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„Can Democracy Theory Explain the Emergence of the Egyptian Democratic Movement?“

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# Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tables and Figures</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgment</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Research Question</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Structure</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Definition</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Democracy</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1. Formal or Procedural democracy</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2. Substantive democracy</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Democratization</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Democratic Transition</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Democratic Consolidation</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Democratization Theory: Causes and Preconditions</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Early Democratization Theory</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1. Origin of functionalist theory</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2. Origin of genetic theory</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3. The origin of the social forces tradition</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. The Third Wave of Democratization</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. Functionalist Theories</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3. Genetic Theories</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4. The Social Forces Tradition</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.5. Transnational Theories</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Causes of Democracy during the Third Wave of Democratization</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Are Preconditions of Democracy Relevant?</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. Genetic Theories</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1. Regime Type</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. Functionalist Theories</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.1. The Rentier State and Democratization ........................................................... 46
4.3.2. Inequality ......................................................................................................... 49
4.4. Social Forces Tradition ........................................................................................... 51
  4.4.1. Mass Movements and Mobilization ................................................................. 51
  4.4.2. Culture – Islam and Democracy ...................................................................... 54
4.5. Transnational Theories ........................................................................................... 61
  4.5.1. Diffusion .......................................................................................................... 61
  4.5.2. Neighbouring Countries ................................................................................... 63
  4.5.3. International Actors and the International System ........................................... 65
5. The Case of Egypt ......................................................................................................... 68
  5.1. Genetic Theories .................................................................................................... 68
    5.1.1. Characterising the Egyptian regime ................................................................. 68
    5.1.2. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 73
  5.2. Functionalist Theories ............................................................................................ 73
    5.2.1. Resource abundance ...................................................................................... 74
    5.2.2. Inequality ......................................................................................................... 77
    5.2.3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 79
  5.3. The Social Forces Tradition .................................................................................... 80
    5.3.1. Mass Movements and Mobilization ................................................................. 80
    5.3.2. Culture – Democracy and Islam ...................................................................... 83
    5.3.3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 87
  5.4. Transnational Theories ........................................................................................... 88
    5.4.1. Diffusion .......................................................................................................... 88
    5.4.2. Neighbouring Countries ................................................................................... 89
    5.4.3. International Actors .......................................................................................... 92
    5.4.4. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 97
6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 98
  6.1. Findings .................................................................................................................. 98
  6.2. Outlook .................................................................................................................. 102
7. Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 104
7.1. Documents...........................................................................................................116
7.2. Online-Resources ............................................................................................116
7.3. Interview..............................................................................................................116
7.4. Tables and Figures............................................................................................117

Abstract..............................................................................................................................118
Zusammenfassung.............................................................................................................119
Curriculum Vitae.............................................................................................................121
Tables and Figures

Figure 1 ................................................................................................................................................................. 44
Figure 2 ................................................................................................................................................................. 59
Figure 3 ................................................................................................................................................................. 64
Figure 4 ................................................................................................................................................................. 78
Figure 5 ................................................................................................................................................................. 84
Figure 6 ................................................................................................................................................................. 85
Figure 7 ................................................................................................................................................................. 86
Figure 8 ................................................................................................................................................................. 92
Figure 9 ................................................................................................................................................................. 93
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Freedom House</td>
</tr>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBG</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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1. Introduction

“It’s no longer any use begging for our rights by appealing to the regime, because it will not listen. But if a million Egyptians went out to the streets in protest or announced a general strike, if that happened, even once, the regime would immediately heed the people’s demands. Change, as far as it goes, is possible and imminent, but there is a price we have to pay for it. We will not triumph in the battle for change unless we summon up our resolve to recover our rights, whatever the sacrifices might be. It’s the only way to evict Battista. Democracy is the solution.”

Anonymous in Alaa Al-Aswany on February 28, 2010

The revolutions in the Arab countries – above all the start in Tunisia and Egypt - caught most analysts, scholars, politicians and journalists off guard. There used to be a widespread agreement in Western academia about the so called “Arab exceptionalism”: while from 1974 onwards democracy spread like wave throughout the world increasing the number of electoral democracies from 40 in 1974 to 117 in 1995, the wave did not so much as touch the Arab countries (Diamond 2010, 93). This led many scholars to believe that democracy was not compatible with Arab or Muslim countries – most prominent among these scholars are Samuel Huntington (1991b) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1959).

Thus, even after the protests swept Tunisia many scholars continued to see them as isolated event which would not have any significant impact on other countries in the region. Stephen Walt argued that “this sort of revolutionary cascade is quite rare, and even when some sort of revolutionary contagion does take place, it happens pretty slowly and is often accompanied by overt foreign invasion.” Moreover, he compared the events to the start of the overthrow of the former Soviet satellite regime whose hold on power was based on Moscow’s support. As this support crumbled, so did the regimes. Concerning the Arab regimes he states, “that's not the case in the Arab world. Although most Arab governments are authoritarian, they are also

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all independent and depend on a slightly different mix of political institutions and measures to keep the rulers in power. The fact that Ben Ali ultimately mismanaged a challenge and was driven from power does not mean that other Arab leaders won’t be able to deflect, deter, or suppress challenges to their rule.” (Walt 2011) This analysis was not uncommon, as it only mirrored the predominant narrative. Also newspapers, such as the New York Times, stressed the unlikelihood of “a revolutionary contagion, [as] political analysts said that each country is different, making such conclusions premature” (El-Naggar and Slackman, January 18/9, 2011). The New York Times referred to the Egyptian President’s resourcefulness in suppressing dissent and supposed that “the wily Mr. Mubarak, who has outmaneuvered domestic political rivals and Egypt’s Islamic movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, for decades, would find a way to suppress dissent and restore control” (Kirkpatrick, January 29 2011). Finally, a political analyst concluded, “Revolutions are not exportable, particularly considering the huge military and security force behind Mr. Mubarak’s regime, the weak and fragmented opposition parties, the fear of an Islamist takeover, the willingness of the regime to mount brutal force against the demonstrators and Egypt’s strategic weight with its Western allies.” (Shahin, January 27, 2011)

This picture changed after the Egyptian President was forced out of office by the Egyptian people and when the protest movement had spread to several other countries such as Yemen, Jordan, Libya and also Syria. Suddenly, newspapers were full of analyses claiming that the Arab countries were more than ripe for revolution and that it was rather the question why it had taken the Arab people so long to rise up against their authoritarian leaders, especially as all indicators had pointed this way for quite some time. The fact that some weeks before the events in Tunisia and Egypt hardly a single analyst would have dared to predict or presume such an outcome seemed forgotten.

Timur Kuran noted the same process during and after the revolutions of the former Soviet satellite states (Kuran 1991, 8-10) and asked the same questions we have to ask today: “if the revolution was indeed inevitable, why was it not foreseen? Why did people overlook signs that are clearly visible after the fact?” (1991, 12) Kuran claims that while the revolutions themselves were not “inevitable”, the combination of psychological and social factors rendered it nearly impossible to predict them (Kuran 1991, 13). The same holds true for the Arab revolutions. Nevertheless, we can and have to ask the question whether current democracy theory is able to explain in hindsight why such powerful democracy movements came into being.
1.1. Research Question

It is crucial to ask this question as it can show whether democracy theories have found valuable answers to the question in which circumstances can democracy come into being. This will be the topic of this paper. I shall try to answer the following question: “Can Democracy Theory explain the Emergence of the Egyptian Democratic Movement?” The decision to focus on the Egyptian example was taken due to the fact that I have visited the country shortly before the revolution took place. Therefore, I have a personal connection to the country and have undertaken some research in Egyptian politics before.

While democratization literature is very rich in analyzing transitions and theorizing about why some transitions are more successful than others, this will not be the purpose of this paper, as it is today still impossible to judge where to the recent developments in Egypt will lead. Therefore, this paper will focus on the causes and preconditions of democracy and democratic transitions only.

In general democratization theory is heavily influenced by the experiences from the different democratic transitions which occurred over time. Especially the conclusions drawn from the so called “Third Wave of Democratization” which started in 1974 (Huntington 1991b) and covers the transitions in Southern Europe and also includes the revolutions in Eastern Europe have left their mark on democratization theory. These experiences were applied to study all other regions worldwide and led to conclusions such as the incompatibility of democracy and Islam which hindered us to correctly analyse the state of affairs in the Arab countries.

So to answer the following question in this paper –whether democracy theory can explain the emergence of the Egyptian democratic movement – I shall look into the four major schools of democratization theory which are genetic and functionalist theories, the social forces tradition and transnational theories and analyse whether the main arguments for democratization of each school can be correctly applied to the events in Egypt.

1.2. Structure

This paper shall proceed through five substantive chapters. In the first chapter I shall provide the necessary definitions of important terms used throughout the paper, such as “democracy”, “democratization”, “democratic transition” and “democratic consolidation”. The
definition of the term authoritarian regime shall be given at a later point when I will also be
discussion the characterization of different authoritarian regimes.

The second chapter will give an overview over democratization literature and its different
schools. I shall give a short account of early democratization theories and explain the origins
of functionalist and genetic theory as well as of the social forces tradition. This will be
followed by an explanation of the so called ‘third wave of democratization’ and its impact on
democratization literature: the immense increase in democracy – both in quality and quantity
– not only led to many new insights which will be described for each of the three already
mentioned schools, but it also led to the development of the fourth school: transnational
theory which will also be presented. In describing the different schools of democratization I
shall always limit my description to the explanations the different schools offer for the
emergence of democratic movements – despite the fact that there is also a very rich
literature on democratic transition, the breakdown of democracy and democratic
consolidation.

The fourth chapter will be dedicated to the main arguments each school presents for
democratization. But before that I shall argue for the relevance of causes and preconditions
of democracy, as some scholars, namely representatives from genetic theories such as
Adam Przeworski, Michel Alvares and Fernando Limongi (Przeworski et al. 2000) claim that
there are none. Firstly, the arguments of genetic theory will be discussed and they are (1) the
type of authoritarian regime and (2) the influence of personalism. Secondly, I shall focus on
functionalist theory: the main arguments which are (1) the factor of the so called rentier state
and (2) economic factors, namely inequality, will be discussed in depth and their relevance
for Egypt will be demonstrated. Thirdly, the arguments of the social forces tradition will be
presented. Here I shall discuss the impact of (1) mass movements, as well as (2) culture and
religion. Finally, the main points in transnational theory will be presented which used to be
seen as less important than domestic factors in the past: (1) diffusion, (2) neighbouring
states, and (3) International Actors.

The fifth chapter will deal with the question of how these arguments are accurate for Egypt
and whether they can explain what caused the democratic movement that swept the country
in the winter of 2010-2011. I shall apply each factor to the case of Egypt and show whether it
can explain the events in Egypt or whether a factor cannot.
Finally, I shall present my conclusions and give a short account how these insights could be applied to the study of democratization of other countries. I shall argue that no theory or scholar was able to predict or foretell what was going to happen in the Arabic countries but revolutions and mass mobilization are always nearly impossible to predict. But there are also only a few theories – among them the social forces tradition concerning mass mobilization, the argument concerning inequality and democratization and transnational theories – which find explanations. The more traditional theories have some difficulties in explaining the changes in Egypt – probably because they are more strongly influenced by transitions which took place before the third wave of democratization.
2. Definition

This paper is concerned with the question of whether democratization theory can explain the emergence of the Egyptian democratic movement. But what exactly is democratization? Maybe it could simply be defined as one country’s transition to democracy, but which conditions have to be met to state that a country is on the path of democratization? What exactly do we mean by the term democracy? What constitutes a transition and where does this process start and end? Thus, in this chapter I shall come up with definitions of those terms, as a lack in clarity of the definitions will only lead to more ambiguity in the subsequent analysis.

Again, as this paper’s concern is for the causes of democratization and democracy I shall only speak limitedly about transitology and democratic consolidation and focus on finding workable definitions for the terms democracy and democratization.

2.1. Democracy

There is hardly any term to be found which is more difficult to define than the word ‘democracy’ because democracy is not only an ideal aspired by many people but also a form of government which describes power relations between the ruled and the rulers. Thus, definitions of democracy range from narrow, descriptive, empirical and institutional to comprehensive, utopian and idealistic definitions depending of course on the intentions of the author.

I shall start by analysing the origin of the word itself. The term democracy was first used by the Greek historian Herodotus and it combines the two Greek words demos – translated to ‘the people’ – and kratein which means ‘to rule’. Taken together democracy literally means ‘rule by the people’ (Femia 2001, 2). Immediately, a very important question concerning participation arises when democracy is defined as ‘rule by the people’: Who exactly are ‘the people’? And what does their participation entail? (Sørensen 2008, 1; Cerny 2003, 89)

As already mentioned one can distinguish between narrow conceptions of democracy which talk about “formal or procedural democracy” and comprehensive definitions called “substantive democracy” (Pridham 2000, 4) which are much closer to the origin of the word.
2.1.1. Formal or Procedural democracy

The narrow definition of democracy is one developed by Josef Schumpeter. For him formal or procedural democracy is a mechanism by which citizens choose their leadership: the democratic method is “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” (Schumpeter 1976, 269) He goes on to describe democracy as a process in which leaders compete amongst each others for the citizens’ vote and while the rulers take the decisions until the next elections, the citizens can only influence politics when they choose to re-elect elected officials or to replace them (Sørensen 2008, 10-11). As Joseph Femia states, in this context “it is almost misleading to say that the people ‘rule’; rather, they periodically call their ruler to account.” (Femia, 2001, 3)

In addition to this definition Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda name several procedural conditions that have to be met in a democracy, such as inclusive citizenship, the rule of law, the separation of powers, elected power-holders, free and fair elections, freedom of expression and alternative sources of information, associational autonomy, and civilian control over the security forces (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997, 63). And finally Émile Durkheim also adds the importance of an “effective two-way communication between state and society” (Wood 2003, 119).

Seymour Martin Lipset likewise opts for a narrow definition and describes democracy as “a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office.” (Lipset 1959, 71)

2.1.2. Substantive democracy

Substantive democracy goes beyond formal democracy and describes democracy as a “way of regulating power relations so as to maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence debates about the key decisions that affect society.” (Pridham 2000, 4) Substantive democracy is also concerned with the importance of an active civil society as well as independent associations whose tasks are to serve to balance state power, the role of political parties and how they influence participation, how well local government is able to address local concerns, and last but not least the part played by the independent media and how it manages to portray political debate (Pridham 2000, 5).
Another widely used approach at capturing – and also measuring – democracy is the Freedom House Index. Freedom House is an institution which tries to measure the degree of democracy in each state worldwide. They divide democracy in two dimensions: firstly, the dimension of political rights, covering the electoral process, political pluralism and participation and the functioning of the Government; and, secondly, the dimension of civil liberties, subdivided into freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House 2011). Freedom House’s approach is also rather comprehensive, but not as far reaching as the definition offered by David Held.

Held sheds light on the importance of equal opportunities for all citizens to participate in politics. He argues that the right to participate in decision-making may be futile should this right be limited by economic and social conditions: “Persons should enjoy equal rights and accordingly, equal obligations in the specification of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they should be free and equal in the process of deliberation about the conditions of their own lives and in the determination of these conditions, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others.” (Held 2006, 264)

This idea of democracy comes close to the original understanding as ‘rule by the people’ derived from the Athens city state where indeed all citizens were allowed to vote on matters of the state. But to adapt the ideal to the present day nation state an element of representation was necessary – provided of course that elected officials represent the interest of their citizens and not their own – due to the size of modern nation states and also because of the extensive knowledge which is required to take certain decisions. In this sense, democracy is clearly more of an abstract ideal than an accurate description of political reality even in those states we define as democracies (Femia 2001, 2). Thus, most scholars came to agree to limit the academic understanding of democracy to the narrower definitions of democracy which allow for academic analysis.

In this tradition, a very prominent definition of democracy was provided by Robert Dahl with his concept of ‘polyarchy’ in which he does not simply limit democracy to the two most important dimensions of participation and political competition, he also stresses the importance of freedom and pluralism which are necessary to give the individual citizen the possibilities to express his or her political ideas (Dahl 1971, 2). Dahl develops seven institutions which he deems crucial for a functioning democracy: (1) elected political officials; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) the right to run for political office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative sources of information; and finally (7) associational autonomy (Berhagen 2009b, 29). Nevertheless, Dahl limits the definition of democracy to “a
political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens” – which means his focus is not on the procedural aspect of democracy but he focuses on the policy aspect. But technically such a system could not exist (Dahl 1971, 2).

Samuel Huntington, based on Dahl’s two dimensions and Schumpeter’s work, defined “a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. [...] It also implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns.” (Huntington 1991a, 7) This is also the approach towards democracy I shall take in this paper.

2.2. Democratization

The next term which I shall attempt to define is ‘democratization’ and it describes a movement from an authoritarian or totalitarian system in direction or towards democracy. Democratization, thus, is not an end point, but a process because, firstly, no country has yet reached the ideal of democracy and, secondly, the ideal itself is dynamic, as new values emerge or new technologies make different forms of participation possible.

The democratization is, as Geoffrey Pridham (2000, 16) states it, “both a multi-stage and a multidimensional process.” Multi-stage refers to the fact that the term democratization describes a process with covers several stages, from – not necessarily – liberalization, the collapse of authoritarian regimes and the phase of transition to democratic consolidation. Whereas the term multidimensional points out that democratization entails change in society, as well at the state-level and in elite-mass relations, to name just a few (Pridham 2000, 16-7).

Analytically, it is important to distinguish between democratization and ‘political liberalization’. The latter refers to “the partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive elections.” (Huntington 1991a, 9) It means, thus, a “qualitative change in authoritarian rule” which allows for some degree of political and civil freedoms but not so far as it would change the authoritarian nature of the system (Pridham 2000, 18). Also liberalization may not always lead to democratization, as Daniel Brumberg analyses correctly. Brumberg names authoritarian regimes which follow this strategy ‘liberal autocracies’: in such countries the opposition is allowed to ‘blow off steam’
but not to get involved in essential issues which would threaten the regime’s stability. Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) are partly free to pursue their agenda and elections are held but their results are controlled by the government (Brumberg 2002). There is of course always the chance that by experiencing limited political rights the population might start to demand full democratization. Thus, liberalization, Pridham suggests, “should be seen as a process (2000, 69) it might, but does not necessarily, lead to democratization (2000, 18-9).

Since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq the term regime change was also very often confused with democratization. But while democratization is an academic term that describes a historical process, regime change is the attempt to change the type of political regime or political system by military force.

It also needs to be stressed that not every collapse of authoritarian rule leads directly to a democratic regime. It is much also very likely that there will be ups and downs in this development and besides the fact that the transitional process might take several decades it might not end in democracy. Thus, using the term democratization refers to the fact that scholars of democracy sometimes assume that after the collapse of authoritarian rule the path towards democracy is the obvious path for a country – a result of the optimistic developments after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

2.3. Democratic Transition

Geoffrey Pridham (2000, 19) defines democratic transition as “that first major stage of regime change commencing at the point when the previous authoritarian/totalitarian system begins to collapse and leading to a situation when, with the new constitution in place, the operation of the new political structures can start to be routinized.” The term is, thus, distinct from democratization of which democratic transition is just one of several stages. A democratic transition includes several crucial tasks which range from developing a new constitution and reappraising the authoritarian past (Pridham 2000, 19). Two further tasks which Samuel Huntington deems most important are the issue of how to deal with former officials who committed grave human rights crimes and the problem of limiting the military’s involvement in politics and of ensuring a civilian control over the security apparatus (Huntington 1991a, 209). While a transition may occur not only from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime but also backwards, transitology is mainly concerned with the former (Linz and Stephan 1995).
Democratization theory in general is predominantly occupied with the issue of democratic transitions and why some of them are successful while others were not. Theory is also heavily influenced by experiences from different democratic transitions in the past. Especially the conclusions drawn from the so called “Third Wave of Democratization” which started in 1974 (Huntington 1991b) and covers the transitions in Portugal, Spain and Greece, and also includes the revolutions in Central and South Eastern Europe have left their mark on democratization theory. So while Laurence Whitehead compares the logic behind a democratic transition to the logic of a drama performance (Whitehead 1997, 1), others stress the importance of ‘crafting institutional design’ or “elite pacts” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

According to Linz and Stepan (1996a), a country has completed its democratic transition when “sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, [when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies,] and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.” (Linz and Stepan 1996a, 3)

Finally, it needs to be mentioned that there can be a variety of outcomes of a political transition such as the possibility of a reversion of the process towards democracy, a breakdown of the political order altogether or the possibility that the process might lead to a development from a non-democratic system to another non-democratic one. But as the focus of this paper is on the causes of democratization, I shall not go further into specificities of democratic transitions.

2.4. Democratic Consolidation

Democratic Consolidation is a process leading to a consolidated or mature democracy. There is no definite amount of time a democracy has to exist until it becomes consolidated; on the contrary the term concerns the quality of democracy. Pridham stresses the fact that it “requires first of all the gradual removal of the uncertainties that usually surround transition and then the full institutionalization of a new democracy, the internalization of its rules and the dissemination of democratic values.” (2000, 20)

2 O'Donnell and Schmitter define “elite pacts” as “an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it” (1986, 37).
The important issue now is to define when a democracy has become consolidated. Samuel Huntington cites the so called “two-turnover test” according to which “a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election.” (Huntington 1991, 266-7) This definition is very limited to the procedural aspect of democracy and falls somewhat short of capturing the real meaning of democratic consolidation which also refers to a state of affairs in which all relevant actors in the state regard democracy and democratic means as the only acceptable rules of the political game or as Linz and Stepan put it, when “democracy is the only game in town” (1996a, 6).
3. Democratization Theory: Causes and Preconditions

After having defined most of the major terms used in democracy literature, I shall now proceed with the more important question of how democracy came into existence. Do certain economic determinants cause the emergence of democracy? Is it that a certain set of actors produces democracy? Are certain mass movements and popular uprisings the key to democracy? But what leads people to rise up against their rulers? Are monarchies more prone to democratization than military or totalitarian regimes? Do international democracy promotion efforts support the spread of democracy?

