Pragmatic transfer and politeness in interlanguage apologizing: the case of Serbian and English

Sonja Stojanovic

Magistra der Philosophie (Mag.phil.)

Wien, Dezember 2011
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1 Introduction

Interlanguage pragmatics is a linguistic area which belongs to the second language studies domain. One of its aims is to study non-native speakers’ comprehension and production of speech acts in a second language.

Language learners need to acquire L2 pragmatic competence in order to be able to communicate successfully in that language. However, research in interlanguage pragmatics has shown that sociolinguistic competence can be problematic for language learners. They may be grammatically competent in L2, but still lack knowledge of sociolinguistic rules to communicate appropriately and to understand language in context. Given that a learner’s first and second languages may differ in realizations of speech acts, the lack of linguistic, social and pragmatic knowledge may cause the learner to make pragmatic failure. One potential cause of pragmatic failure is pragmatic transfer, which occurs when speakers apply rules from the first language and culture to their second language. As a consequence, the speaker may appear as unintentionally rude, disrespectful and impolite.

One speech act in which pragmatic transfer can possibly occur is the speech act of apologizing. Learning to apologize appropriately in L2 is an important part of the speaker’s communicative competence. When social norms are violated and miscommunication occurs, apologies are there as an opportunity to save face in the face-threatening situation.

The present thesis investigates the speech act of apologizing with reference to the phenomena of politeness and pragmatic transfer. It is structured in seven chapters. The first two chapters introduce pragmatics and offer an overview of main linguistic fields in the domain of pragmatics. Chapter 4 deals with the concept of language competence and explains the process and the types of pragmatic transfer. Chapter 5 offers insight into the concept of politeness and looks into both traditional and modern politeness theories. Its main focus is Brown and Levinson’s Politeness Theory and the concept of face. Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theories and indirect speech acts are the subject of chapter 6. The speech act of apology and strategies for its realization are introduced in chapter 7. The final chapter presents the empirical study aimed at analysing the realization of apology strategies by Serbian learners of English. It investigates to what extent language learners transfer
socio-cultural rules from first to second language, and tries to discover differences and similarities between native and non-native English speakers' production of apologies.
2 Pragmatics

2.1 Defining pragmatics

Pragmatics is considered a relatively young discipline, which began to develop as a separate area of linguistics about forty years ago. The term pragmatics dates back to the philosopher Pierce (1905), whose field of interest was pragmatism. But it was Charles Morris (1938) who first identified pragmatics as a research area, and presented it as a complementary branch to syntax and semantics. Even though Morris’ ambitious plan was to integrate language, art and other sciences which deal with signs, he never succeeded in that. However, he started a significant interest in pragmatic research.

In his work on pragmatics, Jacob Mey (1994: 245) argues that Rudolf Carnap’s approach to pragmatics deserves more to be quoted today than Morris’ work, which he finds “rather bland and programmatic”. Here is how Carnap sees pragmatics:

Linguistics, in the widest sense, is that branch of science which contains all empirical investigation concerning languages. It is the descriptive, empirical part of semiotic (of spoken or written languages); hence it consists of pragmatics, semantics, and descriptive syntax. But these three parts are not on the same level; pragmatics is the basis for all of linguistics... semantics and syntax are, strictly speaking, parts of pragmatics. (Carnap 1942: 13 quoted in Mey 1994: 245)

Many conflicting definitions of pragmatics have arisen in the course of the study of that field of linguistics, and David Crystal notes that no coherent pragmatic theory has yet been achieved. Nevertheless, many useful and refined definitions of pragmatics have been provided, and one of it was produced by Crystal himself. In his Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics, Crystals states that pragmatics is

[...] the study of language from the point of view of users, especially of the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interaction and the effects their use of language has on other participants in an act of communication. (Crystal 2005: 364)

With this definition Crystal proposes that pragmatics is the study of language use in the sociocultural context.

There are three philosophers and linguists that have significantly contributed to the development of linguistic pragmatics, and they are John Austin, John Searle, and Paul Grice. They focused their attention on the way speakers used language to
convey messages, producing utterances put in context. Hearers are then able to make inferences and gain information which is stored beyond what is explicit. In his work on pragmatics, Levinson (1983: 24) shares these ideas in a definition which states that

[p]ragmatics is the study of the ability of language users to pair sentences with the contexts in which they would be appropriate.

Context has been of central importance in pragmatic research. Leech (1983: 13) defines context as “any background knowledge assumed to be shared by s and h and which contributes to h’s interpretation of what s means by a given utterance”. Words in interaction carry meaning which is dependent on physical and social knowledge that both speaker and hearer share.

There are a large number of definitions describing pragmatics as the study of meaning in context. According to Mey (1994: 42), pragmatics is “the study of the conditions of human language uses as these are determined by the context of society”. Blum-Kulka and Hamo (2011: 143) define pragmatics as “the study of linguistic communication in context: the choices users of language make and the process of meaning-making in social interaction”, whereas George Yule (1996: 3) defines pragmatics as “the study of speaker meaning” as well as “the study of contextual meaning”.

### 2.2 Semantics and pragmatics

Pragmatics is often defined in contrast to semantics (Leech 1983, Levinson 1983, Mey 2001), even though many linguists consider it difficult to draw a clear line between the two subfields of linguistics (Bach 1997: 33).

In 1983 Geoffrey Leech published his work *Principles of pragmatics*, establishing a theoretic view of pragmatics. Before he turns to main principles of pragmatics, he considers the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. According to him, they are distinct but complementary fields of studies, which have meaning as their main concern. However,

[...] meaning in pragmatics is defined relative to a speaker or user of the language, whereas meaning in semantics is defined purely as a property of expression in a given language, in abstraction from particular situations, speakers or hearers. (1983: 6)
In his definitions of pragmatics, Leech puts emphasis on speech situation, stating that pragmatics studies meaning in relation to a speech situation (1983: 15). He offers a list of aspects of speech situations as a criterion for making the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and these aspects are addressers and addressees, context, goals, illocutionary act, and utterance.

While semantics relates to knowledge encoded in the vocabulary of the language, pragmatics is the study of the interaction of our knowledge of the world and semantic knowledge. In order to make such interaction feasible, it is of great importance to take context into account.

In *Handbook of pragmatics* Jef Verschueren discusses the very common practice of comparing pragmatics to other areas of linguistics, such as semantics or syntax in order to specify and define the domain of pragmatics. He considers pragmatics to be “a specific perspective on language rather than a component of linguistic theory with its own clearly definable object of investigation” (Verschueren 1995: 16). Jacob Mey shares the same view stating that

> [L]inguistic pragmatics … can be said to characterize a new way of looking at things linguistic [i.e., ‘a perspective’], rather than marking off clear borderlines to other disciplines (Haberland & Mey 1977: 5, quoted in Mey 2001: 8).

According to Verschueren, pragmatics should not be assigned “[…] its own set of linguistic features in contradistinction with phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics” (Verschueren 1995: 15). He argues that pragmatics as the study of meaning in context should analyse any contextual meaning of a linguistic feature, “whether this feature has a ‘semantics’ of its own or not” (1995: 16). If pragmatics is seen as a perspective of looking at things and not as a component of linguistics with clear borderlines, than semantics should not be used as the primary point of comparison when trying to define pragmatics, which is common among linguists.

The advantage that pragmatics has over semantics is that it deals with speaker’s intended meaning, goals, and assumptions. However, this can also be a disadvantage since it is very difficult sometimes to study and understand what is meant by what is said (Yule 1996: 4).

Leech (1983: 6) introduces his idea of complementarism between semantics and pragmatics. He distinguishes between three possible ways of describing the relationship: semanticism (pragmatics inside semantics), pragmaticism (semantics
inside pragmatics) and complementarism (pragmatics and semantics complementing each other). This third viewpoint is the one Leech supports, arguing that only by approaching meaning from a viewpoint which combines pragmatics and semantics can meaning be successfully explained and be “faithful to the facts as we observe them” and “as simple and generalizable as possible” (1983: 7). These are the criteria Leech considers essential.

A major contribution to the field of pragmatics is Grice’s Cooperative Principle, which will be explained in the following section.

### 2.3 Cooperative Principle – H. P. Grice

Communication requires speakers to cooperate, and thus in a mutually determined and accepted context. When speakers communicate, they are expected to obey a set of norms and principles. The philosopher H. Paul Grice was concerned with the processes of generating meaning and understanding intended meaning. Grice (1975: 45) argues that in most conversations “[…] each participant recognizes […], to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction”. Furthermore, Grice states that during conversations “[…] at each stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded, as conversationally unsuitable”. As a result, he developed a principle which states: “Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” (1975: 45)

Under this Cooperative Principle, Grice distinguishes four categories – Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner – and these categories consist of the following maxims (1975: 45-46):

**Maxims of Quantity:**

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

**Maxims of Quality:**

Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:

1. Do not say what you believe to be false;
(2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

**Maxim of Relation:**
Make your contribution relevant.

**Maxims of Manner:**
Be perspicuous.
(1) Avoid obscurity.
(2) Avoid ambiguity.
(3) Be brief.
(4) Be orderly.

With these maxims Grice suggests that there is a set of rules in communication, and also an accepted way of communicating. By producing an utterance, we assume that it is true, relevant, that it conveys enough information, and that it is understandable. However, if an utterance does not seem to follow the maxims, a hearer is not expected to consider the utterance false, but to infer the intended meaning. Grice was the first one to study the difference between what is meant and what is said. It often happens that a speaker is communicating more than he is actually expressing in his utterance. In other words, an intended meaning produced by a direct speech act could also be produced by an indirect speech act. In Grice’s terms (1975: 49), “[a] participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim”, to violate it, or “flout” it, and thus create an implicature. There is no explicit definition of implicature offered by Grice, but this is what he explains:

A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that \( p \) has implicated that \( q \), may be said to have conversationally implicated that \( q \), PROVIDED THAT (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the cooperative principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, \( q \) is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say \( p \) consistent with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (1975: 49)

Laurence Horn offers a simple but clear definition saying that “[i]mplicature is a component of speaker meaning that constitutes an aspect of what is meant in a speaker’s utterance without being part of what is said” (Horn 2002: 3). An implicature is thus recognised not from a syntactic form of a sentence alone but needs to be derived with the help of the context of the utterance.
3 Pragmatics across cultures

3.1 Culture

The pragmatics of intercultural communication deals with investigations into interactions between members of different cultural groups. Since intercultural encounters may give rise to miscommunication, cultural differences present an important issue in pragmatics. But in order to explain these differences, it is essential to understand how culture expresses itself in communication.

The concept of culture has been the concern of many disciplines such as philosophy, anthropology, sociology, cultural studies. From the anthropological point of view culture refers to a society’s overall way of life, i.e. a dominant set of habits which are learned and performed by the members of the society. In accordance to this view anthropologist Ward H. Goodenough offers an often quoted definition of culture by which he states that

a society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in any role that they accept for any one of themselves. Culture, being what people have to learn as distinct from biological heritage, must consist of the end product of learning: knowledge, in a most general, if relative, sense of the term. [...] culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, behaviour, or emotions. It is rather an organization of these things. It is the form of things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them. As such, the things people say and do, their social arrangements and events, are products or by-products of their culture as they apply it to the task of perceiving and dealing with their circumstances. (Goodenough 1964: 36, referred to in Hinnenkamp 1995: 6)

When considered in the context of communication, culture can be found in many different elements of interaction. According to Hinnenkamp (1995: 7), culture can be located in the speaker’s “ways of speaking, of structuring arguments or of sequencing information units”, in politeness, deference, in nonverbal signals, “in opinions, attitudes and worldviews”. Scollon and Scollon (2001: 140) analyse the aspects of culture which are major factors in intercultural communication: ideology – beliefs, values, religion; socialization – education, acculturation; forms of discourse – functions of language (information, negotiation), non-verbal communication (kinesics, proxemics, concept of time); face systems – kinship, the concept of the self, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. They hold that, “from an intercultural point of view,
we can see that cultures often are different from each other in how much importance they give to one function of language over the other” (2001: 151).

Goddard (2000: 81) writes about cultural values and norms, and explains some of the features in the following quotation:

> In some parts of the world, for example, it is quite normal for conversations to be loud, full of animation, and bristling with disagreement, while, in others, people prefer to avoid contention, to speak in even, well-considered phrases, and to guard against exposure of their inner selves. In some societies, it is considered very bad to speak when another person is talking, while in others, this is an expected part of a co-conversationalist’s work. In some places, silence is felt to be awkward and people rush to fill up every spare second with talk, while in others, silence is welcomed.

These cultural differences present the basis for various researches in many linguistic fields, such as cross-cultural and intercultural pragmatics, which will be explained in the following sections of this thesis.

### 3.2 Contrastive pragmatics

Contrastive approach in syntax and semantics was logically followed by the emergence of contrastive analysis in pragmatics. The object of such analysis are communicative functions and the ways these functions differ from one language to another.

According to Hinnenkamp (1995: 192), speech act analysis is central to contrastive pragmatics. How different speech acts are realised in one language is a reflection of cultural and pragmatic norms of that language. Contrastive pragmatics offers investigations of these norms and compares interactional styles of distinct speech communities. Kasper and Rose state that contrastive pragmatics deals with “analyzing and comparing the pragmatic meanings of linguistic forms, especially the conventions of means and form by which particular communicative acts are realized in different languages” (Kasper & Rose 2002: 64).
3.3 Cross-cultural pragmatics

What researchers in cross-cultural pragmatics try to explain are differences in ways of speaking, paying special attention to directness, politeness, solidarity, sincerity, cordiality, spontaneity, and so on (Trosborg 1994: 47). A well known cross-cultural pragmatics research project is The Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (CCSARP), whose focus was to study the speech acts of requests and apologies in several languages (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984). It established a coding system for analysis of intralingual and cross-linguistic variations, making comparisons between native and nonnative speakers.

There is a discussion among pragmatists regarding the precise definition and differences of the terms ‘cross-cultural’ and ‘intercultural’. Spencer-Oatey (2000: 4) argues that

the term ‘cross-cultural’ is used to refer to comparative data – in other words, data obtained independently from different cultural groups; the term ‘intercultural’ is used to refer to interactional data – in other words, data obtained when people of two different cultural groups interact with each other.

Gudykunst (2000: 314) agrees with this distinction stating that “[c]ross-cultural research involves comparing behaviour in two or more cultures”, while “[i]ntercultural research involves examining behaviour when members of two or more cultures interact”. This view characterizes cross-cultural research as contrastive, whereas intercultural research deals with communication across cultures.

Kasper and Rose (2002: 73) define cross-cultural pragmatics as “the study of communicative practices in different speech communities”.

3.4 Interlanguage Pragmatics

The term ‘interlanguage’ was first introduced by Larry Selinker to refer to a linguistic system “based on the observable output which results from a learner’s attempted production of a [target language] norm” (Selinker 1972: 214). In a broad sense, interlanguage is the result of the contact between two languages, which shares characteristics of both. Kasper’s definition describes interlanguage as

[...] the linguistic knowledge system the learner activates when trying to communicate in L2. Like any other language, it comprises pragmatic,
semantic, syntactic, morphological and phonological rules. Unlike most other languages, it is typically developmental and can be permeated by learning and communication strategies. (Kasper 1982: 110)

Arabski (1979: 135) notes that interlanguage (IL) can be treated like any dialect or register. However, he stresses two important features which distinguish it from other linguistic phenomena. Firstly, IL is not a complete system, but a system which is being built. In this respect it is similar to child language with which it shares many features. Secondly, IL has a unique status because of its “erroneous constructions” (1979: 135).

Interlanguage pragmatics (ILP) is a relatively young linguistic area which belongs to both pragmatics and the second language studies domain. Its beginnings are linked to Hymes’ concept of communicative competence which is responsible for moving one step away from the grammar-focused second language pedagogy. The works of Hymes and other linguists, such as Canale and Swain (1980) and Bachman (1990), made a significant contribution to the growing interest in pragmatics research and language learning. Current trends in communicative approach see grammar as less important for successful communication. Speakers are encouraged to communicate so as to get across the meaning, regardless of possible grammatical errors.

Emphasising interdisciplinarity of ILP, Kasper and Rose offer the following definition:

As the study of second language use, interlanguage pragmatics examines how nonnative speakers comprehend and produce action in a target language. As the study of second language learning, interlanguage pragmatics investigates how L2 learners develop the ability to understand and perform action in a target language. (Kasper & Rose 2002: 5)

First of all, they argue that language learners need to acquire communicative competence in their second language, and to be able to produce appropriate utterances in a given situation. That means that language learners also need to develop awareness of appropriate linguistic behaviour in L2 communication, which makes a connection between L2 pragmatic knowledge and culture.

Interlanguage pragmatics research is largely focused on L2 learner comprehension and production of speech acts. Some of the speech acts which are mostly investigated are requests, apologies, complaints, refusals, and compliments (e.g. Cohen & Olshtain 1981, 1983; Blum-Kulka et al. 1989; Trosborg 1995). Recent studies point to the fact that majority of interlanguage pragmatics studies are comparative studies focusing on language use with very little attention on
development. Bardovi-Harlig has clearly expressed her view on this issue stating that “not only [is] interlanguage pragmatics not fundamentally acquisitional, but it [is], in fact, fundamentally not acquisitional” (Bardovi-Harlig 1999: 679). She observes that the areas of research in interlanguage pragmatics are completely different from those in second language acquisition, despite the fact that interlanguage pragmatics is a hybrid discipline integrating both pragmatics and second language acquisition studies. That is a consequence of the dominance of comparative studies over acquisition studies in ILP. Similar observations have been made by Kasper and Schmidt (1996), who argue that “ILP has been primarily a study of second language use rather than second language learning” with an accent put on the ways non-native speakers’ sociopragmatic and pragmalinguistic knowledge differs from that of native speakers (Kasper & Schmidt 1996: 150). They see the main reason for focusing on language use and not on acquisition to be cross-cultural pragmatics, which has served as ILP’s main field of reference. As a result, the questions asked and the issues researched in ILP have been the same as those investigated in cross-cultural pragmatics, and those are related to speech act strategies, contextual distribution of speech act patterns, politeness strategies.

Another important concern of ILP is the influence of native language (L1) and culture on the second language (L2). The process of language transfer is considered to have received reasonable attention in ILP research. Selinker introduces the concept of fossilization, and defines fossilizable linguistic phenomena as “linguistic items, rules, and subsystems which speakers of a particular [native language] will tend to keep in their IL relative to a particular [target language]” (Selinker 1972: 215).

Selinker lists five processes he considers central to interlanguage, and these are: language transfer, transfer-of-training (i.e. how the L2 is taught), strategies of second language learning, strategies of second language communication, and overgeneralization of target language linguistic material (1972: 215). These processes are considered important in interlanguage pragmatics research. Therefore, the following chapter deals with pragmatic transfer as part of the concept of language transfer.
4 Pragmatic transfer

In order for speakers to be communicatively competent in L2, they need to acquire not only grammatical but also pragmatic competence. Lack of pragmatic competence may lead to pragmatic transfer, a cognitive phenomenon which occurs when L1 structures influence the performance of forms in L2. This process may, but need not, lead to pragmatic failure, i.e. miscommunication. The following sections deal with the concept of language competence and explain the process and the types of pragmatic transfer.

