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Betreuer: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Heinz Gärtner
To my parents

To Rachely

And to all those, who really have a sincere interest in improving Human Security on the African continent
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHS</td>
<td>Commission on Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy (now CSDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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I would like to thank especially my parents, who have been supporting me throughout my years of studies at the “Universität Wien” and the university “Sciences Po Paris”.

I also want to thank Professor Ingfrid Schütz-Müller and UN Assistant Secretary-General Thomas Stelzer for strengthening my academic dedication to issues of international relations.
1. Introduction

1.1 Central research questions and outline of the thesis

*Human Security* – two at first sight simple words, which nevertheless contain a deep political dimension.

It is those two words which we so often hear from politicians, diplomats and the media when it comes to the reason and justification of a military intervention. Words which are used together with common phrases like “protecting people” or the “security of people”.

But at the same time, and as this thesis will show, “Human Security” is more than just two words, it is a security concept. A concept which should be explained and taken as the basis for a critical analysis of the European Union’s military CSDP\(^1\) missions in the so-called “Democratic” Republic of Congo, which were taking place in 2003 and 2006.

Furthermore, the thesis will analyse if and in how far the Human Security concept is playing a role for the CSDP of the European Union, as well as present genuine European ideas and interpretations of the concept with regard to the EU’s international position as a worldwide security actor.

Of central interest to the thesis are thereby the following research questions:

First of all, what can be exactly understood under the term “Human Security”, or in other words, what is the Human Security concept and idea all about? In which important aspects is this approach differing from other security concepts?

Second, is the European Union with its CSDP paying attention to the approach of Human Security or is the concept instead of no particular relevance?

And third, was the goal of the two military CSDP missions in the DRC, called “Artemis” and “EUFOR RDC”, to deliver Human Security? Or more precisely, is there any sign of Human Security – as understood by the concept – in the missions’ mandates?

In addition it is of interest, what actual impact both missions had on the Human Security situation on the ground. Were they successfully contributing to and improving the Congolese people’s “Human Security”?

\(^1\) Common Security and Defence Policy.
Answers to all these raised questions should be given in the three corresponding parts of the thesis.

At the beginning chapter 2 discusses in detail the Human Security concept, its emergence as a new security approach, the various definitions of the concept and its characteristics, as well as in a final subchapter the most important criticism the Human Security paradigm is confronted with.

Chapter 3 then focuses on the European Union and the importance of Human Security with regard to its CSDP. Starting with a short overview of the CSDP itself, the chapter continues by analysing three significant European documents, namely the “European Security Strategy”\(^\text{2}\), the so-called “Human Security Doctrine for Europe”\(^\text{3}\), and the less known “Madrid Report”\(^\text{4}\), to end then in 3.4 with debating the already given Human Security dimensions of the CSDP, which is of course also of relevance for an appropriate understanding of the following mission analyses.

Chapter 4 takes a close look at the two military CSDP missions in the DRC with regard to their Human Security content, whereas the “Artemis” mission will be discussed in 4.1, and the “EUFOR RDC” mission in 4.2. Both subchapters involve a detailed analysis of the missions’ mandates, based on the definitions and parameters of Human Security from chapter 2 and 3.3, as well as a critical evaluation of the missions’ impact on Human Security on the ground.

1.2 Methodology

The topic of the thesis has been addressed through a qualitative analysis of various academic publications, journals, official UN and EU documents, reports, and further written sources, after a long, intensive period of research over several months.

First, the theoretical basis for the thesis, which is the concept of Human Security, was elaborated, followed second by its use for the practical analysis undertaken in chapter 4, as well as in certain parts of chapter 3.

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\(^{3}\) Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities (2004).

At this point it should be briefly mentioned that the decision to write about the chosen topic was the outcome of the author’s work experience made at the “OHCHR”\(^5\) and his strong interest and dedication to the issue of Africa-EU relations throughout his political studies at the “Universität Wien” and the university “Sciences Po Paris”.

\(^5\) (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
2. Human Security: A new security paradigm enters the international political arena

“The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy (…). It has been related more to nation-states than to people.”
(UNDP, 1994, p. 22)

In this chapter, the notion of Human Security, its emergence and possible definitions will be discussed. It is an overview of the political and academic debates surrounding this relatively new security approach.

At the core of interest are thereby two simple and at the same time complex and controversial questions: What is “Human Security”? And what is its difference to other traditional security concepts?

Starting with an analysis of the historical conditions under which the idea of Human Security did emerge, the chapter will take a closer look on the broad and narrow versions of Human Security. Depending on its definition as “freedom from want” together with “freedom from fear”, or only as “freedom from fear”, the Human Security concept can focus on different elements and threats. Nevertheless, as this chapter shows, all definitions share the same fundamental core ideas, distinguishing the Human Security approach clearly from traditional security concepts.

Defining Human Security means also clarifying its relation to Human Rights, which will be done in 2.2.4, since far too often it remains unclear what the real difference between those powerful ideas actually is.

Furthermore, the consequence of a Human Security approach for state sovereignty, especially with regard to military interventions, needs to be analysed. It is here, where the concept of Human Security, namely in its narrow version, is confronted with some of its harshest critics.

Taking into account those critical voices, a “threshold-based definition” (Owen, 2004, p. 15) of Human Security will be presented at the end of the chapter. A definition that tries to escape from the classical narrow-broad debate by offering an alternative way to conceptualize Human Security.

But before, our attention should be turned towards the emergence of the idea of Human Security in International Relations and its difference to former security concepts.
2.1 The emergence of a new security approach

“The traditional lexicon of sovereignty and statehood is inadequate when it comes to security in the twenty-first century.” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 13)

2.1.1 From the State to the Individual: Moving away from traditional security concepts

Since the Westphalian peace treaty in 1648, security has been commonly understood as the security of states (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 18). It was the Hobbesian state model that has been told to provide security for people. According to Hobbes, a state’s citizens should hand over “the monopoly of the legitimate means of use of physical force” to their country in exchange for their protection (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 18). In order to keep its population safe, the sovereign nation-state has to assure its own survival and security by defending itself against external military threats by other states (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 18). Hence, the security of people is about the security of the state, or in other words, “if the state is secure, then so too will those that live within it” (Owen, 2004, p. 16).

Although other influential philosophers like Immanuel Kant with his vision of a “global society” challenged the Realist Hobbesian view of security over time, the primary responsibility for the protection of people had always been put into “the hands of the state”, which therefore remained the referent object of security for a long time (Owen, 2004, p. 16). This held in particular true for the age of the Cold War, where the traditional state-centred view of security attained its peak (Owen, 2004, p. 16). For over forty years, the world and international relations were shaped by the ideological, military, economic and cultural competition between two superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. In this bipolar world, security was essentially about the territorial integrity of a state and its protection against external aggression through military means (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 1 + p. 72). Following Realism, the dominating school of thought during the Cold War, state security and therefore the security of a state’s citizens should be assured by a balance of power between states (Owen, 2004, p. 16). The possibility that individual security does not necessarily need to correspond with state security, or that some states could even constitute a serious threat to their own population was not taken into account (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 72).
With the Cold War ending, this traditional state-centered concept of security was losing credibility. People became aware that a military balance of power and secure states have not been an automatic guarantee for the security of citizens (Owen, 2004, p. 17). Too often the protection of people was “negated by an over-attention on the state” (Owen, 2004, p. 17). A certain “macro-level stability” during the East-West conflict, and the fear of a nuclear world war were long time hiding the fact that many citizens were indeed killed through diseases, poverty, hunger, violence, environmental catastrophes, and massive human rights abuses (Owen, 2004, p. 17). Furthermore, the end of the Cold War went hand in hand with far-reaching changes and shifts in international relations, putting into question a state-centered view of security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 11).

First of all, transnational non-state actors like private companies or non-governmental organizations were becoming more and more relevant and powerful actors on the international scene. Likewise the role of international organizations was also increasing compared to the Cold War era (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, pp. 11-12). Second, and even more important, new threats and insecurities were emerging in the post-Cold War world, confronting the security of states and individuals (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 12). While the danger of a global military confrontation between states decreased, the new globalized environment was characterized by intra-state and ethnic violence, forced displacement of people, terrorism, diseases such as HIV/Aids, extreme poverty and other non-military challenges (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 12). Beyond its opportunities, modern globalization, and with it the unrestricted movement of financial capital, have also born enormous risks. One just has to look at the Asian crisis in 1997 – or the current ongoing financial crisis – to understand the possible devastating human impact of economic and financial downturns (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 12).

Another striking feature of the post-Cold War world is the so-called “changing nature of conflicts” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 143). Not wars between states, but civil wars and violent confrontations within a state are nowadays the predominant form of armed conflicts (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 74 + p. 143). Some scholars like Mary Kaldor⁶

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(2007, p. 2) even use the term “new wars” to highlight the different character of these conflicts compared to the past.\footnote{The idea of “new wars” is also contested by a number of other scholars of international relations like Duffield and Waddell (2006, p. 6). Their critique as well as Mary Kaldor’s idea of “new wars” will be discussed later on in the thesis.}

The growing awareness of all these issues at the end of the Cold War led to a change in the perception of threats among policy makers and academics (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 12). Focusing mainly on the military defense of the territorial integrity of states and their interests, the traditional state-centered view of security had little to offer to address these new threats and insecurities (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 13). As Owen (2004, p. 23) remarks correctly, this failure gave space to alternative ways of conceptualizing security:

“[…] the end of the Cold War has provided room for a shift in security thinking. The majority of hardship and death in the world is not caused by inter-state war but rather by disease, poverty, natural disasters, civil conflict and small arms. As the primary threats have changed, so too must our security mechanisms.”

However, the most important deficit of traditional state-centered security was and is its blindness regarding insecurity that can pose a state to its own population (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 18). It is simply not taking into account that in today’s globalised world

“a large number of states […] are partly or completely failing to fulfill their social contract to protect people” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 18).

States can indeed become the very actors of insecurity threatening their own populations through repressive measures, massacres or genocide (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 18). According to Mack (2004, p. 366) many more people were killed through violence committed by their own states than by an external army over the last century.

By largely ignoring this problem as well as the above mentioned new security issues, the realist state-centered security concept failed at its most important objective: the protection of the individual (Owen, 2004, p. 17). This was the environment in which Human Security as a different security concept emerged.

For the first time promulgated in 1994 through the UNDP Human Development Report\footnote{The content of this report will be discussed closer in chapter 2.2.1.1.}, the Human Security concept has gained a striking importance in the post-Cold War era (Kaldor, 2007, p. 182; Duffield and Waddell, 2006, p. 2). In particular over the last decade the idea of Human Security has met a rising institutional interest. More and more government, academic
and practitioner networks, research initiatives, international commissions as well as official reports and publications have been focusing on elaborating the idea of Human Security (Duffield and Waddell, 2006, p. 2).

In clear contrast to traditional state-centred security, as Owen (2004, p. 17) points out, Human Security makes the individual and not the state to the central referent object of security. The state – as well as the community or other groups – is only playing a role as a “referent of security as long as the security ‘trickles down’ to people” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 13). This fundamental shift from a state-centred view of security to an individual-centred security is meant to move the focus of policies and research towards threats related to peoples’ lives (Owen, 2004, p. 17). In doing so, the Human Security concept involves far more than “just” putting the individual at the centre stage of security concerns (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 13). As Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 13) stress correctly, Human Security is changing

“the very status of the individual, who is no longer consubstantial to the state – an infinitesimal part of an organic whole – but an equal subject and actor in international relations.”

Human Security is thus dealing with “individuals qua persons” and not with “individuals qua citizens” (Graham and Poku, 2000, p. 17, cited in Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 13). Hence, within the Human Security approach, the individual has become a unit in himself or herself, being the key actor taken into consideration. His or her protection is the ultimate objective to which all security instruments and other actors, like the state, are subordinated (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 13).

Now Human Security does not only differ from traditional security concepts with regard to the crucial question of “security of whom”, as it can be seen in Figure 1 (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 13). It also offers a new answer to the question of “security from what” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 13). Unlike state-centered security, Human Security is well aware of the changing nature of conflict and recognizes the mentioned new security threats, which go beyond traditional and military security risks (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 14).

Depending on its definition, either in a broad or a more narrow way – as we will see later in chapter 2.2 –, Human Security focuses on different threats to the security of individuals. These can range from “personal security threats”, such as ethnic conflicts, “classical” wars, torture or sexual violence, to “socio-economic threats” including unemployment, hunger and poverty, over “political threats” like human rights abuses, up to “environmental
threats” with a devastating impact on people’s lives (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, pp. 14-15). Threats to Human Security thus can obviously encompass acts of direct as well as acts of indirect violence (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 14). The latter has also become known under the term “structural violence”, going back to the distinction made by Johann Galtung (1969, p. 171). He defines direct violence as a type of violence committed by a concrete, identifiable actor, whereas such an actor is missing within indirect or structural violence (Schnabel, 2008, p. 88). Following Galtung (1969, p. 171), indirect violence “is built into the structure [of human society] and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances”.

A (broad) Human Security approach is concerned with threats stemming from both types of violence, and highlighting their interdependence (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 14).

**Figure 1: Human Security compared to State-centred Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security referent (object)</th>
<th>Human-centred security</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In a Hobbesian world, the state is the primary provider of security; if the state is secure, then those who live within it are also secure.</td>
<td>Individuals are co-equal with the state. State security is the means, not the end.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security value</th>
<th>Human-centred security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty, power, territorial integrity, national independence.</td>
<td>Personal safety, well-being and individual freedom: 1 Physical safety and provision for basic needs; 2 Personal freedom (liberty of association); 3 Human rights: economic and social rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security threats</th>
<th>Human-centred security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct organized violence from other states, violence and coercion by other states and from non-state actors.</td>
<td>Direct violence: death, drugs, dehumanization, discrimination, international disputes, WMD, gendered violence. Indirect violence: deprivation, disease, natural disasters, underdevelopment, population displacement, environmental degradation, poverty, inequality, ethnic/sectarian oppression. Threats from identifiable sources (such as states or non-state actors) or from structural sources (relations of power ranging from family to the global economy).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks: 1. In the original table the word “state” is spelled wrong in the first row of the right column, it has been corrected in this table.
2. The term “WMD” stands for “Weapons of Mass Destruction”

Although Human Security as a genuine security concept was first really promoted in 1994 with the UNDP Human Development Report, it is important to be aware of the fact that its intellectual origins go back much further (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 85). As Krause

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9 A narrow Human Security definition is clearly focusing on threats from direct violence as will be shown in 2.2.2.
(2005, p. 1) states, Human Security has to be seen as the latest of many attempts to challenge the state-centered view of security. These attempts comprehend such concepts as *Common Security* and *Comprehensive Security*, dating back to the 1980s and even the 1970s, as well as the concept of *Collective Security* (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 73; see also Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 84).

All these three concepts have two characteristics in common with Human Security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 74). First, they include other than military threats as well and second, they also highlight the need and the positive role of multilateralism in facing and dealing with this enlarged number of threats (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 74). But the three approaches are at the same time different from Human Security in one crucial point. In contrast to Human Security, they focus “on the needs of security for the state – order and stability” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 74). On the contrary, within a Human Security approach, state security is clearly seen as a means of achieving security goals, and not as their end (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 74).

In being the most far-reaching attempt to challenge the state-centered view of security, Human Security is also part of a deepening and a broadening process regarding the idea of “security” (Owen, 2004, p. 17).

“Broadening” of security means nothing else than its expansion to non-military threats like spreading diseases, environmental disasters or overpopulation – as it has already been described above –, whereas “deepening” security implies taking into consideration not just states, but also other actors like individuals, non governmental organizations or financial markets (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 76; Owen, 2004, p. 17). By this broadening and deepening of the understanding of security, Human Security evidently questions traditional

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10 “Common Security” promotes the cooperation among states as the best way to avert conflicts (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 73). The concept became popular with the Brandt Commission’s Report in 1981 and the Palme Commission’s Report in 1982. The latter was urging for arms control in order to deescalate the ongoing East-West conflict (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 73 + 76).

11 The concept of “Comprehensive Security” is not limited to the military security dimension, but also takes into account the economic, the social, the political, the societal, the cultural and the environmental security dimension (Gärtner, 2008, p. 217, translated by the author from German into English). At the same time non-state actors are also taken into consideration, playing an important role (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 74). In the academic world the notion of “Comprehensive Security” has been elaborated in the middle of the 1990s by the so-called “Copenhagen School” and Barry Buzan (Gärtner, 2008, p. 217, translated by the author from German into English).

12 “Collective Security” can be defined as a system, within which all members commit to help one or more members, also by using military force, in the event of an attack or a threat coming from another or several other members (Gärtner, 2008, pp. 122-123, translated by the author from German into English). According to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 73), strategies of Collective Security are aimed at transferring power from states to international authorities, like the UN, in order to maintain peace between and within states.
state-centered security and with it also the Realist paradigm, in particular with respect to the concern of international security, which should now be discussed in the following chapter.

2.1.2 Human Security and International Security: A fundamental break with Realism

As we have seen already, the state-centred view of security is deeply linked to Realism. According to this school of thought, security is about the security of the state living in an anarchic world, where it can rely on no one but itself (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 80 + p. 18).

The rational state, which is seen as the only unitary actor in the international arena, must use diplomacy and military force to defend itself against external threats and to ensure thereby its survival (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 80). The aspiration of all states is to seek for a maximum of security “to be achieved by increasing military capabilities” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 80). Hence, international relations are characterized by a permanent rivalry and tensions between states (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 80). The key to keep the international system stable and secure lies in what Realists call a “balance of power”, which can be described as

> “a mechanism of selective intervention, where states engage in conflict to support the weaker of the belligerents to preserve the status quo and prevent any state from achieving hegemony” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 81).

In this realist vision international security turns out to be “a zero-sum game” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 81).

The Human Security approach now fundamentally breaks with the realist paradigm and its understanding of global security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 86). In contrast to Realism, Human Security is based on moral standards, or normative ethics regulating right and wrong behaviour in world politics (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 20.). It offers a different, a moral framework of international relations “advocating an ethical idea of how

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13 It is important to notice though that there exist different branches, or various “schools” of realism, such as classical realism, defensive realism, offensive realism or neo-realism (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 80). The reason therefore is that new scholars were trying to adapt over time the classical realist theory to observed changes in the world while maintaining and supporting its core ideas like the given anarchy in international relations (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, pp. 80-82). For a more detailed description of the different realist schools, take a look at the definitions by Gärtner (2008).

The first important shift is what has been already analysed above as making the individual and not the state the central referent object of security (Owen, 2004, p. 17). In contrast to national security, Human Security gives a moral priority to the safety and security of individuals, which implies that human sufferings can no longer be tolerated or ignored in the name of state sovereignty (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 21).

The second major shift concerns the role the individual plays regarding global security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 21). By considering the individual as the ultimate unit of all security considerations, Human Security also makes global security depending on the security of human beings (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 18). From a Human Security perspective a threat to the security of individuals is at the same time “a threat to international security” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 21). In this regard the concept emphasizes the possible spread of human security threats from one society and country to neighbouring regions and their negative global impact (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 16). As Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 17) point out,

“threats to human security are […] no longer just personal, local or national; they are global. Drugs, disease, terrorism, pollution, poverty and environmental problems respect no national borders. Their consequences travel the world […].”

In linking the security of individuals with international stability, Human Security transforms the status of people from that of ordinary state citizens into that of relevant actors in international relations (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 21 + 18). It is proposing the idea of a global human society above the states, which is conscious about the high degree of interdependence of all security issues and actors in today’s world politics (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 21).

Hence, following the Human Security approach, the actual key to international peace and security is not something like the above described realist “balance of power”, but rather increasing the safety of individuals, or in other words, “securing people is not just an ethical imperative; it is the best strategy to secure the state and the international system” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 21).
Consequently, proponents of (broad) Human Security now highlight the importance of preventive measures, the use of “soft power” instead of hard, military power, and long-term cooperation as means for the protection of the security of individuals and thereby also of international security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 85 + p. 21).

The third and last shift Human Security brings with it, is the promotion of universal instead of national values. It is the aspiration of the concept to achieve “a world, in which all human beings are ‘freed from want’ and ‘freed from fear’, a world where fundamental rights, dignity, the rule of law and good governance are respected” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 21).

In conclusion, one can state that Human Security constitutes a fundamental departure from the realist paradigm and its described assumptions about the international system (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 86). Figure 2 on the left side summarizes again the main differences between the two security approaches.

In representing a clear “ethical and methodological rupture with the existing conceptualization of state-based security”, Human Security can be seen as a new security paradigm entering international relations (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 20).

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**Figure 2: Human Security vs. Realism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions/Focus</th>
<th>Human Security</th>
<th>Realist approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State of the international system?</td>
<td>Insecurity from inequality, injustice, poverty, health and environmental hazards, denial of human rights and justice</td>
<td>Anarchy, competition, and self-help system Balance of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central referent of security?</td>
<td>Individual and communities</td>
<td>The state and its expressed national interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinants of security?</td>
<td>Economic, health, and food security, environmental, personal, community and political security</td>
<td>State and national security and military security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims/interests of the state?</td>
<td>To empower and protect its citizens</td>
<td>To ensure stability and maximum power States’ interests determined by material conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security through which means?</td>
<td>Prevention, protection, provision of human security, empowerment of people</td>
<td>Protection of the state, a zero-sum game</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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14 The term “soft power” was coined by Joseph Nye and means the capability to influence world politics and actors in international relations through ideas, cultural values, political ideals, as well as social and economic norms (Gärtner, 2008, p. 225, translated by the author from German into English). Nye distinguishes this soft power from what he calls “hard power”, which is based on military might and economic coercion (Gärtner, 2008, p. 96 + 225, translated by the author from German into English).
But as the next chapter will show, Human Security is still lacking in what can be called a single, commonly accepted and shared definition (cf. Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 84; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 9).
2.2 Defining Human Security

Until today, the notion of Human Security has been facing one huge problem regarding its understanding and implementation: There is not just one definition of what Human Security is or should be about, but a hybrid of different definitions which have emerged over the recent years (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 9).

