministry for Foreign Affairs described in its 1987 yearbook that the Austrian armed forces were organized in a defensive way. This means that the army was not equipped to carry out extensive offensive actions. According to this, Austria was in favor of the idea that a similar situation would be created in its surrounding regions (defensive organized armed forces).\textsuperscript{152} A military vacuum would not only decrease Austria’s security, but also its neighbor’s security if the national defense would not be modernized and properly equipped. Because of the defensive organization the Austrian army did not intend to participate in the armament race. The state was much more interested in achieving a balance of power by disarmament on both sides of the conflict.\textsuperscript{153} According to that, Austria was a strong supporter of the achievements that were accomplished from that perspective in 1987 (e.g. INF Treaty and ongoing talks on the planned Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Agreement).

As mentioned previously, there was a unique bond between Austria and Hungary. During 1987, Alois Mock’s first year in office, a number of official and unofficial bilateral visits\textsuperscript{154} took place. These visits can again be interpreted as a sign of good relations as can the proposal to apply as a common host for a world exhibition in their two capitals, Vienna and Budapest in 1995. Also a significant amount of contact economic level took place in order to increase the exchange of goods between both nations.\textsuperscript{155} Hungary became increasingly eager to increase the collaboration with economic partners in the West.\textsuperscript{156}

By 1988, it had become clear that change was on its way. The Annual Report on Foreign Relations dedicated an entire chapter to the ongoing transformations in the Eastern Bloc. It

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{151} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 42
  \item \textsuperscript{152} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 47
  \item \textsuperscript{153} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 42
  \item \textsuperscript{154} From a total of 124 visits of Austrian officials abroad, 28 out of these led officials to Eastern European countries. Out of them 6 visits were made to Hungary which equals a total of 21.4%.
  \item \textsuperscript{155} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 7
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 31
\end{itemize}
predicted that at the end of the century Eastern Europe’s developments and changes would be remembered in history.\textsuperscript{157} The relaxation of tensions between the superpowers, especially in international relations, was still going on and both sides were working to keep the process alive. The lack of agreement on a reduction of strategic arms (START)\textsuperscript{158} was, to some degree, a setback, but did not seriously harm the long term momentum; talks and negotiations were only delayed and an agreement was finally signed in 1991.

Austria saw great opportunity in this changing situation, and pursued plans to intensify its relationship with the Eastern Bloc countries. It understood that in order to help and support the systems’ changes, it was necessary to support the states with initiatives that would follow common European interests as well as common European values.\textsuperscript{159}

In this context, the joint application of Austria and Hungary, as common hosts of the world exhibition in 1995 is better understood, and can be interpreted as an intelligent move in terms of developing a better relationship and support for Hungary. The title for the proposed exhibition was “Bridges to the Future”.\textsuperscript{160} According to the Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook, “the theme of the exhibition, accords with this political resolve to overcome the division of Europe.”\textsuperscript{161} Furthermore, bridges can easily help to surmount obstacles, such as different opinions on political and economical systems. Austria and Hungary were competing with Miami/USA and the decision would not be made until 1989.\textsuperscript{162} The plan in Vienna was to ask the city’s people and to let them decide in a referendum whether they would support the idea or not. However, the Viennese rejected the idea in the 1991 referendum. Unfortunately, the project lost its attractiveness after the fall of the Iron Curtain and, after the referendum, was no longer pursued.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{157} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 45
\textsuperscript{158} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 1
\textsuperscript{159} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 46
\textsuperscript{160} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 10f
\textsuperscript{161} Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1989, p. 10
\textsuperscript{162} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 12
\textsuperscript{163} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 203
There were other signs of a deepening relationship between the two countries. Austrian-Hungarian relations also registered an increase in export and import of goods in 1988. Exports increased by 3% (6.8 bn. öS\textsuperscript{164}) compared to 1987 figures and imports increased by 3.1% (6.4 bn. öS).\textsuperscript{165} The increase in trade on both sides was positively affected by the easing of regulations for the movement of Hungarians.\textsuperscript{166} However, as early as in 1979, a bilateral agreement between Austria and Hungary had come into force that allowed the citizens of both countries to travel to the other country without a visa. This agreement was intended to strengthen the friendly ties between the neighbors.\textsuperscript{167}

As far as Austria’s security policy in 1988 is concerned, much of its focus was on disarmament. The Annual Report of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1988 stated that the policy of disarmament was a tool to bring stability to a situation and was necessary in order to achieve peaceful order.\textsuperscript{168} As for nuclear threats in a war, it stated that war stopped being the mean of achieving a political aim. The Yearbook further elaborated that “armed forces and weaponry serve the prevention of war and not the implementation of political aims.”\textsuperscript{169} This interpretation stands in contrast to what Carl von Clausewitz described in his book \textit{On War}. He argued that “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means.”\textsuperscript{170} However the published interpretation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1988 seemed to be more applicable for this specific time, and in accordance with the understanding of the magnitude of a nuclear war. A war in which its weaponry has the ability to extinguish human kind simply cannot be a \textit{continuation of politics}. This was a simple, but very solid reason, why Austria put most of its political strength into the discussion of disarmament.

\textsuperscript{164} öS (österreichische Schilling) was Austria’s currency until the Euro was introduced in 2002.

\textsuperscript{165} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 606

\textsuperscript{166} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 8

\textsuperscript{167} Visa regulations
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005454&ShowPrintPreview=True

\textsuperscript{168} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 67

\textsuperscript{169} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 67

\textsuperscript{170} Clausewitz 2009, p. 22
For that reason, Austria also applied to become a member of the Conference of Disarmament, where it so far only had observer status.\textsuperscript{171} Austria also suggested hosting an international agency in Vienna. This agency was intended to control and observe agreements on chemical weapons as a counterpart to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).\textsuperscript{172} Austria also supported a comprehensive nuclear test ban, in order to complicate and prevent the further development of these types of weapons.\textsuperscript{173} These are just examples intended to emphasize Austria’s dedication to actively supporting the process of disarmament, and to highlight its positive input into the developments.\textsuperscript{174}

The numbers of refugees coming from Hungary seeking asylum in Austria, increased significantly in the first four months of 1988, as did the number of refugees from Poland. As a consequence, the Ministry of the Interior sped up the process for asylum seekers considerably. A total of 15,790 refugees came to Austria during that period: 6,670 came from Poland, 2,610 from Hungary and 2,314 from Romania. Only 6,718 cases could be closed, but only 1,785 people were approved as refugees. No more than 55 Hungarians (2.11\% of Hungarians coming to Austria) were granted the status of refugees according to the Geneva Refugee Convention.\textsuperscript{175}

Later on, in the part that is dedicated to the topic of Security Studies, it will be argued that migration can very much put a state’s security at risk. A great number of unexpected migrants can influence a state’s perception of its security. Migration is viewed as a non-traditional threat compared to coercive diplomacy or military threat. It was integrated into the concept of Security Studies after the Cold War as a non-traditional security threat.

In 1988, no specific focus on Austria’s security policy towards Hungary could be found. Most of the international developments were dominated by concerns about what the USA and the

\textsuperscript{171} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 73f

\textsuperscript{172} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 75

\textsuperscript{173} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 78

\textsuperscript{174} The OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) took up its work in 1997 and is located in The Hague/The Netherlands. The CTBTO (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) was established also in 1997, but is located in Vienna.

\textsuperscript{175} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 376
USSR were doing or were about to do. The relationship in this year was all about the common application for the world exhibition and focused more (as the Austrian policy intended to) on this common project than on differences.

### 3.2.2 1989 – Annus Mirabilis

The events that took place in 1989, how Austria adapted to these circumstances, and what challenges lay within Austria’s security policy, will be discussed in this section. The analysis is being done from the Ministry for Foreign Affair’s point of view and also forms the center of my focus on the Austrian-Hungarian relation. What has been discussed so far on this matter was done in order to build up better understanding of this *Annus Mirabilis*\(^\text{176}\) in particular, and to be able to see how deep and developed the relationship was, which direction it was heading, and how the necessary adjustments were handled.

In 1989, Austria was confronted with a completely altered global situation, a situation that had changed virtually overnight. The state was therefore challenged to adapt to this new situation fairly quickly. Peaceful revolutions\(^\text{177}\) in the countries under Soviet influence overthrew their governments, and pluralistic and democratic systems started to develop; Moscow did not struck back with military force, as it did in Hungary in 1956 and in Prague in 1968. These new states started their very own and independent systems.

Even for Mock, things came as a big surprise. He had been interested in Eastern Europe for a long time at that point, but the Foreign Minister was at least as astonished by the turn of events as many of his colleagues in Europe and the rest of the world were.\(^\text{178}\)

Even for Mock, things came as a big surprise. By that point he had been interested in Eastern Europe for some time, but the Foreign Minister was as astonished by the turn of events as many of his colleagues in Europe and the rest of the world were.\(^\text{179}\) Mock described the

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\(^{176}\) *Annus Mirabilis* is a term used by Martin Eichtinger for the historic year of 1989 in both articles and the biography about Mock he published with Wohnout in 2008.

\(^{177}\) The only country, in which the revolution did not pass by peacefully, was Romania. It was, though, the only bloody system change at this point in time.

\(^{178}\) Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 191

\(^{179}\) Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 191
changes in Eastern Europe in the preface of the Annual Report of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as historic. He stated that the lines and borders, which were drawn in Yalta in 1945, were finally erased. At the same time, Mock was well aware of the fact that these young democracies had not acquired enough strength at that point in time to actually be self-sufficient and depended on the West to assist them with their newfound freedom.\textsuperscript{180}

This support, he wrote, formed one of the cornerstones of Austria’s reaction to the tremendous developments in 1989. The Foreign Ministry was also aware of the fact that the coming adjustments towards democracy and independence would carry numerous problems along with them; therefore, the need to integrate the new states into a common European peaceful order was seen as essential.\textsuperscript{181} In short, sustaining the security at home by supporting the new developments with all possible means abroad was part of the ministry’s strategy.

Austria found itself in a new position due to its very good relations based on history and its previous engagement in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It took over the role as an interceder in the Western world and in Western institutions after 1989. The ministry also introduced an innovative idea to ease the entrance of these new democracies into organizations like the Council of Europe or EFTA. In addition to that, Austria lobbied in Western European states to open up their markets for Eastern European goods.\textsuperscript{182} Hungary, actually, became the first former Warsaw Pact member to apply for a full membership in the Council of Europe in November 1989.\textsuperscript{183}

One effect of the change in East-West circumstances in 1989 that has not been mentioned so far was the rapidly increasing number of people leaving the East. The restrictions by the Eastern Bloc for traveling to the West were eased, and many people took advantage of this and left their homes behind for potentially better circumstances in the West. The number of people seeking asylum in 1989 peaked an all time high at 21,882 people (15,790 in 1988).\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{180} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. XI

\textsuperscript{181} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 2

\textsuperscript{182} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 5

\textsuperscript{183} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 76

\textsuperscript{184} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 430f
Although most of them did not qualify as refugees as defined by the Geneva Refugee Convention; in Hungary for example, only 31 applicants out of 364 were granted asylum in 1989. In most cases, the migrants left their homes for economic reasons and not because they were afraid or victims of prosecution.\footnote{Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 427} Therefore, it was seen as a necessity to react to these new challenges by opening up new ways of immigration, in accordance with the circumstances of the affected countries.\footnote{Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 429}

The rising number of people migrating and seeking asylum was not viewed as a threat at that time though and one of the major concerns was the challenge of the system itself. It was designed to only serve a certain number of people, and not the influx it suddenly had to deal with. It also meant that an increase of money was spent in order to keep the system running and, more importantly, sustaining the care of refugees and asylum seekers.\footnote{Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 431}

In June 1989, one photo made its way around the world. It captured the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alois Mock, and his Hungarian colleague, Gyula Horn, cutting through the barbed wires of the Iron Curtain at their border together.\footnote{See picture of Mock and Horn meeting at the border under Appendix 7.1.} Their act of ‘removing’ the Iron Curtain was symbolic of the destruction of the boundaries between these two countries. It signaled to the world the removal of the boundaries between the East and West. This day, 27 June 1989, is seen as symbolic of Eastern Europe’s liberation from communism\footnote{Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 192}, although the actual deconstruction of the Iron Curtain began much earlier, on 2 May 1989 and by the end of June it was even difficult to find a part of the Iron Curtain that was still intact and could be used for a photo.\footnote{Oplatka 2009, p. 105f}

In addition to the symbolic act at the Austrian-Hungarian border\footnote{Alois Mock met with his Czechoslovakian colleague, Jiří Dienstbier, at the border of Austria and Czechoslovakia on 17 December 1989, to repeat the act that two politicians from countries with different} several measures were taken in 1989 on behalf of the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The ministry’s focus lay
in the common interest to sustain peace and support the new political and societal systems in their development. By doing so, Austria, and its officials, hoped that the new democracies would not regress into some kind of regime or become unstable systems and it was these concerns that were a constant threat for Austria and Europe.

On 9 November 1989, Mock gave a speech in the Austrian Parliament, in which he presented the “current developments in Easter Europe and the support to these reform processes given by Austria.” In this speech he informed Parliament about the new developments and gave the Members of Parliament an update on the current situation in the East. In addition, he presented findings of how Austria, represented through his ministry, planned to address the current conditions. Mock, once again, pointed out Austria’s importance in this situation, which was determined by its history, its geographical location, and that providing aid for these countries was of vital interest to maintaining the country’s own security. Before Mock proposed a course of action, he pointed out the importance of economic support for the reform process and described how Austria would give financial support based on bilateral relations. In addition to that, Austria would also provide financial support together with other European countries under the coordination of the European Commission.

The following points constitute the course of action the main focus of Austria, as presented by the Minister in his speech on 9 November 1989. First, he listed the endorsement of agricultural infrastructure in Poland, and added the importance of vocational and management training. Mock continued by pointing out that he was asked to encourage Austrian companies to engage in joint-ventures in the area of tourism. Another focus was set

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192 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 197

193 The very same day, 9 November 1989, is the day the Berlin Wall fell. Confusions led to the statement of a spokesperson for the SED Politburo that East Germans were immediately allowed to cross the border to West Germany. Soon East Germans started gathering at the check points and demanded to be let through. The soldiers were not able to hold the crowned back and in the late hours of 9 November the first East Germans went to the other side of the Wall, where they were welcomed by the West Germans.

194 Compare: Stenographisches Protokoll, XVII. GP, 117. Sitzung 1989
on promoting investments; agreements with Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia had already been made and more of these were planned with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The fifth point he made concerned financial aid for Poland in terms of debt conversion. In his sixth point he spoke about the ease of market access for the new democracies, and explained that Hungary had already been granted this access. This meant a reduction of customs; he noted that Poland should be given the same status. His seventh suggestion was dedicated to the protection of the environment. The Minister pointed out that the fine expertise Austria had in this field would open up new possibilities of cooperation, which should also be supported with financial aid. Mock concluded by explaining that closer scientific, technological and cultural collaboration could bring a great benefit for everyone involved in that project. In accordance with this last remark, Mock also mentioned the development of cultural institutes, which could help to improve the understanding for Austria in Eastern Europe.195

Many of the measures that Mock presented in this speech were not carried out by the ministry itself. A number of them were handled in collaboration with the aid that was under the European Commission’s coordination. This aid was mainly dedicated to benefit Poland and Hungary. Austria’s share was primarily focused on food supply, educational training and trade improvements among others.196

Mock also mentioned the eased custom regulations between Hungary and Austria in his speech. The positive effects of these became visible in the increase of trade between the two countries. Austrian exports increased by 27.1% in 1989 compared to 1988 and imports from Hungary increased by 23.1%.197 In comparison to other countries, Hungary had the highest import rate to Austria, followed by increases of 11.3%,198 in Czechoslovakia 6.7%.199

195 Stenographisches Protokoll, XVII. GP, 117. Sitzung 1989

196 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 63f

197 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 643

198 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 636

199 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 613
in Romania and 2.7% in Poland. Austria’s export rate to Hungary was only second highest after Poland (+40.7%).

The actions that are described in the following paragraphs are not a complete representation of every measure that was carried out at that point in time, but does include the Quadragonale, new Austrian representations in the Eastern countries, Austrian libraries and the engagement in education. These actions provide a better understanding of how much Austria was involved in that field. In addition, it demonstrates how great its interest was to provide aid to the new democracies.

Quadragonale

The Quadragonale, also known as the Initiative of Four, was established on 11 November 1989 as an informal forum by Italy, Austria, Hungary and the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Budapest. In March 1989, the groundwork for the initiative was laid by Mock and the Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister, Péter Medgyessy. After the Quadragonale incorporated Czechoslovakia in its circle, it renamed itself and was called Pentagonale for some time. Today the forum is known as the Central European Initiative (CEI). In 2009, the CEI stated that the foundation of the Quadragonale had a double objective. One was political, and the other one was economic. The political goal was to “give a clear sign of overcoming the division in blocks.” The economic objective was a “gradual homogenization of the socio-economic structure of the member countries.”

In the Yearbook of 1989 another ambitious goal can be found, namely, that its cooperation should form an opportunity of newfound quality in relations among European states.

The Quadragonale started its collaboration between the four founding countries with no organizational structure and without a codified base. This was representative of its informal and pragmatic character. Projects which the designated working groups of the initiative

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200 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 611

201 Eichtinger http://www.oep.at/download/gratulation/Gratulation_eichtinger.pdf


203 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 10

204 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 203
were to deal with in 1989 included transport, telecommunication and information, environmental protection, cultural collaboration and the collaboration of small and medium-sized enterprises.\textsuperscript{205} The Quadragonale attracted other countries as well and began to expand. Today the CEI has eighteen active members and after an institutional transformation it is now a project oriented organization.\textsuperscript{206}

Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland also started a separate collaboration in the Visegrád Group (also referred to as V4 after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993). The group was founded in 1991, “to regain full sovereignty, remove the last traces of totalitarianism, create viable democratic structures and a working market economy and make coordinated steps towards their integration into European organizations.”\textsuperscript{207}

**New Austrian Representations**

In the developing democracies in the East, new Austrian representations were opening up. This was done in order to pay tribute to the already existing good relations, and to forge an improvement of these.\textsuperscript{208} By doing so, Austria ensured it would not miss out on having a very good basis of understanding with the new states right from the very beginning.

**Austrian Libraries**

As already mentioned, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had a significant amount of interest in increasing the appreciation of each other’s cultures. Culture and history were elements often seen as common denominators between Austria, its neighbors and other states that were previously under Soviet influence, therefore, the Austrian libraries project was strongly encouraged. The concept had been launched earlier, but was enlarged after the revolutions in 1989. The new libraries were dedicated to offering books by Austrian authors. A lot of these books were banned due to censorship during the regime in the Eastern Bloc.\textsuperscript{209} The

\textsuperscript{205} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 10

\textsuperscript{206} CEI http://www.ceinet.org/content/about-us

\textsuperscript{207} Luif 2010, p. 99

\textsuperscript{208} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 198

\textsuperscript{209} Eichtinger 1996, p. 106f
libraries also provided copies of books in their native German language. Today, 53 of these Austrian libraries, which were of significant interest to Alois Mock, are still in existence.\textsuperscript{210}

**Austrian Engagement in Education**

In order to increase cultural understanding of the country, not only were Austrian libraries established, but also Austrian schools and kindergartens. However, they were not founded right away in 1989 as the realization of such projects takes time and careful planning, but by 1990, an Austrian High School in Budapest began teaching.\textsuperscript{211} Only one year later a school opened its gates to pupils in Prague.\textsuperscript{212} In addition to that, Austrian teachers were sent to teach in schools in Central and Eastern Europe. As a former Minister of Education it is expected that Mock would be interested in positive developments in this field.\textsuperscript{213}

As stated earlier, support for the development towards new and functioning democracies in the East and especially in the neighboring countries, were of major interest for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the examples provided illustrate Austria’s interest. They also indicate the fast pace with which Austria reacted to the new situation. It was not passive, waiting for change, but became a very active player in the process and participated in it with as many activities as possible. Informal gatherings and the foundation of the CEI demonstrated Austria’s ability to adapt. In addition to that, the idea to support the education of people in the new democracies by both opening up schools and sending well trained teachers to these countries, was not only a noble, but also a strategic and intelligent course to pursue; the necessity of well educated citizens was seen and supported, not only through educational institutions, but through access to books in the Austrian libraries.