4.1 Communicative competence

The notion of competence was introduced by Noam Chomsky in his theory of language, i.e. competence and performance (1965). For Chomsky, competence refers to the shared knowledge of the ideal speaker-listener set in a homogenous speech community, while performance refers to the process of applying that knowledge to the actual language use in concrete situations (Chomsky 1965: 3-4). What he means by his dichotomy is explained in the following quotation:

A distinction must be made between what the speaker of a language knows implicitly (what we may call his competence) and what he does (his performance). A grammar, in the traditional view, is an account of competence. It describes and attempts to account for the ability of a speaker to understand an arbitrary sentence of his language and to produce an appropriate sentence on a given occasion. If it is a pedagogic grammar, it attempts to provide the student with this ability; if a linguistic grammar, it aims to discover and exhibit the mechanisms that make this achievement possible. The competence of the speaker-hearer can, ideally, be expressed as a system of rules that relate signals to semantic interpretations of these signals. The problem of the grammarian is to discover this system of rules[,] (Chomsky 1965: 9-10)

However, Chomsky's conception of competence, by which he attempted to explain language, saw many different reactions in the 1970s. Campbell and Wales (1970) and Hymes (1972) were among those who criticized Chomsky's theory, and thought it was too narrow. Pointing to its deficiencies, Campbell and Wales believed that it failed to implement the most important linguistic ability, which is “to produce or understand utterances which are not so much grammatical but, more important, appropriate to the context in which they are made” (Campbell & Wales 1970: 247).
As Canale and Swain explain it, Chomsky’s “theory of competence is equivalent to the theory of grammar and is concerned with the linguistic rules that can generate and describe the grammatical [...] sentences of a language” (Canale & Swain 1980: 3). This explanation reflects Hymes’ reception of Chomsky's definition, and he states that “there are rules of use without which the rules of grammar would be useless” (Hymes 1972: 278). Hymes wrote about the concept of communicative competence and offered an extended definition of it which included sociolinguistic as well as contextual competence. Apart from grammatical knowledge, speakers of a language also need to possess socio-cultural knowledge of the rules of language use. According to Hymes, communicative competence can be expanded into four constituent features which could be seen as judgements that one might make about a sentence, whether it is: formally possible, feasible, appropriate in a given context, and actually performed.

The notion of communicative competence was later examined by Canale and Swain (1980), who dealt with it within the field of second language learning, teaching, and testing. According to them, communicative competence refers to

[...] the relationship and interaction between grammatical competence, or knowledge of the rules of grammar, and sociolinguistic competence, or knowledge of the rules of language use. Communicative competence is to be distinguished from communicative performance, which is the realization of these competencies and their interaction in the actual production and comprehension of utterances (under general psychological constraints that are unique to performance). (Canale & Swain 1980: 6)

They emphasize the importance of the distinction between communicative competence and communicative performance, and argue that both these concepts are not to be seen as the highest or broadest level of language competence or performance, but as subcomponents of the more general language competence and language performance. Moreover, Canale and Swain (1980: 30-31) propose a theoretical framework which consists of grammatical competence, sociolinguistic competence, and strategic competence. Grammatical competence includes knowledge of lexical items and of rules of morphology, syntax, sentence-grammar semantics, and phonology. Sociolinguistic competence consists of two sets of rules – socio-cultural rules and rules of discourse. The first of the two refer to the appropriateness of an utterance produced in a specific social context, and the latter rules refer to the knowledge of the rules governing cohesion and coherence. Strategic competence consists of verbal and non-verbal communication strategies
that may be used by a speaker or hearer in order to compensate a lack in knowledge. Canale and Swain's theory represents a further development of Hymes' model of communicative competence.

### 4.2 Pragmatic competence

Pragmatic competence has been included in the models of communicative competence, and it is considered an essential part of second language teaching. Chomsky writes about the construct of pragmatic competence, and defines it as

> [...] the ability to use such knowledge along with the conceptual system to achieve certain ends or purposes. It might be that pragmatic competence is characterized by a certain system of constitutive rules represented in the mind, as has been suggested in a number of studies. (Chomsky 1980: 59)

However, Trosborg and Shaw (1998) note that pragmatic competence still lacks its own theory and a reliable account of its constituents. According to them, pragmatic competence can be described in terms of pragmalinguistic competence, or “knowledge of the linguistic inventory used to perform pragmatic functions”, and sociopragmatic competence, or “knowledge of when to use these forms in actual social situations” (Trosborg & Shaw 1998: 67). They are regarded as two aspects of pragmatic competence. Both pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics are terms introduced by Leech (1983) to divide pragmatics into two components, and they were later used by Thomas (1983) to classify pragmatic failure, and by Kasper (1992) for a categorisation of pragmatic transfer. The following chapter discusses those classifications in more detail.

A more recent contribution to the theory of communicative competence which is considered to be a further reinterpretation of Canale and Swain’s model is Bachman's theory of communicative language ability. Not only did he suggest the model of language competence which included pragmatic competence as one of its main components, but he was also the first one to consider pragmatic competence as not subordinated to grammatical competence and text organization.

Bachman (1990) suggests the division of language competence, a learner’s knowledge of language, into organizational and pragmatic competences, which are further subdivided into smaller elements.
He subdivides organizational competence into two types of abilities used in communicating, and those are grammatical and textual. Bachman explains that this kind of competence is responsible for controlling the structure of sentences as well as ordering them to form a text (Bachman 1990: 87). He introduces pragmatic competence and defines it as “the relationships between utterances and the acts or functions that speakers (or writers) intend to perform through these utterances, which can be called the illocutionary force of utterances, and the characteristics of the context of language use that determine the appropriateness of utterances” (1990: 89-90). In his view, pragmatic competence includes illocutionary competence, or “the knowledge of the pragmatic conventions for performing acceptable language functions”, and sociolinguistic competence, or “knowledge of the sociolinguistic conventions for performing language functions appropriately in a given context” (1990: 90). Illocutionary force will be further discussed in the chapter on speech acts in this paper.

Littlewood (2004: 503) states that “pragmatic competence […] enables second language speakers to use their linguistic resources in order to convey and interpret meanings in real situations, including those where they encounter problems due to gaps in their knowledge”. Such problematic situations call for the use of a specific strategy of integrating native-language-based elements in the production of a target language, which is otherwise recognized as language transfer.
4.3 Communication strategies

Much research has been done on communication strategies, and many researchers have contributed to their recognition as a major component in communicative competence. The widely used definition of communication strategies was offered by Canale and Swain (1980: 30), who refer to them as “verbal and nonverbal strategies that may be called into action to compensate for breakdowns in communication due to performance variables or to insufficient competence”.

Faerch and Kasper (1980: 81) approach communication strategies from a psycholinguistic perspective and according to them, communications strategies are “potentially conscious plans for solving what to an individual presents itself as a problem in reaching a particular communicative goal”. Another important approach is presented by Tarone (1980: 420), who characterizes communication strategies as

[...] mutual attempts of two interlocutors to agree on a meaning in situations where the requisite meaning structures do not seem to be shared. [Communication strategies] are seen as tools used in a joint negotiation of meaning in situations where both interlocutors are attempting to agree as to communicative goal.

Riley (1989: 240) summarizes discussions on communication strategies and their focus, and he observes that there is a consensus that the term should be used for instances when interactants are aware of an existing communicative problem. He also gives a list of techniques used for negotiations of meaning, and it includes:

- **Evasion** (including message abandonment and change of focus).
- **Paraphrase** (including approximation, circumlocution, description and word coinage).
- **Transfer** (including literal translation and language switch).
- **Appeals** (for assistance, clarification or feedback).
- **Non-verbal** (gesture, mime, facial expression, showing, writing, drawing expressive interjections, acoustic imitations).
- **Checks** (giving further information, examples, contextualising, comparing).
- **Simplification** (of grammar or vocabulary). (Riley 1989: 240)

These techniques occur in both native-speaker discourse and foreigner-talk, and Riley defines them as

[...] procedures for identifying, sharing and agreeing on meanings in interactive discourse: In other words, where an interactant has reason to believe that a given meaning-structure (linguistic or social) is not shared, he/she is faced with a communicative problem and the nature of his response to that problem defines his/her communicative strategy. (1989: 240-241)
An important point was made by Corder (1992), who emphasized the significance of the distinction between the concepts of transfer and borrowing. Corder argues that transfer is a process of learning which occurs “from the mental structure which is the implicit knowledge of the mother tongue to the separate and independently developing knowledge of the target language” (Corder 1992: 25). Borrowing, on the other hand, is “a performance phenomenon, not a learning process, a feature of language use and not of language structure” (1992: 26). Corder refers to borrowing as a strategy of communication which is employed in interaction when the speaker lacks means in his interlanguage to convey certain meaning. However, Corder points out to the difficulty of distinguishing between the results of transfer and borrowing, so he proposes an explanation whereby borrowing presents “the mechanism” by which transfer takes place (1992: 28). Speculating that transfer may result from borrowing, he states that “after regular, repeated, and communicatively successful use of the borrowed items […] they come to be incorporated into the language system of the borrower’s mother tongue” (1992: 28-29).

**4.4 Pragmatic transfer**

Extensive research has been done on language transfer in the area of interlanguage and second language acquisition. Researchers have concentrated on the effects of the learners’ L1 on their development and use of the L2. Results show that in most cases L1 interferes in the learners’ acquisition of the second language (e.g. Odlin 1989, Gass & Selinker 1992). The focus of those studies was largely syntax, phonology, and lexicon until the 1980s, when interest in pragmatics started to grow.

The nature of interference depends on the perspective from which it is approached, and Dulay, Burt, and Krashen (1982:92) identify psychological perspective and sociolinguistic perspective:

Interference has been used to refer to two very distinct linguistic phenomena, one that is essentially psychological and another that is essentially sociolinguistic. The psychological use of the term interference refers to the influence of old habits when new ones are being learned, whereas the sociolinguistic use of interference refers to language interactions, such as linguistic borrowing and language switching, that occur when two communities are in contact.
The term ‘interference’ was introduced by Weinreich to refer to “those instances of deviation from the norms of either language which occur in the speech of bilinguals as a result of their familiarity with more than one language, i.e. as a result of language contact” (Weinreich 1953: 1). However, these deviations in second language use had a tendency to be considered as flaws or failures, so researchers in second language acquisition (SLA) started using the term transfer, rather than interference. With regard to that, Sankoff (2001: 2) notes that “the term interlanguage was also introduced in an effort to conceptualize the linguistic system of the second language learner as rule-governed and orderly, rather than an error-ridden version of the target language”. In Bialystok and Sharwood-Smith’s viewpoint, the use of L1 material in an L2 context refers to both interference and transfer, and the distinction between these two concepts could be explained in terms of “behaviourist model” and “cognitive model” (Bialystok & Sharwood-Smith 1985: 115). What they mean by the two models is clearly explained in the following quotation:

The interference error is the result of a retrieval procedure that is fairly automatic, an aspect of control, and is invoked in L2 speech as part of a control error. The transfer error, however, is the result of a deficiency in L2 knowledge, and the L1 becomes involved to fill that gap. Thus, while they remain distinct strategies in spite of the fact that both lead to the insertion of L1, the difference between them is explained in terms of their reflecting one of the two aspects of cognitive functioning which are responsible for language production. (1985: 115)

In an attempt to differentiate between interference and transfer, Grosjean (2011) has proposed the existence of two kinds of interference. There is static interference which is a permanent trace of L1 on the L2, and which is linked to the learner’s competence in L2. This kind of interference is present at all levels of linguistic knowledge, and an example of this could be a foreign accent, or the constant misuse of a preposition. The other kind of interference is dynamic interference, which Grosjean defines as “the ephemeral intrusions of the other language” (Grosjean 2011: 5). An instance of this type of interference could be the one time use of a word or a syntactic structure from the L1 in the L2. Grosjean further suggests the use of the term ‘transfer’ for static interferences, and the term ‘interference’ for dynamic interferences. However, he notes that it would be necessary to develop techniques to differentiate between these two phenomena, since it is very difficult sometimes to say whether a certain element is an instance of transfer or interference (2011: 5).
Kasper (1992: 207) defines pragmatic transfer as “the influence exerted by learners’ pragmatic knowledge of languages and cultures other than L2 on their comprehension, production and learning of L2 pragmatic information”. In their work on pragmatic transfer, Žegarac and Pennington (2000: 166) offer a similar definition which says that “[p]ragmatic transfer is the transfer of pragmatic knowledge in situations of intercultural communication”. They point to the notion of mental sets, which are largely determined by culture-specific knowledge. Therefore, when interactants from different cultural backgrounds communicate but are unaware of the differences in their mental sets, this might cause misunderstandings to occur. However, the complexity of such definition is pointed to by Žegarac and Pennington (2000: 143) themselves, stressing the lack of universal agreement among researchers on certain questions regarding pragmatic knowledge. They believe that there are still unanswered questions about what pragmatic knowledge is, how it is employed, and what the relationship between linguistic knowledge and pragmatic knowledge is.

### 4.4.1 Types of pragmatic transfer

In accordance with Leech’s (1983) distinction between pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics, Kasper writes about two types of pragmatic transfer: pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic. She defines pragmalinguistic transfer as

\[\ldots\] the process whereby the illocutionary force or politeness value assigned to particular linguistic material in L1 influences learners’ perception and production of form-function mappings in L2. (Kasper 1992: 209)

This concept deals with the transfer of certain L1 forms which may affect the illocutionary force and politeness value of a produced utterance in interlanguage.

Sociopragmatic transfer is the concept which includes context-external and context-internal factors in communication, and refers to the learner’s decision on the use of a strategy, according to the perception of social distance and power.

Sociopragmatic transfer, then, is operative when the social perceptions underlying language users’ interpretation and performance of linguistic action in L2 are influenced by their assessment of subjectively equivalent L1 contexts. (1992: 209)
Even though both aspects of pragmatic transfer are clearly defined, Kasper (1992: 210) points out that they are interrelated, and it is often difficult to make a distinction between them.

A further distinction is made between positive and negative transfer. Positive transfer in communication happens “when learners’ production of a pragmatic feature is the same (structurally, functionally, distributionally) as a feature used by target language speakers in the same context, and this feature is paralleled by a comparable element in learners’ L1” (Kasper 2010:146). However, when learners use strategies which are present in most languages, and not only in L1 and L2, they are, actually, employing their universal pragmatic knowledge. Pragmatic universals are not always easy to distinguish from positive transfer, and that could be one of the reasons why positive transfer has very rarely been examined by researchers (Takahashi 2000: 115). On the other hand, negative transfer has received a lot more attention in interlanguage pragmatics over the years. Negative transfer is employed “when a pragmatic feature in the interlanguage is (structurally, functionally, distributionally) the same as in L1 but different from L2” (Kasper 2010: 147). Both pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic knowledge may be transferred from L1 to L2 communication. Examples of negative pragmalinguistic transfer are literal translations of pragmatic items which do not correspond to L2 norms, or instances where illocutionary force in L2 is produced in a manner different from the one in the target language. According to some research reports, there are many instances when the level of politeness is affected by the learner’s choice of a less direct speech acts strategy which conforms more to the L1 than to the L2 norms (e.g. Blum-Kulka 1983, House & Kasper 1987, Cohen & Olshtain 1981). As regards sociopragmatic transfer, Barron (2003: 38) notes three areas where L1 may influence the realization of L2 communication resulting in negative effects, and these are: learners’ evaluation of context factors, the overall politeness style, and the relative appropriateness of a particular speech act. Investigations dealing with these areas show instances where learners expressed lower degree of apology in L2 than L2 native speakers (Olshtain 1983), or cases where the L2 learner transferred style-shifting patterns from L1 by choosing different strategies according to the learner’s assessment of the interlocutors’ social status (Beebe, Takahashi, & Uliss-Weltz 1990).

Although negative pragmatic transfer leads to pragmatic failure, it is considered only a potential cause of misunderstanding. Kasper (2010: 149) argues that “[w]hile it is
true that negative pragmatic transfer can cause miscommunication, there is no logical and empirical reason that it has to", and she stresses that “negative pragmatic transfer is not the same as pragmatic failure”. The following section juxtaposes the two and outlines the concept of pragmatic failure in learner communication.

4.4.2 Pragmatic failure

One aspect of cross-cultural communication which has received considerable attention in recent years is the concept of pragmatic failure. When interlocutors do not share the same cultural background and pragmatic rules, these differences between them may easily lead to a break-down in communication. There are many different terms used for this phenomenon in linguistics – problematic talk, miscommunication, communication breakdown, troubled discourse, pragmatic errors – and all these terms refer to critical moments of talk exchange.

The concept of pragmatic failure was used by Thomas to refer to situations when “H perceives the force of S’s utterance as other than S intended s/he should perceive it” (Thomas 1983: 26). She considers not only native–non-native communication, but any communication between two people who do not share a common linguistic or cultural background. There are two types of pragmatic failure, and those are pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic failure. Thomas (1983: 32-33) describes them as follows:

Pragmalinguistic failure [...] occurs when the pragmatic force mapped by S (speaker) onto a given utterance is systematically different from the force most frequently assigned to it by native speakers of the target language, or when speech act strategies are inappropriately transferred from L1 to L2.

Sociopragmatic failure [...] refers to the social conditions placed on language in use. [...] [W]hile pragmalinguistic failure is basically a linguistic problem, caused by differences in the linguistic encoding of pragmatic force, sociopragmatic failure stems form cross-culturally different perceptions of what constitutes appropriate linguistic behaviour.

The importance of these definitions lies in the distinction that is made between language-specific norms and culture-specific norms. Although both situations result in inappropriate language production, the type of dysfunction is not the same. Pragmalinguistic failure refers to the inability to interpret or produce meanings correctly, and sociopragmatic failure refers to the inability to evaluate social situations
according to cultural norms and rules. More specifically, pragmalinguistic failures are likely to occur when speakers inappropriately transfer speech act strategies from their mother tongue to the target language. In this way they create a different pragmatic force than in their first language, which can often lead to an error. In addition, pragmalinguistic failures may occur when speakers inappropriately transfer from L1 to L2 structures which are semantically/syntactically equivalent (1983: 35). On the other hand, sociopragmatic failure originates from different cross-cultural evaluations of what is appropriate language use. Situations causing sociopragmatic failure could be “cross-cultural mismatches in the assessment of social distance, of what constitutes an imposition, [...] in evaluating relative power, rights, and obligations” (1983: 39). However, it must be stated that the distinction between pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic failure remains fuzzy because they both belong to the field of pragmatic failure, and they certainly overlap to some degree.

In his work on pragmatic errors, Riley (1989: 234) offers the following definition:

Pragmatic errors are the result of an interactant’s imposing the social rules of one culture on his communicative behaviour in a situation where the social rules of another culture would be more appropriate.

With this definition Riley wanted to broaden the scope of pragmatic failure, and to make it valid not only for linguistic aspects of communication, but for communicative behaviour in the widest possible sense. Namely, this definition allowed Riley to introduce another two categories of pragmatic failure – inchoative pragmatic errors and non-linguistic pragmatic errors. Inchoative pragmatic errors refer to “failure to appreciate the conventional value and social role of discourse and the relative values of speech and silence”, and their main characteristic is when a speaker talks too much or too little with regard to the event, topic being discussed or role-relationship (Riley 1984: 133). With the inclusion of non-linguistic pragmatic errors as a separate category Riley stresses the fact that “not all communicative behaviour is verbal” (1989: 238). However, he argues that even though these two categories have received attention from linguists, they have not been accepted as separate categories of pragmatic failure.
5. Politeness

An important task in learning a language is acquiring knowledge of how and when it is appropriate to use particular language forms. Politeness is a phenomenon which has been much researched over the last thirty years, but there is still lack of agreement among researchers as to what constitutes politeness.