Various actors like the United Nations, the European Union, the Canadian and Japanese governments, as well as several academic scholars have all developed their own Human Security definition (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 9). Hence, one could state that “the content of human security really is in the eye (the culture) of the beholder” (Paris, 2004, p. 371).

Now, some scholars like Bosold and Werthes (2005, p. 101) do not necessarily regard a missing consensus on a common definition as a problem or weakness of the concept. They stress that there are also other powerful ideas in human history, such as “democracy”, which have been defined differently over time and world region. According to them, the strength of an idea lies in its “broadly accepted vital core of elements which nevertheless allows for flexible incorporation by various designs”, as is the case for Human Security (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 101).

Others like Owen (2004) would disagree with such a point of view. He underlines that if Human Security wants to play an important role as a new security concept, it is crucial that “its proponents [...] agree upon a single definition and end what is a self-destructive debate” (Owen, 2004, p. 20). Therefore, Owen (2004, p. 15) proposes a “threshold-based definition”, which will be discussed at a later stage of the thesis.

In any case, it is important to be aware of the fact that defining a concept is always an act of power, making a neutral, objective definition impossible (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 11 + p. 23). As Krause (2005, p. 2) highlights correctly, one first of all needs to understand that a security concept is also a “social construct”. Human Security, just as all other security concepts,

“is constructed through the various efforts of institutions and individuals, and in today’s world, it is a powerful concept around which practical policies and concrete initiatives have been, and can be, developed and promoted” (Krause, 2005, p. 2).

The first serious “construction” of the idea of Human Security came from the United Nations Development Programme (Krause, 2005, p. 2). In its Human Development Report in 1994,
UNDP was conceptualizing and promoting Human Security in a broad way as “freedom from fear and freedom from want” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 24). This was the starting point for further, diverging elaborations of the concept by an increasing number of actors (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 23).

However it should be noted that already in 1992 the “Agenda for Peace” report of the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) spoke of the necessity of “an integrated approach to human security” in addressing the security threats to human beings in a post-Cold War world (Duffield and Waddell, 2006, p. 8). But it was not until the Human Development Report in 1994 that the concept of Human Security had been articulated in a significant and comprehensive manner (Owen, 2004, p. 18).

What needs to be underlined with regard to this influential UNDP report is, as Krause (2005, p. 2) remarks, the circumstance that the idea of Human Security was not the outcome of academic debates, nor did it stem from certain analysts. The Human Security concept “was born in the policy world” (Krause, 2005, p. 2).

Since 1994 the concept has evolved in different directions being adopted by diverse international and regional organisations, various states and academic scholars (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 23 + p. 39). Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 23) are dividing this evolution of Human Security and its involvement with world politics chronologically into three relatively broad stages. The first stage started with the publication of the UNDP Human Development Report in 1994, and was marked by international initiatives such as the Ottawa Treaty in 1997 banning anti-personal landmines, the birth of the “International Criminal Court”, and the formation of the influential “Human Security Network” in 1999 (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 23). The second stage, lasting from 2001 till 2003, was characterized by the debates about what could be called a “responsibility for development” on the one side, promoted by the “Commission on Human Security” (CHS), and a so-called “responsibility to protect” on the other side, going back to the work of the “International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (ICISS) (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 23). The driving forces behind the creation of those International Commissions have been the Canadian government, in the case of the ICISS, and the Japanese government for the CHS (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 23). As we will see later on in this chapter, both states are pursuing a different vision of Human Security.

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15 Electronic document without specific page reference (see Bibliography).
The third and last stage in the development of the Human Security concept in international politics took place during the years 2004 and 2005 (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 23). In those years Human Security gained attention as a concept linking development with security and thereby “became a topic of reform agendas at the UN and in such regional organizations as the European Union” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 23).

Over the period of the three mentioned stages, the concept of Human Security has been, and still is defined differently. Sharing the same core values and ideas which distinguish Human Security from the state-centred view of security – as it has been analysed in 2.1 –, the diverse Human Security definitions differ in their understanding of what threats should be regarded as Human Security threats and which priorities and prevention strategies should be pursued to achieve Human Security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 49).

Although there exist a large number of various definitions nowadays, most of them can be divided into two categories or “conceptual schools of thought” (Owen, 2004, p. 17): A broad and a narrow vision of Human Security (Owen, 2004, p.17).

2.2.1 The broad definition: “Freedom from want” and “Freedom from fear”

2.2.1.1 UNDP Human Development Report 1994: The starting and reference point

At the heart of the broad vision of Human Security is its definition by the United Nations Development Programme in the Human Development Report from 1994. One central motivation behind this report was to make sure that the long promised “peace-dividend” would be realized (Krause, 2005, p. 2). The concept of Human Security was seen as a way to guarantee the redirection of resources spent during the Cold War on the military towards other, more productive and peaceful ends (Krause, 2005, p. 2).

Not surprisingly, the report thus starts with a fundamental critique on the traditional state-centred conception of security and calls for its expansion (UNDP, 1994, p. 22):

“The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly; as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat to a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. […] For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event.”

Hence, what is needed according to UNDP (1994, p. 24), is a shift from the traditional security concept to an “all-encompassing concept of human security”, which pays greater
attention to people’s security and which focuses on achieving security “through sustainable human development” instead through armament.

Following the report (UNDP, 1994, p. 22), one central characteristic of this new Human security approach is its universalism. Human Security is relevant to poor as well as rich people everywhere around the globe (UNDP, 1994, p. 22). Furthermore, Human Security threats are not isolated events, limited to one certain country. The insecurity of people on one side of the planet can have a negative impact on those living on the other side (UNDP, 1994, p. 22). Another important characteristic of UNDP’s (1994, p. 22) Human Security concept – and which can also be seen as a central feature of other broad Human Security definitions – is the conclusion to give early prevention a clear priority against later intervention, whose costs are by far higher.

For UNDP (1994, p. 23), Human Security is a “people-centred” security approach. As Owen (2004, p. 18) points out, the report broadly defines Human Security as consisting of two principal aspects, which are “the freedom from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression” (Owen, 2004, p. 18) and the “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (UNDP, 1994, p. 23).

Hence, Human Security is understood as “freedom from fear”, which means being safe from physical violence, persecution, death, psychological or sexual abuse, and “freedom from want”, which means security in terms of issues like health, food or employment (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 24 + p. 39).

In order to give a structured overview of the large number of threats to human beings, UNDP classifies them in its 1994 Human Development Report into seven Human Security components (Owen, 2004, p. 18). These are “economic security”, “political security”, “personal security”, “health security”, “food security”, “community security” and “environmental security” (UNDP, 1994, pp. 24-25).

Constituting the first category, “economic security” is linked according to UNDP (1994, p. 25) to a guaranteed basic income which normally comes from productive work, but could also be provided by state financed safety nets. The central threat within this Human Security component is poverty (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 15).

“Food security” in its turn is achieved when all people at any time “have both physical and economic access to basic food” (UNDP, 1994, p. 27). This means that food availability alone is not sufficient to assure this component of Human Security. A lot of people in today’s world are starving not because there is not enough food available, but because they

“Health security” is threatened by diseases as well as injuries and thus requires the access of all people to health care (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 15). This includes the “access to safe and affordable family planning”, which is of particular importance to many countries of the South given their high maternal mortality rates (UNDP, 1994, p. 28). People most affected by menaces to health security represent the poorest, those living in rural areas, as well as children and women (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 15; see also UNDP, 1994, p. 28). Regarding health security, UNDP (1994, p. 28) specifically highlights, in its report, the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS as a global Human Security threat.

“Environmental security” means the protection of human beings from such threats as water scarcity and pollution, deforestation, land degradation, air pollution, global warming, floods, earthquakes or cyclones (UNDP, 1994, p. 29 + p. 34 + p. 36). Thus, environmental security concerns the security of people from natural as well as from manmade disasters (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 15). It is about ensuring “a healthy physical environment”, which people can live in (UNDP, 1994, p. 28).

Although the UNDP Human Development Report from 1994 starts its categorization of the seven Human Security components with economic security, it states with regard to “personal security” that “perhaps no other aspect of human security is so vital for people as their security from physical violence” (UNDP, 1994, p. 30). The core concern regarding “personal security” is thus the protection of individuals from all kinds of physical violence (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 15). As the UNDP (1994, p. 30) report points out, people in poor and rich states are more and more facing threats of unpredictable, sudden violence. Those threats to the personal security of individuals can take different forms, coming either from one’s own state – in the form of physical torture – or from other states taking the form of a war, arising from other groups of society in the case of an ethnic conflict, stemming from gangs or individuals targeted against others in the case of street violence and crime, being specifically directed against women in cases of rape and domestic violence or against children in cases of child abuse and prostitution, or even coming from oneself considering such threats as drug use and suicide (UNDP, 1994, pp. 30-31, see also Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 15).

The sixth category “community security” mentions threats related to the cultural diversity of individuals (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 16). Acknowledging the fact that most people gain security through their belonging to a certain group, may that be a family, a social or an
ethnic community, UNDP (1994, p. 31) highlights the possible dangers deriving from group identities to the individual.

First of all, Human Security can be threatened by oppressive practices perpetuated within traditional communities like the use of bonded labor, slavery, and the inhuman treatment of women including the threat of genital mutilation (UNDP, 1994, p. 31). Second, traditional communities, ethnic groups, indigenous people, and hence individuals belonging to these groups, can also be confronted with security threats coming from each other, such as discrimination or ethnic violence and clashes (UNDP, 1994, p. 32).

The last one of the seven Human Security components in UNDP’s Human Development Report from 1994 is “political security” (UNDP, 1994, p. 32). This dimension of Human Security refers to the “basic human rights” of people and means their protection against all forms of state repression, ill treatment, systematic torture, disappearance, political repression and detention (UNDP, 1994, p. 32). It should also be stressed that the report speaks with regard to human rights as “one of the most important aspects of human security” (UNDP, 1994, p. 32).

With these seven Human Security categories UNDP defines Human Security in a very broad way, clearly distinguishing the concept from former, traditional security approaches (Owen, 2004, p. 18). According to UNDP (1994, p. 22), Human Security can be seen as

“…a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human Security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity”.

Hence, the definition of UNDP takes also into account what has been already analysed earlier as indirect, or structural violence (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 24). It comprehends a number of former classical development issues like poverty, inequality or environmental degradation (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 24). Therefore UNDP’s Human Security concept is often described as a “human development approach to human security”, going further than the “classical” concern about massive human rights violations and armed conflicts (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 24).

Such a broad definition of Human Security is also facing, as we will see in chapter 2.2.2, strong criticism from other HS proponents.

Nevertheless UNDP’s definition stays the reference point of all Human Security definitions, forcing more narrow visions to justify the exclusion of threats that are considered by the 1994 Human Development Report as being relevant to Human Security (Owen, 2004, p. 18). As Bosold and Werthes (2005, p. 86) highlight, it is an essential characteristic of UNDP’s
Human Security vision – as well as of broad definitions in general – to refuse a prioritisation of different security issues and dimensions. According to UNDP, Human Security can only be realized if all the mentioned seven Human Security components are taken into consideration (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, pp. 86-87). This is the logical consequence of the report’s assumption that Human Security threats from the different components are deeply linked to each other (UNDP, 1994, p. 33):

“A threat to one element of human security is likely to travel – like an angry typhoon – to all forms of human security”.

This point of view is also shared by other supporters of a broad Human Security definition, like the Japanese government, which is equally stressing the interconnectedness of different Human Security threats and components (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 48).

The broad vision of Human Security as it has been exemplified in UNDP’s Human Development Report from 1994, was followed and embraced by further broad definitions from a number of academic scholars (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 49). Ramesh Thakur (2004, p. 347) for instance regards “the security of people against threats to personal safety and life expectancy” as “the fundamental components of human security”. His definition encompasses threats related to direct as well as indirect violence, caused by humans or by nature, and underlines that dangers to human security can arise either from outside or through the state (Thakur, 2004, p. 348).

Jennifer Leaning (2004, p. 354) in her turn defines Human Security as a concept which “includes the social, psychological, political, and economic factors that promote and protect human well-being through time”.


“the right of individuals and communities to preservation of their life and health and to dwell in a safe and sustainable environment” (Nef, 1999, p. 25).
Like the UNDP definition, Nef (1999, p. 25) emphasizes the “interwoven” character of the different Human Security dimensions, respectively subsystems. For Nef (1999, 25), all five subsystems are interplaying and connected to each other by so-called “bridges”, defining thereby “the nature of systemic entropy – or homeostasis”.

As other academics supporting a broad Human Security concept can be named, according to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 49), Kanti Bajpai, Osler Hampson and Sabina Alkire. But not just scholars embrace and promote a broad vision of Human Security as it has been first defined and laid out by UNDP in its Human Development Report from 1994. There is also a state that started to officially support in international politics a broad Human Security approach based “upon the original UNDP formulation” (Krause 2005, p. 3). This state is Japan (Krause 2005, p. 3).

2.2.1.2 Japan’s Human Security vision and the “Commission on Human Security” (CHS)

In 1995 the former Japanese Prime Minister Murayama mentioned the term “Human Security” for the first time in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 93). He was relating the idea of Human Security to human rights and the fight against poverty, violence, oppression and diseases (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 93).

It was then, in December 1998, under Prime Minister Obuchi, when the Japanese government really launched its Human Security initiative (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 29). At the “Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s tomorrow”, Obuchi announced Japan’s vision of Human Security, which according to him is a foreign policy comprehensively focusing on all threats to the daily life, dignity and the survival of people everywhere, and which is concerned with confronting these threats (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 29). Following Obuchi, such threats range from global warming to infectious diseases, transnational organized crime, human rights violations and refugee crises (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 94). The Japanese concept of Human Security is “about ensuring basic human needs in economic, health, food, social and environmental terms” (Krause, 2005, p. 3). It underlines the need for economic development and can be best described as supporting the “freedom from want” aspect of Human Security (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, pp. 94-95). A remarkable characteristic of Japan’s Human Security approach is thereby that it is missing a keyword of narrow definitions, and that is “humanitarian intervention” (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 95).
The main reason for Japan’s government to adopt a broad Human Security concept – in general as well as instead of a more narrow approach – as its foreign policy strategy, can be found in the 1997 Asian financial and economic crisis (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 95). Threatening also regional security, the crisis made Japan aware of the importance of stabilizing the Asian economy through a long-term engagement and strategy, which a broad Human Security approach could offer (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 30).

Another factor, convincing the Japanese government to officially pursue a broad Human Security strategy, could have been to gain thereby more international attention and hence more influence than a “middle power” state like Japan would normally get (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 28).

Furthermore, Japan’s strong commitment to the “freedom from want” component of Human Security seems quite logical given the fact that the Japanese army is bound by the Japanese constitution, namely by article 9, to use its force only in the case of national self-defense (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 29). Hence, one could state as Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 29) that

“when human security is adopted as a government’s diplomatic policy […], the paradigm is redefined so as to serve particular state-centred national interests”.

To underline its Human Security engagement, the Japanese government created a “Trust Fund for Human Security” within the United Nations system in 1999 (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 95). Managed by various UN agencies, like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and UNESCO, the fund is covering a wide spectrum of Human Security activities. These include public campaigns against the spread of HIV/AIDS, educational programs, refugee care and even demobilization programs (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, pp. 95-96). So far, the UN “Trust Fund for Human Security” has financed a large number of UN-led projects in more than 70 states (UNDP, 2011).

By contributing about $170 million to the fund’s budget, Japan brought the necessary credibility to its Human Security policy and strengthened at the same time its position as an important donor of development aid (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 29).

One motivation behind Japan’s strong financial support for the UN “Trust Fund for Human Security” has also been without any doubt its aspiration to become a future permanent member of a new, reformed UN Security Council (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 29).
The work and Human Security activities of the UN Trust Fund are largely based upon the ideas and conceptual thoughts written in the 2003 “Human Security Now” report of the “Commission on Human Security” (CHS) (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 28). This independent Commission was founded by the Japanese government in 2001 and co-chaired by Amartya Sen, economist and Nobel prize winner, and Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 96; see also Krause, 2005, p. 3). It was given a two-years mandate in order to achieve three central goals (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 153).

First, the Commission on Human Security (2003, p. 153) was charged to “promote public understanding, engagement, and support of human security”. Second, the Commission should work on the Human Security concept “as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation”, and third, the CHS was tasked to propose a clear action program “to address critical and pervasive threats to human security” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 153).

The Commission’s final report was then released in 2003 under the title “Human Security Now” (Krause, 2005, p. 3). The policy recommendations concluded in the report refer to Human Security with regard to violent conflict situations, the migration of people, post-conflict situations, economic security, basic education and health security (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 97).

In this report, the Commission on Human Security (2003, p. 4) defines Human Security as the protection of “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment”. It is about keeping individuals safe from “critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations” as well as about the protection of people’s fundamental freedoms (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4). Human Security thereby takes into account the aspirations and strengths of people and is aimed at creating political, economic, social, military, cultural and environmental systems which can guarantee people’s “survival, livelihood and dignity” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4).

With regard to the phrase “vital core of life”, the Commission on Human Security (2003, p. 4) states in its report that what is considered by people to be “vital” or “crucially important” differs from society to society. The Commission therefore supports a dynamic vision of Human Security and refuses to present an “itemized list” showing what human security is (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4).
In the Commission’s report, Human Security is also defined in relation to traditional state security, and seen as complementing the latter in four main aspects (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4).

First, Human Security is a concept that focuses clearly on the security of people in difference to the state security’s concern about threats coming from other states (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 6). Second, it means not just protecting national borders, but protecting individuals from a large number of menaces and threats, such as infectious diseases, transnational terrorism, environmental pollution, huge population movements, deprivation and oppression (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 6). Human Security is addressing threats related to violent conflicts, war, crime and terrorism as well as threats related to the deprivation of people like extreme poverty, ill health, pollution and illiteracy (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 6). Threats to the security of people can thus be according to the Commission on Human Security (2003, p. 11) direct as with the case of genocide, and indirect as for instance with the case of insufficient health care.

Third, the concept of Human Security does not only involve states but also other actors like non-governmental organizations, international and regional organizations and civil society in confronting and dealing with security issues (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 6).

Fourth and last, Human Security is to be achieved by pursuing and combining two strategies, or “keys to human security” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 11), which are the protection of people on the one hand, and their empowerment on the other hand (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4 + p. 11). Both strategies are needed in most cases and can be seen as reinforcing each other (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 10 + p. 12).

While protection strategies are aimed at shielding individuals from threats, empowerment strategies are giving people the opportunity “to develop their resilience to difficult conditions” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 10). The Commission points out that often people themselves can indeed make an important contribution to identifying and carrying out solutions to security threats (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 6). It is this emphasis of the Human Security approach on “people’s ability to act on their own behalf” that distinguishes it, following the report, from the traditional concept of state security as well as from humanitarian and most of the development aid (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 11).
Consequently, the Commission adds to the “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” components the “freedom to take action on one’s own behalf” in its Human Security definition (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 10).

The Commission’s vision of Human Security can thus be characterized as what Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 49) call “a more expansive and maximalist definition of human security”. It is taking structural threats into account and even issues of distributive justice and inequalities, which are going far beyond threats related to direct violence (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 49). An example for that gives the Commission’s recommendation to change the international regime of “intellectual property rights” with regard to medicines (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 49). The reason therefore is its threat to the health of people, and hence to Human Security, since

“recently promulgated international rules governing intellectual property could lessen the capacity of the world’s poorest people to afford vaccines and drugs essential to their health security” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 103).

This extremely wide scope of the Commission’s Human Security concept, which is capturing nearly every issue of the ongoing security-development discourse, is probably also the greatest obstacle when it comes to its implementation (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 97).

Now, the broad definition of Human Security, as it has been analyzed in this chapter, and as it is being promoted in various ways by the “Commission on Human Security”, by the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report and by others like the Japanese government, is challenged by a narrow approach of Human Security, which is criticizing the broad concept in a number of points, as we will see in the following chapter of the thesis.

2.2.2 The narrow definition: Human Security as “Freedom from fear”

2.2.2.1 “Violent threats” at the heart of a narrow view
Krause (2005, p. 3) specifically criticizes the broad Human Security definition for including nearly every possible threat to people’s well-being, and for making thereby of the idea of Human Security “nothing more than a shopping list”.

This critique is also shared by Deudney (1999, p. 192, cited in Krause 2005, p. 3), who stresses that

“if everything that causes a reduction in human well-being is labeled a security threat, the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym of ‘bad’.”

Another argument against a broad conceptualisation of Human Security is, according to Krause (2005, p. 3), that it stays uncertain if anything can be won by addressing such issues as public health, education and the demand for fair trade under the term of Human Security. He doubts that for instance the problem of illiteracy can be confronted more effectively just by calling it a Human Security threat (Krause, 2005, p. 4). Instead Krause (2005, p. 4) sees the risk that a loose use of the powerful notion of security can have a negative impact on dealing successfully with certain political issues. As one example for that he mentions migration, whose “securitization” within Western Europe has often lead to regard migration primarily or solely under the aspect of security as an alleged threat, and not as a chance or necessity as it would be the case from a different, for instance an economic point of view (Krause, 2005, p. 4).

MacFarlane (2004, p. 369) equally raises the question

“What additional analytical or normative traction one gets from relabeling sustainable human development […] as human security”.

According to him, the renaming of development as security has also not resulted in obtaining more public resources, if this had been the intention behind the rhetoric of the broad concept (MacFarlane, 2004, p. 369). He stresses that a broad concept of Human Security has the disadvantage of making a prioritisation of Human Security issues quite difficult. As a consequence, the objectives of the broad definition are hard to be attained (MacFarlane, 2004, p. 369).