As for Austria’s security, 1989 was definitely a change, but the reactions to the changes were not as much of a discontinuation as one would expect. Relations were intensified and the fields of cooperation were extended. From today’s point of view one could argue whether there had been a better way of dealing with this situation or not. It is also clear today,

\textsuperscript{210} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 198
\textsuperscript{211} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 199
\textsuperscript{212} Eichtinger 1996, p. 108
\textsuperscript{213} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 199
though, that Austria’s security had not been seriously threatened at any time during or after the reform process in 1989. Even later, Austria did not experience a real threat by the new countries. It is clear that the provided support for the new democracies was a positive reaction to the developments.

In regard to relations between Austria and Hungary, as mentioned earlier the conception of the CEI was launched by Mock and Medgyessy together. Even though the CEI is still active today, the Visegrád group is more significant to Hungary. It is said that Mock was especially attracted to support initiatives, which were examples of the democratic Western sphere, and helped to undermine the communist regime in Eastern Europe. 214

A number of the engagements mentioned previously were pursued because of Alois Mock’s personal commitment and his dedication to the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. It was also important to give them a real chance to catch up to advances in Western Europe. Eichtinger, Mock’s personal assistant for several years, wrote in his speech that was given in honor of Mock’s 70th birthday, that his boss often referred to his mentor Josef Klaus in that context. Klaus, in front of the Council of Europe in 1965, was quoted to have said that the architects of the House of Europe cannot forget that this house actually, next to a façade and a west wing, must have an east wing.215

3.2.3 The years following the Annus Mirabilis

In 1990, the first consequences of economic mismanagement of former Soviet influence became obvious; the impact that the centrally planned economy had on these countries was disastrous. Not only was the socio-political backwardness visible and needed to get closer to Western standards, 216 but as Mock noted in the preface of the 1990 Annual Report, the need for their economies to catch up was undeniable.

Of the former Soviet countries Hungary, Poland and later on Czechoslovakia performed best in the process of adapting to systemic changes after the 1989 revolution. Hungary held

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214 Eichtinger 1996, p. 117


216 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. XI
parliamentary elections on 25 March and 8 April 1990 and in November it became the first permanent member in the Council of Europe. At this early stage in its newfound independence, a full membership in the European Community was an explicit goal of Hungarian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{217} Hungary was often referred to as a model of a successful and fast systemic change.

Austria and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs continued to be involved in the bilateral and multilateral initiatives that were formed in 1989. The main focus of aid was multilateral support. This support was diverse, covering humanitarian assistance, technical support and additional financial aid and included consultation and a range of educational endowments.\textsuperscript{218} The list of support offered by Austria to the new democracies is extensive and could be continued, however it is not the intention of this thesis to provide a full accounting of what assistance was supplied, but rather to indicate the level of commitment the country had towards the successful democratization of the former Soviet states. In addition to this, Austria continued, and extended its bilateral engagements, discussed previously.

Austria was also involved on multilateral basis. It participated in a number of actions among the G-24 and the CEI (at this point known as Pentagonale). The G-24 was a group put together by the members of the EC, EFTA as well as the USA, Canada, Japan, Turkey, Australia and New Zealand. The G-24 provided financial and economic aid under the European Commission’s coordination. In the beginning the idea was to assist Poland and Hungary in particular, but soon the Group’s work was extended to other reforming countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Funding, though, was only distributed when strict criteria were met: the recipient country must have taken action to convert their economy to a free market system, in addition to adopting actions towards converting its political systems in terms of pluralistic democracies, rule of law and respect of human rights.\textsuperscript{219} The support of the G-24 was coordinated with other institutions and groups (World Bank, IMF, OSCE, Council of Europe, Economic Commission for Europe, IEA and Paris Club) in order to avoid

\textsuperscript{217} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 34

\textsuperscript{218} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 45

\textsuperscript{219} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 36
duplicated actions. The G-24’s engagement was based on three different levels. The first one, the major point of interest, was direct support of the economic transformation process in the recipient countries. It was followed by measures of technical nature concerning food and agriculture and concluded with the coordination between reforming countries, the IMF and other international financial institutes. Austria’s share of aid money within the G-24 was 3.7% in 1990 out of its total.

In 1990, Poland had also declared an interest in a membership to the CEI, however its initial interest was informal and the country was not able to join until the summer of 1991. Also in 1990, it began to function on a working group basis. In addition to the existing groups, new projects (such as energy, tourism and migration problems) were added to the work load of the group.

As noted earlier, after the revolutions in 1989 the unexpected and increasing numbers of migrants seeking better opportunities abroad became a progressively more urgent matter that needed to be dealt with immediately. In 1990, a total of 22,789 migrants had entered Austria, although on the positive side the number of asylum seekers from Hungary (44) and Poland (132) had decreased. In accordance with the political changes, even less were actually granted asylum (Hungary: 0, Poland: 1). Most of the refugees were either from Romania, or from other developing countries. Due to the rising number from Romania, visas were reintroduced for Romanians although visas had not been necessary since 1969. However, this reintroduction caused many Romanians to migrate to Austria illegally via Hungary where they did not require a visa. To gain better control over the situation, surveillance began at the Hungarian border, with the assistance of the Austrian army. Visas were also reintroduced for citizens from Poland and the Soviet Union as it had become

220 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 36f
221 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 37
222 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 44
223 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 125
224 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 422
225 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 424
226 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 427
obvious that the number of immigrants from those countries increased. Neither state had been able to successfully start the process of democratization; additionally, the economic situation had not improved (e.g. Romania). Others that had introduced these elements (Hungary and Czechoslovakia) had an enormous amount of people traveling to Austria, but these always returned back home. They had a place that was worth going back to as their home country provided them with options and opportunities.

In its Report the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, therefore recommended that the cooperation between the Western and Eastern countries had to increase in regard to economic and technical aid. In addition to that, the process of democratization required support. Arguably, people from democracies with stable economies would not feel the need to leave their homes and immigrate illegally to Western Europe. The ministry also argued that international standards for asylum procedures should be introduced. This would provide a balanced refugee policy among the effect states. A common policy on migration for immigrants from the East was seen as a possible long term solution to successfully deal with this matter.

Most of the new democracies held elections after the *Annus Mirabilis*. The democratic and pluralistic systems settled and strengthened themselves. The Ministry for Foreign Affair’s policy followed the ideas that were started earlier with great intensity. As in the years before, bilateral help was provided as well as multilateral.

The aid and measures were taken to a higher level of organization in 1991. The economic backwardness that became obvious in Central- and Eastern European countries was still striking. Consequently, most of the support was provided to prevent the development of a “Counter-Europe” in the East. An area of economic misery and political instability could also have enormous and negative consequences for Western Europe. The standard of living sank as a result of the underdeveloped economies and this led to the increase of migrants. In its 1991 Yearbook the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, published a list of reasons, why it was of

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227 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 429
228 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 433
229 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 433f
230 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1991, p. 3
such great importance to Austria that the East was provided with a substantial amount of aid. This list included: the return of investments (the markets in the East were seen as very promising, once they were to catch up with the West), environment (nuclear power plants were particularly seen as a threat), and migration movements (economic help had to lead to a rise of the standard of living so people in these countries were given a real opportunities). The list concluded by noting the democratic and humanitarian aspect (engagement of the West would have the effect that people started believing in common moral values such as freedom, democracy and social balance rather than doubting these values when they felt excluded by a society that was built upon these values).²³¹

In terms of Hungary’s relationship with Austria, the new democracy became one of the most important partners from both a political and economic perspective in 1991. After the Federal Republic of Germany Austria was Hungary’s most significant commercial partner. Hungary was also Austria’s major partner among the former members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). On the political side, numerous visits from Hungarian officials to Austria and vice versa nourished relations between the countries. Additional check points at the border also permitted an increase in bilateral border crossings.²³² In 1991, Hungary was also able to move towards increased cooperation with the West when it signed, an Association Agreement with the EC on 16 December 1991, along with Poland and Czechoslovakia.²³³ This Agreement came in force on 1 February 1994, and covered “trade-related issues, political dialogue, legal approximation and other areas of co-operation, including industry, environment, transport and customs and aims at progressively establishing a free-trade area between the EU and Hungary.”²³⁴

The process that started in 1991 continued in 1992, however it was a shift in the importance of issues that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had to deal with. A shift that was, not surprisingly, in favor of the EC integration process of Austria, and away from other issues. In

²³¹ Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 106f
²³² Außenpolitischer Bericht 1991, p. 698f
²³³ Außenpolitischer Bericht 1991, p. 85
²³⁴ Hungary EU Relations
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eu10/hungary/index_en.htm#Overview of key documents related to enlargement
1989 the foundation of new democracies in Eastern Europe was the priority. Democratization and the development of free market economy structures were the dominating factors in 1990. But in 1992, the focus of Austria’s attention was dedicated to the membership negotiations with the EC. Not only does the index in the Yearbooks of the ministry indicate this shift, it is also visible in the size that is dedicated to either topic. Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe in 1992 was still a major concern. It was seen as Austria’s duty to be engaged in these new democracies in order to integrate them in a free market world economy and to secure social peace. Nevertheless, the membership negotiations also required significant resources.\textsuperscript{235}

Austria’s engagement was not something broadly discussed; it was obvious that the assistance, which had started some years ago, continued more or less by itself. The main interest was in neighboring countries and over time an interdependent neighborhood policy was created.\textsuperscript{236} Therefore, the areas Austria had been engaged in since 1989 were still pursued. Out of these, Hungary always stood out whether portrayed as a successful transformation from a communist regime into a country with a functional pluralistic democracy, or as a working economy after introducing free market values. This might also be a major reason why Austrian politicians never got tired of mentioning the relations Austria had with this model country; as it saw itself being in large part responsible for Hungary’s success.

In 1992 a reduction of the number of asylum seekers was registered for the first time. It is incorrect to say that migration in total was less than the years before, as only the number of asylum seekers had decreased (to 16,238).\textsuperscript{237} Instead, the number of refugees fleeing from the Balkans increased dramatically. Due to the tragic conflict that began there in 1991, 66,500 refugees\textsuperscript{238} from the area fled to Austria.\textsuperscript{239} Austria was still convinced that Western

\textsuperscript{235} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. 14

\textsuperscript{236} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. 182

\textsuperscript{237} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. 492

\textsuperscript{238} This group of people also made up the majority of asylum seekers in 1992, with a total number of 7,410 people.

\textsuperscript{239} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. 493
Europe had to deal with the matter of refugees on a common basis and saw a need to harmonize the right of asylum on formal and material base. This was interpreted as a necessity in order to be able to act more efficiently on the matter. Only then would small country like Austria be able to adequately address the problem presented by asylum seekers and refugees.  

In the years from 1993 to 1995, the decline of importance that once was focused on the Central- and Eastern European region was again visible. Nevertheless, the Austrian engagement in this region was never questioned. The aid was supported by the idea of international solidarity and also by the conviction that it was a major component of Austrian Foreign policy and one of Austria’s neighborhood policies in particular.

The transformation process the neighboring countries had to go through was not seen as finished, but rather as an ongoing development. The past years also brought a different understanding of what neighborhood policy was. Before 1989, it was a policy that identified the relationship between two different political blocs and covered cooperation on all levels, including collaboration between different national governments, parliaments, interest groups and so on.

In 1993, a reorganization of aid, provided by the G-24, began. One year earlier, in 1992, first critical voices started to voice concerns about international aid that had been started by the global community (e.g. G-24). They called them insufficient and that these engagements were not thought through. However, the aid continued and in 1993 the G-24 decided to only meet at the foreign minister level if it was truly necessary, whereas previously they met at least once a year. In accordance with this development, several working groups broke up, and the number of meetings below the level of foreign ministers declined. Instead, meetings were held in the new democracies so they would feel responsible for their own development. Until 1995, working groups continued to disband; the process that started...

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240 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. 492
241 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. 163
242 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. XIII
243 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. 15
244 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. 158f
in 1989 was still pursued, but was significantly reduced. In the period from 1990 to 1994 Austria provided 5.04% of the total aid that was given by the G-24,\textsuperscript{245} which is a rather high percentage compared to Austria's size.

The CEI started attracting more and more members to its group. For Central- and Eastern European countries it presented an attractive alternative to the EU, to which membership at this point was out of reach. Besides EU membership another organization that offered the possibility of tight cooperation with Western Europe was the Council of Europe.\textsuperscript{246} The CEI was still based on working groups, which continued their work as intended in 1989. Only their fields of action had expanded over the years. After Austria became a member of the EU, the CEI also became an instrument to coordinate activities between CEI members and the European Commission, especially during the Eastern Enlargement of the EU.\textsuperscript{247}

By 1992, the number of asylum seekers had dropped. It hit an all time low during Alois Mock’s time in office in 1993, with a total of 4,744\textsuperscript{248} and only increased a little\textsuperscript{249} in the following years (1994: 5,082, 1995: 5,920).\textsuperscript{250} These numbers, though, should not create the impression that the problem concerning asylum seekers, refugees and migrants was solved. In the contemporary context, a workable, mutually agreeable solution in the EU has not yet been worked out, with the lack of cooperation from the member states forming a significant part of the problem. However, Mock persistently tried to find a solution at the EU level.

According to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, bilateral cooperation with Eastern European countries was going to be focused on only a few of countries (including Albania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Czech Republic). In addition to that,
Austria would focus on different fields, which included the following sectors: economy, energy, small and medium-sized companies, work and civil service.\footnote{Außenpolitischer Bericht 1995, p. 136}

Despite the changes, Hungary remained one of the countries that received Austrian aid and this again demonstrates the bond between the neighboring countries. In the last two and a half years of Mock’s time in office, Austria further enhanced its relations with Hungary. It did so with the *Auslandskulturpolitik* (International Cultural Policy). *Auslandskulturpolitik* was a tool of Austrian foreign policy that promoted Austrian culture in other countries that would theoretically bring the country closer to the international community.\footnote{Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 222} Because of this, *Auslandskulturpolitik* activities expanded in Central- and Eastern Europe after the system changes.

These enhanced activities were also seen as a support for these countries to some degree. They only had limited budgets, and often suffered from nonexistent infrastructure that could not support culture and science. So it was the Ministry for Foreign Affair’s ambitious goal to reinstate old ties, based on the exchange of art, literature and theater, film, science, research and technology, as well as education and sport. Some of the actions mentioned earlier, such as Austrian libraries and also teacher exchanges fall under the category of *Auslandskulturpolitik*. Also in this context the relationship between Austria and Hungary was a special one. The Austrian schools that opened up in Budapest after 1989 became very well known for good education; as well, until the negative referendum the work on the application for the world exhibition, which Austria had pursued, could also be seen as a part of the *Auslandskulturpolitik*.

### 3.3 Summary
In conclusion the relationship that Austria had with Hungary, represented by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, can be described as a rather good one. This can also be said for Austria’s other neighbors, including the Soviet Union and Poland. As discussed in this chapter, the nature of the relationship between these countries was very much based on the common history many of the countries shared, particularly Hungary and Austria. Another positive
consequence was that Austria continually pursued the goal of mutual wellbeing and never let Hungary and others down; throughout the post-World War II period, including the changes after 1945 (the change of the political systems and the redrawing of borders), it maintained a fundamental relationship. During this period Austria’s neutrality was a great advantage as the Republic was free to associate with any member of the bloc, an opportunity it made use of.

Also during and after 1989, and the Annus Mirabilis, Austria became very active once again. Alois Mock contributed a lot to these successful changes. He pursued the idea to guide the new democracies to a point of no return, where regressing back into communism, or any other form of an undemocratic system, would no longer be thinkable. Mock himself was devoted to promoting the development of democratic and pluralistic political systems in these new countries. For him these were big steps towards stabilizing the countries and bringing a previously unimagined form of security to Europe, and the world.

This was the key reason why Mock supported the involvement of the new democracies with European institutions and organizations such as the EC and the Council of Europe, and why he launched the CEI with colleagues in neighboring countries. Mock was quoted as saying that he saw being an honest broker of membership of the states of Central- and Eastern Europe to the European Union as his life-task.

Alois Mock was also personally very devoted to supporting the changes. In fact, before the events in 1989, he made a point of meeting with dissidents whenever he was on an official state visit. In July 1987, for example, he visited Prague. Based on Mock’s request, a meeting with Václav Havel was organized. Mock was the first Foreign Minister ever to ask for such a meeting. Although the meeting never made it on the official schedule, he nevertheless was the first in a series to meet with a dissident, and it soon became a kind of a ritual for him as

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253 Compare: Stenographisches Protokoll, XVII. GP, 134. Sitzung 1990

254 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. XI

255 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. XIII

256 Eichtinger 1996, p. 119
well as for other official visitors to meet with dissidents.\textsuperscript{257} His habit of meeting with dissidents was not done solely for personal interest; by doing so he was paying tribute to the dissidents’ work.\textsuperscript{258} He wanted to give a sign to those people – a sign that intended to say, you have not been forgotten by the ‘free western world’\textsuperscript{259}

The peaceful engagements, that Austria was involved in after 1989, can be seen as a respectful way of treating and supporting the new partners. Along the way they were never seen as a threat and were treated as such. Everything that happened was on a friendly, diplomatic basis, which can be seen in the cooperation with Hungary, as laid out in this chapter. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was never afraid of any kind of military threat, and did not take a single action that indicated the use of its own military means. This indicates how deep the relations with Hungary were, as well as how much the countries trusted each other; otherwise a meeting of Mock and Horn, to take down the Iron Curtain, might not have been possible.

Alois Mock’s engagement in this region, in supporting the process of democratization, added tremendously to Austria’s credit.\textsuperscript{260} Also the new start in these relationships, which were very much formed by Mock’s principals and visions, made him become one of the most distinguished politicians in Austria’s post-war history in the eyes of his country’s citizens.\textsuperscript{261} How much Mock’s personality, his character and his personal devotion concerning that issue were relevant, is a very interesting question indeed. In addition to that, it would be interesting to analyze whether the same outcome could have been achieved if another person with a different attitude and different point of view were in the position of Mock. But this question cannot be answered shortly and would require a different discussion.

\textsuperscript{257} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 191

\textsuperscript{258} Another example for such a meeting is the informal meeting with the Soviet Union’s most famous dissident Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov in Moscow in September 1988.

\textsuperscript{259} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 192

\textsuperscript{260} Eichtinger 1996, p. 119

\textsuperscript{261} Eichtinger 1996, p. 121
4. The Quest for European Union Membership

Here I highlight Austria’s approach to becoming a full member of the European Union, and its relationship with the European Community. Some people argue that Austria gaining EU membership was Mock’s passion, and a goal, finally realized in 1995, that he had worked towards the entire time he was in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs.\(^{262}\) This is the accomplishment that he remains best known for and will always be connected with and it is difficult to discuss Austria’s foreign policy during Mock’s time in office without referring to his role in the negotiations. In fact, *Mister Europe* is the hard earned nickname that he was given after the EU membership negotiations were concluded.

4.1 It all began with the ECSC...

The development from the beginning of the European Union up to the time when Austria became a permanent member in 1995 is not particularly significant to this thesis, however, a short outline will be given to provide context to some of the events.