Most commonly seen as socially appropriate behaviour, politeness is defined as “having or showing good manners, consideration for others, and/or correct social behavior” (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English). Hill et al. (1986: 349) see politeness as consideration for others, stating that the purpose of politeness is “to consider others’ feelings, establish levels of mutual comfort, and promote rapport”. With this definition they point not only to considerateness as a goal, but also to the maintaining of harmony. Concentrating on the hearer, Adegbija (1989: 58) defines politeness as “a property associated with a communicative situation by virtue of which a person speaks or behaves in a way that is socially and culturally acceptable and pleasant to the hearer”. For Lakoff (1990: 34) politeness is “a system of interpersonal relations designed to facilitate interaction by minimizing the potential for conflict and confrontation inherent in all human interchange”.

Locher (2004: 91) suggests a definition for politeness considering it from both the speaker’s and the hearer’s perspective:

**Politeness for the speaker:**
A polite utterance is a speaker’s intended, marked and appropriate behavior which displays face concern; the motivation for it lies in the possibly, but not necessarily, egocentric desire of the speaker to show positive concern for the addressees and/or to respect the addressees’ and the speaker’s own need for independence.

**Politeness for the hearer:**
Addressees will interpret an utterance as polite when it is perceived as appropriate and marked; the reason for this is understood as the speaker’s intention to show positive concern for the addressees’ face and/or the speaker’s intention to protect his or her own face needs.

Locher argues that politeness can be investigated only by looking in detail at the speakers, the situation, the context and the norms.

The following sections look into traditional politeness theories (Lakoff 1973, Leech 1983, Brown & Levinson 1987) as well as into some more recent ones (Watts 2003).
5.1 Perspectives on politeness

Fraser (1990) offers a critical overview of different approaches to politeness. He identifies four major perspectives on the analysis of politeness: the social-norm view, the conversational-maxim view, the face-saving view, and the conversational-contract view. Fraser notes that many of the writers do not explicitly define politeness, and what they understand by the concept has to be inferred from statements referencing the term (1990: 219).

The social-norm view assumes that all societies have rules and norms for appropriate behaviour. In relation to that, “[a] positive evaluation (politeness) arises when an action is in congruence with the norm, a negative evaluation (impoliteness=rudeness) when action is to the contrary” (1990: 220). This kind of view associates politeness with speech style, whereby the degree of formality is directly proportional to the degree of politeness.

The conversational-maxim view is based on Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the set of conversational maxims. He explains that interactants cooperate with each other effectively when they conform to these maxims. However, they may choose to violate a maxim, and create implicatures, whereby the hearer needs to infer the speaker’s intended meaning. He also suggests that additional maxims should be incorporated into the Cooperative Principle, one of which could be a maxim of politeness. And it was this suggestion that prompted scholars Lakoff and Leech to expand the existing set of maxims with their models of politeness. Robin Lakoff's approach is marked by the rules of politeness, a subcase of which are the rules of conversation (be clear), i.e. the Gricean Cooperative Principle. The rules of politeness (be polite) consist of three sets of rules: don’t impose, give options, and make addressee feel good (Lakoff 1973). However, Watts (2003: 60) criticizes this model stating that “if a speaker follows the rules of politeness by not imposing, giving options and making [addressee] feel good, s/he will be certain at some stage or another in the interaction to violate the rules of conversation”, and he considers this to be “one of the great weaknesses of models constructed along Gricean lines”. In addition to these rules, Lakoff suggests three types of politeness, and these are: formal politeness, informal politeness and intimate politeness. Depending on the type of politeness as perceived by the speaker in a situation, the three rules could be applied. Following Lakoff, Geoffrey Leech develops his model of politeness based on
Grice’s maxims. He chooses interpersonal rhetoric as the domain within which he constitutes the following sets of principles: the Cooperative Principle (Grice), the Politeness Principle and the Irony Principle (1983: 16). The following section (5.2) will deal with Leech’s approach in more detail.

The face-saving view of politeness is represented by Brown and Levinson’s model, one that has attracted considerable attention and caused most controversies compared to all other works on politeness. It is based on the notion of face, a concept first introduced by Erving Goffman. Brown and Levinson believe that every person has two types of face: negative – “the desire to be unimpeded in one’s actions”, and positive – “the desire to be approved of” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 13). In order to maintain the face of every interactant, there are politeness strategies which need to be used in conversations. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 deal with Brown and Levinson’s theory and its criticism.

The conversational-contract view is the fourth and final perspective on politeness, and it is taken by Fraser (1975). According to him, when interactants begin a conversation, they enter a conversational contract (CC), which refers to rights and obligations they have towards each other. This initial set of rights and obligations may be renegotiated during the conversation, if, for instance, the context changes. For Fraser (1990: 233) politeness means “operating within the then-current terms and conditions of the CC”. He further explains that

[r]ational participants are aware that they are to act within the negotiated constraints and generally do so. When they do not, however, they are then perceived as being impolite or rude. Politeness is a state that one expects to exist in every conversation; participants note not that someone is being polite – this is the norm – but rather that the speaker is violating the CC. (1990: 233)

In his view, politeness is present in every conversation, but it depends on the hearer whether an utterance will be considered appropriate or not. One of the followers of Fraser’s theory of politeness is Meier (1995b: 387), who argues that the right definition for politeness is to be found in the term ‘appropriateness’. According to her, norms for socially acceptable behaviour are present in all societies, and they vary across cultures. She further explains:

A set of norms and dependable adherence to these norms within a group engenders a structure and predictability which results in a considerable saving of energy in everyday life and can be viewed as serving the goal of something akin to social harmony and perhaps even survival. Individuals are thus motivated to adhere to these norms (thereby maintaining a desired image)
because of the subsequent social value and consequent ‘power’ they are accorded in relation to a group. (1995a: 352)

What Meier emphasises is the importance of the existence of the norms and the motivation to comply with them. Any deviations from the norms are considered impolite. However, Locher (2004: 72) criticizes this view stating that it only deals with negative deviations and excludes “a positive breach of these norms”. She argues that there are some instances of behaviour which are not expected by participants in an interaction, but are still considered polite. As an example Locher (2004: 72) suggests a situation of helping a woman with her coat which is not regarded today as necessary in Switzerland and, therefore, is not a norm, but is still thought to be polite behaviour.

5.2 Leech’s model of politeness

Leech’s model of politeness is the first model of politeness. It is considered the most influential one, and still serves as a theoretical framework for researchers and their empirical work. Watts (2003: 63) observes the following:

The fact remains that only Leech and Brown and Levinson have elaborated their positions in sufficient detail to allow them to be tested through application to real-language data. In addition, only these two models have given extensive examples of the kinds of linguistic structures that are put to use to realise politeness strategies. Researchers are thus given data and analyses of these data that they can check against their own materials.

In his work on general pragmatics, Leech (1983) chooses rhetorical approach, concentrating on the use of language in the most general sense. He distinguishes two types of rhetoric – interpersonal and textual, each of which consists of a set of principles. The three main principles which comprise interpersonal rhetoric are the Cooperative Principle (i.e. Grice’s CP), the Politeness Principle (PP) and the Irony Principle, while textual rhetoric consists of the Processibility Principle, the Clarity Principle, the Economy Principle and the Expressivity Principle. Leech deals with politeness phenomena within the domain of interpersonal rhetoric, trying to explain how the PP and the CP interact to help the interpretation of messages. This is how he sees the relation between the two principles:

The CP enables one participant in a conversation to communicate on the assumption that the other participant is being cooperative. In this the CP has
the function of regulating what we say so that it contributes to some assumed illocutionary or discoursal goal(s). It could be argued, however, that the PP has a higher regulative role than this: to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations which enable us to assume that our interlocutors are being cooperative in the first place. (Leech 1983: 82)

Leech (1983: 123) introduces three types of pragmatic scales which relate to the degree of tact appropriate to a speech situation – the cost-benefit scale, the optionality scale and the indirectness scale. He further adds another two scales he considers relevant to politeness and these are the power or authority scale and social distance scale. In Leech’s point of view, politeness means minimising the cost to the speaker/hearer and maximising the benefit to the speaker/hearer. In this respect, he proposes six maxims that compose the PP, and which are explained in terms of cost and benefit (1983: 132):

**TACT MAXIM** (in impositives and commissives)
(a) Minimize cost to other
[(b) Maximize benefit to other]

**GENEROSITY MAXIM** (in impositives and commissives)
(a) Minimize benefit to self
[(b) Maximize cost to self]

**APPROBATION MAXIM** (in expressives and assertives)
(a) Minimize dispraise of other
[(b) Maximize praise of other]

**MODESTY MAXIM** (in expressives and assertives)
(a) Minimize praise of self
[(b) Maximize dispraise of self]

**AGREEMENT MAXIM** (in assertives)
(a) Minimize disagreement between self and other
[(b) Maximize agreement between self and other]

**SYMPATHY MAXIM** (in assertives)
(a) Minimize antipathy between self and other
[(b) Maximize sympathy between self and other]

Not all these maxims are equally important for Leech. He assigns greater importance to the tact and approbation maxim as compared to, for example, generosity or modesty maxim, because he believes that “politeness is focused more strongly on other than on self” (1983: 133).

Depending on the situation, there are different kinds and degrees of politeness. Leech identifies four illocutionary functions “according to how they relate to social goal of establishing and maintaining comity” (1983: 104), and they are:
COMPETITIVE: The illocutionary goal competes with the social goal; eg ordering, asking, demanding, begging, etc.
CONVIVIAL: The illocutionary goal coincides with the social goal; eg offering, inviting, greeting, thanking, congratulating.
COLLABORATIVE: The illocutionary goal is indifferent to the social goal; eg asserting, reporting, announcing, instructing.
CONFLICTIVE: The illocutionary goal conflicts with the social goal; eg threatening, accusing, cursing, reprimanding.

According to Leech (1983: 83), "[s]ome illocutions (eg orders) are inherently impolite, and others (eg offers) are inherently polite". Fraser, however, expresses disagreement with this kind of proposal, and believes that Leech’s conclusions are too strong. He sees the problem in Leech’s assertion that certain types of illocutions are either polite or impolite, so he argues that “[w]hile the performance of an illocutionary act can be so evaluated, the same cannot be said of the act itself” (Fraser 1990: 227). Mey (2001: 80) shares this view arguing that “[b]eing inherently polite implies being always polite, without regard for the contextual factors that define what is polite in a given situation”, and this is, in his view, wrong on several counts. He emphasizes the dependence of individual cases on the social position of the speakers, claiming that “the existence of a social hierarchy (as in institutionalized contexts such as the schools, the military, religious communities etc.) often preempts the use of politeness altogether” (2001: 80). Another critical view is offered by Watts (2003: 69), who agrees with Fraser, and also claims that Leech “gives the researcher no clear idea of how an individual participating in an interaction can possibly know the degree and type of politeness required for the performance of a speech act”. Apart from that, Leech’s approach has received criticism from Brown and Levinson regarding the number of maxims. Brown and Levinson (1987: 4) believe that if interactants are allowed to invent a new maxim for every regular use of language in a conversation, “not only will we have an infinite number of maxims, but pragmatic theory will be too unconstrained to permit the recognition of any counter-examples”. Moreover, they say that “every discernable pattern of language use does not, eo ipso, require a maxim or principle to produce it” (1987: 5).

5.3 Brown and Levinson’s Politeness Theory

Brown and Levinson’s model of politeness first appeared in 1978, and eight years later it was republished as a book entitled Politeness: some universals in language
usage. The approach they take is largely based on Goffman's notion of face and Grice's Cooperative Principle.

5.3.1 Face

Goffman (1967: 5) defines his original concept of 'face' as follows:

The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during the particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes – albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.

Face is presented as an image which every person possesses during a conversation. It is a mask which is possible to change depending on the situation (Locher 2004: 52). However, face is not a private property but it rather depends on others, i.e. society:

In any case, while his social face can be his most personal possession and the center of his security and pleasure, it is only on loan to him from society; it will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it. (Goffman 1967: 10)

Goffman considers it important that a person’s face is accepted by others. Brown and Levinson follow Goffman’s approach, defining face as “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61). Furthermore, they claim that face is something that is “emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction” (1987: 61).

Brown and Levinson suggest that every person has two types of face, positive and negative. They are considered as two aspects of the concept of face, and they are referred to as two dualistic wants. Brown and Levinson (1987: 62) define them as follows:

Negative face: the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his actions be unimpeded by others.

Positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others.
In Mey’s interpretation, positive face affirms a person’s status as a free and independent agent, while negative face emphasizes a person’s immunity from undesirable external interference (Mey 2001: 74). For better understanding of the concepts he offers concrete examples stating that positive freedom could be defined as “the freedom to express oneself, to vote, to travel, to choose one’s own company”, whereas negative freedom means “being free from oppression, from threats to one’s safety, from political persecution, police harassment, importuning sales people, and so forth” (2001: 74-75). Brown and Levinson argue that this notion of face consisting of two aspects is universal, but they recognize that its content is culture-specific and “subject of much cultural elaboration” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 13). Spencer-Oatey (2000: 14) agrees with the claim of universality in the sense that every individual has concerns about face. As regards people’s wants, she states that “[p]eople have a fundamental desire for others to evaluate them positively, and so they typically want others to acknowledge (explicitly or implicitly) their positive qualities, and not to acknowledge their negative qualities” (2000: 14).

However, there are social interactions when face wants and needs are not recognized. These situations can often pose a threat to either the speaker’s or the hearer’s face or even to both.

5.3.2 Face-threatening acts and politeness strategies

In every conversation participants have an obligation to save or maintain the faces of the other participants they interact with. The term ‘facework’ was introduced by Goffman to name this kind of action, and he defines it as “the actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face. Face-work serves to counteract “incidents” – that is, events whose effective symbolic implications threaten face” (Goffman 1967: 12).

The basic idea of Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory is that “some acts are intrinsically threatening to face and thus require ‘softening’” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 24). According to them, acts that can pose a threat to the hearer’s negative face are orders, requests and advice. Those that threat the hearer’s positive face are criticism, complaints and disagreements. Acts that pose threats to the speaker’s negative face
are making excuses and accepting thanks, whereas apologizing, confessing and accepting compliments threaten the speaker’s positive face.

Face-threatening act (FTA) occurs when an act of communication “run[s] contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or the speaker” (1987: 70). Brown and Levinson (1987: 60) suggest the possible speech strategies for reducing or eliminating FTAs. They group and number politeness strategies, whereby the higher the number, the more polite the strategy is.

There are four main types of strategies, described by Brown and Levinson, which summarize polite behaviour. An important distinction which should be made first is between an on record FTA (i.e. strategies 1, 2, and 3) and an off record FTA (strategy 4). Brown and Levinson argue that an expression is done on record when it “has one unambiguously attributable intention with which witnesses would concur”, whereas an off record expression has “more than one unambiguously attributable intention” (1987: 69). Locher (2004: 68) further explains the off record strategy, stating that when there is more than one possible interpretation of an utterance, it leaves open “a way out for both S and H, because S can claim never to have done the FTA and H can choose not to understand it”. Strategy 5 is used when the FTA is considered to be too threatening to the hearer. Strategy 1, doing an act boldly, without redressing FTAs, “involves doing it in the most direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way possible” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 69). Doing an act with redress (strategies 2 and 3) involves using devices, namely, positive and negative politeness, in order to mitigate an FTA. Using positive politeness the speaker is “oriented toward the positive face of H, the positive image that he claims for himself”, while using negative politeness the speaker is “oriented mainly toward partially satisfying (redressing) H’s negative face, his basic want to maintain claims of territory and self-
determination” (1987: 70). Positive politeness can be performed using the following strategies (Brown & Levinson 1987: 103-129):

Claim common ground:
Notice, attend to H (his interests, wants, needs, goods)
Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H)
Intensify interest to H
Use in-group identity markers: in-group language or dialect, jargon, slang, contraction or ellipses
Seek agreement: safe topics, repetition
Avoid disagreement: token agreement, pseudo-agreement, white lies, hedging opinions
Presuppose/raise/assert common ground: gossip, small talk, point of view operations, presupposition manipulations
Joke

Convey that S and H are co-operators:
Assert or presuppose S’s knowledge of and concern for H’s wants
Offer, promise
Be optimistic
Include both S and H in the activity
Give (or ask for) reasons
Assume or assert reciprocity

Fulfil H’s want for some X:
Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation)

Negative politeness can be expressed using the following strategies (1987: 129-211):

Be indirect:
Be conventionally indirect

Don’t presume/assume:
Question, hedge: hedge on illocutionary force, prosodic/kinesic hedges

Don’t coerce H:
Be pessimistic
Minimize the imposition, Rx
Give deference

Communicate S’s want to not impinge on H:
Apologize: admit the impingement, indicate reluctance, give overwhelming reasons, beg forgiveness
Impersonalize S and H: use performatives, imperatives, impersonal verbs, passive and circumstantial voices, replace the pronoun ‘I’ and ‘you’ by indefinites, pluralize the ‘I’ and ‘you’ pronouns, use point-of view distancing
State the FTA as a general rule
Nominalize

Redress other wants of H’s:
Go on the record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting H

When choosing a politeness strategy to redress a FTA, the speaker must take into account three variables proposed by Brown and Levinson. The variables, which help the speaker to estimate the risk of loss of face, are: the social distance (D) of the speaker and the hearer, the relative power (P) of the speaker and the hearer, and the absolute ranking (R) of impositions in the particular culture (1987: 74). The weightiness (Wx), or the risk of loss of face, is measured by adding up the three variables, which is decisive in strategy choice. Thus, the formula for calculating the weightiness is presented as follows (1987: 76):

\[ Wx = D(S,H) + P(S,H) + Rx \]

The employment of a certain politeness strategy by members of different cultures is also dependent on ethos. ‘Ethos’ is a term which Brown and Levinson use to refer to “the affective quality of interaction characteristic of members of a society” (1987: 243). They point out that differences between sociocultural groups can be significant, and they are often reflected in people’s choices of communication style which can influence ethos. In his work on language, culture and identity, Riley (2007: 213) gives an elaborate definition of ethos, where he states the following:

Ethos is communicative identity. [...] [It refers] to the self-image projected by a speaker in and through his or her discourse, but also as it is filtered through the hearer’s perceptions, expectations and values, especially as constrained by social roles and genres: it is interpreted self-expression, the rhetorical and socio-psychological product of mutually influencing communicative behaviours and judgements.

Brown and Levinson write about cultural ethos, and they claim that certain cultures have tendencies toward one politeness strategy more than another. Thus, they believe that “in some [positive politeness] societies interactional ethos is generally warm, easy-going, friendly; in others [negative politeness societies] it is stiff, formal, deferential” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 243).

5.4 Reactions to Brown and Levinson’s Politeness Theory

Brown and Levinson’s face-view of politeness has attracted significant attention, and it has been widely studied, receiving both praise and criticism. There are many
linguists and reviewers who have found many aspects of Brown and Levinson’s theory useful, and it is still considered one of the most important theoretical frameworks.

Nevertheless, there is a number of those who disagree with some areas of Brown and Levinson’s theory. Although Brown and Levinson say that their work is based on Goffman’s notion of face, some linguists find differences between the two concepts. While they see face as a “public self-image”, Goffman characterizes face only as a construct “on loan from society”. Mao (1994: 454) argues that “for Goffman, face is a ‘public property’ that is only assigned to individuals contingent upon their interactional behaviour”, whereas “Brown and Levinson characterize face as an image that intrinsically belongs to the individual, to the ‘self’”. Additionally, Watts (2003: 105) points out that for Brown and Levinson the self is “a stable core of values lodged somewhere in the individual”, while Goffman considers it to be constantly renegotiable and dependent on social interaction. In relation to that, Mao (1994: 455) concludes the following:

In my view, Goffman’s face is a public, interpersonal image, while Brown and Levinson’s face is an individualistic, ‘self’-oriented image. Such a ‘self’-oriented characterization of face, which may very well underlie Western interactional dynamics, can be problematic in a non-Western context.