For Krause (2005, p. 3 + p. 4), Human Security should thus be defined in a narrow, and not in a broad way, to be an influential concept “linked to a powerful and coherent practical and intellectual agenda” (Krause, 2005, p. 4).

This narrow definition of Human Security distinguishes itself from the broad Human Security vision by its clear focus on the protection of individuals from violent threats (Owen, 2004, p. 19). It thereby also separates the concept and notion of Human Security from the broader sphere of development approaches (Owen, 2004, p. 19).

Defined in a narrow way, Human Security is about protecting people from threats related to physical violence, and the respect for fundamental human rights, which includes first and
foremost the right of people to live (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 86). It is concerned with “removing the use of, or threat of, force and violence from people’s everyday lives” (Krause, 2005, p. 3).

Following Glasius and Kaldor (2005, p. 67), the narrow definition involves such Human Security threats as genocide, torture, slavery, disappearances, inhuman treatment, war crimes and “crimes against humanity”, whereas other threats like hunger or diseases are normally not taken into account. As Owen (2004, p. 19) remarks, violent threats, and hence Human Security threats according to the narrow vision, can arise from state failure, landmines, ethnic tensions, as well as the illicit trade in small weapons.

The narrow approach of Human Security is thus best described as focusing on the “freedom from fear” component, which has also become its key phrase (Krause, 2005, p. 3).

Furthermore, it can be seen as what Bosold and Werthes (2005, p. 86) call “a crisis-prevention or conflict-management tool”.

This becomes more clear, when one takes a look at the various issues which are part of the political agenda of the narrow Human Security approach (Krause, 2005, p. 4). They include, amongst others, the fight against the abuse of children as child soldiers, efforts to eliminate all landmines and to stop the proliferation of SALW\(^{16}\), the struggle against impunity, the support for so-called “security sector reforms”, as well as the promotion of the idea of “good governance” with regard to the security system (Krause, 2005, p. 4).

The central thought behind such a narrow agenda and understanding of Human Security is the view, that development cannot be expected to take place in states where a safe security environment in the sense of “freedom from fear” is not assured in the first place (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 86). For proponents of a narrow Human Security perspective, the broad definition is thus only a stage in the evolution process of the Human Security concept which needs to be limited to violent threats in order to constitute a useful policy instrument (Owen, 2004, p. 19).

This position is strengthened by the fact that the narrow Human Security approach is at the very origin of many successful political initiatives in international relations (Owen, 2004, p. 19). It was the narrow and not the broad vision of Human Security which gave birth to the Convention against landmines, the “International Criminal Court” (ICC), and the new

\(^{16}\text{Small arms and light weapons.}\)
emphasis of the international community on such problems as small weapons and child soldiers (Owen, 2004, p. 19).

Therefore, Owen (2004, p. 19) goes even so far to state that

> “in fact, most of the significant policy advances achieved in the name of human security have used this narrow definition”.

As one important country to embrace and support the narrow view of Human Security Canada can be named (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 48).

### 2.2.2.2 Canada’s Human Security vision

After 1996, when the Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy used the term “human security” for the first time in public, Canada has officially been adopting and pursuing the concept of Human Security in its foreign policy (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 87). Central issues of Canada’s Human Security discourse and engagement were the fight against landmines, the setting up of a capacity for peacebuilding, and the protection of children from various threats like child labor, sexual abuse, and violence in general (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, pp. 87-88).

Canada’s support of the idea of Human Security was largely due to the awareness of its foreign minister Axworthy for the need of a new foreign policy in a post-Cold War world (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 30). He stressed that the problems in such a world, like the increasing proliferation of arms or children threatened by violent conflicts, demand new methods and strategies to confront them (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 30). Regarding the solution of those problems, Axworthy promoted international “humanitarianism-inspired interventions for which responsibility would be shared” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 30).

Some also argue that the real motivation behind Canada’s new focus on Human Security was to escape from its political as well as military irrelevance in world politics, especially compared to its neighboring country, the United States of America (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, pp. 30-31).

In implementing Human Security, Canada was following a twofold strategy (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 88). On the one hand, it was advocating political initiatives on clear, well-defined Human Security topics in different multilateral organisations and forums. On the other hand, Canada was working on forming a coalition of states and civil society actors,
which would cooperate in supporting the narrow Human Security approach in international politics (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 88).

On the top of Canada’s Human Security agenda was the campaign for an international treaty prohibiting and banning landmines (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 89). In 1997, international efforts and negotiations finally resulted in the so-called “Ottawa Treaty”, which can be seen as “the hallmark of the [narrow] human security approach” (Krause, 2005, p. 4). The treaty, which is also known under the term “Mine Ban Treaty”, forbids the production, the use, the stockpiling as well as the transfer of landmines and obliges its so far 156 state parties to destroy every single landmine in their possession (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

An important aspect of the Human Security approach of the Canadian government – and what has been realized during the negotiations on the landmine treaty – is the pursuing of new, unconventional diplomatic ways to achieve political solutions (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 89). This includes the close cooperation with actors from civil society and the use of the new information technologies to share information and thereby to support and strengthen one’s own position (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 89). Hence, one could state like Bosold and Werthes (2005, p. 89) that

> “human security represents not only a broadening and deepening of the security agenda, but also – and even more important – a different mode of diplomatic conduct”.

Human Security is thus not “only” a concept changing the objectives in foreign policy, but equally “a diplomatic process”, which involves new actors as well as new negotiation instruments (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 89).

Encouraged by the great success of the anti-landmines campaign, Canada was putting efforts in establishing “a human security ‘alliance’” (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 92). In 1999, Canada’s close cooperation on Human Security with Norway17 was followed by the formation of the so-called “Human Security Network”, consisting of 13 states (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 92). In addition to Canada and Norway, Ireland, Austria, Switzerland, Greece, Chile, the Netherlands, Mali, Thailand, Slovenia, Jordan, and South Africa (only as an observing state) belong to this network (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, pp. 92-93). It is what Krause (2005, p. 3) calls “a loose grouping of states” with the objective to support common human security policies in regional and international organisations.

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17 See the 1998 “Lysøen Declaration” (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 92).
The meetings of the “Human Security Network” are held once a year by the member states’ foreign ministers, and beyond that, political initiatives are also coordinated “throughout the year […] in a variety of formal and informal ways” (Krause, 2005, p. 3).

Among the most prominent topics being raised and discussed by the “Human Security Network” are the situation of children threatened by armed conflicts, the menace coming from small weapons, as well as the education of human rights. The “Human Security Network” thereby clearly embraces and supports with its agenda Canada’s narrow Human Security conception (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 93).

Apart from its central role in establishing the “Human Security Network” and in enforcing the campaign against landmines, Canada’s Human Security oriented foreign policy was also of great importance for setting up the “International Criminal Court” (ICC) as well as the so-called “Kimberley Process”, which was dealing with the problem that is better known under the popular term “blood diamonds” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 31).

As a further prominent issue in Canada’s Human Security engagement the prevention and protection of people from a possible genocide has to be seen (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 89). Under the impression of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the shameful role of the United Nations in not stopping the mass killings, the Canadian government urged the international community to undertake “a re-evaluation of the principle of state sovereignty vis-à-vis the […] obligations of the UN to maintain international peace and security” (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 90).

To address this difficult challenge, Canada established the “International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (ICISS), whose final and influential report was released under the well-known title “The Responsibility to Protect” (ICISS, 2001) in December 2001, and which will be discussed in chapter 2.2.2.3 (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 90).

For Canada and its former foreign minister Axworthy it was clear from the very beginning that extreme human rights abuses, like in the case of genocide, cannot just be accepted by the international community in the name of state sovereignty, but rather demand its intervention (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 90). The initiative to form the ICISS thus reflects and highlights the central position which the controversial concept of “humanitarian interventions” takes within Canada’s narrow human security approach (Bosold and Werthes,

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18 The authors wrongly name “September” in their article.
2005, p. 90). It thereby also points to a – not only in the author’s view – more problematic aspect of Canada’s understanding of Human Security, which is that its

“whole agenda is […] constructed on the assumption that human security can be guaranteed only by states that are liberal democracies” (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 97).

As Bosold and Werthes (2005, p. 91) underline, with its Human Security approach Canada promotes “conditions favoring strong and democratic states” to stop civil conflicts, and is therefore willing to use also military means in the form of a “humanitarian intervention” if required.

In conclusion, one can state, if comparing Canada’s with Japan’s Human Security concept – and hence comparing the narrow with the broad vision of Human Security –, that Canada’s approach is more of “a short- to medium-term strategy” to achieve specific, “more easily attainable goals”, whereas Japan’s conception on the other hand constitutes “a medium- to long-term strategy”, which involves far more issues and takes into account “the deeper causes of human insecurity” (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 100).

Having discussed the main narrow critiques on the broad vision of Human Security already earlier, it should be noted here that the other way around, from the Japanese point of view, and thus following a broad definition of Human Security, such central issues of the narrow Canadian approach like landmines or SALW proliferation, cannot be regarded as being the decisive components of human insecurity (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 98). For Japan, the goal of Human Security is better achieved by pursuing more comprehensive policies and measures instead of a selective agenda as Canada does (Bosold and Werthes, 2005, p. 98).

The next chapter analyses the above-mentioned “Responsibility to Protect” report (ICISS, 2001) with regard to Human Security and focuses thereby on the topic of “humanitarian intervention” which “is critical to the narrow conception of human security” (MacArthur, 2008, p. 428).

2.2.2.3 Human Security and Intervention: The ICISS and the “Responsibility to Protect” (2001)

Initiated and sponsored by the Canadian government, the “International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (ICISS) completed its assignment in 2001 by releasing the famous “Responsibility to Protect” report (Krause, 2005, p. 5). The objective of the Commission was to find solid answers to the strongly debated questions related to “humanitarian interventions”, namely, if, when, how and by which authorisation the
international community should intervene, especially militarily, in “another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk” (ICISS, 2001, p. VII). Krause (2005, p. 5) therefore characterizes the Commission’s report as “an attempt to rethink the idea of humanitarian intervention within the framework of human security”.

The political sensibility of the given task can already be seen in the Commission’s name, which includes the term “intervention” as well as the term “sovereignty”, and hence the two key words of the debate (Matláry, 2008, p. 136). For Matláry (2008, p. 136), this combination is nothing less than “a diplomatic master-stroke”, which presents humanitarian intervention as compatible and not as contradictory to state sovereignty.

On the first pages of its report, the ICISS (2001, p. 8) clarifies its understanding of “sovereignty” and describes it as involving “a dual responsibility”, which on the one hand consists of the respect for other states’ sovereignty and on the other hand of the respect for the basic rights as well as the dignity of one’s own state citizens. This interpretation of “state sovereignty” is, as the Commission highlights, fundamental for the report’s answer to the raised issue of possible interventions in order to protect civilian people in a state (ICISS, 2001, p. 8).

According to the ICISS (2001, p. XI), it is indeed first of all the responsibility of a sovereign state itself to care for and to protect its own citizens, but at the same time the Commission stresses that,

“where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001, p. XI).

By stating that, the Commission also intends to turn the ongoing discussion away from the often criticized “right to intervene” to the so-called “responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001, p. 17).

This new, in the report elaborated and promoted “responsibility to protect”, comprehends three dimensions or different kinds of responsibilities (ICISS, 2001, p. XI). First, it includes a “responsibility to prevent”, which means dealing with the direct as well as the deeper causes of civil conflicts and further people-threatening crises that are caused by man (ICISS, 2001, p. XI). Second, it involves a “responsibility to react” which stands for giving a response “to situations of compelling human need” by using various, adequate measures, which can also encompass coercive measures ranging from sanctions to military interventions (ICISS, 2001, p. XI). And third, it is also about a “responsibility to rebuild” to
make sure that a state receives a comprehensive support regarding its reconstruction, its recovery and the reconciliation process, especially in the aftermath of a military intervention (ICISS, 2001, p. XI).

Consisting of those three different responsibilities, the “responsibility to protect” covers, as Matláry (2008, p. 136) points out, all dimensions of international peace operations.

With regard to the significance of each mentioned responsibility, the Commission explicitly refers to prevention as being “the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001, p. XI). It is at this point also interesting to see, how the report speaks about Human Security, namely as being “the security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety and human dignity” (ICISS, 2001, p. 15).

Nevertheless, this should not mislead to the wrong assumption that the report is really promoting a broad conception of Human Security, since

“…the bulk of its 91 pages is devoted to military humanitarian intervention, and though the desirability of preventative measures are [sic!] noted, there is no attempt to link these in any real way with the actual intervention” (MacArthur, 2008, p. 428).

It should be underlined thus at this point once again, that the Commission clearly “preferred a narrow, freedom from fear approach to human security” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 193).

In its report, the ICISS (2001, pp. XII-XIII) limits the deployment of any military intervention in the name of a “responsibility to protect” to several, clearly defined principles, which can be associated, following Matláry (2008, p. 136), with the “just war” discourse.

These six principles or criteria to be respected by the international community when fulfilling its “responsibility to protect” are: the existence of a “just cause”, the “last resort”, the “right intention”, “reasonable prospects”, the “right authority” and the use of “proportional means” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 191).

The first principle, “the just cause”, is clarifying under what circumstances a military intervention to protect humans can take place, by setting a clear threshold for military engagement (ICISS, 2001, p. XII). It is restricting military interventions to two kinds of situations, namely to cases where a “large scale loss of life [...] with genocidal intent or not” or a “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’” is given “or imminently likely to occur” (ICISS, 2001, p. XII).

According to the second principle, the “right intention”, every military intervention has to be primarily motivated by the objective to bring an end to or to prevent “human suffering”,

...
and not by other purposes (ICISS, 2001, p. XII). The report hereby highlights that multilateral missions are better suited to guarantee this criteria (ICISS, 2001, p. XII).

The third principle, the "last resort", stands for the need to first explore all possible non-military means to peacefully resolve or avert a crisis, and the need of "reasonable grounds for believing" that there is no other option left, before military force can be used (ICISS, 2001, p. XII).

The fourth principle to be respected, the "proportional means", demands that the duration, intensity and scale of the military engagement are kept to the minimum required to achieve the set goal of protecting people (ICISS, 2001, p. XII).

The fifth principle, called "reasonable prospects", is about the necessity of a serious chance that the military intervention succeeds in preventing or ending the crisis which provoked the military engagement (ICISS, 2001, p. XII). It is thereby crucial that the effects of the use of military force are not estimated to be more negative than those of non-action (ICISS, 2001, p. XII).

The sixth and last principle, the "right authority", gives the main power to decide about the authorization of a military mission, launched in the name of a "responsibility to protect", to the UN Security Council, whose mandate "should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out" (ICISS, 2001, p. XII).

The report clearly underlines that instead of looking for other sources for authorizing military missions, efforts should be put on making the Council’s work more efficient (ICISS, 2001, p. XII). Nevertheless, the report also speaks of "alternative options" for cases in which the UN Security Council refuses a request or is unable to come to a decision within "a reasonable time" (ICISS, 2001, p. XIII). These options are first, to pass the issue for its consideration to the UN General Assembly by using the so-called "Uniting for Peace procedure" and second, for regional as well as "sub-regional organizations" to take action on their own, limited to their jurisdiction area and "subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council" (ICISS, 2001, p. XIII). Furthermore, the report states that the UN Security Council has to be aware of the fact and danger that in case of its failure to address

"conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation" (ICISS, 2001, p. XIII).

The intention behind these analysed six principles is according to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 191) also to avert a potential use – and hence exploitation – of the “responsibility
to protect’, and thereby of the concept of Human Security, for political instead of humanitarian purposes.

All in all, for Matláry (2008, p. 136), the discussed ICISS report has been nothing less than essential for the Human Security approach since it has delivered “the main contributions to” its evolution.

Others like Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 193) see the importance of the report to the idea of Human Security rather critical and point at its weaknesses following a broad and thus more comprehensive vision of Human Security.

As Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 193) remark, the two situations defined by the report, in which military interventions can be undertaken in the name of a “responsibility to protect”, exclude the whole “freedom from want” aspect. For instance, compared to UNDP’s broad Human Security definition in its Human Development Report from 1994, the “just cause” principle of the ICISS report is only covering three of the therein named seven Human Security dimensions, namely the personal, the community and the political dimensions of security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 193). The “responsibility to protect” is thus not referring to the other four by UNDP mentioned Human Security dimensions, which are – as it has been described in 2.2.1.1 – those related to health, food, economy, and the environment (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 193).

Now, of course one could state that a military mission is perhaps not really the appropriate and best means of putting an end to such issues as poverty (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 194). On the other hand, according to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 194), there could indeed be also an extreme situation of poverty imagined which would demand a military engagement:

“…if, for example, the government of a state was impoverishing the inhabitants of one region on purpose in order to tame a particularly rebellious minority, and was accordingly closing all public services (health, education, etc.), cutting all subsidies, stopping all development programmes, prohibiting foreign investments, etc., then, it is our contention that, if that government persisted in spite of the international community’s condemnations and sanctions, it might be a case for intervention” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 194).

At the same time such a point of view, as Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 194) highlight by themselves, also bears the risk of making the number of cases in which military interventions are desirable and needed nearly endless. It would therefore be of great importance to strictly respect and follow the principles named by the ICISS in its report with
regard to military engagement to avoid this potential problem (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 194).

Another aspect of the “Responsibility to Protect” report which is criticized from a broad Human Security position, is its given emphasis on military missions and hence – as it has already been shown above – its deficit to seriously address the crucial as well as difficult topic of prevention (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 194). Instead of being primarily driven by the concern about military responses, “a broader Human security engagement” is putting its main efforts on preventing Human Security crisis from emerging in the first place, and not on responding to them if it is already kind of “too late” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 199). After all, as Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 199) notice, one should always bear in mind that “effective prevention avoids the kind of life-threatening emergency situation that must be dealt with militarily”.

This profound criticism the Commission’s report is facing from Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007) as well as from other sides, reveals once again some of the major differences and critical issues discussed between supporters of a narrow and those of a broad Human Security definition, whose characteristics and elements have been analysed in detail throughout chapter 2.2 of the thesis.

According to Owen (2004, p. 20), the ongoing intellectual dispute between the narrow and the broad interpretation of Human Security can be characterized with regard to the influence and power of the concept as “self-destructive” and “practically counter-productive”, and should thus be avoided. As a possible solution to escape from those discussions, Owen (2004, p. 20) promotes a different, a “third” way of defining Human Security by paying attention to the “actual severity” of threats.

With his definition, Owen takes a balanced, middle position between Human Security proponents who demand to take into consideration a large number of threats and others who, in return, prefer a more specific, a narrow focus, as the following chapter will show (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 68).
2.2.3 Escaping the controversial debate: A “threshold-based”19 HS definition

“Rather than viewing human security as a list of threats, all of which must at all times be considered security issues, the concept could instead be viewed in terms of a threshold, so that any threat in any location passing this threshold could become a security threat.” (Martin and Owen, 2010, p. 221)

For Owen (2004, p. 20), the assumption that by using a narrow definition of Human Security the task of assessing threats is less difficult and the research results are becoming more exact must not be automatically true. Beyond that, the huge problem with narrow conceptions is that they “simply leave out too many critical threats and ignore too much valuable local data” (Owen, 2004, p. 22).

Following Owen (2004, p. 20), threats to the security of people are not to be taken into account due to their belonging to a specific group or category, like direct violence, as it is the case within a narrow vision of Human Security, but rather on the basis “of their actual severity” (Owen, 2004, p. 20). It is fundamental for a definition of Human Security which wants to be broad as well as precise, to acknowledge that no real difference can be made between a person being dead as the consequence of a natural disaster or of a gunshot (Owen, 2004, p. 20).

Although this means, according to Owen (2004, p. 20), that all kind of “harms” that can be prevented have to be regarded as threats to the security of people, “only those that surpass a threshold of severity should be included” in the definition. Hence, contrary to other definitions, not the “cause” of a menace or threat is the essential factor in deciding about its importance and relevance to the Human Security concept, but its “severity” (Martin and Owen, 2010, p. 221).

According to Owen (2004, p. 20), Human Security can thus be best defined and understood as “the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats”.

In this definition, Owen combines elements from two other prominent – and in the thesis already mentioned – definitions, namely from the one of the “Commission on Human Security” (2003) and the one of UNDP (1994) included in its “Human Development Report” from 1994 (Owen, 2004, p. 20).

First, by using the Commission’s wording of “‘vital core’ and ‘critical and pervasive threats’” the definition provides the needed threshold by comprehending only threats which

refer to “a minimum level of survival” and which “take or seriously threaten lives” (Owen, 2004, p. 20).

Second, in order to guarantee a certain structure and clarity, the definition classifies all chosen threats to the security of people into six different groups of threats, which go back to the categorisation made by UNDP in 1994 (Owen, 2004, p. 20).

Essential to this, what can be called “a threshold-based definition of human security”, is that just those threats to people which are seen as the worst will be confronted by referring to the term of ‘security’ (Martin and Owen, 2010, p. 221). Every other possible menace and threat has to stay within the responsibility of its original established discipline like development or the human rights approach (Martin and Owen, 2010, p. 221).

As Owen (2004, p. 21) himself remarks, the probably most significant aspect and at the same time also great advantage of his definition of Human Security is its dynamic character.

The definition clearly refuses to name a specific threat list constituting Human Security, given the conclusion that it is impossible for any list to be definite and final (Owen, 2004, p. 21). It thereby also brings the focus of interest back to where it actually belongs within the Human Security concept, namely to “the protection of the individual” (Owen, 2004, p. 21).

Finally, Owen (2004, p. 21) underlines the importance and necessity to utilize his definition in combination with a clear regional emphasis. As Owen (2004, p. 21) states,

“The list of all possible threats to human security in the world is vast, the list of relevant harms for a particular region or country, however, is considerably more refined. Using regional relevance as the criteria for threat selection means that no serious harm will be excluded, staying true to the broad conception of human security, but also improves the chances of acquiring relevant data”.