What began in 1950 as a vision presented by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, was in part realized with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. At the time coal and steel were necessary elements of the warfare industry. The agreement between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands was intended to facilitate the scrutiny of each other’s production of these materials. The ECSC’s original raison d’être was to prevent another disaster such as World War II in Europe by monitoring each other’s economic activities. This foundation of mutual trust, a basic feature of the ECSC, also allowed further for developments. These included the 1957 signing of the Treaties of Rome (establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community), by the six countries, which came into force in 1958. The enthusiastic early years, were defined by change and the willingness to cooperate closely, was previously unimagined; however it was followed by a period of stagnation. The 1965 *empty chair*

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crisis\textsuperscript{263} signaled an all time low in cooperation, but was resolved by the 1966 Luxembourg compromise.\textsuperscript{264}

Over the next twenty years significant changes took place including several rounds of enlargement (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom followed in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986). In 1979, the citizens of the member countries, for the first time, were asked to elect the Members of the European Parliament. However, it was not until 1987, that the Single European Act (SEA) came into force and brought with it widespread reform. In fact, the SEA can be seen as the groundwork for even deeper integration in the early 1990s.

In 1991/1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed and came into force in 1993. Also known as the Treaty on European Union, it was considered the most important step in European integration after the creation of the three Communities in 1952/58. Thus the European Union, with its much discussed three pillar structure, was established. This was also the status quo when Austria became a member of the Union along with Finland and Sweden in 1995.\textsuperscript{265}

One has to keep in mind Austria’s political situation when the first steps of European integration were made in the early 1950s. Austria still had not regained full sovereignty since the Second World War. Even after 1955, with the signing of the State Treaty, membership seemed far out of Austria’s reach.\textsuperscript{266} This was due to the obligation created by Austria’s neutrality status. Membership in the European project was seen as incompatible with neutrality and, therefore, the foundation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was much more feasible, as it was seen as compatible with Austria’s neutrality. This was due

\textsuperscript{263} Charles De Gaulle (French President) withdrew his ministers in 1965 from the Council of Ministers after he saw national and especially French interests threatened. The compromise (Luxembourg compromise) that solved this conflict granted France and any other EC member to veto any decision when ultimate national interests were under threat.

\textsuperscript{264} Wessels 2008, p. 73

\textsuperscript{265} Norway applied twice for EU membership however, Norwegian citizens rejected membership in both 1972 and 1994.

\textsuperscript{266} The State Treaty was signed among the Austrian government and the Allied occupying powers France, the United Kingdom, the USA and the Soviet Union. After it came in force on 27 July 1955, Austria was again a free, sovereign and democratic country.
to it being a looser organization compared to the EC. Austria was a founding member of EFTA and this role helped the country to develop skills which were later useful in negotiating with the EC, particularly when these two organizations expressed mutual interest in cooperation. For that reason, it is important to first take a closer look at the development of EFTA before one can discuss the issue that developed during Alois Mock’s first term in office – membership in the European Community.

4.2 The European Free Trade Association
The EFTA was established in 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. As the organization states on its website, the foundation of EFTA was seen as a counterpart to the newly founded EEC, “as an economic counterbalance to the more politically driven EEC.”267 It was also argued that “[c]ompared to the EEC, EFTA was a much looser organization based on a free trade area and not on a customs union.”268 Since three out of the seven founding members were neutral countries, and as such either could not or were not interested in giving away any of their political sovereignty. Even though Austria thought about full membership to the ECSC at this point in time, it strongly believed that the signatory states of the State Treaty of 1955 (especially the Soviet Union) would not allow such a membership. It was considered that they would see it as incompatible with the neutrality status. EFTA membership was, therefore, a welcomed opportunity to save what was left to save and to avoid trade discrimination of non EEC states.269

Strengthening of economic activity, assurance of full employment, increase of productivity, rational exploitation of resources, financial stability, and improvement of the standard of living, as well as fair competition and elimination of trade restrictions were among the goals defined by the founding treaty, which was signed on 4 January 1960.270 With some EFTA

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267 EFTA I http://www.efta.int/about-efta/the-european-free-trade-association.aspx
268 Luif 1995, p. 148
269 Gehler 2005, p. 227
270 Mock 1994, p. 21
members leaving and others joining the association,\textsuperscript{271} it was obvious from the beginning that a tight collaboration with the EC was the goal to work towards. In the early 1970s Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Iceland and Portugal made such an attempt and held bilateral negotiations on free trade agreements with the EC. These agreements ensured that by 1977 “duties on virtually all trade in industrial productions between EFTA and the EC were eliminated.”\textsuperscript{272}

The so-called Luxembourg Declaration was the outcome of a ministerial level meeting between the EFTA and the EC in April 1984.\textsuperscript{273} This meeting was significant for both sides. Subsequently it led to the negotiations on the European Economic Area (EEA).\textsuperscript{274}

In 1985, however, the European Council decided that the implementation of the Internal Market would be the main focus of attention for now, and should be realized by 1992.\textsuperscript{275} This put the further development of the EEA on hold and thereafter the EFTA dedicated its work to develop a joint position. This joint position should then be used for further negotiations with the EC Commission on the EEA.\textsuperscript{276} Despite this in 1988 the Foreign Ministry foresaw that “[a]pparently neither bilateral nor multilateral negotiations held jointly with other EFTA countries can enable outsiders to catch up with the dynamics of events in the EC itself” and stated that “[f]or this very reason, the option of EC membership has become particularly relevant for Austria in 1988.”\textsuperscript{277}

\textsuperscript{271} Denmark and the United Kingdom left after their EC membership in 1973, so did Portugal in 1986. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden left EFTA to become full members of the EU. Finland had been an associated EFTA member since 1961 and a full one since 1986. In 1970, Iceland joined the association and it was not until 1991, when the last member Liechtenstein joined EFTA.

\textsuperscript{272} EFTA II
http://www.efta.int/~/media/Files/Publications/Fact%20sheets/General%20EFTA%20fact%20sheets/efta-50-years.ashx, p. 1

\textsuperscript{273} Luif 1995, p. 149

\textsuperscript{274} Luif 1995, p. 152

\textsuperscript{275} Mock 1994, p. 48f

\textsuperscript{276} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 119

\textsuperscript{277} Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1988, p. 3
In 1989, the head of governments of EFTA members met, in order to discuss the future relationship with the EC. This was the point when Austria took a final decision. After the meeting it decided that only a full membership to the European Community would make it possible to fully participate in the Internal Market. The developments towards a realization of the EEA were seen as too vague. It was even doubted whether an implementation of the EEA would ever happen at all. Austria saw a better future in a full EC membership.\footnote{Mock 1994, p. 66} But until this status would be achieved, it continued to stand loyal by the EFTA’s side and met all its obligations as a member.\footnote{Mock 1994, p.107} Austria even stated that it would support the EFTA in the future without any reservations\footnote{Scheich 2005, p. 189} in a report that was issued on the relations to the EC in 1988.\footnote{The report, mentioned here, was worked out by the Working Group for European Integration and is discussed in chapter 4.4.}

From that point forward Austria’s main focus was on EC membership. Nevertheless, it did not miss the negotiations that followed in the early 1990s concerning the Single Market between the EFTA and the EC, as these were negotiations Austria could profile itself in. The realization of the Single Market was seen as a preliminary stage to eventual EC membership and therefore considered important.\footnote{Mock 1994, p. 111} An agreement between the Council of Ministers and EFTA-Ministers could be reached on the creation of the EEA in October 1991. The main reasons for the delay of the agreement were differences on two major subjects. These were related to the fisheries (special concerns by Norway and Iceland) and transit (Austria and Switzerland). The Agreement on the European Economic Area was not signed until 2 May 1992 though, as the EC Court of Justice considered it to be incompatible with EC law. Adjustments needed to be made\footnote{Luif 1995, p. 165} and on 1 January 1994 the agreement finally came into force. It had weaknesses, which Austria was only willing to accept temporary. As a result, exclusive membership in the European Union became more and more important. The EEA integrated Austria to a large extent. In its Annual Report the Foreign Ministry states that “…[i]t
is therefore a welcome preparation for full membership of the EU, but it cannot be regarded as an alternative." Being only a member of the EEA meant that the country was not able to participate in the common agricultural policy, the customs union and the European Economic and Monetary Union and, most importantly, it was left out in the decision-making process of the EC.

Although the EEA was initially designed to act as a brake in the enlargement process of the EC, it all of a sudden became its motor. The EC could no longer deny that those EFTA members, which also applied for a membership in the EC (Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden), shared the same political, economic and social culture. The applicants would not be a burden to the EC, but would only strengthen the European Community by its membership, as Alois Mock stated. The EC was out of arguments on why to deny these countries access to its circle.

4.3 The European Community & Austria before 1987

As was previously mentioned, the idea of EC membership was not something that suddenly emerged in Austria in the 1980s, or with Alois Mock becoming Minister for Foreign Affairs. The idea had been around for quite some time. However, it was never pursued since membership was widely considered to be in conflict with Austria’s neutrality.

As early as 1956, two politicians (Karl Stürgkh, Member of Parliament for the ÖVP, and Karl Czernetz, Member of Parliament for the SPÖ) suggested that Austria should think about a membership in the ECSC. In October of 1956 the government openly debated a possible membership and considered it to be a serious option. However, the announced membership application was withdrawn after the Soviet intervention in Hungary in November 1956.

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284 Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1993, p. 13
285 Mock 1994, p. 120
286 Mock 1994, p. 145
287 Luif 1988, p. 94
288 Gehler 2005, p. 174f
But it was not until 1961, only one year after the founding of the EFTA, that Austria, along with Sweden and Switzerland, filed an application for an association treaty. The three countries were bound through their common neutrality status. While the application was not filed collectively, with each single state submitting its own application; the wording of the application letters was nevertheless coordinated.\textsuperscript{289} At this time Bruno Kreisky was Austria’s Foreign Minister and due to his position (not solely but still) responsible for the application of becoming an associated member. This fact is interesting when one looks at the time Kreisky was Chancellor during the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s. In these years hardly any constructive steps towards EC integration were made and the focus of foreign policy at that time revolved around different issues. In 1963, the applications for association treaties by Sweden and Switzerland were suspended “whereas Austria continued its efforts to reach an agreement with the EEC. The reason for this can be seen in the strengthening of the ‘reformist’ wing in the ÖVP which stressed the importance of the relations with Western Europe.”\textsuperscript{290}

The time between the application for association in 1961 and the actual application for membership in 1989 was characterized by several ups and downs. It was often influenced by other political events that had nothing to do with the relationship between the EEC and Austria. One of the negative turn of events occurred in 1966, when the Soviet Union’s President Nikolai Podgorny was in Austria. He was asked about his opinion on Austria’s efforts towards the EEC. At this point Podgorny’s ‘no’ to any form of association could not have been clearer.\textsuperscript{291}

After Sweden’s and Switzerland’s suspension of their applications for an association treaty, Austria pursued an Alleingang (going-it-alone). Exploratory negotiations took place, but in 1967, a dispute over South Tyrol between Austria and Italy put the talks on hold until the South Tyrol question was resolved in 1969.\textsuperscript{292} By this point in time Alois Mock was already a member of Chancellor Klaus’ cabinet. He was able to watch the rather unsuccessful

\textsuperscript{289} Mock 1994, p. 22

\textsuperscript{290} Luif 1995, p. 186f

\textsuperscript{291} Mock 1994, p. 24

\textsuperscript{292} Luif 1995, p. 187
approach to the EC first hand. Later on Austria’s Chancellor Bruno Kreisky “asked for a complete abolition of customs and tariffs for industrial goods. He did not ask for a far-reaching association agreement as in the 1960s; the reason being the experience with the Alleingang and the misgivings of the Socialists about too close relations with the EC.” Finally a free trade agreement was signed between EFTA-countries with the EEC and the ECSC in July 1972.

The attempt to achieve a special status was consistently pursued. Consequently, it proved to be helpful to have good relations with other parties on an international level. The 1960s were a time the EC was preoccupied with issues such as De Gaulle and the empty chair crisis noted earlier. After Georges Pompidou became the new President of France, a different political style became evident, which evoked hopes in Austria once again. During Pompidou’s visit to Austria in November 1967, he did not miss the chance to comment on the relations between Austria and the EC. His comment on the matter did not leave any room for speculation; Pompidou stated that a close relation between Austria and Brussels was anything but realistic.

After this evaluation of the situation by Pompidou, it seemed as if no progress concerning the relationship between Austria and the EC had been made. AsMock argued in his book, the reason for this could be found in the policy Austria followed in the 1970s and early 1980s, a time during which the SPÖ was the only party in the government and was accused of having different foreign policy objectives. In fact, Austria was very much engaged in the Middle East and in the Third World during these years.

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293 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 167
294 Luif 1995, p. 187f
295 Luif 1995, p. 188
296 Mock 1994, p. 25
297 Kriechbaumer 1999, p. 56
298 Mock 1994, p. 26
299 cf. Mock 1994, p. 39
In the early 1980s, the European Community yet again became an important issue. It was considered a topic in which the ÖVP could take over the role as leader. In 1984 the party eventually published a manifesto, in which it described Austria as being a part of Western Europe. The EC was interpreted as a community to which Austria had to come back to, and where it had to find its place in the integration process. In the same year the chairman of the JVP, Othmar Karas, argued that the option of membership in the long run could not be ruled out any longer. The only person in favor of a membership from the SPÖ seemed to be Peter Jankowitsch. Because he pursued this opinion, he received a lot of criticism from his fellow party members. Also in 1984, he argued that Austrian participation in the European Community could be a possibility. The criticism he earned at that time, though, faded away very soon and resistance within the SPÖ became less over the following years.

In 1985, the ÖVP was in favor of membership. The FPÖ was as well, and had openly declared this position and thus was the first party in Austria’s history to include EU membership in its party’s platform. It should be mentioned that as early as in 1964 the FPÖ supported active participation in the EEC. In the close national cooperation and the European way of thinking it saw the opportunity to create security for Austrian citizens and argued (not only due to economic reasons) for Austrian EEC participation. In December 1985, the ÖVP made a motion for a resolution for a comprehensive integration policy of Austria. Even though the FPÖ was also pro Europe, the motion was defeated by all parties in Parliament.

In the 1986 national election campaign the EC was not an issue that was broadly discussed. It was more of an untouched topic at that time. However, there were exceptions and even though these were minor they are still worth being mentioned. On the ÖVP’s side it was Robert Graf, who stated that a ‘no’ on the membership question was no longer an option. To

300 Mock 1994, p.44
301 Junge Volkspartei (JVP) is the youth sub-organization of the ÖVP.
302 Mock 1994, p. 45
303 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 171
304 Luif 1988, p. 172
305 Luif 1988, p. 103
306 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 170f
pursue this kind of policy any longer would have serious negative consequences for Austria’s economy, and there was too much at stake. Peter Jankowitsch argued on the SPÖ’s side that all possibilities for a close collaboration with the Community must be tapped to its fullest potential.  

This was the state of affairs of the relations in regard to the EC and Austria when Alois Mock became Foreign Minister in 1987. A grand coalition government was formed between the SPÖ and ÖVP in 1987 and in general full membership was still not seen as an option. The Soviet Union was opposed to Austria joining the EC. Despite that, the changing situation, in Europe’s East and a relaxation of the relations between the two blocs had positive effects on the USSR’s opinion on the matter after all. However, what was of importance at this point was that Graf and Jankowitsch supported the idea of cooperation with the EC. It showed that a common realization had emerged on both of the powerful political sides and according to this realization a membership in the EC had to be the highest priority for Austria over the long term.

4.4 The European Community & Austria from 1987 until the application in 1989

1987 started off with a new government in office and a new coalition agreement. Franz Vranitzky was Chancellor and Alois Mock filled two positions - he was Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister. A new global atmosphere marked by cooperation instead of confrontation, the election in Austria in 1986, and the reinstallation of the grand coalition, made a new quantitative start of the Republic’s integration towards the EC at the turn of the year 1986/1987 possible. 

Vranitzky presented the new government and the coalition agreement to Parliament on 28 January 1987. Among a variety of other issues, the EC had an important place. He argued in his speech that Austria needed to follow the dynamics of the EC. Furthermore, Austria had to coordinate its actions with EFTA partners if it wanted to make a serious effort in the integration process. The new government, therefore, decided to work together with the EFTA on the realization of the homogenous European Market. The Chancellor added that the

307 Mock 1994, p. 47f
308 Scheich 2005, p. 33
extension of the relationship between Austria and the EC was of great concern for Austrian foreign policy. One thing Vranitzky did not neglect to mention was the consequences a disruption of Austria’s relation with the EC could have, not only from an economic point of view, but also for the Austrian society as a whole. Even though the EC issue was not something broadly discussed during the election campaign, the political elite were already convinced of the importance of the EC. In addition, good relations with the Communities were regarded as essential.

On the basis of this speech given by Vranitzky, in which he presented the government’s point of view on the EC issue, it is remarkable to see that this opinion had entirely changed by the end of 1987.

On 3 February 1987, a *Working Group for European Integration* was created following a decision by the council of ministers. The creation of such a working group was already mentioned in the coalition agreement. It was established to determine which consequences possible steps towards integration in terms of the four freedoms (free movement of goods, capital, services, and people) would have. Furthermore, the group would work on recommendations and present its findings in a report. For this purpose, the working group was put together by representatives from all ministries with the exception of the Defense Ministry. The Oesterreichische Nationalbank, social partners, the Federation of Austrian Industries and liaison officials of the Federal States participated in the working group as well. Technically, all fields that would be affected by Austrian integration policy were represented by this group, which also kept close contact with Parliament. Additionally the working group was instructed to take a comparative stock of the EC regulations and the Austrian legal situation. The intention behind this was to get a serious estimate of how long it would take to harmonize Austria’s laws with the laws of the EC. Later on, this specific group was also responsible for the actual membership application.

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310 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 175

311 Scheich 2005, p. 35

312 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 125
Reacting to an interpellation by the FPÖ, Mock stated in Parliament in March 1987, that full membership in the EC was not an option for Austria at this point in time. Nevertheless, he issued instructions addressed to all ambassadors in EC countries to engage in favor of a full participation of Austria in the Single Market.  

The first sign of change on the matter of EC membership on political level occurred in November, 1987. During a meeting of the governors of Austria’s Federal States, the participants opted for full membership in the EC. With this decision the governors requested Austrian membership in the Single Market, with the ultimate goal of full membership in the EC as soon as possible. Earlier, in May 1987, EC membership was demanded by the Federation of Austrian Industrialists. This request followed the claim of a study conducted by Waldemar Hummer and Michael Schweitzer that EC membership “would be compatible with Austria’s neutrality.” At the end of the same year, the Federal Chamber of Commerce also joined the group of EC membership advocates.

The governors’ statement, as Mock described it in his book, had immediate consequences on that matter. It was not only that Mock adopted a different opinion, it also affected the council of ministers. The Foreign Minister presented the council of ministers a paper on “the concept of Austrian integration policy and outcomes so far on the realization” on 1 December 1987. This concept also included the option that an EC accession was not ruled out any longer, but only if as long as precautionary measures for the future were made.

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313 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 176
314 All governors in Austria were either members of the ÖVP or the SPÖ at this time.
315 Mock 1994, p. 54
316 Hummer and Schweitzer published their study in a book in 1987. It provides an extensive background on the legal basis and a comprehensive explanation of the relationship between Austria and the EC.
317 Luif 1995, p. 191f
318 Luif 1995, p. 192
319 Mock 1994, p. 54f
regarding Austria’s neutrality. Clearly, the option of full membership to the EC turned into Austria’s integration policy goal.

Reasons for the growing ambition for accession to the EC were diverse. Besides the fact that all countries of the EC were able to record economic growth, the EC successfully brought peace to a continent which had a long history of war and violent conflict. In addition to that, the promotion of democracy and the promotion of human rights by the EC also had influenced this change. Some might even argue that these factors (democracy and human rights) were necessary to begin with, in order to achieve long term economic growth. The motives for a closer relationship with the EC were not solely of defensive nature, but were positive elements as well. The defensive rationale was the fear that Austria could experience discrimination or disengagement if it would not work towards EC membership. In this context Manfred Scheich also described a growing feeling that a slow but steady political marginalization of the EC’s non-EC neighbours took place on international level and in international bodies, while the EC’s international power rose. The positive driven consequences were seen as the increase of Austria’s economic competitive position, since it would have to deal with (worldwide) competitors.