In other words, there are researchers who argue that “Western cultures tend to display an individualistic organisation of social structure whereas several Asian, African and Islamic cultures are more ‘collectivist’” (Watts 2003: 109). Leech (2006) poses a question in the title of his work “Politeness: Is there an East-West divide?” where he considers the critique which states that Brown and Levinson’s model has a Western bias. The position Leech takes regarding the issue in question is the following:

[...] no, there is no absolute divide between East and West in politeness. Consider the concepts of ‘collective, group culture’ (East) and ‘individualist, egalitarian culture’ (West). These are not absolutes: they are positions on a scale. All polite communication implies that the speaker is taking account of both individual and group values. In the East, the group values are more powerful, whereas in the West, individual values are. (Leech 2006: 3-4)

He argues that, although Brown and Levinson claim universality of their model, they also put emphasis on cross-cultural/linguistic variation (2006: 3). They express this as follows:
The essential idea is this: interactional systematics are based largely on universal principles. But the application of the principles differs systematically across cultures, and within cultures across subcultures, categories and groups. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 283)

Werkhofer (1992) offers a criticism of Brown and Levinson's model, challenging the claim of universality, but with its main interest being the notion of the FTA. He focuses on the way the speaker makes his/her choice of an appropriate politeness strategy identifying three stages – “generating the intended message”, “estimating the risk of threatening face”, “choosing and applying a strategy” – as implied by Brown and Levinson (Werkhofer 1992: 164). What Werkhofer argues is that the polite utterance that the speaker produces is the result of an internal dialogue that develops in the speaker’s mind:

[T]his model presupposes a specific relationship between ego and alter, namely an antagonistic one. This antagonism takes the form of a dialogue, but of a strange kind of dialogue that only takes place within the speaker’s mind: s/he generates as a first turn, what s/he intends to say. This move remains tacit so that the next move is not the addressee’s answer to the first one, but is the speaker’s anticipation of what the threat to her or his face would probably mean to the addressee. The polite utterance is then the third move or the speaker’s second turn in this fictive dialogue. (1992: 165-166)

With this kind of a linear procedure, as Werkhofer points out, the speaker’s initial intention is unconstrained by social considerations. The initial act or intention “does not exploit the whole range of possible communicative intentions, but is confined to the limited subset of egocentric or face-threatening ones” (1992: 166). Moreover, Werkhofer argues against linear processes, stating that linear models rule out cyclical processes. In other words, it may happen that during an interaction the speaker wants to go back to the initial position and change his mind on what to say next, depending on the speaker’s impressions on how the interaction develops and “how well s/he feels s/he has been faring so far” (1992: 169). Brown and Levinson’s model does not account for this kind of processing which Werkhofer calls ‘cyclic’ or ‘parallel’, and which “will of course cover linear cases – but not vice versa” (1992: 169).

Even though the framework of Brown and Levinson has been challenged by many scholars, it still remains the most extensive model of politeness. Watts (2003: 112) sees it as “a toolkit to compare and interpret the ways in which speakers handle a range of different speech events across a range of different cultures”.

5.5 Watts’ politic behaviour

Richard Watts’ approach to linguistic politeness is marked by the introduction of the notion of politic verbal behaviour to refer to a broader concept of socially appropriate behaviour. Watts (2003: 4) stresses the importance of the distinction between first-order politeness and second-order politeness. They present two ideologies of politeness and they refer to the different ways politeness phenomena are explained. For Watts (2003: 3) “first-order politeness [...] correspond[s] to the various ways in which polite behaviour is perceived and talked about by members of socio-cultural groups”, and he refers to this as “folk” or “lay interpretation” of politeness. Second-order politeness is “a theoretical construct, a term within a theory of social behaviour and language usage”, or simply called “technical interpretation”. In other words, first-order politeness (politeness1) is a concept used for different ways in which members of social and cultural groups interpret polite language usage, whereas second-order politeness (politeness2) refers to a theoretical notion. Accordingly, Watts uses the term ‘politic’ as a second-order concept, and he defines politic behaviour as that behaviour, linguistic and nonlinguistic, which the participants construct as being appropriate to the ongoing social interaction. (Watts 2003: 20)

The definition can be illustrated by the following examples:

(1) A: Would you like some more coffee?
   B: Yes, please.
   
   (Watts 2003: 186)

(2) A: Sorry, would you mind moving along a bit?
   B: Of course. No trouble at all.
   
   (Watts 2003: 187)

Watts explains that what has been termed in other politeness theories as polite behaviour is seen as politic behaviour in his approach. Brown and Levinson’s forms of politeness are seen as part of Watts’ politic behaviour. He further argues that politic behaviour consists of “mutually shared forms of consideration for others”, and it is regulated by unspoken conventions which are culturally specific (2003: 28). According to Watts, politeness theory should be able to “locate possible realisations of polite or impolite behaviour and offer a way of assessing how the members
themselves may have evaluated that behaviour” (2003: 19-20). His purpose is to show that politeness is evaluative in nature, and he explains that

[...]

In order to provide an illustration, Watts’ example (1) could be modified:

(3) A: Would you like some more coffee?
   B: Yes, please, that’s very kind of you, coffee would be nice.

According to Watts, when a person’s behaviour in a certain situation meets with other people’s expectations, this is called politic behaviour. To show that politic behaviour is not equivalent to polite behaviour, he offers an example of a situation in a theatre when a person who has bought two tickets numbered 51 and 52 finds those seats already taken by some other people. Some of the possible responses of the ticket-holder of seats 51 and 52 could be:

(4) a. Excuse me. I think you’re sitting in our seats.
(5) b. Excuse me but those are our seats.
(6) c. I’m sorry. I think there must be some mistake.
(7) d. I’m sorry, but are you sure you’ve got the right seats?

(Watts 2003: 257)

But if the reaction is the following:

(8) I’m so sorry to bother you, but would you very much mind vacating our seats?

(Watts 2003: 257)

it is justified from the point of view of the ticket-holder, but it is beyond what is expected by the people sitting in those seats, who could consider the behaviour unnecessarily aggressive, “but at the same time polite” (2003: 258). However, if we assume that an utterance similar to (a – d) is produced in this situation, it is likely that the people occupying the seats would start a negotiation in order to find the source of the mistake. For Watts (2003: 258), “this kind of negotiation sequence constitutes politic behaviour”, and it is something that the participants would expect to happen in this situation, “and it is not therefore polite”.

Even though Watts argues that politic and polite behaviour are two different notions, “certain utterances that lie within the scope of politic behaviour may indeed be open
to interpretation as polite” (2003: 258). He stresses that there is no objective method by which it can be predicted which forms of behaviour will be considered politic.

5.6 Social variables – power and distance

People construct their self-image through everyday conversation and interaction. The way they develop their face depends on social relationships they enter and on daily activities they are involved in together with other people. Through these activities and in relation to others is how an individual is defined, and this is also the setting for the occurrence and experience of social differences. Many researchers dealing with politeness have considered the influence of these differences, namely social power and distance, on linguistic output.

In their classic article on social power, French and Raven (1968) identify five most important bases of power, which are responsible for different effects of social influence. They consider the relationship between an agent (O) and a person (P). The five bases are:

- Reward power, based on P’s perception that O has the ability to mediate rewards for him;
- Coercive power, based on P’s perception that O has the ability to mediate punishments for him;
- Legitimate power, based on the perception by P that O has a legitimate right to prescribe behaviour for him;
- Referent power, based on P’s identification with O;
- Expert power, based on the perception that O has some special knowledge or expertness. (French & Raven 1968: 263)

This kind of classification is especially significant in empirical work when it is necessary to compare behaviour of interactants where it is assumed that power plays an important role in communication. However, not only power, but also social distance is widely used in pragmatics research, particularly in the study of politeness.

Brown and Gilman (1972) were among the first ones who helped establish power and distance as key variables. They offer the following definition of power:

One person may be said to have power over another in the degree that he is able to control the behavior of the other. Power is a relationship between at least two persons, and it is nonreciprocal in the sense that both cannot have
power in the same area of behavior. (Brown & Gilman 1972: 225, quoted in Spencer-Oatey 2000: 34)

As we have seen, Brown and Levinson use social distance, relative power and ranking of imposition in their weightiness formula to account for cultural variations (5.3.2). While they regard status as part of their relative power variable, Watts (1991) considers it a variable closely related to power:

[Status] refer[s] to an individual’s position in the structure of social relationships with respect to other individuals. Position may be determined in a number of ways, through education, wealth, age, sex, etc., or by the possession of specific mental or physical abilities. Status is thus dependent on the set of values attached to these and many other features by the culture concerned, and it is crucially involved in systems of social hierarchies which help to determine who possesses greater potential power in what social activities. It thus fluctuates from culture to culture and, within a culture, from social group to social group. (Watts 1991: 55)

Watts argues that “status is a prerequisite of power but it is not necessarily co-extensive with it” because a person may choose not to exercise power over others (1991: 176).

Both power and distance are variables considered to have significant influence on language use, and there are numerous empirical studies which have confirmed that (e.g. Blum-Kulka et al. 1985, Beebe & Takahashi 1989, Olshtain 1989). Brown and Levinson (1987: 77) define power as “the degree to which H can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation (face) at the expense of S’s plans and self-evaluation”.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 77) define social distance as being “based on an assessment of the frequency of interaction and the kinds of material or non-material goods (including face) exchanged between S and H”. Thomas (1985: 780) argues that “in a situation in which the social distance between speaker and hearer is great, there is likely to be a corresponding increase in the degree of indirectness employed”. Her definition of this variable is as follows:

[Social distance] is best seen as a composite of psychologically real factors (status, age, sex, degree of intimacy, etc.) which ‘together determine the overall degree of respectfulness’ within a given speech situation. In other words, if you feel close to someone, because that person is related to you, or you know him or her well or are similar in terms of age, social class, occupation, sex, ethnicity, etc., you feel less need to employ indirectness in, say, making a request than you would if you were making the same request of a complete stranger. (Thomas 1995: 128)
For the parameter of distance many different labels are used: closeness, familiarity, solidarity, relational intimacy (Spencer-Oatey 1996: 3). One of the problems that exist, as Wierzbicka (2003: 70) points out, is that there is a lack of agreement between researchers as to the terminology and meaning of variables. She argues that they use various terms in their research without explaining what they mean by them. Since this can create confusion, it is important to pay attention to the number of basic dimensions of interpersonal relationships, as well as to the terms and concepts of these dimensions (Spencer-Oatey 1996, Wierzbicka 2003).

The empirical part of this thesis will consider power and distance as variables which may affect the speaker's choice of strategies when conveying the speech act of apologizing.
6 Speech acts

When people communicate with each other, they perform speech acts, such as asking questions, making requests, giving orders, and so on. This idea represented John Searle’s original hypothesis in 1969 when he wrote *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of language*. In his work Searle (1969: 16) argues that “all linguistic communication involves linguistic acts”, and “these acts are in general made possible by and are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic elements”. Moreover, he states that

> [t]he unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act. (1969: 16)

John Searle’s work appeared as a follow-up on John Austin’s (1962) ideas on illocutionary acts, and as a response to Austin’s call for a general theory of speech acts. This chapter looks into both Austin’s and Searle’s theories and classifications of illocutionary acts.

6.1 John Austin

The philosopher John Langshaw Austin was interested in the range of things people can do using words. What one communicates depends not only on the literal meaning of what is uttered, but also on the speaker’s intentions and the circumstances under which the social interaction occurs. In *How to do things with words* (1962) Austin showed how people use language not just to say things, but to perform actions.

Austin’s approach is considered to be partly a reaction to logical positivism, whose central tenet is the verifiability principle. According to this principle, the validity and meaning of a statement depends on whether it can be verified or not. Therefore, if a proposition cannot be verified it is considered invalid and meaningless. Austin’s opposition consisted of the idea that not all utterances can be seen as either true or false, and that some utterances are used for more than simply stating the facts. Observing that there are also utterances in forms of questions, exclamations or
wishes, Austin argues that they “do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true’ or ‘false’” (Austin 1962: 5).

Austin’s theory started with his description, and later the rejection, of a distinction between constatives and performatives. He defines a constative as an utterance which is either true or false, and a performative as “the doing of an action” (Austin 1962: 3-5). For example, by uttering ‘I do’ one performs the act of marrying (1962: 5-6). This kind of utterances are neither true nor false, but could be described as ‘happy’ (felicitous) or ‘unhappy’ (infelicitous), depending on how successfully they perform the given action. In order for a performative to be successful or felicitous it must follow a set of conventions and be uttered in appropriate context. If any of the rules is broken, then the act presented by the utterance is not achieved. To return to the example - if the person uttering “I do” is already married, then the action of marrying cannot be conducted, and such performative falls under ‘infelicities’ (1962: 14-16).

However, Austin realizes that definite distinction between constatives and performatives is not easy to make because, for example, there are performatives which are at the same time (in)felicitous and true/false. He states that “there is danger of our initial and tentative distinction between constative and performative utterances breaking down” (1962: 54), and he decides that a fresh start on the problem is needed:

> We want to reconsider more generally the senses in which to say something may be to do something, or in saying something we do something (and also perhaps to consider the different case in which by saying something we do something). (1962: 91)

While abandoning the constative/performative distinction due to many problems, Austin takes a different approach, and turns to speech act theory. In Austin’s words, by producing an utterance one is performing a locutionary act. That further means that saying something is to perform

a) phonetic act – the act of uttering certain noises;
b) phatic act – the act of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types, belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar;
c) rhetic act – the act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference. (1962: 95)
When someone’s locutionary act is being reported, the focus can be on the phatic act, whereby the uttered words are just quoted producing direct speech; or the focus can be placed on the rhetic act, thus producing indirect speech (1962: 96).

Performing a locutionary act the speaker is also performing an illocutionary act, i.e. “an act in saying something” (1962: 99). Austin explains the illocutionary act in the sense of its functions in language, pointing out that the utterance has its illocutionary force if performed felicitously (e.g. ordering, informing, warning). According to Austin, the illocutionary force lies beyond words and is rooted in convention. Some linguists argue that there is little theory in Austin’s lectures on the nature of such a convention, but believe that he refers to a shared knowledge “with regard to the relation of form and meaning of the expression in question (possibly together with contextual clues)” (Witczak-Plisiecka 2009: 91).

The third type of act is perlocutionary act, which refers to the effect the utterance has on the hearers. Austin (1962: 101) notes that “[s]aying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feeling, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons”. The distinction between the locution, illocution and perlocution can be made clearer with the help of the following examples cited after Austin (1962: 101-102):

a) Locution
He said to me ‘Shoot her!’ meaning by ‘shoot’ shoot and referring by ‘her’ to her.

b) Illocution
He urged (or advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her.

c) Perlocution
He persuaded me to shoot her. / He got me to (or made me, &c.) shoot her.

Austin characterizes illocutionary acts as acts which involve the uptake effect. He writes the following:

Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed. […] I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. […] So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake. (1962: 115-116)

However, Austin emphasizes that the effects produced by illocutionary acts should be distinguished from the effects produced by perlocutionary acts. The main features of illocutionary acts are securing uptake, taking effect, and inviting responses,
whereas achieving an object (e.g. persuading someone) and producing a sequel (e.g. warning may achieve the sequel of alarming someone) are features of perlocutionary acts (1962: 120).

In his theory, Austin focused on illocutionary acts, developing a taxonomy of five types of illocutions according to their illocutionary force: verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives and expositives (1962: 150). Verdictives refer to the giving of a verdict or a judgement (e.g. *acquit, convict, estimate*). Exercitives mean the exercising of powers, rights or influence (e.g. *appoint, order, advise*). Commissives involve the acts of promising or undertaking (e.g. *promise, intend, agree*). Behabitives have to do with attitudes and social behaviour (e.g. *apologize, thank, criticize*). Expositives refer to clarifying of arguments, reasons and communications (e.g. *report, deny, inform*) (1962: 150-162).

However, Austin was not completely satisfied with this classification of utterances, and he suggested that “some fresh classification altogether [was] needed”, admitting that

> [b]ehabitives are troublesome because they seem too miscellaneous altogether: and expositives because they are enormously numerous and important, and seem both to be included in the other classes and at the same time to be unique in a way that I have not succeeded in making clear even to myself. (1962: 151)

Austin’s suggestion for some further work on illocutionary acts was accepted by his student John R. Searle.

### 6.2 John Searle

Searle developed speech act theory to explain the rules which govern the production of utterances. In his work *Speech acts* (1969) Searle accepts Austin’s understanding of the speech act as the basic linguistic unit of meaning and force. However, he rejects his distinction between the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary act, and instead develops different dimensions of the speech act. Additionally, Searle proposes a new taxonomy of illocutionary acts, and introduces the notion of indirect speech acts.

According to Searle (1969: 24-25), there are four basic acts performed in uttering a sentence, and these are:
a) Uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance acts.

b) Referring and predicing = performing propositional acts.

c) Stating, questioning, commanding, promising, etc. = performing illocutionary acts.

d) To these three notions I now wish to add Austin's notion of the perlocutionary act. Correlated with the notion of illocutionary acts is the notion of the consequences or effects such acts have on the actions, thoughts, or beliefs, etc. of hearers. For example, by arguing I may persuade or convince someone, by warning him I may scare or alarm him, by making a request I may get him to do something, by informing him I may convince him (enlighten, edify, inspire him, get him to realize). The italicized expressions above denote perlocutionary acts.

Searle explains the utterance act as “consist[ing] simply in uttering strings of words”, whereas “[i]llocutionary and propositional acts consist characteristically in uttering words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain conditions and with certain intentions” (1969: 24-25).

The major difference from Austin’s approach is Searle’s introduction of the propositional act. One characteristic of the propositional act is that it cannot occur alone, but only in connection to the performance of an illocutionary act. In Searle’s words, “one cannot just refer and predicate without making an assertion or asking a question or performing some other illocutionary act” (1969: 25). The propositional act consists of two components – a referential act and predication. According to Searle, the referential act is a complete act by which a speaker identifies an object, process or action, whereas predication is not a separate speech act, but only a component of it:

Even though reference is an abstraction from the total illocutionary act, it is a separate speech act. By analogy, moving the knight is an abstraction from playing chess (because it only counts as moving the knight if you are playing chess), but it is still a separate act. Predication is also an abstraction, but it is not a separate act. It is a slice from the total illocutionary act; just as indicating the illocutionary force is not a separate act, but another slice from the illocutionary act. (1969: 122-123).

Searle’s hypothesis is that “speaking a language is performing acts according to rules” (1969: 36-37). Additionally, “speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with [the] sets of constitutive rules” (1969: 37). In order to invoke the underlying rules for the successful performance of a speech act, Searle sets the conditions for the performance of a particular illocutionary act. Here are the rules for the illocutionary act of promising (1969: 63):
Propositional content rule:

\[ Pr \] is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence (or larger stretch of discourse) \( T \), the utterance of which predicates some future act \( A \) of the speaker \( S \).

Preparatory rules:

\[ Pr \] is to be uttered only if the hearer \( H \) would prefer \( S \)'s doing \( A \) to his not doing \( A \), and \( S \) believes hearer \( H \) would prefer \( S \)'s doing \( A \) to his not doing \( A \).

\[ Pr \] is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both \( S \) and \( H \) that \( S \) will do \( A \) in the normal course of events.

Sincerity rule:

\[ Pr \] is to be uttered only if \( S \) intends to do \( A \).

Essential rule:

The utterance of \( Pr \) counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do \( A \).

According to Searle, propositional content rule specifies which propositional content of the speech act is acceptable; preparatory rules specify contextual requirements with regard to social relations, beliefs and desires of the interlocutors; sincerity rule specifies the speaker's psychological state regarding the propositional content of the utterance; essential rule specifies the type of illocutionary act performed by the utterance.