Looking at the history of the world, democracy has rather been the exception than the rule and the emergence of the people's rule is quite a remarkable event, as it is in the nature of power elites to pursue every strategy that will sustain their hold on power – the granting of civic freedoms would do exactly that: limit elites' hold on power (Vanhanen 2003). The Indian economist Amartya Sen even regards the occurrence of democracy as “the most important thing that had happened in the twentieth century” (Sen 1999, 3).

During the course of history scholars have answered the question of how democracy comes into being very differently: while some looked to structural reasons, others emphasized the influence of actors or the role of international factors. Especially the significant improvement both in the quality and quantity of democracy in the last thirty to forty years spurred unprecedented activities in the field of democracy studies. This is quite understandable as every country’s transition to democracy provides scholars with new insights about the processes of democratization. Therefore, many new theories were developed after the increase of democracy since Portugal's transition to democracy in 1974 which symbolises the start of the surge in democracy, or the beginning of the “third wave of democratization” as Huntington refers to it (1991, 13). The findings gained from the transitions during this wave will be the focus of this paper.

In this chapter, I shall start by presenting the early insights in democratization literature, such as the pioneering works by Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) and Dankwart A. Rustow (1970). Subsequently, I shall move on to the conclusions gained from the third wave of democratization after explaining the concept of waves in more detail. Analytically, I shall distinguish between Genetic, Functionalist and Transnational theories, as well as the so called “Social Forces Tradition” (Teorell 2010, 22) and analyse them separately, despite the fact that only findings from all theories together can fully explain the complex processes of democratization.
3.1. Early Democratization Theory

To find theories that comprehensively explain such a complex issue as democratization is somewhat impossible. Jan Teorell (2010, 16) summarizes the requirements of such a theory very aptly:

“Ideally, an explanatory theory of democratization should [...] be sufficiently general to encompass the regularities in patterns of regime change across both time and space, but without sacrificing concreteness and the ability to account for complex causal mechanisms at work in singular instances. It should transcend the structure and agency divide [...] and be capable of explaining both short-term and long-term dynamics in regime trajectories over time, and both why autocracies turn into democracies and why some democracies become autocracies again. [...] It should be probabilistic by nature.”

But naturally most theories fall short of such exhaustive requirements. As already mentioned most of them underline different aspects of democratization: those focusing on structural and socio-economic aspects are called “functionalist theories”, those highlighting political choice and actions as “genetic theories”, those stressing the importance of international factors are named “transnational theories” (Pridham 2000, 5) and, finally, those looking into the relevance of social class and the structure of society are called the “social forces tradition” (Teorell 2010, 12).

I shall now describe the earliest representatives of functionalist, genetic and social forces theory which produced their work prior to the third wave of democratization. The idea that international factors can contribute to or inhibit democratization gained influence after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and, therefore, representatives of transnational theories will only be discussed at a later point of this chapter.

3.1.1. Origin of functionalist theory

In general functionalist theory focuses on the “necessary economic, social and cultural preconditions for democracy” (Pridham 2000, 5). Functionalist theory draws its inspiration from Lipset’s modernization theory which addresses the interconnected issues of economic development and social mobilization (Pridham 2000, 5).
The major claim of Lipset’s work is that a country’s chances for democratization depend on its level of socio-economic development or as he himself put it, “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (1959, 75). His argument was based on the fact that the majority of democratic regimes existed in the Anglo-American and Western European regions where capitalist economies existed. Only relatively equally distributed wealth would lead to a situation in which “the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues” (Lipset 1959, 75). Lipset argues that indicators of modernization such as per capita income, the use of energy, the degree of urbanization, and the literacy rate are conducive to democratization (1975, 77-78). Lipset based his argumentation on the less known work by Daniel Lerner who also stressed the importance of the “secular evolution of a participant society” while looking into processes of urbanization and growing literacy rates as well as media growth (Lerner 1958, 60).

3.1.2. Origin of genetic theory

In contrast to functionalist theories, genetic theory is more concerned with the specificities of early transitions as well as the choices and actions of political actors during a transitional period. This approach to democratization was sparked by Dankwart Rustow’s fundamental critique of Lipset’s modernization theory. Rustow accused Lipset of neglecting the “generic question of how a democracy comes into being” (1970, 340) and developed a model of how democratization unfolds. What he called “preparatory phase”, “decision phase” and “habituation phase” would serve as inspiration for O’Donnell and Schmitter in 1986 who coined the terms liberalization, democratization and consolidation and, thus, transformed the way democratization is studied today (Teorell 2010, 19).

3.1.3. The origin of the social forces tradition

While functionalist theories look into structural factors and genetic theories are interested in transitional choices, the social forces tradition seeks the “origins of democratic rule in the characteristics of and relationships among social classes in society.” (Teorell 2010, 22) The major contributor to the social forces tradition is Barrington Moore. In his book he looks into the relationship between the peasantry and the land owning upper class, and demonstrates why their relationship was crucial in determining whether a country’s transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society would lead to democracy or to left- or right-wing authoritarian
regimes (Moore 1966). His most famous quote concerns another societal actor: “No bourgeois, no democracy.” (Moore 1966, 418)

Another noteworthy assumption by this school of thought is that democratization came into being due to a value change in society. Subsequently, “some political cultures are conducive to the establishment of democracy while others are not, for certain mass orientations” need to exist before a society can take the path towards democracy (Pridham 2000, 6). For example Almond and Verba (1963) pioneered with their work on the connection between democracy and political culture by creating the term ‘civic culture’.

3.2. Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization

Now that I have described the origins of three of the major theories on democratization, I will elaborate further on the concept of waves and how the third wave of democratization led to many new insights in the process of democratization

3.2.1. The Third Wave of Democratization

As already mentioned democracy theory gains its insights from the experiences of different countries’ transitions to democracy. In 1989 a crucial factor that led to the revolutions was the fact that the Soviet Union had decided it would not intervene militarily anymore in the Soviet satellite states in case the Communist regimes were in danger of losing power. This encouraged many opposition groups in their fights against the Communist regimes. Until the 1989 revolutions in the former Communist countries, international factors were considered secondary to domestic factors (Teixeira 2008, 2). But this had changed after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Additionally, starting in the year 1974 the world saw a large increase in the numbers of democracies worldwide: in the years from 1974 until 1990, about 30 countries underwent transitions to democracy. This surge in democracy was defined by Samuel Huntington as the “third wave of democratization” (1991b, 12). He defined a ‘wave’ as “a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time” (Huntington 1991a, 15). Thus, all important short- and long-term factors which influenced the transitions to democracy during that certain period of time are somehow brought to attention
Other scholars described the events as significant “moment” (Green 1999) or as “pulses of isomorphic change” (Thomas et.al. 1987). But it was Huntington’s concept of ‘waves’ was most widely accepted and which finally provided the international aspect of democratization the needed attention in the academic field. In Figure 1, the wavelike rise and fall of democratization is clearly visible.

The democratization of so many countries led to the fact that “initial theories and models of democratic transition have been stretched (and even undermined) by the resulting diversity of paths and outcomes” (Whitehead 2008, 8). Also countries democratized which lacked the prerequisites which were discussed in functionalist theories and the outcomes of democratization were not always clearly democracies but a variety of systems in which democracy was mixed with authoritarian elements and vice-versa.

3.2.2. Functionalist Theories

Lipset’s argument that economic development favoured the emergence of democracy is one of the most disputed hypotheses in democratization studies and, therefore, his ideas initiated a widespread debate whether his claims were justified or whether they were to be discharged.
3.2.2.1. Modernization Theory Revisited

Several scholars contributed to the set of structural factors Lipset mentioned: the effects of income inequality (Burkhart 1997), how economic crises affect democratization (Gasiorowski 1995; Bernard et al. 2001; 2003), how the structure of the economy – namely the reliance on one centrally depleted resource – shapes the prospects for democracy (Ross 2001; Dunning 2008), the question whether a large or a small country is more likely to democratize (Dahl and Tufte 1973), and the factor of a colonial past (Bernard et al. 2004) to name just a few. All these scholars see the causes or reasons for democratization in structural reasons “beyond the immediate reach of human agents” (Teorell 2010, 18). Often there were not even any actors specified and what happened is described as almost a mechanical process which can hardly be influenced by actors. A fact which does not mirror the view of the original proponent of this theory: “Lipset himself – would agree that only through the behavior of individual and collective actors could the process of regime change actually occur” (Teorell 2010, 18). Critics of functionalist theories claim that despite the fact that its generality provides fruitful insights in the overall aspects of democratization; the great variety of structural aspects renders clear analyses rather difficult. Moreover, there is a lack of micro-foundations due to blending out the agency factor. But later events of the third wave caused a change of minds, or what Huntington called switching the focus from “causes” to “causers” of democratization” (1997, 107).

Besides those who contributed to Lipset’s hypothesis there are others who argued against it. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi (1997a; 1997b) tried to show that modernization does not forward democracy, but it rather contributes to the consolidation of established democracies and helps to prevent their sliding back to authoritarianism. Charles Boix and Susan Stokes (2003), on the other hand, proved by using the same data, that modernization does both helping democracies to emerge and preventing them from authoritarian backlash.

3.2.2.2. Democracy and Economic Development

Another important conclusion drawn from Lipset’s argument was that, firstly, economic development was necessary for a democracy to be established and, subsequently, that new states had to face “the cruel choice between rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic processes”, as Jagdish Bhagwati put it (1966, 204) because social and economic progress were seen as indispensable “requisites for stable democracies” (Burnell 2000, 40). Thus for a long time, the argument was that democracy hindered economic growth but this has changed...
after the experience in Eastern Europe where countries were able to advance democratic
and economic development simultaneously (Ake 1991, 33) and also when it became obvious
that many authoritarian countries - especially in Africa - performed very poorly in terms of
economic growth and development (Bhagwati 1995, 51). The argument that authoritarian
regimes are better at delivering economic growth and development is to a great extent based
on the economic success stories of East Asian countries like South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Hong Kong. As Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister of Singapore, put it
“what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy. The exuberance of
democracy leads to indiscipline and disorderly conduct which are inimical to development.”
(Bhagwati 1995, 51) This view was also strongly supported by leaders of non-democracies
who were clearly unwilling to give up power.

The notion that development is hindered by democracy is based on the argument that
authoritarian governments “are more effective at mobilizing resources for investment”
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997b, 163) than democracies for example through higher taxation.
The line of argument goes that in democracies people will demand higher wages, welfare
policies and social services from their governments straight from the beginning and, thus,
resources for investment are diverted. The fact that this may also lead to an increase in
productivity is neglected. Furthermore, it was argued that in order to make sound decisions
on economic policies “it is absolutely critical that the government agency in charge [...] be
protected from pressures to divert resources toward the many rent-seeking claims that exist
in the larger society.” (Fukuyama and Marwhah 2000, 86) Moreover, an elected government
might be less inclined to take “economically correct and financially prudent but tough
decisions” (Burnell 2000, 43) which are not favoured by their electoral base but necessary for
the future of the country.

But in fact there were and are not many incentives for an authoritarian ruler to invest in
society and in sound economic policies. Looking at the African countries, evidence clearly
shows that favouring development over democracy has brought no advantage: neither did
the standard of living improve nor did the African share of world trade (Ake 1991, 35).
Instead of empowering society the leaders supported the already wealthy class. Also the
experiences from several transitions in Eastern Europe changed the assumptions about
development being an essential prerequisite of democratization. Thus, it was accepted that
both transitions – economical and democratic – were possible at the same time and even
Jagdish Bhagwati – who created the term “crucial choice” – argued that democracies were
better at allocating resources because democratically elected governments are accountable
to their citizens and will, therefore, act in their citizens’ interest as well as they are able to.
Authoritarian governments are more prone to extravagance and prestigious projects and
there are no mechanisms by which the people could influence this (Bhagwati 1995, 57). Or as Peter Burnell claims, “The idea that many countries face a cruel choice between development and democracy has been supplanted by a growing appreciation that these desirable goals are related in complex way” (2000, 43).

Moreover, looking at the Gulf states where economic development is exceptionally high one cannot detect any significant movement towards democracy. It is, thus, essential not only to focus on the economic aspect of modernization but also on the advancements in education and the communications sector.

### 3.2.2.3. The end of history?

The focus on prerequisites led some authors to make rather deterministic assumptions about the prospects of democracy: the most well-known example is Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis. He interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as “not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” (1989, 107) Thus, he believed that historically democracy was the ideal that each country worldwide was aspiring to achieve and that historical trends would lead to exactly this.

Such assumptions have also fuelled the major criticisms about functionalist theories which are that they appear to be “deterministic, for espousing a linear view of political development” (Pridham 2000, 7). By focusing on prerequisites and determinants functionalist theory appears to make assumptions such as, if conditions X, Y and Z are given, a democracy is about to develop. But of course reality is not that simple.

### 3.2.3. Genetic Theories

Based on Dankwart Rustow’s criticism of functionalist theory’s preoccupation with structural factors of democratization genetic theory made several important contributions the study of democratization.

#### 3.2.3.1. Focus on Actors

Most importantly, the actor was brought into focus instead of the structure. Democratization, was claimed, is not an automatism caused by factors such as economic development and
rising levels of education, but it is a brought about by actors and their choices and strategies (Welzel 2009, 88) or as Michael McFaul (2010, 4) pointedly stated, "individuals make history, not innate structural forces." Thus, the role of cultural, political or socio-economic factors mattered only insofar as they shaped human choices and preferences over the long haul, but those structural factors were deemed less useful for analysing democratization during short periods of time, such as the breakdown of a regime and the succeeding transitional events (McFaul 2010, 4).

3.2.3.2. Path dependency

The other valuable contribution is the concept of “temporal path dependence” or the focus on the “mode of transition” which means that certain choices made at critical times during a transition can significantly influence the further course of the transition. This included taking the impact of uncertainty into account, meaning that only because structural factors point to a democratic development, the reality is often surprisingly different (Rustow 1970; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Thus, there is not one single path to democracy, but democracy “may crop up under extremely varying historical, institutional and structural conditions” and this insight, while important, complicated the study of democratization due to the varied transition typologies which were developed subsequently (Teorell 2010, 20).

Similar to ‘temporal path dependency’ is the concept of “contingency” which according to Schmitter means that regime outcomes “depend less on objective conditions circumscribing routinised actions than on subjective evaluations surrounding unique strategic choices.” (O'Donnel and Schmitter 1986, 271)

3.2.3.3. The Pact School

During the third wave, a successful transition to democracy was most likely when moderates and soft-liners negotiated a pact for a guided transition towards democracy. Scholars focusing on the concept of elite pacts were called the “pact school” because they all focused on the importance of reconciliation between the elite actors (Pridham 2000, 10). O'Donnell and Schmitter define “elite pacts” as “an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it” (1986, 37). If such a pact was not possible – scholars agreed at that time – there was hardly any chance for democracy. Therefore, the focus of attention was put on the different actors of the opposition and the ruling elite (McFaul 2010,
6). O'Donnell and Schmitter drew another important conclusion from the experiences of the third wave which was that “all previously known transitions to political democracy have observed one fundamental restriction: it is forbidden to take, or even checkmate, the king of one of the payers. In other words, during the transition, the property rights of the bourgeoisie are inviolable” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 69). This assumption was of course taken during the height of the Cold War during which leftist and rightist policies were additionally charged with immense geopolitical implications, as leftist parties wishing to redistribute wealth and land were seen as communist threat and, moreover, Communist countries were all non-democratic states.

The pact school sees a pact most likely to occur when there is a stalemate between the opposition and the ruling regime and the political process is blocked because if either side is in a clearly stronger position this side does not see any merits in joining a pact. But as soon as both groups realize that without working together they can only both loose, they decide to cooperate (Rustow 1970, 352).

Another representative, for instance, is Adam Przeworski who contributed to the ‘pact school’ by distinguishing different elements within the ancient regime – so called hard-liners vs. soft-liners - and also among the opposition – radicals and moderates (Pridham 2000, 10). Also Giuseppe Di Palma (1990) is one of the noteworthy representatives of this school. His concept of “political crafting” focuses on the fashion and by which means political elites forge their pacts. His concept is very optimistic, as “greater investment in crafting (so as consciously to steer clear of repeated authoritarian involutions) can open novel possibilities for democracy in contexts previously deemed unfavourable” (Di Palma 1990, 88-90).

The agreement among scholars was predominant that negotiated transitions during which the opposition and the ruling elite would determine the future of the state was the most stable, and guaranteed way to democracy. Also Daniel Friedman stated that negotiated “transitions increase democratic stability by encouraging important interests to compromise” (1993, 484). The importance of compromise between elites led to an emphasis on limiting the role of radicals in the negotiation process. After all, democratic transitions which are based on pacts are “elite affairs”, while mobilized masses were considered to have a dangerous destabilizing effect. “If the masses are part of the equation, then revolution, not democracy, results” (McFaul 2010, 6). Terry Karl postulates that “no stable political democracy has resulted from regime transitions in which mass actors have gained control even momentarily over traditional ruling classes.” (Karl 1990, 8) Also Samuel Huntington
argues the same way: “Democratic regimes that last seldom if ever have been instituted by popular action. Almost always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up […] . The passionate dissidents from authoritarian rule and the crusaders for democratic principles, the Tom Paines of this world, do not create democratic institutions; that requires James Madison. Those institutions come into existence through negotiations and compromises among political elites calculating their own interests and desires.” (Huntington 1984, 6)

3.2.3.4. Critique

Critique of genetic theories revolves around three arguments. Firstly, genetic theories are criticized for being inherently elitist. It is the ‘Social Forces Tradition’ which predominantly points out that mass mobilization does have its merits in the process of democratization. Nancy Bermeo shows that “democratization seems to have proceeded alongside weighty and even bloody popular challenges” (Bermeo 1997, 314). The social forces tradition shall be discussed in depth in the following chapter which is also where I shall further elaborate this argument.

Secondly, genetic theories are criticized for assuming too much freedom for political actors and for disconnecting them from their political, socio-economic and cultural background. Instead of asking how this background shapes actors’ preferences and actions, they seem to be detached from such factors (Teorell 2010, 21).

Finally, the third point of critique focuses on the issue of genetic theories having a too narrow scope (Pridham 2000, 12). By focusing on short-term calculations, genetic theories almost automatically exclude the impact of long-term factors.

3.2.4. The Social Forces Tradition

The diverse thoughts and contributions which I subsumed under the term “Social forces tradition”³ include the social forces tradition, as explained earlier in this chapter, theories about the influence of culture and religion on democratization, and, finally, mass mobilization theories.

³ The term is used by Jan Teorell (2010) in a stricter sense focusing mainly on class relationships, while I added other determinants, such as culture, religion, mass mobilization and civil society.
3.2.4.1. Mass Mobilization

Just like genetic theories, the social forces tradition has been inspired by the transitions of the third wave. But while genetic theories emphasized the importance of elites in a democratic transition, the social forces tradition drew its inspiration from the later transitions which occurred in Eastern Europe as well as the ‘Colour Revolutions’ such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. Thus, contrary to the proposition in genetic theory that mobilized masses have a negative impact on a country’s chances for democratization, the social forces tradition emphasizes the positive role of non-violent mass movements in the process of regime breakdown and subsequent democratic transitions (Karatnycki and Ackermann 2005; Ulfelder 2005; Welzel 2007). The school postulates that a transition to democracy is in fact most likely if a sufficient number of the population is participating in demonstrations and protest movements too large for the authoritarian security apparatus to suppress (Welzel 2009, 83).

Analogies are drawn to the assumption that in history “institutionalization of people power has been an unlikely achievement” because power elites naturally attempt to maintain their hold on power and subsequently are not easily persuaded to allow for civic freedoms because they have exactly this effect – the limit elites’ power (Vanhanen 2003). The process by which the public arrives at a stage where they are both willing and able to mount mass pressure is twofold: firstly, mass movements do not simply come to happen because people have the necessary resources, but because they rally to a common cause for which they are willing to sacrifice their security and well-being (McAdam 1986). Thus, it involves an ideological ‘framework’ which adds the legitimacy and meaning of a common cause to the peoples’ inner conviction so that they are convinced to pursue it (Snow and Benford 1988). Secondly, people have to overcome the perceived or threat of repression. While Welzel (2009, 83) simply states that “when a population begins to long for freedoms, mass opposition does emerge - in spite of repressive threats” Timun Kuran (1991) presents an elaborate model how this process plays out in a very detailed way.

3.2.4.2. Culture and Religion

Another important aspect of the social forces tradition focuses on the role of culture and religion. There is a variety of scholars who represent the opinion that the Islamic religion is not only unfavourable to democracy but even incompatible with democracy. Fish (2002) accords this negative correlation between Islam and democracy to female subordination but
he rather cites social, demographic and psychological reasons than religious ones. Larry Diamond claims that it is not Islam which presents a problem for democracy, as there are several democratic Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, and argues that the democracy gap "is rather an "Arab gap" than a "Muslim gap"" (Diamond 2010, 94).

3.2.4.3. **Class Relations**

To a large part the social forces traditions focuses on the relevance of class struggles and distribution of power among society. One key assumption is based on the existence of collective actors based on class differences which mainly pursue material interests. Thus, democratization is explained in combination with their economic interests: those collective actors are "most likely to champion democracy when their economic interests put them at odds with the authoritarian state" (Bellin 2000, 177). In comparison to functionalist approaches, the social forces tradition is very actor specific but, in contrast to genetic theory, psychological explanations are not taken into account (Teorell 2010, 22). In one of the most essential books Rueschemeyer (1992, 46-61) argues for not looking at the bourgeoisie but the middle class as the ‘champion of democracy’ as the landlord is the one opposing democracy the most while the bourgeoisie has a more ambiguous position towards democracy. Explaining the emergence and fall of democracy depends on two factors according to Reuschmeyer: firstly, how strongly and densely the working class is organized and, secondly, how much the landowning class is weakened (Teorell 2010, 21-22).

3.2.4.4. **Critique**

The social forces tradition is criticized for the difficulties the school of thought has in determining coherently which social classes favour or oppose democracy and how mass mobilization relates to elite choices and for a certain degree of determinism which is the danger for all theories which seek definite determinants of democracy such as in this case, the existence of a middle class or sufficient mass mobilization (Teorell 2010, 23-4). Moreover, there is a lack of systematically and empirically testing its propositions.