The global approach was a concept developed by Manfred Scheich at the end of 1986. It influenced all of the fields described above. In it Scheich argued that a comprehensive approach to the relationship between Austria and the EC is more desirable than dealing with selected points. To only deal with punctual solutions, was the approach endorsed by the Luxembourg Declaration, but not seen as useful when a reduction of discrimination, respectively a full membership in the Internal Market, was aspired. The goal of the global

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320 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 177
321 Scheich 2005, p. 42
322 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 19
323 Manfred Scheich was the Austrian ambassador to the EC in Brussels from 1983 to 1986, chairman of the Working Group for European Integration and negotiator during the accession negotiations.
324 Scheich 2005, p. 31
325 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 125
326 Scheich 2005, p. 33
approach was defined as the participation in the Internal Market, which should lead to a
greater deregulation and openness of Austria’s economy. This intention was included in the
coalition agreement, and Vranitzky also mentioned it in his speech in Parliament in January
1987. Even though full membership in the EC was deliberately not mentioned as a goal, but
instead seen as an option, the accession-train was put on the tracks and ready to leave, as
Scheich described it metaphorically.\textsuperscript{327} Also the establishment of the Working Group for
European Integration has to be seen as part of the concept of this global approach. The
revised opinion on EC membership at the end of 1987 is one of the outcomes of this
concept.

1987 was not only a benchmark for Austria’s EC policy, but also for the EC itself. The Single
European Act came into force, in which the Internal Market was clearly defined for the first
time. In addition, a date was set on the realization of the Internal Market; by the end of 1992
it should be accomplished with its requisite four freedoms (free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital).\textsuperscript{328}

So far, Austria’s potential EC membership was officially only mentioned as an option. But in
March 1988 both Vranitzky and Mock took a firm stance on that matter. It is interesting to
note that, although full membership in the EC was not ruled out any longer by March 1988,
it was not until the beginning of April 1989 that the SPÖ officially decided to support a
membership application. Before that the SPÖ was rather reluctant to take any actions in
favor of membership. The ÖVP representatives already did so at a meeting in January
1988.\textsuperscript{329}

Chancellor Vranitzky and Vice Chancellor Mock met in March 1988, as they always used to
do right before meetings of the council of ministers, and compared their information they
had on the EC issue. From the information provided they concluded that from that time

\textsuperscript{327} Scheich 2005, p. 34

\textsuperscript{328} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1987, p. 123

\textsuperscript{329} Scheich 2005, p. 65
forth accession to the EC was the ultimate target and that participation in just the Single
Market with EFTA was not enough anymore.  

Reasons for the fundamental change of Vranitzky and Mock’s opinion were diverse, but all
led back to the thought that whatever was about to be created and institutionalized by the
EC could not be missed by Austria. Up to this point in time, cooperation with EFTA-partners
had been very useful, but it had become obvious that EFTA was not able to keep up and
compete with the EC. One reason why negotiations between the EFTA and the EC on the
basis of the Luxembourg Declaration could hardly record any progress was that the EC
focused so much on its own development. First of all, it intended to push the Internal
Market program as fast as possible towards its realization before starting any other projects;
the Internal Market program was an outspoken priority of the EC. Additionally, the EC
wanted to reserve exclusive membership in the Internal Market for its members. The
community did not want to put the project at risk by including EFTA-members. However, the
EC was not entirely to blame, as some EFTA-partners were not enthusiastic about the four
freedoms. That combination put negotiations between EFTA and the EC on a rather slow
track. Austria realized that with the EFTA alone the country’s full involvement in the Single
Market could not be guaranteed in the near future. In the light of this new knowledge, the
terms and conditions changed, and from the response by the EC, the only way for Austria to
gain full and equal participation in the European Internal Market was exclusively through
membership in the EC.

In addition to the advantages, one big disadvantage in just participating in the Single Market
together with the EC as an EFTA-member became obvious. Advantages were not only seen in
the construction of a large economic area with 320 million consumers and in the creation of
equality of competition, but it also became clear that the Single Market should have positive
consequences on the labour market situation, as well as on purchasing power. Additionally,
the Single Market would also open up other and new possibilities for Austria, such as the

330 Mock 1994, p. 55

331 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 4

332 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 175

333 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 180
participation in research and education programs. Among these benefits one big disadvantage stuck out. If Austria would only cooperate with the EC as an EFTA-member, it would not be able to fully participate in the decision-making process, meaning it would have a voice, but not a vote.

The Annual Report of 1988 stated that some looked for alternatives to full membership in the EC. They thought Austrian interests could be best served by a high number of bilateral agreements EC and Austria. From their point of view this field of possible cooperation had not been exhausted, compared to other EFTA partners. It was perceived as a potential alternative, but was rejected because bilateral agreements could only go so far. In addition to these doubts, it was also not likely to happen that an outsider would be allowed to always pick where and when to participate whenever it suited the other party.

The changes that the USSR was experiencing under Mikhail Gorbachev (perestroika and glasnost) are often mistakenly interpreted as the reason for the change of Austria’s intention to participate in the EC’s Single Market. Indeed, in May 1988, the changes that were about to take place in the coming months and in 1989, were unforeseen at the time that Vranitzky and Mock decided to work towards full membership.

On 5 July 1988, the report of the Working Group for European Integration was accepted by the government. Earlier the working group had unanimously decided on the final draft of the report on 20 June. Unanimity in this particular case was clearly a sign of political consensus among the members of this working group. What the report did not contain was an explicit recommendation on whether a membership to the EC should be pursued, or not. The working group was not in a position to do so, since it lacked a mandate for such an act. Still, the report had significant impact on Austria’s future and in particular on its way to membership. The report had two parts: the first one was an introduction with political

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334 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 172
335 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 174
336 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 178f
337 Mock 1994, p. 56
338 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 173
339 Scheich 2005, p. 47
overtone (covered on 19 pages), and the other one (about 700 pages) can be summed up as
the technical-legal part. Three main conclusions were drawn in the report. The first was that
an “emphasis was put on the ‘vital interest’, which a comprehensive participation in the
socio-economic process of the EC for Austria” had. Next it was mentioned that full and
comprehensive participation in the Internal Market would not cause any insurmountable
obstacles. Second, the ‘pragmatic method’ (which was described as the global approach
earlier) turned out to be not as effective as it intended to be. It would leave the country far
behind the legal target and, in addition, a lack of codetermination would be anything but
satisfactory. In favor of a partnership with the EC, the third remark pointed out that
codetermination was tied to a full membership and, consequently, was the only way that
allowed equal participation.340

That codetermination, the full participation in the decision making process, was one of the
main conclusions of the working group’s report turned out to be essential in the future.
Codetermination was also used as an argument in favor of an active participation in the EC in
terms of sovereignty. The problem mentioned in this context was seen in ‘real vs. formal
sovereignty’ in the community of states, which was marked with a never before seen
interdependence.341 In case of Austria’s participation, the right of codetermination was
assured, which meant the strengthening of sovereignty rather than the loss of it. Having to
take over regulations that are made by a body in a process where the country has no
opportunity to influence the process or the outcome by any powerful means, was seen as a
greater danger to one’s sovereignty than vice versa.

In the fall of 1988 (October), a road map for the further course of actions on the EC issue
was worked out during a government meeting. According to this road map, Parliament was
supposed to deal with the report of the working group in the first half of 1989. After doing
so, Parliament was asked to decide whether Austria should pursue a participation in the EC,
or not.342

341 Scheich 2005, p. 191
342 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 184
The reactions Austria received, after declaring its attempt to change the relations with the EC in favor of full membership, cannot be described as very positive ones. In fact, Austria’s EFTA-partners felt some sort of betrayal that Austria, after the Luxembourg declaration in 1984, preferred an EC membership over them. It was in November 1988, when the responsible minister for the matter, Michael Graff (Minister for Economic Affairs), informed his EFTA colleagues about the Austrian position on a possible application for membership.  

The response from the EC on that matter was also not very positive. As mentioned previously, the EC was busy dealing with its own issues such as the SEA, preparatory work for the Maastricht Treaty, and the inclusion of three new members (Greece, Spain and Portugal) in the daily working process.  

In April 1988, an EC office opened its doors in Vienna, which brought EC-Commissioner Willy de Clerq to Austria. He openly declared that he rather wanted Austria to pursue relations with the EC in the framework of the global approach, hand in hand with its EFTA-partners.  

This global approach though (also referred to as pragmatic method) was evaluated as too inefficient in the Working Group for European Integration’s report, which was presented only a couple of months later. In January 1989, Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, presented his idea of a European Economic Area (EEA) to the EC Parliament. This presentation included the role of the EFTA in the future, in which the association would function as the second column of the integration process of the EC, and in which it should speak with one voice. It was intended to work as an interim solution, until a full membership was possible for those countries interested in such. But for Mock this concept was not a serious alternative to accession. It would guarantee the four freedoms in the whole EEA, but it would cut out several important policy fields (such as agricultural policy), and it would treat EFTA-partners as a third party in the decision-making process.  

Many people interpreted this statement by Delors as a rejection of Austria’s wish to become a full member of the EC. Furthermore was it only presented a couple of months before the
Austrian Parliament actually decided to send an application to the EC and to opt for full membership.

Unlike Austria’s rather negative reaction to Delors’ idea, the reactions of other EFTA-partners were positive. Nevertheless not even the official statement of the Commission, in which they claimed that no further enlargement would be possible until 1992 (after the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty) and would not be supported by them, could keep Austria from pursuing what it thought was the necessary and right thing to do. Namely, to convince the EC of the importance of Austria becoming a member in the community.

Moscow also needs to be included in the group of doubters. However as it turned out, in the following years Moscow’s line was not as harsh and nonnegotiable as it was first anticipated to be. The ambassador of the Soviet Union to Austria, Gennady Shikin, was the first one to openly announce that an EC accession would not be compatible with Austria’s neutrality. That same kind of criticism could be heard from Gennadi Gerasimov, a spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Mock countered with a statement that neutrality was without any question kept in mind, and that the Western European Union (WEU) was a military alliance located outside of the EC’s legal framework as a separate union. Shikin and Gerasimov were known as hardliners on that matter. Despite this, when Mock and Vranitzky were in Moscow for official visits in the fall of 1988, talks were held in a very different atmosphere than was anticipated.

Alois Mock was in Moscow 11-14 September 1988. After talks with leading politicians in the Kremlin, he summed up that there is no ‘Njet!’ from their side on Austria’s intention to join the EC. Everybody in the Foreign Ministry was well aware of the importance of Mock’s visit to Moscow. For this reason a list of argumentations was worked out in order to be prepared for any possible situation. This list also included a rather interesting argument.

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347 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 234
348 Scheich 2005, p. 43
349 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 181
350 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 178
351 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 181
352 Mock 1994, p. 59
Namely, that if no satisfying solution for Austria’s neutrality could be found during the accession negotiations, another form of cooperation, next to full participation in the EC, has to be figured out. The purpose of this statement was to show the respect Austria paid its neutrality obligation, and that accession would not be carried out under all circumstances. During his visit, Mock met with his Soviet colleague Eduard Shevardnadze, who made it clear that he very much understood Austria’s desire to regulate the relationship with the EC on new terms and if the EC were simply just an economic organization, he would not see any problem in Austria becoming a member. However, since the reality was different, and the EC was to some degree a political organization with a military aspect, he could not see how an accession could be compatible with neutrality. This was the biggest problem Shevardnadze saw in Austria’s intentions. That said, he also mentioned that if a qualitative change in Europe (breakthroughs in disarmament with the USA and Europe, and a continuance of the CSCE) took place, a different evaluation of an Austrian accession could be possible. What Shevardnadze was not able to know at this point in time was that the circumstances in Europe, and the rest of the world, were about to change and create an entirely different situation.

As mentioned earlier, Franz Vranitzky was also in Moscow only one month after the Vice Chancellor (October 10-13). After meetings between Vranitzky and Gorbachev, and with Nikolai Ryzhkov (who was chairman of the council of ministers), the other’s point of few was better understood. Ryzhkov even pointed out that he would acknowledge Austria’s participation in the Single Market as an economical necessity. Still, he still could not see how neutrality and an EC membership could be combined.

Already in November 1988, expertise by the Foreign Ministry stated that an EC membership would be possible under maintenance of neutrality. Nevertheless precautionary measures

353 Scheich 2005, p. 56
354 Scheich 2005, p. 57
355 Scheich 2005, p. 58
356 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 182
357 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1988, p. 588
358 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 183
and clarifications had to be made to ensure Austrian neutrality during the accession negotiations.\textsuperscript{359} In addition, civil servants of the Foreign Ministry started to work on the wording of Austria’s neutrality passage for a possible future membership application. From the beginning this group agreed on two basic elements of its work. First, the application had to include a remark on the permanent neutrality. Furthermore, protection of it was regarded as essential. Second, it was necessary to state that Austria’s international acknowledge status of permanent neutrality was intended to be kept, and that during the negotiations and in the result of those, would be respected.\textsuperscript{360} This rather vague wording on Austria’s neutrality was done on purpose, and not because the civil servants could not agree on a precise wording. It was driven by the opinion that a rushed definition might develop a different connotation than the originally intended meaning and could harm future developments. It could even go that far that a new angle on the definition was not possible in the future.\textsuperscript{361}

All in all, the answers that Austria got from its international partners were still not very positive. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry, with Alois Mock as its leading figure, kept pushing the issue of an active participation in the EC, and repeatedly pointed out the positive effects such a partnership would have for all parties.

According to the road map mentioned earlier, a decision whether an accession to the EC should or should not be pursued needed to be made by Parliament in the first half of 1989. It was possible to stick to this plan and have a decision ready before Parliament began its summer break. In February 1989, the report of the Working Group for European Integration was presented by the Foreign Minister to the National Council. To prepare that report for its presentation, a subcommittee was founded, and began its work in March.\textsuperscript{362}

On 17 April 1989, the council of ministers came to the conclusion to opt for an accession and to take the necessary action in order to speed up the process.\textsuperscript{363} This decision was made

\textsuperscript{359} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 184
\textsuperscript{360} Scheich 2005, p. 63
\textsuperscript{361} Scheich 2005, p. 64
\textsuperscript{362} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 406
\textsuperscript{363} Scheich 2005, p. 65
after the SPÖ also support an accession to the EC. In order to take at least some wind out of
the opponent’s sails in regard to its decision, the council of ministers mentioned that several
disadvantages were expected to turn up, and that procedures of adjustment were
anticipated. Despite that, the positive effects would dominate overall, and the economic
advantages would especially stand out in the long run.\textsuperscript{364} On the following day,\textsuperscript{365} the report
of the “future arrangement of Austria’s relations to the European Communities” was
presented to the national and federal assembly. All of that happened just one day after Alois
Mock resigned as Vice Chancellor on 16 April 1989.\textsuperscript{366} These days must have been marked
with mixed feelings from having to deal with personal loss (being questioned as party leader
for quite some time at this point and, finally, leaving the position for somebody else) to
victory (the positive decision in the council of ministers for EC accession).

Until a final decision in Parliament was made, something unique happened between the
Austrian parties. In the first days of April 1989, the SPÖ officially agreed, during a party
conference, that Austria should pursue membership in the EC and not just participate in the
Single Market with its EFTA-partners. On the following day, 5 April, the two parties in
coalition (SPÖ and ÖVP) settled for a political party agreement. This agreement, suggested
by Foreign Minister Mock, was finalized by the signature of the party leaders Vranitzky and
Riegler on 19 June. Unlike what history had shown up until this point in time, the two parties
stuck to the agreement.\textsuperscript{367} In it the SPÖ and ÖVP expressed the priority of the integration
policy, and that this policy should last longer than just this legislative period. This
understanding was seen as valid from that point on until the end of the negotiation process
with the EC. Additionally, an emphasis was put on the permanent neutrality once again. The
parties agreed that a referendum needed to be held on that matter, as was laid out by the
Federal Constitution.\textsuperscript{368} With this political party agreement topics that would be a matter

\textsuperscript{364} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 188

\textsuperscript{365} The authors Eichtinger/Wohnout and Scheich use a different date for the presentation of the report in
Parliament than Mock uses. They place it on 18 April, whereas Mock wrote that the report was handed to the
national and Federal Council on 17 April.

\textsuperscript{366} Mock 1994, p. 65

\textsuperscript{367} Scheich 2005, p. 66

\textsuperscript{368} Scheich 2005, p. 306-323
during the negotiations were also anticipated. Of course, the special status of neutrality was one of these topics, as well as transit traffic, the maintenance of Austria’s agricultural structure and the rather high environmental restrictions Austria had, compared to other EC members. 369

The day had finally arrived, when on 29 June 1989 Parliament was asked to make a final decision on Austria’s application for EC membership. The very positive votes in the national (175 against 7 votes) and federal assembly (unanimity) 370 on the report of the foreign policy committee and the additional motion for a resolution led to the next step. The government was asked to start membership negotiations with the EC and necessary application should be issued by fall 1989. 371

This stunning support by the Members of Parliament was the continuation of the demand of accession. The decision was supported by the federal states as well as by the social partners. Parliament, though, listed a number of facts that had to be kept in mind during the negotiations. This list included Austria’s permanent neutrality as well as respect for the democratic participation of the people; the principle of the federal state; protection of the high standards in the social area, as well as in the field of environmental policy; and the maintenance of Austria’s agricultural structure. On the matter of transit traffic, Parliament noted that the issue had to be negotiated separately to accession negotiations and had to be solved before the negotiations were even set to begin. 372

Particular aspects, which already influenced the political party agreement, were again picked up by Parliament that day. This, once again, proved how well aware the people in charge were of the crucial points that would turn up during the EC membership negotiations. Additionally, it demonstrated how in depth several issues had been tackled in order to be able to point out crucial topics; after the government was asked by Parliament to apply for membership in the EC, Austria had done its best to be well prepared for the tough negotiations that were to take place.

369 Scheich 2005, p. 67
370 Scheich 2005, p. 65
371 Scheich 2005, p. 266
372 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 186
As mentioned earlier, the government was asked to send its application to the EC in the fall of 1989. A discussion on the wording of the application started right after Parliament’s decision, and it lasted until the final minutes of discussions between Chancellor Vranitzky, Vice Chancellor Riegler and Foreign Minister Mock. Mock was able to get his views heard and due to his intervention, legal obligations based on Austria’s neutrality, and explicit references on neutrality policies were included in the wording.373

It was not even a month after the Parliament’s decision that the applications for membership to the three communities were finished. Mock handed them to his French colleague Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, the President of the Council of the European Communities at this point, on 17 July 1989:

_Mr. President,

On behalf of the Republic of Austria I hereby have the honour to present Austria’s application for membership in the European Economic Community.

Austria presents this application on the understanding that her internationally recognized status of permanent neutrality, based on the Federal Constitutional Law of October 26, 1955, shall be maintained and that also as a member of the European Communities by virtue of the treaty of accession she will be in a position to fulfill her legal obligation resulting from her status of permanent neutrality and to continue her policy of neutrality, as a specific contribution towards the maintenance of peace and security in Europe.

Accept, Mr. President, that assurances of my highest consideration.
Alois Mock

His Excellency Mr. Roland Dumas, President of the Council of the European Communities Brussels.374

Even though the application was actually handed over on 17 July, the letter was still dated with 14 July 1989.375 Mock insisted on dating the letter on this particular day in order to

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373 Scheich 2005, p. 68

374 Mock 1994, p. 72 (This is the original wording of the application. The applications for membership to the other two communities, ECSC and EAEC, were analog to the application to the EEC.)