### 6.2.1 Searle's taxonomy

Searle considered Austin's classification of illocutionary acts deficient, so he proposed his own taxonomy in his paper “A the classification of illocutionary acts” (1976).

In Searle's view, the main weaknesses of Austin's approach are the following:

[T]here is a persistent confusion between verbs and acts, not all the verbs are illocutionary verbs, there is too much overlap of the categories, too much heterogeneity within the categories, many of the verbs listed in the categories don't satisfy the definition given for the category and, most important, there is no consistent principle of classification. (Searle 1976: 9-10)

Arguing that his taxonomy is based on essential conditions, Searle proposes the basic categories of illocutionary acts. In order to group and sort them, he chooses the following three most important criteria:

1. Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act
2. Differences in the direction of the fit between words and the world
3. Differences in expressed psychological states (1976: 2-8)

The first criterion is what Searle calls ‘illocutionary point’, and it refers to what the speaker is trying to do with the utterance. For example, the illocutionary point of an apology is to express the speaker’s regret for having done an act; the illocutionary point of a promise is to commit the speaker to doing an act (Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 14).

The second criterion refers to the relation between the uttered words and the world. It can have two directions: the word-to-world direction, when the propositional content matches the world (statements, descriptions, assertions), and the world-to-word direction, when the world matches the propositional content (promises, commands, requests). More specifically, the former direction reflects the way the speaker truthfully represents the world with the uttered illocution, whereas the latter reflects the speaker’s subsequent behaviour which is supposed to fit the proposition. Searle (1976: 4) explains that “[d]irection of fit is always a consequence of illocutionary point”.

The third criterion refers to the speaker’s psychological state or attitude to the propositional content expressed in the performance of the illocution. The psychological states correspond to the sincerity conditions, and are reflected in the speaker’s wants, intentions, beliefs.

On the basis of these three and several other criteria, Searle postulates his taxonomy, which is presented below:

Representatives – the speaker is committed to the truth of the expressed proposition. Verbs denoting representatives: assert, inform, report, conclude.

Directives – attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. Verbs denoting directives: request, command, permit, invite.

Commissives – attempt to commit the speaker to some future course of action. Verbs denoting commissives: warn, promise, threaten.

Expressives – attempts to express psychological state specified in the propositional content. Verbs denoting expressives: apologize, thank, congratulate, welcome.

Declarations – attempts to bring about changes in the status or condition of objects. Examples: performing the act of marrying, declaring a state of war. (1976: 10-14)
Even though Austin was the first one to construct a taxonomy of illocutionary acts, and there have also been other attempts at classification later (e.g. Bach & Harnish 1979), Searle’s taxonomy has been most widely discussed.

### 6.2.2 Indirect speech acts

The core element of successful communication is understanding the intentions behind utterances. There are instances when the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly what he says, but he may also mean “another illocution with a different propositional content” (Searle 1975: 59-60). Searle has introduced the notion of indirect speech act and his explanation of it is as follows:

In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. (1975: 60-61)

According to Searle, the necessary apparatus for explaining indirect speech acts is a theory of speech acts, general principles of cooperative conversation, mutually shared background information of the speaker and the hearer, and the ability of the hearer to make inferences.

To explain the phenomenon of indirection, Searle introduces the terms ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ illocutionary act. The primary illocutionary act refers to the indirect illocution, while the secondary illocutionary act is the direct one, literally performed. Searle (1975: 61) considers the following example:

(9) Student X: Let’s go to the movies tonight.

Student Y: I have to study for an exam.

The primary illocutionary act in this example is Y’s rejection of the X’s proposal, whereas the secondary illocutionary act is Y’s statement that he/she has to prepare for an exam. Searle tries to explain how a person can mean two things by producing one utterance, as well as the way the hearer recognizes the intended meaning, i.e. the primary illocution in a given situation. He proposes ten steps necessary to derive the primary illocution, and here they are based on Searle’s example given above:

- **Step 1** Understanding the facts of the interaction.
- **Step 2** Assuming cooperation (principles of conversational cooperation).
Step 3 Determining factual background information (e.g. a relevant response must be one of acceptance, rejection, counterproposal, etc.)

Step 4 Making conclusions resulting from steps 1-3 (the literal meaning does not fit the relevant response).

Step 5 Assuming that primary illocution differs from the literal illocution. This is a crucial step: unless a hearer is able to distinguish primary from literal illocutions, he cannot understand indirect illocutions.

Step 6 Considering shared, factual background information (studying for an exam takes much time, just as going to the movies takes a large amount of time).

Step 7 Making an inference from Step 6 (the hearer might not be able to both study and go to the movies in one evening).

Step 8 From speech act theory: a preparatory condition on the acceptance of a proposal is the ability to carry out the proposed act.

Step 9 Inferring from Steps 1, 7 and 8 (the hearer's utterance probably means that he/she cannot accept the proposal).

Step 10 Inferring from 5 and 9 (the hearer’s primary illocutionary point is probably to reject the proposal).

This is the method that Searle develops in order to reconstruct the process of inferring the primary illocutionary point.

Searle (1975: 74) argues that “the chief motivation – though not the only motivation – for using these indirect forms is politeness”, and he explains this as follows:

[...] [O]rdinary conversational requirements of politeness normally make it awkward to issue flat imperative sentences (e.g. “Leave the room”) or explicit performatives (e.g. “I order you to leave the room”), and we therefore seek to find indirect means to our illocutionary ends (e.g. “I wonder if you would mind leaving the room”). In directives, politeness is the chief motivation for indirectness. (1975: 64)

Searle’s notion of indirect speech acts served as a base for many further works on speech acts, one of them being Olshtain and Cohen’s (1983) proposition of a speech act set of apologizing. The following chapters introduce apologies and examine their use in interlanguage.
7 Apologies

In cross-cultural pragmatics apologies are, along with requests, the most frequently analysed speech acts. A possible reason for this interest in apologies could be found in their function of repairing and maintaining social harmony.

Apologies are usually called for when social norms have been violated, and when there is a need to “set things right” (Olshtain & Cohen 1983: 20). However, in order for an apology to take place, the speaker has to believe that an act of violation has been performed prior to the moment of speaking and that the result of the act has caused offence to another person who now deserves an apology (Olshtain & Cohen 1989: 55).

7.1 Defining apology

According to The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (1993), the term ‘apology’ is derived from the Greek term apoloyia, meaning defence or a speech in ones’ own defence. It dates back to the sixteenth century when it was used to mean the following:

The pleading off from a charge or imputation, whether expressed, implied, or only conceived as possible; defence of a person, or vindication of an institution, etc., from accusation or aspersion. (OED 1993)

This early meaning of apologies seemed similar to justifications and explanations. But a more modern usage of the term refers to apology as to

[a]n explanation offered to a person affected by one’s action that no offence was intended, couples with the expression of regret for any that may have been given or, a frank acknowledgement of the offence with expression of regret for it, by way of reparation. (OED 2004)

Goffman (1971: 140) refers to apologies as to remedial and ritual work which “allows the participants to go on their way, if not with satisfaction that matters are closed, then at least with the right to act as if they feel that matters are closed and that ritual equilibrium has been restored”.

In Leech’s terms, apologies express regret for an offence which is committed by the speaker against the hearer (Leech 1983: 124-125). He furthermore explains:
An apology implies a transaction, in that it is a bid to change the balance-sheet of the relation between s and h. If the apology is successful, it will result in h’s pardoning or excusing the offence. Significantly, if we commit an offence against someone, we talk of owing that person an apology, thereby treating the apology as in some sense an expiation of the offence. The metaphor whereby deeds make us ‘debtors’ or ‘creditors’ of one another applies not only to good deeds (favours), but also to bad deeds (offences), so that apologizing can be regarded as an acknowledgement of an imbalance in the relation between s and h, and to some extent, as an attempt to restore the equilibrium.

As the definition makes clear, apology is a speech act performed by an offender, with a focus on the person affected by a committed act.

7.2 Apology and face

There is a lack of consensus as to whether it is the hearer’s or the speaker’s face that apologies redress, and also to the type of politeness apologies involve (Ogiermann 2009: 49).

Brown and Levinson classify apologies as negative politeness strategies, i.e. strategies focusing on the hearer’s right to be “unimpeded by others” (Brown & Levinson 1987). When the speaker apologizes, as Olshtain and Cohen (1990: 46-47) explain, he/she is “willing to humiliate him/herself to some extent and to admit to fault and responsibility for [a violation]”. Therefore, in Brown and Levinson’s terms, the act of apologizing is face-saving for the hearer, and face-threatening for the speaker.

Similar view is offered by Holmes (1990: 159), who defines apology as “a speech act addressed to B’s face-needs and intended to remedy an offence for which A takes responsibility, and thus to restore equilibrium between A and B”.

However, the issue of face in relation to apologies can be looked at not only from the hearer’s perspective but also from the speaker’s. This view is provided by Meier (1992: 31), who focuses on the redress of the speaker’s face and not the hearer’s:

Apologies or remedial work (e.g., apologies, excuses, justifications, etc.) within this view, are not then viewed as politeness phenomena co-occurring with some other face-threatening act. They are rather an attempt to remedy any damage incurred to image upon a responsibility linkage between an actor and inappropriate behavior. Contrary to Brown and Levinson, I posit remedial work as a face-saving device as regards S (not H). Concern for H’s face is only a by-product of the attempt to serve the intent of saving S’s face. S’s image, thus, becomes the central one. The intent of remedial work then is the repair of S’s image.
Meier (2004: 3) presents a model of apology, putting the speaker at the centre of it, which is illustrated in the figure below:

\[
\text{S's image} \Rightarrow \text{S's linkage to a norm violation} \Rightarrow \text{S's damaged image} \Rightarrow \text{apology} \Rightarrow \text{S's repaired image.}
\]

According to Meier (2004: 3-4) apologies serve as a tool for image maintenance, and she further explains:

The major motivating force behind an apology is thus the status of the speaker’s image in the eyes of the hearer, who is the arbiter of the appropriateness or effectiveness of particular apology strategies for a given situation.

In Meier’s opinion, apologies are mostly viewed as hearer-supportive in accordance with Brown and Levinson’s “almost exclusive concern with H's face” (1995b: 383). However, she observes that Leech (1983) classifies apologies as positive politeness strategies, and also Holmes (1990) takes speaker's positive face into consideration. Holmes stresses the function of apologies which incorporates “an attempt to simultaneously redress the speaker's positive face needs as well as the victim's face needs” (Holmes 1990: 162). The following example offered by Holmes (1990: 162) illustrates such a situation:

(10) [A is phoning B to warn her of potential inconvenience.]

A: I'm sorry but I'm going to be a bit late for work. The buses aren't off strike yet and with it being a wet Friday, it'll probably be a while until my taxi arrives.

B: Uh-huh as long as you're here by six, cos I'm going then.

In this interaction the speaker A is addressing the speaker B’s possible face loss (I'm sorry), but he/she is also attempting to redress his/her positive face loss by including an explanation of why the offence is not possible to avoid.

Holmes (1990: 162) also points out to instances when there is an attempt by the speaker at redressing the hearer’s positive face:

(11) [Introducing B to C, A has used Mr. instead of Dr. for B.]

A: Oh I am sorry – it's Dr. Hall not Mr. Forgive me.

B: Nice to meet you.

Although we have seen how an offer of apology can amend the speaker's face, it is also able to make the speaker appear weak. In her article “Apologies: What it Means
to Say ‘Sorry’, Deborah Tannen (1998) discusses the situation when President Clinton made his testimony regarding the Lewinsky affair, after which he was criticized by the press for not having been apologetic enough. Tannen refers to his implicit form of apology, explaining that more explicit apology would have probably weakened his position. On the other hand, she argues that “[t]hough many people resist apologizing because it appears weak, willingness to apologize can be a sign of strength, precisely because it shows that the apologist is confident enough to risk appearing weak” (Tannen 1998).

Ogiermann (2009: 53) comes to the conclusion that there are offences which can cause damage to both positive and negative face, and since the speaker and the hearer have both face types, “a remedial interchange can affect up to four faces”. In order to illustrate the performance of an apology including all four faces, Ogiermann offers the chart presented bellow:

![Face considerations involved in remedial interchanges](image)

**Figure 3 Face considerations involved in remedial interchanges (Ogiermann 2009: 54)**

### 7.3 The form of apology

Apologies have been explored by many authors such as Fraser (1981), Olshtain and Cohen (1983), Owen (1983), Trosborg (1987), Deutschmann (2003) who were concerned with investigating the form of apologies.
Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 21) state that the act of apologizing includes two basic components: the recipient and the apologizer. The participant in interaction who has caused the offence needs to apologize to the offended person. However, it may happen that the offender does not perceive him/herself as guilty for the offence, and may not feel the need to apologize. The following section deals with some major response categories which are employed in the performance of apologies.

According to Deutschmann (2003: 44) an apology includes four basic components, and these are: the offender, the offended, the offence and the remedy. The offender is the person who takes responsibility for some offence; the offended is the victim of an offence, but does not necessarily perceive him/herself as offended; the offence is the incident which merits the apology; and the most important component is the remedy, which is a “recognition of the offence, acceptance of responsibility and a display of regret” (Deutschmann 2003: 46).

### 7.4 Apology strategies

The offender’s perception of the degree of the severity of the offence is only one of the factors which influence his/her decision about whether to apologize or not, or which apology strategy to use. The following factors, as claimed by Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 21), influence the apologizer’s choice of semantic formulas:

1. The recipient’s expectations determined by his evaluation of the degree of severity of the offence.
2. The offender's apology determined by her perception of the degree of severity of the offence.
3. The offender’s apology controlled by the extent of compunction expected from the recipient.
4. The interactive nature of both the initial apology and the recipient’s response.
5. The social status of the two participants.
6. The way the tone of voice may function to convey meaning.

But before discussing semantic formulas of the apology speech act, Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 22) stress the importance of making the distinction between the case when the offender is positively inclined to apologize as opposed to the case when he/she does not accept responsibility for the offence.
7.4.1 Avoiding responsibility

In her work “Apology strategies in natives/non-natives” Trosborg (1987: 149-150) considers strategies for opting out, i.e. situations when the offender does not take on responsibility and decides not to apologize. She refers to an apology as a response to a complaint, but she notes that not every complaint is followed by an apology, and also “the recipient of an apology may or may not have been complaining” (1994: 374-375). Accordingly, Trosborg identifies three ‘Roles’ in a complaint-apology situation, and these are: complainer, complainee or apologizer, and a complainable (i.e. the offence in question) (1987: 148). The following figure displays the major categories of opting out found in the data which Trosborg obtained in her experiment. The complainee either denies that the offence has occurred (0.1) and (0.2), or he/she denies his/her responsibility, either by justifying his/her actions (0.3), or by blaming someone else (0.4) and (0.5).

According to Trosborg (1987: 149-150), explicit denial of responsibility (0.1) refers to the complainee’s denial of an offence having occurred or of having any responsibility for it. The complainee may use arguments, such as “I know nothing about it, I can assure you”, or “strategic disarmers”, such as “You know that I would never do a thing like that”. Implicit denial of responsibility (0.2) is a strategy which includes the complainee’s ignoring a complaint or talking about something else. By offering justification (0.3) the complainee provides arguments to persuade the complainer that

---

Complainee does not take on responsibility

- Does not accept that the complainable has occurred
  - Explicit Denial (0.1)
  - Implicit denial (0.2)
- Accepts that the complainable has occurred
  - Justification (0.3)
  - Blame
    - Blames X (0.4)
    - Blames the complainer ‘attack’ (0.5)

Figure 4 Strategies of opting out (Trosborg 1987: 149)
“no blame can be attached to him” (1987: 149). Blaming someone else (0.4) refers to the complainee’s attempt to evade responsibility by blaming the complainer or a third party for the offence. Another way of evading responsibility may be to attack the complainer (0.5) if the complainee “lacks an adequate defence for his own behaviour” (1987: 149).

Apart from the five strategies presented by Trosborg, there is another one which can be found in the CCSARP coding manual by Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984) (see section 3.2). They list “Pretend to be offended” as one of the strategies the offender may use when refusing to acknowledge guilt. This can be done by saying things such as “I’m the one to be offended” (Blum-Kulka et al. 1989: 292). However, similarities can be found between this one and Trosborg’s strategy (0.4).

These are many of the possible responses that the offender may make in situations when he/she is not willing to offer an apology, and instead chooses to deny any involvement in the offensive act that has taken place. The following section deals with the case when the apologizer decides to express responsibility for the offence, and it describes the forms of the realization of the act of apologizing.

7.4.2 Apology speech act set

On the basis of Fraser’s (1980) list of semantic formulas, associated with the speech act of apologizing, Olshtain and Cohen (1983) developed their own five semantic formulas, which will be presented in this section. Their apology speech act set has served as a framework for various studies carried out by many researchers doing contrastive analysis of apologies in interlanguage pragmatics.

Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 22) note that when the offender is positively inclined to apologize for the offence, in most cases only one of the formulas is sufficient to perform an apology. However, it often happens that two or more formulas are combined together in order to intensify the apology. The five semantic formulas of the apology speech act set developed by Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 22) are the following:

1. An expression of an apology
2. An explanation or account of the situation
3. An acknowledgement of responsibility
4. An offer of repair
5. A promise of forbearance

The first formula in the set, an expression of an apology, consists of a number of subformulas:

a. An expression of regret, e.g., “I’m sorry.”
b. An offer of apology, e.g., “I apologize.”
c. A request for forgiveness, e.g., “Excuse me.” “Please forgive me.” or “Pardon me.”

Olshtain and Cohen (1983: 22) state that the first formula is used as a direct apology strategy, whereby the apologizer uses a word, an expression or a sentence containing a performative apology verb, such as apologize, be sorry, forgive, excuse, and pardon. They believe that the major semantic formulas are “non-language-specific and [...] each language has a direct expression of apology using one or more of the “apology” verbs” (1983: 22). However, when it comes to the appropriateness of the formulas to certain situations, it may vary from language to language.

The second formula is an explanation or account of the situation which “indirectly brought about the offence”, and it is used by the apologizer as an indirect speech act of apologizing (Olshtain & Cohen 1983: 22). If a person is late for a meeting, he/she might give an explanation such as

(12) “The bus was late”

and use that as an apology strategy or in combination with the first formula. However, Olshtain and Cohen note that in some countries this kind of excuse might be perfectly acceptable as an apology, while in some others it is less acceptable (ibid.: 22).

An acknowledgement of responsibility is the third formula, and it is employed by the offender “only when he/she recognizes responsibility for the offence” (Olshtain & Cohen 1983: 23). This formula consists of four subformulas, which are non-language-specific, and they are:

a. Accepting the blame, e.g., “It is my fault.”
b. Expressing self-deficiency, e.g., “I was confused.” “I wasn’t thinking.” or “I didn’t see you.”
c. Recognizing the other person as deserving apology, e.g., “You are right!”
d. Expressing lack of intent, e.g., “I didn’t mean to.”

Only the first one among these four subformulas is a direct expression of responsibility, whereas the other three are indirect expressions.

Both an offer of repair and a promise of forbearance are semantic formulas which are situation-specific. In order for the apologizer to use an offer of repair there has to be some kind of damage which resulted from his/her infringement, whereby the apologizer would, for example, say

(13) “I'll pay for the broken vase.”


A promise of forbearance is the formula used by the offender in situations when he/she “could have avoided the offence but did not do so”, and therefore he/she promises not to repeat the offence (Olshtain & Cohen 1983: 23). The person might use the following utterance to perform the apology:

(14) “It won’t happen again.”

The apology speech act set proposed by Olshtain and Cohen has been successfully applied to a large number of languages, which not only justifies their classification of the apology strategies, but also implies that their speech act set may be universal (Ogiermann 2009: 57).