Hence, the definition presented by Owen has also to be seen as an interesting way of making a broader Human Security understanding measurable (Owen, 2004, p. 22).

Having analysed and discussed different visions of Human Security in detail, as well as the main characteristics of the concept in the previous chapters of the thesis, it seems now necessary and useful, to briefly clarify its relation to another prominent, but far older idea, which is the one of Human Rights.
2.2.4 The relationship between Human Security and Human Rights

In the so called “Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities” (2004), which is also entitled and known as “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”, and which will be discussed in detail in chapter 3, human rights are presented as the first principle out of seven which are an essential part of what is called a European “Human Security Doctrine” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 5).

The report explicitly states that Human Security can be understood as people’s freedom “from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 5). Further, the study group analyses that the prominent position and importance of human rights within the concept of Human Security is exactly the difference between this new security concept and traditional state-centred understandings of security (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 14).

The Commission on Human Security (2003, p. 10) in its turn also highlights the central value and position human rights take within the approach of Human Security by stressing that “respecting human rights is at the core of protecting human security”.

According to Benedek (2011, p. 15), one similarity between the Human Rights and the Human Security concept is without doubt that they both pursue a same fundamental goal, which consists of “changing existing structures and building up capacities to fight against human rights violations”. At the heart of the two approaches stand the will and the objective to empower people as a way to deal with present and upcoming threats (Benedek, 2011, p. 15). Hence, as Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 125) underline, both concepts share the same important and basic feature of clearly putting people into the centre of interest and concerns, and not states.

Furthermore, the issues raised by the Human Security and the Human Rights approach are, regardless of the different phrases being used, overlapping to a large degree (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 126). If one takes a look at the so-called “civil and political rights”, their similarity to the “freedom from fear” dimension of Human Security is not hard to find (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 126). In the same way, there also exists a wide overlap between “social and economic rights” and Human Security’s “freedom from want” dimension (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 126).

On the other hand, as Benedek (2011, p. 15-16) points out, Human Security differs from Human Rights in so far as the latter constitutes “a legally binding concept” whereas the former is mainly “a political concept” that offers strategic orientation regarding the
prevention of threats as well as regarding the question of how people’s vulnerabilities can be confronted, especially in the case of armed conflicts. It has to be kept in mind, that Human Security is not so much about a given, “fixed list of norms”, but in fact a combination of different strategies, principles and policies (Benedek, 2011, p. 16).

For Owen (2004, p. 22), it is quite clear that the approach of Human Security and Human Rights are indeed differing from each other since “rights generally depict conditions in which all people are entitled to live” and “security addresses the very survival of those people”.

As Owen (2004, p. 22) stresses, the term “security” in “Human Security” refers to the urgent and serious character of issues and situations to be dealt with, which means at the same time that it cannot cover and encompass everything.

While massive, grave abuses of human rights definitely constitute threats to the security of people, other, “minor” human rights violations as for instance the non-respect of the freedom of religion, are normally, although worrying, not a matter of Human Security (Owen, 2004, p. 22). There are a lot of aspects and conditions of human rights, as written in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, which are despite their harmfulness, not severe enough that they deserve to be paid attention to as threats to people’s security (Owen, 2004, p. 22).

Nevertheless, the protection of people from abuses against their fundamental human rights has to be seen as a central feature of guaranteeing Human Security (Owen, 2004, p. 23). But following a Human Security vision, people equally need to be protected from further menaces like diseases, conflict or poverty (Owen, 2004, p. 23). Hence, according to Owen (2004, p. 23), one can conclude that the “protection from gross violations of human rights is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of human security”.

The last chapter 2.3 in this first part of the thesis will now give a structured overview of the most common and most profound criticism the new paradigm and concept of Human Security is confronted with from different sides. It should be stated however at this point, that a comprehensive, all-encompassing analysis of all existing critiques is neither the aim nor within the possible scope of the thesis.
2.3 Criticism of the Human Security paradigm

To get an ordered overview of the criticism the concept of Human Security is facing, it might be helpful at the beginning to take a look at Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 58), who are distinguishing five different types of criticism.

First, there are the so-called “conceptual critiques”, which are primarily criticizing Human Security in its broad understanding for being too unclear to be able to confront threats effectively (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 58). Furthermore, these kind of critiques point at the problem that by trying to encompass nearly every possible harm to people, the powerful notion of “insecurity” inevitably loses its significance and descriptive force (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 59).

Second, the Human Security approach is confronted with critical voices which stress that the approach denies “the traditional rules and realities of international relations” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 58). For instance, Barry Buzan (2004, p. 369), warns that the concept of Human Security “drives towards a reductionist understanding of international security and reinforces a mistaken tendency to idealize security as the desired end goal”.

This type of criticism also highlights the, in its view, problematic “securitization” of political, social, economic, human rights and environmental topics, which is seen as a process leading to the irrelevance of the notion of security as well as a way to open the door to possible political abuse and manipulations “in the name of security” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 58).

Third, the idea of Human Security is also facing strong criticism regarding its “political implication” for states whose role and sovereignty in their traditional meaning are challenged fundamentally (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 58). Underlying these critiques is the assumption that Human Security is an approach which could serve to justify and excuse the military interventionism of the world’s most powerful states (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 64).

Fourth, in combination with arguments from the third type of criticism, Human Security is criticized further with regard to its “moral implication” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 58). Especially countries from the South stress their worries about the concept, regarding it as a new way and attempt of so-called “Western” countries to enforce their economic and social values and ideas in other, mainly weak countries of the world (Tadjbakhsh and
Chenoy, 2007, p. 58). Critics equally underline that the concept of Human Security results in a stronger and deeper “North-South divide” since underdevelopment in countries of the South is told to give rise to political crises which could have a negative impact on countries of the North, making hence sanctions and interventions seem necessary (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 65).

Another criticism concerning the moral dimension of the idea of Human Security is directed against its universal character, which is criticized for not taking into account differences between humans and thereby for constituting a clear menace to pluralism (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 66).

The fifth and last type of criticism highlights the numerous problems and difficulties the concept of Human Security is facing when it comes to its operationalization respectively “implementation”, which means the putting of its rhetoric into concrete policies (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 58). Issues being raised and criticized range from the difficulty of prioritizing objectives and of measuring possible successes, given the complexity of the concept, to the accusation of being a concept that is in fact more concerned with giving short-term answers than with sustainable solutions (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 58).

As Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 58) underline at the end of their analysis, all arguments of these five types of criticism can in return also be met by different “counter-critiques”20. Hence, for Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 58), the Human Security approach, although being contested, still needs to be seen as a quite “useful and innovative concept that inspires a new worldview and political agenda” as well as “a powerful tool for research and analysis”.

Some of the most profound and loudest critiques of the Human Security concept and paradigm are coming, as we have already seen above and as Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 35) stress, from the countries of the South, in particular from the “G-77” states, which

“fear it as a tool for the West to impose its values and order and for big powers to justify their interventions abroad” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 35).

According to them, the approach of Human Security has not really been used in the past to protect people globally, but rather appears to have simply delivered a strong argument for

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20 They are mentioned in Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, pp. 59-68).
interventions (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 35). They share the concern that the idea of Human Security goes hand in hand with a “double standard usage” which means that Western states are only willing to implement the concept as “a punitive measure against developing countries, without abiding by it themselves” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 36).

A large number of “G-77” states sees in the Human Security concept nothing else than a new ethnocentric, Western strategy that is promoting so-called, liberal Western ideas and values and clearly aimed at strengthening the economic power of Western countries (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 36).

Such a critical position is supported by the analysis of Duffield (2007, p. 122), according to whom, Human Security is indeed dividing states since some of them are without any doubt in a better position or more motivated to promote and adopt the concept than some others. Duffield (2007, p. 122) underlines that with respect to the will and the capacities of states, the Human Security approach contains a differentiation between states that are “effective” and those that are “ineffective”. Following Duffield (2007, p. 122), the idea of Human Security is only putting into question the unlimited sovereignty of the second type of states and is in this sense deeply linked and connected to the thinking about “state failure”.

Hence, one could conclude, according to Duffield (2007, p. 122), that

“while the common definition of human security is prioritizing people rather than states, it can be more accurately understood as effective states prioritizing the well-being of populations living within ineffective ones”.

This kind of view is for instance inherent and a central feature of the “Responsibility to Protect” report (Duffield, 2007, p. 122).

Another, although much “lighter” criticism comes from Krause (2005, p. 6), who is himself supportive of a narrow Human Security concept as we have seen in 2.2.2.1, but who nevertheless also recognizes certain weaknesses of the approach.

First, Krause (2005, p. 6) highlights the paradoxical situation that on the one hand, Human Security is turning the attention to the state as being in many cases at the origin of people’s insecurity, and on the other hand, Human security policies can have the problematic effect of strengthening and consolidating the position of the very same state. An example for that is the disarmament of the “weak without controlling the strong” which is not going to bring about a higher degree of human security for a longer perspective (Krause, 2005, p. 6).
As Krause (2005, p. 6) states,

“Paradoxically, most of the issues on the agenda of human security actually involve strengthening the role and resources of the state. Most of the activities around security-sector governance, or around stemming the proliferation and misuse of small arms, and other such issues, focus on the national level, and involve working with state authorities”.

Like Krause, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 167) are equally stressing that the idea of Human Security is not at all diminishing the power or the responsibilities of states since the successful realization of the concept is indeed deeply dependent on the state and its structures. Even if some actors other than the state can step in to fulfill several duties of the state, they are not able to replace the latter “in its primary responsibilities” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, p. 167).

However, as Krause (2005, p. 6) points out, it is also clear that the objective of the Human Security approach is to reorganize the state-citizen relationship, also in that way that a state’s sovereignty relies now on the “correct” treatment of its own people.

A second critique raised by Krause (2005, p. 6) concerns the problematic development that the task of conceptualizing the Human Security idea as well as the practical work on Human Security policies and initiatives, have mainly been done so far by states and not by civil society groups. This past trend risks according to Krause (2005, p. 6), to “undermine the commitment to promoting the real concerns of human security”.

The third and last criticism of Human Security coming from Krause (2005, p. 6) is also referring to the marginal importance of actors beyond the state, but this time with regard to the concept implementation. Following a Human Security vision, security clearly demands to empower individuals to not simply participate, but also to play a crucial and leading role in the diverse political, social and economic processes which have a relevant impact on their lives (Krause, 2005, p. 6). Until now however, such a “real” empowerment did, in fact, not take place since the efforts were mostly limited to the modest inclusion of non-governmental organisations and various academics from the Western world in formulating and thinking about the idea and policies of Human Security (Krause, 2005, p. 6).

Despite his above-mentioned criticism, Krause (2005, p. 6) stays rather optimistic regarding the potential and the future of the Human Security concept. According to him, the approach offers, after all, a strong theoretical basis for further “innovative and focused policy initiatives” (Krause, 2005, p. 6). Krause (2005, p. 6) therefore comes to the hopeful conclusion that
“…if the 20th century can be characterized as the century of the ‘national security state’, perhaps the 21st will unfold under the sign of human security”.
3. The EU and Human Security: A newly evolving strategy for the CSDP?

After the previous part of the thesis has analysed the concept of Human Security, its main characteristics, its different definitions as well as the numerous criticism it is facing, this chapter will discuss the relevance and importance of this relatively new security approach for and within the European Union, and more precisely with regard to its “Common Security and Defence Policy” (CSDP)\(^21\).

The chapter starts with a short introduction on the CSDP and further continues with a critical analysis of three important European documents regarding Human Security, which are, first of all the official “European Security Strategy” (Council of the European Union, 2003a), second the so-called “Barcelona Report” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004), and third the “Madrid Report” (Human Security Study Group, 2007). At the end, chapter 3.4 will highlight if, how much, where and, given the broad/narrow difference\(^22\), also what kind of Human Security can already be detected in the existing structures and goals of the CSDP.

3.1 The CSDP: Europe becoming a global security actor

Starting with the new era after the Cold War, and especially with the so-called “St. Malo declaration” in 1998 between Britain and France, the European Union has begun to play a role as an influential actor in the field of security and defence (Matláry, 2008, p. 131). Motivated by the common goal to prevent another Srebrenica, France and Britain came together in late 1998, years after the failed attempt to establish a “European Defence Community” already in 1954, to resolve their traditional differences regarding a defence dimension of Europe “and set European defence in motion in” order to create the needed military autonomy and to strengthen thereby also the credibility of the European Union (Vasconcelos, 2009, p. 15).

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\(^{21}\) Former called “ESDP”.

\(^{22}\) See chapter 2.2.
The deciding moment, however, was then later in 1999, when the European Council at its meeting in Cologne brought officially the “European Security and Defence Policy”, better known under the abbreviation “ESDP”, into existence (Flechtner, 2006, p. 158). The ESDP belongs to the broader sphere of Europe’s “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP), and its institutional structures overlap to a large degree with those of the latter (Grevi, 2009, p. 19). According to Matláry (2008, p. 131) it cannot really be seen as a replacement of the individual security and defence policies of the different member states, but rather as a utile “‘add-on’ for” them.

From the very beginning the ESDP was characterized on the one hand by quite a broad vision of security, but also in return by a restricted, limited strategic mandate which is related to “international crisis and conflict management” (Flechtner, 2006, p. 158).

The possible dimensions of ESDP missions are defined by what has become known as the “Petersberg Tasks”, dating back to the year 1992, and which have been included into the EU’s treaty system with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (Flechtner, 2006, p. 158). As Möstl (2011, p. 147) points out, these tasks, involving the use of military as well as civilian instruments, were broadened by the “Lisbon Treaty” and now comprehend

“joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation” (TEU Article 43, cited in Möstl, 2011, p. 147).

Furthermore, these mentioned tasks can now also be a contribution to fighting terrorism, which encompasses the support of non-EU states in their anti-terrorism efforts on their ground (Möstl, 2011, p. 147).

Although the central objective of Europe’s leaders was to primarily develop, with the ESDP, an autonomous military component for the EU, they were also well aware of the need to equally develop non-military capacities to be able to fulfill the ESDP’s mandate, and thus established a structure focusing on both, the development of military as well as civilian instruments (Flechtner, 2006, p. 158). According to Flechtner (2006, p. 158), the ESDP is therefore in possession of a “range of intervention capabilities, which […] is unique in its ability to combine hard military and soft civilian and diplomatic means”.

But at the same time the ESDP is also facing a number of shortcomings, which came to light with the deployment of its first operations starting in 2003, and which were related to coordination problems, insufficient resources and deficits in its given “crisis-management structures” (Grevi, 2009, p. 23).
Following Flechtner (2006, p. 165), the ESDP’s capacity to deal with crises is still rather limited to the field of peacekeeping, and hence to situations where violent conflicts have already come to an end and the main task is about stabilizing and rebuilding political institutions. For all other, more demanding areas, as they are named in the “Petersberg Tasks”, the ESDP is not yet possessing all required capacities to be completely operational (Flechtner, 2006, p. 165).

Nevertheless Flechtner (2006, p. 157) also admits that the ESDP constitutes without any doubt one of the rare spheres of the European Union which is indeed steadily growing. EU leaders seem to be more and more willing and ambitious to make the European Union to a “major player in global security” (Flechtner, 2006, p. 165).

The very first ESDP operation was a police mission taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which started in January 2003 and was later on accompanied by four further missions to the Balkans, including two military ones, namely the “Concordia” and the “EUFOR-Althea” operation (Flechtner, 2006, p. 162).

Since then, several other ESDP missions have been launched, covering a much greater scope than before, in such states as Indonesia, Georgia, Sudan, and – as this thesis will show – in the DRC\(^\text{23}\) (Flechtner, 2006, p. 164). An overview of all deployed ESDP, respectively CSDP missions, is given below in figure 3.

According to Flechtner (2006, p. 163), the ESDP engagement can clearly be seen as moving into the direction of “more robust, flexible, and, most of all, more globally engaged” operations. This development is reflected in the EU’s “Headline Goal 2010”, which was decided by the European Council in 2004 and envisioned the creation of thirteen so-called “battlegroups”, until the year of 2007, which “can be deployed within 10 days [...] in a 6,000 kilometer radius” (Flechtner, 2006, p. 164). Each one of these EU “battlegroups” should comprehend around 1,500 soldiers and is designed to undertake “small-scale and robust fighting missions in distant regions” (Flechtner, 2006, p. 163).

The military ESDP operation “Artemis” undertaken in the DRC in 2003 already kind of fit this foreseen mission model, having been the first intervention of a EU force in a situation of an urgent crisis as well as the first ESDP deployment outside the European continent with a contingent of nearly 1,800 soldiers (Flechtner, 2006, pp. 163-164).

\(^{23}\) Democratic Republic of Congo
Looking at the Lisbon Treaty, the by far most visible change the treaty has brought to the ESDP, was its renaming into “Common Security and Defence Policy”, or in short “CSDP” (Möstl, 2011, p. 146). Further changes going hand in hand with the Lisbon Treaty have been rather modest regarding the “new” CSDP, which continues regardless of the abolition of the EU’s former pillar structure to be “a special legal area with individual provisions” (Möstl, 2011, p. 146-147).

Like before the Lisbon Treaty, the CSDP will keep its intergovernmental nature and thus be dominated by the member states with only very little influence of the European Parliament.
and the European Commission, and as in the past, unanimity will stay the key to decision-making between the states since the so-called “qualified majority voting” is not allowed to take place “for any decisions that have military or defence implications” (Möstl, 2011, p. 147).24

Möstl (2011, p. 148) underlines the fact that the ESDP was already preparing quite well before the Lisbon Treaty, which can be seen in its rapid expansion concerning both, its operations as well as its institutional structures. But another fact is also that the evolution of the ESDP seems to have been dominated by “practical day-to-day decisions”, taking into account the different national interests of the EU states, and not by a precise concept (Möstl, 2011, p. 148).

Schroeder (2009, p. 492) equally highlights the absence of a clear, given strategy behind ESDP/CSDP missions since the majority of them were simply launched as the result of “ad hoc”, and above all, of among EU states undisputed decisions, which were rather based on what could be called “a logic of feasibility” than a real strategic concept.

It should be also noted, that although over the years the possible operational spectrum of CSDP, and former ESDP operations clearly became more broad and comprehensive, the European Union was not in possession of its own security strategy before December 2003 (Schroeder, 2009, p. 492). Hence, according to Schroeder (2009, p. 492), one could best describe the evolution of the ESDP as having been mainly a “capability- rather than strategy-driven process”.

This is perhaps also due to the circumstance, that the ESDP, like the CFSP in general, always involved, following Glasius and Kaldor (2005, p. 78), a conflict between two different ideas, namely state security and Human Security.

It is a struggle between two diverging visions of Europe, whereas Human Security stands in the tradition of viewing the European Union as a project dedicated to the idea of peace (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005, pp. 78-79). At the center of this vision is the idea of human equality and thereby the deep conviction that “nation-states can no longer privilege the lives of their own nationals” (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005, p. 79).

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24 For a more detailed overview of the changes through the Lisbon Treaty take a look at Möstl (2011, pp. 146-147).
On the other hand, there exists the notion of a Europe, which should rise to a “super-power” in military terms like the United States, and which is refusing a security policy orientated towards Human Security (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005, p. 80).

As Glasius and Kaldor (2005, p. 78) remark, the so-called “European Security Strategy” (2003) is characterized by putting its emphasis more on the first, the Human Security vision.

The following chapter will analyse this strategy and its meaning for the European Union, respectively the CSDP, with regard to the concept of Human Security.

3.2 The “ESS” 2003: A “strategy” committed to Human Security?

The “European Security Strategy”, also entitled “A secure Europe in a better world” (Council of the European Union, 2003a), was formally approved by the European Council on 12 December 2003, and can be seen as the EU’s most explicit statement on the purpose of its CSDP capacities and on the European Union’s intended role on the world stage (Bailes, 2008, p. 117). It was elaborated under the negative impression of the divide between several EU states regarding the war against Iraq and underlines the EU’s commitment and support of such goals and values as international peace, development, stability and human rights (Bailes, 2008, p. 117).

The strategy starts its introduction with admitting that, especially when having in mind the 20th century’s violence, “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 3).

But at the same time the ESS also points out that the European Union is still confronted with challenges and threats to its security and stresses the importance for the EU “to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 3).

In its first part, the ESS analyses the security situation in the world after the end of the Cold War and describes it as being characterized by borders which are becoming more and more open, and thus by a strong, inseparable link between external and internal security issues (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 4).
The ESS further underlines that in large parts of today’s world people are suffering from poverty, malnutrition, and diseases, among which AIDS is seen as a catastrophic pandemic also responsible for the collapse of many societies, and regards those themes as being of concern for security (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 4). Interestingly, the strategy also states that “security is a precondition of development” and consequently highlights that conflicts lead to the destruction of important infrastructure, cause crime and thereby impede the normal functioning of a country’s economy (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 4).

According to the ESS, the European Union is not threatened in today’s world by a large military aggression against one of its members, but rather needs to deal with several new, and compared to the past more unpredictable “key threats” (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 5). Those threats are first of all, “terrorism”, which has become global in its nature and is targeting Europe as well as using its territory as a logistical base (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 5). Second, the “proliferation of” so-called “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMD), which is regarded by the ESS to hold the potential to grow to the most serious threat to the EU’s security (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 5). Third, “regional conflicts” like the one in the “Great Lakes Region”25, which need to be seen as having direct and indirect negative consequences for the interests of the European Union (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 6). Fourth, the problem of “state failure”, which has its example in such countries as Liberia, Afghanistan and Somalia, and is a factor in causing regional insecurity, while being clearly connected to other menaces like terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 6). Fifth and last, “organised crime” is named by the ESS to constitute a major security threat to European states, involving the illegal trafficking in women, migrants, drugs and weapons (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 6).

In a second part, the “European Security Strategy” then points out three central, “strategic” goals the European Union should pursue in order to ensure its common security as well as to advocate its own values (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 8).