375 14 July is the French national holiday. In 1989 it was the 200th anniversary of *The Storming of the Bastille*, which started the French Revolution in 1789.
show his respect to French history. By doing so, he further intended to point out the importance of the French Revolution for the European development in every aspect. 376

The timing of Austria’s application could not have been any better. In July 1989, Austria was not a petitioner; it was a country that, due to its economical ability, would be a net contributor. Austria saw itself as a bridge builder between the East and West, and as a country with a working crisis management and an effective security policy. If Austria had applied any later, maybe along with countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia, the country might have run in the risk of being generalized with these states. 377 This would have put Austria into a whole different position, in which it would not have been able to insist on certain issues and drive a determined bargain policy.

With its application Austria signaled that it considered itself as being bound to Europe by history and culture. Just as the other EC members, it agreed to the goals set by the founding treaties and by the SEA, and was ready to take over the rights, as well as the obligations, which were given to the member states by these treaties. Therefore, the application for membership can be understood as a consequence of continuation of Austria’s integration policy and additionally the only possibility to become actively involved in the communities. 378

Even though Austria had always been told that accession would not be possible before 1992, before the Maastricht Treaty was being agreed on, it still demanded a quick start to negotiations. In its report, the Foreign Ministry also claimed that projects within the EC should not get in the way of these negotiations. 379

Responses to Austria’s application from the EC’s side were generally positive, except for the response of the Belgium Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens. Mock met up with Eyskens shortly after the applications were handed over to Dumas. The Belgium Minister doubted that

376 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 189
377 Mock 1994, p. 81
378 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 187f
379 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, p. 190
Austria’s neutrality would not cause any problems if it kept insisting on it. For this statement Eyskens was even criticized by his own government, especially by Willy Claes, who stated that Eyskens’ reaction was too early and not coordinated. In other words, this reaction showed Austria how sensible it had been to deal with the issue of neutrality.

The first reactions from Moscow included a categorical ‘no’ to Austria’s attempts. Moscow saw Austria’s neutrality as incompatible with an EC membership since the communities also had a component of military and security policy to them, but only two months after that, in October 1989, Michael Gorbachev revised this official statement. He announced that every country had the right to decide on its own relations, which included the right to choose to participate in an organization.

4.5 The Path to the Beginning of Actual Negotiations
Shortly after Alois Mock submitted Austria’s application for EC membership to Roland Dumas, the formal procedure within the EC started. The European Council asked the EC Commission to start its screening on 28 July 1989. As is the procedure, the EC Commission and Austrian delegates (drawn together by the Working Group for European Integration) worked together on the screening report. This meant extensive work until the report could be finalized by the Commission and until the Council would be able to make a final decision. Due to the great workload, this report would not be issued until the end of July 1991 and, therefore, is discussed later on.

Until the actual negotiations could begin, the Foreign Ministry strategically used this time for detailed preparations. Consequently, the Working Group for European Integration became increasingly important. It was its job to prepare the Foreign Ministry for the

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380 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 245
381 Scheich 2005, p. 70
382 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 246f
383 Mock, Scheich and Eichtinger and Wohnout think that the Council reacted very fast after the application, and took this as a positive sign for Austria’s application.
384 Scheich 2005, p. 70
385 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. X
upcoming negotiations. And in 1989, a second working group, located in the Federal Chancellery, was created to respond to questions on the intended integration. Its main responsibilities were coordination in Austria and the preparation of basic positions for the negotiations.\textsuperscript{386}

The Foreign Ministry also used the time after the application to issue a memorandum in July 1989. It was passed on to all EC member states as well as to the EC Council, Parliament and Commission. The idea behind the memorandum was to add credibility to Austria’s application, and was consciously used to impact the decision making process in these bodies.\textsuperscript{387} Furthermore, this memorandum gave room to elaborate some ideas and, additionally, was an opportunity for corrections, which had become necessary since the application. For that reason the memorandum was also referred to as the ‘second application’ and successfully helped to dismantle reservations within the EC. With it the basis for a far more open and constructive discussion was built, hence, the memorandum fulfilled all its intention.\textsuperscript{388}

What was so new in this memorandum to the people, who were sooner or later asked to form an opinion and to make a decision whether to start negotiations, or not? In the memorandum from 1990 Austria highlighted its connection with the EC and described it as being bound to Europe by history. It argued that Austria had, since it gained independence in 1955, been part of the Western cooperation and integration and considered itself part of the European family. To put it differently, the Foreign Ministry intended to point out that Austria was aware of its rights and obligations and wanted to be part of the EC, which was going to influence the continent as well as Austria in the future. Naturally, the positive effects of a full membership were also pointed out. One of them was that Austria’s experience and long engagement in the East would be of great advantage in a changing world, in which cooperation had become more important than ever before. Furthermore Austria was committed to the EC’s goals set in the founding treaties and saw the permanent neutrality as a contribution to ensure freedom and security. Austria also portrayed itself as a stable

\textsuperscript{386} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 70

\textsuperscript{387} Mock 1994, p. 97

\textsuperscript{388} Scheich 2005, p. 71
partner with a socio-economic area that would be able to integrate into the community without any problem. Additionally, Austria would be a net contributor due to its high GDP. In the memorandum, the Foreign Ministry also expressed its wish that the screening report by the Commission would be drawn up as fast as possible. It concluded with the hope that Austria’s membership was not put on hold because of new priorities in the EC. 389

The memorandum was not the only attempt to improve Austria’s relations with EC members. In order to convince them about the advantages of accelerating Austria’s membership to the EC, additional measures were taken. Before the EC summit in Dublin on 28 April 1990, Austria hosted a number of events in all capitals across the EC. During these events Austria once again anticipated the value of informing the countries about Austria’s intentions.

Additionally, during a lot of official visits by Austrian representatives to the EC member countries, the application was constantly discussed. Rather soon it became obvious that the question ‘if’ Austria should join the EC was no longer asked. The question was refocused on ‘when’ that would happen. 390 As previously mentioned the question ‘when’ was answered with not before 1993, but until then the time would be used practically, namely by preparing the country and the people involved as much as possible in order to shorten the actual time required for the negotiations.

From this aspect, the participation in the EEA with Austria’s EFTA-partners was an important-gap filling opportunity. It was used to distinguish Austria and was an opportunity to be integrated in the Single Market. This would be one aspect less to worry about, when the actual negotiations began. In addition, it allowed participation as early as in 1993 in this specific area, as membership for Austria was very unlikely to happen before that time. 391

On 7 October 1990, the Austrian people elected a new national assembly. During the election campaigns, Austria’s potential membership to the EC did not play a major role. This can be explained by the fact that the negotiations had not started. As a result, it was a rather

389 Scheich 2005, p. 334-337
390 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 69
391 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1990, p. 80
uninteresting issue, and the campaigns were dominated by domestic matters. The election result allowed more possibilities than a renewal of the grand coalition. A grand coalition was the only option for the future though, as Vranitzky put it in the first speech he gave as the new Chancellor in front of the national assembly in 1990. The challenges that the government had to face in the upcoming years required a stable foundation. A coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP was, according to Vranitzky, the only opportunity to guarantee such a foundation.\textsuperscript{392} Even though the EC was not discussed before the election, the issue found its way into the new coalition agreement.\textsuperscript{393}

The new government was presented to Parliament on 18 December 1990, and laid out its coalition agreement to the national assembly. The EC was mentioned as a main focus of the new government and the intention to speed up the pace of the integration process was reconfirmed in the agreement. A full membership was still the number one priority, so Austria would be able to participate in the EC’s development as an equal partner. Vranitzky stated that Austria’s neutrality could stabilize the European system. Additionally, he considered a political union as a positive input for a future European security system, in which Austria could be a part of - even with its neutrality.\textsuperscript{394} In a separate section, the Chancellor mentioned the transit traffic problem and highlighted the necessity of an agreement with the EC before the negotiations would start. This was interpreted as a prerequisite so as to avoid negative bargaining for Austria.\textsuperscript{395} The mention the matter of transit traffic indicated that this was going to be an issue heavily discussed between Austria and the EC. As it turned out in the course of the negotiations, it was indeed one of the major concerns.

On 31 July 1991, the long anticipated screening report by the EC Commission was presented. It included the Commission’s recommendation to start negotiations without prerequisites.

\textsuperscript{392} Stenographisches Protokoll, XVIII. GP, 7. Sitzung 1990

\textsuperscript{393} Mock 1994, p. 104

\textsuperscript{394} Stenographisches Protokoll, XVIII. GP, 7. Sitzung 1990

\textsuperscript{395} Stenographisches Protokoll, XVIII. GP, 7. Sitzung 1990
http://www.parlinkom.at/PAKT/VHG/XVIII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00007/imfname_141879.pdf, p. 332
The report evaluated Austria as being ready for Europe, but also pointed out three crucial matters. It drew “attention to problems in the areas of neutrality, transit traffic and agriculture, but also expresses its confidence that these can be resolved in the course of negotiations.” Other than that, the EC Commission referred to Austria as willing and very interested in the integration process, and the only EFTA-member that had persistently sought EC membership. The report noted that the accession of Austria was going to be profitable for the EC as a whole, since Austria would be able to contribute to a fast implementation of a monetary union. Additionally, it could provide knowledge, which it had gained throughout history as a country that is located in the middle of Europe. In terms of neutrality, the EC saw no insurmountable obstacles related to that matter, but predicted harsh confrontations on the issue of transit traffic. A bilateral agreement between the EC and Austria was established on this particular topic, which the Austrian government intended to honor even after its successful accession. Interim solutions would be negotiated in the agricultural sector and, therefore, should not be a serious threat to successful accession negotiations. Alois Mock interpreted the report issued by the EC Commission as a compliment to the work Austria had done so far. It showed that the applicant country would not just be another member, but instead would be a member of the core group.

Austria insisted on an accession date rather soon, and kept repeating its wish that modifications within the EC should not be a reason to keep Austria out of the club. Nevertheless, the EC Commission set 1 January 1993 as the day to start the actual accession negotiations, after the work on the Internal Market was finished.

In the meantime, an agreement on the EEA between the EFTA and the EC was finally reached in October 1991. Additionally, the negotiations on transit traffic were concluded before the actual accession negotiations started. These issues, which usually are items of such

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396 Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1991, p. 11
397 Sweden applied for an accession to the EC on 1 July 1991. Finland (1 March 1992) and Norway (25 November 1992), also EFTA partners, followed the lead later on.
398 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1991, p. 22-26
399 Mock 1994, p. 118
400 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 248
negotiations and big chunks of it, were already agreed on, and it became more and more likely that by January 1995 Austria could be a full member of the EC.\textsuperscript{401}

On 7 February 1992, the member states of the EC signed the Treaty on European Union. The EC agreed on it in December 1991, however, would not take effect until November 1993. This treaty created the European Union with its well known pillar structure. The first pillar consisted of the EC, the second pillar being the CFSP and the third one, Justice and Home Affairs (this pillar was later renamed as Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters). The second and third pillars were organized as intergovernmental, whereas the first pillar was supranational. Within this first pillar the European Commission, the Parliament and the Council had the most power. The Treaty on European Union was also the foundation for the creation of Europe’s single currency. Additionally, the principle of subsidiarity was established by the new treaty. This principle should guarantee that the Union only gets involved when the matter in question can best be solved on the Union’s level. Subsidiarity should avoid the creation of a too centralized system and prevent the EU from dealing with issues that could easily be handled by a local or national authority.

The Treaty on European Union was a big step in the integration process for the community, as it laid out new ways of interaction and completely new possibilities. Compared to the constellation of what Austria applied to in 1989, the community was something different in 1993, when the treaty was finally in force. Doubters argued that the second pillar (CFSP) was incompatible with Austria’s neutrality, but this group was not given too much attention. Still, it was reason enough for the Foreign Ministry to issue a second memorandum.

This memorandum was sent to each EC member state and to Brussels in June 1992. It dealt with the CFSP on the basis of the new treaty. By looking at the memorandum, a further development of Austria’s position on neutrality can be seen, however this was not the only reason why this second memorandum was issued; it was also intended to accelerate the process of the EC proceeding to start negotiations on accession.\textsuperscript{402} Once again, the memorandum pointed out the positive effects and benefits an Austrian membership would have. It mentioned Austria’s commitment to the ideas and goals set by the European

\textsuperscript{401} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1991, p. 28

\textsuperscript{402} Scheich 2005, p. 72
integration over the past decades and that Austria would be (just as the other EFTA-partners that applied or were going to apply for membership) a net contributor to the EC. Furthermore, the memorandum pointed out Austria’s role in Europe due to its geographical position. A new aspect in this memorandum was that neutrality per se was not mentioned. The CFSP was seen as a development that Austria could fully identify with and to which it assured its active participation. Austria’s national security could only be guaranteed through this cooperation and was inseparable from it. In other words, the CFSP should act as a framework for the security of Austria. Austria was well aware of this fact. The memorandum also indicated that Austria was eager to participate in a new European security structure within the European Union.  

Another aspect, which should be mentioned at this point, was the (rising) conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The war, in very close proximity to Austria’s border, demonstrated that armed conflict was still possible in Europe. Suddenly, Europe’s helplessness became quite apparent; it could not provide the tools to effectively deal with a war in the middle of the continent. With this conflict in mind, the Treaty on European Union and the concept of the CFSP, including the perspective on a security policy, were of increasing importance and offered a response to the changing situation in Europe. With this knowledge it is understandable why Austria was eager to fully accept and participate in the CFSP.

The development of Austria’s interpretation of its neutrality needs to be viewed in light of a changing world. World politics looked very different in 1992 when the second memorandum was issued than it did in 1989, when the actual application for membership was handed over to Dumas. In 1992, Europe was able to set the focus on itself, and no longer had to pay attention to the opinions of the East and West. Moreover, the security situation had completely changed over the past years. Austria used this new found freedom by interpreting its neutrality in a different way and later on, during the accession negotiations,

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403 Scheich 2005, p. 340-343

404 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. X

405 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 250
was able to find a solution on the neutrality question by using paragraphs from the second memorandum.\textsuperscript{406}

On 26/27 June 1992, the European Council’s summit was held in Lisbon. At this summit, the Council made a resolution “that negotiations on enlarging the European Community should be opened with Austria, Finland and Sweden at the beginning of 1993.”\textsuperscript{407} However, the negotiations were only to begin when the Treaty on European Union was ratified by the applicants and when an agreement on the fiscal program was found.\textsuperscript{408}

When it became obvious that the European Council would make a final decision on the applications of Austria, Sweden and Finland, Austria sent out another short memorandum just before the summit in Edinburgh was held. Even though the Treaty on European Union was not going to be in force for another 10 months, the accession negotiations would be based on it. In the memorandum, Austria expressed that it had no reservations regarding negotiating on this new basis. In accordance with that Austria stated that its application from 1989 was also directed to the newly founded European Union. Additionally, it admitted to the new treaty, which the member states agreed on in Maastricht.\textsuperscript{409}

In Edinburgh on 11/12 December 1992, the European Council finally decided that negotiations with all the new applicants would start at the beginning of 1993. Even the fact that the Treaty on European Union was not going to be effective for another 10 months did not hold the beginning of the negotiations back.\textsuperscript{410}

As a reaction to the ‘yes’ by the Council, Chancellor Vranitzky and Foreign Minister Mock gave a speech in front of Parliament only two days later, on 14 December. They both informed the Members of Parliament about the recent developments, and what consequences this decision would have for Austria. The Chancellor, as well as the Foreign Minister, did not forget to mention the historical importance of the Council’s decision in

\textsuperscript{406} Scheich 2005, p. 73

\textsuperscript{407} Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1993, p. 18

\textsuperscript{408} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1992, p. 20

\textsuperscript{409} Mock 1994, p. 150

\textsuperscript{410} Mock 1994, p. 152
Edinburgh, for both the EC and for Austria. Both repeated the commitments to the old treaties and to the Treaty on European Union (in this aspect especially the CFSP). At the end of his speech, Mock appealed to the consciences of the parties in opposition and concluded that membership to the EC needed to be of vital interest for all parties in Parliament. He called on the Members of Parliament to act in concert and added that membership was the only factor that could guarantee a secure Europe and, as previously noted, was essential for Austria’s security.\textsuperscript{411}

Negotiations between Austria and the EC were set to start on 1 February 1993. The Austrian government agreed on the negotiating positions on 26 January 1993. A report by Vranitzky and Mock provided the basis of this decision.\textsuperscript{412} In the first part of the report, Austria’s motivations for wanting to become a member (a stable economy, benefits in foreign and security policy, and the only possibility to be a part in the decision-making process in Europe), were repeated. In its second chapter, the proceedings of the negotiations were explained, and stated that negotiations would take place on three different levels. Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the applying countries and the Foreign Ministers of the EC member states were the first and highest level. On the second level deputies (ambassadors) met, and the third level was put together by experts. On ministerial level Foreign Minister Alois Mock was responsible for the negotiations, which was indicated in the third chapter of the report. On the second level ambassador Manfred Scheich was nominated as the head of the delegation. The fourth part of the report consisted of the negotiating positions. Parts of the second memorandum from June 1992 were replaced by this report (such as Austria admitting to the Treaty on European Union, the participation on European integration and the adoption of the \textit{acquis}, and Austria’s dedication to the CFSP), but also new fields were added. Environmental policy was mentioned in this list, as well as Austria’s wish to keep its rather strict regulations in that particular area. Additionally, it mentioned that a membership in the EC could not affect Austria’s ban on the use of atomic energy. In terms of transport policy, the bilateral agreement between the EC and Austria on transit traffic of heavy goods vehicles needed to be kept in force as long as it was decided in an earlier agreement (further

\textsuperscript{411} Stenographisches Protokoll, XVIII. GP, 95. Sitzung 1992

\textsuperscript{412} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 250
elaborated above). Furthermore, Austria wanted its own way in social and income distribution policy. This was seen as a necessity in order to be able to guarantee the current standard and its further development. Numerous other negotiation positions were mentioned. Among them were also those matters that were pointed out by the EC Commission from the very beginning, for example the agricultural issue. Concerning this aspect, Austria claimed financial support by the EC in order to not stress the national budget too much. The report also mentioned that a membership could not affect basic rights of the Austrian constitution.\textsuperscript{413}

4.6 Actual negotiations with the EU
With the decision of the council of ministers on this report and the authority to negotiate in the name of the Republic of Austria, Foreign Minister Alois Mock, along with other delegates,\textsuperscript{414} took part in the formal start of the negotiations on 1 February 1993 in Brussels.\textsuperscript{415} Both sides, the EC and Austria, officially presented each other’s positions. None of these were a surprise to anybody involved, and it was more of a repetition of facts that had been known beforehand. Neither side missed the opportunity though to highlight the historic significance that lay within the start of such negotiations.\textsuperscript{416}

During 1993, five rounds of negotiations took place on the ministerial level. In the first half of 1993, the Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen was chief negotiator on the EC’s side (Denmark held the EU presidency at this time). Denmark was succeeded by Belgium, with chief negotiator being Willy Claes, the Belgian Foreign Minister at the time. On the level of delegates/ambassadors, eight negotiation rounds took place. A total of 29 different chapters\textsuperscript{417} needed to be discussed, and at the end of 1993, already thirteen of them were concluded. Ten other chapters were negotiated up to a point, where the actual closing was

\textsuperscript{413} Scheich 2005, p. 343-357

\textsuperscript{414} Foreign Minister Mock was accompanied by the Minister for Economic Affairs Wolfgang Schüssel, State Secretary Brigitte Ederer, Vorarlberg’s governor Martin Purtscher and Vienna’s Vice-Governor Hans Mayr.