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4 Although it has to be noted that the fact that women are suppressed might only be a Western perception because within a family it is the mother who takes most important decisions for her children – male or female (Mantl 2011).
3.2.5. Transnational Theories

In general transnational theories cover “diverse external factors and influences and a spread of actors that are located or originate outside a country’s borders” (Pridham 2000, 285). Initially transnational theories were somehow intended to improve modernization theory by adding the international system or international influences. Thus, the study of democratization was enhanced by not only looking at structural explanations but by looking at them amplified by diffusion (Pridham 2000, 8). This process of adding the international system to the equation started with analysing the transitions of the third wave of democratization and especially those in Eastern Europe.

3.2.5.1. “Snowballing”

After the fall of the Berlin Wall autocracies fell like dominoes insofar as the fall of one increased the likelihood that one of his neighbours would fall (Starr 1991) – something that had never happened before and scholars were not only taken by surprise, but also struggled to explain what had happened.

The ground-breaking concept by Samuel Huntington that democratization occurs in waves was developed after these events, as already mentioned earlier in this chapter. Huntington claims that the wave-like character of democratization is brought about by “snowballing”, or what he describes as “the demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization” (Huntington 1999b, 13). Huntington cites evidence for the effect of “snowballing” with the fact that the events in Eastern Europe even led to a political opening in the Arab countries, as people demanded more rights and freedoms inspired by the Eastern European citizens (1991, 16). The fact that this political liberalization did not lead to the emergence of democracy in all cases does not refute the argument that democratization processes in one country increase the chances for the emergence of liberalization or democratization in neighbouring countries. Huntington himself doubted that this wave of democratization would reach every corner of the world (1991, 17).

Nevertheless there are limitations to the effect of snowballing: snowballing will only help or spur the emergence of democracy but if the structural conditions are unfavourable to democracy and if there are no actors pushing for democratic change, the snowballing effect will lead to nothing: “The "worldwide democratic revolution" may create an external environment conducive to democratization, but it cannot produce the conditions necessary for democratization within a particular country.” (Huntington 1991, 16)
3.2.5.2. **Diffusion**

Another very similar concept and more accepted and developed is “diffusion”. It has been demonstrated that diffusion has significant influence on democratization on several levels – on a global scale, within a region and between neighbouring countries (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Starr 1991; Starr and Lindborg 2003). Bunce and Wolchik (2010, 34) both worked extensively on the role of diffusion during the transitions to democracy in Eastern European countries and they found a very apt definition of diffusion:

“Diffusion is a process in which new ideas, institutions, policies, models, or repertoires of behavior spread from their point of origin to new sites. [...] Diffusion, therefore, implies a coincidence of time and geography with respect to similar new ways of doing things [...] and it refers to a significant shift in mass political behaviour – that is, mobilization against authoritarian regimes in the streets and during elections – in one country that then moves to neighboring countries.”

But in diffusion processes local actors also play a crucial role by taking a conscious decision to apply the innovations which other actors invented in their specific contexts. Diffusion can take place through different ways. But I shall elaborate more on diffusion in the next chapter, as I chose this concept as one of the elements of transnational theories I shall apply to the example of Egypt.

3.2.5.3. **Neighbouring Countries**

What concerns neighbouring countries, theory proposes that democracies tend to prefer to have other democracies at their borders. The most obvious example here is again the European Union and its “European Neighbourhood Programme”. The EU’s declared goal is to create a circle of democracies around the EU member states because other democracies are regarded as more stable than authoritarian regimes (Bauer and Hanelt 2011, 11).

Moreover, Daniel Brinks and Michel Coppedge (2006) claim that countries and states have a tendency to adapt to the average degree of democracy which is prevalent among the majority of states in their neighbourhood. According to Brinks and Gleditsch, the most important aspect of a country’s international context is the country’s “web of relations with the neighbouring countries in its own region” (Yilmaz 2009, 95) and not international actors or NGOs because they are too distant. Therefore, they first of all adapt to the degree of
democracy in their neighbourhood, but in addition to this Brinks and Coppedge also found evidence that countries tend to move in the same direction as the majority of countries worldwide – be in towards democracy or toward authoritarianism (2006, 463).

Also Kristian Gleditsch and Michael Ward conclude in their study that the chances for a country to embark on a transition to democracy increase significantly when its neighbouring states either currently experience a democratic transition or are already democracies (2006, 928). But they admit that “it is difficult to fully specify the full range of possible micro-level processes of democratization and show how international factors influence these in a model at the aggregate level.” (2006, 930)

Another aspect of here is the influence of ongoing conflict with neighbouring state on the prospects of democratization – in this case the ongoing tensions between Egypt and Israel. Despite the fact that Egypt and Israel signed a Peace Accord in 1978, there are still tensions and while cooperation between the Israeli and Egyptian governments was and still is far-reaching, the attitude in the Egyptian population has remained hostile towards Israel.

Gates, Knutsen, and Moses (1996) argue that a country’s chances of democratization may be curtailed when said country is experiencing conflict. The reason for this, according to Barzel and Kiser (1997) that the emergence of democratic institutions were held back by existence of an external threat because – as Gleditsch and Ward (2006, 920) explain – “insecure rulers were unable to make credible commitments and contracts with the ruled.”

3.2.5.4. Globalization

Before globalization became a crucial factor in international politics it made sense to regard the international level as nothing more than a subsidiary factor in democratization because states were in full control of the flow of information, people, commodities and money. The only influence which was exerted from the international level was direct action taken by another state, such as military attacks or direct support of opposition groups. As already mentioned prominent examples were the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II (Yilmaz 2009, 100-1).

But with the onset of globalization this changed indefinitely. Globalization blurs the distinct borders between the domestic and international, as decision-making is increasingly moved to a supra-national or intergovernmental level which leads to an erosion of the modern nation state. Also the dependence on the international market and global actors rises often at the expense of what people want within a nation (Yilmaz 2009, 101). States increasingly intervene in each other’s domestic affairs as concepts such as the responsibility to protect
are developed and individual rights become the focus of international law instead of states’ rights (Cede 2011, 3).

There is no agreement among scholars whether globalization has a predominantly positive or negative influence on democracy promotion – only on the fact that globalization is indeed very influential. At the same time there are clear winners and losers of democratization as globalization exacerbates existing inequalities. But on the other hand globalization also furthers the spread of ideas due to new information and communications technologies which allow more people access to information from which they were barred before (Teorell 2010, 77). Moreover, these new technologies increase the cooperation between human rights organisations worldwide and, thus, enable these organisations to make human rights violations more visible (Yılmaz 2009, 101).

3.2.5.5. Dependence

Early on during the third wave of democratization Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) developed the so called “dependence theory” which was based on the assumption that the world is divided in an economically wealthy “core” and a dependent, poor, and underdeveloped “periphery”. Wallerstein and other dependence and world system position theorists such as Hadenius argue that “the difficulties of the developing countries are caused chiefly by their external economic relations: they represent the ‘underdog’ in an uneven, exploitive, international system” (1992, 91). This means that not only does the core’s wealth depend on the poverty of the periphery, but the relations between the core and the periphery prevent the periphery from democratizing because the core relies on authoritarian leaders in the periphery to exploit the peripheral countries for mutual benefit (Teorell 2010, 77).

There are several critics of dependence theory, namely Kenneth Bollen, who demonstrates in cross-sectional tests that dependence theory’s claim that countries in the periphery are less democratic simply because of their position in the world system does not hold. Instead he suggests that world position could have an indirect influence on democracy through its impact on the economic development of peripheral countries. He concludes, “[e]conomic development increases the chances for political democracy. If noncore status or dependency depresses economic development, then indirectly it will reduce democracy.” (Bollen 1983, 477)

But others like Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny (2003) by and large confirm dependence theory’s claims. Li and Reuveny conclude from their findings that portfolio investment inflows and the volume of trade correlate negatively with democratization, but that direct foreign
investment has a positive influence which becomes less after some time. They claim that “the economic aspects of integration into the world economy are beginning to cause a decline in national democratic governance.” (Li and Reuveny 2003, 53)

3.2.5.6. Critique

While there is an agreement today that the international aspect is very influential on a country’s prospects for democracy, there is not much consistency in the findings. For example, I have demonstrated that neighbour diffusion has great impact – both positive and negative – on democratization, but the causal mechanisms behind are lacking. Also membership in international or regional organisations seems to promote democratization but again the evidence and results are mixed. As far as foreign intervention is concerned there are examples where it worked exceptionally well, such as Germany, Japan, and Austria, and there are cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan which are both after nearly a decade of foreign intervention more than far from democracy (Teorell 2010, 99).

Moreover, Geoffrey Pridham (2000, 9) criticises overall transnational theories for lacking “a clear handle on estimating cause and effect in terms of developing external-internal interactions.” He also points out that the term ‘wave’ is rather descriptive and not very useful analytically, especially as for example the term third wave of democratization covers the entirety of transitions from 1974 onwards (2000, 9).
4. Causes of Democracy during the Third Wave of Democratization

The fourth chapter is dedicated to the arguments for democratization which I chose to apply to Egypt. From each of the four schools I shall take two or three causes with special relevance to Egypt or to the nature of the revolutionary movement. So far I have presented the causes for democratization which are the most well known but not all of them are applicable to the Arabic countries.

I shall begin with presenting why the concept of prerequisites’ and causes of democracy is not only feasible but also of great importance – in contrast to the opinion of some scholars who claim that prerequisites do not provide much insight into explaining democratization. Subsequently, I shall continue by presenting the chosen causes from the four different schools. Firstly, I shall focus on genetic theories; secondly, on genetic theories; thirdly, on the social forces tradition; and, finally, on transnational theories. For each school, I shall explain why I decided on the presented aspect and not on others. Subsequently, I shall present how the factor will be analysed and its application to the case of Egypt will take place in chapter five.

But first, let me explain why I have chosen to include factors from all four major schools and why I did not limit my research to say the social forces tradition. It is very important to bear in mind that all four schools have major shortcomings – as already mentioned, functionalist theories focus on structural reasons and by doing so forget the impact of the individual; and genetic theories look into actors and their decisions but they ascribe mass participation in a democratic transition negative impact – to give just some examples. It is, thus, crucial to look into aspects of all major schools in order to make sure that those shortcomings do not cause us to overlook or neglect important factors in democratization (Teorell 2010, 12).

For example if we look at the motivations of the Egyptian people from an economic perspective, we would neglect their desire for living in a fair and free environment. The Egyptians did not just call for bread, but for “bread and dignity”.


4.1. Are Preconditions of Democracy Relevant?

Before we look into the actual causes and preconditions of democracy, it is necessary to establish the relevance of those causes and preconditions.

Among representatives of the genetic school of democratization the notion is strong that preconditions of democracy are somewhat insignificant. Rustow (1970) as well as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) claim that democracy is rather established “from above through the strategic skills, and at times sheer luck, of elite actors maneuvering under profound uncertainty” (Teorell 2010, 4). Others such as McFaul stress that democracy has "no uniform causes" and that there are also “no necessary preconditions for, or determinants of, democracy” (McFaul 2010, 4). Most prominently, Przeworski and Limongi (1997a, 159) criticised that, “democracy appears exogenously as a deus ex machina. It survives if a country is "modern," but it is not a product of "modernization"”. They claim that while modernization may help a country to sustain democracy, modernization does not increase the chances of a country to transition to democracy.

These claims may hold true for a short term perspective because even with complete knowledge about the structural factors of a country – such as geographical size, economic performance, the international environment concerning neighbour diffusion or ethnic and religious structure; to name just a few - it is not possible to predict a case of democratization in the short term. But over the long haul one can detect developments in the direction of democracy. Teorell (2010, 10-11) argues that, “If we think of these same structural conditions as determining a long-run equilibrium level of democracy, to which countries would gravitate in the absence of short-term perturbations, their explanatory performance is improved considerably”. Moreover, scholars such as Gasiorowski (1995) and Bernard et al. (2001) show how economic crisis can lead to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes; Burkhart (1997) presents his claim that income inequality and the degree of democracy are indirectly linked; and finally, Gleditsch and Ward (2006) prove the effects of neighbour diffusion on democratization. They argue that while democratic transitions may be rare, they still rather take place under certain conditions than others. Therefore, they refute the argument that transitions to democracy happen randomly (Gleditsch and Ward 2006, 929).

4.2. Genetic Theories

The first school of thought which I shall present are genetic theories which focus on the inherent uncertainty of transitions and how the different actors as well as their decisions
influence transitions and, thus, prospects for democratization. Moreover, genetic theories argue that preconditions and causes are futile, but as they still contribute several important aspects for my research question.

The focus on what type of regime leads to democratization and the question of how a regime breaks up influences the chances for democracy is therefore easily chosen, as genetic theory mostly focuses on transitions themselves not on so much the conditions leading to it. The literature is very rich in describing the actions of soft-liners and hard-liners of a regime during the transition but we are interested in what causes a regime to fall: this is, thus, one aspect I shall focus on: O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 19-21) claim that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself” – meaning that no opposition movement or actor could succeed in overthrowing or changing a non-democratic regime when its government is undivided and unified. Thus, in this chapter I shall, firstly, look into the question how the nature of a regime affects the chances of a regime breakdown and also its chances for democratization. What also needs to be stressed again is the fact that I shall only look into the chances for a country to embark on a transition to democracy, but this transition may not lead to democracy or may in fact take several decades and setbacks. During the third wave of democratization only 23 percent of all transitions actually resulted in democracy, while 77 percent led to another form of authoritarianism (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 152).

Moreover, I am omitting several factors form genetic theories which can also lead to a transition, such as external shocks like economic crises or military defeat. Despite the fact, that they feature a prominent role in the literature, I shall not focus on them, because, firstly, I have to limit my focus, and, secondly, Egypt has not been in a war since 1977 (against Libya and not counting the Egyptian involvement in the second Gulf war on the side of the UN sanctioned coalition). Moreover, the effects of external economic shocks or influences are covered in the subsequent chapter on inequality.

4.2.1. Regime Type

This chapter shall begin with an overview of the different characterizations of non-democratic regimes and continue with analyzing their chances for regime splits or deconsolidation. Afterwards, I shall explain how this concept will be applied to the case of Egypt.
4.2.1.1. Theory: Regime Types and Democratization

In the course of the third wave more and more regimes came to adapt democratic principles as they embarked on transitions, but not all of these countries ended up as fully fledged democracies. In fact many rather showed features of both democracies and of authoritarian regimes. Classic literature on measuring democracy only distinguished between totalitarian regimes on one side and authoritarian regimes on the other hand (Linz 2000). Linz and Stepan (1996a) added the two categories “posttotalitarianism” and “sultanism” but even with these further additions, the categories failed to comprehend the complexities of these new hybrid regimes.

As these “pseudodemocracies” were a rather recent development, it took some time before this phenomenon received recognition in the literature. This term underlines the current attitude that regimes feel international as well as national pressure to legitimize their rule with some sort of democracy – whether nominally or real depends on the country. Nevertheless, it is not very useful for analytical purposes, as it covers all regimes that fall between the two extremes of democracy and non-democracy (Diamond 2002, 24).

Larry Diamond (2002) developed the concept one step further by adding the term “hybrid regimes”. Diamond focused on the degrees “of authoritarian competitiveness” and distinguished between “competitive authoritarian regimes” and “hegemonic electoral authoritarian” ones (Diamond 2002, 29). Between those two extremes he left a group of “ambiguous regimes” (Diamond 2002, 25) which fell in neither of the categories. Diamond has been criticized for focusing only on the degree of competitiveness, for if regimes would only differ on this dimension, different categories would not be necessary (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 144).

Another important contribution comes from Barbara Geddes who made a qualitative distinction between regimes and identifies military regimes, single-party regimes personalist regimes, as well as mixed forms or “amalgams” as she called them (1999). Fareed Zakaria termed such regimes “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria 1997).

In short, the list of different terms and names for such semidemocracies is very long. Armony and Schamis (2005, 114) criticized that this array of terms “not only hinders differentiation among the cases but also clouds the basic distinction between democracy and autocracy”. Moreover, it needs to be kept in mind that reality will never perfectly fit into theoretical categories and, therefore, it is necessary to maintain some flexibility and to restrain oneself to just a number of categories. In this paper I shall rely on the work by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) which focus their studies not on the chances of a regime’s demise but on its chances of democratization.
Hadenius and Teorell (2007, 136) base their distinctions between authoritarian regimes on the mode of maintaining power. They distinguish three different modes and, subsequently, three kinds of regimes that correspond with those methods – besides other hybrid forms. Firstly, they name “hereditary succession, or lineage” and this mode of maintaining power translates to the regime form of monarchy; secondly, “the actual or threatened use of military force” which corresponds with the military regime; and, thirdly, they cite “popular election” which refers to an “electoral regime” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 146).

In this chapter I shall not elaborate any further on those forms of regime which clearly do not fit the Egyptian example, such as monarchies or no-party regimes⁵, and focus on those which correspond with the political system in Egypt.

4.2.1.1.1. Military Regimes

A military regime is the case when “military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force” (Nordlinger 1977, 2 - quoted in Hadenius and Teorell 2007). This does not include regimes where members or former members of the military were elected or chosen for leadership positions in elections which were under the control of the military. Hadenius and Teorell (2007, 152) find that “military/multi-party” regimes have the strongest tendency to embark on a transition that actually leads to democracy but that military regimes as such are most likely to transition to limited multi-party regimes.

The argument here is that military regimes are more likely to give up their hold on power because the institution itself will survive and remain to yield some influence even after relinquishing power to a civilian institution. This is contrary to the situation in a one-party regime where this party is most likely to lose all influence and power. This argument is challenged by the fact that there are many country-specific cases where the military continued to play significant role (Gasiorowski 1995).

Under the category of electoral regimes Hadenius and Teorell subsume a whole range of different regimes: one-party regimes, limited multi-party and dominant multi-party regimes whose common feature is that they do hold elections for parliament or the executive – how democratic these elections are is one of the features that distinguishes them.

⁵ Hadenius and Teorell define monarchies as “regimes in which a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice or the constitution” (2007, 146) and no-party regimes as regimes where elections are held but all parties are forbidden (2007, 147).
4.2.1.2. One-Party Regimes

In such regimes only one party is permitted to take part in the elections. Besides the party some independent candidates may be allowed as well as some “satellite parties” which ultimately depend on the regime and only present a show of opposition (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 147).

4.2.1.3. Multi-Party Regimes

This term applies to regimes which “hold parliamentary or presidential elections in which (at least some) independent or opposition candidates are able to participate” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 147). The focus is not on the result of the elections - therefore, the termination also holds true in case the opposition refrains from running in the elections – but the focus is that elections take place with “a degree of competition between candidates who either represent different parties or who choose to act as individuals” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 147). Again this must not lead us to the conclusion that these elections are either free or fair. The opposition will most likely still face immense suppression and obstruction during the elections and the campaign. (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 147) Other terms that come close to Hadenius and Teorell’s definition are Schedler’s (2002) “electoral authoritarianism” as well as Levitsky and Way’s (2002) “competitive authoritarianism”.

But Hadenius and Teorell (2007, 148) include a subcategory into the group of multi-party regimes which they call “dominant multi-party regimes”. In such regimes, the winning party takes more than two thirds of the votes.

The argument runs that limited multi-party regimes are more likely to democratize than other regimes and, also, that they already have the highest level of democracy (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 150). Teorell argues that the elections in multi-party regimes have two processes which can help democratization: firstly, they can lead to a division within the ruling regime due to the fact that election – how rigged they might be – still open space for opposing voices and, secondly, those divisions may cause a before divided opposition to unify in order to remove the ruling regime. Those two processes are not natural consequences of the institutional structure of a multi-party regime, but they are most likely to
occur in such a setting, especially after external shocks\(^6\) such as mass mobilization or economic difficulties (Teorell 2010, 9-10).

Moreover, according the “average life span of regimes” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007) multi-party regimes have a significantly shorter life span than military or one-party regimes: While one-party regimes survive about 18 years, military regimes only survive about 11 years on an average, dominant multi-party regimes about 10 years and non-dominant multi-party regimes survive only approximately 6 years. This does not allow for the conclusion that after a regime breaks down it will become a democracy, but it nevertheless allows us to conclude that democracy is less likely in a young military regime than in a young multi-party regime.

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Figure 1** Average Life Span of Regimes, 1972-2003

4.2.1.1.4. Personalism

In contrast to Geddes who defines Personalism as form of regime, Hadenius and Teorell agree with Paul Brooker (2000) who regards Personalism as nothing more than a minor or additional feature of any regime. Therefore, they treat personalism “as a property that may be more or less present in any regime” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 149).

Hadenius and Teorell measure the degree of personalism with the number of years the leader has been in power, because the more personalist a regime, the more power is focused on the leader and the harder it is to change that person (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 149). The degree of personalism shows great variety in the different electoral regimes:

6 The term 'external' refers to sudden events which can severely influence a regime and which originate from outside the regime – they may be domestic (mass mobilization) or international (economic crises).
generally multi-party regimes are less characterized by personalism than dominant-party regimes. The two scholars also find a significant correlation between “years of executive tenure and the lifespan of authoritarian regimes” – proving: “Personalist regimes last longer” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 151).

4.2.1.2.  Measuring the Influence of Regime Types

I shall not define the Egyptian regime in this chapter, but in the fifth. There I will rely on data of previous studies on Egypt as well as comparative studies and expert interviews. Here I shall simply describe how I will define what kind of regime is predominant in Egypt.

4.2.1.2.1.  Characterising Egypt

It is paramount to note that for this analysis it is not important to make the example country fit smoothly into one of the afore described categories, but rather to describe the reality. For an empirical and comparative analysis such as undertaken by Hadenius and Teorell it makes sense to make countries fit into the established categories, but not for this country specific approach. Moreover, Pridham (2000, 65) stresses the fact that is better to view non-democratic regimes “rather as approximations where in individual cases there are elements from different (sub-types).” In addition to the fact that reality is never as simple and clear-cut as theoretical categories, regimes which last a long time are likely to undergo a qualitative change.