Trosborg (1987) proposes a speech act set built on Olshtain and Cohen (1983) and on the coding manual from the CCSARP (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984). Her apology speech act set contains the following seven apology strategies:

1. **Minimizing the degree of offence.** With this strategy the apologizer does not deny responsibility, but only seeks to minimize the degree of infraction. There are three substrategies here:

   1.1 *Minimizing:*
   
   e.g. “Oh, what does that matter, that’s nothing”; “What about it, it’s not the end of the world”.

   1.2 *Querying preconditions:*
1.3 Blaming someone else: The offence committed by the complainee can be partly excuse by an offence committed by a third party.

2. Acknowledgment of responsibility. When an apologizer employs this strategy he/she can choose to do it implicitly or explicitly. The sub-categories are:

2.1 Implicit acknowledgment: 
   e.g. “I can see your point”; “Perhaps I shouldn’t have done it”.

2.2 Explicit acknowledgement: 
   e.g. “I’ll admit I forgot to do it”.

2.3 Expression of lack of intent: 
   e.g. “I didn’t mean to”.

2.4 Expression of self-deficiency: 
   e.g. “I was confused”; “You know I’m bad at...”.

2.5 Expression of embarrassment: 
   e.g. “I feel so bad about it”.

2.6 Explicit acceptance of the blame: 
   e.g. “It was entirely my fault”; “You’re right to blame me”.

3. Explanation or account. The apologizer may try to mitigate his/her guilt by using this strategy. This can be done implicitly or explicitly:

3.1 Implicit explanation: 
   e.g. “Such things are bound to happen, you know”.

3.2 Explicit explanation: 
   e.g. “Sorry I’m late, but my car broke down”.

4. Expression of apology. The apologizer uses this strategy when he/she wants to express his/her apology explicitly.

4.1 Expression of regret: 
   e.g. “I’m sorry”.

4.2 Offer of apology: 
   e.g. “I apologize”.

4.3 Request for forgiveness: 
   e.g. “Excuse me”, “Please, forgive me”; “Pardon me”.

5. Offer of repair. The apologizer may offer to repair the damage, or offer a kind of ‘compensatory’ action to the complainer.

5.1 Repair: 
   e.g. “I’ll pay for the cleaning”.

   e.g. “Well, everybody does that”
5.2 Compensation:  
e.g. “You can borrow my dress instead”.

6. **Promise of forbearance.** The apologizer may promise not to repeat the infraction again.

   (15) “It won’t happen again, I promise”.

7. **Expressing concern for hearer.** The apologizer may express concern for the well-being of the complainee.

   (Trosborg 1987: 150-152)

In connection to the above classification of apology strategies, Borkin and Reinhart’s (1979) discussion contrasting the expressions *I’m sorry* and *Excuse me* can be taken into consideration for the purpose of better explaining their use in apology situations. The researchers argue that although both expressions are used as formulaic remedies, there are slight differences as regards the appropriateness of their use in certain situations. According to Borkin and Reinhart (1979: 59), “the simple form *Excuse me* may be used more appropriately than the simple form *I’m sorry* before an infraction”. The situation they offer as an example is when someone is hurriedly trying to make his way through a crowd of people, in which case “*excuse me* is more appropriate than *I’m sorry* in getting someone to step aside” (1979: 59). But if a person wants to apologize after getting in someone else’s way, both expressions are equally appropriate. Borkin and Reinhart define *Excuse me* as “a formula to remedy a past or immediately forthcoming breach of etiquette or other light infraction of a social rule on the part of the speaker”, and *I’m sorry* as “an expression of dismay or regret at an unpleasantness suffered by the speaker and/or the addressee” (1979: 61). They also point out to the fact that while *Excuse me* is limited to being used as a remedy tool, *I’m sorry* is not necessarily used as a remedy, but may function as an expression of sympathy without any implication of responsibility.

### 7.4.3 Apology modifiers – intensifiers and downgraders

In addition to the main strategies in the apology speech act set, there are ways in which the apologizer can modify the apology by either intensifying it or by downgrading it. An intensification makes the apology stronger “crating even more
support for H and more humiliation for S" (Olshtain & Cohen 1990: 47). Internal modification usually occurs by adding a conventional modifier, such as very, really, so, terribly, truly, awfully, deeply. External modification can occur in a form of a comment expressing stronger interest and concern for the hearer

(16) “Oh, no!” or “Oh, God.”

Downgraders are modifiers which lessen the strength of the apology, and at the same time minimize the degree of offence. They can take the form of a comment, such as

(17) “Sorry, but we never start on time anyhow” or

(18) “Sorry, but you shouldn’t be so sensitive”

(Blum-Kulka et al. 1989: 21).

Another instance of the use of a downgrader is when the speaker pretends not to notice the offence:

(19) “Am I late?”

As opposed to Olshtain and Cohen, who refer to downgraders as modifications of apology strategies, Trosborg (1994: 379) makes such classification that puts some downgraders into “evasive strategies” which form the first category of apology strategies. However, she does note that this kind of strategies “can hardly count as apologies”, and she also considers internal modifiers apart from apology strategies classification (1994: 386). According to Trosborg’s categorization of internal modifiers, the following eight categories of downgraders and upgraders are distinguished:

1. Downtoners – adverbial sentence modifiers, such as: just, simply, etc. (e.g. I just left for five minutes)
2. Understaters – phrases that under-represent the state of affairs denoted in the offence, such as: a little bit, a second, etc. (e.g. I went out for a second only)
3. Hedges – adverbials by means of which the offender avoids a precise propositional specification, such as: kind of, somehow, etc. (e.g. Somehow, it all happened very quickly, I kind of didn’t notice before it was too late).
4. Subjectivizers – modifiers that characterize the proposition as the speaker’s personal opinion, or indicate his/her attitude towards the proposition, such as: I think, I suppose, I’m afraid, etc.
5. Intensifiers – adverbials intensifying part of the proposition, e.g. intensifying a lack of intention, an expression of regret. (e.g. I’m terribly sorry)

6. Commitment upgraders – sentence modifiers expressing a special commitment towards the proposition. (e.g. I was sure/positive that you wouldn’t mind…)

7. Cajolers – gambits functioning at the interpersonal level of discourse with the function of restoring harmony between interlocutors, such as: you know, you see, I mean, etc.

8. Appealers – discourse elements (including tags) intended to elicit a response from the complainer, appealing to his/her understanding, such as: okay, right, don’t you think?

(Trosborg 1994: 385-386)

Trosborg (1994: 383) also writes about the apologizer’s attempt at softening the complainer’s feelings with the use of a strategic disarmer, for example:

(20) “This is most embarrassing for me, I really never meant to…”

She explains that the function of strategic disarmers is to “pave the way for the acceptance of the apology”. However, she points out that strategic disarmers, as part of the act of apologizing, differ from apologies “which function as disarmers preceding other speech acts” such as requests, complaints, refusals, e.g.

(21) “I’m terribly sorry but you seem to have taken my suitcase by mistake” (before a complaint)

(22) I’m sorry, but I’m afraid there are no more seats left for the late show (before a refusal)


7.5 Apologies across cultures

Although the above explained apology strategies are available across languages and cultures, the differences in their use have been empirically researched in interlanguage pragmatic studies. Some of the best known studies include Cohen and Olshtain (1981), Fraser (1981), Olshtain and Cohen (1983), Blum-Kulka et al. (1989), Olshtain (1989), Trosborg (1995), Márquez Reiter (2000).

Edmondson (1981) was one of the first researchers to carry out apology studies, whereby he considered apologies in the context of conversational routines. Fraser
(1981) analysed apologies taking into account the nature of the infraction, the severity of the infraction, the situation in which it occurred, as well as the familiarity between the interactants. The research conducted by Cohen and Olshtain (1981, 1983) and Olshtain and Blum-Kulka (1985) helped to establish the apology speech act set which has since been used by many other researchers in their cross-cultural investigation of apologies. Cohen and Olshtain (1981) dealt with measuring sociocultural competence, i.e. “the ability to use target language knowledge in communicative situations”, focusing on the speech act of apology. Based on Fraser’s (1981) nine different apology strategies, Olshtain and Cohen (1983) developed their own apology speech act set in order to classify apologies. The aim of most cross-cultural studies dealing with apologies has been to investigate linguistic differences and similarities in the realization of the speech act across different languages. Studies are usually conducted by comparing the performance of native and non-native speakers of English. Some of the existing contrastive analyses include English and German apologies (House 1989, Olshtain 1989), Austrian German (Meier 1992, 1996), English and Danish (Trosborg 1987, Kasper 1989), English and Hebrew (Cohen & Olshtain 1981, Olshtain 1989), English and Spanish (Garcia 1989, Cordella 1990, Marquez Reiter 2000), English and Polish and Hungarian (Suszczynska 1999).

The Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realisation Project (CCSARP) has been the largest speech act study so far, and it was conducted by a number of international linguists (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper 1989; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1984). The study investigated realizations of requests and apologies in five languages: German, Danish, Canadian French, Hebrew and English (American, Australian and British). The framework developed in this project has been used in various cross-cultural and interlanguage studies comparing two or more languages.

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8 Empirical study

8.1 Introduction

In recent years there has been a considerable amount of research devoted to examining differences between L2 learners and native speakers in the performance of apology strategies. The findings of those studies show that the use of apologies differs between L2 learners and native speakers in several ways. Cohen and Olshtain (1981) and Olshtain and Cohen (1983) found differences in the distribution of the intensity of apology, Trosborg (1987) and Kondo (1997) found significant differences in the number of explanation strategies used, and Linell (1992) found that L2 learners employed a lower number of acknowledgement strategy than native English speakers. Given the fact that a learner's first and second languages may differ in the realization of speech acts, the inappropriate use of a semantic formula in L2 due to pragmatic transfer from L1 is not a rare phenomenon. In order to avoid undesirable instances of miscommunication, it is important for a learner to acquire linguistic, social and pragmatic competence in the target language.

This study presents empirical research aimed at analysing the realization of apology strategies by Serbian learners of English. It investigates to what extent language learners transfer socio-cultural rules from L1 to L2, and how they conform to and diverge from native speaker norms in the performance of apologies. In the analysis of the data the influence of cultural, social and situational factors on the choice of the strategies will be considered.

8.2 Methodological considerations

Research conducted in the field of cross-cultural and interlanguage pragmatics has employed various methods of data collection. However, there is a significant dilemma in pragmatic research which concerns these methods, the validity of data collected and “their adequacy to approximate the authentic performance of linguistic action” (Kasper & Dahl 1991: 215).

Discourse completion tests (DCTs) are written questionnaires which have been a widely used data elicitation tool in interlanguage pragmatics. Although they have
been criticized for limiting the capturing of authentic communication, the number of their advantages is significantly bigger than of any other data collection instrument. An important characteristic is that DCTs allow the collection of large corpus of data in a short period of time, which has led to a widespread use of DCTs in pragmatic research. There are three types of questionnaire used in the field of pragmatics, and these are: production, multiple-choice, and rating-scale questionnaires. The difference between them lies in the type of response that they elicit. Whereas multiple-choice and rating scale questionnaires offer fixed responses from which respondents have to choose the most appropriate one, production questionnaires are open-ended. This means that respondents are required to provide a response with regard to the given situational descriptions. Some of the studies that have employed this instrument are Olshtain and Cohen (1983), House and Kasper (1987), the CCSARP (Blum-Kulka, et al. 1989), Kasper (1989), Faerch and Kasper (1989), Beebe et al. (1990), etc.

Numerous speech act studies have used role play as a data collection technique. The potential of role plays is that they allow the sequential organization of language production. On the other hand, role plays need transcribing, which presents one of their disadvantages as it is very time consuming. Studies that have conducted research employing this instrument are Scarcella (1979), Kasper (1981), Trosborg (1987), Tanaka (1988), etc.

An important feature of DCTs, as well as of role plays, is that they allow for a comparative study of native and non-native speaker behaviour in a given context. For that reason the present study will be based on data elicited by a DCT.

8.3 Research design

8.3.1 Subjects

The discourse completion test was constructed in English and Serbian, and was completed by a total of 60 respondents. In order to set up norms for acceptable apologies, the participants were divided into three groups. They included 20 native speakers of American English, 20 native speakers of Serbian, and 20 Serbian learners of English. They constituted a broadly homogenous group in terms of age, social class and education. The respondents were mainly university students and
graduates in the United States or Serbia, and they were aged from 19 to 34. Non-native English speakers have studied English for 8 to 12 years, and they were asked to rate their speaking ability. Eleven rated themselves as excellent speakers of English, eight as good, and one as fair. The majority of them have never spent time in an English-speaking community.

8.3.2 Design of the questionnaire

The DCT used in this study was designed so as to elicit apologies in a series of situations. It consists of ten open-ended scenarios, eight of which depict offensive situations, while two serve as distractors. The DCT requires the respondents to provide spontaneous responses which resemble real life situations.

The scenarios selected for this study were designed by Ogiermann (2009) and used in the research published in her book On apologising in negative and positive politeness cultures. The DCT was constructed so to include the combination of contextual variables in order to be able to test the influence of social power and social distance on the speaker’s strategy choice. Hence, the situations were based on equal and unequal power combined with three levels of social distance: low (between friends), medium (between acquaintances) and high (between strangers).

The following eight situations were used in this study:

1. H had asked S to look after his fish and some of them have died.
2. S had borrowed H’s book and misplaced it.
3. S lets go a heavy door and it hits H.
4. H had asked S to return her DVSs and S forgot.
5. S mistakes H for his friend and hits him on the back.
6. S goes by train without a ticket and is caught by H.
7. S had a loud party and left a dirty staircase behind in H’s house.
8. S walks out of the shop with an unpaid CD and is stopped by H.

(adapted from Ogiermann 2009: 84)

Two additional situations were included in the DCT to serve as distractors: one of them eliciting a complaint and the other one a request. This way, it was hoped, the
respondents would not reply mechanically providing a response set, which could easily be done when replying to eight consecutive offence situations.

The combinations of contextual variables used in the eight scenarios are presented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dead fish</td>
<td>S=H</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Professor’s book</td>
<td>S&lt;H</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Heavy door</td>
<td>S=H</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. DVDs</td>
<td>S=H</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mistaking a stranger</td>
<td>S=H</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ticket inspector</td>
<td>S&lt;H</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Landlady</td>
<td>S&lt;H</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Security guard</td>
<td>S&lt;H</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Contextual variables included in the eight situations

In the introduction to the DCT the respondents were instructed to imagine themselves in the ten presented situations. They were asked to react as spontaneously as possible while responding in direct speech. The respondents were not requested to apologize since it was considered that the authenticity of the data could be affected if the respondents were informed about the focus of the study. The demographic information included in the questionnaire covered the respondents’ age for all three groups, whereas the group of non-native English speakers were also asked to rate their speaking ability choosing between excellent, good, fair and poor (see Appendix for a sample of the questionnaire).

The questionnaire was taken over in English, slightly modified, and then translated into Serbian. The group of Serbian native speakers received Serbian version of the questionnaire, whereas native English speakers and Serbian learners of English received the questionnaire in English. The questionnaire was distributed as an online version.
8.4 Apology strategies

The taxonomy used in the present study was based on the existing taxonomies proposed by Olshtain and Cohen (1983), Trosborg (1987), and Ogiermann (2009).

The following eight apology strategies were employed in the analysis of the data:

1. Expression of apology
2. Acknowledgement of responsibility
3. Admission of facts
4. Justification
5. Excuse
6. Offer of repair
7. Expressing concern for hearer
8. Promise of forbearance

1. **Expression of apology** is a strategy which appears in Olshtain and Cohen’s speech act set (1983), as well as in Trosborg (1987). In the CCSARP it was labelled as Illocutionary Force Indicating Device (IFID), the term first introduced by Searle (1969). The strategy encompasses several semantic formulas, which belong to the group of direct apology strategies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Serbian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of regret</td>
<td>Žao mi je.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of apology</td>
<td>Izvinjavam se./Izvini-te.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for forgiveness</td>
<td>Izvini-te.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oprosti-te.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgive me.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pardon me.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Expression of apology categories and their realizations in English and Serbian

2. **Acknowledgement of responsibility** is a strategy used by Olshtain and Cohen (1983) and by Trosborg (1987). The subformulas distinguished in the present study are presented in Table 3 together with examples in English and Serbian.
Table 3 Acknowledgement of responsibility subformulas

3. **Admission of facts** is a strategy taken over from Ogiermann (2009). This category could be placed in a middle position on the responsibility scale, and Ogiermann (2009: 142) argues that by stating facts “the speaker distances him- or herself from the offence in the attempt to save face”. This type of strategy often occurs in situations where the speaker needs to inform the hearer about the offence, and it is most often combined with some other apology strategy. Here is an example from the questionnaire in English (E) and Serbian (S):

   (23) Your fish died. (E)
   Neke ribice su uginule. (S)

4. **Justification** is a strategy by which the speaker admits some responsibility but he/she provides arguments trying to justify the offensive behaviour.

   (24) I was really busy. (E)
   Imao sam obaveze. (S)

5. **Excuse** occurs when the speaker does not deny responsibility but names external factors as responsible for the offence. This way the speaker tries to free him/herself from responsibility for the infraction.

   (25) I was distracted. (E)
   (26) Bila sam na službenom putu. (S)
   (I was on a business trip.)
6. **Offer of repair** is a strategy used by Olshtain and Cohen (1983) and by Trosborg (1987). It is employed when the apologizer is willing to repair the damage which resulted from the infringement:

   (27) I’ll pay for the damage. (E)
   Platiću štetu. (S)

7. **Expressing concern for hearer** is a category proposed by Trosborg (1987), and it relates to the consequences of the apologizer’s infraction. By expressing his/her concern for the hearer, the apologizer acknowledges his/her responsibility:

   (28) I hope you are ok. (E)
   Nadam se da ste dobro. (S)

8. **Promise of forbearance** is a strategy which the speaker uses after the offence to express his/her promise that the offence will not be repeated.

   (29) It won’t happen again. (E)
   Neće se ponoviti. (S)

Apart from these eight apology strategies, the category of opting out will be considered as the speaker’s choice to avoid responsibility in offensive situations. The category will include denial of responsibility and blaming the hearer for the offence:

   (30) It wasn’t me. (E)
   (31) Ne znam ništa o tome. (S)
   (I know nothing about it.)

Apology modifiers used in the responses will also be analysed in this study. They will be classified according to the propositions made by Olshtain and Cohen (1983) and Trosborg (1994) (see section 7.4.3).

**8.5 Apology data analysis by situation**

This chapter analyses apology strategies employed by the respondents across situations and language groups. Each of the situations will be considered separately. The analysis will include examples from all three language groups. All the responses
in the questionnaires were assigned identification codes specifying the language group (E standing for native English; S standing for Serbian; SLE standing for Serbian learner of English), the number of situation and questionnaire, for example: (SLE-5/11) = Serbian learner of English, situation 5, questionnaire 11. Serbian examples will be translated into English, and the translation will be kept as close to the original as possible.

8.5.1 Situation 1 (dead fish)

The figures in Table 4 illustrate the distribution of all apology strategies across language groups in situation 1 (dead fish). It shows that direct expressions of apology are the most frequent form employed by all three groups of speakers.

Table 4 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation 1</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>SLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admit facts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excuse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbearance</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total no. of strategies</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opt out</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NE = native English; NS = native Serbian; SLE = Serbian learners of English

Table 5 illustrates the occurrences of all direct apology strategies in situation 1. As can be seen, 100% of all direct apology strategies performed by native English speakers are made up of the expression of regret. Similarly, 91% of direct apology strategies used by Serbian learners of English forms the direct strategy (I’m) sorry. However, of all direct apology realizations in Serbian, offer of apology exhibits the highest frequency, which is 72%, whereas the expression of regret makes up 22%.

At this point it has to be mentioned that the extent to which the expression of regret functions as an apology varies across languages and cultures. Ogiermann (2009: 107) argues that although I’m sorry is the most frequent apology strategy in English,
“it does not entail responsibility acceptance as it does not link the object of regret with the speaker”. Moreover, it can be used as an expression of sympathy, or even denial of responsibility. However, this strategy is largely accepted as an expression of apology in English, and this data exhibit its almost exclusive use by native English speakers. Serbian learners of English also show a strong preference for the same form of the strategy. However, in Serbian, the most favoured form is an offer of apology, while the expression of regret is much less frequent.

Table 5 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>SLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of regret</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of apology</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for forgiveness</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second most frequently used strategy among the Americans in situation 1 is justification with 14 occurrences, but it was also popular with the other two groups of respondents. The main argument was the lack of time, which was also suggested in the description of the situation.

(32) ... My schedule was crazy and I didn't have the time to come feed your fish. ... (E-1/1)
(33) ... stvarno nisam imala vremena da dolazim stalno. ... (S-1/6)
(... I really didn’t have time to come that often. ...)
(34) ... I forgot to give food to the fish only once. I'm sorry. (SLE-1/3)

Responses made by Serbian learners of English include the highest number of accounts acknowledging responsibility. It occurred 16 times, whereas in native English and Serbian responses it appeared only 7 and 6 times respectively. While the Americans mainly expressed their lack of intent, Serbian learners of English referred to their irresponsibility and neglect:

(35) I'm really sorry, but... I think I might have accidentally killed your fish. (E-1/10)
(36) Očigledno sam uprskao stvar, oprosti mi! (S-1/4)
(I obviously messed up, forgive me!)
(37) ... I know I was irresponsible, I am so sorry. (SLE-1/18)
The frequency of excuses was extremely low in native English and Serbian responses, and they usually pointed to external factors as responsible for the damage (38). Non-native English responses contained a lot of excuses usually taking the form of suggestions why the fish are themselves responsible for what happened to them (39), (40).

(38) I’m really sorry but I was held at work and I wasn’t able to feed the fish on time. ... (E-1/11)
(39) ... Maybe some of them were already sick. ... (SLE-1/12)
(40) Well...maybe they died of old age. (SLE-1/20)

An offer of repair is a strategy with a relatively high percentage of occurrences in all three groups’ responses. However, while native speaker groups usually offered to buy new fish, non-native English speakers admitted they had bought new fish and replaced the dead ones (41). This strategy was mostly combined with the expression of apology, but there are instances where a respondent actually denied responsibility but still offered to repair the damage (42).

(41) ... some of your fish are dead because of my neglect. In the meantime I filled in the tank with new fish. ... (SLE-1/10)
(42) ... some of your fish, namely Fifi and Princess Tangerine, died of natural causes, but don’t worry! I replaced them. (E-1/17)

Opting out was a category which appeared 4 times in Serbian responses, whereas the Americans provided 2 instances, and Serbian speakers of English only one instance.

(43) Pojma nemam. hranila sam ih skoro svaki dan, ne znam kako su mogle da uginu. (S-1/2)
(I have no idea, I fed them almost every day, I don’t know how they could die.)
(44) I have no idea, I swear they were alive last time I was here. (SLE-1/8)

The admission of facts was used by all three groups with similar frequencies. The strategy was often employed in combination with the denial of responsibility on the part of the native speakers. Examples (45) and (46) contain the expression of regret, but its function here is to distance the speaker from the damage. In non-native responses the admission of facts was combined with the acceptance of responsibility in all 3 occurrences (47).
(45) I'm sorry to report that when I went to feed the fish on Tuesday, the yellow one seemed to have died. I'm sorry for your loss. (E-1/14)

(46) ... mnogo mi je ţao, neke ribice su uginule, ne znam zašto. (S-1/1)
(...) I'm very sorry, some fish died, I don't know why.)

(47) I am terribly sorry but it seems that some of the fish have died. I might have forgotten to come for a few days, I just haven't had time. I am so sorry. (SLE-1/5)

Although speakers in all three groups used very similar strategies in their accounts, some interesting observations could be made. When producing justifications, the group responding in Serbian adhered closely to the information provided in the description of the situation. They seem to regard lack of time as a good justification form, whereas native English and non-native English speakers employed other forms such as forgetting or incompetence. It appears that the informants responding in Serbian were more interested in producing face-saving accounts than the informants in the other two groups.

8.5.2 Situation 2 (professor’s book)

In situation 2 (professor’s book), which is based on medium social distance and high social power, the total number of strategies employed by native English speakers is noticeably higher than the number of strategies used by Serbian learners of English.

Table 6 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION 2</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>SERBIAN</th>
<th>SL ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admit facts</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excuse</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbearance</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total no. of strategies</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opt out</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As presented by the figures in Table 6, direct apology strategies were almost equally used in native English and native Serbian responses. Table 7 shows that the expression of regret was again dominant in the responses made by native English speakers, while the responses made in Serbian mostly contained an offer of apology. Unlike in situation 1 (dead fish), where Serbian learners of English employed the equal number of the expression of regret as native English speakers, in situation 2 they used it less frequently. Instead, they used more offers of apology.

Table 7 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>SLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of regret</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of apology</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for forgiveness</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An interesting observation could be made as regards justification strategy. It was used only 2 times by native English speakers, as opposed to 8 occurrences in responses made in Serbian. Serbian learners of English used the strategy 6 times, and the nature of those responses resembled a lot the ones made in Serbian. Justifications contained two types of arguments, the first of which referred to the speakers’ claim that they still needed the book (48), (49), (50). This kind of a response was usually accompanied by a request on the part of the speaker asking permission to keep the book longer (48), (49).

(48) ... I would like to keep it for a few more days so I will have the time to re-read some chapters and make some photocopies. That is the reason why I didn’t brought it now. ... May I keep it for a few more days? (SLE-2/3)

(49) I’m so sorry, but if you could be so kind to let me keep your book for the next few days because I have found some great insights on my topic in it? (SLE-2/12)

(50) ... Moram neke stvari još da kopiram. … (S-2/8)

(… I must copy some things. …)

The other form of justification included the argument that the speaker had forgotten the book at home (51), (52). Even though this way the speakers wanted to lessen the degree of offence and save their face, this argument, just as the previous one, is a lie. As the description of the situation states, the speaker has looked for the book and has not found it.
(51) Sorry, can I get it back to you another time? I forgot to bring it with me.  
(E-2/2)

(52) Izvinite što nisam donela knjigu, zaboravila sam je. ... (S-2/15)  
(I apologize for not having brought the book, I forgot it. ...)

The most face-threatening strategy used in situation 2 is the admission of facts, i.e. the speaker's confession that the book may be lost. The group that showed most preference for this type of strategy was the American. Of all strategies they used, the admission of facts made up 33.3%, as opposed to 23% of responses in Serbian, and 31.4% of responses made by Serbian learners of English.

(53) I think I've misplaced it somewhere, I'm really sorry. I'll have another look for it today. ... (E-2/16)

(54) I really have to apologize, but I cannot find the book that you have lent me. ... (SLE-2/13)

As examples (53) and (54) illustrate, this strategy was often used in combination with a direct apology strategy. However, there were instances when it was combined only with an offer of repair (55). This strategy was also very frequent in American responses, appearing 15 times, whereas in accounts made in Serbian it occurred only 7 times. Non-native English responses contained 6 instances of an offer of repair. But according to the responses, all speakers showed significant optimism as regards finding and returning the book (56). This fact displays a strong tendency for face-saving and maintaining harmony with the person of higher social power.

(55) I cannot find the book. May I replace it with another copy? (SLE-2/16)

(56) It’s somewhere in my house, I’ll have it by tomorrow! Sorry. (E-2/20)

Denials of responsibility were not found in the data, which only suggests that the speakers are aware of the face-threat underlying the offence and its possible consequences. When they chose to conceal the true nature of the offence, they attempted to minimize the severity of the offence by providing face-saving strategies reflected in their invented arguments.

8.5.3 Situation 3 (heavy door)

In situation 3 (heavy door) the total number of strategies used differs significantly between the American group and the two groups of Serbian speakers. The
Americans provided only 39 apology strategies, whereas the group responding in Serbian used 54 strategies, 5 fewer than the group of non-native speakers of English. Next to direct apology strategies, justification and concern were the two most frequently used strategies.

Table 8 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION 3</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>SERBIAN</th>
<th>SL ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admit facts</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excuse</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbearance</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total no. of strategies</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 illustrates frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 3. It shows that the expression of regret was again the most preferred strategy among native and non-native English speakers. The informants responding in Serbian employed 18 offers of apology and 3 requests for forgiveness, (57), which were not present in native English responses. Non-native English responses contained only one occurrence of this strategy. Combinations of direct apology strategies were frequent in responses made by both groups of Serbian speakers, as illustrated in example (58).

(57) ... oprostite, molim Vas, oprostite! Jeste li povređeni? (S-3/8)
(... forgive me, please, forgive me. Are you hurt?)

(58) ... sorry miss I really didn’t notice you were walking behind. Please accept my apology. (SLE-3/10)

Table 9 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>SLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of regret</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of apology</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for forgiveness</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The expression of concern was the second most frequently employed indirect strategy, and it was almost equally used by all three groups of speakers:

(59) Sorry. Are you okay? (E-3/6)
(60) I am so sorry madam. Are you ok? Let me take your bags to the station, please. (SLE-3/18)

As regards justifications, they were used in Serbian responses twice as often as in native English responses. Serbian learners of English produced a similar number of justifications to the other Serbian group.

(61) ... Stvarno mi je žao, nisam vas primetio. ... (S-3/19)
(I’m really sorry, I didn’t notice you. ...)

While most justifications offered by Serbian speakers referred to not having noticed the offended, the American informants offered another type of argument:

(62) I’m so sorry! It slipped out of my hands! (E-3/5)

Both groups of Serbian speakers provided a relatively high number of strategies expressing the lack of intent, as opposed to only one instance found in the American data:

(63) Zaista nije bilo namerno! ... (S-3/7)
(It really wasn’t on purpose! ...)
(64) How stupid of me! I’m so very sorry ... (SLE-3/8)

Another interesting difference which could be found in the data is the frequency of the repair strategy, which was absent from native English responses but was employed by the other two groups of speakers.

(65) ... Dajte da vam pomognem oko namirnica. (S-3/16)
(... Let me help you with the groceries.)
(66) ... here...let me help you...is there anything I can do for you? (SLE-3/19)

It can be noticed from the data in situation 3 that the responses offered by the group of American informants were rather brief. The other two groups of speakers provided responses using a lot larger number of strategies, which shows that they are more ready to communicate with strangers.
8.5.4 Situation 4 (DVDs)

Situation 4 (DVDs) is based on low social distance and equal social power, and it presents a scenario in which the offender causes damage by failing to keep a promise. As in situation 1 (dead fish), the hearer is not present when the damage takes place, so this may be the reason for the speaker to produce a higher number of apology strategies, trying to explain the events preceding the offence.

Table 10 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation 4</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Serbian</th>
<th>SL English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admit facts</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excuse</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbearance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total no. of strategies 53 54 50

The three groups of informants employed similar number of apology strategies. Table 11 illustrates the frequencies of direct apology categories produced by the speakers, with the highest number of them found in the American data. The Americans employed 18 expressions of regret, as opposed to only 10 produced by Serbian learners of English. In native Serbian responses 12 offers of apology and 2 expressions of regret occurred.

Table 11 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Apology Strategies</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>SLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of regret</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of apology</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for forgiveness</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Direct apology strategies were usually combined with justifications and offers of repair, which present the two most frequently used strategies in native Serbian and
non-native English responses. The argument which was generally offered to explain the offence was “forgetting”, and it dominated in all three groups’ responses. It should be noted that this argument was given in the description of the situation.

(67) Sorry about that. I totally forgot ... (E-4/11)
(68) ... potpuno mi je to otišlo sa pameti! ... (S-4/17)
(...it completely slipped my mind!...)

While the Americans used exclusively “forgetting” as their justification, the two Serbian groups used it together with an additional justification in several instances:

(69) Totalno sam zaboravio. Svakakve obaveze sam imao tog dana. ...
(S-4/16)
(I totally forgot. I had all kinds of things to do that day. ... )
(70) I’m sorry, I totally forgot, I was very busy ... (SLE-4/20)

Acknowledgement of responsibility occurred in equal number in native English and Serbian responses, while in non-native English data it appeared fewer times. In most instances it consisted of the admission of guilt, and it was usually used in combination with offers of repair, (71), (72):

(71) Argh! My fault. I’ll pay the fine. (E-4/12)
(72) Oh no, I feel so guilty, I will pay the fees ... (SLE-4/14)

Serbian speakers expressed self-criticism in their responses, but this strategy was also used as justification in an attempt to place at least half of the blame on the hearer. Two such examples were found in responses offered by both groups of Serbian informants:

(73) Znala si da u mene ne možeš da imaš previše poverenja kada su te stvari u pitanju, tako da mislim da smo obe krive. ... (S-4/20)
(You knew you couldn’t have too much trust in me when it came to this kind of favours, so I think that we are both guilty. ...)
(74) Well, you know that I keep forgetting things, you shouldn’t have let me do that instead of you in the first place! (SLE-4/19)

On the whole, there is a high degree of agreement as regards the types of apology strategies used in situation 4. Some differences could be found in the frequency of their employment, which shows similarities between the two groups of Serbian informants.
8.5.5 Situation 5 (mistaking a stranger)

Situation 5 (mistaking a stranger) is based on high social distance and equal social power. The offence could be considered a light one, and not necessarily requiring long encounters. The present data illustrates a rather high frequency of direct apology strategies and also the restricted choice of indirect apology strategies. Table 12 shows that the total number of strategies used by the two groups of Serbian speakers is equal, whereas native English speakers provided fewer strategies.

Table 12 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION 5</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>SERBIAN</th>
<th>SL ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admit facts</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excuse</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbearance</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total no. of strategies</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13 reveals the distribution of direct apology categories in situation 5, which does not differ much from their distribution in the previous four situations. Native English and non-native English responses show the equal number of expressions of regret, while the informants responding in Serbian employed the similar number of offers of apology. A slightly more formal category, request for forgiveness, appeared only once in the American data, whereas in each of the Serbian groups it appeared twice. The form used in native English is ‘excuse me’, in Serbian it was ‘oprostite’ (‘forgive me’), and in non-native English the forms were ‘excuse me’ and ‘pardon me’.

Table 13 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>SLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of regret</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of apology</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for forgiveness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Justifications are the second most frequently used apology strategy in situation 5. The speakers largely adhered to the information provided in the description of the situation, as can be seen in the following examples:

(75) I’m sorry! I thought you were someone else! (E-5/15)
(76) ... izvini...! Mislio sam da si moj drug. (S-5/9)
     (... I apologize...! I thought you were my friend.)
(77) I’m sorry, I thought it was someone else! Sorry again! (SLE-5/17)

In the American data, there were also instances of elliptic expressions serving the function of justifications, such as:

(78) Wrong guy, sorry. (E-5/11)

Responses offered by native Serbian speakers and Serbian learners of English did not contain such instances.

Excuses have been defined as strategies which differ from justifications in that they provide external factors responsible for the offence. In situation 5, the external factor leading up to the offence was the resemblance between the offended and the speaker’s friend:

(79) ... Mnogo ličite na jednog mog prijatelja, pa sam hteo da se javim. (S-5/16)
     (... You really look like my friend, so I wanted to say ‘hi’).
(80) You remarkably look like my friend. (SLE-5/10)

The most interesting data in situation 5 is the frequency of excuses occurring in the responses. Whereas in the Serbian data there were 14 occurrences, 7 in each group, the American data contained no instances of this apology strategy. Additionally, Serbian informants tended to produce responses consisting of the combination of excuses and justifications as illustrated in examples (81) and (82). However, example (83) shows a response by a speaker who produced only an excuse combined with a direct expression of apology.

(81) ... ali sam bila ubeđena da si moj prijatelj, s leđa ste identični!! Izvini još jednom!! (S-5/11)
     (... but I was convinced that you were my friend, you look identical from behind!! I apologize again!!)
(82) I thought you were my friend. From the back you look the same. (SLE-5/5)

(83) Izvinite, mnogo ličite na mog prijatelja. Izvinite još jednom! (S-5/20)
(I apologize, you really look like my friend. I apologize again!)

All three groups of speakers used the strategy acknowledgment of responsibility, which could be found in the speakers’ feeling of embarrassment (84). In some instances this strategy was used alone, without being accompanied by a direct expression of apology, as in example (85).

(84) Oh, my God. This is so embarrassing. I thought you were somebody else. Pardon me! (SLE-5/19)

(85) Well. That was embarrassing. (E-5/17)

According to the length of their responses, it can again be stated that Serbian speakers were more ready to communicate with strangers than the Americans. The responses were also longer due to their employment of excuses, as opposed to the American speakers, who did not include that strategy in their responses.

As regards the function of excuses used in situation 5, it can be said that they serve as complements to justifications in order to make the non-intentionality of the offence more credible. When compared to situation 1 (dead fish), it is clear that the nature of excuses is not the same; they are used in situation 1 as an attempt to avoid responsibility, which cannot be said for excuses employed in situation 5.

8.5.6 Situation 6 (ticket inspector)

The offence described in situation 6 (ticket inspector) elicited the equal number of apology strategies from all three groups of speakers (see Table 14). Situation 6 also elicited the lowest number of strategies when compared to the other seven situations in the present DCT. As regards social variables, this scenario is based on high social distance and unequal social power (S<H).

As table 15 illustrates, the frequency of direct apology strategies in situation 6 is rather low. Native English speakers have produced 6 direct apology strategies in their responses, all of which are expressions of regret. Non-native English speakers have produced 4 direct apology strategies, 2 of which are offers of apology, and 2
are expressions of regret. Informants responding in Serbian have used only 3 direct apologies in their responses, and all of them are offers of apology.

Table 14 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION 6</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>SERBIAN</th>
<th>SL ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admit facts</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excuse</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbearance</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total no. of strategies</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opt out</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>SLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of regret</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of apology</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for forgiveness</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instances of verbal denial could be found in responses offered by the speakers of both Serbian groups. They pretended to have purchased the ticket:

(86) ... samo da je pronadem u torbi. (S-6/12)
    (... let me find it in my bag.)
(87) I’m trying to find it, it’s really difficult with big bag, so many things. I know
    that the ticket was here somewhere. (SLE-6/4)
(88) Just a second, I got it here, it is somewhere in my purse. (SLE-6/14)

Another strategy employed by these two groups of subjects, but avoided by the Americans, were excuses. Whereas the response in Serbian implies that the ticket has been purchased (89), the response in English contains the speaker’s admission of the lack of the ticket (90).

(89) Karta mi je ostala kod drugarice, a ona je otišla u wc. (S-6/15)
    (My friend has my ticket, and she has gone to the toilet.)
(90) ... the machine on the platform where I got in was broken. (SLE-6/9)
Admissions of fact were rather popular with the speakers, though slightly more with the Americans.

(91) I...don’t have it. (E-6/8)
(92) Madam, I do not have a ticket, neither some money to buy it. (SLE-6/2)

Offer of repair is a strategy with a relatively high number of occurrences in all three groups’ responses.

(93) ... Can I give you my name and address and pay as soon as I get some money? (E-6/9)
(94) I’ll call my friend to wait for me at the end stop and give me the money for the ticket? Is this ok with you? (SLE-6/15)

All respondents employed justifications frequently. They either claimed to have forgotten the ticket at home or lost it (95), or they adhered to the information in the description of the situation (96), (97):

(95) Oh no! I’m afraid I dropped it while I was rushing down the platform. (E-6/18)
(96) ... uletela sam u voz u poslednjem trenutku. (S-6/2)
(97) I didn’t have time to buy the ticket. ... (SLE-6/20)

Acknowledgement of responsibility occurred in responses offered in Serbian and non-native English. This strategy was found in long replies which consisted of several strategies combined, and it expressed how the speaker felt in the given situation.

(98) Zaista mi je neprijatno! ... (S-6/20)
(I feel really embarrassed! ...)
(99) ... How embarrassing! (SLE-6/5)

Although many speakers tried to avoid penalty by making up justifications and excuses, there were others who provided justifications consistent with the description of the situation. These justifications could be considered as the admission of truth. Therefore, the most face-threatening approach in this situation were responses combined of this type of justification and the admission of facts, as in example (100):

(100) I wasn’t on time at the station and I didn’t have time to buy one, otherwise I would’ve miss the train. (SLE-6/3)
8.5.7 Situation 7 (landlady)

Table 16 gives the total number of apology strategies in situation 7 (landlady). Serbian learners of English had the highest number of strategies – 57 against 54 for native English speakers and 51 for native Serbian speakers. As illustrated, all three groups mainly offered direct apologies, justified their behaviour and offered to repair the damage.

Table 16 Distribution of strategies across language groups in situation 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION 7</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>SERBIAN</th>
<th>SL ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admit facts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excuse</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbearance</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total no. of strategies</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opt out</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated in Table 17, the routine formula *I'm sorry* is again by far the most frequently used form by native and non-native speakers of English. Native English speakers employed the expression of regret to the exclusion of other strategies, while in responses offered by Serbian learners of English offer of apology and request for forgiveness occurred once. Native Serbian speakers used offer of apology most of the time.

Table 17 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>SLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of regret</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of apology</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for forgiveness</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Situation 7 elicited a few instances of the category of opting out. Speakers tried to deny responsibility by shifting the blame to someone else, or pretending to know nothing about it:
(101) Oh wow... Are you sure that was us? ... (E-7/3)
(102) Strašno! Ko zna ko sve dolazi ovde. ... (S-7/10)
   (That's terrible! Who knows what kind of people come here. ...)

The two Serbian groups accepted the blame for loud music, but denied responsibility for the dirty staircase:

(102) ... Prljavo stepenište može biti zbog svakoga! (S-7/19)
   (... Anyone could be responsible for the dirty staircase!)
(103) ... concerning the dirty staircase, I don't think any of my guests is responsible for that. (SLE-7/11)

Admission of facts appeared five times in both Serbian groups' responses, whereas the Americans used it only twice:

(104) ... bila je žurka pa smo bili malo glasniji. ... (S-7/2)
   (... I had a party, and we were a bit louder. ... )
(105) Yes, I know that my guests were very loud ... (SLE-7/2)

Realization of justifications was most frequent in non-native English responses. It occurred 10 times, as opposed to 7 in Serbian responses and only 4 in native English. The arguments mostly consisted in naming an occasion for the party (106), (107), or in claiming the non-awareness (108):

(106) ... bio mi je rođendan, pa smo slavili. ... (S-7/12)
   (... it was my birthday, so we celebrated. ...)
(107) ... But you see, it was my birthday party. ... (SLE-7/12)
(108) If I'd known it was bothering you, I'd have gotten them to be quiet.
   (E-7/5)

Informants in both Serbian groups were more ready to acknowledge responsibility than the American subjects. The reason for avoiding that strategy may be the face-threat inherent in its realization.

(109) ... u pravu ste, stepenište je zaista prljavo. ... (S-7/5)
   (... you are right, the staircase is really dirty. ...)
(110) You are right, the party was a bit louder than it should have been. ... (SLE-7/15)

Offer of repair is the second most frequently used strategy, after the direct expression of apology. It occurred in 18 American responses out of 20 observed. The
two Serbian groups of respondents employed a slightly lower number of repairs – 15 offered in English and 14 in Serbian.

Situation 7 elicited the highest number of promises of forbearance. In the American data this strategy occurred 10 times, whereas in responses offered in Serbian it was found only 4 times. Serbian learners of English employed the strategy twice as often as compared to the other Serbian group of speakers.

(111) ... I’ll clean the staircase immediately, and I won’t give you any more reason to complain about the noise. (E-7/6)
(112) I’m really sorry, but it won’t happen again. I’ll take care of the stairs and try not to be that loud any more. (SLE-7/13)

8.5.8 Situation 8 (security guard)

The distribution of apology strategies in situation 8 (security guard) shows strong agreement among all three groups of speakers. The majority of respondents used a combination of strategies, which resulted in a rather high number of strategies employed in this situation, as illustrated in Table 18.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION 8</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>SERBIAN</th>
<th>SL ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apology</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admit facts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excuse</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbearance</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total no. of strategies</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opt out</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lowest frequency of direct apologies was found in the American data. The American speakers used the expression of regret with no exceptions, whereas the informants responding in Serbian exclusively used offers of apology. Non-native English speakers employed the same category as the Americans with one exception being a request for forgiveness.
Table 19 Frequencies of direct apology strategies in situation 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT APOLOGY STRATEGIES</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>NS</th>
<th>NNE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expression of regret</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer of apology</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for forgiveness</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most frequently used indirect apology strategy in situation 8 was justification. The arguments used by the respondents derived mostly from the description of the situation. The informants claimed that they were engaged in a conversation, didn’t realize and forgot. Native and non-native speakers produced very similar arguments (113), (114).

(113) I’m so sorry, I didn’t even realize I still had it in my hand. ... (E-8/7)

(114) I’m really sorry, but I left the shop without noticing that I have the CD in my hand. ... (SLE-8/13)

(115) Izvinjavam se! Zapričala sam se s prijateljicom ... (S-8/8)
     (I apologize! I was chatting away with a friend ...)

One more way the speakers attempted to justify their behaviour and emphasize lack of intent was providing logical proof. These examples were found in non-native English data:

(116) Sorry sir, I was so caught up in a conversation with my friend that I completely forgot I was holding the CD in my hands, you can’t possibly think I wanted to steal it, I would’ve at the very least put it in my bag. (SLE-8/8)

(117) I’ve completely forgotten that I haven’t paid for the CD...come on do you really believe that I’m so stupid to do such a thing when I’m aware that the alarm would go off! (SLE-8/19)

Excuses occurred 6 times in native English responses and only once in non-native English data, while in the responses in Serbian this strategy was avoided.

(118) ... I honestly wasn't going to take it, I don't shoplift. Sorry again, I was too distracted. (E-8/20)

(119) ... It was accidentally, I was distracted, sorry! (SLE-8/14)

Acknowledgement of responsibility in the form of explicit acceptance of guilt was mostly avoided in situation 8. The expressions containing the high degree of face-threat which were used in responses were lack of intent and expressions of embarrassment.
In situation 8, the use of only one category such as lack of intent or self-criticism may appear insufficient as an attempt to justify the nature of event. For this reason many speakers used a combination of several apology strategies:

(123) It is me, isn’t it? I’m so sorry, I forgot I was still holding it. I did mean to buy it and then I was distracted. Please, may I go and pay now? (E-8/12)

(124) I completely forgot I was holding a CD in my hand. I didn’t mean to go without paying, please forgive me. I will pay for it instantly! (SLE-8/16)

Situations such as 8 (security guard) and 6 (ticket inspector) involve offences which may lead to far-reaching consequences for the offender. Therefore, the choice of employed strategies depends very much on the speaker's awareness of the severity of his/her offence.

### 8.6 Apology modifiers

Direct apologies are speech acts which are often considered to be routinised formulas (Ogiermann 2009: 121). Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between a ritual and a sincere apology. In cases when a speaker believes that his/her direct apology strategy might not seem sincere enough, he/she may decide to use modifiers in order to intensify the apology.

In the present study, the frequencies of native and non-native English internal intensifiers are comparable. They amount to 60 in native English responses and 66 in non-native English responses. Native Serbian responses include only 29 internal intensifiers.

The most frequently used adverbial intensifiers in the American data were so and really. The intensifier terribly appeared only twice. Since the American informants used the expression of regret almost exclusively, they combined the three adverbs with this strategy.
Native Serbian speakers intensified the offer of apology *izvini-te* mostly with *molim te/molim Vas* (*please, lit. I beg*). The same form of intensifier co-occurred with the request for forgiveness *oprosti-te*. The expression of regret was used with several adverbial intensifiers: *stvarno* (*really*), *mnogo* (*very much*), *zaista* (*really*).

The most popular adverbial intensifier among Serbian learners of English was the adverb *so*, followed by *really*, *very*, *terribly* and *truly*. All of them co-occurred with the expression of regret. There were also several instances of a combination of adverbs such as *so terribly*, *really truly*, *so very*, which were not present in the American data. The requests for forgiveness *excuse me* and *forgive me* were usually accompanied by the intensifier *please* which also appeared together with the offer of apology (125):

(125) Please accept my apology for the inconvenience. ... (SLE-1/10)

Serbian learners of English often repeated the expression of regret combining it with *(once) again* (126):

(126) I’m sorry, I thought it was someone else! Sorry again! (SLE-5/17)

As regards external modifiers, the most frequent form were exclamations. They were employed by all three groups of speakers, amounting to 52 instances in native English responses, 48 in non-native Serbian responses, and 46 in native Serbian responses. American informants used the following forms: *oh, oh no, oh whoops, oops, oh my god, shit, ugh no, ups*. Responses in Serbian contained the following exclamations: *jao, joj, o, u, uf, uh, ups*. Serbian learners of English employed expressions very similar to those used by the American respondents: *oh, oh dear Lord, oh my God, oh no, goodness, oh shit, oops, ups*. These exclamations were mostly used in situation 3 (heavy door), situation 5 (mistaking a stranger) and situation 8 (security guard) in all three data.

Even though exclamations can be regarded culture-specific, their frequencies in all three groups are rather comparable.
8.7 Discussion

When performing an apology, second language learners have to be able to first recognize a situation which calls for an apology, to take into account variables such as social distance and social power, and to select the appropriate strategy.

The findings of the present study show that there are not many differences between native English speakers and Serbian learners of English with regard to the direct apology strategies. This result could be expected given the non-natives’ generally advanced level of English.

The only significant difference could be noticed in situation 4 (DVDs) where the Americans employed 18 direct apologies as opposed to 10 occurrences in non-native responses. The number of direct apology strategies in native Serbian responses was also lower than in native English responses. As situation 4 is based on low social distance and equal social power it may be the case that the two Serbian groups of speakers did not consider it as important to apologize to a friend as much as the Americans did. Another assumption could be that the Americans perceived the offence more severe than the Serbian speakers.

As regards direct apology categories, it has already been mentioned that the expression of regret was the preferred direct form by the Americans and Serbian learners of English, whereas in Serbian responses the most frequent form was the offer of apology (see section 8.5.1). It is clear from this that the concept of apologizing in these two languages is culture-specific. However, although Serbian learners of English mostly employed the expression of regret, they were not so exclusive in their choice of direct strategies as the American speakers. Specifically, in situation 3 (heavy door) and situation 5 (mistaking a stranger) the responses made by Serbian learners of English included several instances of offer of apology and request for forgiveness, which could also be found in native Serbian responses, whereas the American informants adhered to the expression of regret. Additionally, requests for forgiveness were very rarely used by both groups of Serbian informants in situations based on low social distance. These facts imply that this category is considered more formal than other explicit apology categories in Serbian culture. Using requests for forgiveness in situations where the Americans did not use them, Serbian learners of English may have provided instances of socio-cultural transfer from their L1 to their L2.
Ogiermann (2009: 126) argues that the request for forgiveness and the expression of regret vary greatly in the degree to which they are face-threatening. While the former threatens hearer’s negative face involving him/her in the process of forgiving, the latter implies a lower degree of imposition for both the speaker and the hearer and is considered a less direct category. It cannot be claimed with certainty to what extent speakers are aware of the semantic implications of the explicit apology strategies which they use. However, considering the relatively high frequency of intensifiers combined with the expression of regret in both native and non-native English responses, speakers of English seem to be aware that the expression of regret can be considered a relatively weak and routinised formula. In contrast, the much lower degree of intensification in Serbian responses may be related to the higher degree of imposition on the speaker and the hearer implicit in the offer of apology, which was the most frequent category in the native Serbian data.

The results show that overall Serbian native speakers resorted to justifications more often than the Americans. The language learner data reveal that the frequency of this strategy is more similar to the native Serbian data than to the native English data in all situations. As regards the excuse strategy, the data show similar results. Significant differences were found in situation 5 (mistaking a stranger) where both native Serbian speakers and Serbian learners of English felt bound to offer excuses to the offended, producing an equal number of this strategy, as opposed to the Americans, whose responses did not include excuses at all. Situation 8 (security guard) elicited excuses in the American data, whereas in responses offered by both groups of Serbian informants this strategy was not present. Therefore, as regards excuses and justifications, it seems that Serbian learners of English adhered to their native socio-cultural norms when employing these strategies.

An interesting observation could be made with regard to the length of responses. Especially in situations where the offender apologized to a stranger (situation 3 and situation 5) the responses made by both Serbian native speakers and Serbian learners of English were considerably longer than the responses offered by the American group of informants. In scenario 3 (heavy door) the data show that both groups of Serbian informants provided significantly more apology strategies than native American speakers. They felt the necessity to justify their behaviour much more, acknowledged responsibility more often, and offered to repair the damage unlike the native English group of speakers. While Serbian respondents recognized
the need to name numerous mitigating circumstances, American informants offered an absolute minimum of information necessary in the given situation, which would probably be considered as insufficient from the point of view of the Serbian speakers. The use of positive politeness strategies (offer of repair, concern for hearer, and promise of forbearance) showed little difference between native and non-native speakers. The only noticeable difference was found in situation 2 (professor’s book) where an offer of repair was employed twice as often by native speakers of English as compared to non-native speakers, as well as the Serbian native speakers. It may be the case that the Serbian groups of informants regarded the infraction less severe than the American group, which then resulted in lower number of repair strategy supplied by the two Serbian groups. This could be another instance of learners’ adhering to their native socio-cultural norms.

Finally, the results indicate that Serbian learners of English conformed to English native speaker norms as regards apology modifiers. They produced an almost equal number of intensifiers as the Americans, and a significantly lower number than Serbian native speakers.
Conclusion

The present study has investigated apology, a speech act which involves politeness to a significant extent. Its purpose was to obtain a description of how apologies are realized by Serbian learners of English, and to understand the nature and extent of possible gaps between native and non-native English apologies. The results show that, for the most part, the non-natives used the same semantic formulas as native English speakers. However, some instances could be found where the non-natives did not use all the expected formulas. According to the data, the cases where non-native speaker performance deviated from the native speaker norms occurred mainly as a result of the influence of the learners’ native language patterns. The findings, therefore, suggest that the linguistic choices made by Serbian learners of English are to some degree dependent of their cultural background.

Lack of pragmatic competence, as well as negative pragmatic transfer, has been considered the primary source of miscommunication in interactions. Different cultures have different sets of linguistic and social rules and norms, and if a speaker does not possess the necessary knowledge of them, he/she may not be able to express him/herself appropriately, and may misinterpret the intended pragmatic force of an utterance. In order to avoid unpleasant situations and unintended rude behaviour, many linguists argue that it is important to raise pragmatic awareness of students. Thomas (1983: 32) believes that the language teacher has the responsibility to point out to possible consequences of certain linguistic behaviour. Moreover, she stresses the importance of making foreign language speakers able to express themselves in the way they want to, and that is why pragmatic competence is such a significant factor in intercultural communication.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Questionnaire in English

Instructions:

Imagine yourself in the situations described below and assume that in each instance you will say something. Write down what you would say in the space provided. Try to react as spontaneously as possible and put your answer in direct speech.

1. When going on holiday your friend gave you his flat keys and asked you to feed his fish. You have not always had the time and some of the fish have died. When you return the keys your friend asks what happened.

2. Your friend had asked you to return some video tapes to her. You totally forgot and she has just received a call from the video shop, saying that the films are required by another customer and she owes a week’s fees.

3. You see a friend of yours in the crowd, run up to him and hit him on the back. Only then you realize that it’s not your friend, but a complete stranger.

4. When leaving a crowded shop you let go a heavy door and it hits a woman behind you.

5. You have borrowed a book from a professor. Now you are supposed to give it back to him, but you cannot remember where you put it.

6. You had a party at your flat. The next day you meet the landlady, who lives in the same house. She complains about the noise and the dirty staircase.

7. You are at a shopping centre and having an interesting conversation with your friend. You are so engaged in it that you don’t realize that you are holding a CD in your hand that you were going to buy. You leave the shop and the alarm goes off. A security guy comes up to you.

8. You are just in time to catch your train and have neither a ticket nor money with you. You have just taken a seat when the ticket inspector enters the compartment. She asks you for your ticket.

Distractors:

a. You got ill and cannot attend an important lecture. You ring up a fellow student to ask if you can copy his notes.

b. You have lent a book to a friend of yours and she returns it in a bad condition.
Appendix B: Questionnaire in Serbian


1. Kada je krenuo na odmor prijatelj ti je dao svoje ključeve od stana i zamolio te da hraniš njegove ribice. Ti nisi baš uvek imao/la vremena pa su neke ribice uginule. Sada vraćaš ključeve i prijatelj te pita šta sta se desilo.

2. Prijateljica te je zamolila da vratiš neke diskove umesto nje. Ti si potpuno zaboravio/la na to i ona je upravo dobila poziv iz video kluba gde je obaveštačaju da kasni sa vraćanjem filmova i da će morati da plati prekoračenje.

3. Slučajno si spazio/la svog prijatelja u gužvi, dotrčao/la si do njega i udario/la ga po leđima. U tom trenutku shvataš da to nije tvoj prijatelj već neko nepoznat.

4. Izlaziš iz prodavnice prepune ljudi i iza sebe puštaš teška vrata koja slučajno udare ženu iza tebe.

5. Pozajmio/la si knjigu od profesora. Treba da je vratiš ali ne možeš da se setiš gde si je stavio/la.

6. Pravio/la si žurku u svom stanu. Sledećeg dana srećeš svoju gazdaricu koja živi u istoj kući i ona se žali na buku i prljavo stepenište.


8. Stižeš na voz tačno pred polazak ali nemaš ni kartu ni novac kod sebe. Tek što si zauzeo/la mesto, konduktorka ulazi u kupe. Traži da pokažeš svoju kartu.


b. Pozajmio/la si knjigu prijateljici i ona ti je vraća oštećenu.
Zusammenfassung


Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht den Sprechakt der Entschuldigung im Bezug auf die Phänomene der Höflichkeit und den pragmatischen Transfer. Ihr Zweck ist es zu beschreiben wie serbische Englischlernende sich auf Englisch entschuldigen und zu verstehen in wie fern sich diese Entschuldigungen von jenen englischer Muttersprachler unterscheiden. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, dass als direkte Entschuldigungsform der Ausdruck des Bedauerns die bevorzugte Art der Amerikaner und der serbischen Englischlernenden ist, während auf serbisch die
Curriculum vitae

Persönliche Daten

Name:          Sonja Stojanović
Geburtsort:    Niš, Serbien
Staatsbürgerschaft: Serbien

Ausbildung

Seit März 2005  Universität Wien
               Diplomstudium, Anglistik und Amerikanistik

2000-2004      Universität Niš, Serbien
               Englische Sprache und Literatur

1996-2000      Gymnasium „Stevan Sremac“, Niš, Serbien