\textsuperscript{415} Mock 1994, p. 160

\textsuperscript{416} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 251

\textsuperscript{417} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. 29f
only a matter of time. With this success in a rather short period of time Austria was, therefore, able to focus on the chapters that seemed to be of significant importance for the country in 1994: transit traffic of heavy goods vehicles, agriculture, and regulations on second homes.\footnote{Außenpolitischer Bericht 1993, p. 33}

The desire to conclude the negotiations by the beginning of March 1994 grew steadily. The reason for this urgency was that if negotiations could be finished by then, the accession of the applying states would be possible on 1 January 1995.\footnote{Mock 1994, p. 164}

On 1 November 1993, the Treaty on European Union, which had already been the basis of the negotiations so far, came into force. The necessity to agree on a definition of Austria’s neutrality became more relevant at that point. Finally, the council of ministers was able to agree on a common definition on 9 November, which stated that the Republic of Austria had sole power – also in the future – in regard to the interpretation of that matter. The interpretation, which was accepted by the council of ministers on that very day in November, recorded that Austria was not obliged to participate in wars with military means, nor did it have to join a military alliance, and further was it not obligated to host foreign military bases on its territory. In order to be able to fulfill this position, legal actions within Austria had to be taken. Nevertheless, Austria stated that it would contribute to the development of security policy structures as they were foreseen in the Treaty on European Union. With this interpretation, the understanding of neutrality can be interpreted as being minimized to its core area.\footnote{Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 252}

Alois Mock presented the neutrality interpretation to the EC on the very same day during negotiations on ministerial level. This meeting was held in order to open up negotiations on the chapter of CFSP. The reason why neutrality was interpreted in exactly this way was done to prevent the other side (EC) from discussing that matter. Mock added in his statement that Austria saw an important step in the CFSP towards a stronger international capacity to take actions, and that it fully agreed with the decisions made in the treaty on the CFSP.\footnote{Scheich 2005, p. 79}
these ground rules laid out by the Foreign Minister, the legal negotiations on the level of ambassadors began. On 20 December, the EC’s Foreign Ministers were able to agree on a common position on the CFSP chapter, which was submitted to the potential new candidates. It also included the unreserved acceptance of the *acquis communautaire*. Only one day later, the Austrian council of ministers accepted this paper and the chapter of neutrality was successfully agreed upon and could be closed.\(^{422}\)

This, however, was not the only success that was achieved by the end of 1993. Additionally, the question of environmental standards could be solved. Austria was granted the right to keep its standards for the next four years. During this time the EU obligated itself to revise its own standards instead.\(^{423}\)

As mentioned earlier, Austria and the European Union wanted to finish the negotiations by March 1994. Certainly, an intense closing phase was imminent. Even though most issues where solved by then, as Mock described it himself, some were better tackled and solved under the pressure of time and a solution had to be found.\(^{424}\) These remaining issues were the questions over regulations on second homes, agriculture and transit traffic of heavy good vehicles. In a speech given in front of the national assembly on 19 January Foreign Minister Mock outlined that even within these sensitive matters, compromises began to evolve. He shared the optimism that the negotiations could be brought to an end by March, as was intended.\(^{425}\)

The final negotiations on the level of Ministers took place from 25 February until 1 March 1994. These days were exhausting and very intense and for the Austrian Delegation. Not only did the European Union meet with the Austrian delegation, but it negotiated with all potential members at the time, which included Sweden, Finland and Norway. Out of them, Austria had the biggest delegation with almost 90 delegates. Next to Foreign Minister Mock, Finance Minister Ferdinand Lacina, Minister of Economic Affairs Wolfgang Schüssel, Minster

\(^{422}\) Scheich 2005, p. 82

\(^{423}\) Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 252

\(^{424}\) Mock 1994, p. 183

for Agriculture and Forestry Franz Fischler, Minister of Transport Viktor Klima and State Secretary Brigitte Ederer were part of this delegation, in addition to numerous prominent delegates from the social partners.\footnote{Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 253}

This delegation was more or less nonstop on duty during the negations, which in the literature is also referred to as ‘Jumbo Meeting of Ministers’.\footnote{cf. Mock 1994, p. 179; Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 253.} Even though the delegation consisted of people from very different political backgrounds, Mock described the spirit of Brussels as something unique, something he had never experienced before. As soon as Austria’s future was at stake, all delegates pulled together and tried to get the best out of it for the Republic; the interests of parties were no longer relevant at this point.\footnote{Mock 1994, p. 184}

Out of the remaining issues, the matter of second homes was the first one that was solved.\footnote{Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 253} On only the second day of negotiations the delegates were able to reach a very satisfying compromise for Austria. It allowed it to keep its current regulations in terms of control and restrictions on second homes over a period of five years. Even after this period, Austria was granted extensions of its regulations to some degree, and was, by doing so, able to first serve the need of its own population as the Annual Report of the Foreign Ministry stated.\footnote{Außenpolitischer Bericht 1994, p. 7} Austria’s dedication on that matter was driven by the fear that a sale of Austrian property among non-Austrians would take place after the country had become an EU member.\footnote{Mock 1994, p. 196}

However, as successful as the negotiations began, the progress quickly faded away. Next on the agenda was the issue of agriculture. It was obvious to everybody involved in the process that this would not be an easy one. Some voices within the EU (namely The Netherlands and France) did not want to make an exception for Austria. They argued that the Internal Market also had to come into force for Austria’s agriculture sector when full membership was
achieved, namely, without any transition regulations or exceptions. Austria feared that prices for agricultural goods had to be lowered if the Internal Market was effective from the very beginning. It was predicted that the lowering of prices would have a huge impact on Austrian farmer’s income – in a rather negative way.

Fortunately, Franz Fischler, Federal Minister for Agriculture and Forestry, was able to come up with a compromise that served the needs of and was acceptable to all parties involved. His proposal was put together by subsidies of the EU and by grants from the Austrian national budget. It was created to support farmers in building up an agricultural sector which was designed to protect the environment and to sustain tradition in that particular sector. Later on, this concept served as a model for agricultural subsidies within in the EU.

The last matter that needed to be agreed upon concerned transit traffic of heavy goods vehicles regulations. Austria was, and still is today, an important transit route in Central Europe. As mentioned earlier, Austria was able to sign a contract on that matter with the EC, which came into force just at the beginning of 1994. The Austrian delegation intended to keep the commitments laid out in this contract. But again, this issue required a lot of bargaining.

When the negotiations were at stake, due to the difficulties in the areas of agriculture and transit traffic, Foreign Minister Alois Mock mentioned in front of the press that there was a limit to the price that would be paid for membership. Nevertheless, he was well aware of the consequences that a negative outcome of the negotiations could have for Austria. He pointed out that Austria might run in danger of becoming a second-class country in Europe and in order to avoid such a predicament every possible measure had to be taken into account.

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432 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 254
433 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1994, p. 5
434 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 254
435 Mock 1994, p. 180
436 Mock 1994, p. 190
Negotiations between Austria and the EU lasted until the very last minute. Whereas Sweden and Finland were able to finalize their deals in the early hours of 1 March 1994, Austria kept on negotiating, but was finally able to settle every detail later that night. Norway adjourned its negotiations for a week, after no solution on the fishery could be found.\textsuperscript{437} The negotiations with Norway were then brought to an end on 15 March.\textsuperscript{438}

It was in the late hours of 1 March 1994 that Austria was finally able to agree on a compromise on the issue of transit traffic of heavy goods vehicles and could successfully bring the negotiations to an end. Concerning the compromise, Austria was the first member to be granted its own transit traffic regime in its territory. It could only be set out of force if by 2001 a reduction of pollution of 60% was reached. Was this not the case in 2001, it would stay unchanged in force until 2004. Furthermore, the EU promised to provide financial subsidies for the building of the Brenner Base Tunnel.\textsuperscript{439}

Alois Mock described the final minutes of the negotiations as one of the most moving moments in his political career. He saw an enormous chance for Austria to actively participate and take a role in the European peace project and contribute to Europe’s future.\textsuperscript{440} As the negotiations ended, some delegates were even seen with tears in their eyes.\textsuperscript{441} These examples indicate how dedicated Mock and his delegation were. The final negotiations in Brussels and the tireless effort also reflect the passion that was connected to this historic opportunity. Asked to interpret the outcome of the negotiations, Mock stated that everybody considered the product of the negotiations, as a much better outcome for Austria than anybody had ever anticipated.\textsuperscript{442}

Foreign Minister Mock was very eager to return back to Austria after the negotiations were concluded. The very next day, on 2 March 1994, he gave a speech in front of the national assembly. He used this opportunity to shortly sum up the whole process that began when

\textsuperscript{437} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 255

\textsuperscript{438} Luif 1995, p. 313

\textsuperscript{439} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1994, p. 6f

\textsuperscript{440} Mock 1994, p. 191

\textsuperscript{441} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 256

\textsuperscript{442} Mock 1994, p. 191
Austria applied for EC membership in 1989. To bring the Members of Parliament up to date he informed them about the results of the negotiations of the past couple of days. Mock especially emphasized the achievements of the delegation on the sensitive issues, discussed above. He also used the chance to point out the historic significance of the current situation and what a big opportunity this was for Austria. His statement was followed by long lasting applause, as one can read in the protocols of the national assembly session, and can be seen as a gesture of appreciation for the tireless effort of Mock and his delegation for Austria.443

4.7 The Final Steps to Membership after the Successful Negotiations
Which tasks still needed to be done, before Austria could call itself a member of the European Union? Foremost, “the European Parliament, acting ‘by an absolute majority of its component members’, has to give its assent to membership applications.”444 Second, the accession to the Union was going to change the Austrian constitution. It was, therefore, compulsory for Austria to hold a referendum on that matter. Before such a referendum could take place, it was necessary that the Austrian national assembly and the Federal Council took a vote on the proposed changed law. As the final step, after a positive outcome of the referendum, the Treaty of Accession needed to be signed.

On 4 May 1994, the European Parliament approved the upcoming enlargement. There was a slight concern as to whether the European Parliament might use this opportunity to demand a reform of the institutions of the EU, before such a vote could take place. This concern, though, turned out to be a more or less hypothetical one. 378 members of the European Parliament out of 517 (24 votes against and 60 abstentions) were in favor of Austrian participation in this project.445

The following day, 5 May 1994, the National Council decided upon the federal constitutional law, concerning the membership of Austria in the European Union. 140 out of 185 votes supported the law. After the National Council, the Federal Council voted with 51 against 11

443 Stenographisches Protokoll, XVIII. GP, 155. Sitzung 1994

444 Luif 1995, p. 314

445 Luif 1995, p. 314
for this particular law change. With this success, the only outstanding step in order to finalize EU membership by fulfilling all constitutional prerequisites was the referendum.

The referendum in Austria was scheduled on 12 June 1994. Austria was the first out of the current applicants to hold the referendum, since the public opinion for a participation in the EU was the highest here. The other referenda were held in the same order with Norway, which had the lowest predicted public support, being the last. It was anticipated that high acceptance in one country would create a ‘spill-over’ effect that would have a positive impact on the outcome of the referenda in the remaining countries. As history tells us though, such a ‘spill-over’ effect was not successfully achieved – the referendum in Norway was negative.

Before the referendum took place, Foreign Minister Mock was hospitalized due to a slipped disk. Still, he managed to keep on campaigning for EU membership, and a celebration held in Mock’s honor (to celebrate his 60th birthday in the Hofburg Palace on 10 June) turned out to be the final campaign-event. In an act of high praise by Erhard Busek (ÖVP chairman at this time), he said that the only and best present one could get Mock cannot be given to him today. Rather he had to wait two more days for the positive outcome of the referendum.

Two days later, the day of truth had come. Soon after the first polling places closed, the trend became apparent; a trend that the Austrian people were in favor of EU membership, and that they supported the work of the government, especially the work of Foreign Minister Mock, was visible early on in the day. In the end, a total of 66.6% of an 82.3% turnout supported membership. This very high acceptance of the people can be interpreted as the success of an information campaign, which informed people about the European Union, the unity of all parties, and social partners.

Referenda in Finland (16 October 1994) and Sweden (13 November 1994) were also positive. In Finland, 56.9% voted with ‘yes’, and in Sweden 52.7% were in favor of joining the EU.

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446 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1994, p. 8
447 Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p. 260f
448 Mock 1994, p. 205
Norway, the last country to hold the referendum on 27/28 November 1994, once again missed the chance to become an EU member by only 47.7% of the people supporting the membership idea.\textsuperscript{450}

The Treaty on Accession was then formally signed by Austria, Finland and Sweden in Corfu, Greece on 24 June 1994.\textsuperscript{451} The Austrian treaty was signed by Chancellor Vranitzky, Foreign Minister Mock, Manfred Scheich and Ulrich Stacher.\textsuperscript{452} In the run-up to this procedure, a dispute broke out about who was entitled to sign the treaty as the head of state. It was unclear whether this was President Klestil or Chancellor Vranitzky. The Treaty of Accession was then approved by the national assembly and the Federal Council in November,\textsuperscript{453} and hence could enter into force on 1 January 1995.

4.8 Summary
Finishing the formal process of accession was a milestone for Austrian politics. The previous treaty of the EEA between the EFTA countries and the EC was of great importance to that and made it possible for the accession process to conclude so quickly. Without these steps, the negotiations might have taken much longer. All in all, Austria was aware of the fact that EEA membership was the first of many steps in the right direction. However, the final step was not made until the Treaty of Accession was signed. It granted Austria equal rights in the decision-making process and in the further development of community law.\textsuperscript{454}

In order to make the transition phase easier for the new member countries, they were able to attend all Councils of Ministers, Permanent Representatives Committees and Council Working Groups meetings as observers after the signing of the Treaty of Accession. Additionally, participation as an observer was possible at the European Council in Corfu. Austria, along with the other two new members Sweden and Finland, was entitled to speak,

\textsuperscript{450} Luif 1995, p. 320

\textsuperscript{451} See picture of the signing of the Treaty on Accession under Appendix 7.2.

\textsuperscript{452} Eichtinger and Wohnout 2008, p.262

\textsuperscript{453} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1994, p. 11

\textsuperscript{454} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1994, p. 48
but was not involved in the decision-making. Alongside these areas of participation Austria was also integrated in the work of the Commission as an observer. This unique opportunity made it possible for the federal administration to deal with procedures and requirements within the EU before actual participation began.\(^{455}\)

Furthermore, the federal government initiated the creation of a White Paper, which would form the basis of information about current EU policy. It outlined Austria’s responsibilities on a variety of matters, and pointed out how different Austrian requests, which were made during the negotiations, could be incorporated. Not only did the White Paper serve to inform politicians, but it was also used as the basis of information for the Austrian people, and the basis for a broad discussion.\(^{456}\)

To achieve EU membership for Austria was one of the highlights of Alois Mock’s political career. In the end, his Parkinson’s disease forced him to hand over his position as Foreign Minister to Wolfgang Schüssel. This illness had become much more visible over the past couple of months, partly due to the heavy physical effort he demanded from himself. He was still in office when Austria became a full member of the European Union, an event with which the Foreign Minister Alois Mock will always be connected. From now on, Austria was an equal partner in the European Union with the opportunity to participate in this unique framework of cooperation and to influence its further development.

\(^{455}\) Außenpolitischer Bericht 1994, p. 11  
\(^{456}\) Außenpolitischer Bericht 1994, p. 12
5. Security Studies as a Mean to Explain the Empirical Events

So far, this work dealt with Foreign Minister Alois Mock’s biography and his career on national and international level. The main focus was set on the developments in 1989 in Eastern Europe and on Austria’s path to EU membership in 1995. In this chapter, the previously elaborated historic events will be combined with theory. Theories “are a necessary means of bringing order to the subject matter of International Relations. Theories are needed to conceptualize contemporary events.” In order to be able to conceptualize the work done so far, the following section will discusses whether the two events (1989 and EU membership) were perceived as threats, and whether the way the Foreign Ministry (re)acted can be explained and better understood with the help of Security Studies. The Copenhagen School will be the designated theoretical approach to do so.

5.1 Definitions
Before going deeper into the subject, some definitions of terms which are widely used are necessary. It is for a better understanding from the very beginning of the subject, as well as to avoid misunderstandings.

5.1.1 Security
The meaning of security derives from the Latin word ‘securus’, which again can be connected to the term *sine cura* and means without care. It describes the feeling, which is subjective of a single person feeling safe. Many tried to define the word security and many attempts were done during the past years and decades, but a general definition for security has yet to be found. It is questionable, if it is even possible to find one definition that has universal meaning and fits all purposes of security. On the one hand, a definition too wide is not helpful and on the other hand, a too narrow definition might lose its ability to be universally used. Collins states that among all

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457 Burchill and Linklater 2009, p. 16f
458 Wüster 2009, p. 18
the definitions one common point can be made out, namely that security and, especially, the studies of security, have “to do with threats to survival.” Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, the founders of the Copenhagen School, ask themselves in their book *Security, A New Framework for Analysis*, what is needed for an issue to become an international security issue. They can locate their answer “in the traditional military-political understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object.” Their understanding of security is, therefore, relevant since their concept of securitization is further discussed and as a concept of analysis applied to evaluate the designated historic events.

5.1.2 Actors
An actor in Security Studies takes over the role of being the one that secures a referent object. “States have been the central actors in international affairs,” therefore, it is obvious that the state takes over the role as the actor. The state has the ability to act through its government or through other agents. “A state must sustain security against external threats, such as other states and other international actors such as terrorists. It must also maintain security against internal threats to its character, rule, or territorial and demographic integrity.” As described in the section below (referent objects) over time other actors, next to the state, were also seen as to be able to take over this role. The Copenhagen School further explains that an actor acts as such, when issues are securitized “by declaring something, a referent object, existentially threatened.”

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459 Collins 2007, p. 2
460 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 21
461 Morgan 2007, p. 14
462 Morgan 2007, p. 14
463 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 36
5.1.3 Referent object
The question, which needs to be asked in order to figure out who or what the referent object is: Who or what is to be secured? In the very beginning of Security Studies, as a separate field, the only valid referent object was the state. “[S]ecurity refers to protecting the state from external threats, and the people living within the territory of the state are considered secure to the degree that the state is secure.” That the state was the only referent object was not questioned until Security Studies started to evolve after the end of the Cold War. As it will be explained later on, the concept of security was broadened and widened after the Cold War, and other subjects were able to serve as referent objects. The concept developed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde defines five different sectors, which can serve as referent objects. These include the military sector, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors. By defining these five sectors, they intended to follow the general trend in widening the fields of referent objects. But limiting it to these five sectors was necessary in order to avoid a too general list, which would include all possible aspects that could become referent objects. By creating a too general definition the theory might run danger of not being accepted among scientists due to its general character.

5.2 Development of Security Studies

5.2.1 The birth of Security Studies
Knowing the origin of the subject, which is to be discussed, is an undeniable essence for a better understanding of the field one studies. Not only does it provide important background knowledge, it can also help to explain the influences certain developments had on the field of interest, how certain variables are connected with each other and, more importantly, interact with each other.

Security Studies, as a separate field of studies, evolved in the aftermath of World War II in the United States and “grew out of debates over how to protect the state against external and internal threats … both distinguishing International Security Studies (ISS\textsuperscript{465}) from earlier

\textsuperscript{464} Mutimer 2007, p. 57

\textsuperscript{465} Buzan and Hansen use the term ISS in their book \textit{The Evolution of International Security Studies} “as an umbrella label to include the work of scholar who might refer to themselves as being in ‘international security’, or ‘security studies’, or ‘peace research’, or various other more specialised labels.” p. 1
thinking and the disciplines of War Studies and Military History, and, as it evolved, serving as the linking concept connecting an increasingly diverse set of research programmes.” 466 Soon, Security Studies, which actually started off as an independent field, were subsumed under the field of International Relations (IR) and mainly discussed in the Western World. 467

Security Studies ultimately developed on the basis of War Studies with On War by Carl von Clausewitz often referred to as the founder of this science. In his sequence of books On War, Clausewitz wrote about the experiences he gathered during the Napoleonic Wars as a member of the Prussian military, and later on as a member of the Russian-German Legion. On War was the first approach to connect war to greater means than just battles; his definition of war is widely known and accepted among students of ISS and tries to explain that “[w]ar is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.” 468

What made Security Studies different from its predecessor and legitimized it as a separate sub-field in IR is summed up by Buzan and Hansen in three points. First, discussing security as the key concept, instead of defense or war, a “broader set of political issues, including the importance of societal cohesion and the relationship between military and non-military threats and vulnerabilities” could be dealt with. Second, ISS dealt with problems surfacing after World War II, such as the Cold War and nuclear weapons, which, due to its novelty, could not have been discussed before. And third, “ISS was much more a civilian enterprise than most earlier military and strategic literatures.” 469

During the early years of the Cold War most of the research was preoccupied with strategy which again generated the field of Strategic Studies. “Strategy is a part of Security Studies, just as Security Studies are part of International Relations, which itself is part of political science.” 470 Its heydays were during the Cold War, were most of the research was preoccupied with strategy. But it was never considered an independent discipline, rather a

466 Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 8
467 Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 1
468 Clausewitz: http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1123&Itemid=290
469 Buzan and Hansen, p. 1f
470 Baylis et all 2007, p.13
sub discipline, well connected with Security Studies. The period of the Cold War was marked by “political leaders, government officials, and academics interested in security issues (who) wrestled with the problems of how to survive and prosper in the nuclear age.” Therefore, Strategic Studies dealt with a field in which “power had to be exercised in a way that promoted the interests of the state, while at the same time avoiding a conflict which would lead to the destruction not only of the states involved but of civilization as a whole. This predicament gave rise to the theories of deterrence, limited war and arms control that dominated the literature of Strategic Studies (and indeed International Relations) during the period from the 1950s to the 1980s.”