As Hedius and Teorell (2007) showed, about 70 percent of all transitions end in another non-democratic regime and not in democracy. Juan Linz suggests that this is due to the fact that non-democratic regimes have more difficulties to, firstly, find out about the changing preferences and grievances of the population, and, secondly, to incorporate the changed environment into their policies. This lack of responsiveness is by far less evident in democratic systems than in authoritarian systems (Linz 1990). Pridham (2000, 66) pointedly sums this up with the saying that in non-democratic regimes “the government is the regime” and in personalist regimes, the leader is the regime. Therefore, a top leadership succession can turn into a veritable crisis in highly personalist regimes where the regime’s legitimacy is linked to and based on the leading figure (Pridham 2000, 67).

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7 I shall not elaborate on the effects of personalism on monarchies, no-party and one-party regimes.
Thus, in chapter 5 I will consult previous characterisations of Egypt and together with the knowledge gained from expert interviews I shall define the Egyptian regime and draw conclusions for the chances for democratization Egypt had, according to theory. I shall also look into the degree of personalism separately from defining the Egyptian regime. To measure the degree of personalism, I shall look into the life span of the Egyptian Presidents, the concentration of power and decision-making in their hands, and also the debate which surrounded the possible succession of President Hosni Mubarak by his son Gamal Mubarak.

4.3. Functionalist Theories

In this chapter on functionalist theory’s causes, I shall focus on the aspect of income inequality and the influence of this factor on the chances for democratization. As usual, I shall start by, explaining the theory and, subsequently, I shall elaborate on how it will be applied to the Egyptian example, and, finally, underline why I use this aspect.

4.3.1. The Rentier State and Democratization

This chapter will focus on the effects of the so called rentier state on democratization. Firstly, I shall define the term rentier state, secondly, I shall elaborate on the theoretical impact which the reliance on external rents can have for a state and his chances for democratization, and, thirdly, I will describe how I shall measure the impact of the described rentier state and its reliance on resources for democratization in the case of Egypt.

4.3.1.1. Theory: The “Rentier State” and Democratization

Democracy first emerged in states where the population was able to gain some concession in terms of political participation and political rights form the rulers, in exchange for the extraction of resources from the people. A classical example is the principle of “no taxation, without representation” which was established in the Anglo-American realm and which was possible due to the bargaining power the people were able to wield against the ruling elites (Welzel 2009, 75). But such bargaining powers were historically linked to the people’s chance of gaining some dependence from a centralizing state insofar as that the people did not ultimately depend on the state for their survival. One example here is the access to one of the most crucial resources in agrarian societies: water (Jones 1985). In a country
depending on agriculture where water was rare and needed to be extracted with a centrally coordinated irrigation system (Midlarsky 1997), the people were ultimately dependent on the central state and could not wield much bargaining power. Welzel (2009, 76) stresses that, in such countries where “rulers gain access to a source of revenue they can bring under their control without anyone’s consent, they have the means to finance tools of coercion” and societies democracy was unable to be established.

Boix argues that not only does it matter that the rulers can accrue wealth it also matters what kind of wealth – whether it is mobile or not. This distinction is crucial because if the former is the case, the owners could avoid re-distributional efforts by moving their assets abroad. If the latter is the case, this possibility is not an option and the wealthy have strong incentives to suppress the emergence of democracy in order to prevent redistribution (Boix 2006). The prime example of an immobile source of revenue is obviously the existence of crude oil (Ross 2001).

The reliance on natural resources for income is also described with the term ‘rentier state’ which describes states which “derive a large fraction of their revenues from external rents” (Ross 2001, 329). Hussein Mahdavy (1970, 428) defines foreign rents as “rental paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a given country” and names foreign and military aid, transit fees for oil pipelines, passage fees for say the Suez Canal, or workers’ remittances – besides revenues from exporting oil – as important sources of rent. Hazem Beblawi adds other important features of a rentier state: he claims that the foreign nature of rents is crucial and that “in a rentier state [...] only few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the majority being only involved in the distribution or utilisation of it” (1987, 51). Moreover, he states that in a rentier state it is the government who principally receives the external rents – “cutting across the whole of the social fabric of the economy affecting the role of the state in the society” (1987, 52). From this definition derives the fact that agricultural commodities are not defined as rents, because their production is labour intensive and it is mostly not the state but private concerns who profit from its revenues (Ross 2001, 331-2).

According to Ross, a rentier state has three important effects on the structure of a society: firstly, the so called “rentier effect” allows governments to satisfy certain social demands with the revenues gained from these external rents and, thus, prevents social pressure – which is linked to the aforementioned principle of “no taxation without representation” which is undermined by external rents (Ross 2001, 332) - and can also lead to a system of patronage such as the one in Saudi-Arabia (Entelis 1976) as well as to suppression of any social group which might challenge the state's supremacy (Ross 2001, 334); secondly, the “repression effect” refers to the tendency that external revenues also provide governments with extensive
funds to finance their repressive policies towards their populations which is apparent in Middle Eastern countries in the reliance on the so called mukhabarat\textsuperscript{8} and security services (Ross 2001, 335); and, thirdly, what Ross calls the “modernization effect” describes the fact that economic growth based on rents does not lead to the consequences of economic development which Lipsets (1969) regards as crucial for democratization, such as education, occupational specialization, urbanization or an increase in the quality and quantity of access to media and communications technologies. In Ross’ extensive study (2001, 356) he finds that oil and other wealth derived from nonfuels does indeed hamper democratic development. In addition to this he finds that this effect also holds true for relatively small oil exports, especially when exported by a relatively poor state. Thus, the negative correlation between democracy and external rents does not only hold true for the countries such as Saudi-Arabia which derive a substantial percentage of their GDP from exporting oil, but also for countries which only export a relatively small margin.

4.3.1.2. *Measuring the impact of resource distribution*

In order to apply the concept of the rentier state to Egypt I shall first of all look into the economic structure of Egypt: from where does the Egyptian state derive most its revenues? How large is the percentage of foreign rents in the Egyptian GDP? How is the accrued wealth distributed?

Looking at the three effects of the rentier state, I shall also analyse in how far they apply to Egypt: (1) for analysing the rentier effect, I shall analyse the social programs of the Egyptian state, such as health service, free education or food subsidies; (2) for the repression effect, I shall look into the amount of GDP used for financing the military and the security services; (3) for modernization I shall consider occupational specialization: the percentage of Egyptians which are employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the Egyptian economy; into education: enrolment in secondary school; access to media: percentage of Egyptians who regularly use the internet, watch TV, use a mobile phone or read a newspaper. I cannot conduct my own empirical analysis but I shall conclude that if Egypt meets the same statistical conditions as used in Ross’ empirical study, the result will also hold true.

\textsuperscript{8} Mukharabat is the Arabic term for “intelligence services”.

48
4.3.2. Inequality

In this final of the chapter on functionalist theory’s causes, I shall focus on the effect of income inequality on the chances for democratization. I shall start by, explaining the theory, subsequently I shall elaborate on how it will be applied to the Egyptian example, and, finally, underline why I use this aspect.

4.3.2.1. Theory: income inequality and democratization

A strong link has always been suggested between democratization and income inequality. Wood (2003, 118) postulates that democracies are “characterized by higher levels of equity than those encountered under any other state form.” But among the earlier scholars interested the link between income inequality and democratization, only two teams of scholars find that not only does democracy affect inequality, but that the relation is reciprocal. But it is exactly this reciprocity which makes it so hard to pin the causal relation between the two (Ross Burkhart 1997, 148 and 150). Most other scholars focused on the effect of democracy on economic development and also inequality. While Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) claim that income inequality negatively affects prospects of democratization, Bollen and Jackman (1985) find no such connection in their empirical study. Later scholars find strong evidence that there is a negative link between inequality and democratization. Burkhart, for example detects a non-linear connection between democracy and income inequality. He posits that socioeconomic development first renders a country more unequal in terms of income, because it is mostly the middle class who benefits at the expense of the working class. But later on the chances grow that wealth will also be spread among the working class to avoid political destabilization (Ross Burkhart 1997, 151).

At the heart of the theory about this link is the distribution of wealth as well as the distribution of income and the struggle between the different social groups for redistribution or against it. The line of argument is that in non-democratic societies wealth is more or less concentrated among those in power – whether among a ruling elite, among the military, or among a dynasty matters little (Ross Burkhart 1997, 150). Thus, those in power pursue strategies to maintain their wealth, whereas, the poorer groups struggle to close the gap in income inequality. Democracy, then, would offer the poor majority the possibility to vote for redistributional policies and, therefore, those in power have a strong incentive to resort to repression in order to, firstly, prevent democratization, and, secondly, maintain their wealth. It also needs to be stressed that in democracy – especially when it comes to redistribution –
stakes are high during elections: elections are very uncertain events, because all parties risk losing their whole influence for a whole legislative period. This means that stakes are even higher for those in power who are in possession of large amounts of wealth as “democracy poses an undeniable threat to those who profit from the authoritarian status quo [and they...] will be relentless in opposing the introduction of free elections” (Boix 2006)⁹. Additionally, the more income inequality increases, the more the population’s discontent increases which renders the ruling groups more dependent on repression (Teorell 2010, 60; Boix 2006). The argument also runs the other way round: When resources and income are more equally distributed among a society, the different groups in this society will be more likely to accept the high stakes during elections (Welzel 2009, 79).

4.3.2.2. Measuring the impact of inequality on democratization

One of the most ambitious attempts at measuring the impact of economic inequality on democratization was undertaken by Boix and Stokes (2003). Their data leads them to the conclusion “that democracy is caused not by income per se but by other changes that accompany development, in particular, income equality” (2003, 540).

In their research they looked into several factors over the course of time – some of which I shall also apply in the next chapter: Per Capita Income, the distribution of wealth, and also the “degree of occupational diversification on regime transitions” (Boix and Stokes 2003, 543) which was developed by Vanhanen and measures the percentage of the urbanized population and the percentage of the non-agricultural population. Urban population, here, refers to people who live in cities or towns with at least twenty thousand inhabitants. Boix and Stokes also stress the fact that they find that the distribution of rural properties has little impact on democratization; therefore I shall not include this factor in analyzing the case of Egypt (Boix and Stokes 2003, 543-4).

I decided to look into the factor inequality in the case of Egypt as inequality is rampant in Egypt and demands for economic reforms were voiced forcibly already before the protest movement gathered force in 2011.

⁹ Due to the fact that this article appeared online without page numbers, I was not able give the page numbers in this citation.
4.4. Social Forces Tradition

This chapter is dedicated to what I termed the “Social Forces Tradition”. I shall focus on two aspects of democratization which are, firstly, the nexus between culture and democracy and, secondly, the effect of mass mobilization on democratization. Those two aspects were chosen over others, such as the structure of society or the impact of a middle class, because – contrary to the argumentation of genetic theories – representatives of the social forces tradition argue that democracy is not most likely to develop with the help of elite pacts but due to mass mobilization and participation. Moreover, mass mobilization was crucial in the events of the Arab Spring.

Furthermore, I chose to focus on the impact of culture and religion because many scholars argue that democracy and the Islamic culture are incompatible (Lipset 1969; Kedourie 1992; Huntington 1991b). Moreover, others argue that certain other religions are more compatible with democracy: Bollen (1979) and Huntington (1984) argue that Protestantism and his strong sense of individualism are very conducive to democracy. In addition, Diamond (1993) and Almond (1980) bring political culture into the picture and claim that there are cultural preconditions for democracy, such as egalitarianism, tolerance or the readiness to compromise. Other comparative and empirical studies find that countries with a “predominantly Muslim population” are less likely to democratize (Teorell 2010, 8). As these arguments would simply render all aspirations for democratic change in the Arab region futile, I found it crucial to address this aspect.

4.4.1. Mass Movements and Mobilization

Looking at history, popular rule was rather the exception than the rule. Elites used to suppress the masses and limit their power as well as their participation in politics. Therefore, they limited their freedoms and rights, and the fight for those rights and freedoms was always met with resistance and suppression. But how did masses of people decide to demand such rights and mobilize? Moreover, it seems to be hardly possible to predict such mass mobilization just like the ones during the fall of the Soviet Union or during the so called Arab Spring. While I will not focus on trying to develop parameters for the prediction of further mass mobilization, I shall limit this chapter on the effect that mass mobilization has on the prospects of democratization. Prior to the third wave of democratization the notion was predominant that mass participation during or before a transition was detrimental for the prospects of democratization because the involvement of the masses complicated elite pacts. But Rueschemeyer (1992) and Collier (1999) claim that mass mobilization during the third wave was essential for democratization movements.
Therefore, I shall now present theory of how democratization and mass mobilization are connected, but not without, firstly, giving a short overview of how masses are mobilized in general.

4.4.1.1. Theory: Mass Mobilization and Democratization

As already outlined in authoritarian regimes popular participation is suppressed, therefore, in order to gain those rights they have to be fought for. One way is by mass mobilization and demonstrations. Most of the time authoritarian regimes do not have to deal with widespread mass oppositional movements, because the perceived threat of repressing such a movement – besides the very real suppression of individuals – suffices to prevent mass mobilization. The threat becomes very relevant as a factor of stabilization if a significant percentage of the population has decided to claim their rights despite the threat of repression but this “is only when people come to find appeal in the freedoms that define democracy that they begin to consider dictatorial powers as illegitimate” (Welzel 2009, 83). Whether a regime succeeds in suppressing a once emerged mass opposition depends on one side on the extent of coercion and how it is used and on the other side the size of the opposition which can reach a size large enough to force the regime to concede to the opposition’s demands or even to overthrow the regime.

There are three different approaches which try to explain mass mobilization: a structural approach, one focusing on rational choice and a third which is called the “relative-deprivation approach”.

One of the main contributors to the structural analysis of how revolutions and mass mobilization come to pass is Theda Skocpol (1979). She claims that two things condition a revolution: firstly, the state’s ability to uphold law and order has diminished due to either relations with other states or due to internal reasons; secondly, the elites are not powerful enough to overthrow the regime but strong enough to cause a political impasse on the side of the government. This political deadlock causes an uprising which aims to change the political and social status quo. Skocpol explains the emergence of such movements entirely with structural reasons, such aspects as personal beliefs, personal decisions, or preferences are left out of her theory.

Theories focusing on structure seem to be better at predicting social uprisings than those focusing on “Rational Choice” and the sentiments of a people. But it is the Rational Choice

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Welzel (2009) cites only the extent of coercion as factor, but excessive use of violence proved to anger more and more sections of the Egyptian population which led more and more to join protests. Therefore, also the smart use of coercion is relevant.
approach which focuses on the latter and which explains why popular uprisings are so rare. Timur Kuran (1991, 16) puts the structural approach into perspective by reminding that “a mass uprising results from multitudes of individual choices to participate in a movement for change; there is no actor named "the crowd" or "the opposition."” But from the view point of rational choice theory the outbreak of such a movement is very hard to explain, because the downfall of a dictator is seen as ‘collective good’ - which can be enjoyed without personally risking one's life during a revolution. This free rider problem should actually prevent most revolutions from emerging and if one does take place rational choice theory struggles to find an explanation (Kuran 1991, 14).

The third approach claims that revolutions are caused by economic disappointments and if a significant size of the population is economically desperate this causes a revolution. But this explanation ignores the fact that in Eastern Europe people were not more discontent than average levels would suggest (Kuran 1991, 16).

4.4.1.1.1. What is the impact of Mass Demonstrations on Democratization?

As already mentioned my focus is not how exactly mass mobilization is caused but on how mass demonstrations affect a country’s chances of achieving democracy.

Welzel (2007), Ulfelder (2005) and Karatnycki and Ackermann (2005) explicitly underline the positive effect that non-violent mass opposition has on the chances of overthrowing an authoritarian regime. They all conducted studies which show that recent transitions were most likely to result in democracy when the people were involved in significant numbers in a struggle against a reluctant government (Welzel 2009, 83). Teorell stresses the importance of the non-violent character of such demonstrations, “as violent strategies are usually reserved for marginalized groups in a society and therefore less accepted by the majority. And by staying peaceful a possible violent reaction by the regime will most likely give the demonstrators the morale high position” (2010, 6). Lee Smithey and Lester Kurtz (1999) also add the “paradox of repression” to this explanation. Kurz Schock (2005, 40) explains that non-violent protest has “the potential to allow the maximum degree of active participation in the struggle by the highest proportion of the population” because it neither requires a certain physical fitness which would limit participation to a group of healthy and younger participants, nor special equipment. Moreover, Teorell (2010) notes that unarmed opposition may have significant mobilization effect in the population caused by anger due to the harsh repression of peaceful demonstrators. It can also cause splits in the government of the ruling regime or among the supporting elites of the regime or even in the security forces and the army who are after all forced to fight against their countrymen. Finally, a brutal crackdown on
demonstrator might also lead to intervention of a third party, most likely an international or regional organisation.

4.4.1.2. How to Measure the influence of Mass Mobilization on Democratization

Arguably, it is somewhat hard to establish how accurate theory is in the case of mass mobilization, as in fact no theory was ever able to predict any revolution or mass demonstration which led to the breakdown of a regime. Nevertheless, in the case of Egypt it is quite clear that the demonstrations forced the regime to make concessions and the President to step down. Therefore, what I will do in this chapter, will be to focus on what kind of demonstrations have taken place in Egypt.

In fact, there have been many demonstrations and protests in the history of Egypt, but so far none of these have led to any comparable steps towards democracy as the events in the winter of 2010 – 2011 have. Therefore, I shall give an explanation how these demonstrations were different and why.

4.4.2. Culture – Islam and Democracy

This chapter focuses on the argument that democracy can only flourish in a cultural environment that embraces democratic values such as individualism, equality or compromise. As religions leave an important stamp on the predominant culture of any region - the argument claims - certain religions like Protestantism are more conducive to democracy than others such as Catholicism, Confucianism or in our case Islam. In order to answer whether this argument holds true or not, I shall firstly discuss whether Protestantism is uniquely linked to democracy and, subsequently, whether Islam is compatible with democracy or not. This question is linked to the question about the nature of democracy – is it a value-free “process of manipulating power for the purposes of administration and control” (Joffé 2008, 168) or is it a Western concept of governance intrinsically linked to Western liberal values and, therefore, not applicable to other cultures?

4.4.2.1. Theory: Islam and Democracy

After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the absence of democracy and political instability in the Middle East was seen as a threat to international security and this perception spurred the search for what caused the lack of democracy and freedom. Some analysts
started a debate about the compatibility of democracy and Islam (Ehteshami 2004) while others adopted an approach which sought the explanation entirely in the Arab world and its disability to adapt to modernity (Lewis 2002). Moreover, the expectations of the third wave of democratization had led most analysts to believe that also the Middle Eastern countries would be developing into democracies, but the contrary was the case as in the Middle East - only Lebanon truly showed signs of democracy (Volpi and Cavatorta 2006). Thus, analysts looked for a common feature that stifled democratic change in the region and came to the conclusion that Islam hindered democratic change. But scholars such as Larry Diamond (2010) as well as Stepan and Robertson (2003) argue against the conclusion that one religious belief prevents democracy, but that there are many other reasons behind the lack of democracy in the Middle East. Before I address this issue in more depth, I shall first of all focus on the issue of religion and democracy.

4.4.2.1.1. Religion and Democracy: Protestantism

In the literature on the emergence of democracy, there is a line of argument which claims that Protestantism was crucial for the development of democracy. Steve Bruce (2004, 4) argues that religion does exert influence on the overall cultural environment and, thus, on the development of democracy, even though the effect of “religious innovations are unintended and inadvertent.” 

But what exactly links democracy and the Protestant religion? Bruce (2004, 5) names “personal autonomy, freedom of choice, literacy, diligence, temperance, loyalty, democratic accountability, egalitarianism and the overlapping ties of voluntary association we now call ‘civil society’”. Moreover, it is a historical fact that democracy first emerged in Protestant countries and that most regimes in the 20th century happened to be in predominantly Catholic countries11.

Bruce argues that by eliminating priests as the only connection between god and the believers, Protestantism abolished the hierarchical structure of the church – laying the basis for egalitarianism – and this ultimately led to the separation of Church and State. Moreover, this also led to the development of tolerance of different religious beliefs, as the interpretation of the bible was now up to the individual, more different factions emerged which were respected in the course of time. All these developments furthered the emergence of democracy (Bruce 2004, 7-9).

11 With the exception of South Africa.
But does the fact one religion was in an unintended fashion favourable to the emergence of democracy allow the conclusion that other religions such as Islam are incompatible with democracy? This is the question I shall address in the following.

4.4.2.1.2. Religion and Democracy: Islam

Along the assumption that Protestantism may have contributed to the emergence of democracy, there are arguments which claim that “the regressive and authoritarian precepts of Islam as a system of beliefs and social organization” (Volpi and Cavatorta 2006, 363) are the reason for the absence of democracy in Muslim countries. This makes the Muslim world incapable of dealing with modernism and, thus, leads to non-democratic regimes in the region (Volpi and Cavatorta 2006, 363).

I shall, firstly, focus on the arguments in favour of an incompatibility of Islam and Democracy by addressing issues such as sovereignty, the status of religion as private or public matter and the argument that there are no Muslim countries with real democracy. Afterwards, I shall present the counter-arguments.

Let me start by addressing the issue of sovereignty. From an Islamic perspective, in the Western notion of sovereignty the people are the ultimate source of power and legitimacy and the state should merely carry out its citizens’ policies. In Islam – traditionally – sovereignty is “a divine attribute” contrary to the “popular attribute” in democratic states (Joffé 2008, 169). Thus, in theory, for devout Muslims a democratic sanction should be impossible, as policies should not be legitimized by popular consent but by the fact that policies are in concordance with Islamic law and practice – not what the majority votes for, but what is defined in the scripture should become law. Nevertheless those who in power or those “to whom divine sovereignty was delegated were chosen” by the ‘ulama’12 who constituted the class of jurists (Joffé 2008, 169). It is argued that this essential difference in the definition of sovereignty – the divine attribute somewhat renders a democratic system based on Islamic precepts impossible – at least from a theoretical and philosophical point of view. While this does not lead to the conclusion that democracy cannot emerge in Muslim countries it clearly renders it more complicated as democracy – so the argument – lacks a clear philosophical foundation for democracy. But Islamic commentaries argue themselves that it is impossible to establish a functioning democracy, while maintaining a supreme or even prominent role of religion (Anderson 2004).