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25 This point should be kept in mind with regard to the in chapter 4 undertaken analysis of the military CSDP missions in the DRC.
First of all, the European Union needs to address the above-mentioned threats – an area where it is seen by the ESS as having already been engaged – and thereby must be aware of the fact that

“In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe” (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 8).

The strategy therefore stresses that unlike in the past, the European Union today often has to defend itself outside the European continent in the first place and needs to put a strong emphasis on preventing crisis and threats from emerging as well as to use more than solely military means to confront the identified security threats (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 9).

The second goal is to create security in Europe’s own “neighbourhood”, which means to make sure that neighbouring states “are well-governed” since violent conflicts, crime, weak institutions and non-functioning societies in those close countries also negatively affect Europe’s security (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 9).

The ESS clearly states that it is the task of the EU

“to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East […] and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 10).

The third and last goal for the European Union consists in supporting “an international order based on effective multilateralism”, on which Europe’s prosperity and security are seen to depend more and more (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 11). The ESS underlines here the importance and the commitment of the European Union to International Law and consequently stresses the central role of the United Nations and its Security Council, which is given, as it is already written in the UN charter26, “the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 11).

Another international institution, explicitly named in the ESS and to be supported by the EU is the “International Criminal Court”, which is as we have already seen in chapter 2 of the thesis of particular relevance with regard to Human Security (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 12).

26 See article 24.1 of the UN Charter.
At the end, the strategy reminds the European Union that to be able to fulfill its described role in “crisis management”, and thereby also a role which corresponds to its real potential, it is crucial for the EU to become “more active, more coherent and more capable” as well as to cooperate “with others” (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 13).

Although the “European Security Strategy” is not using the term “Human Security” at all, it comprehends, as Möstl (2011, p. 149) correctly points out, clear “references to human security thinking”.

By referring to such issues as poverty and diseases, as well as by highlighting the importance of security for development, the ESS understands security as much more than solely state and military security (Möstl, 2011 p. 149). Given the fact that development themes are taking a prominent place within the strategy, one could indeed state that the ESS is at least partially and implicitly following a broad Human Security vision (Möstl, 2011, p. 149).

According to Keane (2006, p. 46), the “European Security Strategy” rather has to be regarded as combining Human Security and realist interests, which can best be seen in its central thought “that their security out there effects our security in here”. This is also already reflected in its title “A secure Europe in a better world” (Council of the European Union, 2003a), which signals that the goal is to keep Europe safe while at the same time the world should be made better, and thereby equally gives to understand that both ambitions are in fact connected and complementary (Keane, 2006, pp. 41-42).

This point of view is also shared by Flechtner (2006, p. 161), for whom the ESS is married to what she calls “a defense-oriented argument” as well as to a “commitment to international peace and order”.

For Flechtner (2006, p. 161), the strategy is, however, not offering any responses to important and central strategic issues for the CSDP, in particular not regarding the question of intervention. As before, it stays quite unclear with the ESS when the European Union has to intervene and even more important under what circumstances the EU should make use of its military force (Flechtner, 2006, p. 161). Flechtner (2006, p. 161) therefore characterizes the ESS in the words of Lindley-French and Algieri (2004, p. 9) as being “a 'pre-strategic concept’”.

Following Biscop (2009, p. 367), the “European Security Strategy” nevertheless also exceeded high expectations in one particular point, namely in so far as that it has anything but disappeared from the European political stage since 2003. Hence, its role in “forging the
EU’s identity as an international actor” should not be underestimated (Biscop, 2009, p. 368).

But on the other hand, Biscop (2009, p. 368) also points out that the impact of the strategy on past policies of the European Union has been rather insufficient. The reason therefore lies in the nature of the ESS, which is not defining clear, measurable objectives but instead formulates “a holistic approach”, which involves all existing EU/CSDP instruments (Biscop, 2009, p. 368).

The first time Human Security was explicitly named and promoted within the European Union was then after the ESS in the year 2004, where a group of academics and practitioners handed over the so-called “Barcelona Report” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004) to the former “High Representative” Javier Solana (Martin and Owen, 2010, p. 217). Like the later released “Madrid Report” (Human Security Study Group, 2007), it was elaborated under the coordination of Mary Kaldor and belongs together with the former report to the most significant research works undertaken until now regarding the Human Security idea and its role for the European Union (Möstl, 2011, p. 141). Both reports will be discussed in the next chapter.

3.3 Promoting HS as a strategy for the EU and its CSDP

3.3.1 The “Barcelona Report” 2004: Offering a European “Human Security Doctrine”\(^\text{27}\)

“The most appropriate role for Europe in the twenty-first century would be to promote human security” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 29).

The famous “Barcelona Report”, better known under its more familiar title “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004), shares the view that the European Union has to become more involved in supporting “global security”, and clearly describes itself as an attempt to develop further and realise the ESS

\(^{27}\) (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004).
It promotes an on Human Security based “doctrine” for the European Union, which consists of three parts, namely seven different principles related to missions, a so-called “Human Security Response Force”, and a central “legal framework” regarding the missions taking place as well as regarding the decision-making on intervening or not intervening (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 5).

Although the report starts by stating that the insecurity of people can indeed be related to diseases or natural disasters, it immediately stresses that in a large number of cases people’s insecurity rather results from conflicts which are characterized by the targeting of the civilian population on purpose (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 7). Consequently, Human Security is understood in the “Barcelona Report” as “referring to freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 5). As such insecurities are seen by the report first and foremost genocide as well as for instance slavery or torture (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 9).

Following this definition, the report further underlines its emphasis on the European Union’s capabilities required “for dealing with situations of severe physical insecurity, ‘freedom from fear’,” and not on all possible CFSP fields and instruments (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 8).

Hence, given these rather clear statements at the beginning of the report, there can only be little doubt that the “Barcelona Report” is in fact strongly in favour and supportive of a more narrow understanding of Human Security, whose characteristics have been described in chapter 2.2.2.

A central theme of the report and its conclusions is its analysis regarding the present “changed global context”, which stands for a world distinguishing itself by a “global interconnectedness” and in which the “character” of conflicts is seen to have altered fundamentally (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 8). By speaking of so-called “new wars” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 8), the report reflects the ideas and wording of Mary Kaldor, who has been using and promoting this phrase since the mid-1990s (Kaldor, 2007, p. 2). For Kaldor (2007, p. 2), those “new wars” need to be differentiated from former, “old wars”, which were carried out between countries’ official armies, whose confrontation stood at the very centre.

As pointed out in the report, “new wars” occurred for instance in Central Asia or Africa as a result of collapsing states, and one of their principal characteristics is that violence is mainly
affecting civilians, with "population displacement" as "a typical feature" (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 8).

Furthermore, the report stresses that this new kind of wars are easily crossing borders, with local as well as international actors, and different military forces beyond regular armies being involved, and thus they are making common differentiations regarding conflicts such as external vs. internal or private vs. public become indistinct (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, pp. 8-9).

According to the report, the European Union has to respond to this "new global context" by a security policy which is based on and pursues Human Security, in addition to state security (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 9). This implies that the EU needs to make efforts towards protecting "every individual human being" instead of being only concerned with defending its own borders (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 9).

The report names three concrete reasons explaining the necessity for the European Union to pursue the concept of Human Security (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 9).

First of all, due to our common, universal human nature, there exists a “moral” argument demanding from the European Union to help those humans whose lives and security are threatened (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 9).

Second, there is a “legal” dimension, which means that by assuming that human security is “a narrower category of protection of human rights”, the European Union, as well as other countries, has indeed a legal responsibility to deal with and confront issues of Human Security globally (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 10). As the basis therefore is cited by the report the UN charter, and more precisely its articles 55 and 56, which refer to the promotion of human rights (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 10).

Third, pursuing Human Security is for the European Union also a matter of “enlightened self-interest” since people in Europe are not able to enjoy security if at the same time people in another world region are facing extreme, serious insecurity (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 10). Security problems emerging from and going hand in hand with conflicts and failing states, like human trafficking, the drug and small arms trade or the more generally, dangerous “brutalisation of” individuals, are not restricted to their region of origin, but instead also expanding to other parts of the world, which includes the European Union (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 10). Hence, the
report partially concludes that in order “to be secure, in today’s world, Europeans need to make a contribution to global security” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 7). When it comes to the central theme of the report, the possible deployment of a military European mission related to a “situation of severe insecurity”, the report states that such missions would be carried out in accordance with the – already earlier mentioned – “Petersberg Tasks”, with the principal objective being “to uphold human rights and to act in support of law and order” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 10). The report is also realistic by admitting that the capacity of the European Union as well as its political determination to launch military operations is rather restricted, which makes the prioritizing of cases according to specific factors necessary (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 11). These factors to be kept in mind are first, the urgent and severe character of a situation, second, the given risks and the possibility of success of an operation, third, a stronger obligation to help people in neighbouring states, fourth, historic relations with other countries, and fifth and last, the needed support for a mission coming from the public (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, pp. 11-12). The very heart of the “Barcelona Report” and of the therein offered “new European security doctrine” constitute seven different principles, referring to the realization as well as to the objectives of the security policy of the EU, and thereby equally to the instruments as well as the goals of launched missions (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 14). The first among these principles is “the primacy of human rights”, which stands for the imperative to clearly protect and respect fundamental human rights like those related to life, housing and free opinion also during conflicts (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, pp. 14-15). The report highlights that the mission’s personnel has to restrain from killing and injuring people as well as from destroying infrastructure except in cases where this is really inevitable and legally allowed, and further needs to bear in mind that protecting civilians and not the enemy’s destruction is the main interest (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 15). The second principle is what the report calls “clear political authority” and underlines that a strategy based on Human Security should be primarily aimed at the (re-)creation of a “legitimate political authority” which is able to guarantee Human Security (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 15). In order to guarantee that this objective is truly
respected by all EU missions, it is of crucial importance for the European Union to be in complete political control and command of its launched operations, and therefore a civilian, most preferably a politician, needs to be in charge of an operation (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 16).

As a third principle “multilateralism” is named by the report, which is seen to comprehend first, the cooperation with international organisations, in particular with the UN, as well as with diverse regional organisations like the African Union (AU), second, the central role of shared norms and rules, and third, coordination instead of rivalry and competition between the different involved EU and non-EU actors (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, pp. 16-17).

The fourth principle is the so-called “bottom-up approach” implying that decisions on specific policies and on all questions related to a possible intervention, have to be based on “the most basic needs” that the people facing violence identify by themselves (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 17). According to the report, it is exactly those persons with whom a permanent dialogue, consultation and cooperation are deeply required, giving an insight into which strategies are best, as well as offering information relevant to early warning and the evaluation of operations (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 17). As the report stresses, a mission’s success largely relies on involving local people also in the carrying out of missions’ objectives and not just on consulting them for needed information (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 18).

The fifth principle highlights the need for a “regional focus” since “new wars”, as has already been analysed above, are understood as not knowing definite boundaries and as spreading to other locations in the form of refugees or violent and criminal activities (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 18). Interestingly, the report explicitly mentions the negative example of the “Great Lakes Region” on the African continent by criticizing the past engagement of the UN to have been mostly about “piecemeal interventions confined to one state, whilst refugees and combatants crossed borders back and forth” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 19).

The sixth principle is about the “use of legal instruments”, which means that not only the diplomatic decision-making regarding the question if an intervention is needed, but also the very way in which such an operation is carried out later on, have to be based on law, especially international law (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 19).
is essential that the soldiers participating in European missions are operating “within a legal framework that applies to individuals”, signifying that there must exist clear “codes of behaviour for” all EU deployments as well as sanctions in case those rules are violated by soldiers (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 19). Furthermore, the report stresses that such persons as war criminals, terrorists, and people responsible for human rights abuses also deserve to receive just trials which have to fully respect “international human rights standards” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 20).

The seventh and last principle concerns the “appropriate use of force”, making clear that people’s protection and the minimisation of victims, and not the soldiers’ lives are the principal concern of missions, and thus the “key” is “minimum force” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 20). In this regard, the functioning and tasks of “human security forces” correspond more to those of the normal police, which can be generally described as saving other people by often risking their own lives, although however “killing in extremis” stays a possible action (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 20).

According to the report, two central “capabilities” are needed enabling the EU to put into practice a security policy which follows the highlighted seven principles (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 20). The first one of these two capabilities is a so-called “Human Security Response Force”, encompassing about 15,000 people, from the military as well as civilians, and whereof civilian specialists and policemen constitute not less than a third of the total force (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 22). A part of 5,000 people from this force needs to be “at a high level of readiness”, forming what the report calls “Human Security Task Forces”, which are continuously having common trainings, and are deployable “at short notice” within only some days, and another part of 10,000 people holding common exercises only periodically, and thus “being at a lower level of readiness” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 22).

A third part of the force comprehends personnel occupied with the missions’ strategic planning as well as “a civil-military crisis management centre”, which both have to be established, following the report, upon the already existing, and in Brussels based EU headquarters responsible for “civil-military planning” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 22).
As the report points out, the civilian contingent of the force is to be made up of medical staff, doctors, human rights observers, legal specialists, policemen, humanitarian workers, and others (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 22). A further important feature of the force, which deserves to be underlined, is without any doubt its demanded multinational character, explicitly mentioned in the report (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 23).

In addition to this “Human Security Force”, the European Union necessitates according to the report as a second central capability “a legal framework” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 24). Given the lack of an undisputed, coherent and single “body of international law governing foreign deployments”, the EU, besides making efforts towards developing clear international rules, has to elaborate a genuine European legal framework for its operations abroad, which covers four issues (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 24).

First, the mission’s personnel must be, just in the same way as the local citizens, bound to the host country’s domestic law, although there might exist situations, where the latter is either in clear opposition to international law or has lost its power, and hence for which the framework equally is in demand to provide orientation (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 25).

Second, it is crucial that the framework deals with and averts that the mission’s personnel is treated unequally due to given differences in the domestic laws of EU countries (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 25). The report hereby highly welcomes the elaboration of “common rules of engagement”, which are however only seen as a short-term solution (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 25).

Third, it has to be taken into account by the framework that conflicts could arise between various dimensions of international law, especially between “humanitarian law”, which concerns the regulation of acts normally considered as illegal like the killing of military adversaries, and on the other hand human rights, which should be given priority over the former (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 25).

Fourth and last, the framework must contain and explain “complaints procedures”, which can be utilized by the local people of a conflict region just as by the mission’s personnel itself (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 26).

For Matláry (2008, p. 139), the above analysed “Barcelona Report” constitutes the very first coherent effort towards the elaboration of an intervention policy which is founded on
“individual rights to security”, and hence Human Security, with regard to both, legal and policy principles on the one hand\(^{28}\) as well as the required “civilian-military integration” on the other hand.

Nevertheless Matláry (2008, p. 140) sees the report quite critical, in particular when it comes to the report’s goal of establishing a “Human Security Response Force”, which is qualified by her as being an unrealistic overestimation of military capacities, especially if compared to the “battle-groups”, which involve only 1,500 soldiers.

As another, however indirect criticism on the report’s principle seven\(^{29}\), and to a certain degree also on principle one\(^{30}\), Matláry’s (2008, p. 142) statement referring to “military reality” could be seen. According to her,

> “An operation like the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which would fit the criteria of a human security operation, has to undertake offensive war-fighting when the enemy no longer ‘behaves’. The same holds for any modern peace enforcement operation. It is naive to think that an operation will develop differently if we label it ‘human security’” (Matláry, 2008, p. 142).

Duffield (2007, p. 116) for his part criticizes the idea of a given “changing nature of conflict”, which is, following him, not meeting reality since most conflicts after 1945 were, in contrast to widespread beliefs, already indeed internal or civil. For Duffield (2007, pp. 116-117) the only actual difference between conflicts in Cold War times and those after 1990 lies in the fact that nowadays “the international community of effective states [...] denies any legitimacy to warring parties within ineffective ones” (Duffield, 2007, p. 117).

Furthermore, Duffield (2007, p. 128) points at a problematic underlying the “enlightened self-interest”, which is that this thought could lead into the direction that the development of other people only becomes a matter of interest when it touches one’s own security. Hence, all areas and concerns that are not visibly and clearly connected to one’s own – and in our case Europe’s – security, risk “to fall by the wayside” (Duffield, 2007, p. 128).

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\(^{28}\) This has already been done before, as Matláry (2008, p. 139) remarks, by the “ICISS report”, which has been analysed in chapter 2.2.2.3 of the thesis.

\(^{29}\) the “appropriate use of force” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 20).

3.3.2 The “Madrid Report” 2007

The “Barcelona Report” was followed in 2007 by a second report coming from the “Human Security Study Group” (2007), the so-called “Madrid Report”, also named “A European Way of Security”, which continued, as Martin and Owen (2010, p. 217) point out, the agenda of the first report and developed the Human Security approach further.

In this report, the “Human Security Study Group” (2007, p. 7) calls upon the European Union to determine and pursue a genuine “European Way of Security”, which follows clear principles of Human Security, and which thereby would allow the EU to make more effective crisis interventions in the future.

Such a “way of security” needs to put its emphasis on people’s and communities’ protection, and at the same time also on “the interrelationship between ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’” (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 8). The report explicitly underlines that although the civilian dimension of security is highlighted, it nevertheless constitutes “a hard security policy” (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 8).

However, the report also states that the difference between military Human Security engagement and neo-imperialist operations consists in the multilateral nature of the former as well as in the distinct way the military is making use of its force (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 10). The report thereby reacts to certain criticism which stresses that Human Security is only instrumentalized “to justify liberal interventionism and a new European militarism” (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 10) 31.

For the “Human Security Study Group” (2007, p. 11), the approach of Human Security offers the possibility to the European Union to improve and better coordinate all its already existing actions under one common idea, respectively label, and thus to enhance “the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of European security policy”.

The core of the Human Security concept suggested by the “Madrid Report” forms the elaborated principles in the “Barcelona report”, though the initial seven principles have now been reduced to six by excluding “the appropriate use of force” as well as “the use of legal instruments” from being specifically named since they are regarded as inherent in the remaining principles (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 9). In return, another new principle, which is “clear and transparent strategic direction”, was added by the “Human

31 As one author raising such a criticism could be cited Marischka (2006) (see Bibliography).
Security Study Group” (2007, p. 9). It stands for the need for the European Union that all its external interventions have to be accompanied by transparent mission mandates, an unambiguous legal authorisation, and a general strategy that is coherent (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 10).

On its final pages, the “Madrid report” presents several interesting recommendations, whose goal it is to bring Human Security forward within the EU (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 23).

First, it suggests the signing of “a Public Declaration of Human Security Principles”, either as a charter or a simple protocol, by all countries of the European Union (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 23). This declaration should include the central values of the EU with regard to global missions, and consequently serve as a source for deciding at which moment and in which places and crises the European Union is willing to intervene (Human Security Study Group, 2007, pp. 23-24).

Second, it promotes “a new strategic framework for ESDP missions”, which is aware of the fact that the objective of any crisis intervention constitutes ultimately not the creation of a long military occupation, but the re-establishing of “politics as normal” (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 24).

Third and last, the report also names certain concrete measures to be adopted by the European Union, encompassing the introduction of specific “Human Security ESDP mandates”, the distribution of so-called “‘Human Security’ cards” among the mission’s participants, including and explaining the six HS principles, the evaluation of all ESDP operations on the basis of those same principles, and their integration into civilian as well as military trainings (Human Security Study Group, 2007, pp. 24-25).

Despite those recommendations, and despite the already analysed “Madrid-” and the before in 3.3.1 discussed “Barcelona report”, the Human Security concept has, according to Möstl (2011, p. 148), rarely been mentioned until now in an explicit way in official ESDP papers and documents. However, if one looks at the practical ESDP shape, it seems that the idea of Human Security was indeed “at least occasionally [...] in the back of the decision makers’ minds”, as the last chapter of the third part of the thesis will show (Möstl, 2011, p. 148).
3.4 A concept already put into place? The CSDP and its present HS dimension

As Möstl (2011, p. 148) points out, the "Treaty on European Union" already contains a general statement in favor of a broad Human Security vision in its article 21, which refers to the EU’s goals in its external actions. The Treaty therein names such fundamental objectives as conflict prevention, an engagement for peace as well as international security, and the support of human rights, democracy and international law (Möstl, 2011, pp. 148-149, see also TEU, article 21).

Even though the formulation of these objectives is quite general, it should nevertheless not be overseen that the European Council has an obligation to stick to them (Möstl, 2011, p. 149).

Further elements of Human Security can be found following Möstl (2011, p. 149) in the ESS – as it has already been shown in chapter 3.2 – as well as in the 2008 approved "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy" (Council of the European Union, 2008). With regard to the latter document it should be noted that it constitutes the very first time that “Human Security” is explicitly mentioned by the Council, which considers it “as central to the EU’s particular strategic goals” (Martin and Owen, 2010, p. 216). The 2008 report is not a substitute for the ESS nor making it irrelevant, but rather strengthening the strategy while equally supporting a broad Human Security vision (Möstl, 2011, p. 149).

Another element of Human Security is visible in the European Union’s adherence to multilateralism and its refusal of unilateral actions, a criterion which is of importance for the narrow as well as the broad Human Security conception (Möstl, 2011, p. 149). Besides cooperating closely with the UN, the EU also involves third countries in its CSDP missions, whose mandates always contained multilateral aspects in the past, like a resolution by the UN Security Council or a request coming from the host country (Möstl, 2011, p. 150).

A further support for the goal of Human Security can be detected according to Möstl (2011, p. 150) in the EU’s dedication to the “Petersberg tasks” and their integration into the TEU, which proves the readiness of EU states to fight different insecurities. The clear CSDP emphasis on crisis situations thereby needs to be seen also as a logical necessity given the current power distribution between the Council and the EU Commission (Möstl, 2011, p. 150). This is stressed in a decision by the “European Court of Justice” which states that every
“action which has more than one objective, e.g. development and security, and the competence for one of these fields lies with the Community, the respective action must be taken under the Community” (Möstl, 2011, p. 150).