The period from the 1950s to the 1980s is, as mentioned above, often seen as the climax of Strategic Studies. After the end of the Cold War and the (more or less) peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union, Strategic Studies, which were mostly based on deterrence, lost part of its basis.

Two theoretical approaches, also referred to as the traditional approaches in the literature, dominated not only Security Studies, but also IR starting in 1945 until the end of the Cold War. On the one and more dominant side, there was realism and on the other side liberalism. These approaches are referred to “as traditional approaches because they underpinned Security Studies for much of our thinking during the previous century; they remain, though, hugely influential and just because they are labeled traditional does not mean they have been replace by more recent thinking.” Each of these two theories has created a number of sub-divisions with different characteristics in itself, but this is not the place to discuss the development of these traditional approaches in great detail and length. Rather, it is the goal to present an overview of them in order to be able to further discuss the developments, which (amongst others) ultimately lead to the foundation of the Copenhagen School in the 1990s.

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471 Baylis et all 2007, p. 2

472 Collins 2007, p. 5
5.2.2 Realism

The theory of realism in the sector of IR has produced an uncountable number of books discussing that approach, which tries to determine how IR works. Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes are both seen as realists and their works, *The Prince* (Il Principe) by Machiavelli and *Leviathan* by Hobbes, are always referred to when one tries to explain realism.\(^{473}\) Respected realists in the twentieth century are for example Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, John Herz, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and Henry Kissinger. Realism was particularly influential in the United States and was rather dominant after World War II. At this point in time, “realism seemed to offer a more coherent and accurate account of the world than the liberal ideas it critiqued.”\(^{474}\)

Donnelly states that, “[t]he core of realism lies in the conjunction of anarchy and egoism and the resulting imperatives of power politics.”\(^{475}\) The international order, viewed by realists, is *anarchic*, because of “the absence of any ultimate power and authority over states.”\(^{476}\) “Anarchy assures the centrality of struggle for power ‘even in the absence of aggressivity or similar factors’.”\(^{477}\)

The international order is seen as something which Hobbes describes in his book *Leviathan* as a war of all against all. Following this logic, “[e]ach (state) must arrange for protection itself. This makes military strength to cope with possible attacks the most vital kind of power. Therefore states are natural competitors for *relative* military power, and accordingly competitor for things that build military power – wealth, natural resources, strategically valuable positions, technology, population.”\(^{478}\)

During the Cold War, the relationship between the United States and USSR in a bipolar world order was dominated by increasing ones military power and, therefore, the time, in which “realism became the dominant theory of IR, offering a conception of the world which

\(^{473}\) See Donnelly 2009, p. 31-36; Morgan 2007, p. 17

\(^{474}\) Brown and Ainley 2005, p. 27

\(^{475}\) Donnelly 2009, p. 32

\(^{476}\) Morgan 2007, p. 17

\(^{477}\) Donnelly 2009, p. 32

\(^{478}\) Morgan 2007, p. 17f
seemed to define the ‘common sense’ of the subject.” This time also produced the security dilemma and the concept of the balance of power. Both concepts fall under the category of realism and are products that were created to explain and provide a better understanding of realist thinking.

Another characteristic of realism is that it sees cooperation between states as something impossible. Morgan writes that, “[s]ince international politics is basically rivalry, conflict, and insecurity, realists insist that true cooperation, especially among major states, is rare, particularly on security-related matters.” He provides four reasons for this kind of behavior of states. The first one is that states weigh their own autonomy and sovereignty as too important which would experience cut offs in case of a cooperation with one other or several states. Second, states tend to cheat in order to get a better pay off compared to others. Third, for any party involved, a cooperation could mean less benefits for one state than for another and, therefore, the one state with fewer benefits is not likely to agree to a cooperation in order to prevent benefits for some other state. Fourth, it is unlikely that states agree to cooperate if benefits are not visible immediate.

As the five principles of realism, Filzmaier et al. cite Hans Morgenthau and name the following to define realism. First, politics and society are dominated by objective rules which

479 Brown and Ainley 2005, p.28

480 “When the term is used in the field of international politics it almost always refers to the way in which a government may arm itself solely in order to be safer from possible attacks but in doing so scares other governments into arming as well, so that everyone’s security is not improved and may even be diminished. The analysis is often extended into suggesting that such an action-reaction dynamic can feed suspicions, arouse fears and hostility, contribute to misperceptions and, in the end, help provoke a rivalry and even a war.” Morgan 2007, p. 18

481 “It is sometimes used to describe what frequently happens as a result of competition among states; they compete and the result is that over time a rough balance of power among the competitors emerges, constraining all the actors. This is because the major states always try to gain ground relative to each other, and thus react competitively to success by any rival, often imitating whatever is producing that success. Next, the term is used to describe a deliberate policy that states may employ. They fear the emergence of a dominant state so they deliberately attempt to construct and maintain a balance of power instead. A third way the term is used is simply to refer to the distribution of power in an international system – regardless of what that distribution looks like.” Morgan 2007, p. 20

482 Morgan 2007, p. 19

483 Morgan 2007, p. 19f
are in the human nature - to gain more power means an increase in security. Second, it is natural for a state to pursue power and not to follow moral standards. International power means the real or theoretical possibility to push ones interests, whether with military or economic means. Third, common moral rules are not applicable; a state has to act rational. Fourth, politics follows inherent laws and, fifth, the moral pursuit of a state can never become a moral law for all.\textsuperscript{484}

Morgenthau also was of the opinion “that international relations is about states pursuing interests defined in terms of power.” A state in this case is not “the only actor but ... it is the most significant actor,” these “states behave in accordance with these interests,” and “whatever else states seek, they seek power in order to achieve other goals. The need for power stems from the anarchical nature of the international system.”\textsuperscript{485}

Since core values of realism disappeared with the end of the Cold War, it was questioned whether this theory was still relevant. Additionally, it was questioned how important can a theory be to begin with if it is possible for it to become obsolete within a relative short timeframe. Realism accounts for the changes in 1989/90 and was exposed to a lot of critique. Donnelly opposes this by stating that, “[r]ealism is a theory ‘tuned’ to explaining constancy. Realists are more impressed by the repeated occurrence of certain patterns across time than by the undeniable historical and cultural diversity of actors and interactions in international relations. They emphasize constancy not accidentally but by self-conscious theoretical choice.”\textsuperscript{486}

Other problems, with which the realist analysis had to fight with, surfaced after the end of the Cold War. Morgan identified the following points as difficult for realism. After all realism explains that a state can only collapse after an external loss, this statement is not true for the end of the Cold War. It “collapsed due to internal developments in communist states. Instead of collapse due to a great war or other systemic pressures, or a sharp decline in communist governments’ relative military power, it was because of a failure of rule and of their attempts at cooperation among themselves. ... Next, realists see states as constantly

\textsuperscript{484} Filzmaier et al. 2006, p. 74-76

\textsuperscript{485} Brown and Ainley 2005, p. 30

\textsuperscript{486} Donnelly 2009, p. 49
worried about their survival. Yet with myriads of small weak governments around, the durability of states is very high. ... Many realists expected the end of the Cold War to result in some version of multipolarity. Instead it brought American hegemony, which has yet to provoke the responses realism would expect. ... Another serious problem is persistently greater cooperation than a realist might expect. A premier example is the deepening and enlargement of European integration.”

In its defense, Donnelly writes that “[r]ealism simply cannot explain the vast majority of what happens in international relations.” He, though, argues that, “the most important things” have been explained by it (realism), and that, nevertheless, “[r]ealism must be an important, even essential, part of a pluralistic discipline of international studies.” Realism is still the dominant theory, and even if critics of realism “have been increasingly effective over the years, it is difficult to deny the fact that realism still, in one form or another, provides the dominant mode of discourse in the discipline.”

5.2.3 Liberalism

Next to realism was liberalism the other dominant theory in IR. Bruchill describes liberalism as “a theory which champions scientific rationality, freedom and the inevitability of human progress. It is an approach to government which emphasizes individual rights, constitutionalism, democracy and limitations on the power of the state. It is also a model of economic organization, which argues that market capitalism best promotes the welfare of all by most efficiently allocating scarce resources within society.”

Prominent thinkers in the field of liberalism are Immanuel Kant, Robert Koehane, Joseph Nye, Michael Walzer and Francis Fukuyama. Whereas realism dominated the studies of IR in the United States, was the theory of liberalism more successful in Europe. Obviously,
liberalism also developed numerous side-strands, which are not subject of discussion here. Rather it is the intention to give an overview of liberalism as a theory in IR.

Starting in the early 1970s, Hyde-Price notes that realism in its form, in which it had existed until then, was challenged “by neoliberal institutionalism, or simply liberal institutionalism. This accepted many realist assumptions (notably the anarchic nature of the international system) but rejected its conclusions. In particular, liberal institutionalists stressed the potential for international cooperation, especially through multilateralism and institutional integration. Their focus on the emergence of complex interdependence also led them to highlight the importance of the economic and political dimensions of the international system, and thus to move away from realism’s concentration on power politics and military force. Associated with this was the recognition of the growing role of non-state actors in the international system.”

Whereas realists portray a bipolar world order in which no power above the level of nation states exists and cooperation is impossible, liberals very much believe in the cooperation of nation states. Unlike realism, where war and a constant struggle for survival and more power are considered the normal order, “[f]or liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs. … War is therefore both unnatural and irrational, an artificial contrivance and not a product of some peculiarity of human nature.” These differences might help to explain why “[t]he demise of Soviet Communism at the beginning of the 1990s enhanced the influence of liberal theories of international relations… .”

What realists and liberals have in common is that they both treat “states as primary actors in an international politics characterized by elements of anarchy. … Liberals tend to treat the state as less important in itself – governments are major actors but typically this is in their capacity as agents for domestic groups.” Having the state act as a primary actor in common is one thing, but it is part of liberalist thinking to say that domestic order explains the behavior of foreign policy. This so called ‘inside-out’ approach is another differentiation

\[ \text{Hyde-Price 2001, p. 30} \]
\[ \text{Burchill 2009, p. 60} \]
\[ \text{Burchill 2009, p. 57} \]
\[ \text{Morgan 2007, p. 25} \]
to describe demarcations between liberalism and realism. In realist thinking, the ‘outside-in’ approach dominates, which sees foreign affairs influencing domestic order. 496

“The liberalist perspective puts considerable emphasis on state survival, less on autonomy. Its adherents expect the emergence of and usually support arrangements that curtail state autonomy but enhance development, including international interactions that promote development even if they erode sovereignty.” 497 State survival and general peace can be achieved, in a liberalist point of view, by the promotion of democracy and free trade.

It is a common view of liberals that “liberal democracies are unique in their ability and willingness to establish peaceful relations among themselves.” 498 Democracies have, as far as history is concerned, not gone to war with each other and have been able to establish relationships that pay off for the states and their people. It does not mean, though, that democracies do not “make war with non-democratic states, ... democracies maintain a healthy appetite for conflicts with authoritarian states.” 499 Therefore, liberals consider it important to further promote the spread of democracy. This line of argumentation (democracy brings peace in terms of absence of war) is challenged by others who “believe the correlation between democracy and the absence of war is spurious, that some third factor is responsible for the absence of war among democracies. ... (And) that modern democracies simply share common interests and similar basic perspectives and values. Hence their disagreements are not serious enough to fight about and they make natural allies. This, not democracy, is the key variable.” 500

Besides democracy, the other factor that guarantees state survival in liberalism is free trade. “According to Kant, unhindered commerce between the peoples of the world would unite them in a common, peaceful enterprise.” 501 Burchill argues further in his article about liberalism that free trade helps a nation to become wealthy, borders become obsolete and

496 Burchill 2009, p. 59
497 Morgan 2007, p. 26
498 Burchill 2009, p. 61
499 Burchill 2009, p. 61
500 Morgan 2007, p. 31
501 Burchill 2009, p. 65
people develop a sense of one common community. Additionally, free trade spreads understanding for one another and friendship in this community.\textsuperscript{502} People in this community would then no longer support their states if they went to war with each other. Not only because of this evolving community would war become obsolete to people, but also because war would be bad for business. Moreover, people would then see “warfare as disruptive, expansive, and destructive in terms of their interests. War was bad for business, and capitalist expansion was demonstrating that war was no longer necessary for national development.”\textsuperscript{503} Rather growing business, for which free trade is inevitable, can increase national development and wealth. Free trade also increases “[i]nterdependence (and) would replace national competition and defuse unilateral acts of aggression and reciprocal retaliation.”\textsuperscript{504} An example often referred to in this context is the successful project of European integration. A project that started off by promoting free trade and, by doing so, created interdependence among states, which has brought them closer together and established a zone of safety, security and stability. Burchill cites Mitrany in his text, who argues that a ‘spill over’ effect from technical areas would be achieved “into other functional areas where states found that mutual advantages could be gained.”\textsuperscript{505}

As liberalism was portrayed here, it cannot be denied that this theory has had experienced an increase in its relevance in the past two decades. “The liberalist approach is currently the dominant perspective in the practice of international politics.”\textsuperscript{506} As such, it has been influential to many fields, but still, realism has not been dismissed and both theories are up to this point relevant as they are “[t]he most influential theoretical and prescriptive approaches on security in international politics.”\textsuperscript{507}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{502} Burchill 2009, p. 64f
\bibitem{503} Morgan 2007, p. 27
\bibitem{504} Burchill 2009, p. 65
\bibitem{505} Burchill 2009, p. 66
\bibitem{506} Morgan 2007, p. 29
\bibitem{507} Morgan 2007, p. 15
\end{thebibliography}
5.2.4 Comeback of Security Studies

Not only did the years from 1989-1991 have tremendous impact on the political world order. The end of the Cold War and the well known settings until its end also influenced theories of IR. With less focus on strategic studies and traditional studies in IR there was room again for different and new developments in this area. Nevertheless, both fields were still part of the development and not simply dismissed after the end of the Cold War. But “Security Studies has re-emerged and core assumptions about what is to be secured, and how, have come to occupy our thoughts.”\(^{508}\)

Security Studies has been of great interest in the past two decades, and “[m]uch of this debate has revolved around four questions, the two most important are: What is the referent object of security? What is the nature of the threat? The two supplementary questions are: Who provides security? With what instruments can security be provided?”\(^{509}\)

A widening process took place concerning the referent object. Was it so far only the state which needed to be secured, were now other objects added to this list; objects such as the economy, the environment and the human as an individual, for example. Also the number of issues that were perceived as a threat increased. Was it only the military power of another state, in the earlier days, all of a sudden also pandemics (e.g. AIDS) and environmental issues were seen as problems, which might jeopardize a state’s security.\(^{510}\) This shift from traditional security issues (e.g. coercive diplomacy) to non-traditional security issues (e.g. AIDS, transnational organized crime) has opened up the field for new subjects.\(^{511}\)

This widening process and shift, towards the inclusion of non-traditional security issues, did not only have positive impacts, it also harbored problems. The most relevant was that it became very difficult for Security Studies to set clear boundaries on what was relevant for the subject and what was not. “The problem with this all-encompassing approach is that security, if it is defined so broadly that it embraces all aspects of human existence, ends up

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508 Collins 2007, P. 2
509 Hyde-Price 2001, p. 32
510 Collins 2007, p. 2
511 Collins 2007, p. 7f
being about everything and nothing.”\textsuperscript{512} A consequence of this for Security Studies might then be that it ends up not being useful anymore and eventually becomes obsolete.

In the following chapter, the so-called Copenhagen School will be discussed with its concept of securitization. It is an approach that left traditional security issues behind and integrated non-traditional security issues into its concept. Needless to say, it is not a flawless approach\textsuperscript{513} but it is the designated theoretical approach in this work.

5.3 The Copenhagen School
The book \textit{Security: A New Framework for Analysis}, published in 1998, started the development of the so called Copenhagen School. The authors Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, who were all representatives from the Conflict and Peace Research Institute of Copenhagen at that time, claim that their book is “a genuinely joint enterprise, with all of the authors making substantial inputs into every chapter.”\textsuperscript{514} Another work that had significant impact on this book was \textit{People, States and Fear} by Buzan, published in 1983. It first laid out some of the ideas that were then further elaborated in \textit{Security: A New Framework for Analysis}.

As mentioned earlier, the post Cold War period in Security Studies was marked by a widening and deepening of the subject and the issues studied. The authors of \textit{Security: A New Framework for Analysis} tried to come up with a concept that met the requirements of these new developments. To integrate new security issues and additionally set out rules that create borders, in order to avoid the integration of random issues into the concept and, subsequently limiting the area of study, was the aim. With their book, the authors also try to set “out a new and comprehensive framework of analysis for security studies. … And it offers a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization – for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions.”\textsuperscript{515}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{512} Hyde-Price 2001, p. 35
\item \textsuperscript{513} Hyde-Price 2001, p. 36f
\item \textsuperscript{514} Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. viii
\item \textsuperscript{515} Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. vii
\end{itemize}
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde start their approach by defining their understanding of security. According to them, “security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society).”^516 With this definition in mind, they identify the following sectors as security issues: the military sector (considered the traditional security issues), the political sector, the economic sector, and the societal as well as the environmental sector.

Each of these five sectors, mentioned above, is determined by the securitizing actor and the referent object. Securitizing actors are seen as “actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened.”^517 Usually, the “securitizing actor is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. ... Their argument will normally be that it is necessary to defend the security of the state, nation, civilization, or some other larger community, principle, or system.”^518

Referent objects are “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.”^519 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde say that, “the referent object for security has traditionally been the state” but “[i]n principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object.”^520 So it is not solely the state and its “physical safety, autonomy, development, and rule,”^521 but for example also HIV/AIDS among other pandemics, migration, and environment, have been included into this group.

^516 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 20
^517 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 36
^518 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 40
^519 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 36
^520 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 36
^521 Morgan 2007, p. 14
5.3.1 Securitization

The Copenhagen School argues that virtually any matter can be made a security issue. “Depending upon circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum.” This spectrum includes parts that are nonpoliticized, those that become politicized, and some out of them end up being securitized.

Nonpoliticized means that “the state does not deal with it (an issue) and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision.” The next step on the spectrum means that an issue is politicized if it “is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance.” The final step on this spectrum is reached when an issue is being securitized. It means that an “issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” An issue can be securitized and, furthermore, be put at the end of that spectrum, by any securitizing actor. Securitizing actors (defined earlier) can be “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups.” In order to respond to existential threats, the securitizing actor needs to adopt extraordinary means. Extraordinary means are described as a right “to break the normal political rules of game.” "Securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules.”