12 The Arabic word “Ulamāʾ” is Plural of the word “Ālim” meaning scholar.
The second aspect concerns the discussion whether religion is confined to the private space or whether it should also be prominent in the public space. Joffé (2008) calls the Western notion an “aggressively secular concept” which – as a result of the secularization process in Europe – is based on the people and mainly concerned with the secular world: Rationalism replaced religion as guiding principle in explaining all matters and religion became a private affair. Joffé also claims that this is in striking contradiction to political governance in Islam.

The third aspect focuses on a line of argument which claims that because there are no democratic traditions in the Islamic tradition, democracy is ultimately confined to regions where democratic traditions – at least basically – are already existent. Elie Kedourie (1992, 5-6) claims that “nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world—which are the political traditions of Islam—which might make familiar, or indeed intelligible, the organizing ideas of constitutional and representative government.” In a comparative study in which Robert Barro (1999) analysed different determinants of democratization he found significant negative effect for the size of the Muslim population. George Kennan (1977, 41-43) argued that democracy is restricted to Western culture: to him democracy is a system of ruling “which evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in northwestern Europe, primarily among those countries that border on the English Channel and the North Sea (but with a certain extension into Central Europe), and which was then carried into other parts of the world, including North America, where peoples from that northwestern European area appeared as original settlers, or as colonialists, and laid down the prevailing patterns of civil government.” Therefore, he claims it is not applicable to other cultures.

One of the most prominent scholars writing on culture is Samuel Huntington. He also agrees that because non-European countries did not undergo the same historical evolution including the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution but were under different influence such as the Ottoman traditions, those countries may be separated from the European “areas where democracy will take root from those where it will not” (1991b, 23). Huntington (2001) argues that especially Islam is hostile towards democracy. To support his claim he argues that there is only one Muslim country which counts as a democracy which would be Turkey. The only Arab country with (signs of) democracy is Lebanon. But in the case of Lebanon he contributes the emergence of democracy to the Christian majority which was predominant in the country and he claims that once there was a Muslim majority, democracy ceased to exist (Huntington 1999b, 18).
Now I shall present the arguments which support the notion that it is not Islam per se which causes the lack of democracy in Muslim countries but a combination of other aspects. Ray Hinnebusch (2000) claims that former theories of democratization valued linear and simple theories and explanations over accuracy which led to one superficial explanation of Middle Eastern or Muslim exceptionalism instead of thorough analysis of the reality in those countries. Larry Diamond (2010) argues that there is a variety of reasons behind the democracy deficit in said region such as economic inequality, the rentier economy and the influence of oil, internal and external support for authoritarian statecraft – to name a few – but that Islam does not cause this deficit.

Firstly, let me argue against the general argument that Islam and democracy are incompatible. There is one fact that is often overlooked when analysing the relationship between Islam and democracy: while the Middle East and North Africa might be seen as the place where Islam historically originated or as the Muslim heartland, it is often overlooked that the majority of Muslims does not live there. Not only is Indonesia the most populous Muslim country but there are also more Muslims living outside the Middle East and North Africa than in this region. As a matter of fact, those non-Arab Muslim-majority countries do not suffer from the same lack of democracy as do the Arab Muslim-majority countries.

There are two important contributions which make this case: firstly, Stepan and Robertson (2003; 2004) and, secondly, Larry Diamond (2010). In both articles the scholars claim that the alleged democracy gap in the world is rather an “Arab gap” than a “Muslim gap”. Stepan and Robertson were the first to argue in favour of the “Arab gap”. Using the Freedom House and Polity IV score the scholars compared the electoral competitiveness in Arab Muslim-majority countries and in non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. Both come to the conclusion that, while the former show a significant democracy deficit, the latter countries score very well both in the Freedom House survey and in the Polity IV score.

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13 Stepan and Robertson define Muslim-majority countries as those countries in which more than 50.1% of its population are Muslim; and Arab countries as those countries where the majority of the population is Arab.
Considering Figure 3 which Stepan and Robertson (2003, 34-35) use in their article we can clearly see that the 16 Arab countries score significantly less high than do most non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. Therefore, they conclude that: “If our two subsets of countries share the predominance of Islam in common, but differ sharply on so crucial a political measure as electoral competitiveness, then Islam cannot, by itself, explain the exceptionally low performance of one of them” (Stepan and Robertson 2003, 39).

In addition Diamond also finds that democracy was able to take hold in regions like Africa whose political traditions of the past also did not show any of the democratic notions – just like the Arab countries lacked this experience. But he demonstrates that only in the Arab countries overcoming this obstacle was impossible, while in other regions the lack of historical experience with democracy and of democratic notions was overcome. He continues to show that there is strong support for democracy in all Arab countries, but that especially among liberals fear from an Islamic overturn or of civil war is also very widespread (Diamond 2010, 95-97).
Concerning the argument that Islam is inherently incompatible with an egalitarian democratic political system, Ernest Gellner (1979, 35-36) argues that the concept of egalitarianism is not new to Islam, but that Islam is "endowed with a number of features - unitarianism, a rule-ethic, individualism, scripturalism, puritanism, an egalitarian aversion to mediation and hierarchy, a fairly small load of magic - that are congruent, presumably, with requirements of modernity or modernization" as well as democracy. Moreover, one should not confound the theoretical arguments of a strict religious interpretation of sovereignty with what is actually applied in Islamic countries. A good example is the former President Wahid from Indonesia who constantly argued for a separation of mosque and state, as well as against the introduction of shari’a law (Stepan and Robertson, 2004). There are also more similarities between democracy and Islamic interpretation especially when it comes to the rule of law: both "require authority to be exercised in accordance with autonomous concepts of law over which neither has control" (Joffé 2008, 170).

Finally, Steven Fish (2002) claims that the lack of democracy is not caused by the Muslim faith but by female subordination for which he does not find any basis in the scripture itself, but he attributes it to demographic, sociological and psychological reasons. The consequence is a patriarchal family whose authoritarian structures might spill over to the political realm indirectly supporting the authoritarian states.

As I have tried to show, explaining the democracy gap in the Arab countries is not as simple as attributing it to Islam but in fact there is a strong case to be made that democracy only shows serious deficits in the Arab countries and not in all Muslim-majority countries. The reasons for this deficit are manifold and cannot simply be attributed to the predominant culture of a region.

Vali Nasr argues that while there might be discrepancies with Islam and democracy in theory, in praxis “Muslim Democracy” already exists – at least in non-Arab countries - and as he claims does not rest “on an abstract, carefully thought-out theological and ideological accommodation between Islam and democracy, but rather on a practical synthesis that is emerging in much of the Muslim world in response to the opportunities and demands created by the ballot box” (Nasr 2005, 15). Thus the challenge is not to find the theoretical and ideological discrepancies between Islam and democracy, but to find out where Islamists accept the logic of power-sharing and where they do not. After all, also the Catholic faith is theoretically incompatible with democracy but as Catholicism developed, so the difference between the two concepts diminished.
4.4.2.2. **How to measure the Impact of Religion on Democratization**

Arguably, the impact of Islam on the aspects of democratization is somewhat difficult to measure and will always be subject to argumentation. Nevertheless, I will look into several indicators which will signify how important Islam and faith is in Egypt. For this case I shall cite several polls which analyse the support for democracy in Arab countries. Moreover, I shall look into the religiousness of the Egyptian people: how many Egyptians are Muslims, how important is faith in comparison to other aspects of their life. But I shall also look into the question which other values are also seen as important and which are seen as more conducive to democracy.

4.5. **Transnational Theories**

After having presented the factors from functionalist and genetic theories as well as from the social forces tradition, I shall focus on which causes of democratization developed by transnational theories I will analyze and apply to the case of Egypt. I have chosen three different factors: firstly, diffusion; secondly, neighbouring countries; and, thirdly, international states and the changing international system as a whole. Along the lines of this chapter I shall now explain for each of these factors their why I chose them and their relevance for Egypt. Finally, I shall conclude by explaining why I other frameworks were neglected.

4.5.1. **Diffusion**

After having defined the concept of diffusion in the last chapter as “a process in which new ideas, institutions, policies, models, or repertoires of behavior spread from their point of origin to new sites” (Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 34), I shall now try to explain how it works, although we can detect some degree of weakness in the concepts of scholars working on diffusion because they have difficulties showing how exactly “diffusion works and through which channels democratic ideas and institutions spread among neighbouring states and societies.” (Yilmaz 2009, 95)

4.5.1.1. **Theory: Diffusion**

Bunce and Wochik (2010) propose that diffusion is possible in three different ways: Firstly, there is diffusion through demonstration: which is the case when the calculus of actors in one
setting is changed by the developments in another setting “by redefining what is possible”\textsuperscript{11}, by alerting actors in other settings to a highly attractive course of action, and, as a result, by tilting the ratio of benefits versus risks attached to innovation in the decided favor of the former.” (Bunce and Wochik 2010, 34) An example might be the overthrow of the Tunisian President Ben Ali which inspired the Egyptian citizens to apply their tactics and attempt to do the same. Secondly, diffusion is possible in a more structural way: in a setting where the structural conditions and problems are similar in one place and another. Actors will apply the innovations when they think that the innovations which have been applied in a setting very similar to theirs will also work in theirs. The third possibility of diffusion is via “expanding collaborative networks that support change and that fan out from the original point of innovation” (Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 34-5). Also the incumbent elites may be affected by diffusion since experiences from successful liberalizations in a neighbouring country might encourage the other ruling elite to agree to reforms in their own state (Teorell 2010, 86).

Jan Teorell (2010, 78) also lists imposition as way of diffusion and according to him it describes the fact democracies themselves promote democracy in non-democratic countries. But I shall not include imposition in my concept of diffusion in this paper, because in my opinion diffusion should be analytically distinct from democracy promotion undertaken by states as states themselves always have their own agenda besides promoting democracy and there is no hidden agenda behind diffusion.

However there are several unanswered questions about the causal mechanisms of diffusion that require further research. Firstly, it is still somewhat unclear how exactly diffusion works – by which process democratic changes in one country end up in another. Secondly, the question why one country becomes the leader and how it is determined that the process of democratization begins in this country and not another (Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 31). If we take the example of the Arab Revolutions which started in the winter of 2010/11 it was not clear why the process started in Tunisia and not in Egypt – the country where historically all important ideas were born and which had experienced a series of demonstrations and strikes in the last years.

Admittedly, there are several other factors in transnational theories on which I could focus instead of diffusion, but I shall explain why I did not choose any other factor. There is much discussion on the merit of international military intervention for democracy, but as the revolution was clearly not initiated or linked to any foreign military intervention, it makes little sense to bring it up in the case of Egypt. Likewise, not many cases can be found where a foreign intervention resulted in democracy and, thus, it cannot be regarded as crucial cause
of democratization (Gleditsch and Ward 2006, 919). Apart from this aspect there are the consequences of the US invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan which were over the course of time increasingly portrayed as democratization missions and, subsequently, rendered Arab populations very suspicious of similar foreign military interventions.

Diffusion, on the other hand, has already played a crucial role in transitions in Latin America and South and Central Eastern Europe (Youngs 2008, 159). Moreover, while democracy seems to garner almost unchallenged support in many areas of the world, in the Middle East the normative appeal of the Western concept of democracy was always fiercely debated and yet it appears that democratic norms nevertheless spread among the region.

Finally, it also has to be noted that diffusion of norms and practices is naturally closely linked to the influence neighbouring countries exert over the democratization chances of a single country, but in this part of my paper I shall limit my analysis to the diffusion of anti-government strategies, democratic norms and ideas on a micro-level. The influences that public actors of neighbouring countries or the political constellation in a region have will be discussed in the following part.

4.5.1.2. How to measure the Influence of Diffusion

Thus, in chapter 5, I shall attempt to answer how the diffusion of democratic ideas to Egypt were possible as well as how strategies for popular protest spread from Tunisia to Egypt through the three different forms of diffusion.

4.5.2. Neighbouring Countries

As the Middle East is striking in that the region is only comprised of non-democratic regimes – with the exception of Israel and maybe Lebanon which Freedom House at least defined as Partly Free (Puddington 2010) - it appeared logical to include neighbouring countries in my analysis. Moreover, the influence that the state of democracy of neighbouring countries exerts over the chances of democratization in another neighbouring country, gives reason to analyse this factor – especially, since in the Middle Eastern authoritarian systems seemed to resist change until last year. It would have been reasonable to focus also on the factor of ‘membership in regional organisation’ which is in theory favourable for democracy but I decided to include this aspect in the broader theme of neighbouring countries. Moreover, the Arab League is not known as a regional organisation which promotes democratic values and
human rights. On the contrary it is rather focusing on the conflict with Israel\textsuperscript{14} and in addition to this it was rather seen as nothing more but a talking shop for Arab authoritarian leaders and monarchs without much influence\textsuperscript{15} (El-Gawhary 2011).

4.5.2.1. Theory: Influence of Neighbouring States

Thus, in this chapter I shall focus on the impact of the state of democracy in Egypt’s neighbouring countries on the emergence of the Egyptian democratic movement in 2010-2011.

According to Brinks and Coppedge (2006), Egypt’s prospects for democratization should be influenced negatively by the fact that it was surrounded by other non-democratic countries. Gleditsch and Ward use a very telling figure which shows the link between the chances of democracy and the degree of democracy in a certain region. Looking at Figure 2, we can clearly see that the chances for a democratic transition increase the greater the proportion of democracies is in the region of said country.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{Probability of a democratic transition in relation to the proportion of democratic neighbours}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{14} It is striking though that the Arab League recently called on Syria to end the violence against peaceful demonstrations and to engage in negotiations with the Syrian opposition. Nevertheless, this was clearly not motivated by the League’s commitment to democracy and human rights but rather by the fact that many of its members – such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states – sought to cease the opportunity to weaken an Iranian ally which they regard as immense threat.

\textsuperscript{15} The League did of course have some influence for example on the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict: for example it was the Arab League that founded the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Deeb 1980, 99-100).
This is also due to the fact, as Gleditsch and Ward assume, that democratic transitions are “clustered geographically”, meaning that the transition in one country is very likely to spur a transition in a neighbouring country (2006, 916). They also find that a transition to democracy is more likely, the higher the worldwide number of democracies is (2006, 925).

4.5.2.2. How to measure the Impact of Neighbouring Countries

To measure the influence of Egypt’s neighbouring countries on Egypt’s democracy movement I shall be looking at the state of democracy and its development in the whole region. Moreover, I will assess the influence of neighbouring countries in how they cooperate with certain domestic actors in Egypt. This is especially the case for Israel which has worked closely together with the Egyptian regime as well as Saudi-Arabia which has vested interest in the development of the Egyptian nation as Egypt was and still is one of the leading Sunni Arab states.

4.5.3. International Actors and the International System

Traditionally there was a clear distinction between the domestic and the international level in analysing democratic transition, but even as the focus on international factors in democratization increased, the attention was mostly limited to singular events or strategies such as intervention, or foreign aid but not so much on the international context as a whole (Yilmaz 2009, 93).

But changes in the international system must not be neglected: During the transitions in Eastern Europe not only international actors such as the United States, Europe and above all the Soviet Union were highly influential in the democratization process, but also the changes in the international system itself: the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen as a triumph of democracy and capitalism over communism which in turn positively influenced the chances of those countries who had just shaken off their authoritarian leaders to pursue a transition towards liberal democracy. Thus, McFaul argues that the transitions in Eastern Europe were distinct from previous transitions in an important way: the new role of international system because during earlier transitions, the bipolar system constrained possible kinds of transitions both in the east and west. He claims that the “international system is the missing independent variable that […] moves us closer to a general theory of democratization.” (McFaul 2010, 3)
4.5.3.1. The missing link

George Pridham proclaimed that “the international context is the forgotten dimension in the study of democratic transition. Growing work on this problem, both theoretical and empirical, has continued largely to ignore international influences and effects on the causes, processes and outcomes of transitions.” (Pridham 1991, 1)

I shall now present two attempts to link the international system with domestic politics: Firstly Laurence Whitehead developed his concept of ‘democratization through conversion’ in which he outlines a process of democratization by which a democratic community absorbs a non-democratic country which, thus, becomes a member of the democratic club but does not lose national sovereignty. Whitehead notes that what his framework struggles with most is the measuring of international factors when applied to concrete cases: while most crucial actors are domestic in their origin and course of action, they very often gain their motivation and inspiration from the international level and, moreover, “their strategies and calculations have often been strongly shaped by the pressure of externally designed rules and structures.” (Whitehead 1991, 45-6)

Secondly, Douglas Chalmers presented his idea of ‘internationalized domestic politics’ which is not a new idea but in his case he stressed the implications for democratization. Chalmers introduces “internationalized domestic actors” to the study of democratization. He defines them as actors who are inherently involved in domestic politics of one country – in policies as well as politics but whose sources of power also originate outside the country (Chalmers 1993, 1). Chalmers used the dichotomy of the terms “internationalized” and “domestic” to show that while there are foreign actors and powers involved, the problem or its solution is not located in foreign policy but in domestic decision-making structures (Yilmaz 2009, 94).

4.5.3.2. Theory: International Actors and the International Environment

Göran Therborn noticed another important factor that caused countries to democratize besides for example modernization and this factor was war (1977) or more specifically the consequences of military defeats: noteworthy examples are the defeat of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire during the first world war; most notably the defeat of the fascist states in the second World War which lead to the most prominent examples of successful democratization of a country by a foreign power, namely of Germany, Japan and Austria. (Welzel 2009, 83)

16 McFaul (2010) accurately called the international system the missing link in our understanding of democratization.
In discussing the influence of international actors on democratization we have to distinguish between the different actors. Here I shall distinguish between international actors and neighbouring countries – meaning countries in the region not just those sharing a border with Egypt -, and of course international and regional organizations. Generally speaking, regional and international organizations are considered to have a positive impact on democracy (Teorell 2010, 78) – maybe with exception to the Arab League. But the picture is mixed for states such as the United States or supra-national entities as the European Union.

I shall give a short account of the role the two Western powers played in furthering democratization during the Cold War and most recent influence of those two powers will be analysed in the fifth chapter – especially focusing on the last 10 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as the Western response to international terrorism – especially al-Qa’ida – was very detrimental for democratization worldwide and above all in the Arab countries and the wider Middle East.

The European Community (EC)\(^{17}\) positively influenced not only the consolidation of democracy in southern Europe - by promising Greece, Spain and Portugal accession only if the three countries were fully democratized – but the EC also played a crucial and supportive role for the democracy movements in Eastern Europe against the Communist regimes and greatly helped Eastern European countries during and after the transitions (Huntington 1991b, 14). The United States was also very supportive of any democratic movement which was at the same time anti-Communist and the end of the Cold War limited the priority that had always been given security issues over democracy and human rights issues. Subsequently, the United States pushed much stronger for democracy and the requirement for political reform and liberalization was increasingly added as condition for development aid (Burnell 1997, 188-92).

4.5.3.3. How to measure the Influence of International Actors and the System

To assess the influence of international actors and the international system I shall give an account over the influence that Western states had in Egypt and what the policies in the context of the war on terror had on democratization itself and on how democracy was viewed internationally.

\(^{17}\) What is today the European Union was called European Community until 1993.
5. The Case of Egypt

This fifth chapter will now be dedicated to applying the theoretical concepts and prepositions to the case of Egypt. I shall start by looking into the four different schools in the same order in which I have presented them in the previous chapter. Thus, firstly, I will present genetic theories; secondly, functionalist theories; thirdly, the social forces tradition; and, fourthly, transnational theories. There will be a conclusion for every chapter to sum up my findings for each theory.

5.1. Genetic Theories

In the first chapter, I shall focus on the influence that the character of the Egyptian regime had on the chances that a democratic movement would develop and lead to the events of February 2011.

To assess the influence of the regime type on democratization possibilities I shall firstly define the Egyptian regime and discuss important features such as personalism, the role of elections and the opposition as well as the repression and security apparatus. Finally, I shall present a conclusion of what impact these features bear for the prospect of democratization.

5.1.1. Characterising the Egyptian regime

According to the Egyptian Constitution from 1971, Egypt is a Presidential Republic where the President is elected by popular vote for a term of six years. The President is formally the head of state and government, commander of the military, leader of the National Democratic Party (NDP)\(^{18}\) and can appoint and dismiss not only the Vice-President, the Prime Minister as well as other ministers, but also all provincial governors, state officials, officers and the diplomatic staff – subsequently, all of them depend directly on the president who can dismiss them at will (Egyptian Constitution, Articles 137 to 152). Moreover, the Egyptian President has the authority to proclaim a state of emergency and rule by decree if the parliament authorizes the state of emergency (Article 108). In addition, the President is not subject to

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\(^{18}\) The NDP, or Al-Ḥizb al-Waṭaniy ad-Dīmūqrāṭ iyy, is the ruling party in Egypt and was founded by in 1978 by the then President Anwar al-Sadat in order to establish a party in which all leading figures of Egyptian society became a member. The party was used to control its members and also to hand out favours (Dieterich 2007, 21).
any oversight – possibly by parliament – nor is his budget (Dieterich 2007, 20). Finally, the President largely controls the police as well as the judiciary\textsuperscript{19}.

The Legislature is composed of the ‘Advisory Council’ or ‘Majlis al-Shura’ and the ‘People's Assembly’ or ‘Majlis al-Sha'b’ – both are elected by popular vote as well as appointed by the president\textsuperscript{20}. The parliament has the right to approve the general policy of the state, the general plan of economic and social development and the general budget of the state\textsuperscript{21} (Article 86). Moreover, the People’s Assembly nominates the candidate for the Presidential elections – usually not more than one candidate which is the incumbent. In combination with the manipulation of elections, this ensured the re-election of the ruling president (Dieterich 2007, 19-20). In addition to this, the 2007 constitutional amendments regulated when a person was eligible to become a Presidential candidate: a candidate had to be supported by at least 250 Members of the elected officials at state or regional level; only parties which had existed continuously for more than five years and which had won at least 5% of both legislative chambers are allowed to nominate a candidate. Among others these provisions rendered it virtually impossible for any other candidates to emerge (Hamzawy 2005, 2). If they did the so called Presidential Elections Committee could always reject any applications (Article 76).

But now to characterizing the Egyptian regime: in defining the system it is important to keep in mind that we should not make reality match theory but describe reality. Nevertheless, I shall subsume Egypt under one of the described categories which were used by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) and which I described in the previous chapter in order to be able to analyse their findings accordingly.

Hadenius and Teorell characterize Egypt as a ‘dominant multi-party system’ which was defined as multi-party regime\textsuperscript{22} where one party takes more than two thirds of the vote and therefore represents a dominant party – in the case of Egypt this would refer to the NDP.

Due to the fact that the military plays such a predominant role after former President Mubarak stepped down in February 2011, it is necessary to explain why Egypt was not a military regime – a conclusion which would seem more likely in hindsight. A military regime is

\textsuperscript{19} The influence on the judiciary is not that far reaching, as there have been a movement by judges from 2004 to 2006 calling for their independence (El-Mahdi and Marfleet 2009).

\textsuperscript{20} In the Advisory Council 176 are elected and 88 appointed, whereas in the People’s Assembly 444 are elected and 10 assume office by being appointed by the president. Moreover, it needs to be kept in mind that, firstly, elections in Egypt are characterized by a very low turn-out and, secondly, they are manipulated.

\textsuperscript{21} Note that the general budget does not include the budget of the military.

\textsuperscript{22} A regime which “hold parliamentary or presidential elections in which (at least some) independent or opposition candidates are able to participate” (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 147).
defined as a regime where “military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force” (Nordlinger 1977, 2 - quoted in Hadenius and Teorell 2007). But this is not the case in Egypt where the military may be a highly esteemed institution in the eyes of the population due to its role in the conflict with Israel and due to the fact that it had not been directly involved in the suppression of citizens but it is not the source of legitimacy and power. It may rather be characterized as somewhat parallel organisation to the civilian structure with immense economic influence and power (Mantl 2011).

According to Hadenius and Teorell's study (2007, 152) multi-party regimes have the strongest tendency to embark on a transition that actually leads to democracy because they already have the highest level of democracy (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 150) and because this level of democracy might possibly lead to a split in the regime and a unified opposition – both essential factors for genetic theories to embark on a transition to democracy. According to Hadenius and Teorell's (2007) findings dominant multi-party regimes last about 10 years.

But President Mubarak came to power in Egypt in the year 1981 and has been ruling the country for nearly thirty years. So how can the durability of the Egyptian regime be explained? As mentioned in the previous chapter, the two scholars identified another feature of regimes which significantly prolongs its lifespan: the degree of personalism. Other factors are the phenomenon of ‘Electoral Authoritarianism’ and the excessive use of torture and suppression which I shall focus on hereafter. Finally, I shall conclude whether this theory can explain what emerged in Egypt.

5.1.1.1. Elections and Opposition

Egypt is a prime example of what is also termed “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 2002): In the Western discourse elections are intrinsically linked with democracy, but in the Egyptian context elections were nothing but a means of the regime to hold on to power. Elections are held but they were so tightly controlled that the ruling party was guaranteed to win but was, nevertheless, able to claim at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy. Like other regimes Egypt “fail[ed] to institutionalize other vital dimensions of democratic constitutionalism, such as the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and public deliberation” (Schedler 2002, 37).

In the literature such hybrid regimes are considered to have a long lifespan because the put up a show of democracy and allow for some participation as well as opposition in order to prevent a full blown revolution – or so theory would assume. But in Egypt the balancing act
between the appearance of democracy and the underlying control of the regime had been alienating more and more people. Although voting is compulsory for parliamentary as well as for presidential elections, participation used to be very low in Egypt. During the 2005 Presidential elections a total of 22.95 percent of registered voters cast their vote\textsuperscript{23} (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Also in the Parliamentary elections in 2010 the turn-out was at a low 27.47 per cent out of 29,109,107 registered voters (with a population of more than 80 million (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). The low participation can be attributed to the fact that Egyptians knew that voting would have little to none impact on policies but not to a disregard for democracy by the Egyptian people. Especially, the 2010 elections were so obviously manipulated and the fraud was so well documented that many people were outraged which clearly fuelled their perception that the regime under Husni Mubarak was unbearable. But not only were the elections manipulated, the entire legislature was also neglected, as Mubarak relied predominantly on the security apparatus to rule. During the mass demonstrations in February 2011 none of the parliamentarians or party members of the NDP were able to communicate with neither Mubarak nor his sons (Masoud 2011).

5.1.1.2. Personalism

Another feature which significantly influences not only the lifespan of non-democratic regimes, but also their chances of democratization is personalism. As already outlined, the higher the degree of personalism – measured in terms of office – the longer a regime is likely to survive (Hadenius and Teorell 2007).

Considering how long the Egyptian Presidents stayed in power, Hosni Mubarak has ruled by far the longest from all Egyptian Presidents: He came to power in 1981 and ruled the country for almost thirty years until his resignation on February 11, 2011. This clearly indicates a high degree of personalism. Moreover, the way the state President's health was treated as a national secret indicates that due to the centrality of President Mubarak simply discussing his probable sickness was considered as causing trouble (Masoud 2011, 20).

5.1.1.3. Repression and Torture

The third feature which explains the durability of the Egyptian regime is the excessive use of repression and torture.

\textsuperscript{23} A total of 31,826,284 people were registered to vote out of a population of 77,505,756.
In Egypt the whole state depended on the abilities of the security services to suppress dissent and to maintain order. Since 1981 the country is in a state of emergency enabling the mukhabarat – the secret police and intelligence services which are highly sophisticated, well trained, without legal boundaries and in close cooperation with their Western counterparts – to detain any person at will without charge, try suspects in special military courts, monitor who ever appears suspect (Seif El-Dawla 2009; Diamond 2010).

The Egyptian regime also used torture as means of suppressing the population. According to Human Rights Watch the Egyptian “security forces act with impunity, with the result that ill-treatment and torture of ordinary Egyptians has become a systematic, daily practice” (Human Rights Watch quoted in Saif El-Dawla 2009, 120). Alone from April 1993 to April 2004 the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights documented 532 cases of torture and of those cases 120 victims died of the injuries caused by the torture but numbers are most likely much higher as families of torture victims and the victims themselves did not dare to speak out for fear of further repression (Saif El-Dawla 2009, 122). The Egyptian government acknowledged the fact that torture takes place but portrayed the use of torture as isolated incidents and not as state policy. But not only was the existence of well-equipped torture rooms documented, the use of torture was also facilitated by the fact that the Egyptian Penal Code only recognizes torture “if the victim is accused of a specific crime and if the practice is used to extract a confession” (Saif El-Dawla 2009, 129).

But it is essentially the fact that the state was not entirely repressive but applied a mixture of selective repression, representation, cooptation and consultation, limited (manipulated) elections which made the regime so durable. Daniel Brumberg (2002, 56) went so far as to say that “[l]iberalized autocracy has proven far more durable than once imagined. The trademark mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and Kuwait is not just a ‘survival strategy’ adopted by the authoritarian regimes, but rather a type of political system whose institutions, rule, and logic defy any linear model of democratization.” According to theory, this pattern even extends to reform: so while competition and pluralism may be allowed in some Arab states, it is always within certain boundaries which ensure that the opposition remains weakened and isolated (Diamond 2010).

But apparently there must have been some aspect which was overlooked in genetic theory; otherwise what happened in Egypt – that an authoritarian ruler was forced to step down by his people who were protesting in a peaceful manner – would have seemed impossible because it would have meant breaking a vicious circle of liberalization and taking back reforms. I shall argue that what genetic theories overlook with their focus on elite politics is
exactly the possibility of mass mobilization because in genetic theories mass participation in form of demonstrations is seen as unfavourable for a transition to democracy.

**5.1.2. Conclusion**

In the case of Egypt, genetic theory perfectly explains the phenomenon of “durable authoritarianism” (Masoud 2011, 21) but fails to give account for the breakdown of this form of authoritarianism. This failure can be attributed to the focus on elite politics – as for example Karen Kramer’s work on ‘Arab Political Pacts’ (2006). Moreover, the two factors that genetic theory counts as causing a regime to breakdown did not occur; neither did the regime split – the military simply decided to rid themselves of an aging leader – nor did the opposition unify – the protests were not led by any parties but by citizens themselves.

So, one lesson drawn from the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria is that authoritarianism is in fact an instable type of regime because at some point the population will demand their rights. So focusing on the possibilities of a regime split or an elite pact cannot explain why Mubarak fell because not only does this leave out ‘the street’ as factor in politics but it also does not mirror the realities of the events in February 2011 as Mubarak was forced down by a leaderless movement of demonstrators – an aspect which hardly corresponds with elite politics. Still it has to be noted that the strengths of genetic theories lie in analysing the transition phase itself which is not the topic of this paper.

**5.2. Functionalist Theories**

This chapter on functionalist theories mainly addresses economic factors which might or not contribute to the chances that a democracy movement arises in Egypt. In chapter four I have already outlined why and which factors I have chosen – they were inequality and the rentier state – and I have also presented the theory related to those two topics. In this chapter I shall focus on the application to Egypt.

I shall firstly address the issue of the rentier state and, subsequently, focus on the aspect of inequality and democracy. Finally, I shall present my findings in a short conclusion.
5.2.1. Resource abundance

So let me begin to analyse the effects which the so called rentier state has on the prospects of democratization. The less dependent a state or national government is on its people for revenues, the less accountable the government is to its people. On the contrary if a government depends on its people in the case of agriculture, the people have more leverage vis-à-vis the rulers to extract concessions – freedoms and rights. Subsequently, the more a government depends on external sources of income, the less leverage the population has. As outlined in more detail in chapter four, states which “derive a large fraction of their revenues from external rents” (Ross 2001, 329) are called ‘rentier states’.

This chapter will argue that this term applies to Egypt and, subsequently, I shall analyse whether the three already described rentier effects can be detected in Egypt.

5.2.1.1. Egypt – a rentier state

So to be able to analyse the effects of the rentier state on Egypt’s chances of democratization it is necessary to determine first why Egypt can be characterized as ‘rentier state’. To answer this question I shall first of all look into the economic structure of Egypt: from where does the Egyptian state derive most of its revenues?

Egypt’s most important source of income is the vast tourism industry which does not only employ a very large amount of Egyptians but also provided for nearly $12 billion of receipts from international tourism in the year 2009 according to the World Bank Group (WBG). Compared to a gross domestic product of $218 billion (2010) this already represents a significant percentage but the indirect revenues from tourism are much larger. The entire tourism sector comprises about 11 percent of Egypt’s GDP (Heyer 2008).

The second largest source of income for Egypt besides tourism and remittances from Egyptians who are working abroad are the fees from the Suez Canal. During the fiscal year 2009/2010 the government received about $4.5 billion from the Canal. Moreover, the Canal’s earnings are predicted to increase ever more: for the fiscal year 2010/2011 canal revenue is forecast for about $5 billion (Reuters 2011). The third most important source of income are workers’ remittances which amounted to more than $3 billion in 2009 and slightly less than $3 billion in 2010 (World Bank Group).

Two further important factors are earnings due to crude oil and natural gas as well as foreign assistance and aid. Egypt produces about 660,000 barrels of oil per day but exports only a small percentage of this amount while the majority is designated for the domestic market in
order to keep oil prices in Egypt at a low level. The same holds true for natural gas of which about 18 billion cu m are exported which makes Egypt the 12th largest exporter of natural gas (CIA World Fact Book).

Moreover, Egypt receives very large sums in economic aid and military assistance from the United States. From 1977 to 2007 the US paid almost $62 billion dollars to Egypt – which amounts to an average of $2.1 billion every year. In addition to this Egypt receives sophisticated military equipment from the United States (Alexander 2009).

Other sectors such as for example agriculture employ about 32 percent of the entire Egyptian labour force (World Bank Group) but only accounted for about 17 percent of the country’s GDP in 1999 and the percentage has been steadily decreasing (Encyclopaedia of the Nations). In 2010 agriculture only made for 14 percent of the Egyptian GDP. The percentage of tax revenue in Egypt’s GDP only amounted to 15.7 percent (World Bank Group). Thus the Egyptian government only depends to a rather small degree on its own population for its national income.

Looking at the three effects which arise from a rentier state, I shall also analyse in how far they apply to Egypt:

5.2.1.2. The rentier effect

Compared to countries like Saudi-Arabia or Kuwait the rentier effect in Egypt is rather limited because the Egyptian regime does not have comparable funds at its disposal. So while in Saudi-Arabian citizens do not have to pay for such services as electricity, the Egyptian government has to limit the granting of financial favours but the government tries to keep oil prices at a low level. In recent decades, though, the government undertook several market reforms and cut many subsidies for food. Nevertheless, the government has an elaborate patronage system for a limited group of influential people which are close to the regime (El-Sayed El-Nager 2009, 35-36).

5.2.1.3. The repression effect

In order to measure the repression effect I shall look into the percentage of the Egyptian budget used for the military and internal security, as well as the structure and importance of the so called mukhabarat.
In Egypt the military expenditure amounts to 2 to 3 percent of the Egyptian gross domestic product and to about 7 to 8 percent of central government expenditure according to official numbers (World Bank Group). Currently, the army disposes over a force of about 450,000 active troops plus 405,000 paramilitary forces and reserves (Zuhur 2007, 15).

Concerning the security services in Egypt, they used to work unchecked and were characterized as “an authority in its own right” by Seif El-Dawla (2009, 131) who has done extensive research on the issue. Thus, the repression effect is clearly detectable in Egypt.

5.2.1.4. The modernization effect

To analyze the modernization effect I shall look into three different aspects which are supposed to develop in a rentier state despite to the states additional funds: occupational specialization, the level of education and the access to media.

I shall start by looking into occupational specialization. The percentage of Egyptians working in the industrial sector was at 51 percent, while 31.6 percent worked in agriculture in 2009 and about 17 percent worked in the industrial sector – the numbers are from the year 2001 (CIA World Factbook). Thus, the fact that the such a high percentage of people are employed in the agricultural sector which ultimately depends on a centrally organized irrigation system allows for the conclusion that these people have in the end not much independence from their government and do not, therefore, dispose of much leverage against the regime. The high percentage of people employed in the services sector can be attributed to the importance of tourism in the Egyptian economy – besides finances and banking. But ultimately tourism is also firmly in state’s hands – especially when talking about the national heritage or sights. Therefore, those people employed in the services sector are also not independent from the government.

Concerning education several numbers are crucial. Firstly, education enrolment in secondary school amounted to 78 percent in 2002, while the percentage of primary enrolment was at about 96 percent in 2009. Secondly, in the last years, the Egyptian government spent about 4 percent of the Egyptian GDP on education. Thirdly, the literacy rate among adults meaning here people aged 15 and above was at 71 percent in 2005 (World Bank Group). Altogether these numbers show that the Egyptian government does not use money from rents to provide a quality education system for the Egyptian population.

The access to media on the contrary is rather developed in Egypt. In 2010 there were 87 mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people – a number which was about half as high, at 39 subscriptions for every 100 people, in 2007. The number of internet users has risen steeply
since 2006 when it was as about 9,500,000 to about 21,691,000 in 2010 (World Bank Group). Here it is clear that the modernization effect has taken root in Egypt when it comes to media access, but most likely not because the government intended to grant its people access to new media and information but for reasons of practicality. Moreover, the positive effects that the access to media and especially to internet had on Egypt’s democracy movement were certainly contrary to the interests of the Egyptian regime.

5.2.2. Inequality

In this chapter I shall deal with the question of how income and – more importantly – income distribution are related to a country’s chances of democratization. In the early theory on the relation of income and democratization which I have outlined in chapter four, the argument goes that the higher a nation’s income the higher the chances for democratization. Contrary to this, recent theory has shown that it does not only depend on the amount of income but what is even more influential is the equal distribution of income (Boix and Stokes 2003). Therefore, the more equal wealth and income is distributed in a country, the easier it is for all national actors to embark on a transition towards democracy.

This chapter shall now analyse the levels of inequality in Egypt and provide conclusions for Egypt’s chances for democratization. The factors with which I shall determine the level of inequality are, firstly, income and the distribution of wealth; secondly, the distribution of property, and, thirdly, occupational diversification.

5.2.2.1. Income and the Distribution of Wealth

In this part of the chapter I shall present data on income distribution and poverty in Egypt.

One of the major causes of inequality in Egypt is unemployment. Figure 5 shows that especially among the youth of Egypt unemployment is very high. Moreover, this data is based on official numbers which are most likely to be much lower than the actual unemployment rate.
The number of people living below the national poverty line in Egypt was at 22 percent in 2008 and the percentage has been steadily increasing over the last decades (World Bank Group). According to the Arab Human Development Report (Arab HDR 2009) which is also produced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) the number of people living in extreme poverty – again based on national lower poverty lines – rose from 10.6 million in 1999 to 13.7 million in 2005 (Arab HDR 2009, 113). Again from the Arab HDR there are numbers taken from a national survey in 2004/5 about the “incidence of poverty at the national upper poverty line”: Egypt set the poverty line at PPP $0.7 per day and according to this survey the poverty rate was at 40.93 percent (Arab HDR 2009, 114).

Probably one of the best Indexes for measuring the distribution of income is the so called Gini index which is calculated by the World Bank Group (WBG). The index “measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution” (World Bank Group 2010). To be more clear, if the Gini index accounts to 0 this means that there is perfectly equal distribution of wealth in a country. If the index shows 100, this represents a perfectly unequal distribution of wealth.

For Egypt the most recent data which is available is from the year 2005. In this year Egypt had an index of 32. But this figure does not depict the reality anymore because Egypt has seen a sharp rise in inequality in recent years. Marfleet (2009, 17) demonstrates clearly how this had happened in Egypt since 1991: in this year 3.9 percent of the country’s income was...
accessible to the poorest 10 percent of the Egyptian population while the richest 20 percent had access to 26.7 percent. In 2001, the poorest still received only 3.7 percent, while the richest had access to 29.5 percent. But Marfleet reminds that this “headline figures do not fully capture the reality of recent change” (2009, 17) also because his numbers are by now already 10 years old. But he quotes Nader Ferangy, one of the authors of the United Nations Arab Human Development Report, claims that the economic policies of the Egyptian government have probably led to inequalities which have not been seen since the era of colonialism. He detects “a vicious circle of a small clique getting filthy rich and the rest getting impoverished... We have returned this country to what it used to be before the 1952 revolution: the 1 per cent society. One per cent controls almost all the wealth of the country” (quoted in Marfleet 2009, 18). Official numbers though are somewhat hard to come by. The rising gap between rich and poor in Egypt is attributed to Egypt’s radical change of economic policies which began under President Sadat and his policy of infitah (meaning ‘opening’). But under Mubarak these economic reforms increased in speed and depth, but while the opening of the Egyptian economy led to immense profits of a few, the majority of the population was left with less and less to survive (Marfleet 2009).

5.2.3. Conclusion

The first part of this chapter has focused on the so called rentier effect and its consequences for democratization. Ross (2001) has argued that the rentier effect can also be detected in countries which only export a rather small margin of oil and natural gas. This claim can clearly be confirmed in the case of Egypt. The rentier effect can certainly be seen when it comes to the extensive system of patronage the Egyptian government has established for the elites. This was not possible for the entire population because on one hand Egypt’s external rents are not that substantial and on the other hand the Egyptian population is much larger than for example the population of Kuwait. Also the suppression effect can be proven as not only the military but also the security and intelligence services have extensive budgets at their disposal. Moreover, some of these funds also come directly from abroad in form of military assistance and economic aid. While occupational specialisation has taken place to a certain degree this has not lead to any increased leverage of the population against the regime – a sign for the so called modernization effect which refers to the fact that those aspects of modernization essential for the development of democracy do not take root in rentier states.
The second part of this chapter on functionalist theory concerns the issue of inequality and democratization. While Lipset’s (1959) Modernization theory argues that increased income ultimately leads to democratization, Boix and Stokes (2003) argue that it also depends on the distribution of income and that only equal distribution of income and wealth facilitates democratization. Moreover Stepan and Robertson (2003) show that democracy is also possible at low levels of income, such as for example in India.

Therefore, it is unequal distribution of wealth and income which prevents the development of democracy – at least over the long haul. Nevertheless, the existence of inequality in a country like Egypt does not allow for the conclusion that democracy cannot take hold. This only means that it will be more difficult for Egypt to achieve democracy with such levels of inequality because economic problems will divert attention from issues concerning governance and democracy. But what must not be forgotten that in the short term, rampant inequalities can push more and more people to take part in demonstrations – firstly, against the economic policies of a country, but, ultimately, also against the whole system of government, as we have seen in Egypt.

5.3. The Social Forces Tradition

In this chapter I shall deal with the influence mass mobilization has on democratization and also the relationship between Islam and democracy. I shall begin with the aspect of mass mobilization and participation and cover the aspect of Islam and religion in the second part of the chapter. Finally, I shall give a conclusion of my findings.

5.3.1. Mass Movements and Mobilization

In the last chapter I have already outlined the three different theories which explain the emergence of mass mobilization and mass protest. But as mentioned this is not the focus of this chapter, but I shall concentrate on the effects that mass mobilization has on democratization. For that purpose I shall, firstly, give an account of the protests and demonstrations that have taken place in Egypt and I shall explain why it was this protest movement which led to the fall of the former President Hosni Mubarak although there have been several protest movements in the last decade. Secondly, I shall focus on the relation between demonstrations and the chances for democratization focusing especially on the impact of peaceful demonstrations.
5.3.1.1. Recent Mobilization and Protest in Egypt

One can put the start of the recent developments in mobilization and political protest in Egypt at the year 2000. Before there was hardly any open public space for political dissent with the government breaking down on any formation of dissent and with no real opposition existent.

5.3.1.1.1. Start of Recent Mobilization – Focus on international politics

But 2000 signifies a change when the “second intifada triggered perhaps the largest and most spontaneous demonstrations in the Arab world since the first Gulf war” (Pratt 2007, 170). This change spurred the hopes of many Arabs that they could achieve more equality, justice and emancipation with people-power (Sadiki 2000, 83) which in turn led many people to go on the streets not for protesting against their government but in support of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, being on the streets at a demonstration caused many to get involved in NGOs and a number of groups and committees were founded in support of Palestine (El-Mahdi 2009, 94).

After political action subsided more and more until 2002, the US invasion in Iraq in March 2003 served as new rallying point. Over 40,000 people attended a rally on Tahrir square on 20 March 2003 while only a few hundred were expected. Security forces were hesitant to disperse the crowd out of fear that the focus of attention might switch from the war in Iraq to domestic issues. Nevertheless, the protesters were dispersed after occupying the square over night – an event which became known as ‘Tahrir intifada’ (El-Mahdi 2009, 95).

5.3.1.1.2. Focus on Domestic Issues

But in 2004 the focus of the protests and demonstrations changed: for the first time in a long time, the activists from the demonstrations against the war in Iraq and those who had worked in support of the Palestinian Intifada came together with newcomers and other opposition figures and started to challenge Mubarak’s rule.

The Egyptian Movement for Change – or better known under the movement’s slogan ‘Kifaya’ which means ‘Enough!’ – was founded in 2004 when Mubarak was about to run for his fifth term in office. The movement and other groups such as the Popular Campaign for Change publicly urged Mubarak not to seek re-election and they also strongly opposed to the idea that Hosni Mubarak’s son Gamal Mubarak could inherit the office from his father (El-Mahdi
2009, 88). The movement organised many protests of which many went unseen and unheard by the major public because the regime managed to isolate these events. Moreover, the activists were never able to extend their reach beyond the urban centres or to mobilize significant numbers among the Egyptian middle class which still valued stability and security more than political reform (Hamzawy 2005, 4). Still the movement came to be known and popular across Egypt and inspired many others to become active (Hamzawy 2005, 3). Kifaya already made good use of the internet to communicate, organize and inform their members (El-Mahdi 2009, 89-90).

This development is significant because in the prior decade Hosni Mubarak had used the threat from terrorist groups as pretext to shut down all domestic opposition – whether left, right or human rights groups – with the help of the prolonged state of emergency “to the point where there is little domestic impetus for reform” – as Brownlee (2007, 11) attested. Now activists were calling for political changes and reform whereas in the past they had not dared to question the system itself but only protested out of economic or social grievances (El-Mahdi 2009, 92). Masoud even goes as far as identifying “the beginnings of the Mubarak regime’s final act in the 2004 founding of the Egyptian Movement for Change” (2011, 21).

But after 2005’s presidential elections the momentum of Kifaya slowed down – only to make way for protest which came from within the regime. In 2006 Egyptian judges strongly protested against rampant corruption and the manipulation of elections. Two leading judges even criticised the 2005 elections and refused to endorse them. Both were charged with ‘defaming the state’ and they were supported by many protesters during their trial. But also this movement eventually subsided when one judge was found not guilty and the other was reprimanded (El-Mahdi 2009, 99-100).

But 2007 and 2008 saw more and more protest movements due to the hardship the Egyptian population had to endure because of the economic crisis and soaring prices for food (El-Mahdi and Marfleet 2009). In this environment a series of strikes in virtually all sectors of the economy began. Especially the strike of the workers of the textile mills of Mehalla al-Kubra in December 2006 is noteworthy because they managed to extract most of their demanded concessions from the regime and when those granted concessions were not upheld the workers went on strike again in 2007 (Beinin 2009, 79-80 and 83-84).

So although Kifaya and the other organisations and groups on strike did not count as mass mobilization, they laid the groundwork for what happened in February 2011. What enabled this mass mobilization will be covered in the next chapter.
5.3.1.1.3. 2011 – Mass Mobilization

The earlier accounts of this chapter are to outline that the mass demonstrations in February 2011 did not appear out of thin air but that it was more than time for them to happen. During the elections in 2010 the regime did not even try to cover up their manipulation of the election results which angered many of the before mentioned activists. Moreover, there was a sense of uncertainty about the future of the regime due to the fact that Mubarak was obviously in bad health and that the regime had failed to put forward a certain plan for the time after Mubarak. But the only possibility spoken of was the succession of his son Gamal Mubarak which only fuelled the anger of the Egyptian population who resented the idea of such a dynastic hand-over of power. This uncertainty opened up a possibility for Egyptian prodemocracy activists. Therefore, the only thing needed was the spark to set the revolution in motion which was provided by the downfall of the Tunisian dictator Ben Ali and the movement surrounding the brutal beating of the activist Khaled Said in broad daylight (Masoud 2011, 21-22).

5.3.1.2. Peaceful Protest and Democratization

But how will the fact that the transition was brought about by popular demonstrations influence the chances of democratization in Egypt? As outlined in chapter four there is a strong and positive connection between non-violent mass opposition and the chances of overthrowing a regime (Welzel 2007; Ulfelder 2005; Karatnycki and Ackermann 2005). Although the demonstrations in Egypt were met with severe violence from the side of the regime and from civilians hired by the regime, the protesters themselves remained peaceful and non-violent. It was – as theory predicted – exactly this non-violent attitude while facing a riot police which was using life ammunition, tear gas and water to disperse the crowds of protesters which convinced many other Egyptians to join the protesters as they were angered by the brutal suppression of the demonstrations.

5.3.2. Culture – Democracy and Islam

In this part of the chapter I shall focus on the relation between democracy and religion – in the case of Egypt this is the Islamic religion. As in most Arab and Muslim countries there is little “real progress toward democracy” (Ottaway and Carothers 2004) some scholars have attributed this lack of progress to the values and traditions of the Islamic religion. The theoretical arguments have already been presented in chapter 4, so in this chapter I shall focus on the question whether this holds true for the case of Egypt. Can there be a
contradiction in favouring democratic values and Islamic values at the same time? I shall
argue that for most Egyptians this contradiction does not exist but that they rather see the
importance of democracy as a system of government but that this does not necessarily
translate to the exact same understanding Western scholars have of so called “Western
liberal democracy”. In order to do so I shall, firstly, present the Egyptian’s attitude towards
religion and its importance, secondly, I shall present their attitude towards democracy, and,
thirdly, I shall present the connection between democracy and religion.

5.3.2.1. Religiosity

In 2010 the UNDP issued the “2010 Egypt Human Development Report” which explored
among other issues the values predominant among Egypt’s youth. Concerning the
importance of religion in peoples’ lives the UNDP found that while 96 percent of the sample
stated that religion was an important part of their life, only 7 percent said the same about
politics24.

![Figure 5](image)

**Figure 5**

Important Concerns in Life

Compared to international standards, Egypt is the country where most people say that
religion is important in their lives worldwide. While the international average in this respect is
58 percent, Egypt is 38 points above the average (Egypt Human Development Report 2010).

24 This indifference can most likely be contributed to the fact that political participation in Egypt is
highly restricted and, moreover, dangerous for those who promote democracy.
Closely related to the importance of religion, is a certain fatalism which leads 69 percent of the asked people to state that they were not able to influence their fate and that “everything is preordained and unavoidable”. The report puts this statement into perspective by reminding that “religious tendencies manifest themselves more in talk than in actual rituals” (Egypt Human Development Report 2010, 72). Nevertheless, none of this can lead to the conclusion that this excludes democracy as the Egyptians political system of choice.

5.3.2.2. Democratic Values

Concerning the Egyptians’ sentiment towards democracy, I shall present the findings of two studies: firstly, one undertaken by Jamal and Tessler (2008), and, secondly, the findings in the Egypt Human Development Report (2010).

In Jamal and Tessler’s (2008) paper “Attitudes in the Arab World” they look into different questions concerning the sentiments of Arab citizens towards democracy. Jamal and Tessler find that “support for democracy in the Arab world is as high as or higher than in any other world region” (2008, 97) maybe exactly because there is such a striking lack of democracy.
Citizens of five different countries were asked whether democracy is the best or a good form of government: 86 percent stated that they saw democracy as the best system of government and 90 percent said called democracy a very good or good form of government. (Jamal and Tessler 2008, 98). Nevertheless, their picture of democracy was not all positive because 31 percent believed that democracy was not good for the economy, 33 percent thought democracy was not the best form of government to maintain order (Jamal and Tessler 2008, 98-99).

But the support for democracy is not limited to the idea of democracy but also extends to democratic institutions and procedures. Thus, 64 percent are convinced that the laws passed by the government should mirror the people’s preferences and 62 percent “believe that competition and disagreement among political groups is a good thing for their country” (Jamal and Tessler 2008, 99). But when asked to identify democracy’s core principles many stated economic considerations and only half of the respondents named the possibility to vote a government out of office. This mirrors the fact that also half of the interviewees stated the economic situation and not the authoritarian system as the main problem of their country of origin. This does not mean that those people do not value democracy as such, but that for them “democracy is a “useful” form of government that has the potential to address many of a country’s most pressing needs” (Jamal and Tessler 2008, 99).

![Figure 7](image)

**Figure 7**

Importance of Living in a Democratic System by Country
The more recent survey undertaken by the UNDP also detects that 84 percent of the correspondents stated that it was important to live under a democratic regime. In worldwide comparison Egypt is at the eighth rank, before Britain, India or Indonesia. 90 percent of the respondents support the fact that leaders should be elected in free elections and 73 percent state that civil rights are important to protect individual rights and freedoms (Egypt Human Development Report 2010, 77). While these views are similar among all different age groups, democracy is still “a higher priority for youth among peoples struggling for further democracy” (Egypt Human Development Report 2010, 68). Surprisingly, the respondents did not state democracy or participation in decision-making as one of their top priorities but rather named economic development (Egypt Human Development Report 2010, 68).

5.3.2.3. **Co-Existence of Values**

So after having established that both religion and democracy are very important for Egyptians, let me now turn to the issue of how those are connected. Jamal and Tessler find that neither Arab citizens nor academics or journalists seem to see a problem in the compatibility of Islam and democracy, rather “large numbers of Arabs and other Muslims contend that the tenets of Islam are inherently democratic” (Jamal and Tessler 2008, 101). The discourse on the incompatibility of these two concepts is rather based in Western intelligentsia and used to explain the persistence of authoritarianism in Arab countries. Along this line of argument religious people should support democracy less than non-religious people but the degree of religiosity matters little to nothing in determining the support for democracy (Jamal and Tessler 2008, 101-102).

5.3.3. **Conclusion**

This chapter is dealing with the Social Forces tradition in two aspects. Firstly, the nature of the protests from February 2011 and its relation to the chances of democratization, and, secondly, the question whether Islam and democracy are compatible and how this influences Egypt’s chances for democratization.

In the first section of this chapter I have tried to make two points: firstly, that the Egyptian movement for democracy has been developing and growing since the recent decade and that the experience from past demonstrations in combination with the exceptional historical circumstances – an aging leader of a regime which was unable to clearly formulate a post-Mubarak-plan, a population growing more and more weary of suppression and a historic precedent in Tunisia – led to the peaceful demonstrations which ousted former President
Mubarak; and, secondly, that it was essentially the peaceful character of the protests which led to Mubarak's demise. Thus, according to theory the character of the protests could enhance Egypt's chances that the transition on which the country has now embarked will lead to democracy.

The second part of the chapter on the Social Forces tradition dealt with the issue of Islam and democracy. I have showed that both religion and democracy are values held in high esteem. Nevertheless, Arabs themselves see no problem in the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Moreover, in chapter four I have shown that there are many other reasons for the lack of democracy in the Arab states and that democracy can exist in Muslim-majority countries but does not in Arab Muslim-majority countries. Therefore, we can conclude that the religion itself cannot be seen as an impediment to democratization in Egypt. Thus, according to most surveys, Muslims when given the choice will opt for democracy (Haass 2003, 137). What stalled the development towards democracy was and still is also Arabs’ fear of instability and liberals’ fear of an Islamist takeover, therefore, some had preferred a more gradual development towards democracy which in the end only solidified the authoritarian regimes’ hold on power.

5.4. Transnational Theories
The focus of this final chapter will be the international aspect of democratization and its importance for the case of Egypt. Firstly, I will answer the question whether the theoretical concept of diffusion can explain the beginning of democratization in Egypt. Secondly, I will highlight the influence of neighbouring countries and, thirdly, the impact of the international system and international actors like the United States.

5.4.1. Diffusion
In the previous chapter I have already defined diffusion as as “a process in which new ideas, institutions, policies, models, or repertoires of behavior spread from their point of origin to new sites” (Bunce 2010, 34). I shall now assess the three forms of diffusion in the case of Egypt.
Firstly, diffusion is possible through demonstration or to say when the calculus of actors in one setting is changed by the developments in another setting “by redefining what is possible” (Bunce and Wochik 2010, 34). As already mentioned this happened when the Egyptian people witnessed that the Tunisian population managed to force their President Ben Ali to step down with the help of popular protest and demonstrations.

The second form of diffusion is rather structural: Actors will apply the innovations when they think that the innovations which have been applied in a setting very similar to theirs will also work in theirs. Again this can be said to be the case in Egypt, as the Egyptians applied the same strategies of popular demonstrations and protest as in Tunisia. In return the Egyptian example also inspired other demonstrations to act in a similar fashion. Especially the strategy to permanently occupy a certain public space found many imitations.

Thirdly, there is diffusion via “expanding collaborative networks that support change and that fan out from the original point of innovation” (Bunce and Wolchik 2010, 34-5). But this form was probably not as influential as the first two because “transnational linkages and the dissemination of norms [...] articulated through transnational civil society linkages, have remained of comparatively limited import in the Middle East” according to Youngs (2008, 159).

5.4.2. Neighbouring Countries

The second part of this chapter will focus on the influence of neighbouring states on Egypt’s chances of democratization. As already outlined in chapter four, both Gleditsch and Ward (2006) as well as Brinks and Coppedge (2006) found in their studies that the fact that Egypt is part of a predominantly undemocratic region should have a negative influence on the development of democracy in Egypt. To prove this assertion I shall give a short account of how the situation regarding democracy or human rights has been in the region. Secondly, I shall give an example of how one regional actor influenced the prospects of democratization in Egypt and, finally, I will look into recent changes in the region.

5.4.2.1. Democracy over Time

The whole region of the Middle East is first and foremost comprised of relatively young nations which have gained their de facto independence from colonial powers – mainly the United Kingdom and France – in long and fierce struggles only about fifty or sixty years ago. Moreover, their borders were not defined by historical or ethnic considerations but by colonial
interest and the intention to create smaller states which were more easily controlled than one unified state instead of by historical boundaries. This was not the case for Egypt itself but for most of its neighbours a fact which complicated relations between them. The best example hereof is the region of Greater Syria which was divided into the four states Israel, Jordan – or rather Transjordan, at that time – Lebanon and Syria (Evron 1987, 20).

Moreover, during the Colonial period in Egypt calls for more democracy and an end to the monarchy which was heavily under British influence were subdued with the help of the British troops (Mansfield 2010). It nevertheless managed to hold onto power until the 1950s when the whole region was distressed by one coup after another. In Syria, Iraq and Egypt the ruling elites came to power through more or less bloody coups d’état. In 1952 the Free Officers seized power in Egypt after many demonstrations and strikes for an end to the current ruling elites (Mansfield 2010). The new President Al-Nasir was expected to implement more democratic reforms but one of the first actions taken in office was the suppression of further demonstrations as the Free Officers movement was inherently a very elitist movement which did not believe in mass participation – contrary to the expectations of the population (Marfleet 2009). Despite that the President was the first to invoke a sense of common nationalism - an Arab nationalism - among the inhabitants of the Arab speaking countries. Not only did he resist European and US influence but he also sparked a feeling of pride not only among the Arab people but throughout the former colonized world. The conflict with Israel and the subsequent military confrontations only served to grant Al-Nasir legitimacy and it united the population against the state of Israel. Thus, any democratic aspirations were put on hold. Also under Al-Nasir’s successors Anwar Al-Sadat or Hosni Mubarak there was never space for a democracy movement and there was also none detectable. The same holds true for Egypt's neighbours.

The only democratic country in the region is Israel but due to the hostilities between the two countries before the Camp David Accords in 1978 and because Israel was and still is predominantly interested in stability across its borders there was never any cooperation in terms of democratic reform but only cooperation in security matters.

5.4.2.2. The Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia

Another country in the region which has significant negative impact on all possible pro-democracy movements in Egypt is the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia. The immense funds available to Saudi-Arabia due to the country’s oil wealth were mostly used to further the extremely conservative interpretation of Islam which is predominant in Saudi-Arabia. Until today the kingdom funds and supports extremely conservative groups in Egyptian politics.
While it did also support the Muslim Brotherhood, this changed after the Brotherhood criticized the Gulf states for allowing the United States to operate from the Gulf during the second Gulf war in 1991 and the organisation lost both funding and political support. The focus of the Saudi regime then switched to the more conservative group of the Salafis (Naguib 2009).

5.4.2.3. Recent Changes

Thus, after having named some examples the influence of neighbouring countries in Egypt has been negative for the development of democracy as relations between the countries have either been used to justify putting democratic reform on hold or as the neighbouring countries did support the non-democratic regime in power.

But the last decade has witnessed a certain development in direction of democracy in many countries in the region which came from the population – not from the ruling elites. In this regard the regional context gains more importance as it is “more permeable to changes in the short term than socioeconomic factors” and, therefore, the regional and international aspect is equally important as the domestic level (Gleditsch and Ward 2006).

And in fact there has been a significant increase in the numbers of strikes and protest in many Arab countries in the region in the last decade - especially though in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Jordan. But until recently the involved groups and organizations – labour groups, workers, students, bloggers, opposition parties, youth groups and Islamist organizations – had operated separately with distinct demands and constituencies. Especially, in Egypt there has been a separation between for example labour movements and opposition parties due to a lack of trust by the former of the latter. But this divide only served the incumbent regimes who managed to uphold power vis-à-vis a divided opposition (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011).

The recent surge in activity during the winter of 2010/2011 which started in Tunisia with the fall of President Ben Ali then inspired people in many other countries to believe “that they can force change” (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011, 1) and the potential was there, because in most Arab countries the social and economic conditions were dire - except maybe for the Gulf region where not the citizens of the oil-rich Gulf states had to suffer from poor living conditions but a segment of migrant workers coming from India, Pakistan and other Arabic countries. Thus, the protest which erupted in this region was motivated politically from the beginning. In the other countries the “ politicization of protest” took place and led to new situation in which the incumbent regimes had to face a real challenge to their rule (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011).
5.4.3. International Actors

To be frank the outlook for democracy was rather bleak before the events in the Arab countries took place. Several factors led to the fact that liberal democracy was increasingly contested as the best form of government. The annual Freedom House Review also drew a rather dark image for the prospects for democracy in their 2010 report which covered all events until the end of 2010. Thus, they did not cover the developing events in the Arab countries. Puddington (2011, 1) concluded that, “[t]he increasing truculence of the world’s most powerful authoritarian regimes has coincided with a growing inability or unwillingness on the part of the world’s democracies to meet the authoritarian challenge, with important consequences for the state of global freedom.” Freedom House also noted a decline in democracy “for the fifth consecutive year”, calling this a threat to “gains dating to the post–Cold War era in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the former Soviet bloc.” (Puddington 2011, 2)

![Country Breakdown by Status](image)

**Figure 8**

Status of Freedom in the World according to Freedom House

Especially in the Middle East democracy in general was in a dire state. Figure 2 shows the number of Free, Partly Free and Not Free countries – according to Freedom House data. While worldwide at least 45% of all countries are considered as free, in the Middle East it is
only 6%, as shown in Figure 3. Moreover, 78% are considered as Not Free and only 17% as Partly Free.

![Status of Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa according to Freedom House](image)

**Figure 9**
Status of Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa according to Freedom House

There are several international reasons for this into which I shall look now. Firstly, I shall assess the role of China, secondly, the effect that Western policy had in the whole region.

First of all the economic success of China and the Communist Party’s aptness to suppress democratic change is an inspiring example for the world’s authoritarian leaders. Moreover, China’s recent surge in foreign aid activities give many countries, especially in Africa the possibility to gain aid without attached conditionality as it would be the case with foreign aid from European or American money.

Secondly, it has to be noted that – as Youngs (2008, 151) put it – the Middle East reveals “the international domain’s profound and complex impact on political processes.” As international actors such as the United States give such high priority to Middle Eastern policies, those countries are highly affected by changes in the international system and the Western response to it. But the attacks on September 11, 2001 changed this even further and put the Middle East on top of the agenda. The attacks constituted an unprecedented event in the history of the United States of America: it was the first terrorist attack on US soil and, thus, it profoundly altered the focus of US foreign policy. Whereas President Bush had paid little attention to the importance of democracy promotion before 9/11 his administration now regarded democracy promotion as central in their response to al-Qai’da and Islamist extremism (Carothers 2003a, 63).
In the name of democracy promotion and counter-terrorism a coalition of Western countries toppled the authoritarian regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the connection between al-Qaeda, 9/11 and Afghanistan was obvious, his was not so clear for the war in Iraq where economy, security and democracy related reasons played a role (Carothers 2007, 6). In theory democracy in Iraq would have put pressure on neighbouring authoritarian regimes to democratize and it would have created a powerful democratic example for the whole Middle East – thus strengthening democracy promotion attempts (Carothers 2003b). But as Freedom House stated in its annual reports on the status of freedom in the world that in the time between 2000 and 2008 when President Bush was actively pursuing his agenda for democratization “the record shows modest progress in terms of overall status [but] stagnation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region” which was at the very center of the American democracy promotion effort (Puddington 2008, 93-99).

Moreover, the United States also tried to push for democratization throughout the world as solution for Islamist extremism and terrorism in the broader Middle East. Thus, democracy promotion became the central theme of US foreign policy (Carothers 2006, 56). The basic idea was that democracy in Middle Eastern countries would enable all parts of the population to reconcile their grievances peacefully and participate in the political process (Windsor 2003) and an important example for this is the large Indian Muslim community (Haass 2003, 142). But in fact scholars disagree whether democracy is the antidote to terrorism, because by granting its citizens more freedoms a democratic state can actually facilitate terrorist attacks (Li 2005). Moreover, there were always fears that due to a lack of secular opposition in most Arab states (Wittes 2008, 11) democratization of the elections might “produce theocratic regimes” (Fukuyama, McFaul 2007). Besides, the United States “still needed the close cooperation of these governments on several fronts, such as antiterrorism, access to oil, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict” (Carothers 2007, 7) which decreased the pressure the US was willing to put on those authoritarian regimes.

Thus, while there was very strong verbal support for democracy promotion, this created an “an ever-widening gap between the rhetoric of promoting democracy” (Hurrell, On Global Order, 161) and the reality where the western governments rather sacrificed the agenda of

25 The lack of secular opposition is due to the fact that most authoritarian regimes used Islamist Parties in order to justify their strong hold on power. For the eyes of the West they portrayed themselves as the only bulwark against Islamism. The existing secular opposition was more ruthlessly suppressed than Islamist parties. A very telling example is the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which always served former President Mubarak as excuse for putting off reforms while he granted the Brotherhood limited access to political offices. (QQQ al-aswany)
democracy promotion in favour of security or economic interests. A telling example is President Bush’s second inaugural Address: “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions” and in another of his speeches the President stated, “If liberty can blossom in the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire millions of men and women around the globe who are equally weary of poverty and oppression, equally entitled to the benefits of democratic government” (Remarks at the White House, June 24, 2002). The strong rhetoric pushing for democratization which the President used did not translate into a consistent policy of criticising anti-democratic governments, such as for example the Saudi government or Pakistani military dictator Pervez Musharraf, or into actual political pressure for democratization.

Despite these choices between idealism and realism the West was partly successful in promoting democracy: One can argue that today Iraq is a democracy where the people proved their will to participate in the last election on 6 March 2010 despite ongoing attempts by terrorist organisations to undermine this. Also Pakistan witnessed a major shift from Not Free to Partly Free according to Freedom House (Puddington 2008, 102). Another positive factor is the fact that the West questioned its support for authoritarian rulers and that democratization in the un-democratic areas of the world became an important issue on the agenda (Puddington 2008, 104). Especially the verbal support of democracy throughout the West has led an acceptance of democracy as desirable form of government and to the fact that “democracy promotion is now an unavoidable part of any serious foreign policy debate” (Carothers 2007, 2).

But apart from these small achievements, the consequences of Western policies after 9/11 were predominantly negative. Especially the war in Iraq and the toppling of the Taliban had negative consequences as “opponents of democracy promotion have tried to associate it with the removal by force of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, claiming that democracy promotion is simply the pursuit of regime change by other means (Gershman and Allen 2006, 49.) Moreover, after Iraq democracy promotion became inextricably linked to military intervention (Carothers 2007, Carothers 2006) – especially in the Arab world – and this link could therefore constitute a pivotal case which some scholars feared might alter the meaning of democracy promotion for good (Whitehead 2009).

The war in Iraq was also misused by Arab leaders to stress the “message to their citizens about the perils of rapid democratic change” (Carothers 2007, vi). In terms of democracy as solution to terrorism, the West is in danger of exploiting democratization efforts by “wrapping security goals in the language of democracy promotion and then confusing democracy
promotion with the search for particular political outcomes that enhance those security goals" (Carothers 2003a, 71). A clear example is the reluctance of Western countries to accept the outcome of Palestinian elections in 2006 – one of the most free and fair elections in the Middle East – because the radical organisation Hamas won the majority of the votes.

Despite strong verbal support for democracy the results on the ground actually signalled that Western policies achieved very little and this led to a situation where democracy promotion itself was questioned as foreign policy goal and there were serious doubts about whether democracy promotion was even possible (Puddington 2008, Carothers 2007). Worldwide there was a spreading feeling of “broader public unease with the very idea of democracy promotion” (Carothers 2006, 63-64). Furthermore, in the War on Terror the lack “transparency, accountability, human-rights protection, and even commitment to the rule of law” (Whitehead 2009, 233) in Western democracies but especially in the United States and its “counterterrorism policies, including the use of torture, extraordinary renditions, and the treatment of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay military base” (Puddington 2008, 98) tarnished the image of the US and also the West as example of the advantages of democracy. Despite all those negative consequences of the West’s counter-terrorism measures it is important to note that the focus on democracy promotion as solution to extremism was not the worst idea, but the implementation and the detailed policies were faulty and often neglected in the face of economic or security interest. Had the West’s response been less martial and more focused on democracy assistance, and had the West supported democracy not just vocally but also substantially instead of relying on authoritarian rulers to combat terrorism, the prospect for democracy might not have been so bleak before the Revolutions in the Arab countries.

Nevertheless, important lessons can be drawn from failed policies: the most crucial one would be that democratization comes mostly from within a society or state and it can be achieved even against Western security interests and against the interests of neighbouring states – the best example hereof are of course the recent democratic revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the ongoing demonstrations in Syria and Yemen and the overthrow of the Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qaddhaffi. Today the situation in the Arab countries is of course quite different and the assumed backlash against democracy and democracy promotion was not as profound as assumed in Western media. Thus, I would conclude the backlash was not so much against democracy, but against how democracy was promoted by Western governments.
5.4.4. Conclusion

I have looked into three different aspects of transnational theories. Firstly, I have presented the influence of diffusion on democratization in Egypt and we can conclude that to a certain degree there has been diffusion through demonstration and also the second form of diffusion – when actors in the same or similar setting apply successful strategies of actors from another place with the same problems. But diffusion through networks was not detectable, as the cooperation between different opposition groups was rather limited. It was not inexistent, though, but confined to individual communication via the internet.

Secondly, I have assessed the influence of neighbouring countries on Egypt and there has been an overall negative impact from neighbouring countries on democratization in Egypt, as theory suggests, because democracies and authoritarian regimes tend to cluster geographically. Therefore, the fact that Egypt was surrounded by authoritarian regimes – or in the case of Israel a democracy which in this unique case preferred Egypt not to democratize - contrary to what democracies in other regions worldwide favour – has stalled democratization. Nevertheless, the whole region is more permeable to change than expected and this change was detectable throughout the region with a slowly growing protest movement.

Thirdly, I have been looking into the influence of international actors and especially the influence the worldwide so called ‘war on terror’ had on democratization. We can conclude that there was very strong verbal support for democracy and human rights but that this verbal support did not translate into substantive action which would have effectively furthered democracy. What had happened instead were superficial reforms which never touched the monopoly of power of the undemocratic regimes of the entire region because most international actors valued stability over democratic change. Moreover, in the so called ‘war on terror’ the authoritarian regimes and especially the Egyptian regime cooperated with Western countries in counter-terrorism activities. Among them was also extraordinary rendition where terrorist suspects were transferred to Egypt in order to be tortured for information. Thus, while the strong verbal support for democracy may have had a positive influence, many scholars had concluded that this positive influence had probably been cancelled out by the ongoing support for the authoritarian regimes. But, apparently, the Arab population was able to distinguish between Western policies and Western ideals, as democracy was and is clearly regarded with high esteem.
6. Conclusion

In the course of this paper I have tried to find an answer to the question whether current democracy theory is able to explain why such a powerful democracy movement emerged in Egypt – or being more precise which theoretical schools can explain the development of the movement and which could not. To be clear, no theory or scholar was able to predict or foretell what was going to happen in the Arabic countries as revolutions and mass mobilization are always nearly impossible to predict. Nevertheless, it is important to question whether theories can offer an explanation in hindsight for the emergence of the democracy movements and its recent upsurge in activity.

I have looked into the four different schools of democracy – genetic theory, functionalist theory, the social forces tradition and transnational theories – and identified certain factors which I have then analysed in more detail. I shall now sum up my findings.

6.1. Findings

For genetic theories I have looked into the question of which type of regime is most likely to break down and democratize. I have used Hadenius and Teorell's (2007) categorization and defined Egypt as dominant multi-party regime which – according to Hadenius and Teorell's findings – are among those who are most likely to embark on a transition to democracy. But in the case of the Egyptian regime the trait of personalism was very strongly developed which stalled this development. Moreover, the theory and its proponents strongly emphasised the phenomenon of durable authoritarianism and analysed the region with this lens. This led to a failure to explain or presume the breakdown of this durable authoritarianism – also due to a focus on elite politics and to neglect for political mass participation. Also the two possibilities for regime breakdown – a split in the regime and a unified opposition – did not take place in that simple fashion. One lesion learned from the events in the Arab world would be that contrary to the assumptions of 'durable authoritarianism', this type of regime is instable and will eventually break down. Nevertheless, this does not lead to the conclusion that it will be any easier in the future to establish neither from outside nor inside when such a breakdown could occur. Moreover, neglect for the ideas and aspirations of the population led to wrong assumptions. But, arguably, it is difficult to come by accurate information about the mood of a population in
authoritarian regimes. Thus, genetic theories have significant problems explaining the events in Egypt.

Secondly, I considered functionalist theories and looked both into the rentier effect and the existence of inequality in a society and their influence on the prospects of democratization. I have defined a rentier state as state which heavily depends on foreign rents as form of revenue and not on its population and established that this term applies to the Egyptian example – a state which does not only export oil and natural gas, but also depends financially on the Suez canal. Other important sources of revenue are agriculture which is dependent on the centrally controlled river Nile and essentially tourism which is also centrally organized. Moreover, Ross (2001) has argued that the rentier effect can also be detected in countries which only export a rather small margin of oil and natural gas. This claim can clearly be confirmed in the case of Egypt. Also the three effects the rentier state has can be found in Egypt: firstly, the rentier effect shows itself in the system of patronage the Egyptian government has established for the elites; secondly, the suppression effect leads to Egypt’s vast military and both security and intelligence services. This effect is only enhanced by funds which come directly from abroad in form of military assistance and economic aid; the modernization effect – just as predicted – is restricted and does not extend to those aspects of modernization essential for the development of democracy, such as for example education or access to media. So, this concept explains very aptly how such rentier states maintain their power but again fail to give an account of regime break down.

The second factor of functionalist theories which I considered in this paper was the nexus between inequality and democratization. While Lipset’s (1959) Modernization theory argues that increased income ultimately leads to democratization, Boix and Stokes (2003) argue that it rather depends on the distribution of income and that only equal distribution of income and wealth facilitates democratization. Moreover, Stepan and Robertson (2003) show that democracy is also possible at low levels of income, such as for example in India. I have cited several studies which show the excessive inequality in Egypt which has existed since colonial times and has been growing to historical levels under President Mubarak and his economic policies. The theory explains that while inequality makes the development of democracy more difficult over the long haul, rampant inequality can also push people to become active in politics out of the desire to abolish inequality. Moreover, this can and has motivated large segments of the population in Egypt to protest against the regime’s
economic policies and ultimately against the whole system of government. Thus, theory aptly describes the effects that inequality has on democratization.

The third chapter was dedicated to the social forces tradition; looking into, firstly, the nature of the protests in February 2011 and influence on to the chances of democratization, and, secondly, the question whether Islam and democracy are compatible and how this influences Egypt’s chances for democratization. Concerning the former, the social forces tradition claims that mass participation is very favourable to democracy, as most transitions to democracy during the first wave were initiated by mass protest and demonstration. Especially, peaceful demonstrations are seen as very conducive to democratization as they motivate more people to join the protest. In the case of Egypt I have tried to show that demonstrations have a long history and, moreover, that the recent decade has seen an increase in public protest and demonstrations. Thus, the exceptional historical circumstances – an aging leader of a regime which was unable to clearly formulate a post-Mubarak-plan, a population growing more and more weary of suppression and a historic precedent in Tunisia – led to the peaceful demonstrations which ousted former President Mubarak. It was also the essentially peaceful character of the protests which led to Mubarak’s demise. Thus, according to theory the character of the protests could enhance Egypt’s chances that the transition on which the country has now embarked will lead to democracy.

Concerning the latter argument that Islam and democracy are not compatible, I have shown that there are many scholars who argue that it is the Islamic religion which prevents democracy from taking root in Muslim-majority countries but I have also presented evidence that the lack of democracy is limited to Arab Muslim-majority countries and that there are in fact democratic Non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. Furthermore, there are many other reasons for the lack of democracy in the Arab countries such as the economic structure, the promotion of authoritarian regimes from abroad, and also the fear of liberal moderates from the Islamic opposition parties – a fear supported by the regimes who portray themselves as the only bulwark against a possible Islamist takeover not unlike the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Nevertheless, I have presented the argument that despite the fact that the Egyptian people consider religion a very important part of their life, they do not see a problem in the compatibility of Islam and democracy. On the contrary, Arabs and Muslims hold the ideal of democracy and accountability in very high esteem according to several polls which I have cited in the course of the paper. Therefore, we can conclude that the religion itself cannot be seen as an impediment to democratization in Egypt.
The last chapter deals with the international aspect of democratization. Here I have looked into three different factors, namely, diffusion, the influence of neighbouring countries and finally the impact of international states and the international system.

In order to assess the influence of the first aspect of diffusion I have, firstly, defined the concept of diffusion as "a process in which new ideas, institutions, policies, models, or repertoires of behavior spread from their point of origin to new sites" (Bunce 2010, 34) and its three different forms. In the case of Egypt I have shown that to a certain degree there has been diffusion through demonstration and also the second form of diffusion – when actors in the same or similar setting apply successful strategies of actors from another place with the same problems. But the last form of diffusion – through transnational networks – was not verifiable because the cooperation between different opposition groups was rather limited. It was not inexistent, though, but confined to individual communication via the internet.

The second aspect which I analysed was the influence of neighbouring countries, as theory presents a very strong case that democratization is clustered geographically – meaning that the fact that Egypt’s neighbours are not democracies should negatively influence Egypt’s chances for democracy²⁶. This theoretical argument holds true. Nevertheless, the whole region is more permeable to change than expected and this change was detectable throughout the region with a slowly growing protest movement.

Finally, I have assessed the influence of international actors and the Western policies adopted during the so called ‘war on terror’. While there was strong verbal support for democracy and human rights, this never translated to substantive action which would have effectively furthered democracy. Moreover, in the so called ‘war on terror’ authoritarian regimes and especially the Egyptian regime cooperated with Western countries in counter-terrorism activities, such as extraordinary rendition and torture. Thus, while the strong verbal support for democracy may have had a positive influence, many scholars have concluded that this positive influence had probably been cancelled out by the ongoing support for the authoritarian regimes. But, apparently, the Arab population was able to distinguish between

²⁶ Israel is a democracy but in this unique case Israel preferred Egypt not to democratize but to work together with the Egyptian regime which was very cooperative, especially concerning the Palestinian issues. The population was always very critical of the Egyptian actions concerning the Palestinians, so, a democratic Egypt would subsequently cooperate to a lesser degree with Israel.
Western policies and Western ideals, as democracy was and is clearly regarded with high esteem.

Thus, we can clearly state that democratization theory was not only surprised by the events and changes in the region, but also that there are only a few theories – among them the social forces tradition concerning mass mobilization, the argument concerning inequality and democratization and transnational theories – which find sufficient explanations. But the more traditional theories have more difficulties in explaining the changes in Egypt – probably because they are more strongly influenced by transitions which took place before the third wave of democratization.

6.2. Outlook

The majority of deductions from my findings lead to the conclusion that democracy in Egypt is rather unlikely. This can probably be attributed to the fact that the region has been viewed through a lens of Arab exceptionalism. Moreover, prior to the fall of the Soviet Union nobody had argued that democracy in Eastern Europe was imminent or even possible; the same can be said for Arab countries. Nevertheless, the conclusions we can draw for the future of democracy in Egypt must be drawn very cautiously because even though Egypt may have embarked on a transition we cannot assume with certainty that this development will lead to democracy – nor can we claim that democracy is unreachable. Here genetic theories are invaluable as they underline the uncertainty inherent in transitions.

Therefore, I shall not argue that the transition in Egypt will or will not lead to democracy. Nevertheless, I can again sum up what the theories suggest. According to genetic theories Egypt’s transition to democracy might be rather likely because multi-party regimes are the regimes that transition most frequently to democracy – though not if the analysis of the Egyptian regime is undertaken with respect to the concept of ‘durable authoritarianism’ which would rather suggest that another authoritarian regime would be the outcome of Egypt’s transition.

The argument that rentier states hardly democratize – one of functionalist theory’s propositions – one the other hand would suggest that Egypt will face great difficulties institutionalizing a government which accountable to its citizens despite the fact that it is dependent on external sources of revenue. In the same direction go the conclusions which can be deduced from my findings concerning inequality and democracy. Inequality not only
increases the elites’ fear of re-distributional policies but also diverts attention from governance and accountability issues to economic problems.

On the contrary the social forces tradition suggests that most transitions which have been started by mass mobilizations led to democratic regimes. Concerning the discussion about the compatibility of democracy and Islam, no overall agreement – for neither side – has been found. But I have argued that the absence of democracy in the Middle East cannot be contributed solely to the Islamic religion.

The arguments made in theory on diffusion would also suggest that because mass mobilization, demonstrations and the call for democracy have spread throughout the region this will encourage democracy in all of these countries. Thus, it will ultimately also depend on the development in Egypt’s neighbouring countries – Libya has overthrown its dictator and there was also a popular movement in Israel – and whether these countries will have a positive or negative influence on democratization in Egypt. Other actors such as Saudi-Arabia though have clearly a negative impact on democratization. International influences are more ambivalent; despite the strong support for democracy worldwide there are many actors and states which favour the status quo instead of a democratic Middle East.

Moreover, I have to stress the uncertainty of democratic transitions which implies that even though theory might suggest one way or the other over the short term the Egyptian actors and stake holders will decide the future for democracy in Egypt.
7. Bibliography


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7.1. Documents


7.2. Online-Resources


7.3. Interview

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7.4. Tables and Figures


**Figure 2:** Hadenius, Axel and Teorell, Jan (2007) ‘Pathways from Authoritarianism’, in *Journal of Democracy*, 18:1, p. 150.

**Figure 3:** Stepan, Alfred with Robertson, Graeme B. (2003) ‘An “Arab” more than “Muslim” Electoral Gap’, *Journal of Democracy*, 14:3, pp. 37.


**Figure 5:** Puddington, Arch (2011) *Freedom in the World 2011: The Authoritarian Challenge to Democracy*, from [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org), p. 21.

**Figure 6:** Puddington, Arch (2011) *Freedom in the World 2011: The Authoritarian Challenge to Democracy*, from [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org), p. 23.

**Figure 7:** Egypt Human Development Report (2010) *United Nations Development Programme*, p. 83.

**Figure 8:** World Values Survey quoted in 2010 Egypt Human Development Report (2010) *United Nations Development Programme*, p. 65.

**Figure 9:** World Values Survey quoted in 2010 Egypt Human Development Report (2010) *United Nations Development Programme*, p. 72.

**Figure 10:** World Values Survey quoted in 2010 Egypt Human Development Report (2010) *United Nations Development Programme*, p. 68.
Abstract


Democratization theory is heavily influenced by experiences from different democratic transitions in the past, especially those from the so called third wave of democratization. These experiences were applied to study all other regions worldwide and led to conclusions such as the incompatibility of democracy and Islam which impeded a correct analysis of the state of affairs of the Arab countries prior to the so called Arab Spring which had surprised scholars and analysts alike. Therefore, this paper asks the question whether current democracy theory is able to explain in hindsight why such powerful democracy movements emerged in Egypt – or being more precise which theoretical schools can explain the events and which cannot. To answer this question, I have looked into the four different schools of democracy theory – genetic theory, functionalist theory, the social forces tradition and transnational theories – and identified certain factors which I have then applied to the case of Egypt.
Zusammenfassung


Die vorliegende Arbeit interessiert die Frage ob die heutige Demokratietheorie in der Lage ist, die Ereignisse des Arabischen Frühlings in Ägypten und die Entstehung einer so erfolgreichen Demokratiebewegung zu erklären. Wichtig ist allerdings, dass nicht die Frage gestellt wird warum die Theorie keine Vorhersage der Revolution in Ägypten liefern konnte, sondern lediglich ob die Aussagen und Argumente betreffend der Grundvoraussetzungen und Ursachen von Demokratisierung die Geschehnisse in Ägypten treffend beschreiben und im Nachhinein erklären können.

Um diese Frage beantworten zu können wurden in der Arbeit die vier verschiedenen Theorieschulen der Demokratietheorie – also „Genetic Theories“, Funktionalistische Theorien, die „Social Forces Tradition“ sowie Transnationale Theorien – untersucht. Aus jeder der Schulen wurden entweder die Hauptgründe für Demokratisierung oder die für Ägypten am zutreffendsten beziehungsweise anwendbaren Gründe herausgearbeitet und am Beispiel Ägyptens analysiert, ob diese die eine Erklärung anbieten können.

Die Arbeit teilt sich in fünf Hauptkapitel, wobei sich das erste mit der in dieser Arbeit angewandten Demokratiedefinition und weiteren für die Analyse nötigen Begriffsbestimmungen, wie ‚Demokratisierung‘, ‚demokratische Transition‘ und ‚demokratische Konsolidierung‘ beschäftigt.

Das zweite Kapitel liefert einen historischen Überblick über die Anfänge der Literatur über die Entstehung von Demokratie und über die Entwicklung der Theorie in den verschiedenen Schulen. Die ersten drei Schulen sind hier „Genetic Theories“, Funktionalistische Theorien und die „Social Forces Tradition“. Transnationale Theorien wurden erst nach der so genannten Dritten Welle der Demokratisierung entwickelt, als zusehends die Einsicht verbreitet wurde, dass internationale Faktoren ebenso einflussreich auf Demokratisierung
waren, wie innerstaatliche. Die Dritte Welle der Demokratisierung führte auch zu zahlreichen neuen Einsichten über Demokratie und ihre Entstehung.


Curriculum Vitae

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