With its ruling, the Court emphasizes the need for the Council to clearly concentrate on “crisis management”, hence making operations aimed at the prevention of conflicts impossible (Möstl, 2011, pp. 150-151).

As another sign of embracing Human Security could be seen the European Union’s official backing and endorsement of the earlier discussed “responsibility to protect” in the context of the 2005 UN World Summit, although it must be highlighted that the EU has avoided since then to devote itself to this topic, and it stays rather uncertain in which way the EU is really willing to carry out such a “responsibility” (Möstl, 2011, p. 152).

Furthermore, the EU’s engagement regarding Human Rights, whose protection constitutes a major Human Security theme, needs to be taken into account when looking at the European Union and its CSDP from a Human Security perspective (Möstl, 2011, p. 153). As Möstl (2011, p. 153) points out, the EU is striving towards “mainstreaming human rights into ESDP operations”, which can be seen in various initiatives such as the suggestion to include “human rights advisors” in the mission planning as well as in the missions themselves.

In addition, the European Union puts an increasing focus in its “crisis management operations” on civilians and so-called “vulnerable groups” protection by incorporating related initiatives into the CSDP structure (Möstl, 2011, p. 153). Starting in 2003, various “guidelines” directed at the CSDP have passed the Council, providing clear standards to be respected in launched CSDP operations (Benedek, 2011, p. 25). Having been motivated and influenced to a great degree by UN Security Council resolutions, they refer, among others, to the “Protection of Civilians (2003)”, to “Children in Armed Conflict (2003/2008)”, to the “Protection of Women in Armed Conflict (2005)”, to “Standards of Behaviour for ESDP Operations (2005)”, and to “Human Rights and Gender Mainstreaming (2006)” (Benedek, 2011, p. 25). Hence, according to Möstl (2011, p. 154), the CSDP clearly touches, in its theory, the narrow, “freedom from fear” Human Security component to which the question of protecting vulnerable people in conflicts and their aftermath is deeply linked.

As another interesting factor with regard to Human Security “the inclusiveness of the ESDP” can be named, which stands for the involvement of such actors as think-tanks, civil society and academics in CSDP activities, although to a limited extent only (Möstl, 2011, p. 154). The European Union is more and more appreciating experience and know-how coming
from non-governmental actors, which is for instance reflected in the fact that NGOs are informing the members of the so-called “Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)” (Möstl, 2011, p. 154).

However, despite all the above-analysed given Human Security elements in the CSDP, it doesn’t appear as if Human Security interests are, at the moment, of any great importance when it comes to the European Union’s decisions in which cases and at what time to launch a CSDP intervention (Möstl, 2011, p. 156).

In conclusion, one could state following Möstl (2011, p. 157), that human security themes, in particular the ones belonging to a narrow definition, are indeed very present, although largely in an implicit and non-comprehensive way, in the developing of the CSDP’s “conceptual framework”. As has been shown, the CSDP’s emphasis on the narrow Human Security vision can thereby be regarded as a structural necessity since the CSDP’s intended nature lies in responding to conflicts and crises, and the Council’s competences are thus restricted (Möstl, 2011, p. 157).

Nevertheless, with regard to the European Union at large, and taking into account various tendencies like the EU’s awareness of the interrelation between the fields of development and security, it could even be argued that the EU is pursuing generally a broad Human Security concept (Möstl, 2011, p. 157).

In this context, Möstl (2011, p. 144) highlights three central tendencies in policies of the European Union, which stand for a certain turning away from traditional security conceptions.

First of all, an important objective and activity of the EU is the export of peace, security and stability to states around the world through a large variety of means, whereof the so-called “Instrument for Stability” and the “African Peace Facility” constitute two recent initiatives (Möstl, 2011, p. 144). The latter was established by the EU in 2004 and is aimed at creating and strengthening local, African capacities by primarily supporting the operations of the African Union (AU), but also the work of further regional organisations on the African continent (Keane, 2006, p. 49). On the one hand, the “African Peace Facility” could be seen as a sign of EU’s dedication to a “global responsibility to protect”, whereas on the other hand, and from a more critical point of view, it could serve as an excuse for the European Union’s unwillingness to deploy soldiers to future African peace missions (Keane, 2006, p. 49).
Furthermore, the European Union supports several development programs, offers humanitarian aid, carries forward the “European Neighbourhood Policy”, and regards the prevention of conflicts as a central foreign policy goal (Möstl, 2011, p. 144).

Second, the issues taken into consideration by the European Union with regard to security are clearly broadening and encompass now even threats like climate change, while at the same time the EU also began to confront threats to its security which are stemming from non-state actors such as terrorists (Möstl, 2011, p. 145).

As a third tendency needs to be seen according to Möstl (2011, p. 146) that various themes which are essential to the Human Security approach are referred to and dealt with by the EU states in different common strategy papers and legislative documents. Together the three described tendencies reveal the EU’s changing threats perception, although it must be underlined that they are not the outcome of an explicit impact of the Human Security approach, but instead going back to specific initiatives (Möstl, 2011, p. 146). Given the emphasis of the European Union on non-coercive methods, economic development, and long-term programs in order to reduce the insecurity of humans, one could consequently speak of clear “parallels [...] with broad conceptualisations of human security” (Möstl, 2011, p. 146).

Like Möstl, Kotsopoulos (2007, p. 222) also stresses the view that the European Union already implicitly dedicates itself in diverse fields to topics related to Human Security. He thereby names among others the European Union’s engagement regarding DDR and SSR, its support of democracy as well as human rights, its humanitarian and development financing, and its CSDP crisis management (Kotsopoulos, 2007, pp. 222-223). According to Kotsopoulos (2007, pp. 229-230), the European Union could thus indeed be described as being already a relevant actor in areas of importance to Human Security, but whose initiatives and activities nevertheless still “lack a common thread” (Kotsopoulos, 2007, p. 230).

Such an analysis would probably not be shared by others like Bailes (2008, p. 120), who points instead at the EU’s readiness and indifference to “hurt” humans through the pursuing of its self-interests in its non-military policies. According to her it needs to be taken into account that

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32 “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration” (Kotsopoulos, 2007, p. 222).
33 “Security Sector Reform” (Kotsopoulos, 2007, p. 222).
“EU trade policies hurt the same weak states the EU tries to heal through its ESDP missions and security advice; tough EU immigration and asylum policies throw individuals back to the same environments that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) defines as an offence against human values” (Bailes, 2008, p. 120).

For Bailes (2008, p. 120), the European Union, apart from its engagement regarding development, climate change as well as some other areas, is acting quite egoistic in all non-defence related international policies, whereas it is at the same time trying to act altruistically in and with its policies concerning security and defence.

This critical perspective brings us back to the CSDP into which, following Möstl (2011, p. 158) – and as it has been shown in this chapter –, a lot of issues touching Human Security have been incorporated by the way of “mainstreaming”. However, Möstl (2011, p. 158) correctly reminds, that the act of mainstreaming alone is not enough and that the given CSDP concepts of course need to be put into practice if people’s insecurity really ought to be confronted and reduced. He further stresses that therefore the concepts must also be included into the mission mandates to strengthen their visibility and most of all to achieve their legal bindingness (Möstl, 2011, p. 158).

If this has already been done with regard to the EU’s two military CSDP missions in the DRC is one of the aspects which will be analysed in the following last part of this thesis.
4. Securing humans? The military CSDP missions in the DRC

The last part of the thesis will now analyse the two military CSDP missions carried out by the European Union in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and 2006 with regard to the concept and ideas of Human Security. Chapter 4.1 thereby focuses on the first EU mission called “Artemis” and chapter 4.2 on the second mission named “EUFOR RDC”.

Both chapters begin with a general overview of the respective mission, then take a closer look at the mission mandates in order to reveal their existing or non-existing Human Security content, before critically evaluating in a second step the two missions in general regarding their Human Security character and impact on the Human Security situation on the ground.

The basis for the undertaken analysis are the parameters and definitions of Human Security explained in detail in chapter 2 as well as chapter 3.3 of the thesis.

Furthermore, chapter 4.1.1 also comprehends a short introduction on the DRC’s recent conflict history, although a clear emphasis is kept on the concrete circumstances and events leading to the first military EU mission in the country.

34 Especially those of a narrow version with the explanations given in chapter 3.4.
4.1 Operation “Artemis” 2003

4.1.1 General mission facts

For nearly two decades now, the Democratic Republic of Congo has been a politically highly instable country which was confronted in its recent history with two main wars, whereof the first one lasted from 1996 to 1997 and the second one from 1998 to 2003 (Hoebek, 2007, p. 44). These wars were not only the outcome of internal political conflicts, but also of great instability and power competition within the so-called larger “Great Lakes Region” (Hoebek, 2007, p. 44).
Whereas the war of 1996-1997 was about the victory of Laurent-Désiré Kabila over long-term dictator and President Mobutu, the second war began in 1998 as a military confrontation between Kabila on the one side and Uganda and Rwanda, which were initially supporting Kabila in 1996, on the other side (Hoebeke, 2007, p. 44). Ending in 2003, this second war, which soon became referred to as “Africa’s first world war”, took almost five years, with up to nine different African states participating, and resulted according to estimations in 3 million deaths, around 500,000 refugees and 2 million people internally displaced (Baregu, 2006, p. 63).

The signing of the “Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement” already in July 1999 and the following deployment of “MONUC”35 for its implementation in November the same year, changed little since the support of the different actors for the agreement signed by them was anything but strong and since MONUC was not provided with the needed human as well as financial resources to be able to exercise control over a country that is as huge as whole West Europe (Morsut, 2009, p. 262).

In 2000 the conflict was coming to a political and military deadlock with none of the involved conflict parties having the required capacities to finally gain the confrontation (Hoebeke, 2007, p. 44).

The decisive moment arrived much later in January 2001, when Laurent Kabila was assassinated and power was consequently transferred to Joseph Kabila, his son, who from there on succeeded in pushing back the various rebel groups including their foreign supporters (Hoebeke, 2007, pp. 44-45). Furthermore, Joseph Kabila was in clear favour of the 1999 agreement, which put MONUC now into the position to start with its “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” tasks in the country (Morsut, 2009, p. 262).

In addition, a complicated period of negotiations between conflict parties began with the so-called “Inter-Congolese Dialogue” in October 2001, and ended in December 2002 in Pretoria with achieving the important “Global and All-inclusive Agreement”, which, at least officially, brought the long enduring war to an end and which was followed by the signing of the “Final Act” in Sun City in April the next year (Morsut, 2009, pp. 262-263).

Despite the formation of a “National Unity and Transition” government on the basis of the agreements and its inauguration on the first July 2003, violence was continuing throughout

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35 “UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (Brittain and Conchiglia, 2006, p. 78).
the whole DRC, and in particular in the country’s northeast region Ituri, which was afflicted by ethnic tensions going hand in hand with confrontations between Rwandan, Ugandan and the DRC armed forces (Morsut, 2009, p. 263).

The time of transition was planned to take only two years, although with the possibility to be extended twice for 6 months, and with all responsible actors to work on such essential issues as the country’s unification, the creation of a Congolese army, and nationwide democratic elections (Hoebek, 2007, p. 45).

As the consequence of an agreement reached between Uganda and the DRC in 2002 during the “Inter-Congolese Dialogue”, Ugandan soldiers had to leave the Ituri province, which in February 2003 caused the breakout of combats between the, by the ethnic group Hema controlled “Front de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri”, in short the “FPRI”, and the by Lendu led “Union des patriotes congolais”, the “UPC”, resulting in a huge humanitarian catastrophe with over 500,000 displaced people (Helly, 2009, p. 182).

To confront the ongoing violence, MONUC brought into existence the so-called “Ituri Pacification Commission” in April 2003, whose initially positive impact on the situation was soon reversed when in May violent confrontations re-emerged in the region, first and foremost in Bunia, the region’s capital city (Morsut, 2009, p. 263).

The UN mission was thereby facing one enormous problem, namely its clear overstretch given the DRC’s size, making it impossible to send enough soldiers to the Ituri province by that time, which meant that MONUC was not only incapable of protecting the citizens of Bunia but also of protecting itself since even its headquarters came under attack (Morsut, 2009, p. 263).

Given this catastrophic situation, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was demanding France to take control over a multinational intervention force which should be launched and operating until MONUC is successfully reinforced in the field by the strongly needed UN soldiers (Helly, 2009, p. 182). After the French requirements for such a mission, which were the provision of a strong UN mandate, a temporal and geographical limitation, as well as its political acceptance by Rwanda and Uganda were met, France agreed to launch a military mission on May 16, first called “Mamba”, and further convinced its EU partners to realize the mission within the ESDP framework (Helly, 2009, p. 182).

With its resolution 1484 (2003) the UN Security Council then approved under reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter the launch of the so-called “Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF)” on 30 May (Morsut, 2009, p. 263). As it is written in the
Security Council mandate, this force is supposed to be active “until 1 September 2003 [...] in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC” (UN-SC Res. 1484, 2003, p. 2).

In the following the Council of the EU authorized the military mission on 5 June 2003, with its “Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP” (Council of the European Union, 2003b), which was from then on named “Artemis” and which began its operations seven days later on 12 June (Morsut, 2009, p. 263).

Once on the ground, the EU mission was commanded by two French Generals, and furthermore it was also France which was contributing the greatest part of the armed forces with 1,785 French personnel participating, given the mission’s total strength of around 2,000 soldiers (Helly, 2009, p. 181 + p. 183). Whereas the mission’s Force Headquarters (FHQ) was set up in the neighboring country Uganda next to the airport of Entebbe, the mission’s Operational Headquarters (OHQ) encompassing about 80 not only, but mostly French officers was situated far away in Paris (Helly, 2009, p. 183).

This seems logical given the fact that France had been appointed to fulfill the role of the “framework nation” of the mission36, in which apart from France a number of other EU- as well as non-European states were involved (Olsen, 2009, p. 251). To be more concrete, 14 EU members including such countries as Belgium, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany, and further three states from outside the European Union, namely South Africa, Canada and Brazil were sending personnel to the ESDP mission (Helly, 2009, p. 183).

The end of “Artemis” came after just three months with all ESDP soldiers having been out of Bunia on the 6th September 2003, and their replacement through a 5,000 people strong new contingent from the UN, consisting of soldiers from Nepal, Pakistan, India, Indonesia and Bangladesh (Helly, 2009, p. 183).

4.1.2 The mission mandate and its Human Security dimension

Already mentioned above, two legal documents are determining the mandate of the ESDP mission “Artemis”, and these are first of all, the resolution 1484 of the United Nations Security Council (2003) and second, the “Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP” of the Council of the European Union (2003b).

In the following both documents should be analysed separately regarding their Human Security character.

4.1.2.1 UN-SC Resolution 1484

Contrary to the author’s quiet hope, the resolution 1484 of the UN Security Council (2003) from 30 May is neither containing the term “Human Security” nor referring to it explicitly. A fact which alone of course does not disqualify the resolution in general from addressing and containing elements of Human Security.

The resolution starts with highlighting the Council’s “utmost concern at the fighting and atrocities in Ituri, as well as the gravity of the humanitarian situation in the town of Bunia” (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 1). To get a better impression of what the Council is exactly meaning by this statement, a look into broader literature, as for instance into the description of the “events” in the DRC by Brittain and Conchiglia (2006, p. 78) might be helpful. According to them,

“The security situation in the Ituri district in Oriental Province was rapidly deteriorating: various militias, including thousands of young children, were laying waste towns, looting, raping, carrying out massacres, causing tens of thousands of people to flee their homes” (Brittain and Conchiglia, 2006, p. 78).

Hence, there can be little doubt, also given the remarks in chapter 4.1.1, that the security of individuals in the given region was clearly threatened, and more precisely, threatened by direct, extreme violence.

In its resolution 1484, the Security Council regards the conflict in Bunia and Ituri to be not only “a threat to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” but also a menace “to the peace and security in the Great Lakes region” (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2). This means that at least with these words, the Council is stressing the conflict’s regional dimension, although this alone does not really meet the criteria of a “regional focus” as it has been defined by the “Barcelona Report” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 18), which even criticizes past UN missions in the region with regard to this principle of Human Security as has been shown in chapter 3.3.1.

The most important part of the resolution with regard to the research questions of the thesis concerns of course the concrete tasks the “Artemis” force was mandated to carry out, and

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37 See chapter 3.3.1.
which are named in the very first paragraph of the resolution (cf. UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2).

The UN Security Council therein states, while referring to chapter VII of the UN charter, that the mission’s aim is

“to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town” (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2).

The still called “Interim Emergency Multinational Force” is thereby assigned to operate “until 1 September 2003 […] in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC, in particular its contingent currently deployed in the town” (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2).

With this mandate, the ESDP “Artemis” mission can be seen as having clearly been tasked to deal with “issues” in the DRC which are of central importance to the Human Security concept, and more precisely to its narrow, the “freedom from fear” emphasizing version. However, the UN Security Council mandate is of course at the same time also touching one of the concerns of a broad Human Security approach, as understood by UNDP, and that is “personal security” (UNDP, 1994, p. 30).

The UN-SC resolution names “internally displaced persons” as well as “the civilian population”, and hence individuals, whose security needs to be protected (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2). In this way, it follows the focus of the Human Security approach, although it must be critically remarked that the resolution is apparently, given the order of tasks, considering “the protection of the airport” as a more important goal than protecting IDPs (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2). Furthermore, the phrase “if the situation requires it” in relation to the mission’s objective to make a contribution to the security of civilians, leaves a problematic space for different interpretations, which could result in a rather hesitant implementation of this important goal (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2).

What is clearly missing in the UN Security Council resolution 1484 with regard to Human Security is an explicit reference to the taking into account of human rights by the mission’s soldiers in their actions. Even though the resolution is urging in its paragraph 7 “that all Congolese parties and all States in the Great Lakes region respect human rights”, this

38 see chapter 2.2.1.1.
39 ‘Internally Displaced Persons’.
obviously does not seem to apply or play a major role for the mission itself (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2).

The resolution is also not paying any attention in the description of the mission’s tasks to two other Human Security principles established by the “Barcelona Report”, namely to the “bottom-up approach” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 17) and to the “appropriate use of force” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 20).

There is also no sign in any of the 10 paragraphs of the resolution that the mission itself should be addressing any issue related to the broader “freedom from want” dimension of the Human Security approach, although by being mandated “to contribute to [...] the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia” (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2), the mission could be seen as indirectly helping through its engagement to deliver food and also health security\(^{40}\).

On the other hand, with regard to multilateralism, the Security Council resolution is explicitly speaking of a “multinational force” and thus highlighting once more the multilateral character of the authorized military operation (UN Security Council, 2003, p. 2). This aspect of “Artemis” will however be revived again critically in chapter 4.1.3, together with the quite restricted duration and operation area of the mission.

4.1.2.2 EU Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP

The second legal document of central relevance to the launch and the work of the mission “Artemis” is the “Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP”, which was agreed on by the Council of the European Union (2003b) on 5 June 2003. It encompasses 16 different articles dealing with all kind of aspects concerning the carrying out and the organisation of the military CSDP mission.

In its very first article the joint action refers to the tasks of the mission and announces that the EU is going to


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\(^{40}\) which are two criteria of the UNDP (1994, pp. 24-25) Human Security definition as described in chapter 2.2.1.1.
Hence, the Council of the European Union thereby formally confirms the mission tasks and goals included in the UN Security Council resolution, although without going into detail and without making any reference to Human Security.

In addition, the joint action states in the second paragraph of the first article that the soldiers have to “operate in accordance with the objectives set out in the ‘Framework for EU action in response to the crisis in Bunia’ approved by the Council” (Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 51).

This specific document, dating back to the 4 June 2003, was not accessible to the public before 8 December 2010, when an, only to some extent, declassified version was finally released (see Council of the European Union, 2010). But contrary to certain expectations, it holds nothing really new regarding the mission goals and their Human Security dimension, if compared to the UN Security Council resolution 1484.

The framework document declares similar to the wording of the UN-SC resolution that the EU armed forces have to

“contribute to the stabilisation of the security and humanitarian situation in Bunia, including, if the situation requires it, to the protection of the civilian population, and will allow the UNSG [UN Secretary General] to reinforce MONUC’s presence in Bunia” (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 4).

Turning the focus back on the Council Joint Action, it must be noted at this point that just like the UN-SC resolution 1484, the Council Joint Action is not making use of the term “Human Security”.

Of interest with regard to its implicit Human Security character are apart from article 1 also the articles 3 and 5 of the Joint Action, which refer to the appointing of the mission’s “Operation Commander” and the mission’s “Force Commander”, two positions which are given both to persons from the military, and to be more precise to the two Generals Neveux and Thonier (Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 51).

Thus, in this respect, the “Artemis” mission is clearly not meeting one important criterion of the earlier discussed “Barcelona Report”, namely that a civilian needs to be in charge of an operation dedicated to Human Security (see Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 16).  

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41 This criterion is part of the “clear political authority” principle as analysed in chapter 3.3.1 (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 15).
On the other hand, it has also to be taken into account, that the strategic direction and the political oversight of the mission should be carried out, as it is written in article 7 of the Council Joint Action, by the so-called “Political and Security Committee (PSC)”, and thus not by a military body (Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 51).

Another article of the Joint Action that deserves to get a closer look regarding its Human Security dimension is article 9, defining the relations to be kept with other actors (Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 51). According to paragraph 3 of the article, contact should be established and maintained by Artemis’

“Force Commander […] with local authorities, the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and other international actors, as appropriate, on issues relevant to his mission” (Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 51).

Hence, there is no single word in this paragraph of keeping contact or of even involving ordinary civilians and citizens in the implementation of the mission tasks, which means that as in the UN-SC resolution, the “bottom-up approach” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 17) finds no recognition in the Council Joint Action.