In other words, a politicized issue needs to be articulated as an existential threat by a securitizing actor to be called an issue that is securitized. A securitization can then be called a success if three prerequisites are fulfilled. Thus are, according to the authors Buzan,

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523 See figure under Appendix.
524 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, p. 23
525 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, p. 23
526 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, p. 23f
527 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, p. 40
528 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, p. 24
529 Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, p. 25
Wæver and de Wilde, “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules.”

“The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act.” The speech act is “defined as the discursive representation of a certain issue as an existential threat to security.” Even though the issue, tackled by the securitizing actor, is interpreted as an existential threat, it is not relevant whether one utters security, but “the acceptance of that designation (the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action) by significant audience” is important and relevant.

Another way to see whether securitization of an issue has been a success is, when this issue pushes nearly all other issues aside. The integrity of the referent object is a priority, compared to any other issues and, consequently, has to be handled as a number one priority.

The Copenhagen School claims that it is impossible to say whether a security issue is an objective or a subjective threat. Security issues cannot be successfully measured since there are no theories that would support such a statement. According to that logic, it is also not possible to state whether securitization of an issue which is perceived as an existential threat is a positive or negative thing to do, since almost any issue can be securitized if an acceptance by the audience is the consequence of the securitizing actor’s speech act. What the authors though say is that securitization is “a failure to deal with issues as normal politics. ... In some cases securitization of issues is unavoidable, as when states are faced with an implacable or barbarian aggressor.”

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530 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 26
531 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 26
532 Emmers 2007, p. 112
533 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 27
534 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 176
535 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 30
536 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 29
This point, just discussed, is one aspect that the Copenhagen School does not try to answer, whether a referent object was ever really threatened or endangered. There is no theory that would provide a solid framework for such a statement. Despite that, the concept of securitization of the Copenhagen School can say whether an issue has successfully been securitized by an actor, or not.

What do critics say about the approach of the Copenhagen School? Some argue that the approach is too Eurocentric. Developed in Europe and greatly influenced by the experience the authors gathered here, makes it difficult to be reasonably applied to other geographic regions. Moreover, the boundaries of securitization and politicization are criticized as not clear enough and too blurred, which makes it complicated to isolate these two steps on the securitization spectrum.\textsuperscript{537} Hyde-Price sees the securitization model as a useful tool to study one feature of Security Studies, but according to him, “[i]t cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline.”\textsuperscript{538}

\section*{5.4 Case Studies}

The following section is put together by the case studies of the two historical events, discussed in great length earlier in this work. It examines whether the dissolution of Eastern Europe, in particular the relationship with Hungary, and EU membership were treated as security issue; whether these incidents were treated as existential threats to Austria’s security, and whether extraordinary measures were taken in order to fight against these threats will also being discussed. Additionally, this chapter is intended to connect the single sections of this work so far and apply the theory discussed below to the historic events.

By applying the concept of securitization of the Copenhagen School to the two previous mentioned events, the Foreign Ministry, with Alois Mock as head in the position of Foreign Minister, acted as the securitizing actor. According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde it is important to see, “[w]ho can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects?”\textsuperscript{539} The person here that could ‘do’ security was the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{537} Emmers 2007, p. 116
\textsuperscript{538} Hyde-Price 2001, p. 39
\textsuperscript{539} Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 27
\end{flushleft}
Minister of Foreign Affairs, namely Alois Mock. In his role as Minister, he had the necessary resources available in order to be heard by a proper audience (e.g. via Parliament, news, etc.). The issues that were chosen were of great importance to the Foreign Ministry and to Mock as well, and were presented and given the stage to address concerns about these particular issues. The conditions under which they were presented are described in great length earlier in this work. In the following section, whether or not the securitization was successful, or if an issue was even elevated from the politicized spectrum to the securitization spectrum, are examined and explained.

5.4.1 Securitization during the Dissolution of Eastern Europe

Austria was very much influenced by the sudden and unexpected changes in Eastern Europe in 1989. Geographically located at the Eastern end of the Western World, it was obvious that for Austria the impacts were much more real than for other states, which were not bordering the countries under former Soviet influence.

The ever present uncertainty dominated discussions at that time. This disintegration of the bipolar world order had never been seen before and certainly no ‘protocol’ existed on how to best handle such a situation. Furthermore, at the very beginning of the revolution, it was not clear whether the USSR would use military force or not to keep the freedom pursuing countries under its influence. However, it soon became obvious that they were not going to use any force, as had happened in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. One factor, though, that was perceived as a threat to a certain degree, was the fast growing number of people crossing the border to Austria.

Migration is among the group of non-traditional security issues within the field of Security Studies. It has been included among security issues, during a widening and deepening process of Security Studies took place after the Cold War. The referent object in this particular case is the political stability (political sector) in Austria. If Austria were not able to deal with the increasing number of (illegal) migrants, it could further undermine the authority of the government and, therefore, threaten the political integrity of the country.

One of the main motivations for migration is the prospect of a better life with better opportunities somewhere else. As mentioned in the chapter on “The years following the
Annus Mirabilis”, migration developed to a security issue to some degree. Emmers defines migration as something that “can be articulated by politicians and perceived by specific audiences as representing a threat to the political, societal, economical as well as cultural security of a state and its society.”

As noted earlier, in the concept of securitization by the Copenhagen School, the spectrum of securitization has three different stages. Until a security issue is seen as securitized, it first has to be elevated from the non-politicized level on to the politicized level. The issue of migration had clearly moved out of the non-politicized sphere at an early stage. Very soon, in 1989, it became obvious that the number of people crossing the eastern border of Austria increased tremendously, and that this fact could not just be ignored. The issue was discussed, as mentioned earlier, in Parliament. To put it differently, the state, in terms of the government, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in particular, dealt with it.

The criteria for an issue to be politicized are that the “issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance.” Migration can be seen as part of public policy. As stated above, the topic was discussed in Parliament by the Foreign Minister as well as by other Members of Parliament. Decisions were taken by the government when system changes were made by the Interior Minister, who was responsible for that specific matter. One measure, as an example, was the reintroduction of visas for certain citizens (Romanians). Whether resource allocations or communal governance took place in Austria during the changes undergone in the countries under former Soviet influence cannot be said by the information provided so far, and it would be wrong to simply take assumptions based on that information. Regardless, it is legitimate to say that the issue was securitized.

A successful securitization requires certain elements, such as the presentation as an existential threat, emergency measures, and when “an audience tolerate[s] violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed.” Never during Mock’s term in office was migration articulated as an existential threat. It was seen as a security issue, which could

540 Emmers 2007, p. 118

541 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 23

542 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 25
trouble the societal and political sector. In fact, it was more important to help the people, improve their situation at home, to not have them leave their home country to begin with and to support them. However, one emergency measure was taken. The Austrian army was sent to the border to assist the regular border control and to further protect Austria from illegal migration. From an Austrian point of view, this particular measure was not just a normal reaction to an event. The positioning of military personal at the border can be interpreted as an emergency measure that has lasted until 15 December 2011. Even though extraordinary measures were taken, the main requirement for a security issue to be securitized, namely to be presented as an existential threat, did not occur.

As explained earlier, an issue is only successfully securitized when all necessary requirements are fulfilled. The analysis here tried to elaborate whether the security issue of migration was successfully securitized or not. As has been proven, the issue was lifted on to the level of securitization. However, it only fulfilled most of requirements necessary for a complete securitization; it lacks one main claim, which is a necessity as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde point it out in their concept, namely the lack of calling migration an existential threat. The absence of just this one prerequisite is proof enough to conclude that the issue was only partly securitized and that migration was not considered an existential threat.

5.4.2 Securitization in the Process of Becoming an EU-Member
At first, one might wonder why EU membership is discussed in this context, but it is easily explained. As already described, the integrity of a state may be harmed not only if its physical safety is at stake, but a state’s security can also be hindered if its autonomy and the rule of law are no longer guaranteed. Opponents of Austria attaining EU membership feared that a loss of sovereignty could become a security issue for the state. On the contrary, the main threat, the Foreign Ministry argued, was that Austria would miss its chance of becoming a member. This possibility was seen as a great risk for Austria. Hence, this section deals with the question of whether a successful securitization took place in this case, or not. The referent objects in this context are, for that particular analysis, sovereignty (political sector) and Austria’s economy (economic sector).
First, the argument is addressed as to whether Austria’s security was perceived as threatened, in connection with autonomy and the rule of law. The opponents of EU membership argued that Austria would lose its sovereignty. By becoming a member of the European Union, some power was surrendered to decision makers beyond the nation state and has the ability to make decisions to which Austria would be bound. On the other hand, it was also the opinion, supported by the Foreign Ministry, that decisions of the EU would directly affect Austria, whether or not it joined the EU. In particular if it would continue to collaborate with the EU as an EFTA member but would be left out of the EU decision-making process. Austria would be able to offer its viewpoints, and may even be heard in some cases, but it would not be given a vote in the decision-making process. Being left out in the decision-making process would have meant a much greater loss of sovereignty than actual membership. By becoming an EU member, Austria could influence EU decisions in a positive way, and would be able to work against the loss of sovereignty, which again would neither threaten Austria’s sovereignty, nor its security.\textsuperscript{543} Other facts that spoke against the loss of sovereignty were, for example, that Austria took part in numerous sessions held by EU bodies as an observer. This was an opportunity for Austria to familiarize itself with the procedures in a transition phase.\textsuperscript{544} The successive adjustment into the procedures of the EU could also be seen as an increase of sovereignty, since Austria did not have to work and function in the system from one day to another, by 1 January 1995. Instead it had a chance to adapt to the change gradually. Additionally, the White Paper, which was published by the government, can be seen as preparing Austrians as well as maintaining Austria’s influence. Additionally, the negative consequences that non-participation in the EU could have for Austria’s economy were seen as threatening.

Back to the three levels of securitization the initial argument discussed here. They are applied now to the security issue of Austria not joining the EU in 1995. The issue of EU membership can be located at the politicized spectrum of the concept of securitization. Membership to the EU and its predecessor, the EC, was a political issue in Austria for a long time, even before the actual membership application in 1989. It was an issue that was dealt with on bilateral basis as well as in connection with the EFTA. As soon as the application was

\textsuperscript{543} Außenpolitischer Bericht 1994, p. 15f

\textsuperscript{544} cf. Chapter 4.8
handed over, preparations for the actual membership negotiations began. Furthermore the issue started to become more publicly discussed and, moreover, lots of government decisions needed to be made in that context. To name only a few examples among many, the government needed to agree on who would be in charge of the negotiations. Next to that was it important to reach consensus on several issues that had to be negotiated before a membership. Such issues were for instance Austria’s position on its neutrality, the matter of second homes, and the transit traffic of heavy goods vehicles.

For these reasons, it can be said that the issue of a potential non-membership was politicized. Next, if the level of securitization on the spectrum was reached it can be analyzed whether or not the issue was securitized. According to the definition of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde for a securitized issue, “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”

Potential non-membership was, definitely, formulated as an existential threat to Austria’s security by Foreign Minister Mock. His line of argument was the following: Mock was convinced that if Austria missed its chance to become a member in the Union by 1995, it would, sooner or later, make another attempt to be included into the exclusive club. At this time, Austria was in a relatively good position; it was a stable and rather wealthy country that was welcomed by the EU, especially since Austria would be a net contributor. Nobody would be able to predict which role the country would play in another 10 to 15 years and if Austria had to apply again for EU membership at a later point, it might submit its application together with the countries under former Soviet influence. This could mean that Austria would be lumped together with these countries, which might have to offer less to the EU than Austria had. No one would know for sure, but this could have tremendous negative impacts on its position during the negotiations. This possible scenario was reason enough for Mock to take any necessary action so that Austria could become a member in 1995.

Additionally, other threats and security issues were seen in the possible non-participation in the integration process. One reason was that Austria would be left out when major developments took place, and more importantly, it could not participate in the decision-

545 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 23f
making process. Austria would become a country that had to play by the rules the EU set out, but without any chance to change these rules, and as a small country it would always depend on partnerships with EU members. Besides, it would be denied participation in the Internal Market, which would have a negative effect on Austria’s economy, as was extensively discussed earlier.

Furthermore, it is required to analyze whether emergency measures were taken, and whether actions outside the normal bounds were taken. During the whole accession process, the government did not take any emergency measures. The same can to be said for the other prerequisite. One might argue that the referendum, which was held in Austria in 1994, could be seen as such an emergency action. Even though it is right to say that this referendum was outside of the normal bounds of procedure, it is only a democratic tool hardly used in Austria. It was, however, a legally correct action, within the legal framework of the Austrian constitution.

Since only one of the prerequisites of securitization is fulfilled in the present analysis, it again cannot be stated that the issue of a potential non-membership was successfully securitized. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde argue though that, “security is about priority, about elevating issues to absolute priority. ... [I]f an issue has not pushed almost all other issues aside, it has not been fully securitized.” Without hesitation, it can be said that the EU membership issue did most certainly push all other matters aside. The matter was definitely a priority in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and very dominant in its workload. As was mentioned earlier, this can be seen by simply looking at the index of the Annual Report published by the ministry. After the dissolution of Eastern Europe, the upcoming EU negotiations and the possible EU membership were the main workload of the ministry.

To summarize, a comprehensive securitization did not take place on this issue, since a number of prerequisites could not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, a partial securitization did take place by declaring the case of non-membership as an existential threat. It can be argued that this threat, to miss this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, was understood as such perceived by the Austrian people. This might be one factor that helps explain the high support for EU membership, which was achieved in the referendum. Regardless, the creation of an

546 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 176
existential threat did not lead to the breaking of any rules and, thus, the criteria for a successful securitization were not fulfilled.

5.5 Summary
The concept of securitization, as it was developed by the Copenhagen School, applied to the two events of the dissolution of Eastern Europe and to Austria’s EU membership reveals interesting findings. Even though both events had not been successfully securitized in the understanding of this concept, both affairs included elements that made them security issues, be it migration in the case of Eastern Europe, or potential non-participation in the EU. At the same time there was never a need to take any real emergency measures or to take actions outside the normal bounds. Still, Austria was able to deal with these issues in a way that they were no longer seen as security issues. In the case of migration, legal actions were taken to change the laws. Concerning EU membership, the hard negotiations with a positive outcome for Austria and the highly successful referendum resolved the issue by joining the EU.

That these issues were not securitized can be seen as a positive achievement for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as well as for Mock. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue that “[b]asically, security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics.” According to this interpretation, Foreign Minister Alois Mock was better off by not securitizing these two issues. He was able to deal with them within normal politics.

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547 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998, p. 29
6. Conclusion

“May you live in interesting times”, is a well known Chinese curse that is frequently used for times that, on the one hand, are interesting to live in, but on the other painful, if not disastrous.

The time while Alois Mock was Foreign Minister can undeniably be described as interesting, but not as the Chinese curse implicates. His time in office was not only marked by cruel, but also by peaceful and interesting occurrences; the cruelties and crimes, committed during the War in the former Yugoslavia cannot be denied and was an event where one cannot begin to describe the damage it brought to the people and will bring to the future generations. Unfortunately, this war, as mentioned during the introduction, could not be covered here. Due to its complexity, it would have exceeded the scope of this work, and it would not have been possible to discuss the topic in its full extent.

Besides the War in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, there were also other, more pleasant and interesting events, such as the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union and Austria’s accession to the European Union. Alois Mock had been involved and familiar with these two topics from very early on. Working as a young man in politics gave him the opportunity to follow the developments and see where things were going. This knowledge was the background he needed to become a rather successful politician.

The two events discussed above were of great significance for Austrian contemporary history. Both brought along major changes, as well as opportunities, for the country. The analysis of these events, with the help of the theory of securitization by the Copenhagen School, provided information for answering the hypothesis formulated in the very beginning. This hypothesis sought to answer the question whether the issues were seen as security issues, or not. In conclusion both matters were seen as security issues. When focusing on Hungary and the dissolution of Eastern Europe, the issue of migration, which was perceived as a security issue. Therefore, it formed a threat to the societal and political spectrum. In the case of EU membership, it was argued that a potential non-membership was perceived as a threat to the political and the economical sector.
In answering the second part of the hypothesis, it can be stated that in both cases a complete and successful securitization did not take place. Some of the prerequisites, defined by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, could not be fulfilled. In simpler terms, a partial securitization took place, but not a comprehensive and, therefore, successful one.

As already said, it was not a bad sign for a politician, in this case for Alois Mock, that the issues were not successfully securitized. With his ability as a politician, he was able to manage these situations using normal politics, which often requires more courage and knowledge. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde interpret security as a failure of normal politics, as something negative. All in all, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, under Alois Mock did react with reasonable measures since both incidents were not fully securitized.
7. Appendix

7.1 Mock and Horn meet at the border to cut through the Iron Curtain

Source: http://members.aon.at/roemersteinarena/Mock&Horn27.6.1989.jpg

7.2 Signing the Accession Treaty

Source: http://www.alois-mock.at/leben/artikel.asp?where=fotogalleries&gallery=507&foto=1&link=mai
7.3 Securitization spectrum

Nonpoliticized

- The state does not cope with the issue.
- The issue is not included in the political debate.

Politized

- The issue is managed within the standard political system.
- It is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation.
- Or more rarely, some form of comminual governance (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998).

Securitized

- The issue is framed as a security question.
- A security actor articulates an already politicized act as an existential threat to a relevant object.

Source: Emmer 2007, p. 112
8. Abbreviations

CEI – Central European Initiative
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
COMECON – Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EAEC – European Atomic Energy Community
ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community
EC – European Community
EDU – European Democrat Union
EEA – European Economic Area
EEC – European Economic Community
EFTA – European Free Trade Association
EU – European Union
EUCDA – European Christian Democrat Workers
FPÖ – Austrian Freedom Party
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
IDU – International Democratic Union
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IR – International Relations
ISS – International Security Studies
JVP – Young People’s Party
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
ÖAAB – Österreichischer Arbeitnehmerinnen- und Arbeitnehmerbund (The ÖAAB is part of the ÖVP, and as a sub-organization represents the interest of employees.)
ÖVP – Austrian People’s Party
SEA – Single European Act

SPÖ – Socialist Party of Austria (from 1945-1991) and Social Democratic Party of Austria (from 1991-present)

START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
9. Bibliography


Donnelly, J. (2009), Realism, in Burchill, S. et al. (2009), Theories of International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.


Filzmaier, P. et al. (2006), Internationale Politik, Wien: Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG.


Picture of Mock and Horn, http://members.aon.at/roemersteinarena/Mock&Horn
27.6.1989.jpg, last access 21.07.2011


10.2 Abstract English

The present work outlines Austria’s foreign policy between 1987 and 1995. In this timeframe Dr. Alois Mock was Foreign Minister. This position allowed him to highly influence Austrian foreign policy. A closer look on Mock’s life and his political career is taken so one can understand the choices he made better. Two main historic events are the focus of the research period. First, the changing relation between Austria and Hungary is examined. At the beginning of Mock’s term as Foreign Minister these two countries were separated through the Iron Curtain, but after 1989 they were able to reestablish their friendly relations. Austria was very eager in supporting the new independent Hungary in becoming a stable country. Austria becoming a member of the EU is the second focus in this work. Again, substantial changes in positions can be detected in the investigation period. At the beginning of 1987 a membership was considered as not possible, but already in 1995 Austria could call itself a full member. These two events are further analyzed with the concept of securitization, which was developed by the Copenhagen School; whether the changing relations with Hungary or Austria’s EU membership were treated as existential threats to Austria’s security. According to the concept, the use of extraordinary measures is allowed when an issue is seen as an existential threat. It is further argued, that only a partial securitization took place in both cases, because not all prerequisites according to the definition are fulfilled. In conclusion, it can be said that the partial securitization is positive, because it was possible to deal with the issues within the framework of normal politics.
### 11. Curriculum Vitae

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Magdalena Brottrager</th>
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<tr>
<td>September 1999 – Juni 2005</td>
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<td>Volontariat an der Österreichischen Botschaft in Den Haag, Niederlande</td>
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