Furthermore, the Joint Action does not comprise any explicit reference to human rights, nor to a regional aspect and emphasis of the mission, or to the “appropriate use of force”, which are all themes of Human Security highlighted by the “Barcelona Report” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 20).

However, with its article 10 the Council Joint Action is paying attention to “multilateralism” by announcing that also non-EU countries are able to take part in the “Artemis” mission (Council of the European Union, 2003b, p. 51).

In conclusion, it can be said that both documents, the UN-SC resolution 1484 as well as the “Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP” are not referring explicitly to Human Security, and thus in this way the operation “Artemis” was clearly not possessing a what could be called formal “Human Security mandate”\(^{42}\).

Nevertheless, the mission mandate as defined by the UN-SC resolution 1484 and reconfirmed by the Council Joint Action, contains the carrying out of tasks which are aimed at delivering narrow Human Security, although this changes nothing about the fact that the

\(^{42}\) As this is, for instance, proposed with regard to all CSDP missions by the “Madrid Report” analysed in chapter 3.3.2 (see also Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 24).
clear majority of aspects relevant to a Human Security approach regarding military intervention, as formulated in the “Barcelona Report”, are not taken into account. It equally should be underlined once more that the broad Human Security spectrum of “freedom from want” is completely ignored in the mandate.

Given this mandate, it is further of interest for the thesis what actual effect the “Artemis” mission did have on the precarious Human Security situation on the ground, or in other words, could narrow Human Security successfully be delivered by the CSDP operation? This question should now be discussed in the next chapter together with some general, critical political aspects of the military mission regarding its overall Human Security character.

**Figure 5: Overview of Mission Facts of “Artemis”**


- **Highlights of the mission’s mandate:**
  - To contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia.
  - To ensure the protection of the airport and of the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia.
  - If the situation so required, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.

- **Duration:** 12 June – 1 September 2003.

- **Budget:** €7 million (common costs).

- **Mission strength:** Approximately 2,000 troops.

- **Contributing states:** 14 Member States (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, Hungary and Cyprus contributed but only became EU members in 2004) and 3 third countries (Brazil, Canada, South Africa).

**Source:** Helly, 2009, p. 181.
4.1.3 Delivering Human Security? The impact of operation “Artemis” on the ground

The mission soldiers succeeded first in securing the airport in Bunia on 6 June and then to re-establish security in the city of Bunia later on 8 July (Helly, 2009, p. 183). According to Helly (2009, p. 183), the armed forces thereby were clearly giving priority to deterrence over direct fighting – which is an interesting remark regarding the Barcelona report’s first and its seventh HS principle –, leading to only few casualties among militias with 2 persons having been killed.

Such a view of the operation is however contradictory to how Giegerich (2008, p. 29) describes the mission, stating that European soldiers were indeed involved several times in direct confrontations with diverse militias, in which they killed more than 20 people.

On the other hand, Giegerich (2008, p. 30) equally stresses that the security situation of the people in Bunia ameliorated during the ESDP mission, with militias being kept away from the town, refugees coming back home and needed humanitarian aid being provided. Following Gegout (2009, p. 237) Bunia’s population was rising from 40,000 citizens at the beginning to 100,000, illustrating Artemis’ positive impact on the returning of former displaced people.

Furthermore, the economic life in the city was recovering, and clinics as well as schools could reopen their doors (Brittain and Conchiglia, 2006, p. 78).

But although the “Artemis” mission was obviously achieving a certain stabilization of security inside Bunia, and can thereby also be seen as having protected, at least to a certain degree, the residents’ human rights, the conflict and atrocities were persisting in the rest of the region (Arloth and Seidensticker, 2007, p. 36). As a rather logical outcome of its quite restricted mandate, the military operation was not bringing an end to those violent confrontations and attacks on the civilian population that were taking place beyond Bunia’s borders (Arloth and Seidensticker, 2007, p. 36).

One could thus even come to the conclusion as Giegerich (2008, p. 30) that

“The geographical restrictions on Artemis meant that the violence it apparently quelled was merely temporarily displaced to areas outside Bunia”.

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43 Which are “the primacy of human rights” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 14) and the “appropriate use of force” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 20).
44 See chapter 4.1.2.1.
Hence, all in all, due to the mission’s limitations regarding its operation zone and its duration as well as due to the mission’s comparatively small contingent, the impact of “Artemis” needs to be qualified as having been mainly one of short term (Giegerich, 2008, p. 30).

As a report from “International Alert and Saferworld” (2004) states, the amelioration of the security of people accomplished by the EU operation did not bring with it automatically and everywhere a “freedom from fear or attack” (International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, p. 7).

Not only during, but also after the end of the CSDP mission, massacres were carried out throughout the entire Ituri province and even beyond, militias and weapons could still move without any real control, and rape as well as sexual mutilation remained to be used on a large-scale as horrible war tactics (International Alert and Saferworld, 2004, pp. 7-8).

With the arrival and take-over of control from “Artemis” by a smaller MONUC contingent in September, it came again to a clear deterioration of security in Bunia (Giegerich, 2008, p. 30). Also in the following years 2005 and 2006 violations of human rights did not disappear at all, raising more and more doubts if the 2003 Artemis mission was really of great use regarding a lasting amelioration of the DRC’s security conditions (Arloth and Seidensticker, 2007, p. 37).

Although it should not be overseen that “Artemis” was indeed fulfilling its given mandate, the mission’s effect on the much broader goal to establish peace and security, which it was equally supposed to enhance, stayed rather little (Giegerich, 2008, p. 30). Nevertheless, in this respect, as one positive consequence of the ESDP mission could be taken the fact that it provoked an alteration of MONUC’s mandate from a former Chapter VI to a strong Chapter VII mandate following the UN charter, making MONUC’s success far more realistic and easier to attain (Brittain and Conchiglia, 2006, p. 78).

If evaluated with regard to the Human Security concept, and especially towards the criteria of the “Barcelona Report”, the “Artemis” mission is facing one particular criticism which is also highlighted by International Alert and Saferworld (2004, p. 8), namely that the “Operation commander” did not involve any senior civilian in his actual work to facilitate the linking of the mission to more comprehensive activities from the civilian sphere. This critique could be added to the, in the previous chapter 4.1.2.2 revealed, Human Security deficit of the operation that two Generals and not civilians have been in charge of it.

Despite the above-mentioned rather questionable result and achievements of the “Artemis” mission concerning the creation and delivering of Human Security, it could be argued as Gegout (2009, p. 241) does, that “Artemis” was however launched as a response to a
humanitarian need, which gives the mission at least a certain Human Security character. But at the same time this is not a sufficient explanation why the military ESDP engagement took place in 2003 since the European Union did not act in a number of other cases where “humanitarian missions” in the DRC would also have been necessary (Gegout, 2009, p. 241).

For instance, in 2004 the EU was not intervening on the side of MONUC when humanitarian law and human rights were violated massively in Bukavu in the context of military confrontations between government and militia forces (Gegout, 2009, p. 241). In the same way, the European Union abstained from taking action in 2005 in Rutshuru and the following year in Sake, both representing two other examples where Europe should have considered to intervene if the principal motivation had really been “humanitarianism” (Gegout, 2009, p. 241).

Consequently, for Gegout (2009, p. 241) the real driving force behind the EU’s military intervention in 2003 can be rather found somewhere else. According to her, and what needs to be taken into account when evaluating Artemis’ Human Security dimension,

> “EU missions [Artemis and EUFOR RDC] were carried out first and foremost to promote the EU as a security actor, and not to help civilians in conflicts” (Gegout, 2009, p. 241).

This argument, or accusation is shared by others like Olsen (2009, p. 257), who points out that the military EU engagement in African conflicts has been following so far primarily self-serving European interests, and here especially those of France, and just in the second place real concerns about African security itself.

With regard to “Artemis”, there is strong reason to assume, as Olsen (2009, p. 251) remarks, that the actual, decisive factor for its launch was the visible divide between EU countries in 2003 due to the polarizing issue of the Iraq war. By carrying out the ESDP mission on the African continent, European states intended to demonstrate their ability to cooperate, to come to common decisions and to give a clear sign of the CFSP and ESDP’s existence and functioning (Olsen, 2009, p. 251).

Gegout (2009, p. 240) underlines this point of view by stating that

> “EU states agreed on setting up the Artémis mission after they took up radically divergent positions over the war in Iraq; this new enterprise reinforced the idea of European unity and power”.

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45 See here also the description of the situation in Ituri by Brittain and Conchiglia (2006, p. 78) in chapter 4.1.2.1.
An important role was thereby played, as already indicated above, by France and its former President Chirac, who demanded from the European Union to show its capability to take action outside the NATO and who further saw the “Artemis” mission as a possibility to strengthen the image of France as a relevant military player (Olsen, 2009, p. 251). As a matter of fact, France did indeed earn credit on the international stage through the ESDP mission, since it was not only a France-led operation realised independently from NATO, but also a – at least military – successful one, which was crucial for France’s aspiration to maintain its influence in the African region given the debacle in Rwanda in 1994 (Gegout, 2009, p. 240).

Having now in mind “multilateralism” as a feature of the Human Security concept, this of course also raises the fundamental question of how “multilateral” the “Artemis” mission in fact really was in the light of a large and far going French domination of almost every mission aspect.

Bagayoko (2004, p. 104) stresses for example the point that “Artemis” was actually a military engagement of France which had only been “made” European and not so much the outcome of a genuine, common EU ambition.

In order to better comprehend its acceptance in 2003 as well as of “EUFOR RDC” later in 2006 by all remaining EU countries and the absence of any veto by them, Olsen (2009, p. 257) suggests to take a look at a thought offered by Hyde-Price (2008, p. 31). According to the latter, the European Union is more and more “serving as the institutional repository of the second-order normative concerns of EU member states” (Hyde-Price, 2008, p. 31). As such concerns are seen by Hyde-Price (2008, pp. 31-32) the support of democracy, human rights, the reducing of poverty especially in African countries, and the protection of the environment.

Furthermore, as Bagayoko and Gibert (2007, p. 17) underline, the management and prevention of African conflicts represent for the European Union a rather perfect “field of validation for the CFSP/ESDP means and procedures”. In this respect, the “Artemis” mission needs to be understood as marking the beginning of mobilizing the CSDP instruments on the African continent (Bagayoko and Gibert, 2007, p. 17).

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46 Following the “Barcelona Report” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004).
47 See also chapter 4.1.1.
48 Translated by the author from French to English.
49 The clear parallel to Human Security issues is quite obvious.
Although not changing the before highlighted facts about Artemis’ concrete, actual impact on the Human Security situation on the ground, these last statements relating to the EU’s motivation behind its 2003 carried-out military ESDP mission in the DRC, nevertheless deserve and should indeed be taken into consideration when speaking of Artemis’ Human Security nature in general.
4.2 “EUFOR RDC” 2006

4.2.1 General mission facts

After the 2003 “Artemis” mission, the European Union further launched three other, but this time civilian, CSDP operations in the DRC with “EUPOL Kinshasa” as the first one, taking place from 2005 till 2007, followed by “EUPOL RD Congo”, which has been operative since 2007, and third, “EUSEC RD Congo” which began its work in 2005 (Major, 2009, p. 312). Whereas the aim of the two EUPOL missions was, and for one still is, to assist the DRC in establishing a nationwide police, the EUSEC mission’s goal consists in the same task regarding a national, functioning army (Pajuste, 2008, p. 82).

The three missions thereby need to be seen as a part of the EU’s considerable political and financial backing of the DRC’s difficult process of transition after 2002, for which the realization of elections in 2006 was of high significance (Major, 2009, p. 312).

These elections, the first democratic ones since the start of Mobutu’s dictatorship in 1965, constituted an enormous political and practical challenge for the DRC (Hoebeka, 2007, p. 46). Especially given the fact, underlined by Martin (2008, p. 89), that “Human security [...] is a precarious commodity in the Democratic Republic of Congo”.

Nevertheless, and regardless of the country’s huge deficits in infrastructure and civil administration, the essential registration of voters as well as the subsequent “Constitutional Referendum” were carried out with success as two first important tests in 2005 (Hoebeka, 2007, p. 46). It was then also in December that year when the European Union was invited by the UN to support again MONUC with another military operation for the time of the upcoming 2006 elections (Major, 2009, p. 313).

After the affirmation by the Council of the EU in March 2006, the UN Security Council gave its authorization to the EU intervention on 25 April by approving the resolution 1671, and

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50 See also Figure 3 in chapter 3.1.
51 Especially in its role as an important participant of the so-called “CIAT”, the “Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition” (Major, 2009, p. 312).
52 For instance, according to Major (2009, p. 312), the DRC receives the hugest part of its humanitarian aid from the EU.
53 See chapter 4.1.1.
only two days later, on 27 April, the related “Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP”54 passed the Council of the European Union (Major, 2009, p. 313).

The central aim behind EUFOR’s deployment was to guarantee the peaceful taking place of the DRC’s parliamentary as well as presidential elections, for which Joseph Kabila, until then President, and Jean Pierre Bemba, until then Vice-President, were the two candidates most probable to win (Major, 2009, p. 318). Since the first election round on 30 July was not bringing any decision regarding the country’s next President, another, second round had to be carried out on 29 October, which Joseph Kabila was declared to have won by the Supreme Court with a majority of 58,05% of all votes (Major, 2009, p. 318). Kabila’s inauguration on 6 December 2006 meant the beginning of the DRC’s so-called “Third Republic” and thus the official end of the country’s transitional period (Hoebbeke, 2007, p. 47).

Launched on 30 July, the first election day, the EUFOR mission was operating in the DRC until 30 November, and hence for 4 months, although if taking into account its “pre-deployment and withdrawal phases”, one could speak of a 6 months’ presence (Major, 2009, p. 315). An important feature of the 2006 military mission to be kept in mind is that it was launched with the explicit acceptance from the DRC’s official authorities and further, accurately coordinated with them as well as with MONUC (Pajuste, 2008, p. 81).

The EUFOR operation consisted of three different elements regarding its armed forces, which were first, a contingent positioned in Kinshasa, second, “an on-call force” waiting in Gabon’s capital Libreville, and third, reserve troops at home in Europe (Major, 2009, p. 313). The force element in Libreville was thereby encompassing about 1,200 soldiers and supposed to intervene on the side of the other active troops “in the event of troubles requiring their presence” (Pajuste, 2008, p. 83).

All in all, the EUFOR contingent really active in Africa comprehended 2,400 soldiers coming from 21 states of the European Union, with the most important participants having been France with 1,090, Germany with 780, and Poland and Spain with each 130 soldiers, as well as contributions from two non-EU states, which were Switzerland and Turkey (Major, 2009, p. 314).

By having the greatest part of its armed forces actually outside the DRC, EUFOR tried to avoid being present in Kinshasa with a counterproductive, too strong military force, while keeping at the same time an important element of deterrence (Major, 2009, pp. 313-314). Although in theory EUFOR could operate, if requested, everywhere in the entire DRC, it stayed nevertheless clearly centred on Kinshasa, also as a result of the problematic circumstance that the soldiers of certain participating countries, like those of Spain and Germany, could not be deployed beyond the DRC’s capital due to specific provisions of their own states (Major, 2009, p. 315).

France was once again in charge of the mission’s Force Headquarters (FHQ), which was established directly in Kinshasa, whereas Germany on the other hand was in control of EUFOR’s Operational Headquarters (OHQ), situated in Potsdam, and which included – in contrast to the “Artemis” mission – an advisor for gender issues (Major, 2009, p. 314).

This last fact will be discussed later on in chapter 4.2.3 with respect to its importance to Human Security.

4.2.2 The mission mandate and its Human Security dimension

As done in chapter 4.1.2 with regard to “Artemis”, the mandate of the “EUFOR RDC” mission should be analysed regarding its Human Security content.

Of relevance thereby are two legal documents already mentioned above, namely the resolution 1671 of the UN Security Council (2006), which will be discussed in 4.2.2.1, followed by a critical analysis of the “Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP” of the Council of the European Union (2006) in 4.2.2.2.

4.2.2.1 UN-SC Resolution 1671

Just like UN-SC resolution 1484 (2003), the resolution 1671 of the UN Security Council (2006) is also not containing the term “Human Security” at all or making any direct, explicit reference to it.

The resolution starts by classifying the given “situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” as being a continuing “threat to international peace and security in the region” (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 2). Pointing to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council then approves in paragraph 2 of its resolution the operation called “Eufor
As stated in paragraph 2, the mission should be launched “in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, thus meaning no specific region of the country, but paragraph 3 further stresses, that the force is going to comprehend “advance elements concentrated in Kinshasa” (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 2).

The most relevant part of the resolution 1671 for analysing its potential Human Security dimension concerns its paragraph 8, which names the specific tasks the EU mission is mandated to deal with “in accordance with the agreement to be reached between the European Union and the United Nations” (UN Security Council, 2006, pp. 2-3).

First of all, EUFOR should help MONUC in “stabilizing a situation” where the latter is confronted with “serious difficulties” (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 3). Due to the rather general formulation, it cannot be really told in how far this task touches Human Security and involves protecting individuals.

More concrete, with regard to Human Security, is however the second task of EUFOR mentioned in paragraph 8 which consists in

“contributing to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 3).

Hence, with this given task the EUFOR mission can be seen as having clearly been aimed at delivering a narrow, to “freedom from fear” corresponding Human Security, which also finds its expression in the use of two key phrases of the narrow Human Security approach by the resolution, namely “physical violence” and “protection of civilians” (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 3). It should be noted that the term “imminent” in relation to “threat” enables on the one hand EUFOR to act before it is too late, although on the other hand it also bears the risk of being interpreted not in favour of the declared goal of protecting civilians (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 3).

According to paragraph 8e of the UN-SC resolution, the EU mission is further tasked “to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger” (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 3).
Remarkably, the resolution thereby directly refers to “individuals” and their narrow security, which is obviously of great interest with regard to the Human Security concept, although this objective is at the same time weakened by the phrase “of limited character” and thus apparently not given priority (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 3). It also remains unclear which individuals the resolution is actually speaking of since this task is mentioned separately from the one before referring to civilians.

The other tasks of EUFOR named by the resolution are not involving any important Human Security elements, and are “to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa” and to guarantee the personnel’s security “as well as the protection of the installations of Eufor R.D.Congo” (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 3).

Of particular importance for all above-described tasks is paragraph 9 of the resolution, which states that the EU decides if EUFOR is getting active in carrying them out “upon a request by the Secretary-General”, which actually reduces the ESDP mission’s autonomous character (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 3). However, the paragraph also declares that in situations of emergency decisions can be made, except for the first task (see above), “in close consultation with MONUC” (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 3).

Despite the “freedom from fear” dimension of the mission tasks given in paragraph 8, the UN-SC resolution 1671 does not include, apart from the quite evident, general multilateral character of the operation, any clear reference to the themes which are of great relevance to a narrow Human Security concept, especially with regard to interventions, as these are stressed by the “Barcelona Report”.

For instance, the resolution is not paying attention to the “bottom-up approach” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 17), nor to such other crucial aspects as human rights or the “appropriate use of force” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 20), which would have made EUFOR’s mandate really dedicated to the approach of Human Security, at least through the eyes of the “Barcelona Report”.

Given though the overall intention of the mission, which finds again its expression in paragraph 1 of the resolution, and that is “to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections” (UN Security Council, 2006, p. 2), the UN-SC resolution 1671 can be seen as implicitly corresponding indeed to one of the “Barcelona Report’s” Human

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55 given the common association of danger with a violent threat.
56 regarding the security of the local population.
57 (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004).
Security criteria, namely to the one of “clear political authority” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 15).

In order to underline this argument, it should be called again into mind that the report thereby understands that “the central goal of a human security strategy has to be the establishment of legitimate political authority capable of upholding human security” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 15).

Furthermore, and less surprisingly, the UN-SC resolution 1671 is not involving in its, all in all, 18 paragraphs any Human Security concern related to “freedom from want”, or more precisely to matters like economic or health security\(^{58}\), as they are highlighted in chapter 2.2.1, with “personal security”\(^{59}\) (UNDP, 1994, p. 30) being the only, though rather narrow criterion of the UNDP’s broad definition taken into account.

4.2.2.2 EU Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP

As the second legal document with importance to the realisation of the “EUFOR RDC” mission the “Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP”, which comprehends altogether 16 articles and which was accepted on 27 April 2006 by the Council of the European Union (2006), should be analysed regarding its Human Security content.

In the first paragraph of its first article, the Joint Action legally confirms the tasks for the EUFOR mission, included in the UN-SC resolution 1671 and involving Human Security elements, by declaring that


In addition, in the second paragraph of the first article the Joint Action states with regard to the mission’s goals that the EUFOR soldiers must also act

“In accordance with the objectives for possible EU support to MONUC as approved by the Council on 23 March 2006” (Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 99).

\(^{58}\) Which have been described in 2.2.1.1 as part of UNDP’s HS definition (see UNDP, 1994, p. 24).

\(^{59}\) See chapter 2.2.1.1 for its definition.
Unfortunately, this specific document has not been released to the public yet, although it can be doubted if it would really reveal any new Human Security element regarding EUFOR’s mission mandate, not already mentioned in the UN-SC resolution 1671.

At this point of the analysis it must also be noted that the Council Joint Action does not explicitly speak of “Human Security”, or refer to it, nor contain any aspect of the Human Security’s broader spectrum of “freedom from want”.

Nevertheless four of its 16 articles deserve a closer look with respect to the narrow Human Security concept and especially the criteria for interventions stressed by the “Barcelona Report”.

First of all, the articles 2 and 4 of the Joint Action, which concern the positions of the mission’s “Operation” and “Force Commander”, and which name for both jobs once again, like in the case of Artemis, two persons from the military, namely the two Generals Viereck and Damay (Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 99). The Joint Action does thereby not respect a fundamental idea of the “Barcelona Report”, according to which “Human security missions should be led by a civilian” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 16).

Of further interest is article 9 of the Joint Action, which clarifies the relationship between EUFOR on the one side and the DRC, the UN and so-called “other actors” on the other side (Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 100). In its three paragraphs the article does not specify which actors, apart from the UN and the DRC, are actually meant, leaving the question open if also non-state actors are involved, which of course would be crucial following the Human Security approach. In the same way, the article does also not include any sign that EUFOR should implement in its relations on the ground a “bottom-up approach” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 17), as it is understood by the “Barcelona Report” and as it is an important feature of the Human Security concept in general. The third paragraph of article 9 of the Joint Action simply states that the EUFOR mission’s

“Force Commander […] shall, on issues relevant to his mission, maintain close contacts with MONUC and local authorities, as well as with other international actors, as appropriate” (Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 100).

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60 Also given the experience made in chapter 4.1.2.2 with regard to the framework document (see Council of the European Union, 2010) for the Artemis mission.
61 Thereby are meant the seven principles of the report highlighted in chapter 3.3.1.
As the last article of the Council Joint Action, which deserves to be highlighted, its article 10 should be named, which is of relevance regarding the, for the Human Security concept important, aspect of multilateralism, since it permits non-EU countries to also join in the EUFOR mission, and thereby clearly proves and points to the overall multilateral nature of the operation (Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 100). However, at the same time the article restricts this possibility to those states which are European and part of the NATO or “candidates for accession to the European Union and other potential partners” (Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 100)\textsuperscript{62}.

To conclude, as has been shown in this chapter, neither the resolution 1671 of the UN Security Council (2006) nor the “Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP” contain any explicit reference to “Human Security”, and consequently the EUFOR RDC mission cannot be regarded, at least by its mandate, to have been a “formal” Human Security engagement. On the other hand, the tasks EUFOR was mandated to carry out clearly involved a “freedom from fear” aspect\textsuperscript{63}, although most of the narrow Human Security criteria, as stressed by the “Barcelona report”\textsuperscript{64}, with the rare exception of multilateralism and to a certain extent “clear political authority” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 15), were completely ignored as well as the whole “freedom from want” dimension. Especially disappointing from a Human Security perspective is the fact that none of the two legal documents analysed above contains any clear details on if and how to involve other than state actors – keyword “bottom-up approach”\textsuperscript{65} – in the realisation of the EUFOR mission.

If however, on the ground, this as well as other concerns of the Human Security concept have nevertheless found recognition in EUFOR’s “work”, and in how far the EUFOR mission can be said as having really delivered narrow Human Security, this is going to be discussed in 4.2.3, the following and final chapter of the thesis.

\textsuperscript{62} Unless African states are not seen as such “partners”, they are de facto excluded by this restriction from taking part in the mission.

\textsuperscript{63} With protecting individuals and civilians.

\textsuperscript{64} (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004).

\textsuperscript{65} (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 17).
4.2.3 EUFOR’s impact on the ground: Delivering Human Security?

Before this chapter highlights the most essential facts and consequently also the criticism on EUFOR RDC’s practical impact on Human Security related to it, a first part will analyse if and in what way the CSDP mission was, regardless of the only little recognition in its mandate, paying attention to some of the criteria or, as the report itself calls them, “principles”\textsuperscript{66} of Human Security of the “Barcelona Report” on the ground.

It should be noted that this first part is based on a similar analysis realised by Mary Martin (2008)\textsuperscript{67}, although it also takes into account further publications, as will be seen in the following.

\textsuperscript{66} (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 5).
\textsuperscript{67} see Bibliography.
With regard to the first criterion, “the primacy of human rights” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 14), it can be stated following Arloth and Seidensticker (2007, p. 37) that despite the absence of the issue of human rights in the mission mandate – as has been shown in chapter 4.2.2 –, the EUFOR mission must be seen as having been in fact of great importance for protecting the human rights of those people living in and around Kinshasa.

By helping to create a safe environment in which the DRC’s citizens can participate in electing their government, EUFOR was not “just” protecting “the physical safety of the people but also [...] their ability to exercise political rights” (Arloth and Seidensticker, 2007, p. 37).

As Martin (2008, p. 94) remarks, human rights were present from the very beginning in the EUFOR mission, starting with its planning, which was undertaken under the participation of the HR secretariat of the Council, and where an advisor for human rights had been appointed for the operation. Furthermore, EUFOR soldiers were receiving trainings on gender and human rights concerns and were equipped with “a human rights monitor” when patrolling the streets (Martin, 2008, p. 94).

Another important characteristic of EUFOR is that it was the very first ESDP operation, in which a “Gender Advisor” was involved on the ground throughout the whole mission (Arloth and Seidensticker, 2007, p. 38). This advisor worked in close cooperation with EUFOR’s 20 so-called “Gender Focal Points”, created in Kinshasa as well as in Gabon, and organised a number of meetings with Congolese women’s organisations in order to give them details on the EUFOR mission, to provide support to them, and to get relevant facts from them on, for instance, local groups taking care of victims of sexual abuse and rape (Arloth and Seidensticker, 2007, p. 38).

Compared to previous ESDP missions, the 2006 EUFOR operation has also known a further interesting innovation with regard to human rights, namely a “Soldier’s card”, which was distributed among the EUFOR soldiers and which contained clear principles to be respected by them on such topics as child soldiers, sexual abuse and the right use of force (Martin, 2008, p. 94).

According to this card, of which parts are illustrated below in Figure 7, soldiers of the EUFOR mission were “personally responsible for respecting and promoting Human Rights”

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68 Human Rights.
and a possible violation of the principles of the card was “considered as serious misconduct” (Arloth and Seidensticker, 2007, p. 39).

As a last feature of the EUFOR mission with relevance to human rights should be named the creation of two so-called “Human Rights Focal Points (HRFP)”, which could guarantee that human rights were respected in EUFOR’s different directives, for example in the abovementioned “Soldier’s Card”, and which moreover succeeded in introducing an effective reporting mechanism “to control the good conduct of EUFOR RD Congo and to assess the human rights situation in the area of operations” (Arloth and Seidensticker, 2007, p. 38).

Figure 7: EUFOR RDC “Soldier’s Card”

![Figure 7: EUFOR RDC “Soldier’s Card”](image)

Coming to the next principle of the report, the “clear political authority” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 15), it needs to be criticized that due to its mandate\textsuperscript{69}, EUFOR was only able to get active after MONUC and the DRC’s army and police, and hence in crucial situations it could not take action given the lack of authorization (Martin, 2008, p. 95).

In addition, the force was also hampered, following Martin (2008, p. 95), by another problematic aspect, which was the, as already described in 4.2.1, existence of two different headquarters for EUFOR, one in Germany and the other one in France, posing difficulties with regard to the line of command.

More generally, and given the fact that elections do not automatically have to correspond to the goal of “constructing legitimate political authority”, the EUFOR mission could be criticized from the perspective of Human Security for having contributed with its engagement to the consolidation of a political regime which is not at all committed to “good governance” and known for being responsible of violating human rights (Human Security Study Group, 2007, p. 17). This point of view should be regarded as an additional, critical second part of the related positive statement concerning EUFOR’s mandate made in 4.2.2.1.

If taking a look at EUFOR’s realisation on the ground with respect to “multilateralism” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 16), there can be little doubt that the ESDP operation was truly multilateral, although on the other hand it remains less clear if this multilateralism has been really effective (Martin, 2008, p. 95).

For Martin (2008, p. 95), the greatest deficit of EUFOR was its rather weak coordination with the existing other initiatives of the European Union in the DRC, which is also reflected in its abrupt end, leaving no clear means behind for the latter to step in.

It needs to be underlined at that point that policies aimed at containing a conflict will not “be effective if they are isolated and contradictory” (Martin, 2008, p. 95).

A relatively strong dedication of EUFOR to one of the criteria of the “Barcelona Report” in its practical operations can be attested according to Martin (2008, p. 96) with regard to the “bottom-up approach” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 17), which

\textsuperscript{69} This point has been raised in 4.2.2.1.
is especially interesting given the total absence of this aspect in the mission mandate, as it has been shown in 4.2.2.

What initially started as a classical military “to ‘win hearts and minds’” operation, developed quickly to an extremely innovative campaign to get in touch with the public opinion as well as to involve in EUFOR’s considerations also “grassroots views” (Martin, 2008, p. 96). This campaign encompassed, among other things, the producing and publishing of the DRC’s largest newspaper, called “La Paillotte”, the polling of public opinion to receive a local feedback on EUFOR, and a daily radio broadcasting program transmitted on seven different radio stations (Martin, 2008, p. 96). The campaign was of great importance since the Congolese people’s perceptions of EUFOR were at the beginning anything else than positive, with the widespread beliefs that EUFOR was only present to guarantee the election of Kabila, and to participate in the exploitation of the country’s natural resources (Martin, 2008, p. 96).

As a further way of implementing the “bottom-up approach” realized by EUFOR the so-called “civil-military cooperation projects (CIMIC)” can be seen, whose goals were to strengthen the ESDP mission’s visibility as well as to provide humanitarian aid (Martin, 2008, p. 96).

Nevertheless, it must be stressed at the same time that CIMIC and the above-described campaign were clearly underfunded, that there existed rarely any coordination of EUFOR’s projects with those of other present actors, and that only little consultation took place with Congolese NGOs (Martin, 2008, p. 96).

Furthermore, the focus had been mainly on various short-term initiatives which were often not consistent with the important “long-term needs of” the Congolese people, who were – and still are – largely lacking essential public goods and infrastructure (Martin, 2008, p. 96). It could thus be stated, according to Martin (2008, p. 96), that seen through the eyes of the Human Security concept, EUFOR’s “initiatives were symbolic, not effective”.

Regarding its “regional focus” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 18), the last Human Security parameter of the “Barcelona Report” to be highlighted here, all that can be said about EUFOR is, following Martin (2008, p. 97), that a stronger

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70 This beliefs or fears EUFOR was confronted with, are actually quite understandable given the DRC’s long, negative historical experience with European powers, which is analysed critically in the book “The Congo: Plunder & Resistance” by the authors Renton, Seddon and Zeilig (2007).
coordination with regional initiatives would have increased EUFOR’s lasting effect, which implies that, as in its mandate, EUFOR did not really pay attention to this aspect on the ground.

To summarize, as this first part of the chapter has revealed, in its practical operations EUFOR showed more respect for certain Human Security criteria of the “Barcelona Report” than its mission mandate actually did, although most of them were still ignored, which hence makes it rather difficult to agree with Martin (2008, p. 94) who states that “*the EUFOR mission in practice implemented what could be called a Human Security approach*”.

EUFOR’s Human Security “deficit” becomes more evident by taking a brief look at some general aspects related to the mission’s real impact on the ground, which should be done in the following, second part of the chapter.

As Major (2009, p. 319) points out, throughout its duration EUFOR was not confronted with any difficult military challenges, but nevertheless became involved in the stabilisation of three situations, whereof the most dangerous events took place between 20 and 22 August 2006. At the side of MONUC, EUFOR was intervening following a request by the former in a moment where violence broke out as a consequence of the official results for the presidential election (Major, 2009, p. 319). Militias, supporting the announced winner Joseph Kabila were fighting against militias belonging to the opposing candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba, which led to over 23 people killed and about 43 injured (Martin, 2008, p. 93).

EUFOR’s and MONUC’s intervention succeeded in separating the two militias when the headquarters of Bemba was hit by an attack, while EUFOR was receiving support by additional soldiers from its contingent in Gabon (Major, 2009, p. 319). For Martin (2008, p. 93), it was EUFOR’s correct dealing with this violent crisis which played a crucial role for the general success of the mission.

But although EUFOR can, indeed, be regarded as having fulfilled its mandate, as well as having brought the European Union a certain recognition on the international stage, the operation on the other hand only had a marginal impact on the DRC’s political – and hence Human Security – situation in the long run (Major, 2009, p. 320).

After the end of the mission, confrontations between the two opposing political camps were starting again, and attained an even “*much higher intensity*” in March 2007 than in August the year before, making it necessary for MONUC to bring Bemba safely out of the country (Major, 2009, p. 320).
This points, with regard to Human Security, at a problematic characteristic of EUFOR, namely its duration, which was deliberately decided to be short in order to correspond to the planned timetable for the DRC’s elections, and due to the more questionable political circumstance that Germany wanted its soldiers to return before Christmas (Martin, 2008, p. 92). It must be underlined, according to Morsut (2009, p. 265), that even despite an official wish of the UN that EUFOR should be given a prolonged mandate to be able to continue its mission, the ESDP operation was not extended since Germany was unwilling to vote once again on this matter in the “Bundestag”. The consequence of this was, as Martin (2008, p. 93) remarks, that EUFOR “had to leave at a time when tensions were still high in the capital”.

Another critique on the EUFOR mission, which further questions its Human Security dimension, refers to the generally strong EU engagement for the DRC’s elections, of which EUFOR was an integral part, and highlights that through its focus on elections the EU has not advanced but actually undermined the improvement of Human Security objectives in the DRC (Martin, 2008, p. 97). For instance, the political campaign for the elections itself amplified the violations against groups from the opposition, the media, and individuals (Martin, 2008, p. 97). Moreover, as Woudenberg (2006) states in a document of “Human Rights Watch”, the international and European actors

“[…] preferred to look the other way on tough matters that could affect the elections. Diplomats dismissed concerns about corruption or the need to disarm private militias and integrate them into the national army, saying it would be unproductive to push too hard at such a delicate time. It was important, they said, ‘not to rock the boat’. This was short-sighted at best” (Woudenberg, 2006, electronic source without specific page reference).

At the end, it must be stressed that similar to the “Artemis” mission, and as Olsen (2009, p. 254) points out, the central European motivation behind the EUFOR mission seems to have been to strengthen the EU’s international position and further to demonstrate that the European Union was still able to pursue its CSDP despite the referendum crisis caused by the negative results in the Netherlands and in France.

This critical view, relativising once more EUFOR’s general Human Security character, is shared by many others like Haine and Giegerich (2006) who state that

“The mission’s rationale has [had] more to do with French-German cohesion and with the EU’s desire to bolster the credibility of the European Security and Defense Policy after the
fiasco over the European constitutional treaty’s rejection in referendums […] The actual reality on the ground in Congo is [was] only a secondary factor” (Haine and Giegerich, 2006, electronic source without specific page reference).
5. Conclusion

As this thesis has shown, the concept of Human Security, in its different versions, did only play a rather marginal role for and in the two military CSDP missions of the European Union having taken place in the DRC in 2003 and 2006. First of all, when it comes to the two mission mandates, second regarding their concrete realisation, and third with respect to the (assumed) European motivation behind their launch.

Moreover, the positive impact of both missions on the Human Security situation on the ground has been anything else than “overwhelming” due to several in 4.1.3 and 4.2.3 mentioned factors.

The mandates of “Artemis” and “EUFOR RDC” contain no explicit reference to Human Security, and show only little recognition for the aspects relevant to a Human Security approach. This concerns Human Security in its narrow understanding, having in mind the criteria of the “Barcelona Report” as a reference point, but most of all, Human Security in its broad interpretation, which includes such elements as economic or even environmental security.

Nevertheless, it must clearly be underlined that both mission mandates, and hence the two CSDP missions in general, comprehended a “freedom from fear” dimension with tasks to carry out related to the narrow security of the Congolese population. In this way, and visibly in their request by the UN, “Artemis” and “EUFOR RDC” can be indeed seen as two EU missions in reaction to a given situation of Human Insecurity.

But as understood in this thesis, Human Security, even in its narrow version, is not just the “simple” protection of humans against violent menaces, it is also about how this is done, namely, as the example of Canada and in far more detail the “Barcelona Report” have illustrated, by paying specific attention to such crucial themes as Human Rights as well as by actively involving also non-state actors including individuals. And in this regard, the way narrow Human Security, respectively “freedom from fear” should be delivered, the mandates of the “Artemis” and “EUFOR RDC” mission were largely not committed to the Human Security approach, neither in its more comprehensive nor in its narrow version.

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72 See chapter 2.2.2.2.
73 See chapter 3.3.1.
However, interestingly, with EUFOR at least one of the two CSDP missions was following on the ground more aspects of the narrow Human Security concept, especially thinking of the so-called “bottom-up approach”\textsuperscript{74}, than its mandate actually contained.

If the circumstance that the EUFOR mission was carried out – contrary to the earlier “Artemis” mission – after the release of the “Barcelona Report” played any role, this question stays to be answered by further research.

The fact that the Human Security “freedom from want” component is entirely absent in both mission mandates also needs to be seen in relation to the in 3.4 given analysis that, according to Möstl (2011, p. 157), the CSDP’s emphasis on the narrow Human Security vision is a structural necessity since the CSDP’s intended nature lies in responding to conflicts and crises, and the Council’s competences are thus restricted.

Furthermore, it deserves to be repeated at this point that human security themes, in particular the narrow ones, are indeed very present, though mainly in an implicit and non-comprehensive way, in the developing of the CSDP’s “conceptual framework” (Möstl, 2011, p. 157). This has been shown with the discussion of the ESS in 3.2 as well as with the various points highlighted throughout chapter 3.4 of the thesis.

Officially launched to confront situations of (Human) insecurity, the concrete impact of the “Artemis” and “EUFOR RDC” mission on this very aspect can be summarized as having been quite limited and of no real positive long-term effect, also as a consequence of their given, restricted mandates\textsuperscript{75}, and in the case of EUFOR there even exist accusations that the operation had a counterproductive effect on addressing Human Security concerns in the DRC.

Another strong criticism, questioning the overall Human Security character of both missions, refers to the EU motivation behind them, which seems to have been more to do, as this has been stressed in 4.1.3 with regard to “Artemis” and in 4.2.3 regarding “EUFOR RDC”, with the EU’s need and intention to back its CSDP in times of internal political crises\textsuperscript{76}, and less with thoughts about the (Human) security of the Congolese population.

Therefore, the thesis should end with a quote of Matlářy (2008, p. 143) who points out that

\textsuperscript{74} Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{75} With respect to their duration and operation area.
\textsuperscript{76} the Iraq “crisis” in 2003 (see chapter 4.1.3) and the treaty “crisis” in 2006 (see chapter 4.2.3).
“The problem is not that human security is not a good idea, but that interventions rarely happen for human security reasons alone. [...] The EU may benefit from calling all its security policy ‘human security’, but if rhetoric promises more than policy can deliver, the ethical implications are grave.”
6. Bibliography

Books:


Journal Articles:


**Reports / Documents:**


Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992) *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement*


**Internet pages:**


Available at:

Abstract (English)

This thesis discusses the Human Security concept in detail, its emergence as a new security approach as well as its various definitions, and takes it as the basis for a qualitative, critical analysis of the European Union’s two military CSDP missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which took place in 2003 (“Artemis” mission) and 2006 (“EUFOR RDC” mission). Of central interest is to reveal if the goal of both EU missions was to deliver Human Security to the Congolese people, and if this was successfully done while paying attention to the criteria of the Human Security approach.

The thesis equally analyses if and in how far the Human Security concept is of importance for the EU’s CSDP (“Common Security and Defence Policy”) and presents genuine European interpretations of the concept like the so-called “Human Security Doctrine”.

It is the result of the undertaken analysis that the idea of Human Security did only play a rather marginal role for the two military CSDP missions, first of all when it comes to the two mission mandates, second regarding their concrete realisation, and third with respect to the European motivation behind their launch. Moreover, the positive impact of both missions on the Human Security situation on the ground has been anything else than “overwhelming”.

Abstract (German)


Desweiteren analysiert die Diplomarbeit, ob und inwieweit das Konzept der „Human Security“ für die GSVP („Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik“) der EU von
Bedeutung ist, und stellt europäische Auslegungen des Konzepts wie etwa die sogenannte „Human Security Doctrine“ vor.

Curriculum Vitae

Jakob Mühlstein
Nationality: Austrian
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Language skills:

Fluent: English, French, German (mother tongue)
Good: Spanish
Basic: Italian

Education:

March 2004 - 2011:
Political Science Magister Degree Course, University of Vienna (Austria);
Focus on: International Relations, International Organisations (UN), International Security & Development, African Studies (including France’s Africa Policy), European Union (Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations), Human Rights, Racism and Migration issues, Conflict Resolution;

Sept. 2007 - July 2008:
Undergraduate Exchange Program at “Sciences Po Paris” (Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris);
Focus on: International Relations, International Development, Work / Financing of NGOs;
Obtainment of a Diploma in International Relations with a language emphasis on
French

1994 - 2002:
High school “Lycée Danube”, Linz (Austria); Emphasis on languages (French, English, Italian);

Professional experience:

May 2010 - present:
UN Consultant at the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV), Visitors Service

July 2009 - October 2009:
Internship at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva within the “Peace Missions Support and Rapid Response Unit” (PMSRRU).
Key tasks: Monitoring and analysing human rights developments through reviewing reports of the OHCHR field presences, reports of UN agencies, human rights and humanitarian
organizations, and media sources; Assistance in the production of the “FOTCD (Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division) Daily Update”, an internal communication tool for senior management, aimed at sharing key human rights developments in the field; Assistance in the production of the “PMSRRU fortnightly” watch list, and other early warning tools and processes.
Supervisor: Joana Miquel-Gelabert, Associate Human Rights Officer

February 2003 - January 2004:
Civilian Service at the so called “Volkshilfe Flüchtlingsbetreuung”, an humanitarian aid organisation for refugees, Linz (Austria)

Special studies:

October-December 2010:
Curso Intensivo de Idioma Español, University of Havana;

April-May 2010:
Lectures at the University of Havana, Facultad de Filosofía e Historia

September 2009:
Attendance of the 12th session of the Human Rights Council (Geneva)

December 2008:
Study tour to the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Hague, the European Parliament, Brussels, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Paris.

April 2006:
Study tour to the United Nations Headquarters, New York, and the World Bank & International Monetary Fund, Washington DC;
Lectures at the Columbia University, New York; (organised by the Dept. of Political Science, University of Vienna).

Publications:
