DISSERTATION

‘NEW SCRAMBLE’ FOR AFRICA?
AN ANALYSIS OF US AND EU 21ST CENTURY AGENDAS IN AFRICA
CASE STUDIES: US AFRICOM AND JAES P&S

Verfasser:
Mag. phil. Manjola Raich, M.A.

angestrebter akademischer Grad:
Doktor der Philosophie (Dr. phil.)

Wien, 2010

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 920 300
Dissertationsgebiet lt. Studienblatt: Politikwissenschaften
Betreuerin / Betreuer: Univ. Prof. Dr. Heinz Gärtner
To TED
‘NEW SCRAMBLE’ FOR AFRICA?

AN ANALYSIS OF US AND EU 21ST CENTURY AGENDAS IN AFRICA
CASE STUDIES: US AFRICOM AND JAES P&S

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
EXTENDED TABLE OF CONTENTS v
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ix
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xix

INTRODUCTION 3

PART I OF CONTEXTS AND ACTORS

CHAPTER 1 A ‘NEW SCRAMBLE’ FOR AFRICA? 31
CHAPTER 2 AFRICA’S ‘AWAKENING’ AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY 39
CHAPTER 3 OF US FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE G.W. BUSH YEARS 53
CHAPTER 4 OF 21ST CENTURY EU WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 65

PART II OF ISSUES, INSTRUMENTS & PROCESSES
US & EU 21ST CENTURY POLICIES IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 5 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN AFRICA 83
CHAPTER 6 THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AFRICA 125
# PART III OF THE CASE STUDIES OUTPUTS

## CHAPTER 7
**US AFRICOM** 185

## CHAPTER 8
**JAES P&S PARTNERSHIP** 219

## CONCLUSION 253

## BIBLIOGRAPHY 261

## ANNEXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABSTRACT</strong></td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ZUSAMMENFASSUNG</strong></td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CURRICULUM VITAE</strong></td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘NEW SCRAMBLE’ FOR AFRICA?
AN ANALYSIS OF US AND EU 21ST CENTURY AGENDAS IN AFRICA
CASE STUDIES: US AFRICOM AND JAES P&S

EXTENDED TABLE OF CONTENTS v
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ix
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xv

INTRODUCTION 3
OF NEW CONCEPTUALISATIONS AND PARADIGM CHANGES 12
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 19
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 26

PART I OF CONTEXTS AND ACTORS

CHAPTER 1 A ‘NEW SCRAMBLE’ FOR AFRICA? 31
OF CHINA INTO AFRICA 31
OF BRAZIL INTO AFRICA 34
OF RUSSIA INTO AFRICA 35
OF INDIA INTO AFRICA 36

CHAPTER 2 AFRICA’S ‘AWAKENING’ AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY 39
Mega Challenges and Trends in Africa 40
AU: African Security Redefined 46
CHAPTER 3  OF US FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE G.W. BUSH YEARS  
OF THE NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY  
OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER 4  OF 21ST CENTURY EU WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA  
OF THE LEGAL AND THE ORGANISATIONAL DEBATE  
OF THE AGENCY VERSUS STRUCTURE DEBATE  
OF EU ACTORNESS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

PART II  OF ISSUES, INSTRUMENTS & PROCESSES  
US & EU 21ST CENTURY POLICIES IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 5  THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN AFRICA  
FROM HARD THROUGH SOFT TO SMART POWER  
THE US POLICIES IN AFRICA  
US SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA  
US ENERGY INTERESTS IN AFRICA  
US AID AND TRADE POLICIES IN AFRICA  
US POLICIES IN ADVANCING DEMOCRATISATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA  
US RECORD ON ENVIRONMENTAL, FOOD SECURITY AND DEMOGRAPHICAL POLICIES IN AFRICA  
US’ STANCE ON CHINA INTO AFRICA  
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S/US 21ST CENTURY AGENDA IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 6  THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AFRICA  
AT THE SEARCH OF AN EU–AFRICA STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK  
OF EU’S CIVILIAN AND NORMATIVE POWER  
The European Union Policies in Africa
PART III OF THE CASE STUDIES OUTPUTS

GRAHAM ALLISON’S THREE-LEVEL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 181

CHAPTER 7 US AFRICOM 185

THE AFRICOM CRISIS THROUGH THE LEANS OF RAM 185
CHANGE IN THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 188
HEADQUARTERS LOCATION 192
AFRICOM’S MISSION: A COCOM PLUS? 195
AFRICOM, SECURITY & THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS 200
AFRICOM AND UNILATERALISM VS. MULTILATERALISM 206
THE AFRICOM CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF OBM & BPM 209
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON AFRICOM CRISIS 216

CHAPTER 8 THE JAES P&S PARTNERSHIP 219

THE JAES P&S THROUGH THE LENS OF RAM 222
WHY ENGAGE IN AFRICA? 223
EU’S SECURITY & SECURITISATION OF EXTERNAL BORDERS 224
SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS 228
THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AS A TEST CASE FOR EU’S PEACE AND SECURITY CAPACITIES 230
**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>11 September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African Caribbean and Pacific states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEEP</td>
<td>JAES’ Africa – Europe Energy Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGOA</td>
<td>US African Growth and opportunity Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMANI</td>
<td>Peace in Africa (Swahili)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMESD</td>
<td>African Monitoring of Environment and Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVs</td>
<td>Anti-Retrovirals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU MS</td>
<td>African Union Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVCs</td>
<td>Additional Voluntary Contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bpd</td>
<td>Barrels per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPM</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Politics Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil – Russia – India – China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASDP</td>
<td>Common African Defence and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Communauté Économique et Monétaire des États d’Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States’ Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESW</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFBP</td>
<td>Congo Basin Forest Partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CFR Council on Foreign Relations
CIVCOM European Council’s Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CJTF – HOA Combined Joint Task Force – Horn Of Africa
COAFR Africa Working Group
COMCOM United States’ Combatant Command
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COOPENER External Programme for the promotion of policies, technologies and best practices in the fields of renewable energy and energy efficiency
CPA Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CSIS US Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSOs Civil Society Organisations
CSPs DG RELEX Country/regional Strategy Papers
DAC/OECD Development Assistance Committee / Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument
DCMA US AFRICOM Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFQF Duty Free Quota Free
DG DEV European Commission’s Directorate General for Development
DG ECHO European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DG RELEX European Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations
DGE IX GSC’s Directorate General E: Civilian Crisis Management
DGE VIII GSC’s Directorate General E: Defence Matters
DGE GSC’s Directorate General E: External and Political-Military Affairs
DoD US Department of Defence
DoS United States Department of State
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC East African Community
EBA Everything But Arms
EC MEA European Commission’s Multilateral Environment Agreements
EC European Commission
ECD European Consensus on Development
ECOSOCC African Union Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EDF European Development Fund
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDULINK</td>
<td>ACP – EU Cooperation Programme in Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education For All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFP</td>
<td>European Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (old)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPAs</td>
<td>European Union Economic Partnership Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESA</td>
<td>European Union Strategy for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP/CSDP</td>
<td>European Union Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Union Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU CFSP</td>
<td>European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU GAERC</td>
<td>European Union General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU HR CFSP</td>
<td>European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU MS</td>
<td>European Union Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force Mission Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU SSIR</td>
<td>European Union Security Sector Reform Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>United States’ European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUEI</td>
<td>European Union Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR DRC</td>
<td>European Union Force Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU Training Mission Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARA</td>
<td>Forum for Agriculture Research in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum On China – Africa Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>The Group of Eight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCA</td>
<td>Global Climate Change Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>World Bank’s Global Environmental Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFATM</td>
<td>Global Fund to fight AID, Tuberculosis and Malaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSC</td>
<td>General Secretariat of the European Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP +</td>
<td>Generalised System of Preference +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalised System of Preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War On Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>High Indebted Poor Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAES P&amp;S</td>
<td>Joint Africa – European Union Peace &amp; Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa – European Union Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAESP</td>
<td>Joint African – European Union Strategic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM</td>
<td>United States’ Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defence Authorisation Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neocon</td>
<td>Neoconservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership For Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>Normative Power Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBM</td>
<td>Organisational Behaviour Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>United States’ Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PEPFAR  President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PMI  President’s Malaria Initiative
PSC  African Union Peace and Security Council
PSC  European Council Political and Security Committee
PSI  Pan Sahel Initiative
PSOs  Peace Support Operations
QMV  Qualified Majority Voting
RAM  Rational Actor Model
RBM  Roll Back Malaria Partnership
RECAMP  Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix
RECs  African Regional Economic Communities
REDCOM  United States’ Research, Development and Engineering Command
S/GAC  Department of State Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator
SADC  South African Development Community
SOPs  Standard Operating Procedures
SROs  Sub-Regional Organisations
SSA  Sub-Saharan Africa
SSR  Security Sector Reform
STCs  African Union Specialised Technical Committees
STRICOM  United States’ Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command
TB  Tuberculosis
TSCTP  Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership
UCP  Department of Defence Unified Command Plan
UEMOA  Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
UK  United Kingdom
UN SG  United Nations Secretary General
UN  United Nations
UNAIDS  Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDESA  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund
UNHABITAT  United Nations Human Settlements Programme
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US COCOMs</td>
<td>United States’ Combatant Commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GAO</td>
<td>United States’ Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US NEP</td>
<td>United States National Energy Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US NSS</td>
<td>United States’ National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA/US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>United States Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIPs</td>
<td>Values, Images, Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMDs</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As the title itself foretells, this dissertation will handle issues connecting three continents: Europe, North America and Africa.

My motivation to research on and write about Africa is directly related to the fascination I think to have always felt for this continent and its people, which grew even more as a result of accounts and experiences lived when my husband decided to work throughout the East African region (Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti) and Chad/Central African Republic. This has compelled in me a desire to learn about and study issues of relevance to the African continent, which this dissertation partly covers. With times, I intend to travel Africa from North to South and from West to East: this is a promise I hope to fulfil sooner rather than later.

My M.A. in Contemporary European Studies with Trans-Atlantic Track, in the UK, USA and Italy, point at my already there interest on the EU and US policies. The knowledge I gained from these studies, but also from consequent stays, freelance researches and visits to the relevant institutions involved in the decision-making of US and EU foreign policies, respectively, proved indispensable for this research effort.

With the aim of securing access to information, I contacted, first and foremost, US government & EU structures relevant to my topic. For instance, the Political Adviser of the USA Embassy in Vienna was very kind to provide the contacts with the Public Affairs Office of the AFRICOM Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany; on the EU side, contacts were made with the relevant Brussels-based EU institutions. Several African embassies accredited in Vienna and the Permanent Mission of the African Union in Brussels were also contacted.

I got in touch with several renowned institutions, universities, think-tanks, and journals, across all three continents and actively participated in several conferences and workshops focusing on Africa and US/EU foreign policies especially those concerning Africa, which proved an abundant source for contacts with academics,
practitioners and pundits. Thus, this dissertation is the result of a comprehensive research work and contacts from the three continents. My gratitude is due to all the persons I contacted for the, sometimes, lengthy discussions on US and EU agendas in Africa.

I owe greatly to all of them that shared their knowledge and supported me throughout my research effort. In this sense, my thanks go to the tutor of my dissertation, Univ.-Prof. Dr. Heinz Gärtner, for initially suggesting USAFRICOM as a possible policy case-study and for the supervision provided; Ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Otmar Höll, for the interest he showed towards my research, the advice and kind readiness to act as the second referee; Prof. Kenneth J. Menkhaus, at the Political Sciences Department of the Davidson College, USA, who, on the request of a student at the beginning of the doctoral studies (myself) desperately looking to gather material, very kindly and promptly passed his own writings on US in Africa; Dr. J. Stephen Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director of the Global Health Policy/Africa at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a renowned public policy research institution in Washington DC, USA, who promptly mailed out his co-edited book on US policies in Africa.

Above all, my gratitude is due to my family, and in particular, I want to thank my husband, Dr. Ted Raich, for the constant trust he puts on all endeavours I undertake, this academic effort included. I am grateful for the tireless support he gave me day-in day-out, for the encouragement when it was needed and for the understanding when work lacked behind. This work is dedicated to him, without whom, it would have not come to completion.

Notwithstanding all the support given, the responsibility for remaining errors and shortcomings in this work rests with me alone.
INTRODUCTION

THE ROAD TO AFRICOM 6

THE ROAD TO JAES P&S 10

OF NEW CONCEPTUALISATIONS AND PARADIGM CHANGES 12

THEORETICAL APPROACH 19

OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 26
INTRODUCTION

The 9/11 has provoked a change in the way many international actors modelled and implemented their respective foreign policies. For instance, within a post-9/11 environment and Global War On Terror (GWOT) strategy context, in the United States of America (USA), academia and policy makers alike invoked for a combination of hard and soft powers with the aim of strengthening existing alliances, bolstering potential allies as well backing up and supporting failing states who were perceived as vulnerable to extremist penetrations. This calling upon and attempts to invoke the global appeal of US values, its strengthening of partnerships with like-minded states, and imperatives for a multilateral diplomacy became paramount benchmarks for an informed and effective foreign policy. On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Union (EU) factually emerged as and developed into an important actor in international politics. The nature of EU’s foreign and security cooperation has been and continues to be object of discords among academia. Latest, on the one side, there are authors who sustain that an analysis of European Foreign Policy (EFP)¹ is better explained through a structural realist analysis, and accordingly, its development should be seen as ‘a function of systemic changes in the structural distribution of power’; on the other side, other authors argue that stressing only an interest-informed foreign policy does not take into account the vast array of ‘EU actions in world politics [which indeed demand for] a wider and more appropriate approach’. The most prominent idea, according to these last ones, highlights the thorough ‘principled’ behaviour of the EU foreign activities, which sustains that the EU, through ‘the domestication of international relations [by emphasising] equality, institutions and peace’, has become a civilian/normative power. It is argued that within this prism is possible to provide with ‘a wider and more appropriate approach in order to reflect what [the EU] is, does and should do’.

¹ A discussion on the European foreign policy and her global role will be provided in Chapter 4.
The foreign policies of both these actors towards the Global South were also informed of the paradigm shifts in the conceptualisation of security and development, which emerged in the 1990s and were firmly established after the shock of 9/11. Reference is being made to the salience of the Human Security (HS) concept as opposed to a traditional state-centric security as well as to the Security-Development Nexus which has made peremptory comprehensive and coherent policies that take into account the symbiotic interrelationship between security and development concerns. Another important paradigm has been that on regional integration and cooperation as an appropriate instrument in tackling security and instability concerns. The EU has proved a weighty example in this matter. Concerning Africa, this last issue intensified and reached its peak with the creation of the African Union (AU) at the dawn of the new century, providing thus Africa with an important structure with which to present itself as a unified actor within the international arena.

This dissertation, broadly speaking, has as its object of interest the agendas that the USA and the EU have set up with regards to Africa since the dawn of the 21st century. As it will be shown throughout this writing, Africa gained an increasingly important place on the respective agendas. On the one side of the Atlantic, the terrorist attacks on September 11, changed the American perceptions of, especially, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and on the other side of the pond, the African conflicts and wars, which reached their peak just right at the dawn of the new century, did much of the same. Since, there has been a steady incrementing concerning the quality as well as the quantity of efforts/capacities, which both the US and the EU, dedicated to Africa. The year of 2007, was kind of pivotal, in terms of demonstrating the strategic relevance of the continent to this two actors. Two groundbreaking policies, US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and the Peace and Security Partnership within the Joint Africa–European Union Strategy (JAES P&S), were announced months apart from each other, and both aimed at putting Africa definitively into the high politics agenda. These two policies, which are also chosen as case studies, will serve to this dissertation as paramount policies through which, according to the imperatives of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a comparison of US and EU peace and security strategies in Africa, will be made. The argument of this dissertation is that while both policies put Africa into the high politics agendas, the outputs generated
differed: AFRICOM was faced with an ‘unprecedented unity of opposition’ and hostility among African leaders as well as with an amounting resistance among the US government civilian agencies involved; on the other side, JAES P&S was widely accepted by the African leaders. Thus, the core question is how to explain these different attitudes, since both policies aimed to support Africa in better dealing with its security problems. The answer will be found by squarely placing the empirical analysis within the approach offered by the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a sub-field within the International Relations (IR) theory. FPA is chosen, not only because this approach offers a useful structure for a comparative analysis but also because is ‘a means [to bring together] foreign and domestic action under the same umbrella’, and last but not least, because FPA ‘highlights the virtues of case studies as a basis for comparing, analysing and interpreting foreign policy phenomena’. Such concords with the aims of this research effort. The analysis will centre on the notion of a foreign policy system in action which is composed of the context, actors involved, policy processes, issues, instruments and finally, the output.

Based on the above said, as follows:

**Hypothesis 1.** Since it is assumed that the output is generated as a result of the interrelationship between the context, actors involved, policy processes, issues, and instruments, then a difference on how they are conceptualised by the concerned actors as well as a partly/wholly omission of one or more of these elements may/will cause deviations from the desired output.

It is argued that, firstly, the reason for the African hostility to AFRICOM is to be found on the fact that the US decision-makers failed to take into account the above elements evenly, i.e. the changed African context/sensitivities, and thus did not fully consider the costs produced by such planning i.e. hostility to AFRICOM. The EU, while taking stock from, continuing on and strengthening the previous conflict

---


prevention and crises management policy thinking, seems to have wholly involved the African party on the formulation of JAES P&S, resulting in broad accordance among both parties.

Secondly, the outputs of both policies have been influenced at varying degrees by the respective bureaucracies involved, who inasmuch as bureaucracies have a clear preference for continuity as opposed to change, unless change means increase in own organisational health. Both policies demanded change, thus the second hypothesis would read as follows:

**Hypothesis 2.** Since bureaucracies resist policies which imply change, then the involved bureaucracies would try to mould them (AFRICOM, JAES P&S) in a way that would best fit their own organisational health/interests.

This seems to have accounted for less than optimal policy outputs.

**THE ROAD TO AFRICOM:** The terrorist attacks on September 11 changed the American strategic perceptions of Africa. Less than two months after these attacks, it was officially declared that Africa was an important region for the US government’s high priority war on international terrorism. On 30 October 2001, the then National Security Advisor Condoleeezza Rice stated that: ‘Africa’s history and geography give it a pivotal role in the war on terrorism. […] Africa is critical to our war on terrorism.’ The US national ‘Security Strategy’ launched in September 2002 clearly highlighted this same objective. It was pointed out that ‘the events of

---


September 11, 2001 taught us that weak states […] can pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states […] poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders. […] An even more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones […]7. The ‘Security Strategy’ emphasized that a crucial aim was ‘[…] together with our European allies […] help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, […] help build indigenous capacity to secure porous borders and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists’8. Together with the strong emphasis on failed states, the ‘Security Strategy’ also concerned one of the traditional instruments in US Africa policy, namely development aid9. In the ‘Strategic Plan for 2004-2009’, the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) jointly accentuated that development assistance ‘must be fully aligned with the US foreign policy’10. The Plan left no doubt that the US’s own security was the highest priority in relation to Africa and other parts of the world. Thus, ‘[w]hat happens in Africa is of growing concern to the United States and our active engagement advances significant US interests […]’. And therefore, the focus must be on ‘resolving regional conflicts, countering global terror networks, [and] combating international crime’11.

On February 6, 2007, President Bush and Defence Secretary Robert Gates announced the creation of a US Africa Command. The decision is a clear acknowledgment of the emerging strategic importance of Africa, and of the recognition that peace and stability on the continent impacts not only Africans, but the interests of US and international community as well. Until this point, the regional command structure of


8 Ibid., pp.10-11.

9 Ibid., pp.21-23.


11 Ibid., pp.5, 8.
the Department of Defence (DoD) did not account for Africa in a comprehensive way, since it had three different US military headquarters maintaining relationships with African countries. The creation of US AFRICOM was aimed at enabling DoD to better focus its resources in supporting and enhancing existing US initiatives that help African nations, the African Union (AU), and the regional economic communities (RECs) succeed. The DoD would function as an integrated coordination point in addressing security and related needs. AFRICOM was created with the aim of pointing at the interrelationship between security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa, incorporating so the so-called three D approach to foreign affairs. At the security/defence end AFRICOM would bring into one the actions of three separate commands, improving so the US/DoD abilities to act in Africa. At the diplomacy end, AFRICOM would present the goodwill to treat African partners as equal, providing so an opportunity for continuous dialogue to develop and help building partner capacity through coordinating the kind of support that would enable African governments and existing regional organizations to have greater capacity in providing security. At the development end, AFRICOM is designed to ‘prevent problems from turning into crises and crises from turning into conflicts’, convinced of the fact that the securing of a peaceful and stable environment promotes economic prosperity. This last one provides us with an important clue of AFRICOM centring the ‘development-security nexus’ discourse as one of its relevant concerns. As a result, AFRICOM’s staff structure would include significant management and staff representation by the Department of State (DoS), USAID, and other US government agencies involved in Africa. It would also ‘seek to incorporate partner nations and humanitarian organizations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work alongside the US staff on common approaches to shared interests’.

---


‘AFRICOM, in concert with other US government agencies and international partners, aims at conducting sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy\textsuperscript{15}.

AFRICOM would also aim at putting into practice the conceptualisations on soft/smart power, inasmuch it would seek to address human rights abuses, poverty alleviation, the building of health clinics and schools as well as the digging of wells\textsuperscript{16}. So far, the new command presents itself as having the best of intentions. These, though, stand in stark contrast with US’s behaviour in Africa. In recent years, access to alternative oil supplies has increasingly become a US policy priority towards Africa. As a matter of it, the policy goal of fighting international terrorism has increasingly been mixed with another classical US national security issue: access to oil supplies\textsuperscript{17}. According to the National Intelligence Council forecasts, the US could be importing as much as 25\% of its oil from Central Africa by 2015 compared with 16\% at the beginning of this century\textsuperscript{18}. The increasing emphasis on securing oil supply from Africa and other regions but the Middle East has led the Pentagon to reflect on new strategic initiatives\textsuperscript{19}. These changes have resulted in a situation where it has gradually become difficult to separate the protection of oil from the war against terrorism which it seems to amount to one and the same thing\textsuperscript{20}. These analyses seem

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16}Tieku, T, K 2010 ‘The African Union and AFRICOM’, p.139.


to stand nearer to the truth, since AFRICOM generated an ‘unprecedented unity of opposition’ and hostility across Africa as well as a mounting resistance among involved US government agencies, especially the civilian ones.

**THE ROAD TO JAES P&S:** Due to its history of colonial involvement in Africa, Europe shares a common past with the African countries and has maintained a close partnership with them ever since their independence. This was done through the Yaoundé (1964-1969) and Lomé (1975-2000) agreements. An increasing emphasis on political stability and on security was then progressively introduced into the two last Lomé agreements and their successor, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), signed in 2000. Thus, while development policies have a long history, security issues gained salience, particularly as the conflicts, civil wars and interstate wars in Africa (especially SSA) reached a peak during the 1990s and continued to remain a concern of the EU also at the dawn of the new century.

In 2000, the EU Portuguese Presidency stated clearly security concerns by interlinking them with development issues: ‘Being realistic about development means thinking in an integrated manner about politics, security, and trade as well as development aid itself’21.

At about the same time, the EU and Africa held their first ever summit on continental level, in Cairo, Egypt. The resulting Cairo Declaration together with an Action Plan highlighted the main issues of concern among the two parties: security figured prominently in both the documents, due to the acknowledgement that,

> ‘persistence of numerous conflicts, which continue to cause [...] loss of human life as well as destruction of infrastructure and property and threaten peace, stability, regional and international security and hinder the aspirations of African peoples to peace, prosperity and development’22.

---


22 SN 106/4/00 REV 4, Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000 ‘Cairo Declaration’, available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/
Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the already ongoing debate on European security focused on the necessity to tackle terrorism adequately. As a result, in the European Union’s Security Strategy (ESS) agreed upon by the European Council in December 2003, terrorism was placed as one of the main threats to the EU followed by the threats from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. The ESS points out that ‘conflicts can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure [and] it provides opportunities for organized crime’. On state failure the ESS underlines that ‘collapse of the state can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional instability’. With time, the focus on terrorism faded, and in general it can be said that the ESS, by continuing on the above mentioned, furthered a close link between the new and old security threats and underdevelopment by stating that ‘Security is the first condition for development’.

Despite the first steps undertaken through the Cairo Process towards a comprehensive EU Africa policy, there was still a wealth of sectoral and fragmented policies. The challenges to coordination for a more efficient and effective action, asserted the need for a new and comprehensive single approach, which evolved under the form of the ‘EU Strategy for Africa’ (ESA). The main objectives of this Strategy were the provision of a single framework for all EU actors as well as the development of Africa, namely the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as one of the EU’s main political priorities. Peace and security was again


Ibid, p.4.

Ibid, p.15.
seen as prerequisites to a sustainable accomplishment of MDGs. The greatest problem of EU Strategy for Africa (ESA), was that the African partners saw themselves excluded from it, since they perceived it as a strategy FOR rather than a strategy WITH Africa. In a second try, at the Lisbon Summit, the second between Europe and Africa, the EU-Africa relationship marked a real turning point. Its agenda has been characterized by far-flung objectives and an all-embracing list of measures for future activities. Its Action Plan sets out the steps the EU will take by 2015 in supporting the African efforts to build a peaceful future. JAES defines the long-term policy orientations between the two continents, based on a shared vision and common principles such as the African unity, interdependence between the continents, ownership and responsibility, respect for human rights and democratic principles, right to development, strong political dialogue, burden-sharing, solidarity, common and human security, etc. The main objectives of JAES consist on improving the Africa-EU partnership, promoting peace, security, democratic and human rights, basic freedoms and gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialization, regional and continental integration, ensuring that all MDGs are met by 2015, effective multilateralism and a people centred partnership.

The Strategy’s First Action Plan, jointly agreed by the European and African parties, outlines eight areas for strategic partnership for the period of 2008-2010. The list is headed by the peace and security agenda. The objective of the JAES P&S is to cooperate in enhancing the capacity of Africa and EU to respond timely and adequately to security threats, and also to join efforts in addressing global challenges. Priority actions foresee the enhancing of the dialogue on challenges to peace and security, the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and last but not least predictable funding for African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

**OF NEW CONCEPTUALISATIONS AND PARADIGM CHANGES**

The referral, made at the beginning, to the new conceptualisations and paradigm shifts concerning security, development, their interrelationship, and the regional integration as an instrument to tackle and solve security problems, as well as the informed foreign policies of the US and EU concerning concepts such as
hard/soft.smart and civilian/normative power, make peremptory to provide these concepts with short definitions.

**Human Security & Security-Development Nexus:** As has been above mentioned, both policies (AFRICOM, JAES P&S) did further supplement the close link between security and development. The thinking about development and security and more so the relationship between them has indicated a paradigm shift since the 1990s. In the post-9/11 world, it became a commonplace to talk about the all-encompassing role of security. Three major changes in international relations have been crystallised as factors for such paradigm shift: firstly, new threats – international terrorism, organised crime, energy security, spread of WMDs, etc; secondly, steady growth of global or universal norms crystallised within the framework of international law; and thirdly, the consequences of globalisations. No longer exclusively defined in terms of national safety, security is seen broadened to include protection of the individual from threats such as lack of basic necessities, human rights abuses, and environmental degradation as well violence from conflicts or wars. The concept of Human Security (HS) emphasizes the ‘developmentalisation’ of security, since it includes ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’\(^{27}\). In opposition to the traditional state-centric security concept, HS is an individual-centric approach, which includes ‘the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence’\(^{28}\). The paradigm shift, thus, consists in ‘[r]ather than viewing security as being concerned with ‘individuals qua citizens’ (that is of their states), the HS approach views security as being concerned with ‘individuals qua persons’\(^{29}\). HS

---


is ‘the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfillment’\(^{30}\).

‘Human Security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential […] Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment—these are the interrelated building blocks of human—and therefore national security’\(^{31}\)

Development itself has been increasingly fused with and subjected to security concerns\(^{32}\). During the 1990s matured the recognition that there is a two way interrelation between the salience on armed conflict as well as crime and violence with economic inequality, underdevelopment and poor governance. Conflicts and/or wars had themselves massive costs in terms of missed development opportunities, translated in i.e. failing states and low indexes of human development\(^{33}\). From here on, it has become imperative to facilitate coherent, holistic or comprehensive approaches which integrate conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and good governance with development interventions\(^{34}\). For ‘the political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others. International actors should move to support national


reformers in developing unified planning frameworks for political, security, humanitarian, economic and development activities at a country level. This phenomenon has highlighted what within the developmental circles is called the ‘securitisation of development’. There is still an ongoing debate whether the merging of development and security should be viewed positively inasmuch it potentially provides for coherent and comprehensive policies, or whether this new paradigm points towards a subordination of development and poverty reduction to the security needs of major powers, mostly Western ones, i.e. US and its leadership in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), or even the Western powers’ desire to contain the ‘at risk’ regions of potential instability away from their borders.

REGIONALISATION & SECURITY: The 1990s as well as the dawn of the new millennium showed an intensifying of, on the one side, intrastate conflicts and wars and on the other side, a renaissance concerning regional cooperation, both


phenomena observed especially in Africa. The endemic presence of a large number of weak and/or failing/failed states also accounts for a potential spill-over of instability beyond states and across regions. In trying to find a response to these problems, regional cooperation became an important and appropriate instrument in curbing instability and insecurity. EU provides an example par excellence in this case. This interrelationship between regional cooperation and security/conflict prevention is not new. Its sources reach as back as 16th and 18th century with the writings of Erasmus von Rotterdam, Abbé de Saint Pierre as well as Immanuel Kant and its perpetual peace. At a later period, regional cooperation was intrinsic and present within situations and concepts such as balance of power, emergence of alliances when states are faced with common enemies and threats, the influencing of state behaviour through regional structures thus reducing the chances for conflict. As a result though of the above-mentioned paradigm shifts concerning security/development and of the changed international context (prevalence of intrastate as compared to interstate conflicts/wars) states are seen as coming together out of a common threat rather than to restore a balance of power between themselves. Since threats themselves are of a transnational nature, it implies that security becomes increasingly a matter of regional concern. The current state-of-the-art for such interdependence is given through Buzan and Weaver’s concept of regions rising as security actors. The existence of (positive) linkages between regional economic integration and peace and security is accepted by many and is an assumption behind


39 Buzan, B, Weaver, O, de Wilde, J 1998 ‘Security: A New Framework For Analysis’, Lynne Rienner, Boulder. This book sustains that with the state increasingly losing its role as a central security actor, regions do present themselves as the appropriate arena upon which to stage common action since security threats, and especially because their increasingly transnational character, often are shared among most actors in the same region. An interesting analysis of the interdependence between regional cooperation and security/conflict prevention in Africa, as explored in the example of four Central African states, is to be found at: Meyer, A 2006 ‘L’Intégration Régionale Et Son Influence Sur La Structure, La Sécurité Et La Stabilité D’États Faibles: L’Exemple De Quatre États Centrafricains’, Universität Wien.
many contemporary discourses in favour of more cooperation and integration at the regional level in order to avoid or end bilateral, regional and even domestic conflicts. European post-war history and the initial phases of European integration are thereby explicitly or implicitly presented as a demonstration of the validity of the assumption. [...] It is often assumed that this experience is replicable in other parts of the world.\(^{40}\)

Concerning Africa, the pan-African movement has strong endogenous political, economic and security motives. Its political motive is based on the strong pan-African urge towards ‘a continental identity and coherence’\(^{41}\), and a, as much stronger, urge based on economic motives for a regional cooperation, given the small size of most African economies. Concerning the security motives, the erosion of the state’s powers and consequently their being unable to capably and efficiently tackle security challenges, sees an increase in reliance on regional structures, since doing so it provides for a more efficient use of scarce resources and a more effective tackling of security problems.

**US: HARD/SOFT/SMART POWER**\(^{42}\). Hard power is defined as the ‘wilful power, [...] the ability to impose one’s goals without regard to others’, and ‘the ability to talk instead of listen and to afford not to learn’.\(^{43}\) Its source is seen in ‘large population and territory, extensive natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability’.\(^{44}\) The context within the new century made peremptory the

---


\(^{42}\) Hard/soft/smart power will be dealt at greater detail on Part II where these conceptions will be applied and thus evaluate on these same grounds the concerned US policies in Africa since the dawn of the new century.


strengthening of existing alliances, bolstering potential allies and backing up and supporting failing states that were perceived as vulnerable to extremist penetrations. Such, was argued, invoked for a combination of hard and soft powers. Joe Nye defines soft power as the ability to ‘[...] shape the preferences of others and getting others to want the outcomes that you want’\cite{nye2004}. Nye adds that in reaching the desired results one must decide which type of power is the most expedient by taking into consideration the context within which power is executed. Hence, smart power: a mix of hard and soft power skills and resources, the exact dosage depending on the context\cite{nye2008}. Nye’s academic deliberations did have a stark impact on the way US implements its foreign policy, as evidenced by the *CSIS Commission on Smart Power (2007)*\cite{csis2007}. The Report provided with a guidebook-like on the international US behaviour.

**EU: CIVILIAN/NORMATIVE POWER**\cite{duchene1972}. Following on Duchène’s conceptualisation of the EU –then EC– as a new kind of civilian power/actor\cite{duchene1972}, his academic ‘successors’ have developed a thesis which maintains that the Union, inasmuch uniquely capable and/or uniquely configured, constitutes an effective exporter of values and norms in the international system\cite{manners2002}. A civilian power implies acceptance of the necessity for cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives, a preference for civilian means, and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address pressing international issues, as well as the development of a set of values

---


\textsuperscript{46} Nye, Jr., J S 2008 ‘The Powers to Lead’, Oxford University Press, New York, p.x

\textsuperscript{47} Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007 ‘CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America’, CSIS, Washington DC, p.4

\textsuperscript{48} Civilian/normative power will be dealt at greater detail on Part II where these conceptions will be applied and thus evaluate on these same grounds the concerned EU policies in Africa since the dawn of the new century.


encompassing ‘solidarity with other societies, and a sense of responsibility for the future of the world’\textsuperscript{51}. The civilian attribute has come under attack, for ‘civilising’ is seen as a far too laden term from the historical European relations with the rest of the world\textsuperscript{52}. Manners has advanced that the notion of Normative Power Europe (NPE) better describes the EU, which focuses on the ‘ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role’\textsuperscript{53}. EU’s normative ambitions have their source from, firstly, an explicit rejection of the divisive nationalisms, imperialism and war of Europe’s past, secondly, its unique character as a ‘hybrid polity’, and thirdly, the development, over the past 50 years, of a body of values which are firmly embedded in successive Treaties and in the Union’s practices\textsuperscript{54}.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

‘[T]he essence of FPA is that it offers an actor rather than a state perspective, and, equally important, it provides a policy focus [...]’\textsuperscript{55}.

A glance at the already existing large literature focused on analyzing the US and EU policies in Africa, and we would quickly find out that, little work is available concerning a systematic comparative analysis between them. It seems that, apart from globalisation and the end of the cold war era, this is due to other four main reasons\textsuperscript{56}. Firstly, Africa has only lately acquired an important and even strategic

\textsuperscript{51} Maull, H, 1990 ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Volume 69, Issue No. 5, pp.92-3. Maull’s definition of civilian power, although it refers specifically to Germany and Japan, has been regularly used with reference to the EU.


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p.240.


\textsuperscript{56} Although, an assessment of these factors is in itself highly interesting, they are only mentioned and not further elaborated within this research effort.
position within the agendas of both actors; Secondly, prior to 9/11, the array of policies and issues was rather limited, with development policies featuring prominently; Thirdly, with the institutionalisation of a common European security and foreign policy, the EU surfaced as an actor within the international arena, thus, attracting greater academic interest for its policies; and fourthly, arguably, the emergence of a ‘sui generis’ actor such as the EU, that does not fit the traditional actor’s theorizing, accounts for the most prominent reason for such a gap in the literature. The new developments and conceptualizations, which engage a critical approach to foreign policy, have opened the way for and make possible such comparison.

This research effort finds as most applicable two definitions of foreign policy. The first offers a classic explanation of foreign policy, which is seen as encompassing ‘those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy’\(^{57}\). The second one, while not conflicting with the above-mentioned, it offers a broader definition which does not exclusively focus on actions performed by nation-states, thus allowing for an analysis of foreign policy actions performed by i.e. non-state/sui generis actors such as the EU. This definition is well accepted by many theorists in the field of foreign policy.

> ‘[Foreign policy] is the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’\(^{58}\).

This notion of foreign policy is easier applicable to actors other than the state, since nowadays, academics, pundits and decision-makers alike view foreign policy as ‘something that a variety of actors do, from influential social movements on the one


hand to regional actors like the EU on the other. The inclusion of these new actors is explained by the fact that through their foreign policies ‘they have a high impact on other states and organisations’.

While an analysis of foreign policy through a FPA-like approach is seen as having been ‘around as long as there have been historians and others’ who have sought to understand the reasons for the choices made regarding relations with external entities, the FPA approach within the field of IR per se is dated back to the 1950s and early 1960s. Its first thirty years are characterised by a vibrant research community in IR. At that time, there were three main themes, each of them concerning a paradigmatic publication. Firstly, the publication of Snyder, Bruk and Sapin in the 1950s and the consequential work on the bureaucratic and organisational politics in the 1960s and early 1970s by Allison and Halperin, inspired an analysis of foreign policy focused on the decision-making. Secondly, FPA was referenced to the psychomilieu, by which is to be understood the psychological, situational, and social contexts, within which individuals, involved in the decision-making process, act. This strand had its paradigmatic guidance in mainly the publication of the Sprouts. The third strand centred on the work of Jim Rosenau which focused on the


60 Ibid.


relationship between genotypes of states and the sources of their foreign policy in the 1960s. The dynamics of foreign policy are, thus, found in a wide range of social science fields. Recently there is observable a new development which bears witness of a dynamic interplay between IR concepts and ideas and what would previously have been termed FPA.

The occurrence of 9/11 did give salience to FPA approaches, which since the late 1980s had fallen out of fashion. This new salience is explained by the fact that 9/11 incited the scholarly body to ‘focus attention on the centrality of decisions taken by states and by other independent actors, as well as why the US and UK intelligence service turned out not to be fit for purpose [sic]’. As mentioned above, the focus of this research goes on these same lines: it focuses on the decisions taken by the US and EU concerning Africa since the beginning of the new millennium, as well as looks at why two paramount policies, although aiming the same, at their announcement were so diversely greeted, especially by the African parties.

FPA is seen as an appropriate theoretical framework for this research, applicable to the analysis of US and EU foreign policy in Africa. There are two fundamental reasons which sustain this claim. First, FPA has lost its state-centricity, and as result of it, the analytical techniques associated to FPA can be transferred from the state to other significant international actors, just such the EU. This brings no losses to the FPA as an approach, for when the FPA was born, the state, as the most significant actor in IR, was the logical unit with which to analyse international relations. From the very beginning, though, it was always the actor perspective, rather than a specific

---


67 For more see: Hill, C 2003 ‘The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy’, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. In his analysis to foreign policy, Hill draws heavily on ideas and concepts found in writers associated with the theory of international relations.


69 White, B 2004 ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, p.50.
type of actor/actors, that was important to the foreign policy analyst\textsuperscript{70}. The second reason concerns the perceived focus of FPA on government and governmental power. As a matter of fact, this problem pertains not just to foreign policy analysts but to ‘all political scientists’ evident since the emergence of the so-called ‘authority structures that are not coterminous with geographic borders, whether territorially or regional based (like the EU) [...]’\textsuperscript{71}. The accepted solution here has been by replacing the term ‘government’ with that of ‘governance’, allowing so the study of government-like activities. Thus, ‘as with replacing state by actor, it does not obviously damage the essence of an FPA approach to replace government with governance’\textsuperscript{72}. By building on the premises that the essence of FPA is that it offers an actor perspective and a policy focus, the rest of the analysis is done by posing the six standard FPA questions concerning contexts, actors, processes, issues, instruments and outputs. All of them are assumed to be interrelated to each other and thus, constitute a foreign policy system in action, by which it is understood that the nature of processes is affected by the identity of the actors involved, the concerned issues, the available policy instruments and the context within which policy is made. Outputs are then generated as a result of such interrelationship\textsuperscript{73}.

By building on these premises, a critical foreign policy analysis, methodologically seen, has to follow certain imperatives which take five relevant features\textsuperscript{74}. Firstly, critical foreign policy should be empirical, meaning that analysis ought to look at actual cases and evidence, of course within an explicit theoretical framework; secondly, both structure and agency should be taken into consideration, since both of them are involved in foreign policy, with decisions being made –agency– but always


\textsuperscript{72} White, B 2004 ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, p.51.


within a set of constraints –structure; thirdly, a critical approach to foreign policy accepts a broad view of politics, meaning that politics does not exclusively happen at the governmental level, for politics is shaped by NGOs and transnational norms; fourthly, critical foreign policy means confronting important theoretical issues with knowledge –constitutive of ideas/beliefs/discourses which shape the context within which decision-making happens– and reality. This implies that ‘all critically inclined scholars search for gaps between words and deeds’; and fifthly, the critical foreign policy study recognises the contingency of the political process, meaning that decision makers find themselves operating within parameters which constrain their freedom, but equally they do make decisions. Accordingly, ‘a critical approach accepts that things could have always been different’.

In trying to satisfy all the above-mentioned imperatives, it seems to this author that, Graham T. Allison’s three-level framework 75 does exactly that. The first level of analysis, the Rational Actor Model (RAM) it assumes that X (in this case AFRICOM and JAES P&S) is the action of an international actor (here USA and EU), which has a coherent utility function, it acts in relation to external threats and opportunities, and its actions are value-maximising; and it asks what threats and opportunities arise for the actor; what is its utility function; and what is the best choice in order to maximise its own objectives. Thus, it can be said that RAM satisfies wholly/partially the first four imperatives for a critical foreign policy analysis. The second and third models, respectively the Organisational Behaviour Model (OBM) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) go at a deeper level and provide so a detailed analysis by identifying the units at the governance level involved with the concerned policies, the constraints or capabilities created as a result of their respective standard operating procedures (SOPs) as well as views and values that shape the choice and action made. Thus, this analysis counts for the satisfaction of the fourth and fifth features for a critical foreign policy analysis.

The models complement each other. RAM squares up the broader context, the larger national/supranational patterns and the shared images. The RAM assumptions and

logic is apparent – unitary actors with specified objective, maximising value. Such is applicable to foreign policy of non-state actors, for as Allison argues, ‘In explaining actions of nonstate actors, from international institutions such as the European Union or IMF to international businesses and nongovernmental organisations such as the Red Cross, this paradigm is also predominant. One reason the model is so pervasive is that it does have significant explanatory power’.

OBM, on the other side, focuses on the organisational routines (SOPs) which effect information, options and actions, while BPM goes further onto detail by highlighting politics and procedures which shape perceptions and preferences. As it will be shown, none of the three models simply describe events, for

‘[i]n attempting to explain what happened, each of them distinguishes certain features as the relevant determinants. Each combs out the numerous details in a limited number of causal strands that are woven into the most important reasons for what happened [and] by integrating factors identified under each model explanations can be significantly strengthened’.

As it becomes clear Allison’s framework is used with the aim of analysing the concerned polices at different levels: the role of US/EU as international actors concerning Africa at macro and meso levels, the concerned organisational routines as well as the politics and procedures within relevant governmental units. For this purpose, the research was focused on gaining an overview about technical discussions in political documents of US, EU and AU/SROs; gathering official statements; comparison of legal texts; analysis of information provided through official websites such as EU Council, EC, JAESP, White House, US DOD, US DoS, AFRICOM, AU, African SROs; contacts with relevant research institutions and think tanks across the globe, etc. The output expectations of this research effort are to provide the discussion with a stronger empirical as well as analytical base on,

---


generally, the role of US and EU in Africa, and particularly, of their peace and security strategy since the dawn of the 21st century.

OUTLINE

By building on the notion of a foreign policy system in action, the dissertation is divided in three main parts. The first is concerned with the contexts and actors; the second with issues, instruments and the nature of processes; while the third and last one will look at two specific outputs of such foreign policy system in action, respectively one policy for each the US and EU agendas in Africa: AFRICOM and JAES P&S.

CONTEXTS AND ACTORS: This part is divided in four chapters. The first two analyse the changed African context. The first chapter concerns the changes due to the increased presence of emerging powers, above all of China, in Africa. The questions posed here are i.e. how the unorthodox methods, concerning trade and development cooperation, used by the emerging powers have had an impact on the way the traditional methods employed by Western countries (most prominently, USA, EU, etc) are perceived in Africa?; does the presence of i.e. China and its sheer volume of investments provide Africa with a leverage that allows it to better negotiate and bargain with the other partners i.e. with US and EU?; has the scramble for access to African resources contributed towards a heightened competitiveness among traditional (US, EU) and new (China, etc.) actors in Africa? As a matter of fact, ‘African states are today actively courted by a range of new partners and suitors [and] Africa has become a far more intensely competitive political and economic marketplace’78. The second chapter is exclusively concentrated on Africa, by looking at the main trends and mega challenges that confront today the continent. It is important to identify them, for they are relevant to the analysis of respective US and EU agendas in Africa at a later stage (Part II). Since the research aims to highlight the peace and security strategies, greater attention will be given to the evolution, and

institutionalisation of peace and security structures at a pan-African level. Thus, the emergence of the AU, and that of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) will be analysed at greater detail. Chapter three and four leave the African continent and focus on the US and EU’s actorness and their foreign policy making. Chapter three begins with an analysis of the main actors involved in US foreign policy in general, for then continuing to explore the US foreign policy during the G.W. Bush years. Clearly, that the neoconservative way of thinking and its repercussions on the US foreign policy, deserve a short stop. The EU foreign policy, which is the object of concern in the fourth chapter, is advanced through the ‘EU-as-actor’ approach. This is, arguably seen as dominating the existing analyses on Europe’s global role and consequently, explaining conceptually the impact of EU on world politics. By working backwards, as it were from impact, scholars have tried to conceptualise the kind of actorness the EU has acquired, which evidently has enabled her to become such an influential global player. Such approach is chosen for a second reason as well: the actor focus of the analysis is expedient to and perfectly marries with FPA theoretical approach.

ISSUES, INSTRUMENTS AND NATURE OF PROCESSES: Part II is divided in two chapters, which each analyse the respective 21st century US and EU agendas in Africa on the grounds of their informed foreign policies concerning hard/soft/smart and civilian/normative power discourses. The evaluation of these two different approaches will concern the issues of interest that each actor has in Africa, how they are advanced, what means and instruments are chosen/available, and how the identity of actors has influenced the nature of the processes. As specified by the critical foreign policy analysis here special attention will be placed on the ‘search for gaps between words and deeds’.

OUTPUTS: AFRICOM AND JAES P&S: By using Allison’s approach in critically analysing these two foreign policy case studies, once again is seen the foreign policy system in action –the interrelationship between contexts, actors, issues, instruments and processes has a direct impact on the output, with RAM and OBM/BPM covering them all. It is proved that the omission of one or more of these elements on the decision-making process accounts for outputs which though aiming the same will be recognised differently by the concerned parties. For instance, the US policy-makers failed to wholly take into account the changed African context and their sensibilities
concerning i.e. the pan-African aspirations and institutions in tackling peace and security, or the differences on the conceptualisation of security between US and Africa: seemingly, the US conceptualises security in traditional state-centric and militaristic terms, while the Africans have moved onto accepting a more holistic concept, namely that of human security. On the EU side, the research results point out that while the standing up of JAES P&S did take into consideration the necessary strategic steps, the implementation of JAES P&S, as the insights gained through the BPM approach seem to suggest, faces considerable operational challenges. The JAES P&S risks to be stamped with a ‘too good to be true’.
PART I:
OF CONTEXTS AND ACTORS

CHAPTER 1  A ‘NEW’ SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA?  31

CHAPTER 2  OF AFRICA’S ‘AWAKENING’ AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY  39

CHAPTER 3  OF US FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE G.W. BUSH YEARS  53

CHAPTER 4  OF EU WITHIN THE 21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL ARENA  65
CHAPTER 1
A ‘NEW’ SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA?

‘Today emerging-market giants are fighting for oil, gas and metal ore in Africa as energetically as 19th-century European colonialists grabbed land’\(^1\).

The dawn of the new century saw a run among old and emerging powers to gain influence in Africa. The emerging powers, among them the most prominent a group called also BRIC\(^2\) countries, have intensified their respective relations with Africa and accordingly invested heavily in the continent.

OF CHINA INTO AFRICA

‘[W]hereas some 3,6% of Chinese imports come from Africa and Africa absorbs 2,8% of Chinese exports; whereas the value of Chinese trade with Africa increased from USD 2 billion in 1999 to roughly USD 39,7 billion in 2005; whereas China is now Africa's third most important trading partner; whereas Africa is clearly becoming the economic frontier for China, which is very effective in coupling aid-for-oil strategies with foreign policy tools’\(^3\).


\(^2\) BRIC is an acronym which stands for Brazil – Russia – India – China.

China-Africa relations, also seen as an expression of the ‘South-to-South cooperation’, are not new but do have a long history. Such relations have been forged since African liberation movements sought to free themselves from colonialism. Of course there have been strong ideological ties in this sense, but China has also heavily invested in Africa such as i.e. scholarships for 18 thousand African students, 900 infrastructure projects such as building of railways, roads, national parliaments, as well as some 240 million patients in 47 African countries were treated by 16 thousand Chinese personnel etc. As of 2006, China’s trade with Africa amounted to $55.5 billion as compared to $39.7 billion just one year before. Within this framework, some 800 Chinese companies have invested $1 billion, established 480 joint ventures and employed over 78 thousand Chinese workers. 32 percent of China’s oil imports come out of Africa, and in these terms, its oil related investments account for at least $16 billion. It has cancelled $1.3 billion in debt from 31 African countries, as well as it has abolished tariffs on 190 kinds of goods from 29 African Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and promised to do the same with other 400 goods. Over 3 thousand Chinese nationals partake in the UN peacekeeping in Africa.

China stages its relations with Africa within the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and is genuinely convinced that their approach deriving from their own developmental model is valuable to Africa’s own developmental quest. This is brought about, successfully, via a rhetoric of ‘South-to-South cooperation’ and perceptions of better understanding Africa’s development needs, which seem to resonate ‘powerfully in Africa’. China’s leverage in Africa is also explained by the fact that

---

4 Cited in


‘China is not interested in territorial conquest, in exporting its own surplus nationals (although the presence of Chinese nationals in Africa is growing), or, necessarily, in gaining converts for a Chinese model of development’.

Its attractiveness in Africa is further heightened by the fact that China seems to offer faster implementation of programmes, in a time when western partners fail to deliver on i.e. the promise of scaling up aid for Africa. China’s immense mercantilist appetite especially for raw materials, ranging from petroleum to diamonds to ferrochrome and so on, has also positive effects on SSA countries, for apart from buying raw materials China invests heavily in their infrastructure. China’s engagement is ‘a transformative’ one, inasmuch it couples her voracious appetite with the promise of doing more for economic growth and poverty alleviation in Africa than anything attempted before by traditional donors. There are estimates that due to the Chinese investments, the African countries have experienced an increase of 1 to 2 percent in their overall economic growth figures. This is quite a remarkable feature, in a time when an international crisis is ravaging havoc, the world market economy has not yet found a way to end the marginalisation of African economies, and most importantly, a growing realisation that traditional relations and partnerships have failed to deliver on Africa’s poverty eradication and reversing of economic marginalisation. The growing literature on the topic sustains that China’s policies involve much long-term strategic planning, and that

‘[i]n comparison, Western foreign policies toward Africa seem short term in their focus and often improvised in response to specific events rather than strategically conceived.’

Another characteristic of China into Africa is the absence of ‘moral judgements’, as compared to the western partners’ conditionality clauses on i.e. governance and democratic benchmarks. Thus in posing the question of how Chinese involvement into Africa is shaping the parameters with which Africa relates with the west and

---


vice-versa, one might conclude that, while on the one side, Africans perceive China viewing them as attractive economic partners, on the other side, the western partners are perceived as seeing them through the lenses of donor-beneficiary relationship, and furthermore, the western political conditionalities as a neo-colonial imposition.\(^9\)

China’s diplomatic efforts have been as intensive as its trade and aid policies. For instance, it has established embassies in 38 out of 48 African countries, exchanged military attachés in 14 of them, erected Confucius institutes in several African capitals as well as partly finances a renowned think tank in South Africa.

It has, though, to be said that China’s activities into Africa, call for caution too. The very fact named above, of China desiring Africa’s resources and priding itself of not meddling with the internal affairs, points at its opportunistic, exploitative nature.

‘Africans and Westerners certainly, further complain about China’s disdain for human rights and mayhem in Africa. The fact that China may have been and may still be morally complicit in the Sudan’s massacring of Darfuri civilians or the repressions of Equatorial Guineans and Zimbabweans, through the supply of weapons of war to the relevant militaries and through the refusal to employ its evident economic leverage appropriately on the side of peace, weighs heavily in the balance.’\(^{10}\)

OF BRAZIL INTO AFRICA

President Lula da Silva, decided to visit Africa in November 2003, just a year after he was in office. Such gesture explains the importance that Africa holds on Brazil’s foreign policy agenda. Brazil-Africa relations are based on the principles of

---


solidarity and cooperation and such solidarity and cooperation is felt as most needed in no other area than that of HIV/AIDS pandemic fight. Based also on Brazil’s own successful cutting off by 50 percent the HIV/AIDS mortality rate, contracts in Namibia and Mozambique were concluded to manufacture generic anti-retroviral (ARVs) drugs to combat HIV/AIDS. In Angola, Brazil is involved with health, education, agriculture and $150 million water supply projects; in Mozambique much of the same including a cancel of $20 million in debts; in Namibia it trains marine and air force personnel. More than 100 Brazilian businesses compete for contracts in Africa especially for oil and mining projects, including the mining giant Companhia do Vale do Rio Doce which plans to get involved and rehabilitate the Moatize coal mine and the approaching railway, a mammoth project valued at some $700 million. Brazil has been important in creating a perfect example of South-to-South cooperation, with the establishment of a tripartite alliance among Africa, India and itself aiming global agriculture trade and UN Security Council reform.

OF RUSSIA INTO AFRICA

On the other side, Russia has trebled its trade with Africa since early 2000s reaching $3 billion a year, and Russian businesses have invested $5 billion in buying African assets. Lukoil, Rosneft and Stroytransgas – all Russian oil giants – have concluded contracting worth $3.5 billion earmarked for oil exploration contracts to be completed by the end of the decade with Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt and Angola. Until 2007 the four big Russian metal companies have invested over $5 billion in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) alone. Such expansion fits perfectly with Russia’s desire to restore its international position and expand its ‘sphere of influence’ in Africa, for


12 More information on Brazil-Africa relations see: An interesting and thorough analysis of Brazil’s policies towards Africa can be found at Captain, I 2010 ‘Brazil’s Africa Policy under Lula’, in Global South, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp.183-198.

a move to create a bloc of countries rich in energy sources […] would increase the political weight of its participants and change the balance of power and influence in the world\textsuperscript{14}.

OF INDIA INTO AFRICA

India is intended to jump on the ring, as well. In April 2008, following the example of China two years ago, India invited the African leaders in Delhi in a summit aiming at strengthening trade and diplomatic ties. Such move comes not just as a result of India having lost a number of contracts to China in oil exploration, but also due the historical ties it has especially with African countries on the Indian Ocean Rim, which it actually considers as its own strategic backyard\textsuperscript{15}. During the above-mentioned summit, India’s Prime Minister announced that his country would provide $500 million for projects in Africa. Trade with Kenya between 2004-5 showed an increase of 55 percent, reaching some $450 million – slightly lower than the trade balance sheet between China and Kenya. India is among the top ten investors in Mozambique, especially interested in oil and gas. India’s private businesses are also competing and implementing diverse contracts in the region, such as India’s Essar Group, who participates in three oil and gas exploration in Madagascar. In general Indian exports to Africa include engineering goods, cotton and pharmaceuticals, while it imports inorganic chemicals, gemstones and other precious metals\textsuperscript{16}. A new feat of the cooperation with Africa is India purchasing and/or lending arable land, as evidenced by the Indian southern state of Andhra Pradesh which has signed letters of...
intent with Kenya and Uganda, concerning some 50,000 and 20,000 acres respectively.\(^{17}\)

---

It is not clear whether these new emerging powers’ thrust into Africa will turn out to be better than the Westerns’ turned out to be. By concluding this chapter it can be said that these new and emerging powers seem not to be in Africa for territorial grabs as the European colonisers did in the past, neither to gain converts for a given model of development as the whole West aims at. At a first glance seems that what they are looking for is rather to grasp the opportunity for enormous profit. African leaders are attracted by the new powers’ approaches because the Western’s formulae and conditionalities failed to deliver the promised results. Now Africa may turn to the new countries, because at least they bring cash. A point in the case is also provided by the fact that ‘Africa’s exports to China increased at an annual rate of 48 percent between 2000 and 2005, two and half times as fast as the rate of the region’s exports to the United States and four times as fast as the rate of its exports to the European Union over the same period’.\(^{18}\)

‘[...] the boom is a potentially pivotal opportunity for African countries to move beyond their traditional reliance on single-commodity exports and move up from the bottom of the international production chain, especially if growth-enhancing opportunities for trade and investment with the North continue to be as limited as they have been historically’.\(^{19}\)

---


\(^{19}\) Broadmann, H, G 2008 ‘China And India Go To Africa: New Deals In The Developing World’. 
On the other side, China’s approach to aid and for that matter the approaches of the ‘new donors’ have steered high attention, for they seem to be of an independent nature which does not fit within the established western aid and development standards or institutions, such as those implemented through DAC/OECD\(^{20}\). A debate among developmentalists has been prompted on the appropriateness and timeliness of these last ones. It becomes possible to imply that due to the counterweight offered by the growing presence of new powers in Africa and their development cooperation, Africa has the possibility to place itself in a better position while negotiating and bargaining with the other/traditional donors involved in the continent.

‘African states are today actively courted by a range of new partners and suitors from Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Russia, and others [and] Africa has become a far more intensely competitive political and economic marketplace’\(^{21}\).

But, there are also worries too, as an analyst argues, a flood of cash may help flourish corruption in countries where that it is already a problem, and as it is known, alas, resource-rich developing countries are prone to corruption and instability. With this picture in mind, analysts worry that if the West loses its leverage in Africa then the ‘fruits of Africa’s resources may be squandered’\(^{22}\). Thus, there is an imperative for

‘the US and Europe [to] utilize their technological, financial and ‘soft power’ advantages– or be overtaken by ruthless competitors’\(^{23}\).

---


\(^{22}\) Cohen, A 2009 ‘Russia’s New Scramble For Africa: Moscow Attempts to Build its Sphere of Influence in the African continent’.

\(^{23}\) Ibid.
CHAPTER 2
OF AFRICA’S ‘AWAKENING’ AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY

‘Ex Africa Semper Aliquid Novum’, Pliny the Elder

Africa is no longer just a development issue, but rather it has become an independent political actor within the international politics. First and foremost, ‘the advent of the AU can be described as an event of great magnitude in the institutional evolution of the continent’1. Africa’s ownership of ‘poverty eradication, sustainable growth and development, better integration within the world economy’, hit all the right keys and is best reflected through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which aims to ‘accelerate the process of intra-African cooperation and integration’. Many countries throughout the continent have moved away from despotic regimes and have picked up the pace towards comprehensive reforms and adopted democratic principles. Economically speaking, Africa has witnessed an incredible growth, boosted by high demand on and soaring prices of commodity goods, especially oil and other natural resources.

The strategic importance of Africa has seen continuous increase also as a result of the rearrangement of the global powers and emergence of new ones, notably ‘with the arrival of China and the return of USA’, reducing so the EU’s role as the natural partner of Africa. At a first take, this growing competition on the continent for influence and resources can explain in a way the wider and deeper engagement of the EU, US and others in Africa. A last but not least issue is the demography of the African continent, which it will in short have as many inhabitants as China or India, and this will have repercussions pertaining to mobility and migration, especially an issue of concern to the EU.

The following will concentrate on the changes or trends, Africa has been experiencing since the dawn of the new century, seen in terms of democratic governance, economic boom, and wars/conflicts, for continuing with the phenomenon of pan-African regionalisation analysing especially the emergence of the AU and its institutions.

MEGA CHALLENGES\(^2\) AND TRENDS IN AFRICA

Africa is overwhelmingly present in the world press, especially for its mega challenges, be it conflict, disastrous pandemic diseases’ statistics, food insecurity, or migratory flows. Pandemic diseases remain one of the main concerns in Africa: HIV/AIDS being one of the deadliest diseases. In 2007, according to UNAIDS, of the world’s 33 million living with HIV/AIDS, 22 million or 67 percent of the global figure live in SSA. If one looks at the fatality rate, the statistics get even grimier: 75 percent of the global annual deaths or some 1.5 million people die in SSA\(^3\). In 2008, of the world’s 2 million infected children younger than 15 some 90 percent of them live in SSA and of the approximately 375 thousand newly infected also 90 per cent of them live in SSA. The adult HIV prevalence is as well in SSA at its highest at some 5 percent in a time where the immediate next on the list is at around 1 percent. The Southern Africa has an adult HIV prevalence which roams around 15 – 28 per cent with Botswana and Swaziland reaching the high 30s. In overall figures the adult HIV prevalence tends to be higher among women than men\(^4\). Another health threat is the recurrence of the tuberculosis (TB) pandemic at the same areas hit hardest by the HIV/AIDS as well. Greater numbers of Africans are found to be infected with both the diseases making so treatment even more difficult, especially since they seem to

\(^2\) Part III of this dissertation will have a detailed look at how the US and EU policies and instruments do try to tackle these issues. A thorough analysis of how the new US administration should tackle these African challenges can be found at: Cooke, J, G, Morrison, J, S (eds.) 2009 ’US Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years’, CSIS, Washington DC.


be infected by a TB strand which is resistant to usual treatment drugs. Such co-infection is associated and thus responsible to higher mortality rates. Added to them is malaria, which according to WHO is the disease which causes the highest mortality rates.

The second mega-challenge which faces Africa is the social constrains caused by its demographics. For instance, SSA is characterised by a very young population which in many cases accounts for most than the half of the total adult population. And since fertility rates continue to remain high throughout the continent, than this ‘fastest growing labor force in world’ creates a condition that requires provision and creation of new jobs. Another challenge connected to African demographics is its rapid urbanisation. By 2030 it is expected a total population of two and a half times higher than that of 2000 – from 294 to 742 million, and by 2025 more than half of them is expected to live in urban areas, in a time when, currently more than 72 percent of the African urban population lives in slums. This of course, due to the high potential of destabilising effects, i.e. a swelling of migratory pressure becomes a major issue of concern to the African states themselves but also to Europe, this last one as the African migrant’s chosen end-destination.

Environmental degradation and climate change are the next major challenges for the SSA. Although Africa counts for less than 5 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions, its share as the result of the climate change is disproportionally high, since its ecosystems are changing at a faster pace than anticipated. Such conditions create

---


high probabilities of increasingly frequent and violent natural disasters, shortages of clean water, loss of arable land as a result of accelerated and amplified desertification\(^\text{10}\), which in its own terms creates bottlenecks for crop production. As a matter of fact, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that by 2020 Africa will face a 50 percent reduction in crop yields, and 75-250 million Africans will be put under water stress\(^\text{11}\).

Africa is among, if not, the region most at risk to food insecurity. It unfortunately is accelerated by the environmental degradation and climate change mentioned above, but it also has other deep and endogenous roots. For instance, the underdeveloped infrastructure and still relying on traditional ways of farming, are two of them, but also the declining of foreign investment in agriculture, speculation at financial markets and of course the unjust world trading system that puts developing countries at great disadvantages as compared to the first world, constitute other factors. During 2008 many African countries were faced with rioting masses, which, as a result of spikes in food prices, were no longer able to afford food for themselves and their families.

This grim picture, though, does not count for all the facets of Africa. For instance, there is evidence about a growing support for democratic governance across SSA. Africa in general and SSA in particular, provide many examples of having changed from single parties to multiparty systems as a significant step towards attaining democratic governance\(^\text{12}\). For instance, autocratic leaders of one-party systems have either stepped down or have been defeated in multiparty elections such as in Kenya, Togo or Zambia. SSA offers many examples of multiparty elections with varying degrees of success such as the ones in Ghana, Togo, Benin, Liberia, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania and Senegal. According to a *Freedom House* global survey, some 21 percent of, or 10, SSA countries are listed as ‘free’, while 48 percent, or 23 of them are listed as ‘partly free’; the rest, some 31 percent or 15 countries, though are

\(^{10}\) Ibid.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) The main stream of analysts tends to view democracy in Africa in terms of pluralism and elections, although, arguably rightly, democracy should include much more than that.
attributed as ‘not free’\textsuperscript{13}. Such surge for democratic governance has been as much an endogenous phenomenon, as certified by the data provided through a survey of African people by Afrobarometer. For instance, 62 percent of African citizens interviewed in 2005 preferred democracy to any other form of governance, although support for democracy from 2000 to 2005 has slightly dipped from 69 – 61 percent\textsuperscript{14}. The urge for democratic governance is due also because of the pressure that the international community has increasingly mounted on Africa, especially for NEPAD and the APRM in meeting certain requirements\textsuperscript{15}. In these terms, an exogenous push is also provided by the conditionality clauses attached to development policies of Western actors like US’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), or EU’s Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA)\textsuperscript{16}, etc.

Economically speaking, the African continent has been in the midst of ‘a profound economic transformation’ with growth rates at an average level of 6 percent annually. International trade accounts for nearly 60 percent of Africa's GDP, and foreign direct investment in Africa reaches nowadays figures of over US $15 billion per year. Overall, private-sector investment constitutes more than twenty percent of GDP, and not forgetting the ever growing number of countries with stock-markets in SSA, which handle a volume that has risen ‘from virtually nothing’ to $245 billion


\textsuperscript{16} A detailed analysis the conditionality of AGOA, CPA and other EU and US policies as well as their impact on the promotion of democratic governance will be provided in Part II of this writing.
This success is observable not just in oil producing countries but also across most SSA countries, i.e. about two dozen sub-Saharan African nations are enjoying real growth rates in excess of 5 percent. Only one nation - Zimbabwe - is really going backward quickly. Africa plays a strategic role in the global energy market. It is one of the big suppliers of oil, natural gas as well as it is thought to have enormous reserves, thus meaning a huge potential in meeting global future demands. This has led to a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment, which seem to have triggered a fiery competition for access, not just among traditional actors such as Europe and the US but also, and especially, China and other emerging energy powers such as India, Brazil, etc. Credit for this economic success is not just due to energy investments and high commodity prices but also equally due to reforms effected throughout Africa with the international assistance through Breton Woods institutions as well as EU, US, etc.

It has though, to be said, that for all the positive development in terms of democratic governance and economic progress, they continue to remain fragile. For instance, in the later years, there have been some setbacks as evidenced by coups in Guinea and Mauritania and profoundly flawed elections in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, the 2000s witnessed a declining trend in conflicts and wars in Africa as compared to the 1990s and casualty counts across Africa are well down compared to the late 1990s. For instance major conflicts in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Angola, between Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as between the North and South Sudan have ended. It

has, though, to be said that in very few instances have the conflicts ended definitively and mostly where peace negotiations have been concluded no consequential political actions have been followed. Thus, though a trend in Africa is towards the resolution of conflicts, peace continues to remain very fragile in many post-conflict areas. An important trend at the pan-African level concerning peace and security in the continent is undoubtedly the emergence of the African Union, its specialised institutions on the matter as well as their emergent capacity for peacekeeping missions. They are testimony to a strong and re-emergent pan-African movement on the continent. As a matter of fact, and especially since the dawn of globalisation, it can be noticed that the pan-African movement as well as regionalism in Africa have strong political, economic and security motives. Its political motive is based on the strong pan-African urge towards ‘a continental identity and coherence’22, and a, as much stronger, urge based on economic motives for a regional cooperation, given the small size of most African economies. Concerning the security motives, the erosion of the state’s powers and consequently their being unable to capably and efficiently tackle security challenges, sees an increase in reliance on regional structures: a more efficient use of scarce resources for a more efficient tackling of security problems.

The following will handle the ‘securitisation’ of regionalisation in Africa as presented through the creation of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The emergent APSA, which Salim Ahmed Salim, a former Organisation for African Unity (OAU) Secretary General and member of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Panel of the Wise, defines it as ‘the structures, norms, capacities and procedures relating to averting conflict and war, mediating for peace, and maintaining security’23, is currently composed by a set of AU structures which together with African Sub-Regional Organisations (SROs) are spearheaded by the AU PSC.


In 1999 African leaders met in Sirte, Libya to celebrate the achievement of the main aim of the OAU, namely that of liberating the continent from colonialism and at the same time review the Charter of the OAU and draft a new one. The Constitutive Act of the new organization – the African Union – was agreed in Lomé, Togo, in 2000. The official inauguration in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, signified that the advancement of the ideal of Pan-Africanism was brought at another, higher level. The emergence of the African Union is due particularly to two African leaders, who sought to reform the OAU. First and foremost, the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, who driven by commercial interest,

‘called for the reconstruction of African identity in order, first, to conclude the work of the earlier Pan-Africanist movements and, second, to re-invent the African state to play its effective and rightful role on the global terrain’24.

In achieving these aims Mbeki introduced the concept of ‘African Renaissance’, which is to be understood as a ‘holistic vision [...] aimed at promoting peace, prosperity, democracy, sustainable development, progressive leadership, and good governance’25.

The President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, on the other side motivated by security-political considerations, supported Mbeki’s reform calls. His own vision of a ‘new’ Africa saw a reformed OAU at the centre of African development, focused on four calabashes: security, stability, development and cooperation26. A significant characteristic of this vision is that of seeing security in terms of human security as well as the interdependency of security in Africa. For instance, it views security as a


25 Ibid.

multi-dimensional phenomenon that goes beyond military considerations and embraces all aspects of human existence, including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community and national life. President Obasanjo saw peace and security as central to the realization of development of both the state and individuals.

‘Thus the security of the African people, their land and property must be safeguarded to ensure stability, development and cooperation of African countries; The security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole […] A fundamental link exists between stability, human security, development and cooperation in a manner that each reinforces the other’.

The AU’s main goals are the intention to bring to an end the deep segmentation caused by the many sub-regional organisations, which hindered a pan-African cooperation. A second goal was the achievement through the AU of an institution that advocates an engagement at the political, social and economic levels so that war among African states becomes unlikely. The third goal for such institution concerned access and participation in the international markets and international negotiations related to trade, finance and debt. In achieving these goals, AU established 17 institutions –the most important among them, as follows: the African Heads of State and Governments –the supreme organ--; the Executive Council; the Commission (AUC); the Permanent Representatives’ Committee; Peace and Security Council (PSC); Pan-African Parliament; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC); Court of Justice; Specialised Technical Committees (STCs); and financial institutions (African Central Bank, African Monetary Fund, African Investment). After having read the above names, the reader is forgiven if it sees a striking resemblance with the EU institutions. At the OAU Summit in Lusaka,


28 Ibid.

Zambia in 2001 ‘several references were made to the African Union being loosely based on the European Union model’\(^{30}\). But, for all the resemblance, the reader is warned, as one analyst writes, that: ‘whereas the architects of the AU relied on the EU template, the two entities are not only spatially, but also fifty years apart’\(^{31}\).

The emergent African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is currently composed by a set of AU structures which together with African Sub-Regional Organisations (SROs) are spearheaded by the AU PSC.

The PSC was established in 2002 at the AU Durban Summit\(^{32}\) with the aim of Africa having a military mechanism which was able to deal with the different security threats. The US’ war in Iraq might have triggered among African leaders the realisation that ‘the UN could no longer guarantee world peace and that alternative arrangements had to be sought, particularly for weak states such as those in Africa’\(^{33}\). Consequently, in January 2004 a Draft Framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CASDP) was adopted\(^{34}\), which entered into force a month later\(^{35}\). The policy sets out the guiding principles, the interdependence of African states concerning security as well as, again, the notion of security including both the traditional state-centric and that of human security\(^{36}\). While all African states are, principally, responsible for the implementation of CASDP, the 15-member\(^{37}\) PSC has

---


\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) 5 of its members are elected for 5 years, while the other 10 for 2 years.
the immediate responsibility of promoting ‘collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’\textsuperscript{38}, and it has the authority to mount and deploy peace and support missions as well as to ‘recommend to the Assembly of Heads of State intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments’\textsuperscript{39}. The PSC has also authority over the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), Military Staff Committee and the Special Fund. The Panel of the Wise is ‘composed of five highly respected African personalities [...] who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent’ mandated to advise the PSC ‘on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa’. It is expected to carry out ‘discreet diplomatic’ efforts at the very early stages of conflict prevention to avoid escalation and prevent it from escalating further\textsuperscript{40}. The PSC is assisted and advised as well on matters concerning military and security requirements from a Military Staff Committee, this last one composed of the chiefs of defence of the countries serving on the PSC. The CEWS who collects and analyses data, enabling and supporting the PSC in the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, is composed of a ‘Situation Room’ located at the Conflict Management Division of AUC\textsuperscript{41}, and is linked to ‘Regional Mechanisms’\textsuperscript{42} who link the AU with


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., Article 7(e), p.10.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., Article 11.2 and 11.3. The current five members of the Panel, as nominated at the 8\textsuperscript{th} Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in January 2007, are: Salim Ahmed Salim, former SG OAU, Brigaglia Bam, Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Ahmed Ben Bella, former Algerian President, Elisabeth Pognon, President of Constitutional Court Benin, and Miguel Trovaoda, former President of Soa Tomé et Principe.

\textsuperscript{41} Conflict Management Division together with the Division of Peace and Support Operations as well as the Secretariat constitute the Department of Peace and Security headed by the AU’s Peace and Security Commissioner, currently, Ramtane Ramamra.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., Article 12. The PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission are charged with harmonising and coordinating activities of Regional Mechanisms. The AU and the Regional Mechanisms of Conflict Prevention and Resolution signed a Memorandum of Understanding on peace and security in 2007.
the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The third body PSC makes use of in fulfilling its mandate is the ASF, composed of ‘standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components [...] and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice’. The ASF is composed of five regional brigade-sized units and is expected to reach full operability by 2010. The conditions upon which ASF are to be deployed are defined by articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU’s Constitutive Act, which cover circumstances of war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, as well as at the request of a member state. A last instrument, relevant for AU’s emerging profile in peace and security is the Special Fund created as a continental financial mechanism for AU’s activities in the peace and security field. Its finance sources are the AU’s regular budget as well as direct contributions by AU MS and from other donors within Africa, including the private sector (civil society and individuals). A last component of the APSA is provided by the civil society comprised of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based civil society organisations (CSOs), especially women’s organisations, all of which are invited to contribute and participate in promoting peace and security in Africa as well as they may be invited to address the PSC.

By taking stock of these developments, that have contributed towards an AU rising to continental prominence, which in its own terms ‘proffers a substantive opportunity for peacekeeping and the attenuation of other security threats that often compete for

---

43 Africa has various RECs many of which have overlapping memberships. There are eight RECs as recognised by the AU: The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC); The East African Community (EAC); The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS); The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); The Southern African Development Community; and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA).


46 Ibid., Article 20.
attention in Africa\textsuperscript{47}, the AU has/is indeed venturing some peacekeeping missions in Africa.

By concluding on ‘Africa’s awakening’, it can be said that as a result of all said above, Africa, through the AU has entered the international arena as a more confident and unified actor, which is increasingly able to negotiate its interests not anymore on the basis of beneficiary-donor relations.

CHAPTER 3
OF US FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE G.W. BUSH YEARS

‘An unprecedentedly dominant United States [...] is in the unique position of being able to fashion its own foreign policy. After a decade of Prometheus playing pygmy the first task of the new [Bush] administration is precisely to reassert American freedom of action’¹

George W. Bush delivered the ‘unbound America’²

The making of the US foreign policy is complex and extremely messy and, in many ways, an impenetrable process³. Most people think, that the US foreign policy is made and defined ‘at the top of the political hierarchy’, especially by the president⁴. While, the president and his conviction play an important, if not, a crucial role, nevertheless, he is not the only one to make US foreign policy. Apart from him, a variety of other individuals and institutions are involved within the government, such as White House advisors, high level officials within the executive branch, and huge and complex foreign policy bureaucracies, most notably the State Department, the Department of Defence and the National Security Council. Consequently, the presidential administrations are a key player and they usually ‘tend to place great

emphasis on maintaining a unity of purpose. Adopted policies are usually defended by all members of the administration regardless of personal leanings. AFRICOM, though, as it will be analysed further on, did constitute a so-called exclusion to the rule.

The fiscal power over the federal budgets makes of the Congress another key player in the process of foreign policy formulation. The function of the Congress takes mainly a twofold nature. On the one side, through its control of the government’s purse it adjusts, –approving, modifying or rejecting– the foreign policy aspirations of the president and its executive branch, and on the other hand, it attempts to control policy by taking advantage of the legislative process and the annual budgetary cycles initiating so action on their preferences as well. The role of the Congress is strengthened by the tendency of Presidents to use foreign policies for domestic, political gain which, in turn, leads to a ‘domestication of foreign policy’. In addition, to presidential administrations and Congress, the political parties, the media, and international actors as well as foreign policy lobbies, non-governmental groups and public opinion, play a highly visible role in US foreign policy debate. This variety of individuals and institutions involved within the foreign policy process accounts, as well, for the ‘messiness’ of the process itself, since these players ‘do not

---

5 Toje, A 2008 ‘America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain’, Routledge, Oxon, p.6.


7 The Congress’ powers over the US foreign policy are concentrated on four main policy areas. The first being the War Powers (granted through the Public Law 93-148, known as the War Powers Act in 1973), though, the Congress has been very parsimonious in it – it has declared war on only five cases in the American history; while the President on over 200 ones. The second power it concerns the advice on and consent to appointments and treaties. The third and most powerful one concerns the power of the purse and the power to make laws. The last area concerns the power of oversight and investigation. For a more detailed information see: i.e. Rosati, J, A, Scott, J, M, 2007 ‘The Politics of United States Foreign Policy’, pp.291-325; Hersmann, R, K, C, 2000 ‘Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy’, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.


9 Toje, A 2008 ‘America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain’, p.8.
stand still but constantly interact with and have an impact on one another\textsuperscript{10}. This feature of the policy process has become more intense and increasingly visible:

‘Presidents now have much greater difficulty marshalling governing coalitions [...] it is a much looser power game now, more wide open, harder to manage and manipulate’\textsuperscript{11}.

‘The making of American foreign policy [has] entered a new and far more ideological and political phase’\textsuperscript{12}.

Consequently, the making of US foreign policy is, apart from being a very complex and messy process, also inseparable to politics. These complexities of US politics has been elevated even further with the collapse of the cold war era, the war on terror and as well as the economic global crisis.

The following will concentrate on the US foreign policy during the Bush years by concentrating on the influences, which it incorporated, from the foreign policy lobbies and advocacy groups, most notably the neoconservative one. It will start with an analysis of the neoconservative idea by identifying its key tenets and will continue in analysing the great deal of influence they had on the execution of US foreign policy during the Bush years, by showing that the thinking of some of the neoconservative’s major advocates, who won key positions in the Bush administration, are mirrored in the policies this last it executed.

OF THE NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY:

‘The neo-conservative story [...] spans a period of over thirty years. It is complex and diverse, comprising [...] a fascinating intellectual migration from the left to the right and from domestic to foreign policy. Occasionally, it includes wild-eyed obsessives [...] [b]ut


more often [...] mild-mannered East Coast academics of formidable ability serving conservative administrations in senior positions.

The origins of the neoconservative thought are deemed as to have derived from ‘the disillusioned liberal intellectuals of the 1970s’. They felt that, whatever America’s errors were, her political values and system were superior to the alternatives, insisting hardly on the American exceptionalism.

Apart from domestic issues, the neoconservatives had also a foreign policy agenda. As fervent anti-communists, they emphasised the ideological and moral superiority of democracy, while advocating the maintenance of a strong military. In the name of restoring the prestige and power of the US military, they argued for strong military budgets, even in times of economic strain. As a result of the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War Era, the Neocon found themselves on the ideological and political margins. It only was at mid and late 1990s that that they gathered further momentum, especially with the articles of William Kristol and Robert Kagan, in particular with ‘Toward a Reaganite Foreign Policy’ which appeared in the Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996. This article is nowadays widely

---


14 The neoconservatives do not accept to be categorised as belonging to a movement since they ‘never had or aspired to the kind of central organisation characteristic of a movement’; Neoconservative prominent figures such as Irving Kristol speak of ‘the neoconservative persuasion’; Joshua Muravchik of ‘a distinctive neoconservative sensibility’; and Norman Podhoretz of a ‘neoconservative tendency’.


16 With American exceptionalism is referred to that attribute ‘[...] which implies the United States’ moral superiority as well as the uniqueness of its origins, political system, social organisation and values and cultural and religious characteristics’. Quotation from: McEvoy-Levy, S 2001 ‘American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War’, Palgrave, NY, p.25.

17 The neoconservatives hold the ‘view that ambitious social engineering often leads to unexpected consequences and often undermines its own ends’, such as rewarding undesirable social behaviour like single motherhood through welfare support, cited in Fukuyama, F 2007 ‘America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy’, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.5.

considered as the seminal foreign policy statement of the contemporary neoconservative thought. The authors argue that the United States’ international role is to exercise ‘benevolent global hegemony’ since the US is ‘a leader with preponderant influence and authority over all others’, and to continue and maintain this status ‘a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence’ was needed. This strategy consisted of three main points: firstly, a consistently strong defence budget that reinforces the power disparity between the US and the new-coming and/or would-be challengers; secondly, educating Americans of the role they can play in understanding and supporting US army, in carrying out the ‘responsibilities of global hegemony’; and thirdly, by having a clear moral purpose behind American foreign policy, achieved through the US’ promotion of democracy, free markets, and individual liberty overseas.\(^{19}\)

A further reason for gaining momentum was especially provided through the establishment of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in 1997, a neoconservative-keen think tank whose many of its founders later received senior positions within the Bush Administration. Thus, ‘no one can doubt that PNAC was an important contributor to the Bush administration’s foreign policy.’\(^{20}\)

In putting together the neoconservative thought, as derived from the writings and analyses of prominent scholars and pundits alike\(^ {21}\), four main tenets crystallise. The first of them concerns the conviction that moral clarity in foreign policy is of outmost importance. Such it derives from the belief that the human condition is defined as a

---


choice between good and evil and that the true measure of political character is to be found in the willingness of goods to confront the evil. Thus, neoconservatives analyse international issues in black-and-white, absolute moral categories. In practice it means democratic leaders and liberal democracies are good; tyrants and tyrannical regimes are bad, and consequently it is morally peremptory and at the same time in the interest of the US ‘not to shy away from regime change and democracy promotion’\(^\text{22}\). The second pillar concerns the assertion that the fundamental determinant of the relationship between states rests on military power and the willingness to use it. Consequently, the US should strive to preserve its military pre-eminence and work towards ‘a benevolent US hegemony’\(^\text{23}\), where the US ‘enjoys strategic and ideological predominance’\(^\text{24}\). The third pillar concerns the imperative that the US should be willing to use military force in pursuing her foreign policy goals. Neoconservatives argue that if one’s ends are noble and good, then one is morally dilapidated if not all the means at disposal –including military force– are used in the pursuit of those ends. Consequently, in executing their foreign policy actions, i.e. such as invading Iraq, ‘the Bush administration saw itself not as acting out of narrow self-interest but as providing a global public good’\(^\text{25}\). To this, as it has been called in some circles, ‘Wilsonianism on steroids’, it is added the fourth tenet which concerns the deep scepticism about the ability of multilateral international institutions to secure peace and justice in the world. UN and other institutions are seen as mechanisms used by weaker powers to tie down the US. This view is seen as being further encouraged by the international criticism, and as a confirmation of the American virtue.

\(^{22}\) Kristol, W 2004 ‘Postscript –June 2004: Neoconservatism Remains the Bedrock of the US Foreign Policy’, in Stelzer, I (ed.) 2004 ‘The Neocon Reader’, Grove Atlantic, NY, p.75-76. The twining between morality and interests is in stark contrast with i.e. the classical realists who believe that in foreign policy the US actions have to be guided by an interest-based pragmatism rather then, as sustained by the neoconservatives, a value-based modus operandi.


\(^{24}\) Ibid.

John Quincy Adams has warned that America should not go ‘abroad in search of monsters to destroy’: Neoconservatives’ reply is ‘Why not?’

‘The alternative is to leave monsters on the loose, ravaging and pillaging on their hearts’ content [...] Because America has the capacity to contain or destroy many of the world’s monsters, most of which can be found without much searching, and because the responsibility for the peace and security of the international order rests so heavily on America’s shoulder, a policy of sitting atop a hill and leading by example becomes in practice a policy of cowardice and dishonour’.

OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S FOREIGN POLICY:

‘[...] the neocon [sic] vision has become the hard core of American foreign policy’ and ‘[the neoconservatives] have penetrated the culture at [...] every level from the halls of academia to the halls of the Pentagon’.

‘[T]he neo-conservatives have taken American international relations on an unfortunate detour, veering away from the balanced, consensus-building, and resource-husbanding approach that has characterized traditional Republican internationalism [...] and acted more as a special interest focused on its particular agenda’.

‘[T]he United States no longer pays what Thomas Jefferson called ‘a decent respect to the opinions of mankind’.


At the time when President Bush took office, US foreign policy has been for some time somewhat incoherent and inconsistent. The Cold War Era was replaced by an increasingly complex international and domestic environment in which the days of grand design had given way, despite the enormous power of the United States, ‘to a more pragmatic time of muddling through’.

Commentators think that this ‘muddling through’ best describes the initial months of the new Bush administration. This is also sustained by the fact that during the campaign, great emphasis was placed on the need to minimise commitments, highlight vital national interests and exercise greater humility abroad. Once in office, one did not have the impression that the new administration had a global vision in executing their foreign policy. Rather, it seemed ‘to be heavily influenced by a realpolitik and power politics approach to world politics, leading to a strategy that remained heavily conditioned by the cold war legacy, especially given his selection of so many foreign policy advisers who had [previously] worked [within the Bush Sr. administration]’. Nevertheless, several members of the new administration had a clear propensity towards viewing power, especially military power, as indispensable and at the same time rejected traditional strategies which emphasised deterrence, containment, multilateralism, international agreements and rules. In short, the new administration held ‘a view fundamentally committed to maintaining a unipolar world and acting unilaterally’.

With September 11, this orientation became even more aggressive, and placed the global war on terrorism at the very top of the foreign policy agenda. Prominent US administration officials compared the post-World War II with post-9/11 ‘in that the

---


35 Ibid.
events so clearly demonstrated that there is a big global threat alluding to communism as compared with terrorism. Terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Iraq and Saddam Hussein, provided the administration ‘with an irreconcilable enemy, the sort of black-and-white challenge’, which the neoconservatives had so long been in need of. As it has been mentioned on the neocon section, these last ones had proposed a foreign policy agenda which claimed as necessary regime change, preemptive action, benevolent hegemony, unipolarity and American exceptionalism, which all came to be included at the Bush administration’s foreign policy and became crucial part of the Bush Doctrine. Bush starkly believed that, on the one hand, in a increasingly dangerous world the best and only way to ensure America’s security interests was to relieve it from constraints and entanglements imposed by ‘friends, alliances, and international institutions’, and on the other hand, that America should make use of its unprecedented strength to change the status quo in the world. These beliefs fundamentally impacted the US foreign policy. Consequently, he and his administration endorsed a foreign policy which underlined the imperative for a major defence build up, ‘ homeland security’, and ‘with us or against us’ rhetoric. This meant that the US approached her foreign policy by heavy relying on the use of force abroad; the international institutions, such as the UN were deemed as futile and in those very few cases when multilateral action was chosen, then in the form of ad hoc coalitions of the willing, a sort of a ‘à la carte multilateralism’; his administration assumed that international support is often a function of coercion, that Western values and principles, such a democracy, should and can spread throughout the


world, and last but not least, pre-emption was no longer a last resort of US foreign policy. He delivered America unbound.

‘Bush has set in motion a revolution in American foreign policy. It was not a revolution in America’s goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them’\textsuperscript{40}.

Such acclaim may be founded also on the fact that many believed that since the shock of 9/11, the US ability to deal with changes broke as a result of ‘the loss of American confidence’ and of a ‘culture of fear [propagated] everywhere’\textsuperscript{41}. This is in stark distinction with the traditional US approach in handling problems, notably with confidence\textsuperscript{42}.

While for some scholars and analysts, George W. Bush, after 9/11, has presided over the most sweeping redesign of US strategy since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt\textsuperscript{43}, others argue that for as much as sweeping this redesign was, it represented not a one of its kind feature, but rather that, in times and again, the US was posed in front of situations which did not leave much room for other than acting pre-emptively, unilaterally and secure her own hegemony. So did John Quincy Adams after the British burning of Washington in 1814 and so did Franklin D. Roosevelt after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 and so did George W. Bush after Al-Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11.

In a 2007 article in Foreign Affairs, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, notes that the mistake of the Bush administration in concentrating its foreign policy, as mentioned above, on mainly just one topic –that of the global war on terror (GWOT)– lies at ‘a profound misunderstanding of the relationship between strategy, 


\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p.3.

power, and diplomacy’. The Bush administration failed to make use of, what he calls ‘smart statecraft’, a pulling together of ‘wits, wallet, and muscle to create realistic policies’. The smartness of it all relies in setting ‘them in motion through agile diplomacy’.

‘Smart statecraft does not dispense with hard power; it uses hard power intelligently, recognizing both its potential and its limits and integrating it into an overarching strategy. [...] Diplomacy, contrary to the current misconception, is not about making nice, exchanging happy talk, and offering concessions. It is the engine that converts raw energy and tangible power into meaningful political results. In other words, diplomacy is all about the intelligent use of power. Diplomacy is not an alternative to coercion and other forms of power; its effectiveness depends on their skilful use.’

As it becomes clear, the emphasis on the war on terrorism and the approach used in winning it, had become the ‘core and the mantra of the G W Bush administration’s foreign policy, to the neglect of numerous other foreign policy issues and approaches’.

---

Statecraft is dealt in greater detail at: Ross, D 2007 ‘Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World’, Farar, Straus and Giraux, NY.

CHAPTER 4
EU WITHIN THE 21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL ARENA

‘[I]ndeed we are a global actors. With 25 member states, with over 450 million inhabitants, a quarter of the world’s GNP, and around 40% of the world merchandise exports [sic]; and with the comprehensive array of instruments – economic, legal, diplomatic, military – at our disposal, that claim is not an aspiration but a statement of fact’

Javier Solana, 24 January 2005

‘The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security’

European Council, 2010 Headline Goals, 17/18 June 2004

By looking at the institutional structures governing EU’s foreign actions, it becomes immediately clear that they are dissimilar from their nation-state counterparts. The very fact that the Union, within the international arena, is seen as an actor, a process and a project, all simultaneously, makes it behave differently as compared to the traditional actors in world politics. On the one side we have the EU Commission which acts as the implementing organ and which also shares, in definite issues, the right of initiative with the MS. On the other side, we have the Council, the institution where the strategic and forward-looking elements of the EU’s foreign policy are decided through a policy-making process characterised by intergovernmental bargaining. It is here where the definition of the principles, general guidelines and common strategies to be implemented by the EU, is made. Although, here decisions are taken under the unanimity procedure by which all the 15-25-27 MS have an
absolute veto over any policy\textsuperscript{1}, the system does not operate under a perpetual threat of veto\textsuperscript{2}, rather decision-making is made by consensus which is reached through ‘carefully crafted ambiguities, consensus building and horse trading\textsuperscript{3}. Another important structure, prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, was provided by the so called ‘Troika’, comprising the holder of the rotating EU presidency, the EC Commissioner for External Relations, and the High Representative for CFSP and their staff, which have played an important role in formulating EU policies. All of these actors have been proved fertile, if one looks at the generated body of policies, be they in form of common positions or joint actions.

As briefly mentioned above, the EU has built up a distinct institutional architecture which combines supranational and intergovernmental features, political and economic integration. During this last decade it has come to engage an increasingly significant position within the contemporary discussions about world politics. For instance, some see her institution-building practices as a model to follow in mastering processes of regionalisation and/or globalisation. On the other hand, others see in her a \textit{sui generis} creature and have focused on the internal dynamics and the distinct features as compared to other regional and global organisations. Notwithstanding this division the EU’s role and influence within the international arenas has gained increasing attention.

Seen in these terms, a vast wealth of literature has been produced by European studies scholars, who have long been involved with questions regarding the extent to which the EU’s external actions have developed so as to make, or not, the Union a capable and coherent actor within the international arena\textsuperscript{4}. As pointed out above,

---

\textsuperscript{1} Article 5a TEC: ‘if a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the granting of an authorisation by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken’.

\textsuperscript{2} Nuttall, SJ 2000, \textit{‘European Foreign Policy’}, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.187-8


since the EU does not comply with the model provided by the traditional actors (i.e. nation-states), this discussion has raised important questions about what constitutes ‘actorness’ in contemporary international relations, and can and / or has the EU, in her capacity as a regional entity, emerged as a significant actor in world politics?

To this work, the issue of actorness is a relevant one: firstly, because actorness is seen as being attributed ‘to an individual, group, organisation or other collectivity’\(^5\), so per extension it encompasses the EU; secondly, it implies that the outcome of it is ‘a variable indicating the state of another social entity [i.e.] behaviour, beliefs, attitudes or policies of a second actor’\(^6\); and thirdly, that such actorness is constituted through the ability to influence other actors –and the ability to resist attempts at such\(^7\). Consequently, being or not attributed with it is very important, since in the jargon of IR, it implies being or not designated with power attributes within the international arena\(^8\).

The scope and the intent of this chapter is, first and foremost, to present an overview on how issues that contribute to a weighted EU actorness in the world arena have been tackled by the European studies scholars. Consequently it will handle issues concerning theory, conceptualisation and analytic approaches in current research on EU’s actor and actorness status\(^9\). Given the EU’s unique character, the conceptualisation concerning EU foreign policy becomes an uneasy exercise. Scholars have focused on three main matters, which provide differing understandings on the issue. The first focuses on the EU’s Pillar II structures and the institutional

---


6 Ibid.

7 Toje, A 2008 ‘America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain’, Routledge, Oxon, p.9.

8 Ibid.

9 Empirical analysis will be amply handled on the second and third part of this work.
machinery of CFSP/CSDP\textsuperscript{10}. The second strand of literature focuses primarily upon the MS’s foreign policy\textsuperscript{11}. The third branch of literature concerns the external relations of the EC, notably Pillar I issues such as i.e. development aid, economic cooperation, international trade, etc.\textsuperscript{12}.

It seems relevant that in defining the EU foreign policy, this last must be encompassing all the above-mentioned branches\textsuperscript{13}. This work, though aims at focusing on the EU as a political system, therefore, it will look ‘[...] at EU foreign policy as the political actions that are regarded by external actors as ‘EU’ actions and


\textsuperscript{11} This branch was predominant at the times when the European Political Cooperation served as the framework for coordinated EU foreign policy. With the development of EU’s own foreign policy, this branch of literature has lost some of its strengths; notwithstanding this the MS’ foreign policies continue to play a crucial role. For more see: Hill, C (ed.) 1996 ‘The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon; Manners, I, Whitman, R, Allen, D (eds.) 2000 ‘The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States’, Manchester University Press, Manchester; Gross, E 2009 ‘The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)’, Palgrave Macmillan, London.


that can be considered the output on the Union’s multilevel system of governance in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{14}

I have already presented a short rationale on why the issue of being or not attributed the quality of actorness is important for the EU. This part of the chapter will proceed by focusing on the theory, conceptualisation and analytical approaches to EU actorness from a legal and organisational point of view, for progressing then with the debate and analysis approaching the EU actorness from the behavioural and structural criteria, to conclude then on a constructivist note.

OF THE LEGAL AND THE ORGANISATIONAL DEBATE:

From a purely legal point of view, an actor, which has since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia been equivalent with a sovereign state, has a legal personality. Through the legal personality an actor can make treaties, join international organisations, and be held accountable by other actors. ‘Legal actorness confers a right to participate, but also to be held responsible by other actors, and to incur obligations.’\textsuperscript{15} The EC has been vested with it concerning defined competencies (economic issues).\textsuperscript{16}

From a purely IR theories point of view, neither of its major schools of thought have been able to create a theory that properly puts in a nutshell the many different elements of the EU: it is not a state, the unit of measurement chosen by the traditional theories (i.e. Realist) neither a clear-cut international organisation nor a supranational institution, the unit of measurement favoured through the pluralist approaches. For instance, the traditional Realist theorising has focused on the international inter-state political system. The state is seen as the basis of power


The rejected Constitutional Treaty (Article I-7) did provide the Union as a whole with a legal personality; the now ratified and in force since December 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (Article 46a TEU) does the same.
within the international system where ‘the uneven distribution of military might is a still formidable factor in determining outcomes’\(^\text{17}\). The Realist thought also provides for a possibility to include other non-state actors, such as the intergovernmental organisations\(^\text{18}\) and transnational business corporations, nevertheless, they are seen as subordinated to the state\(^\text{19}\). This categorization though, does not take into account nor the role that the EU institutions play and neither the many formal or legally binding commitments that the MS have signed at EU level.

Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism theory\(^\text{20}\) remains a state-centric approach inasmuch states continue to be the initiators of policies. This approach fails to acknowledge the value–added of the EU’s supra–national institutions\(^\text{21}\). The neo-functionalists head off from the state-centric approach, and put an emphasis on the role of EU’s community actors. They sustain the idea of ‘incremental political change driven by the logic of a self-sustaining process’\(^\text{22}\), best described by the phrase of ‘spill-over effect’. Nevertheless though, due to the distinction they make between high and low politics, –where integration is assumed to happen at the low rather than high end–, neo-functionalists fail to give an encompassing explanatory of EU’s i.e. CFSP/ESDP developments. Therefore, the hypothesis sustained by a neo-


\(^{19}\) For instance Hyde-Price sees the EU as serving three main purposes of her MS: as an instrument for the collective economic interests in the context of globalisation; as an instrument for collectively shaping the regional milieu; and finally as a repository for second-order normative concerns (p.31). In these terms the EU is seen more as a marionette at the hands of MS rather than an international actor. For more see: Hyde-Price, A 2008 ‘A Tragic Actor? A Realist Perspective on ‘Ethical Power Europe’’, in *International Affairs*, Volume 84, Issue 1, pp.29-44.


functionalist reasoning of the EU as an economic giant and a political pygmy, is no longer relevant.

OF THE AGENCY VERSUS STRUCTURE DEBATE

The ‘Westphalian assumption’ has been challenged, inasmuch an actor is no longer an absolutely and exclusively predefined, traditional ‘unit of a system’, i.e. a nation-state. From a strictly behavioural point of view, a unit to be recognised as an international actor it has, firstly, to behave as such. Thus, an actor is ‘an entity that is capable of formulating purposes and making decisions and thus engaging in some form of purposive action’, highlighting so the attributions of autonomous and purposeful actions. Scholars focusing on autonomous actions, analyse the internal procedures of certain EU institutions, such as i.e. European Commission. Through these studies it has been possible to arrive at, albeit different, conclusions on whether the EU is or not an actor. For example, depending on the competences endowed upon the EC it can be concluded that the Union acts as an actor only on certain given


25 Ibid., p.17.

issues and in others not. The same is valid about conceptualisation depending on the
voting arrangements within the Council of Ministers: so long the absolute voting is
requested the EU cannot play ‘a specific role independent of [her] constituent
members’, ergo it cannot be attributed with the quality of actorness; in anyway, since
the number of areas covered by qualified majority voting (QMV) has lately been
largely extended, it can be concluded that the EU is so capable of playing ‘a specific
role independent of [her] constituent members’, and has become at least a
disaggregated actor. The scholars, who have focused on the purposeful action
criteria, have inspected the EU deeds undertaken abroad and the nature of her diverse
global interventions. They focus on two behavioural criteria that condition the
attribution of actorness: the first concerns the ‘impact on inter-state relations’
generated through the ability to perform ‘significant and continuing functions’, and
the second underlines the importance accorded to the EU through interaction from
members and third parties. These criteria must be met ‘in some degree for most of
the time’, in order for the entity to be attributed the quality of actorness. Under this
formula, since the late 1960s, the EU –then EC– has been ‘a viable international
actor’.

Increasingly, certain circles within the academia as well as pundits and decision-
makers alike, are keen to see in the EU an international actor with a ‘principled
behaviour’ within the international arena. They argue that the best way to
understand the foundations of the EU actorness is by looking at the concept of
identity, rather than deliberating on the Union’s interests. This inclination seems to


Union as a Global Actor’, p.17).

29 Ibid.

30 For more information see: Duchêne, F 1972 ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Mayne, R
Smith, H, 2002 ‘The European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is And What It Does?’, Pluto
Press, London.

31 Tonra, B, 2003 ‘Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a
Cognitive Approach’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 42, Issue 4; Aggestam,
L, 1999 ‘Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy’, in ARENA Working
Paper, No.: 8; Aggestam, L, 2000 ‘A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role
be attributable to the very patterns the EU creates upon delivering her foreign policy actions. So we have a discussion on EU’s actions which sees her as a civilian and/or normative actor/power. Consequently, attention to values, norms and principles, becomes central in conceptualising EU’s actorness and the process of her foreign policy actions:

‘The VIPs [values, images, principles] present in the Union’s international conduct, are not simply idealistic symbolism in the pursuit of EU material gains, but they are the defining elements of a polity which is constructed differently to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a [different] way.’

The EU, ‘[...] promotes [so her] domestic values’ through her capable ability to make and implement policies abroad. Although, it has to be said, that scholars have quite differing views concerning the EU’s capability. Hill’s ‘expectations-capability gap’ concept, for instance, is quite something else as compared to the above-cited view of H. Smith. According to Hill, the actorness of the EU resides upon three elements, her ‘sui generis’ character and uniqueness as compared to other political entities, the autonomy it enjoys in making its own laws and her possessing a variety of actor capabilities. Capability, here, is defined as ‘the ability to formulate effective policies


For a more detailed analysis see the next chapter which will deal more extensively on EU’s civilian / normative / transformative powers.


and the availability of appropriate policy instruments.\textsuperscript{36} The EU does possess such capability; it is rather in her ability to effectively coordinate her own and with the MS’ policies, where deficiencies arise.

Moving away from the behavioural approach, the EU actorness has also been tackled from a structuralist point of view. It takes as a starting point Waltz’s neo-realist theory and its maxim that the sources of behaviour among actors within the international arena are not to be seen on the purposive action of actors rather on the ‘need to survive and flourish’ within the international, anarchical system. Within this constellation, the respective power possessed by states becomes the significant factor which determines the behaviour among actors.\textsuperscript{37} Nowadays, state–power has come under constant battering and states seem to be less and less able to guarantee order – domestically or internationally. Consequently, an international framework, such as the international organisations, becomes peremptory, since they seem to be better suited to handle global problems and supply applicable global solutions.\textsuperscript{38} As Keohane and Nye argue, international/regional organizations bring officials together, help to activate potential coalitions in world politics, provide a forum in which weak states can share their view and permit linkage strategies. International regimes and organizations are seen as sources of information, improving coordination, allowing burden sharing and introducing stability.\textsuperscript{39}

Another structural factor, which supplied the EU with a niche where her action would be applicable,\textsuperscript{40} was the fact that, although after the end of the Cold War, the


\textsuperscript{37} For more details see: Waltz, K, N 1979 ‘The Theory of International Politics’, Addison Wesley, Reading.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p.109.


prospects for a peaceful and prosperous world seemed rosier than ever\(^{41}\), the number of conflicts continued to grow, and the risks, –or necessity–, of involvement and spill-over loomed ever larger. Undoubtedly, that the great historical changes such as the end of the Cold War and the globalisation process, have accounted for the rearrangement of power within the international system, which in its own turn accounts for the emergence of complex, multi-layered systems of governance which have challenged the Westphalian assumptions of sovereignty and territoriality\(^ {42}\). Ikenberry sustains, that it is in moments of great historical upheaval when the world order becomes more ‘anarchical’ and the balance among power distributions gets destabilised. The actors within the new order are posed before the imperative to arrange themselves to the new power distributions\(^ {43}\). These conditions facilitate the emergence of actors such as the EU\(^ {44}\). The surfacing of the EU as an actor within the international arena is further sustained through the process of regionalism and interregionalism\(^ {45}\), which are seen as responses to the needs to deal with the pressures of globalization and interdependence\(^ {46}\). The EU has been eager to establish strategic partnerships with regional and continental organisations such as AU and it

---


\(^{45}\) Regionalism is defined as a situation within which states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a determined zone composed of various entities such as states, groups or territories whose members share some identifiable traits, cited in Farrell, M, Hettne, B, Van Langehove, L (eds.) 2005, ‘Global Politics of Regionalism – Theory and Practice’, Pluto Press, London, p.24. Interregionalism, on the other side, refers to cooperative contacts between regions to address issues of mutual concern. In relation to the EU it refers to region-to-region contacts in which the EU participates, cited in Söderbaum, F, Van Langenhoven, L 2005 ‘Introduction: The EU as Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism’, in European Integration, Volume 27, Issue 3, p.256.

has formulated strategies towards other regions as well. In this context, region to region relations represents a novel field of international relations and an extension of multilateral arrangements. Here, the actorness of the EU is seen in terms of ‘contributing to order in world politics’. The successful model that the EU constitutes, is a perfect showcase from which other regions in the world can subtract lessons on how i.e. regional rivalry can be structurally contained. Apart from the passive effect of the EU as a model, there are the very actions that the EU herself undertakes in encouraging regionalism throughout the world, which are done, firstly, through the help that the EU gives in creating other regions – which in its turn endows her with greater credibility and leverage, and secondly, by using this leverage to shape other regions in the EU’s image via the export of all its preferred values of order, i.e. her preference for ‘cooperation’ rather than confrontation. This is mirrored by the weighted positions of instruments, such as i.e. those concerned with aid and trade, which the EU has developed. This does not mean that the EU has not or does not make use of her coercive capabilities, rather it shows that the EU has a preference of putting the execution of direct, i.e. military coercion within wider international fora, preferably within the UN Security Council.

**OF EU ACTORNESS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM**

Assertions, such as the first two mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, are an excellent example of ‘social constructions by which shared understandings evolve

---


48 The reader is reminded of the EU ‘predetermining [through the system of values and principles] a well-defined framework within which interactions [with other entities] occur’, as mentioned on the above section ‘of the agency versus structure debate’.

49 Sanctions are a coercive instrument, just as much conditionality is as well. The EU’s economic weight and other incentives she provides make them very effective, indeed.

over time and play a role in shaping - enabling or constraining - subsequent action’51. Actoriness, as sustained by social constructivism, is not alone decided by the structural determinants, since they do not determine outcomes, but rather provide ‘action settings’ or distinct patterns of opportunity and constrains within which agency is displayed52. In this sense, social constructivism provides an analytical framework which does emphasise neither structure, nor agency, but the relationship between them. So actoriness generally, and EU actorness in particular, is seen as the resultant of a dynamic relationship between structure and agency.

The focus here is one of a normative and ideational approach, which emphasises that the world of international relations does not exist independently of human action and cognition but rather it is an intersubjective and meaningful world53 whose rules and practices are made and reproduced by human interaction. This strand further emphasises the function of identities in international relations, and does this by pointing at the constitutive role that norms and ideas play in defining identities54. This aspect, which is ignored by other theories that do not concern themselves with cultural and historical influences, is very helpful in explaining the significance of the Union’s civilian and normative foundations. Further, it simultaneously examines the relationship between internal and external factors, taking so into account international terrorism, interstate conflicts, and globalisation, and further illustrates how the EU internalizes these issues and then produces or fails to produce a response. For Bretherton and Vogler an actor is defined ‘as an entity that is capable of agency; of formulating and acting upon decisions. [Agency is not seen] as unlimited, rather [they] consider that the capacity to act reflects the interaction between understandings about internal character and capabilities and external


53 Constructivism does not see structures in material terms, as compared to other grand theories; rather they are intersubjective and ‘consist of shared understandings, expectations and social knowledge [...] they give meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors act’, cited in Wendt, A, 1994 ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’ in American Political Science Review, Volume 88, Issue No. 2, pp.384-396.

opportunities’. They identify three areas, which are seen as crucial in achieving international actorness, namely opportunity, presence and capability.

Opportunity is a structural attribution and sets the context that frames and shapes EU’s actions, i.e. globalisation and the failure of the state to regulate and control them ‘presented opportunities for the EU to act externally on behalf of its members’. Discourses that focus on the ‘construction of Europe [...] in the light of external challenges’ have consequently, become quite common. These external demands have also attributed to heightened expectations, which as we know haven’t been entirely fulfilled by the EU – the discourse on the expectations-capability gap reminds us of such. In taking advantage from the opportunities presented, the EU has to elaborate on her impact within the global system, through her presence, consisting of EU’s own external behaviour and the way it is perceived by other international actors. Further, it can be said, that presence is an indication of the EU’s structural power, which combines understandings about the fundamental nature, or identity of the EU and the (often unintended) consequences of the Union’s internal priorities and policies. Consequently, if opportunity explains the political room for EU action, presence examines the nature of the role that the EU has in international relations. This examination accounts i.e. for how the rich civilian expertise of EU member states results in the ‘civilian actor’ reputation of the EU. Another facet of the presence accounts for the EU’s influence in international affairs, in as much the EU serves as model of i.e. regional economic integration, ‘a stabilising factor and a model in the new world order’, etc. Capability, on the other side, refers to the behavioural attributions of the EU’s actorness, namely the internal context of EU

56 These issues where handled by the previous section which focused on the structural approach towards conceptualising EU’s actorness.
60 These issues where handled by the previous section which focused on the structural approach towards conceptualising EU’s actorness.
action and inaction. It serves as the interchangeable bridging element between the EU’s capitalising on presence and her responding to demands arising from opportunities. By looking at capability, it is possible to evaluate coherence and consistency, which continue to remain very much an issue for the EU and clearly describe how internal issues make it difficult for the EU to live up to the external expectations.

61 These issues were handled by the previous section which focused on the behavioural approach towards conceptualising EU’s actorness.
PART II

PROCESSES, ISSUES & INSTRUMENTS: EU & US 21ST CENTURY POLICIES IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 5  THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN AFRICA  83

CHAPTER 6  THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AFRICA  125
CHAPTER 5
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN AFRICA

‘Despite historic ties with the continent, US policy towards Africa has generally been marked by indifference and neglect\(^1\).

‘In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic priority – combating global terror\(^2\).

‘[The US recognises Africa] as a high priority [and] that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies\(^3\).

Policy documents and statements, in particular those released post 9/11, suggested that Africa required more attention in US foreign policy\(^4\) due to its increasing


importance concerning US national and economic security, and because of the humanitarian crises that emanates from the continent.

At the height of the Cold War era, the US pursued a foreign policy towards Africa, which was mostly informed by the interests to contain the influence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the African continent, at the same time itself influencing and supporting the African authoritarian regimes and securing so access to strategic mineral resources. The US national security interests in Africa in a post-Cold War environment were outlined through concerns about under-development and humanitarian issues, failed states, HIV/AIDS epidemic, drought and famines as well as a conviction that the international community could work jointly in facilitating solutions that assure Africa’s democratic promotion and consequently its peace and security. This is exemplified by the George H W Bush administration’s willingness to participate in UN humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, such as the UN authorised and US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia during 1992-3. Subsequently, as a result of ‘Black Hawk Down’ images well known to all of us, the US policies in Africa were severely cut. The new security threats as a direct result of 9/11 and the emergence of Africa, especially its resources, as strategic and vital to the US national interests, outline the new 21st century U-turn US policy in Africa, from retreat to full-scale engagement. The Bush administration’s legacy and track record includes a US military base in Djibouti, active counterterror

---


6 The so called Somalia Syndrome had a significant impact on the retreat of the US from Africa. The Clinton administration, especially through PDD 25 (Presidential Decision Directive 25), outlawed US unilateral deployment and partaking in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, except of course when the direct national interests made it peremptory. The full text of the PDD 25 is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm, last accessed on 30.03.2009.
programmes, a massive expansion of aid and trade policies, extended support for UN peace operation and, most obviously, the launch of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Prior to analysing the US engagement in Africa since the early 2000s, it is envisioned to put a greater focus on the different patterns and nuances that power takes, as expressed by its different appellatives, and as it is attested to and/or executed by the United States of America in order to bring about its foreign policy in the world7. The focus will, obviously, be on hard, soft and smart power, which in their turn will provide this author with valuable conceptions to be applied and thus, evaluate on these grounds, the concerned US policies in Africa.

US: FROM HARD THROUGH SOFT TO SMART POWER

US foreign policy has a split personality, between (1) realism-conservatism, the need for military power and political will to maintain friendly alliances [... and] (2) idealism-liberalism, the need to perfect and spread democracy8.

The agenda of world politics has become far more complicated and as shown by the Bush years, it does not allow to put at play only the military or economic might – the so called ‘carrots and sticks’, in pursuing what is widely perceived as national

7 The author is well aware that, as pertaining to the power tools that the US and/or EU is attested to and/or uses in executing their respective foreign policies, – from hard to soft, smart, civilian and normative – no clear cut can be made, the distinguishing line has, especially lately, become very vague, since both actors make use of tools which may belong to the type of power indicated here as predominantly performed by the other actor. Therefore, the aim of this paper is not seen as an all comprehensive analysis of the US and EU types of power, rather it focuses itself at the respective foreign policies and the power discourse it has accompanied them since the early 2000s, when both actors decided ground breaking policies towards Africa.

interests. For Nye, this agenda of the world politics it resembles ‘a three-
dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally’⁹.

The vertical board, hegemonised by the USA, concerns the hard power which is
defined as ‘wilful power, [...] the ability to impose one’s goals without regard to
others’, ‘the ability to talk instead of listen and to afford not to learn’¹⁰. Its source is
seen in ‘large population and territory, extensive natural resources, economic
strength, military force, and social stability’¹¹. The primacy of the US in some of
these fields is being challenged by the emergence of new powers such as China,
India, Russia, perhaps Brazil, etc., so much so that some forecasted the decline of the
US, sure that ‘ultimately history will happen’ to it¹².

In one particular field, though, the primacy of the US continues to remain the
dominant one throughout the whole world: its military capacity. The US asserts that,
as a result of the anarchic nature of the international politics and the self-help
environment it provokes, a great power’s, and consequently its own, most important
resource is the military capability it possesses¹³. Accordingly, the US spends more on
its military than all other nations in the world combined¹⁴. This condition triggered a

---

York, p.4


¹² ‘Every ten years, it is decline time in the United States’. So starts Joseph Joffe his last article in
Foreign Affairs, where he makes a short collage of the main US decline theories starting with
the 1950s ‘sputnik scare’ till to the last claim fuelled by the global economic strangle. For
more see: Joffe, J 2009 ‘The Default Power: The False Prophecy of America’s Decline’ in
Fareed Zakaria mentions in his ‘The Post-American World’ the ways how ‘history happened’
to Great Britain, and he skilfully outlines why USA will avoid that fate. For more see:

¹³ McMahon, P C, Wedeman, A 2006 ‘Introduction’ in Forsythe, D P, McMahon, P C,
Wedeman, A (eds.) ‘American Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, Routledge Taylor &
Francis Group, New York, p.4

The above authors sustain that this position is vindicated from the history of the USA,
sustained through the realist theoretical explanations.

¹⁴ Bremmer, I 2009 ‘Obama or not, U.S. still needs hard power’ in Foreign Policy, September 2,
A (eds.) ‘American Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, Routledge Taylor & Francis
Group, New York
fervent debate among academia, pundits and politicians alike, on the best and effective ways the US has to exercise its power within the foreign policy, whether unilaterally or multilaterally. The neoconservative thought took the upper hand during the years of the Bush administration. Following their reasoning, the US, as the only superpower, must act unilaterally in order to protect its interests and for the greater good of humanity. In making this statement, the sustainers create and at the same time legitimise a sort of causal relation between the fact of being a great power on the one side and the greater responsibility for international affairs on the other hand. In other words, the US, because of its primacy, has different responsibilities than other states and, with it, it comes this sense of right and even duty to undertake the role of the world’s policeman, by also acting unilaterally and in a pre-emptive way. The US, is seen as ‘mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the

---


possession and use of military might’. In order for the USA to keep policing the world, which it is no longer seen as a choice but actually as a ‘requirement of the system’, it has to keep the primacy in military means. The Latin adage ‘si vis pacem, para bellum’ describes it best.

As Daalder and Lindsay in 2003 but also Ikenberry in 2002 notice, the Bush administration relied on the unilateral exercise of the American hard power, and disdained the utility of international law and international institutions, such as the UN, which were deemed as futile. In those very few cases when multilateral action was chosen, then in the form of ad hoc coalitions of the willing, a sort of a ‘à la carte multilateralism’. It assumed that international support is often a function of coercion and preferred regime change to direct negotiations with countries and leaders loathed. The outcome of such policy-making within the international arenas was an –at best– undermining of the US claim to the moral high ground:

‘there has probably never been a time when there was such a wide gap between our military and political standing in the world’.

Various prominent scholars, pundits and politicians alike, argued that in order to expel this acrimony, things must change. Policy has to be more of a collaborative venture between partners instead of a relationship based in power among un-equals. In this new constellation, where America’s power does not have the sway it once had, in a time when other nations now have the potential to opt-out of ‘the carrot and

---


stick’ incentive programmes, and in order to accomplish its foreign policy goals, the US must rely on soft power, for it ‘will face great difficulties […] unless it is able to persuade other countries that their vital interests are best served by cooperation with, rather than balancing against the US.’ By stressing US’ soft power and its potential decline, analysts could advocate a much more prudent and varied foreign policy strategy that it [is] sensitive to claims [of] legitimacy and cultural attraction.

By turning to the two other boards of Nye’s three dimensional chess game, the middle one concerns the interstate economic issues where the distribution of power is multipolar and the US has to share its power with the EU, Japan, China, and others. On the bottom board of transnational issues like terrorism, organized crime, climate change, swell of epidemic diseases, power is distributed and chaotically organized among state and non-state actors. Accordingly, in approaching Africa, issues concerning mainly the ‘middle and bottom board’ gain greater relevance and hence, the one-dimensional players cannot but be insufficient in their dealings. ‘In the long term, that is the way to lose, since obtaining favourable outcomes on the bottom transnational board often requires the use of soft power assets.’

[... S]oft power [means] getting others to want the outcomes that you want [and] [S]oft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.

---


25 Ibid., (emphasis added). Nye, in presenting and analysing soft power, differs between behavioural power: ‘the ability to obtain outcomes you want’, and resource power: ‘the possession of resources that are usually associated with the ability to reach outcomes you
Thus, attractiveness is very important in getting others to want the desired outcomes and shaping their preferences so as to serve the proper interests. Such it ‘depends very much upon the values [...] expressed through the substance and style of [...] foreign policy’\(^{26}\), i.e. development assistance to third world countries provides an important soft power source. Acting multilaterally, is another soft power source since desired goals ‘are far more likely to succeed and be less costly if shared with others’. Consequently, the traditional sources of soft power production range from international agenda-setting to leading multilateral events and institutional practices, through the transmission of information, ideas, policies, values and norms that are attractive to other countries. Soft power, though, is not a substitute or alternative of hard power, as some seem to think about\(^{27}\), rather it represents in itself ‘real power’, it is an ability to gain objectives and it is more than just ‘image, public relations and ephemeral popularity’. As much as the military strength, the dominance of US culture and language can sustain American power. And as all power has limits, so does soft power no exception. Since, ‘all power depends on context – who relates to whom under what circumstances – but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers. Moreover, attraction often has a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action’\(^{28}\). Thus, ‘[one] must use what has been called ‘smart power’: the full range of tools at our disposal –diplomatic, economic, military,

---


\(^{28}\) Nye, Jr., J S 2004 ‘Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics’, p.16
political, legal, and cultural– picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation.”

Hence, with smart power, is to be understood a mix of hard and soft power skills and resources, the exact dosage depending on the context it -smart power- is to be exercised. In Nye’s analysis, there are two concepts which are basic to smart power. The first being ‘effective leadership’, which it ‘requires a mixture of soft and hard power skills’; and the second concept concerns ‘contextual intelligence’, which it combines cognitive abilities with the emotional intelligence, both learnable and increaseable through experience. It is the contextual intelligence that determines the interplay between hard and soft power skills. Following Nye’s rationale, a good leadership, ‘effective and ethical’, needs to combine three essential soft power skills –communication, vision and emotional intelligence- with two other skills, located at the repertoire available to hard power –organizational ability and political wisdom. In other words, leaders must understand and adapt according to the ‘followers’ and in the context in which they work. Thus five important dimensions emerge to contextual intelligence: culture, distribution of power, the needs and demands of followers, crisis and time urgency, and the flow of information.

On the level of international politics and specifically at the US foreign policy level, the CSIS Commission on Smart Power (2007) did tackle these issues from a practical point of view. The report provided with a guidebook-like on what the US must do in order to resume its global leadership. The first step in achieving this proposition is, understanding that being the only superpower does not justify a domineering attitude:


31 Ibid., p.147

32 Ibid., p.69

33 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007 ‘CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America’, CSIS, Washington DC, p.4
'The United States can influence, but not control, other parts of the world'.

The other lesson to be learned was that despite the fact that the Pentagon is the best-trained and best-resourced arm of the government, it does not mean that there are no limits to what hard power can achieve. Turning all to the Pentagon because it can get things done will inexorably lead to an over-militarized foreign policy, which in its own way attracts distrust and hostility and provokes friction with the approaches, deemed more adapt to given contexts from other actors. Therefore, to formulate it with the words of *The Powers to Lead*, contextual intelligence must take into consideration not just the muscles but also the limits of US power. Thus, there has to be equilibrium between the military and non-military means in executing the foreign policy.

‘Military might does constitute a part, but only a part of possible responses to the threats by which US feels endangered. For the response to be comprehensive it necessitates cooperation between governments and international institutions’.

Confronted with such statements one might be forgiven if tempted to think, arguably due to a Europhile inclining, that such enlightenment is actually plain common sense.

The main recommendation of the CSIS Commission is that for the sake of its own interests, the US must invest in the global good, which in the absence of a US leadership they cannot be attainable to the rest of the world. Therefore, contextual intelligence must come again into play: in terms of style, the attitude of the US ought to change, it must learn to cooperate and listen and in terms of substance, while it

---


35 Ibid.

36 CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America’, p.1

must first ensure its national survival, it should also provide global public goods\textsuperscript{38}. There are five areas deemed crucial for securing a welcomed US world leadership: the reinvigoration of alliances, partnerships, and institutions that serve US interests and help solve the 21\textsuperscript{st} century challenges, translated in i.e. a renewed commitment for a reformed UN and ‘working to erase the perception that the [US] has double standards when it comes to abiding by international law’; an elevated role of global development within the US foreign policy, helping so align US interests with aspirations of people around the world; an enhanced, long-term public diplomacy that can bring foreign populations to hold the US side; economic integration also for those left behind at home and abroad; and technology and innovation, especially concerning energy security and climate change\textsuperscript{39}.

The following will handle the US engagement in Africa; its main policies will be analysed through the application of the conceptions of hard, soft and smart power.

\section*{THE US POLICIES IN AFRICA}

As the new Bush administration started its work, little was expected from it concerning the Africa policy\textsuperscript{40}. Analysts predicted that the US Africa policy would

\textsuperscript{38} Nye, Jr., J S 2008 ‘Recovering American Leadership’ in \textit{Survival}, Volume 50, No.1, p.64. The World Bank gives the following definition on public goods: ‘Goods that are non-rival-consuming by one person does not reduce the supply available for others- and non-excludable- people cannot be prevented from consuming them. [...] they are often supplied by government. Public goods are usually national or local. [...] There can also be global public goods, benefitting most of the world's population, for example global peace and security, or information needed to prevent global climate change. \textit{Providing such goods (and services) is a function of international organizations}'. (emphasis added) The World Bank 2004 ‘Beyond Economic Growth: Student Book’ WB, Washington DC, p.142, Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/ glossary.html, last accessed on 28.12.2009. From the last sentence in this definition, one might, arguably rightly, ask whether the US in order to secure its leader role, is willing to take over functions, which up to date were fulfilled by international organizations. Nye writes that one of the great challenges the US faces is ‘how to better control the non-state actors that will increasingly share the stage with nation-states’. For more on it see: Nye, Jr., J S 2008 ‘Recovering American Leadership’, p.62.

\textsuperscript{39} CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America’, pp.27, 29-30, 37, 47, 53, 57.

\textsuperscript{40} George W Bush interview during the election campaign at the \textit{PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer} on 16 February 2000, Bush was quoted saying that Africa ‘doesn’t fit into the national strategic interests’. For the full transcript of the interview see: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ bb/election/jan-june00/bush_2-16.html, last accessed on 30.03.2009.
continue to be run by the State Department bureaucrats. The DoD would rather continue its ‘business as usual’ behaviour, since ‘ultimately [... the DoD] see[s] very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.

These low expectations were actually proved wrong, since quite almost immediately, the administration embarked on a major diplomatic endeavour in trying to put an end to the north-south conflict in Sudan. This change of mind was followed suit by what became to be considered important initiatives with a predominant focus on Africa: the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Broadly speaking, there are three main issues which are seen as pointing at the heightened relevance of Africa to the US national interests. Firstly, Africa’s role to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) which includes also the potential that failed states, porous borders, ungoverned areas, poverty etc, provide in facilitating terrorist activities. Secondly, Africa’s abundant natural resources, especially oil. Thirdly, humanitarian concerns as a result of conflicts, poverty, and disease. In 2004 an advisory panel of Africa experts, authorized by Congress to propose new policy initiatives, went into greater detail and identified five factors that have shaped the increased US interest in Africa: oil, global trade, armed conflicts, terror, and


43 In May 2001, the appointment of the USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as the US Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan; In August 2001, the appointment of John Danforth as the US Special Envoy for Sudan’s Peace Process; In June 2001 the Senate passed the Sudan Peace Act, which made available funds of up to $ 10 million to assist the population in the areas outside the Sudanese government control. For more information see: Huliaras, A 2006 ‘Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists: The Bush Administration’s Policy Towards Sudan’, in Orbis, Volume 50, Issue No. 4, pp.714-5.

HIV/AIDS\textsuperscript{45}. They suggested that these factors had led to a ‘conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa’\textsuperscript{46}.

This section of the chapter will continue to analyse the US agenda in Africa at the dawn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century by focusing on the main policies within following core fields: security, energy, aid and trade, democratisation and governance, demographics, food security, and climate change. The section prior to wrap up with some concluding remarks on the US in Africa will also have a look at the US stance about China’s engagement in Africa.

**US Security Engagement in Africa**

In having a look backwards, US hard power engagement in Africa, in terms of security policies and military instruments, has usually taken traditional forms such as concealed military, security and counter terrorism operations, combined military exercises and training programmes with different African militaries, as well as peace support operations and peacekeeping missions on African ground, plus humanitarian relief operations. Nevertheless,

‘despite this long history of engagement on the continent, the DoD has never focused on Africa with the same level of consistency with which it has focused on other regions of the world’\textsuperscript{47}.

\textsuperscript{45} CSIS Africa Policy Advisory Panel Report 2004 ‘Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy’, CSIS, Washington DC, p.6, available at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/rising_u.s._stakes_in_africa.pdf, last accessed on 30.3.2009. It has lately been argued that environmental security / climate change serve as a ‘threat multiplier’ and consequently it should be added to the list of issues concerning the national security interests, the more so the one concerning Africa as argued by a DoD official, in his testimony before Congress. Examples from Nigeria, Sudan, and Somalia further highlight this argument asserting that, ‘beyond the more conventional threats we traditionally address, I believe we must now also prepare to respond to the consequences of dramatic population migrations, pandemic health issues and significant food and water shortages due to the possibility of significant climate change’. For a detailed information see: US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2007 ‘Testimony of General Charles Wald, Member, Military Advisory Board, at a hearing on Climate Change and National Security Threats before the Committee of Foreign Relations, US Senate, May 9, 2007’, p.2, available at: http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/WaldTestimony070509.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009.

A U-turn in the US thinking came as a direct result of 9/11. Concerns about terrorist attacks originating from Africa, seemed to take the upper hand among US officials and observers in general, who thought of Africa, with its large Muslim populations, failed states, and porous borders, as being the ideal breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. As a result of it, a heightened intelligence cooperation was stood up, accompanied by policies such as mutual antiterrorism assistance, more insistent developmental and public diplomacy projects, aiming at targeting the ‘root causes’ of extremism and terrorism. This was sustained by the conviction that US security depends as much on the success of preventive measures in weak states as on combat operations against the obvious enemies.

‘[...] military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more [...] help protect our security and advance our interests and values.’

Such policy statements, and especially the DoD directive 3000.05 (2005), become exemplary of ‘a tendency to conflate all forms of US assistance to Africa—security, development, humanitarian— with overriding counterterrorism objectives.’ Initially, the African parties welcomed this surge of US interest in African security matters,

---

47 Quotation from Theresa Whelan, a current DoD functionary, who served from September 2003 to June 2009 as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence (DASD) for African Affairs.


50 This directive delineated for the first time that stability operations were a core DoD mission, thus chronic weaknesses that had traditionally attracted the attention of humanitarian and developmental experts (corruption, weak governance, poverty, disease, etc.) were discovered to have new strategic importance.

although they felt that the continent had other more pressing security matters than terrorism\(^{52}\).

By turning to the counterterrorist projects, the US initially focused on the Horn of Africa. Paramount example is the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), a 1600 person strong new US military base in Djibouti established in early 2003 with the assignment to tackle a possible surge in extremist or terrorist activities in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa\(^{53}\). The mission’s mandate –disrupting the activities of ‘transnational terrorist movements’– seems to have been ill-defined (alas, a mistake repeated with AFRICOM as we shall see later on) since it has been discarded as non achievable\(^{54}\). The force though, evolved over time to include intelligence gathering, civic action operations, and host country training exercises, which were executed in close cooperation with the US embassies in the region. Surprisingly, contrary to the dominant thought within the strongly neocon-influenced administration about the need for a robust firepower, the CJTF-HOA had little means to fight\(^{55}\), which in its own turn, it seems to have prompted it to better cooperate with other US agencies and host governments in trying to address the root causes of violent extremism\(^{56}\). This seems to have contributed in large parts to the CJTF-HOA’s soft/smart power image since it concurs with an important feature of soft power, where preference for policies that are more of a collaborative venture

---


\(^{53}\) More information about CJTF-HOA is available at: www.hoa.africom.mil/AboutCJTF-HOA.asp, last accessed on 30.03.2009.


\(^{55}\) Its kinetic (combat) capability was often represented by a single rifle company. It has, though, to be said that these diminished means of fight are diametrically opposed to the budget CJTF-HOA it uses annually. For instance, speaking in figures, CJTF-HOA disposes of an estimated $330 million annually, almost as much as the annual operating expenses of AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. For more see: www.hoa.africom.mil, last accessed on 30.03.2009.

between partners instead of a relationship based in power among un-equals, is central. After all, Nye sustains that ‘soft power is about mobilizing cooperation from others without threats or payments’. Concerning smart power, the CJTF-HOA seems to exemplify a proper employment of ‘contextual intelligence’ in terms of appropriate use of soft and hard power means. Regarding the changed US style and attitude, it seems ‘it [has] learn[ed] to cooperate and listen’; and in terms of substance, in ensuring first its national survival, ‘it [has] also provide[d] global public goods’.

Another project was the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative launched in mid 2003, just short of the first visit of President Bush in Africa. The programme was dotted with $100 million, largely from previously budgeted money for projects across East Africa within the security, governance and development fields. Countries concerned were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and assistance ranged from improvements in airport security to helping herd owners in remote areas to bring their animals to market. Yet another counterterrorist project was the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), also launched in 2003 with a focus in Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, and focused on assisting the respective militaries track and neutralise suspect terrorist targets within the Sahel region. In 2004 the PSI advanced to become the Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), dotted with $500 million over a five-year time span, and focused on training the local militaries as well as programmes concerning governance and public diplomacy.

Albeit the good coordination example set up by CJTF-HOA, these programmes pointed towards a, for many worrying, trend in authority transfers that the Bush administration has set in motion. Reference is being made of the transfer to DoD of authorities which once were executed exclusively by civilian agencies, most notably the Department of State and USAID. An exemple par excellence is provided through


the sections ‘1206’ and ‘1207’ authorities of the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) of 2006, through which the DoD can in predefined circumstances train and equip non military counterparts and transfer its funds to the State Department for purposes of security and stabilisation requirements. This authority transfer has obviously created frictions between the two departments. Such function has been followed with suspicion and distrust not just by the State Department but also the Congress itself, as well as the broader developmental and nongovernmental community over an alleged erosion of civilian command within the assistance programmes. It is thought that this ‘militarisation’ —programmes, including the non-military ones, funded and/or executed by DoD— has progressively expanded to include large percentages of the US policy towards Africa. Generally speaking, in 1998 USAID managed 64.3 percent of US official development assistance; the State Department 12.9 percent; DoD only 3.3 percent. Meanwhile in 2006, USAID dropped to 45 percent while DoD rose to 18 percent. Other agencies, apart from State, USAID and DoD, saw an increase in official development assistance as well, from 19.3 percent to 23.6 percent.


These features would account for a diminished soft/smart power image since ‘turning all to the Pentagon because it can get things done will inexorably lead to an over-militarized foreign policy’\(^6^3\), which in its own way attracts hostility and distrust and provokes friction with the approaches, deemed more adapt to given contexts from other actors. On the other hand, for all the talk of ‘DoD getting things done’, nevertheless, it is sustained that the DoD is ill-suited as compared to other US civilian services to afford such civilian activities, i.e. training police officers, etc., especially within the African continent\(^6^4\). Another related concern is that aid may increasingly be pressed to fit into preset counterterrorism templates, thus ‘flattening out and obscuring the true complexity of Africa’s security problems’\(^6^5\). The idea for a greater role of DoD in foreign assistance, despite the fact that the DoD accounts today for 21 percent of overall US ODA, is seen as a dangerous one, since it may ‘misconceive[e] the nature of development and threatening the role and credibility of development agencies and NGOs’\(^6^6\).

The template of civilian-military cooperation created by the CJTF-HOA, served as a good example upon which AFRICOM would then be found\(^6^7\). AFRICOM\(^6^8\) is intended as a new kind of military command, aimed at integrating traditional security functions with humanitarian aid and development, through application of i.e. hard power for counterterrorist and security issues, and soft power for military training, officer exchanges and humanitarian projects. This was to be achieved through a greater and closer cooperation between the DoD, State Department and USAID. In this sense, AFRICOM’s potential to increase US soft power is given, since ‘the military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of soft power [… with its] broad range of officer exchanges, joint training, and assistance programs.

---


\(^{68}\) A much more detailed account of AFRICOM will be provided on the following chapter IV of this work.
with other countries in peacetime. For all the potential, the military, failed to send out a soft power message, in large parts because its ‘belated and clumsy outreach generated suspicion about the military’s true motives’. Africa did not buy AFRICOM’s claim to ‘help development, health education, democracy, and economic growth’. A further reason for distrust was presented by the fact that the search of a headquarters in the continent was started prior to explaining how the command would help Africa, so Africans felt that ‘very little was really known by the majority of people or countries in Africa who were supposed to know before such a move was made’. The failure to explain AFRICOM to Africans is also sustained by the fear that AFRICOM could provide an excuse for a presence of US troops in the continent, and consequently, the felt imperative was that ‘Africa has to avoid the presence of foreign forces on its soil’. A further cut to the soft power image was the perception that AFRICOM ‘was an inappropriate and knee-jerk US militaristic response to clumsy Chinese mercantilism’. The so much looked-after soft power image failed because as Nye says:

‘a communications strategy cannot work if it cuts against the grain of policy. Actions speak louder than words and public diplomacy that appears to be mere window dressing for hard power projection is unlikely to succeed.’

Apart from the above-mentioned policies, the Bush administration, in stark contrast to its predecessor, did support peacekeeping missions in Africa, be they UN or AU missions. The contributions are seen as to have been in the form of troops, financial,


70 Bellamy, M, Hicks, K, Morrison, J, S 2007 ‘Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case’.


logistic and/or political support. Thus, by mid 2001 a large UN force was deployed in Sierra Leone, followed by UN peacekeeping operations in DRC in 2001, Liberia in 2003 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2004. A new development from the continent, in this sense, was the creation of the AU, and its peace and security architecture. This provided for an opportunity to improve US soft/smart power, since “[m]ultilateralism helps to legitimate American power” be it hard, soft or smart, as well as US’ legitimacy and standing in Africa may well increase if it cooperates at a closer level with these international institutions, for they enjoy “broad political support among Africa’s elected leadership, military officers, and general public.” It has to be said that the AU and its peace and security architecture were not a focal point of the Bush administration in addressing security problems in Africa; the appointment of an ambassadorial-level envoy to the AU, although a good step in the right direction, failed to account for great improvement.

The above-mentioned engagements account for the traditional security assistance including the counterterrorism programmes. It is well known that Africa is facing other new security challenges which do not fit with the traditional approaches. Reference is being made to international drug trafficking (a predominant security challenge that West African countries face), organised crime, money laundering and human trafficking. Although the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) is charged with tackling these African challenges, the results seem to fall on a modest scale. The budget allocation exemplifies best the small priority Africa occupies i.e. for the FY2008, less than 3 percent of the total budget, only $34 million out of $1.24 billion, were earmarked for

75 Detailed information about mission mandates as well as contributing countries and other statistical data see the official website of the UN peacekeeping operations: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/, last accessed on 30.03.2009.


Africa⁷⁹. Another reason for the modest results, seems to lay on the fact that capacity building programmes for Africa’s national law enforcement and criminal justice systems are scattered all over the administration’s structure—some two dozen departments and agencies! The result is ‘a fragmented mosaic of loosely connected initiatives covering many countries and addressing many diverse issues in a generally superficial fashion. […] Therefore] it is nearly impossible to correlate these efforts with any durable improvements in African law enforcement or judicial capacity’⁸⁰. To speak with the wording of the CSIS Report on Smart Power, these fractured and compartmentalised US foreign policy institutions, cannot but only deliver a ‘wrong-headed’ and ‘incoherent’ agenda, that ‘lack[s] in credibility’, all of which, ultimately, account for a diminished smart power image⁸¹.

US ENERGY INTERESTS IN AFRICA

The US thirst for foreign oil imports, as predicted by the US Department of Energy, will grow from 24.4 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2003, to an estimated 26.7 million bpd in 2020⁸². Predictions offered by the US National Energy Policy (NEP) in 2005 moved on these same lines. Perceived threats to the US energy security globally arouse after 9/11 and the consequent Global Wars On Terror (GWOT) especially that in Iraq. This feeling was further sustained by the perceived ‘new scramble’ for Africa’s strategic resources particularly the competition flamed by the hunger of China as well as that of other emerging economies in the Global South. Such situation seems to have influenced the Bush administration to regard Africa and especially African oil resources as a ‘strategic national interest’ of the US.

---


The 2005 Council on Foreign Relations report on Africa stressed that the ‘US energy security is based on achieving a stable supply of energy at affordable prices from as diverse a set of suppliers as possible’\(^{83}\). The situation in the Middle East, and particularly after the US’ Iraq war, made it all too clear that turmoil and instability in one country can at worse hinder access to oil and at best raise the global price of it. In the search for alternative sources, President Bush announced in his 2006 State of the Union address the intention to ‘replace more than 75 percent of [US] oil imports from the Middle East by 2025’\(^{84}\), further strengthening a previous commitment made in 2002 ‘to expand the sources and types of global energy supplies, especially in [...] Africa [...]’\(^{85}\). The Assistant Secretary of State Department for African Affairs is quoted to have said that: ‘African oil is of national interest to us, and it will increase and become more important as we go forward’\(^{86}\). Apart from the fact that the US has invested heavily, the low sulphur quality of crude oil extracted from Africa, especially from the Gulf of Guinea countries, is highly valued by the US market\(^ {87}\). Thus, African countries such as Nigeria and Angola are seen to have gained an increasing importance for the US in particular and within the global energy market generally: ‘In 2000, Nigeria and Angola’s combined exports to the US totalled 1.2 million bpd; an amount that is expected to double or triple in the next ten years’\(^{88}\). Or ‘the global energy market is such that rising mid range producers like Nigeria and Angola today are increasingly critical to the reliability and stability in global oil


prices’. The main issues, though, apart from this strategic importance, are the pervasive security troubles that these African countries are faced with, the risks of poor governance and corruption, as well as, ironically, the economic challenges that African countries are faced with as a result of the discovery of oil. All in all contributes to what has been called as the ‘resource curse’.

Concerning the Bush administration’s energy security policy, although it did identify the importance of Africa as a strategic supplier, the risks of poor governance and corruption and the need for engagement, critics point at the fact that it is much of the same strategy since the Carter Doctrine, which calls for military intervention in

---


91 National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001 ‘Report: Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future’, Washington DC, p.162, available at: http://www.wtrg.com/energyreport/national-energy-policy.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009. The NEPD Group recommends that the president direct the secretaries of state, energy, and commerce to reinforce the US-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum and the US-African Energy Ministerial process; deepen bilateral and multilateral engagement to promote a more receptive environment for US oil and gas trade, investment, and operations; and promote geographic diversification of energy supplies, addressing such issues as transparency, sanctity of contracts, and security. The NEPD Group recommends that the president direct the secretaries of state, commerce, and energy to support more transparent, accountable, and responsible use of oil resources in African producer countries to enhance the stability and security of trade and investment environments.

assuring US access to oil\textsuperscript{93}. In assessing the energy policy one has to look at the US engagement with the suppliers, the technical and other assistance on energy policy itself as well as related issues of transparency and governance, and a policy response to emerging threats to US investment and personnel\textsuperscript{94}. In terms of diplomatic engagement the record is at best mixed, since ‘[a]s part of a general dismantlement and minimisation of standing bilateral policy dialogues, the US retreated from engagement with most suppliers’\textsuperscript{95}. For instance, the US-Africa Energy Ministers Partnership, a forum which brought together all energy producers and aimed at addressing energy security, investment security and sustainable development, was, after the first rounds, a failure, due to little political effort from the US side in sustaining it. Or for that matter, in a time when policy dialogues at the head-of-state-level, were launched annually by other parties, such as EU-Africa, China-Africa, Russia-Africa, etc., US engagement, i.e. bilateral commissions with Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa, lapsed. For example, the agenda on US engagement with Nigeria was rather enlarged, including issues from Liberia, to Sudan, to Sierra Leone, but only episodically were discussed issues concerning the strained situation on the Niger Delta\textsuperscript{96}. US engagement with other parties such as the EU or China on Africa can also be defined as negligible. These attitudes do not qualify as soft power, since as Nye points out diplomatic engagement, as well as multilateral settings are core to soft power attributes\textsuperscript{97}. These attitudes point out at a rather unilateral and arrogant US in its foreign policy dealings. This has undoubtedly resulted in a loss of legitimacy and soft power.


\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.

Concerning the development assistance, the track record is also mixed. For instance under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)\(^98\) passed in 2004, the aim was to decrease the trade imbalances with Africa and to provide incentives for diversifying Africa’s economies. Nevertheless, under AGOA, 99 percent of Angolan exports to US were energy related and Nigerian exports are very much the same\(^99\).

Another facet of the US development assistance, as related to the African energy producing/exporting countries, is provided by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)\(^100\). The MCC is an innovative initiative which has made participation dependant of certain conditionalities and standards, it does, though, by doing so, exclude most of energy-producing countries, in a time when those countries are most in need of improved governance\(^101\). Here we have useful tools that do not properly address the contexts of the oil-producing African countries. It may be sustained that because of the substantial influence of neoconservatist ideology within the Bush administration and of the subsequent justification of the Iraq war in terms of democracy spreading, the US democratisation track record during the Bush years is extremely flawed, and through it the soft/smart power image.

Another endogenous factor for such shrinking of the US soft/smart power in this field, is also provided by the fact that ‘[a]t least 18 different federal agencies, from DoE [US Department of Energy] to HHS [US Health and Human Services], conduct at least 158 energy related program activities’\(^102\). In the face of such conditions, there is no room for wondering why the CSIS Report on Smart Power, sustains that a major factor for a diminished US soft/smart power effecting, is largely due to these

\(^98\) AGOA will be handled at greater detail further down on the section of US Aid and Trade Policies in Africa.

\(^99\) More information is available at the official website of AGOA: http://www.agoa.info, last accessed on 30.03.2009.

\(^100\) MCC will be handled at greater detail further down on the section of US Aid and Trade Policies in Africa.

\(^101\) Detailed information is available at the official website of the MCC: http://www.mcc.gov/mcc /selection/index.shtml, last accessed on 30.03.2009.

fractured and compartmentalised US foreign policy institutions, and their output is a ‘wrong-headed’ and ‘incoherent’ agenda, that ‘lack[s] in credibility’.

In concluding about the US energy policy towards Africa during the Bush years, its administration identified Africa’s rising potential and risks, nevertheless, ‘transparency and governance were low-priority issues, diplomatic engagement with energy producers atrophied, and no significant sums of new resources were deployed to address the challenges associated with rising revenues and eroding capacity of governments to manage them’.

US AID AND TRADE POLICIES IN AFRICA

Aid and trade policies concerning Africa, are considered as the paramount achievements of the Bush administration. As a matter of fact, aid to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) almost tripled from $2.3 billion in 2000 to $6.6 billion in 2006, and further President Bush pledged to increase aid to $9 billion by 2010. This meant that US’ Official Development Aid (ODA) disbursements in 2006 averaged something less than $9 dollar per African per year. A great contributor to these figures is the President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), accounting for quite 25 percent in 2006, while humanitarian assistance, another substantial contributor, accounted for 31 percent. The most, though, was contributed by one time debt relief (especially DRC, $689 million; Nigeria, $597 million; and Zambia, $188 million). On trade, the Bush administration took over and advanced the Clinton’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Another important initiative was the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) which aimed at

104 NEP Development Group, 2001 ‘Reliable, Affordable and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future’, p.162.
107 Ibid., p.1.
improving and strengthening trade capacity in Africa through infrastructure projects. At a less positive note, US ODA to SSA decreased in real terms by a staggering 15 percent to $5.9 billion in 2007 at about $7.25 dollar per African per year.\(^{108}\)

The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)

In 2000, a National Intelligence Council (NIC) Report identified a number of specific diseases as possible threats to the US, between them the HIV/AIDS pandemic.\(^{109}\) HIV/AIDS has a tremendous toll especially in sub-Saharan Africa: it ranges there as one of the greatest threats, thus it ‘quickly came to the forefront as a concern in US policy approaches to Africa’\(^{111}\). A subsequent NIC report focused on HIV/AIDS only and five populous ‘second wave countries’ which may be heavily affected by the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS.\(^{112}\) This report appeared just after the White House published its NSS in September 2002, where infectious diseases and health inequalities were identified as a major cause for global instability, and accordingly a strategy was outlined to address explicitly issues concerning HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria.\(^{113}\)

The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)\(^{114}\), is considered as ‘one of the most important new US foreign assistance programs’\(^{115}\) that ‘leads the

---


\(^{113}\) The White House, 2002 ‘*The National Security Strategy of the United States*’. This attitude towards public health issues was reiterated on the next NSS issued in 2006.

\(^{114}\) A wealth of prime data, various reports and progress so far, can be found on PEPFAR’s official website: http://www.pepfar.gov/progress/index.htm.
world”\textsuperscript{116}. From the 2003 bipartisan effort led by the Bush administration to create ‘the largest commitment ever by a single nation to combat […] HIV/AIDS around the world’\textsuperscript{117}, was born PEPFAR a $15 billion, five-year programme, which aims at tripling US commitments from $1 billion to $3 billion per year. Of the obligated $15 billion some 83 percent ($10 billion) have been pledged for bilateral programmes, 16 percent to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and about 1 percent has gone to UNAIDS. Disbursement have been kept at a lower scale than obligations, nevertheless in the first four years they have totalled $9.4 billion, and in 2007 HIV/AIDS disbursement amounted to 15 percent of the total US ODA\textsuperscript{118}. The programme was reauthorized in 2008 and extended to cover another five-year time-span from 2009 to 2013 with some $48 billion earmarked to fight HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria diseases\textsuperscript{119}. During its first quinquennial PEPFAR provided to nearly 2 million HIV infected sub-Saharan Africans with antiretroviral (ARVs) drugs as compared to only 50 thousand in late 2003; it has supported some 30 million HIV testing; and some 200 thousand infants were spared the fate of being born with HIV\textsuperscript{120}. Undoubtedly, as Meads writes ‘the generosity of US humanitarian assistance abroad enhances US soft power’\textsuperscript{121}, thus ‘[t]he ‘soft power’ success of treating such large numbers of people with AIDS [...] build considerable good will in Africa’ toward the US’\textsuperscript{122}. Nye points out that apart from being ‘a wise investment in US soft

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[115]{Radelet, S, Schutte, R, Abarcar, P 2008 ‘What’s Behind the Recent Decline in US Foreign Assistance?’, p.4.}
\footnotetext[117]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[118]{Radelet, S, Schutte, R, Abarcar, P 2008 ‘What’s Behind the Recent Decline in US Foreign Assistance?’, p.4.}
\footnotetext[120]{PEPFAR, 2008 ‘Latest Results’, Washington DC, available at: http://www.pepfar.gov/about/c19785.htm, last accessed on 30.03.2009.}
\footnotetext[121]{Meads, W, R 2004 ‘America’s Sticky Power’ in Foreign Policy, Issue No.141, p.51.}
\footnotetext[122]{Nieburg, P, Morrison, J, P 2009 ‘The Big US Leap on HIV/AIDS in Africa: What is the Next Act?’, p.34.}
\end{footnotes}
power\textsuperscript{123}, the US, when it promotes public goods like fighting HIV/AIDS, gains greatly ‘from the goods themselves, and from the way that being a major provider legitimizes and increases its soft power\textsuperscript{124}. Another reason for the success of PEPFAR may lay on its new management structure: the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (S/GAC) who reports to Secretary of State and the President and has authority over all official US funding and programmes that address global HIV/AIDS. This assures coherence, since it ‘has forged exceptionally successful interagency coordination and cooperation by creating a ‘one-US government’ approach to decision-making and program implementation at the policy, technical, and managerial levels\textsuperscript{125}. Coherence is a buzzword, which, as Nye and the CSIS Report on Smart Power have pointed out, is also a major source to soft/smart power. The close work of the US with local and international actors provided another source for increasing US soft power and legitimacy. Thus in FY2008, PEPFAR partnered with 2667 organisations, 86 percent of which were local, up from 1588 in FY2004\textsuperscript{126}. Such international cooperation has, though, expanded to other programmes, accounting so for other sources of US soft power. An example is provided by the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), created in 2006, which is another public health policy of the Bush administration, also a quinquennial programme dotted with $1.2 billion, aiming at fighting the falciparum malaria – a disease that kills yearly some 880 thousand people, most of them in Africa. The DoD had previously carried out programmes addressing malaria, with the aim of protecting US troops. PMI though

\textsuperscript{123} Nye, Jr, J S 2003, ‘The Velvet Hegemon’ in \textit{Foreign Policy}, Issue No. 146, p.75.


\textsuperscript{126} PEPFAR, 2008 ‘\textit{Latest Results}’, Washington DC, available at: http://www.pepfar.gov/about/c19785.htm, last accessed on 30.03.2009. This international cooperation moved actually beyond HIV/AIDS to encompass malaria and ‘neglected tropical diseases’ through PEPFAR, USAID and HHS’ CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), which have provided funding to the WHO’s Stop TB Department.
has moved beyond it and implements projects in close collaboration with international and in-country partners, especially the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) Partnership, a combined initiative of WHO, UNICEF, WB, UNDP, Gates Foundation and others, with a predominant focus on Africa\textsuperscript{127}.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)

AGOA, is a North-South preferential scheme, which began during the Clinton years, as a bipartisan congressional initiative, and was taken over and strengthened by the Bush administration. Its aim is to promote better opportunities for African producers through diversification and competitiveness, by exchanging policy reform for preferential access –duty-free, quota-free (DFQF)– of SSA exports to the US. It comprehends mainly oil and related energy products, but also textiles and apparel merchandise, and it is envisioned to last till 2015. Today, there are 40 AGOA-eligible African countries, 27 receive AGOA apparel benefits, 98 percent of AGOA-related exports enter the US duty free\textsuperscript{128}. ‘The AGOA Forum’ which takes place under the form of annual meetings between the US and the AGOA partners has been seen as ‘institutionali[sing] a high-level dialogue […] to foster closer economic ties between the United States and the region’\textsuperscript{129}. Indeed, AGOA has led to a rapid expansion of trade in certain African countries such as Kenya, Lesotho and Swaziland, as well as almost all SSA exports to the US were under the AGOA preferential trade. Accordingly, apparel exports reached a volume worth $1.3 billion in 2007, as compared to $359.4 million in 2001. Although, it has to be said that, African exports saw a drop of $300 million as a result of the expiration of restrictions on Chinese exports to the US in 2005. Another distortion is provided by the fact that the very largest increases are in terms of oil and related energy products. For instance of the $67 billion in African exports in 2006, only a volume $3.4 billion is filled by


AGOA-related nonpetroleum products. As hinted on the previous section, AGOA does not provide additional resources and financial incentives or not enough for energy producing countries. For instance, exports of agriculture products in 2007 declined\textsuperscript{130}, in a time when agriculture is widely seen as ‘a major conduit for African economic growth and development […] AGOA benefits to that sector have been miniscule […] and] it has not lived up to [its] promise’\textsuperscript{131}. Thus, critics sustain that the US gives ‘lip service to free trade while maintaining tariff barriers and paying subsidies to their farmers’\textsuperscript{132}. By some analysts, the potential that AGOA has, is seen as a gain for US soft power, since, as Mead finds, economic ties create ‘sticky power’, through which the US ‘attract[s] other countries to the US system and then trap[s] them in it’\textsuperscript{133}. AGOA, by eventually contributing to increases in private business investments, provides on the one hand, the US with another source of soft power since ‘vast deposits of soft power reside in the private sector’\textsuperscript{134}, and on the other hand, by aiming at the ‘global development […] it] reinforces basic American values, contributes to peace, justice, and prosperity, and improves the way [the US] are viewed around the world’\textsuperscript{135}.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
Established in January 2004, MCC is based on the principle that ‘aid is most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in

---

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{133} Meads, W, R 2004 ‘America’s Sticky Power’ in Foreign Policy, Issue No.141, p.46.

\textsuperscript{134} CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America’, p.65.

\textsuperscript{135} CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America’, p.41.
It aimed at pledging large amounts of aid, reaching a volume of $5 billion by FY2006—figure never reached—through compacts with poor countries that have a proven track-record in progressing their governance standards. On the MCC official website is sustained that indicators such as the protection of civil liberties, primary education expenditure, government effectiveness, as well as business start-up times come from organizations such as the World Bank, Freedom House, and UNESCO. African countries have to date received some $5 billion worth in compacts, which result in putting the responsibility on the ‘recipient governments [… to build up] proposals in line with their own development priorities’. This letting the African governments taking the initiative on developing their own compacts, increases the legitimacy of MCC in particular and that of the US in general. Pushing too hard though, may prove the wrong approach. Nevertheless, MCC is seen as a positive contributor to US soft power. Nye sustains that:


[138] For instance for the FY2006, MCC eligible countries were identified as those that: have a per capita income level of less than $3,255; rank above the median score on half of the indicators in each of the three categories of ruling justly, economic freedom and investing in people, as well as pass a hard hurdle for democracy; and are agreed upon by the MCC Board. MCC Compact countries are those who have been invited by the MCC Board and have submitted a successful proposal for funding. For more detailed information see: Fox, J, W, Rieffel, L 2005 ‘The Millennium Challenge Account: Moving Toward Smarter Aid’, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, p.4; Clark, E, S 2005 ‘The Millennium Challenge Account: Spur to Democracy?’ in Foreign Service Journal, April 2005, available at: http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/associates_clark_mca.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009; Brown, K, Siddiqi, B, Sessions, M 2006 ‘US Development Aid and the Millennium Challenge Account: Emerging Trends in Appropriations’, CGDEV, Washington DC, available at: http://www.cgdev.org/doc/MCA/USDev_Aid_MCA.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009.


[141] Ibid., p.35.
‘The Bush administration deserves credit for its efforts to align the United States with the long-term aspirations of poor people in Africa […] through its Millennium Challenge Initiative […]. Success in implementing these programs will represent a significant investment in American soft power’.142

To the first stage euphoria, after the perceived expectations that US ODA would increase, also through the MCC, showcasing so the importance that Africa’s development has to the US, and the consequent deliberations that ‘[…] when the United States is seen as supporting [democracy and human rights], US soft power grows’143, came the rather sober awakening as a result of the failure to live up to promises. Accordingly, to the requests of the Bush administration for a combined $15 billion dedicated to MCC for the FY2004-FY2009, the Congress allowed little more than the half (55 percent) of that figure, namely $8.3 billion144.

In conclusion about the Bush administration’s aid and trade policies in Africa, it can be said that, the record of promoting soft power, is mixed. It created innovative and independent programmes and institutions such as PEPFAR and S/GAC, who have accounted for great US soft power sources in Africa, but at the same time it created the need for greater coherence between aid and trade, with a greater focus on long-term development and more attention for relatively neglected areas such as agriculture145. As a matter of fact, Nye sustains that:

‘International development is also an important global public good.

Nonetheless, American foreign aid was .1 percent of GDP, […]',


145 ‘It is painfully obvious to Congress, the administration, foreign aid experts, and NGOs alike, that our foreign assistance program is fragmented and broken and in critical need of overhaul. I strongly believe that America’s foreign assistance program is not in need of some minor change, but, rather, it needs to be reinvented and retooled in order to respond to the significant challenges our country and the world face in the 21st century’. Quotation from Berman, H 2008 ‘Opening Remarks by Chairman Howard Berman’, in Foreign Assistance Reform in the New Administration: Challenges and Solutions, US House Foreign Affairs Committee, 110th Cong., April 23, 2008, available at: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/pres_display.asp?id=507, last accessed on 30.03.2009.
and protectionist trade measures, particularly in agriculture and textiles, hurt poor countries more than the value of the aid provided. [...] Despite the Bush administration’s efforts, the United States has a distance to go to gain soft-power resources in the development area.\textsuperscript{146}

**US POLICIES IN ADVANCING DEMOCRATISATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA**

Democracy is ‘a core American value [...] Democracy promotion also enable[s] the United States to present its best face to the world as an example of American ‘soft power’.\textsuperscript{147}

As the Bush administration entered in office, Africa was seen as the least democratised region in the world except the Middle East, despite the ‘Third Wave’ having hit Africa at the beginning of the 1990s: two-thirds of SSA’s 48 countries were either facing a stalled transition from authoritarian to democratic rule or the transition itself had remained incomplete.\textsuperscript{148} The US, through the USAID, increasingly promoted democracy in SSA, by building capacities in the fields of good governance, rule of law, electoral and political processes and civil society. In this sense, USAID spent some $274.4 million in 2008, as compared to $89.2 million in 2001.\textsuperscript{149} In 2007, of the 24 countries where USAID had democratisations program, some 60 percent of the total figure was invested on only five countries – Sudan: $55.6 million; Liberia: $22.2 million; Sierra Leone: $15.3 million; DRC: $14.6 million; Somalia: $9.0 million – living so the remaining 19 countries with an average of $3.9 million.\textsuperscript{150} The Bush administration’s democracy promotion did book a few


\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., pp.9.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., pp.11-2.
successes in Africa, and not just the innovative initiative of MCC discussed on the section above, but also i.e. the public diplomacy engagement of the then Secretary of State Colin Powell in urging serving African presidents to respect constitutional provisions that limited their time in office to two elected terms. During the Bush administration’s second term though, these efforts declined sharply. So when the presidents of Nigeria, Mr. Obasanjo and that of Uganda, Mr. Museveni, declared that they would extend their terms and amend their respective constitutions accordingly, the US instructed its ambassadors to ease up with their initial stance. Here again the US appeared to hold a double standard: yes to democratic principles, but when the US interests are in play then an eye can be closed, or both\footnote{Obasanjo’s quest for a third term was eventually blocked by the Nigerian National Assembly. Museveni, on the other side succeeded and it seems wants to candidate for a fourth term. The US stance can be understood in terms of its energy interests given Nigeria’s prominence as a major oil supplier, and in case of Museveni by Uganda’s support for i.e. the US counterterrorist initiatives.}. These, though, stand in stark contrast with the US democracy promotion in DRC and Liberia both in 2006, or during the last Kenyan elections, when President Bush dispatched the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Nairobi to move the negotiations forward.

Bush administration’s democracy promotion is best understood within the context of the administration’s overall foreign policy. The neoconservative thought, as analysed on the above section of power conceptions, took the upper hand within the Bush administration, especially during the first term. They had proposed a foreign policy agenda which claimed as necessary regime change, preemtive action, benevolent hegemony, unipolarity and American exceptionalism. Because ‘[d]emocracy is [seen as] desirable because democracies do not breed those who engage in terrorist acts against the United States’\footnote{For more information about the views of President Bush on democracy and democracy promotion see: ‘George W. Bush Speech at the National Endowment for Democracy, October 6, 2005’, available at: http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.06.05.html, last accessed on: 30.03.2009; ‘President Bush Discusses Democracy with Freedom House, March 29, 2006’, available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=349, last accessed on 30.03.2009.} the instrument of democracy promotion was used to advance short term goals, such as the Global War On Terror (GWOT). In general, the stance endorsed by the Bush administration resulted in an ‘increasing [global] disapproval of the cornerstones of US foreign policy’\footnote{The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2007 ‘Global Unease with Major World Powers’, p.1.}. The Bush administration’s
preference for regime change to direct negotiations with loathed countries and leaders, took for many in the world a very different meaning. The leaders of democratic movements across Africa met the administration’s approach to democracy promotion with caution and at times with distrust. The war in Iraq, the images and US practices in handling prisoners especially those in Guantanamo and Abu Graib, the US pressures to African states to either not ratify the International Criminal Court or to pass laws that exempted US forces from prosecution, as well as the refusal of the Kyoto Protocol, further strengthened this suspicion. Such practices and double standards have accounted for a heavily undermined US claim to the moral high ground. Consequently, in these terms, the image of US and its soft power withered.

US RECORD ON ENVIRONMENTAL, FOOD SECURITY AND DEMOGRAPHICAL POLICIES IN AFRICA

Environmental conservation projects enjoyed significant support by the Bush administration. Thus, the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CFBP), launched in 2002 was supported with approximately $15 million yearly. Another positive note comes from the support that the US administration gave to the multilateral sanctions on Liberia’s timber exports, which contributed to give a halt to unsustainable logging and the funding it provided to Charles Taylor’s regime. These efforts stand in stark contrast with the initial reluctance of the Bush administration to acknowledge the phenomenon of global climate change. As mentioned above, the refusal of the Kyoto Protocol, from a country like the US, who is responsible for the most greenhouse gas

emission in the world, and ‘the way Bush’s policy toward it was handled resulted in foreign reactions that undermined American soft power’\textsuperscript{158}. The other point which accounted for further loss of soft power was the fact that the US failed to provide ‘superior alternatives’ in the light of these rejections\textsuperscript{159}. This stance was mirrored through the environmental policies pursued by the US administration. For instance, their funding has been at best modest, and with time it declined. USAID’s Global Climate Change Program which aims at tackling issues of natural resource management, clean energy and climate change adaptation in Malawi, South Africa, Madagascar, Uganda, Mali, Senegal and Guinea as well as regional programmes in Central and West Africa, was covered by a volume of only $27.4 million during the FY2007\textsuperscript{160}.

Concerning the US policies, which aim at addressing the demographics in Africa, the track record is also at best mixed. Funding in FY2007 for family planning projects declined steeply, for instance a staggering 18 percent from $436 million during the FY2006 to $357 million\textsuperscript{161}, in a time when experts argued for a constant increase aiming at reaching $1.2 billion by FY2010 and when currently there are over 44 million women with unmet needs in SSA\textsuperscript{162}. In line with the best neoconservative thinking regarding scepticism towards multilateral and/or international organisations, the US administration withheld funding from the UN’s specialised agency for population matters –UNFPA. The administration felt that girls and the young in general were being engaged through the other initiatives, such as PEPFAR, which actually, as analysed above, focus rather narrowly on HIV/AIDS but not on family planning.


\textsuperscript{159} CSIS, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America’, p.20.


Food security is also another new African challenge, where the US involvement has been lagging behind. Funding declined by 3 percent over the course of the administration’s first term, and the US Government Accountability office (US GAO) sustained that the situation did not improve during the second term\textsuperscript{163}. Thus, the President’s Initiative to End Hunger in Africa, launched in 2002, seemed to have been more of a new name to the ongoing efforts, and ‘merely an organising scheme for existing efforts involving about $200 million a year’\textsuperscript{164}. The MCC, as discussed above, was more successful, with one of its six focuses concerning agricultural development. Thus in 2007, some 39 percent of the $605 million pledged was earmarked for agriculture projects\textsuperscript{165}.

\textbf{US’ STANCE ON CHINA INTO AFRICA}

‘America has reason to welcome the rise of a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China. We want China as a global partner, able and willing to match its growing capabilities to its international responsibilities’\textsuperscript{166}.

The US began to develop a framework within which to engage China as late as mid 2005, despite the fact that China has been active with its Africa strategy through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) since early 2000s\textsuperscript{167}. The first signal of such strategic dialogue was given by the then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick who, at a hearing of the National Committee on US-China Relations in September 2005, stated that:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} Quoted in Gavin, D, M 2009 ‘Africa’s Looming Mega-Challenges’, p.191.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{167} For a detailed information about FOCAC’s activities, archive and current China-Africa Policy see: http://www.focac.org/eng/, last accessed on 30.03.2009.
\end{itemize}
‘China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success [and therefore called on China] to become a responsible stakeholder [in the international system]’ 168.

At a Congressional hearing, the then Deputy Assistance Secretary of State for African Affairs, Michael Ranneberger, pointed out that China’s increasing presence in Africa should be seen as a potential for cooperation ‘as part of a broader, constructive bilateral relationship’169. Issues of concern, that US need to tackle, he followed, was ensuring that such engagement promotes free and open market; that respective political and economic policies promote stability, democracy, good governance, economic prosperity and human rights; foster conflict resolution; as well as to identify areas where interests converge, but also ensure that the US remains the key partner to African countries and institutions170.

Chinese and US officials, alike, especially those in respective foreign affairs ministries, have been diplomatic, arguably as one might expect from diplomats, in trying not to present China’s engagement as being ‘in direct competition to the United States’171, though perception within the broader public continued to see potential for friction as well as threat to the US interests in Africa172. Such perceptions were furthered especially by the statement of the US Treasury Department. For instance, during the 2006 China visit, the then Treasury Secretary urged China to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’, referring so to the US concerns about China’s lending practices in Africa. During all the Bush administration’s period such perceptions persisted. In his last Africa visit in February 2008, President Bush stated


170 Ibid.


172 Ibid.
that he did not ‘view Africa as zero sum for China and the United States’ in answering whether China’s huge aid and commerce agenda was ‘ignoring human rights issues and corruption’\textsuperscript{173}. For all the good-willing words, deliverance of results in practice has lagged behind. One of the reasons for it was that the administration was slow in recognising the enormous impact China has been having on the African continent since the early 2000s. Once recognising it, though, the DoS officials continued to insist treating China as any other country with interests in Africa.

‘[The US] administration was late in recognising the exceptional scope and impact of [China’s engagement in Africa]. It was then tardy in realising that this engagement warranted a US policy approach different from that toward other significant external actors in Africa’\textsuperscript{174}.

A further reason for lagging behind was the lack of tangible results from the few projects in cooperation with China\textsuperscript{175}.

While it might be true that China does not pose a strategic threat to the US in Africa, it, though, poses serious challenges for political and commercial influence\textsuperscript{176}. Thus, in analysing such in terms of soft/smart power, the US soft power potential in engaging in multilateral dialogue is given, but nevertheless it needs to accompany words with deeds.

\begin{itemize}

\item[\textsuperscript{174}]Ibid., p146.


\end{itemize}
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S/US 21ST CENTURY AGENDA IN AFRICA

During the Bush Administration’s term, the US agenda into Africa received a remarkable makeover, where security, energy and health took the lion’s part of it. PEPFAR and MCC are nowadays seen as the best legacy of the Bush years and an example of US soft power in Africa. For all the good wording, though, the US agenda had its limitations:

‘[Despite attracting] consistently strong bipartisan support, it was also criticised for imbalanced, un-sustained, underpowered, and inconsistent approaches’177.

Although, US assistance to Africa almost trebled, paradoxically, its influence wavered on the continent. Such, not just because of the above-mentioned ‘significant weaknesses’ of US policies, but also due to the rising of Africa as a more confident actor politically and economically. As a result of the high commodity prices and revenue flows, Africa is nowadays in a better position to choose among the many partners who court it actively, such as the EU, China, India, Brazil, etc. The undermined US diplomatic skills and leadership did further exacerbate the situation. The US security and energy engagement in Africa, sought to satisfy only the American interests, and engagement with China has been inexistente. Counter-terrorism programmes were narrowly defined, HIV/AIDS commitment gave the impression of crowding out other public health problems and commitment to basic development needs and democracy promotion remained quite unchanged at previous levels. The same can be said about the US engagement with Sudan, which left little space for engagement with other problem countries, such as Somalia or DRC. US trade and investment in Africa have lagged behind, if compared to the engagement of other actors in the continent, such as EU and China.

In a 2007 article in *Foreign Affairs*, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, notes that the mistake of the Bush administration lies at ‘a profound misunderstanding of the relationship between strategy, power, and diplomacy’. The Bush administration failed to make use of, what he calls ‘smart statecraft’, a pulling together of ‘wits, wallet, and muscle to create realistic policies’. The smartness of it all relies in setting ‘them in motion through agile diplomacy’, and clearly, the Bush administration failed to bring that about in Africa.

---

178 Crocker, C, A 2007 ‘The Art of Peace: Bringing Diplomacy Back to Washington’, in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 86, Issue No. 4. Statecraft is dealt in greater detail at: Ross, D 2007 ‘Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World’, Farar, Straus and Giraux, NY. In defining smart statecraft he sustains that ‘[s]mart statecraft does not dispense with hard power; it uses hard power intelligently, recognizing both its potential and its limits and integrating it into an overarching strategy. [...] Diplomacy, contrary to the current misconception, is not about making nice, exchanging happy talk, and offering concessions. It is the engine that converts raw energy and tangible power into meaningful political results. In other words, diplomacy is all about the intelligent use of power. Diplomacy is not an alternative to coercion and other forms of power; its effectiveness depends on their skilful use’.

124
CHAPTER 6
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AFRICA

AT THE SEARCH OF AN EU-AFRICA STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

‘Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this’¹.

Up to 2000 the EU policies towards Africa were fragmented and did not reach the continent as a whole. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), the most prominent in a series of EU’s trade and development concerned frameworks, does not cover all African countries and it is a selective and in as such in opposition with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules requiring the elimination of preferential practices² as set up within it for the African, Caribbean and the Pacific states (ACP)³. The other framework that the EU had, the Barcelona Process, was also selective in as such it concerned, in regard to Africa, only the North African countries⁴.


³ More information can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro_en.cfm, last accessed on 01.03.2010.

⁴ For more see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm, last accessed on 01.03.2010.

125
It was not until 3-4 April 2000 that the EU moved forward towards a tentative comprehensive framework with Africa, just a couple of months before the world leaders adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration committing for the MDGs. At the dawn of the new millennium, the EU first considered in her policies Africa as a whole⁵. This happened under the form of a summit between the heads of State and Government of African and EU countries as well as the president of the European Commission. The summit was also attended by the Secretary General of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), the Secretary General of the European Council / HR CFSP as well as a representative of the UN Secretary General.

Since then EU’s Africa policy has changed fundamentally. It does not only cover the development agenda, as it has been the case since its earliest moves, but it increasingly covers human rights, good governance issues, and the promotion of democracy. An exemple par excellence is provided through the Cotonou Agreement that considered these issues as ‘essential elements’ upon which the partnership shall evolve. Another characterising factor moves within the realm of security issues: peace and security became peremptory, as conflicts became endemic within the continent and cost the lives of hundreds of thousands. This pointed at the necessity and opened the road for a greater African ownership in terms of capacity, be they institutional, structural, military or civilian nature. In short EU’s policy has become more and more political, assuring so that Africa climbs up to and enters the level of high politics.

The historicity of the Cairo summit lays not just in being the first ever in its form, but mainly because of the erection of a platform for a structural political dialogue between the actors concerned in the form of regular meetings between senior officials (bi-regional groups) and ministers. The aim of the dialogue was to build a strategic partnership with the whole continent based on shared objectives and common values⁶.

---


The Cairo Declaration, as the summit’s outcome document, highlights six main general areas of concern, which include economic issues such as regional economic cooperation and integration in Africa, the African integration into the world economy, a deeper link between trade and development issues, human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance issues, peace building and conflict prevention matters as well as management and resolution, and development measures aimed at combating poverty such as health, education, environment, food security, drug consumption and trafficking as well as culture matters about stolen or inappropriately exported cultural goods from Africa to European countries.\(^7\)

The plan of action adopted at the summit\(^8\), highlighted the six main areas described above. Finding them as too broad, eight more specific areas of cooperation were picked: conflict prevention and resolution (including the problem of anti-personnel landmines); regional cooperation and integration, integrating Africa into the world economy and trade; the environment, including the fight against drought and desertification; HIV/AIDS and communicable diseases; food security; human rights and democracy; the return of cultural items that have been stolen or exported illegally; and Africa's external debt. The last issue was linked with the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries / HIPC, an international debt relief mechanism which has an effect on mainly African countries\(^9\). This continental dialogue exposed as well some differences, among the prominent ones most notably the preference of identified priorities that the one part had as compared to the other: EU did put peace and security as the main concern while the African side was more interested about trade, economic and debt matters.

Despite the first steps undertaken through the Cairo Process towards a comprehensive EU Africa policy, there was still a wealth of sectoral and fragmented

---

\(^7\) For more information see: SN 106/4/00 REV 4, Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000 ‘Cairo Declaration’, available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/afreurdecl00.pdf, last accessed 17.11.2009

\(^8\) For more see: Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000 ‘Cairo Plan of Action’, available at: http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/afreurplan00.pdf, last accessed 17.11.2009

policies. Apart from the ACP Agreement, the Barcelona Process and the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership which have been mentioned above there was the Trade
Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa (2004) which later in
2006 evolved into Strategic Partnership with South Africa\textsuperscript{10} as well as the 2006 EC
proposal of a partnership with the Horn of Africa. The challenges to coordination for
a more efficient and effective action, asserted the need for a new and comprehensive
single approach, which evolved under the form of the ‘EU Strategy for Africa’
(ESA). It expressed the guidelines, objectives and principles for a new partnership
with Africa\textsuperscript{11}. This constituted the first

‘political strategy document since the development cooperation
between Europe and Africa [which] had been launched with the
Treaties of Rome nearly 50 years earlier’\textsuperscript{12}.

The strategy rested upon the principles of equality, partnership and ownership,
solidarity, and upon a culture of the political dialogue. The main objectives of this
EU Strategy were the provision of a single framework for all EU actors and the
development of Africa, namely the attainment of the MDGs as one of the EU’s main
political priorities. Peace and security, good governance principles, regional
integration and trade together with sustainable economic development as well as
distinctive issues that have a direct impact on the MDGs (such as health, education,
environment, social cohesion etc.) were seen as prerequisites to a sustainable
accomplishment of MDGs.

For all the good wording, the new strategy was faced with challenges and criticism.
By starting with the critiques, one main issue, which actually was also the greatest
problem, was that the African partners saw themselves excluded from it, since they


perceived it as a strategy FOR rather than a strategy WITH Africa. On the other hand, the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) criticized that the strategy not only did not provide for a clear role for CSOs, but also found that in fostering good governance, instead of using the ‘political conditionality’ as it has been usual with all other policies concerning third countries, the EU seemed to have traded it for incentives, i.e. it overtly relied on the African Peace and Review Mechanisms (APRM). The problem is seen in the fact that ‘very few African countries have the moral authority to indulge a meaningful peer review process’ and consequently the principle of ‘despots watching themselves’ would not work in practice\(^\text{13}\).

Another point of contention was seen on the strategy’s absence of an ‘added value’ as compared to i.e. the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). The strategy is seen as rather a summary of already existing policies and measures, lacking ‘any clear sequencing or priorities in the wide spectrum of anticipated measures’\(^\text{14}\) and also by some as a ‘clever move’ on the part of the Directorate General for Development, so as to ensure control over new mechanisms such as the ‘heavy weight’ Peace Facility\(^\text{15}\). Apart from these external critiques, the Strategy faced challenges which were raised up from within the EU itself. Although the strategy is seen as an attempt to attain greater coherence in the policy of the whole EU towards Africa, by so ‘reducing conflicts about goals at the level of policy formulation as well as aiming at diminishing coordination conflicts within the EU’\(^\text{16}\), it nevertheless cannot eliminate the EU’s ‘institutional weaknesses’. The organisation of the EU institution does not


mirror with this policy framework, in as much there is a fragmentation of authority within Commission’s Directorates General and between Commission itself and the Council as well as between the Commission’s development policy and those of the EU member states. For instance there is a division of responsibilities for external relations within the Commission, not only in terms of policy areas but also geographically seen: North Africa falls under the responsibility of DG RELEX whereas EU development policy towards sub-Saharan African countries was accountable to DG DEV Commissioner Louis Michel. These two DGs conflicted as well with the responsibilities of the High Representative of the CFSP, who has the overall responsibility for the EU’s CFSP. Another controversial issue is provided through the financing instruments. ESA did not have an own financial instrument thus it had to rely on the existing ones, such as the European Development Fund (EDF), European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), etc. Since there are many in number they create an additional matter which requires coordination.

In sum, the European Union’s Africa strategy of 2005 was an important step on the way, but it did not pursue a holistic approach and ‘offered little guidance for the day-to-day relations’. In any way, for being rather a political statement than a strategy, it initiated important EU activities in Africa.

The Lisbon Summit, the second between the Europe and Africa, marked a real turning point in the EU-Africa relationship. Its agenda, as presented within the Action Plan of the Joint Africa European Strategic (JAES) Partnership, has been characterized by far-flung objectives as well as an all-embracing list of measures for future activities. JAES has to be understood as the product of a process, which had its highs and lows. The controversy about the attending of President Mugabe constituted one of the lows. One of the first highs was signalled at the 5th Ministerial Meeting EU-Africa in Bamako (December 2005)17 where an initial agreement over a joint EU Africa Strategy was accorded. Concluding arrangements were made at the 8th Ministerial-Troika EU-Africa, from where the final document was then agreed at the

second Lisbon summit in December 2007\textsuperscript{18}. The Joint Strategy, testifies its civilian/normative ‘distinct nature’ by being based on common values and principles such as the unity of Africa, interdependence between Africa and the EU, ownership, joint responsibility, equal partnership, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, as well as the right to development. The JAES as a long-term framework for the EU-Africa relationships shall find its implementation through successive short-term Action Plans accompanied by a political dialogue at all levels. Both parties agree to enhance the coherence and the efficiency of previously agreed accords, policies and instruments\textsuperscript{19}. The novel strategy has brought new political approaches as well, which consist in handling all political questions of mutual interests, not just the development matters or the so called ‘African’ issues. It has to be understood as a people-centred strategy which aims at supporting civil society in both the continents but also supporting Africa in finding its own regional and continental solutions. This \textit{mode d’emploi} would guarantee so for measurable results in all eight defined partnerships\textsuperscript{20}.

The objectives of the strategy are to offer ‘a political vision and a roadmap for the future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and arenas’\textsuperscript{21}. It aims at a continent-to-continent partnership with the AU and the EU at the centre of it, giving so prominence to the institutional cooperation in mastering joint challenges such as peace and security, migration, sustainable development, regional and continental integration, as well environmental issues and the attainment of MDGs in all Africa by 2015. Another main pillar of the partnership is the support for an effective multilateral system, and therefore the need for a reformed UN. Overall the strategy seeks a broad-based, wide-ranging and people-centred


\textsuperscript{20} The eight partnerships are as follows: Peace and Security; Democratic Governance and Human Rights; Trade, regional Integration and Infrastructure; MDGs; Energy; Climate Change; Migration, Mobility and Employment; and Science, Information Society and Space. For a detailed information see: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/, last accessed on 11.10.2009.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
partnership, in short a holistic approach. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy is financed through multiple sources. Concerned instruments are such as the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), and the Instrument for Stability (IfS) as well as the various thematic Programmes. An instrument which is alone responsible for the financing of JAESP is still missing consequently, the problems in ensuring a coherent and efficient financing still persist.

Speaking in terms of civilian/normative concepts, the participation of the main multilateral international organisations concerned in Africa through their respective high representatives in the form of a forum, as well as its proceeding under given specific values, principles and norms, witness the ‘distinctive nature’ of EU activities be it in civilian terms –‘cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives, and a willingness to develop supranational structures’ as well as EU’s ‘distinct nature’ in normative terms –‘her unique institutional set-up and multi-level governance system which make the EU ‘particularly well equipped to grasp and utilise the potential of multilateral network organisations’.

---

Prior to analysing the EU engagement in Africa since the early 2000s, it is envisioned, as already attested within the US counterpart chapter of this paper, to put a greater focus on the different patterns and nuances that power takes, as expressed by its different appellatives, and as it is attested to and/or executed by the European Union in order to bring about her foreign policy in the world. The focus will, 

22 Ibid.


25 The author is aware that, as pertaining to the power tools that the EU and/or US is attested to and/or uses in executing their respective foreign policies, –from civilian and normative, to hard, soft, or smart,– no clear cut can be made, the distinguishing line has, especially lately, become very vague, since both actors may make use of tools which may belong to the type of power indicated here as predominantly performed by the other actor. Therefore, the aim of this paper is not seen as an all comprehensive analysis of the US and EU types of power,
obviously, be on civilian and normative power, which in their turn will provide this author with valuable conceptions to be applied and thus, evaluate on these grounds, the concerned EU policies in Africa.

OF EU’S CIVILIAN AND NORMATIVE POWER

‘The EU is not an island, it’s a part of a global community. For large parts of the world, the word Europe itself has become associated with a philosophy of humanity, solidarity and integration. Therefore the EU has to play a bigger role to work for the ‘global common good’’. Havier Solana EU HR CFSP, 2005

At the beginning of the 21st century the European Council posed the question of ‘What is Europe’s role in this changed world?’ Since then, the Europe’s global role, within the academia and the decision-makers alike, has increasingly turned into a topic of great recurrence. Indeed, it became imperative because of September 11 and new international challenges, such as security, climate change and energy dependency, rising of new economic powers and globalisation, but also lasting problems of poverty and epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS, and their soaring toll in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The literature focusing on the EU as an international actor has predominantly been focused on the ‘nature of the

rather it focuses itself at the respective foreign policies and the power discourse it has accompanied them since the early 2000s, when both actors decided ground breaking policies towards Africa.


beast’. Some see the EU as a potential and/or future state, which already performs state-pertinent functions. Others see it as an aggregated actor, ‘something more than a system of regular diplomatic coordination between the member states’. Some other still, see it for what it actually does and what it actually is, and focus on issue areas by working with concepts such as ‘presence’ and ‘capabilities’ 28. Thus, the EU continues to remain an ‘unidentified international object’ 29, a unique, ‘sui generis’ actor in international politics.

‘The fact that the Union is at the same time an actor, a process and a project makes it behave differently in comparison to traditional actors in world politics’ 30.

Duchêne in the early 1970s conceptualised the Union –then EC– as a new kind of civilian power/actor 31. Others think that, if the Union ought to become a power, then it has to develop a full-spectrum military capability 32. The sustainers of EU as civilian power/actor have developed a thesis which maintains that the Union, inasmuch uniquely capable and/or uniquely configured, constitutes an effective exporter of norms and values in the international system 33. The following conceptualisations are a product of such thinking 34.

---

28 For a detailed analysis see previous chapter, section 2.2.

29 Quotation from Jacques Delors.


Duchêne’s original idea, had a second renaissance in late years, and became ‘one of the main conceptual anchors for debate over the sources of EU influence in the world’. The debate was bifurcated among those who sustained that civilian meant not necessary an exclusion in the use of military means, rather a preference of political and economic ones, and those who argued that a civilian power ought to use only civilian means. EU as a civilian power, though, is defined not just by the means but also by way it uses such means and the ends it internationally pursues. Duchêne argues that the EC ought to remain ‘true to its inner characteristics […] values of equality, justice and tolerance’.

Hanns Maull defines as well that being a civilian power implies acceptance of the necessity for cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives, a preference for civilian means, and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address pressing international issues. He also stresses the necessity for the development of a set of values encompassing ‘solidarity with other societies, and a

---


38 It has to be said that there it seem to be a confusion over where to draw a line between civilian and military means. K.Smith, who prefers a rather rigid definition of civilian power, points out that i.e. peacekeeping are frequently considered to be a ‘civilian foreign policy instrument’, but since peacekeepers, armed or not armed, remain troops who are trained to eventually kill, then, the civilian attribute falls down. For more see: Smith, K 2005 ‘Still Civilian Power EU?’, in LSE European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2005-1; Smith, K 2000 ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern’, in International Spectator, Volume 35, Issue 2; Smith, K 2005 ‘Beyond the Civilian Power EU Debate’, in Politique Europeenne, Volume 1, No. 17.

sense of responsibility for the future of the world.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, a civilian power seeks international cooperation, domestication of international relations\textsuperscript{41} through the strengthening of the rule of law in international relations, solidarity, and the diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance. In this sense, many of EU’s objectives/ends are, it is argued, ‘milieu goals’, rather than ‘possession goals’\textsuperscript{42}.

‘[... Possession goals] are apt to be praised by some for being truly in the national interest, while condemned by others as indicating a reprehensible spirit of national selfishness and acquisitiveness [...] Milieu goals [aim not] to defend or increase possession [...] to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond [...] national boundaries’.\textsuperscript{43}

Concerning the way a civilian power uses its means Christopher Hill sees four different approaches: the first approach concerns using the sticks, the second its threat, the third involves the use of the carrots and the fourth concerns latent

\textsuperscript{40} Maull, H, 1990 ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Volume 69, Issue No. 5, pp.92-3. Maull’s definition of civilian power, although it refers specifically to Germany and Japan, has been regularly used with reference to the EU.

\textsuperscript{41} A recent evolution of Duchêne’s domestication of foreign affairs is Habermas’s idea of Weltinnenpolitik –domestic politics of the world, which sees the civilian power EU as better equipped than others to assume the responsibility of best executing Weltinnenpolitik. For more see: Habermas, J 1998 ‘Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie’, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Weltinnenpolitik –domestic politics of the world as the disappearance of barriers between internal and international politics make any political decision-maker before all those affected by their decisions, despite a formal belonging to a political community. Cited in Lucarelli, S 2006 ‘Introduction: Values, Principles, Identity, and European Union Foreign Policy’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon, pp.5-6. See also: Bonanate, L 2001 ‘La politica interna del mondo’, in \textit{Teoria Politica}, Fascicolo 1, available at: http://www.francoangeli.it/Riviste/Scheda_Riviste.asp?IDarticolo=15687, last accessed on 30.03.2009.


influence. Hill argues that, ‘civilian models’ (such as EU) rely on persuasion and negotiation in dealing with third parties, encouraging so regional cooperation with and within other parts of the world, supporting global and regional institution-building, and by relying on multilateralism to resolve conflicts rather than on unilateral measures. Karen Smith, though, points out that the predilection of a civilian power for persuasion and negotiation does not hinder it to use its civilian means quite coercively. In this sense, EU’s conditionality clauses (i.e. Art.96 of Cotonou Agreement), would point at the EU as a non ‘ideal type’ civilian power. Some scholars and most decision-makers, sustain that the EU remains a civilian power, even when it uses non civilian means, such as military instruments, or conditionality clauses – what most counts, they sustain, are the pursued civilian ends.

‘[D]eveloping and strengthening the military instrument is not sufficient to validate or invalidate the notion of civilian power Europe.’

Such definition, though, implies that any actor by using civilian instruments can be attributed as a civilian power. It is further argued that such militarisation would weaken EU’s distinct civilian international identity, for it ‘would represent the culmination of a ‘state building project’ and ‘integration would [so] recreate the state on a grander scale’. Such conceptualisation is found by Ian Manners as one of the problems with the notions of civilian vs. military power, namely, ‘their unhealthy

46 This is sustained by Maull’s definition, presented above, by which civilian powers concentrate on non-civilian means but retain military power to safeguard other means of international interaction.
concentration on how much like a state the EU looks. A second problem is also
the use of civil, civilian, civilianise, civilianising, civilise, civilisation, and
civilising as if they were interchangeable and exactly this ‘makes their use highly
problematic’. ‘Civilising’ is a far too laden term from the historical European
relations with the rest of the world and ‘civilisation’ is also a term considered as too
Eurocentric, which it implies that ‘Europe can congratulate [so] itself for progress’.

Manners has advanced that the notion of Normative Power Europe better describes
the EU, for it heads off of the civilian/military dichotomy, and focuses on the
‘ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role’, shaping so conceptions
of ‘normal’ in international relations. The nature of a particular actor—the EU—is
given by whether and how it constructs itself as an international actor and whether
and how the surrounding world it constructs the entity—the EU—as an actor, i.e.
through the expectations they raise. In this sense, roles are determined both by an
actor’s own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role
prescriptions, of other actors. Actors follow so the ‘logic of appropriateness’, by
which it is to be understood that they behave in a way they believe it is expected
from them. From these dynamic interactions ‘it is formed a complex mixture of
geographical, power-politics, historical and socio-economic characteristics, shared
ideas and norms as well as system structures’. In this sense, ‘the European model is

50 Manners, I 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, in *Journal of
51 Manners, I 2006 ‘’, p.184.
53 Ibid., p.238.
54 Ibid., p.239.
55 Harnisch, S, Maull, H, W 2001 ‘Conclusion: Learned its lesson well? Germany as a Civilian
Power ten years after unification’, in Harnisch, S, Maull, H, W (eds.) 2001 *‘Germany as a
Civilian Power? The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic’*, Manchester University Press,
Manchester, pp.129-130
56 For more see: Allison, G, Zelikow P 1999 *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Organisational Basis of Politics*, Free Press, NY.
57 Tewes, H 2002 ‘Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe. Enlarging NATO and the
spoken of as part of a European understanding of self, history, principles, and politics. It is so argued that these normative ambitions have their source from, firstly, an explicit rejection of the divisive nationalisms, imperialism and war of Europe’s past, secondly, its unique character as a 'hybrid polity’, and thirdly, the development, over the past 50 years, of a body of values which are firmly embedded in successive Treaties and in the Union’s practices. It is further argued that within the *acquis communautaire* and the *acquis politique* there can be identified five core values –(sustainable) peace, (social) liberty, (consensual) democracy, (supranational) rule of law and (associative) human rights–, and four subsidiary values –(inclusive) equality, (social) solidarity, (sustainable) development, and (good) governance.

The normative ambitions of the EU are best exemplified by the inclusion of normative conditions in most of its international agreements, which in their turn demonstrate EU’s conscious efforts to shape her environment:

‘The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organizations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.’

---


61 Treaty of Lisbon, Art.21 TEU
EU’s identity is thus based upon the difference from and superiority over other global actor, most notably the USA, which is claimed to be more focused on threats to its security. As it has already been mentioned the EU’s foreign policy is a principled one, aimed ‘to play a stabilising role worldwide’ inspired by an ‘ethics of responsibility’ towards others:

‘[...] Europe is not weak, but rather it has developed a new type of power that starts not with geopolitics but domestic politics. When the US talks to other countries, it is about the war on terror, Iraq or the ICC. Europeans start from the other end of the spectrum: what values underpin the state? What are its constitutional and regulatory frameworks?’

Increasingly, certain circles within the academia as well as pundits and decision-makers alike, are keen to see in the EU an international actor with a ‘principled behaviour’ within the international arena. They argue that the best way to understand the foundations of the EU actorness is by looking at the concept of identity, rather than deliberating on the Union’s interests. This inclination seems to

---


be attributable to the very patterns the EU creates upon delivering her foreign policy actions\textsuperscript{66}.

‘The VIPs [values, images, principles] present in the Union’s international conduct, are not simply idealistic symbolism in the pursuit of EU material gains, but they are the defining elements of a polity which is constructed differently to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference predisposes it to act in a [different] way’\textsuperscript{67}

Excellent examples, which highlight the Union’s commitment to project its values externally, are the international negotiations on climate change in Kyoto 1997, Bonn 2001, Johannesburg 2002\textsuperscript{68} (less successful Copenhagen 2009); Doha Summit of the WTO (although, less successful on certain issues i.e. labour standards)\textsuperscript{69}; her role in the creation of an International Criminal Court\textsuperscript{70}, her opposition to the death penalty (shaming the ‘super-executioners’ USA and China, and strongly influencing decisions of abolishment in many other countries)\textsuperscript{71}. EU activities suggest that:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Manners, 2006 cited in Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, London, p.15.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Backer, S 2006 ‘Environmental Values and Climate Change Policy’, in Lucarelli, S, Manners I (eds.) 2006 ‘Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon
\item \textsuperscript{71} Manners, I 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, pp.249-250.
\end{itemize}
‘[...] not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is build upon the crucial and usually overlooked observation that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is.\textsuperscript{72}

Concluding, there seem to be a vast number of terms used to describe the EU’s power/role in the international system. Apart from the two analysed above – which are also the two most established terms in defining the EU – there can be found terms such as a ‘superpower’, ‘quite superpower’, ‘strange superpower’ ‘post modern power’, ‘ambiguous power’, ‘gentle power’, ‘a silent global player’, ‘transformative power’, and even ‘metrosexual power’. In this run for providing with the EU’s eventual permanent conceptual categorisation, Karen Smith offers, arguably, the most conciliating one:

‘[T]he broad conclusion is that none of the categories really fits the EU well enough to justify an uncritical use of them (and in fact, all might fit some aspects of its behaviour – just like individuals, the EU can have ‘multiple identities’).\textsuperscript{74}

The following section will concentrate itself on analyzing the most relevant, recent EU policies in Africa, by focusing on a civilian/normative power discourse.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, p.251.


Consequently, this approach will lend on the academic deliberations about the
civilian and normative characteristics of EU’s foreign policy which in their turn will
provide this author with valuable conceptions to be applied and thus, evaluate on
these grounds, the concerned EU policies in Africa.

**THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES IN AFRICA**

‘Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by geography,
and by a shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous
future for all their peoples’

Europe has a longstanding relationship with Africa, which is deeply rooted in history
and has progressively advanced from a colonial heritage into a strong and equal
partnership based on common interests, shared recognition and accountability. The
two continents are closely linked with each other in crucial sectors. An excellent
example of, i.e. strong trade links, is provided by the fact that the EU constitutes the
largest export market for African products. For instance, Africa exports some 85
percent of selected agricultural products to Europe. Another prove which attests this
special relationship, is the substantial and predictable aid flow, i.e. in 2005 the EU
institutions only provided Africa with some €15 billion with development aid, while
if one takes into account the contributions from the member states as well, then
Africa received in i.e. 2008 €50 billion. The EU has consistently been by far the
biggest donor in Africa, constituting some 60 percent of the total ODA going to
Africa. Along member states who have a long standing political, economic and
cultural relations with many African countries and regions, the EU institutions,
especially the European Commission ‘has build up extensive experience and
concluded a number of contractual arrangements with different parts of Africa’

---

75 Council of the European Union, 2005 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards A Strategic Partnership’,
73.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009.

76 Council of the European Union, 2005 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards A Strategic Partnership’,
73.pdf, last accessed on 30.03.2009.

77 Commission of the European Communities, 2007 ‘Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: From Cairo to Lisbon –The EU-Africa Strategic
The experience gained and the agreements consented provide for a predictable and secure foundation upon which to further the intercontinental relationship. On the other side, the EU has acknowledged and at the same time welcomed the changes the African continent chose and went through, especially since the beginning of the 21st century. ‘Africa is now at the heart of international politics, but what is genuinely new is that Africa – and the African Union (AU) in particular – is emerging, not as a development issue, but as a political actor in its own right’\textsuperscript{78}. Indeed, Africa has increasingly become a political, economic, and cultural actor within the international arena, an actor that the world cannot any further afford to condescend.

The following will concern the EU’s agenda in Africa and will concentrate at the peace and security; promotion of democratic governance; MDGs; energy and climate change and migration policies, as well as EU’s stance on China into Africa, for ending with some concluding remarks about the EU into Africa in the 21st century.

\textbf{THE EU’S PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA IN AFRICA}\textsuperscript{79}  

‘Without peace there can be no lasting development. Without African leadership to end African conflicts there can be no lasting peace’\textsuperscript{80}.

‘[P]ersistence of numerous conflicts, […] continue to cause […] loss of human life as well as destruction of infrastructure and

\textsuperscript{78} Commission of the European Communities, 2007 ‘\textit{Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: From Cairo to Lisbon – The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership’}.  

\textsuperscript{79} Having chosen, for this dissertation, as a starting point for review the EU policies from the year 2000 one should however, recognise that the debate within the EU on conflict issues in Africa has started well before that year. Reference is being made to the EC’s initiative on Peace Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution in 1993; to the decision from the Madrid EU Summit in 1995, where security problems in Africa were officially recognised as a concern in Europe; and of course the Petersburg Tasks discussion at the Cologne Summit in 1999.  

property and threaten peace, stability, regional and international security and hinder the aspirations of African peoples to peace, prosperity and development.\(^{81}\)

Starting from 2000, the first relevant policy documents, which concern conflict issues in Africa, are the Joint Statement on EC Development Policy\(^{82}\) and the ACP Partnership Agreement\(^{83}\). Although, these documents serve as key milestones to the EU Development policy, they nevertheless maintain crucial relevance to be mentioned in this section. The first document identified conflict as a ‘horizontal issue’ which undermines development in countries affected and as such it required ‘systematic attention’. The Cotonou Agreement, which in his ‘The Political Dimension’ chapter includes a whole section dedicated to ‘Peace-Building Policies, Conflict Prevention and Resolution’\(^{84}\), underlines once more the two-way relationship between development and security.

In 2001 the EC made public its Communication on Conflict Prevention\(^{85}\), which was followed by a Common Position of the EU Council\(^{86}\). These two documents opened the way to a period of debate among the EU institutions on the suitable approach the Union should take to tackle conflict. Confirming the EU as a civilian/normative power, these documents assert once again the preference for and importance to work inside the framework provided by the UN Security Council as well as the preference for and importance to work at the regional level:

\[^{81}\text{SN 106/4/00 REV 4, Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000 ‘Cairo Declaration’, available at: http://www.iss.co.za/AFRegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/afreurdeci00.pdf, last accessed 17.11.2009}\]


\[^{84}\text{Ibid., ‘Title II: The Political Dimension, Article 11’}.\]


‘The Commission will give a higher priority to its support for regional integration and in particular regional organisations with a clear conflict prevention mandate’\textsuperscript{87}.

In May 2002, by taking in consideration the peak in conflicts especially in SSA, the Development Council published its ‘Conclusions on Countries in Conflict’, where apart from the importance of a work in partnership with the UN, the Council emphasised the importance of coherence, coordination, and complementarity as well as the importance of working in partnership with ACP governments, civil society organisations and with regional/sub-regional organisations (SROs)\textsuperscript{88}. With these conclusions the period of policy reflection on conflict prevention, came to end and the EU moved to an operationalisation phase, as it is best reflected through the next official documents.

EU’s Political and Security Committee, in November 2004, submitted to the Council for adoption an Action Plan for ESDP in Africa\textsuperscript{89}. It included actions such as capacity building, planning support, Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR). The addressees were individual African states, SROs and predominantly the AU\textsuperscript{90}. Within the framework of the EU Strategy for Africa (ESA), EU it committed to ‘step up its efforts at all stages of the conflict cycle and to support the emerging new structures, collectively known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)’, with the African Union and its PSC at the centre\textsuperscript{91}. As a further support to ESA, the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) adopted in 13 November 2006 the document entitled

\textsuperscript{87} EC, 2001 ‘\textit{Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention\textquoteright}', p.8.


\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.

‘EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts’\textsuperscript{92}, notably in response to the ‘EU Common Position on the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Violent Conflicts in Africa’\textsuperscript{93}. The EU Concept ‘is intended to provide a coherent and comprehensive EU framework for the implementation of key aspects of the Peace and Security cluster of the EU Strategy for Africa’\textsuperscript{94}.

Under the Joint Africa EU Strategic Partnership the priorities of the EU peace and security agenda in Africa include overseeing Africa’s peace and security architecture and supporting African peace and security operations\textsuperscript{95}. Generally seen, the conflict prevention and peace-building efforts are classified into two categories: direct and indirect ones. Under the first one is understood a broad range of humanitarian activities led by DG ECHO\textsuperscript{96}; support for conflict resolution through i.e. assessments of root causes of conflict prepared by the EC (by its geographic desks and EC delegations)\textsuperscript{97}; and institutional reform through i.e. EIDHR\textsuperscript{98}. The second category includes the mainstreaming of conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes,


\textsuperscript{94} Council of the EU 2006 ‘EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts’, adopted at the 2760\textsuperscript{th} EU GAERC Meeting, Brussels, 13 November 2006.


\textsuperscript{96} The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was created in 1992. Initially placed under the DG DEV, in 2004 it became an independent DG on its own. DG ECHO strictly identifies humanitarian action as an apolitical, neutral and impartial activity. Being not part of the ‘crisis management’ system, DG ECHO is not such an instrument.

\textsuperscript{97} The information gained through these assessments is provided to the General Secretariat of EU Council and EC used in preparing a ‘watch-list’ of countries at the start of each Presidency.

\textsuperscript{98} For more on the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) see the following section of EU Democratic Governance and Human Rights Agenda in Africa.
which serve to bridge security concerns with other policy fields such as trade, i.e. The Kimberly Process or the FLEGT99.

Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that EU is still a young global actor needing essential reforms and improvements at policy, political, financial, technical and structural levels. Such, contributes greatly to an expectations-capability gap, which in its own terms accounts for a weak representing of the civilian/normative power, the EU intends to project in international politics. The same can be said about the lack of coherence between institutions and actors involved in CFSP. Notwithstanding these difficulties the EU has significantly contributed to support peace and security in Africa. For instance, the African Peace Facility has been an important instrument the EU has provided aiming at supporting Africa towards effectively establishing its APSA. The Facility has been ‘the backbone of the funding for AU operations’100 for it ‘remains by far the most important source of funding for th[e] support’101 of these operations. Thus,

‘[APF] has been a very positive initiative which has allowed the EU to support African work on peace and security in a practical, flexible and highly relevant manner that has respected the principle of African ownership’102.

99 The Kimberly Process aims to prevent the trade of goods which fuels conflicts, in this case the trade of the so called ‘blood diamonds’, which financed the conflicts in West Africa. The EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), regulates trade of timber.


Nearly €440 million of financial support has been channelled through the APF under the 9th EDF (2004-7), including Additional Voluntary Contributions (AVCs) of EU Member States and a first tranche of €300 million is already committed under the 10th EDF (2008-10). Efforts in enhancing the political dialogue take place at all levels, be it continental through the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Political and Security Committee; to the regional level through regular exchanges with i.e. ECOWAS and other sub-regional organisations; and lastly at the national level within the framework of the CPA’s Article 8. Concerning the predictable funding it sustains that:

‘€1 billion of EU funding [is provided] to support the African Peace and Security Agenda and [APSA]. This support covers a range of activities such as the [CEWS], the definition and implementation of disarmament and counter-terrorism policies and the operationalisation of the [ASF], including African Training Centres [sic]’.

To date, Africa has been the theatre of ten operations conducted within the EU CFPS/ESDP framework. Some of them have already been completed and others are ongoing and they have been/are of military, civil-military and civilian nature. As military operations account: Operation ARTEMIS in Bunia/DRC (12 June – 1 September 2003); EUFOR DRC (- 30 November 2006); EUFOR Tchad/RCA (28 January 2008 – 15 March 2009); EU NAVFOR Atalanta (end of 2008 – still operating); EUTM Somalia (April 2010 – still operating). There has been to date one civil-military operation, namely that of EU Support to AMIS Darfur 18 July 2005 and was came to an end on 31 December 2007. The civilian operations in Africa are as follows: EUPOL Kinshasa (April 2005 – June 2007); EUSEC RD CONGO (June 2007 – 30 September 2010); EUPOL DRC (June 2007 – still operating); EU SSR

---

103 A detailed information and presentation of the APF is to be found at http://europanafrica.net/jointstrategy/1_peace-and-security/, last accessed on 12.12.2009


105 For detailed information on all EU completed and ongoing missions of military, civilian and civil-military nature see the official website of the Council of the European Union at http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN.
Guinea-Bissau (June 2008 – 30 September 2010). From November 2008 a major capacity building programme to the AU /APSA has been stood up. Reference is being made to the AMANI AFRICA – EURO RECAMP, which it originated at the Africa-France summit at Louvre some ten years ago by a French initiative, under the name of Renforcement des capacités Africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP). This initiative was operationalised in close collaboration with US, Great Britain and the willing African countries and deliberately placed under the auspices of the UN and the then OAU.

From the analysis provided above it becomes clear that European preferences in conflict prevention and crisis management do take into consideration the commitment to the normative principle of lasting/ sustainable peace, by which it is meant resolving both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict so that ‘war [...] becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’. In terms of policies, the EU focuses on a comprehensive approach including development aid, trade, regional integration/cooperation and political dialogue. In terms of resolving the violent symptoms of conflict, EU has developed, as part of her CFSP/ESDP policy, a civil and military capability, which aims at sustainable peace missions by focusing on ‘peace-keeping, […] and strengthening international security in

---


110 Each of these issues will be handled further down at greater detail.
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Apart from the
above stated objective of sustainable peace, the variety of instruments/means as well
as the way these are used, –preference for economic and diplomatic action,
persuasion, positive incentives, rather than coercion, constructive engagement rather
than isolation, all within a multilateral setting and not to forget the EU’s complex
multi-level governance system that makes it ‘particularly well equipped to grasp and
utilise the potential of multilateral network organisations’ – all these factors
underline the EU’s ‘distinctive nature’ as a civilian/normative power within the
peace and security agenda in Africa.

THE EU’S DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA IN AFRICA

The EU’s promotion of democratic governance and human rights agenda in Africa is
a prominent characteristic of both the EU’s development cooperation policy and
generally of its foreign policy. EU’s democracy promotion is guided by her
inherent normative values of

‘[...] democracy – the promotion of a particular form, organisations
and philosophy of political life; [...] supranational] rule of law – the
political foundations provided by just legal systems and equal
protection for all; and [...] good governance – the provision of
open, participatory democratic governance without creating
hierarchical, exclusionary and centralised government. [This last
one] is the most recent value to develop within the EU, especially

111 EU 2008 ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union’, Article 42.1 (ex Article 17

112 Two key documents, both of early 1990s, testimony of the rise up of democracy promotion:
the Council of Ministers Resolution on ‘Human Rights, Democracy, and Development’ in
1991, which made democracy promotion an objective and condition for EU development
cooperation and the Maastricht Treaty, in 1993, most notably Art.11 (democracy promotion
as an objective of the then new CFSP), and Art.177 (‘essential elements’ for EC development
cooperation). It can be sustained that through these documents the EU makes use of
standardised human rights and democracy clauses in all her agreement with third countries,
allowing thus the use of a conditionality mechanism.
reflecting its external promotion through [...] development policies.\footnote{113}

Democracy promotion has been incorporated as a shared value and objective within EU’s regional agreement, notably the CPA and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, concerning respectively SSA and North Africa. The CPA signed in June 2000\footnote{114}, 48 of its signatories are countries in SSA, affirms that the ‘respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law’ are essential elements of the Agreement\footnote{115} which are coupled by a suspension clause in case of serious violation. ‘Good governance’ on the other hand becomes a ‘fundamental and positive element’\footnote{116}. The EU’s making conditional alignment with the ‘essential’ and ‘fundamental elements’ have fuelled a discourse on the positive/negative conditionality or the use of ‘carrots and sticks’. Obviously, arguing through the arguments of Karen Smith, even by using ‘civilian means’ the EU makes use of these conditionality clauses in a ‘quite coercive way’, which then make the EU fail her ‘ideal type’ civilian power image\footnote{117}. While others believe that the ends aimed are thoroughly civilian and therefore that is what should matter. The proponents of EU as a normative power see in her promotion of democratic governance, exactly that what the attribute ‘normative power’ was coined for in the first place.

‘[T]he EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to


\footnote{116} Inclusion of ‘good governance’ in CPA was object of fierce discussion between EU and the ACP countries. Such discussion resulted in ‘good governance’ being not one of the ‘essential elements’ of Art. 9 but instead a ‘fundamental and positive element’, meaning that it is not subject to a non-execution or suspension clause, but for in ‘serious case of corruption’ where significant funds provided by the Community are involved (Art.97).

\footnote{117} Smith, K 2005 ‘Still Civilian Power EU?’, in European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 1, LSE p.9.
change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system.\textsuperscript{118}

Coming back to EU in Africa, apart from the high-level EU-Africa dialogue delineated at the very beginning of this chapter, the CPA provides another framework through which to act. The EU has attached to the ‘political dialogue’ increasing importance, be that with regions, sub-regions or individual countries\textsuperscript{119} as well as representatives of civil society\textsuperscript{120}. Such political dialogues include ‘a regular assessment of the developments concerning the respect for human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance’\textsuperscript{121}.

Another way of promoting democratic governance has been the continuous attempts on the EU side to enhance policy coherence and consistency between different EU actors. For instance, there is room for greater effectiveness by ‘[p]romoting coherent and consistent policies both within European Community activities, and between those and other EU actions, especially the CFSP, as well as Member State activities’\textsuperscript{122}. In line with such policy prioritisation, there is the fourth way of promoting democratic governance through the provision of funds, usually highlighting the role of the civil society. There is a range of different sources from where the EU makes available such funds. The most substantial contributions are made through the European Development Fund (EDF), which is at the same time the financial instrument of CPA. In addition to these mainstream regional funding, the EC provides of so-called thematic-budget lines. The most prominent in the promotion of democratic governance is the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which has at its disposition some €100 million per annum,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.8(6).
\item \textsuperscript{120} ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.8(7).
\item \textsuperscript{121} ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.8(6).
\end{itemize}
focusing especially on electoral assistance. At the beginning of 2007, EIDHR was replaced by the new European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and provides of a budget of €1.104 million for the period 2007-2013. Promotion of democratic governance in Africa is also presented as an exemple par excellence of the importance the EU puts on the people-centeredness of its activities, executed in partnership and ensuring ownership:

‘[promotion of democratic governance] should focus on working with civil society to promote greater participation of people in decision-making at all levels [...] a flourishing civil society [...] plays a fundamental role in holding governments accountable and denouncing human rights abuses’123.

Despite, a general scepticism regarding the real effects of external democracy promotion, where the majority of the studies argue that in order to be sustainable, democracy promotion should come from within and not induced and/or enforced externally and the fact that the EU, sometimes seem to have a large gap between theory/rhetoric on the one hand and the reality/actual application on the other one124, arguably, due to a lack a strategic and coherent application, nevertheless, the current EU framework for democracy promotion can be seen as quite promising. As a matter of fact, some of the latest actions undertaken by the EU, within the democratic governance partnership of the JAESP framework, are the provision of €1 million to the AU’s Electoral Assistance Fund; €2.7 million to the APRM and some €2 million to the UNDP-managed Trust Fund aimed at supporting APRM secretariat and some of its national structures125.


‘[R]egional integration, if implemented properly, will build markets where economies of scale, return on investment, and enhanced domestic competition become really meaningful and stimulate economic growth and employment’\textsuperscript{126}.

EU’s external relations policy includes support for and promotion of regional integration with the world. Such policy is as well greatly supported by the fact that other parts of the world see in the EU a successful model of regional integration, which in their terms has fuelled demands for EU political and financial assistance. This has led to the EU being seen as a ‘natural supporter’\textsuperscript{127} for such policies. Thus the EU, according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’\textsuperscript{128}, and concerning the regional integration behaves in a way it believes it is expected from her.

Next to the support provided in promoting integration at a pan-African level, done through/with the AU, as this entire chapter points out at, the EU is also actively supporting the institutionalisation of SROs in Africa. The CPA is the most prominent instrument for regional integration and at the time was seen as the ‘most advanced and comprehensive [South-North] development cooperation agreement […] going] hand-in-hand with ownership and mutual confidence’\textsuperscript{129}. The CPA rests on three pillars: encouraging the political dialogue, assisting countries and regions with development and economic cooperation and promoting the negotiation of bi-regional free trade agreements. Article 28 presents the general approach, through which the EU affirms her assistance in achieving African owned objectives and priorities in the


\textsuperscript{129} Quotations from Paul Nielsen, the then EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid.
context of regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration, by i.e. fostering gradual integration in the world economy, accelerating diversification as well as economic cooperation and development, promoting free movement of persons, goods and services\textsuperscript{130}. Further articles, which focus on regional economic integration, are Article 22 (macro-economic and structural reforms and policies), Article 29 (regional economic integration) and Article 30 (regional cooperation). Articles 6 to 14 of Annex IV attached to the CPA refer as well to regional integration.

Another important feature of the EU’s promotion of regional integrations, as expressed through CPA’s Article 35, is that ‘economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP states bearing in mind that regional integration is a key instrument for the integration of ACP countries into the world economy\textsuperscript{131}. Article 35 is important, for it points out that for the EU the support for regional integration is not an end in itself but is rather an intermediary step to foster the integration of developing and transition economies into the global market\textsuperscript{132}. Under these terms, the CPA heralds a new dimension in the North-South Cooperation, in a time when regional integration became one of the main goals aimed by the African leaders, as by the way best mirrored through the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

By 2002, though, the CPA partners had to accept that their partnership had produced rather disappointing results concerning the integration of ACP economies into the world market:

‘Despite our common efforts, the ACP market share in the EU - its main export market by far - has shrunk dramatically. The wider

\textsuperscript{130} ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.28. ‘Cooperation shall provide effective assistance to achieve the objectives and priorities, which countries have set for themselves in the context of regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration [...] In this context cooperation support shall aim to a) foster the gradual integration of ACP States into the world economy; b) accelerate economic cooperation and development both within and between the regions of the ACPs states; c) promote the free movements of persons, goods, capital services, labour and technology among ACP countries; d) accelerate diversification of the economies of the ACP states and coordination and harmonisation of regional and sub-regional cooperation policies; e) promote and expand inter and intra-ACP trade and with third countries’

\textsuperscript{131} ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.35.

picture is no better: Africa’s share of world trade dropped from around 6 per cent in 1980 to 2 per cent in 2002\textsuperscript{133}.

Such sobering view created the background context of the decision to stand up the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), meant to succeed CPA. Another reason behind the decision to stand up EPAs was provided by the fact that the ACP-EU relationship was a preferential-based one, therefore by definition it discriminated on others not included in it. Thus, within the framework of the CPA, as written down in Article 36, the ACP and EU agreed to conclude new WTO compatible trading arrangements, who would count for the progressive removal of trade barriers as well as enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade. Furthermore, Article 37 of the CPA saw the regional bodies (RECs) as the accurate media through which EPAs may be negotiated; it further elucidates the procedure for these new South-South-North negotiations, envisioned to be concluded after a five year preparatory period starting by September 2002 and scheduled to enter in force by 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2008. Through the EPAs is aimed the expansion of liberalisation of services and trade-related issues (investment, public procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, etc) in a time when WTO requires it only in terms of trade in goods.

EPAs are based on four pillars: partnership, regional integration, development and link to the WTO\textsuperscript{134}. Their main objectives, as indicated at the Cotonou Agreement, are to: achieve an ACP-EU free trade area based in reciprocity, in line with Article 24 GATT\textsuperscript{135}, through the gradual elimination of trade restrictions. Countries, though, are allowed to exclude some products in liberalising their markets access offer\textsuperscript{136}; promotion of sustainable development and poverty reduction through supporting the integration of ACP within the world trading system and at the same time their own

\textsuperscript{133} Address by Peter Mandelson, EU Trade Commissioner, at the \textit{ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Bamako, 19 April 2005}, p.1.

\textsuperscript{134} As stated in the DG Trade website, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/nepa_en.htm, last accessed on 11.09.2009

\textsuperscript{135} Article 24 GATT concerns the liberalisation ‘of substantially all trade’ in goods ‘in a reasonable length of time’. For more information see: http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/index.php?loc=epa/background.php, last accessed on 12.09.2009.

\textsuperscript{136} ACP-EC, 2003 \textit{‘Partnership Agreement’}, Art.37.
regional integration\textsuperscript{137}; ensuring through the EPAs a further step towards regional integration, since following this is seen as the first step towards integration within the world trading system\textsuperscript{138} and take into account the different levels of development that exist between the ACP countries. For these reasons EPAs are envisioned to possess great flexibility in order to provide special and differentiated treatment to the concerned countries\textsuperscript{139}. The EU, in terms of the liberalisation commitments, agrees to a 100\% elimination of tariffs of almost all goods imported from the ACP countries (exception transitional periods for rice and sugar) and some 80\% of imports from the ACP countries over a period of fifteen years\textsuperscript{140}. The ACP countries were initially divided into six regional groupings, four being in SSA, then eventually a seventh regional grouping was added – the East African Community (EAC) – bringing so the number to seven, five of which are in SSA: West Africa/ECOWAS & Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA); Central Africa / Communauté Économique et Monétaire des États d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC); East and South Africa/Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community/EAC; and Southern African Development Community/SADC\textsuperscript{141}.

EPAs, however, have been surrounded by a great amount of criticism, be it within the academia as well as within the partner countries. African countries rejected EPAs on the grounds of fearing a loss of custom revenues, which do constitute something like a quarter of African state revenues, as well as business feared unfair competition from subsidized European imports\textsuperscript{142}. Thus, at the Lisbon summit, coinciding with

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., Art.34.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., Art.35.2.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., Art.35.
the deadline for the WTO waiver, no concluding agreement was reached\textsuperscript{143}. The initial intent not to negotiate through the AU but with individual states grouped by sub-regions was furthered after the failure to abide by the WTO deadline, so the EU initialised negotiations with individual countries. By doing so it breached the very rationale the EU proclaims to pursue integration in Africa as well as snubbed her natural pan-continental partner of choice in Africa, the AU. This undoubtedly counts for a weakening of EU’s normative claims in preferring a ‘pick and choose attitude’ rather than ‘finding solutions within a multilateral setting’.

Apart from EPAs, the EU has offered the Everything But Arms (EBA) for 49 Least developed Countries (LDCs), which provides with Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) access for all products except, as the name says it, for arms and ammunitions. While for others, the EU offers the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which is seen, though, as offering less favourable conditions\textsuperscript{144}. In June 2005, the EU introduced the ‘GSP+’, with the aim of providing development aid within GSP but under certain conditions.

‘Whenever an individual country’s performance on the EU market over a three-year period exceeds or falls below a set threshold, preferential tariffs are either suspended or re-established. This graduation mechanism is only relevant for GSP and GSP+ preferences: LDC access under EBA is not at all affected. Graduation is triggered when a country becomes competitive in one or more product groups and is therefore considered no longer to be in need of the preferential tariff rates – it is a sign of growing export success!’\textsuperscript{145}

Developing countries had to have ratified a number of international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol. Although certain circles among representatives of African


\textsuperscript{144} Detailed information is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wideragenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/, last accessed on 07.08.2010.

countries, see the EU conditions as an expression of ‘new colonialism’, the kind of such programmes goes in perfect line with the EU’s aspirations as a civilian/normative power, for such conditionality is considered as a ‘structural aid’ measure, providing developing countries with incentives to meet international obligations.

**THE EU MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AGENDA IN AFRICA**

The new millennium brought with it the recognition that the paradigm that became known under the name of the ‘Washington Consensus’\(^{146}\) was finally dead, and its subsequent ‘Post-Washington Consensus’\(^{147}\) which takes a deeper look at the connections between development, trade and the role of governments, is at least incomplete\(^{148}\). Sings of the ailing paradigm, have been evident since the early 1990s, when as a counterweight to the World Bank’s annual *World Development Reports*, the UNDP started to publish its *Human Development Reports*, which pointed out that the approach based on market-oriented policies has failed to deliver results on the

---


betterment of many people’s life, and it forwarded its sustainable human development approach, which to say it in their own words ‘Human Development is a development paradigm that is much more than the rise and fall of national incomes’. This approach is a people-centred paradigm, based on participation, ownership as well as on a more equal partnership between developing countries and aid donors as compared to the top-down, outside-experts of the former. Through this approach, in itself an all-encompassing framework is made a connection between the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), nationally owned poverty reduction strategies, harmonized aid and good governance practices. Security problems are also included into the rationale, especially in those cases when failing or failed states are of concern. Here it is thought that humanitarian aid is the best support as well as, in selected cases, security interventions may be the appropriate approach.

It is within this framework that the EU has staged and anchored its development policies towards the Global South and in particular towards Africa. Issues such as the people-centeredness, participation, ownership, equal partnership, but not only, are nowadays, all important parts of the concerned EU policies towards Africa. An important step in EU’s development policy has been the 2005 ‘European Consensus on Development’ (ECD), a policy statement which put the poverty eradication at the centre of EU’s development policy. It identified shared values and principles upon which the EU MS and EC will implement their development policies, by focusing especially on three main issues: the achievement of MDGs which ‘will help meet other challenges such as sustainable development, HIV/AIDS, security, conflict prevention, forced migration, etc., to bring about equitable globalisation’; a development based on Europe’s democratic values; and the third component put a crucial importance on the ownership of countries concerned. In this policy statement, in order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, the EU makes a commitment to raise the ODA to 0.56 per cent by 2010 putting herself on the best track to achieve the UN


target of 0.7 per cent by 2015: half of the additional aid will be earmarked for Africa. The EU collectively is the world’s biggest donor, covering some 56 per cent of the global figure, showing an almost doubling of the figure since the MDGs were adopted to reach by 2008 some €50 billion.

In these terms, in achieving the MGD 1: reduction of poverty and hunger, the EU has committed to respect the principle of ownership by aligning its aid to national strategies and procedures and further by providing aid more efficiently through better coordination, since there seem to be room for gains (between €3 - €6 billion annually). Food security is considered as another important step in achieving MDG 1. The EU has established a new EC Food Facility, through which it has mobilised some €1 billion. Of that figure €560 million are earmarked for Africa. There are other instruments which concern food security, such as EDF/B-envelope that provides some €200 million to approximately 30 African countries, as well as the Food Security thematic programme with an annual budget of approximately €220 million of which 40 percent is allocated to Africa. Here again comes to light the ‘distinct civilian/normative nature’ of the EU by preferring arrangements at the supra-national / sub-regional level such as support in the form of fund mobilisation of over €45 million provided to the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) and other sub-regional organisations.

Concerning the MDG2-Education, the EU collectively remains the main donor to international education ‘Education For All’ (EFA) initiative, providing some 90 per cent of the $1.6 billion pledged for the period 2003-2013. 21 of the 30 countries who participate are African. The EU has funded within her human development/education the Erasmus Mundus and the Julius Nyerere student


153 This envelope covers unforeseen needs such as emergency assistance not financeable from regular EU budget; contributions to international agreed debt relief initiatives; whereas envelope A covers long-term programmable development operations.

exchange programmes. The last one focuses exclusively on student exchanges between universities in EU and ACP countries by supporting up to 250 student-years of mobility/exchanges annually. EDULINK is another instrument concerning the ACP countries through which in its first phase from 2006-2008 involved some €30 million, financed through the 9th EDF intra-ACP envelope. Within the JAESP framework, it has been agreed to support collaboration at the regional level between SADC and EAC on ‘quality management of education and linkage between education and economic growth strategies’.

Gender equality was also identified by the EU’s Consensus on Development (ECD) as a core part of all policy strategies. In 2007 the EC and consecutively the Council deliberated on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Cooperation by stressing the close inter-linkages between sustainable achievements in poverty reduction, development and the empowerment of women. Financing has been provided through the country cooperation strategies and through the thematic instrument ‘Investing in People’. The last one has provided since 2007 some €3 million annually and for the period 2007-2013 is foreseen a budget of €57 million. The EU has heavily engaged itself also with the fourth, fifth and the sixth MDGs which concern health issues. For instance, the EC alone has


158 More on EU’s focus on gender equality is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/crosscutting/gender eq_en.cfm, last accessed on 23.11.2009.


160 More on EU’s focus on global health see, for instance European Commission, 2010 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
provided €100 million annually to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), as well in 2008 in committed some €9.5 million to the Global Fund for Vaccines and Immunisation. Africa receives some 60 percent of these funds. EU’s work in close cooperation with the AU representatives, civil societies and international partners, especially the World Health Organisation (WHO), testimonies once more her civilian/normative preference for international arrangements in finding solutions to health problems in Africa.

THE EU ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA IN AFRICA

‘If the Millennium Development Goals – particularly poverty eradication - are to be met, people everywhere need access to modern, affordable energy services. This is the goal of the EU energy initiative’\(^{161}\).

Such stance counts for the higher priority that energy and climate change have acquired within the EU’s development policy. It was in 2002, when within the framework of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)\(^{162}\), the EU MS and the EC jointly launched the EU Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development (EUEI)\(^{163}\). Its aim is three fold: to raise political awareness among high level decision-makers; promote coherence and synergies on energy-related activities; and draw new resources in terms of capital, human, and technology from all involved and concerned parties be they financial institutions, private sector, civil society and/or end-users. Ownership by the partner country and local participation are seen as EUEI’s key features\(^{164}\). In 2003, the Nairobi meeting


\(^{162}\) For more on the Johannesburg Summit 2002 see: http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/prep_process/africa.html, last accessed on 15.03.2008.

\(^{163}\) More information of EUEI is available at: http://www.euei.net/about-euei; http://www.euei-pdf.org/africa-eu-energy-partnership.html, both last accessed on 15.03.2010.

\(^{164}\) Ibid.
‘Energy for Africa’ was a milestone on the EUEI dialogue with Africa. The Nairobi Conference set the priorities for the EUEI, which included: rural electrification, a stronger focus on national and regional strategies and policies and capacity building at all levels. The ‘Energy for Africa’ has had several follow up conferences and workshops such as those in Ouagadougou in 2004, which concentrated on energy in West Africa, followed by those in Maputo in 2005 for Southern and Eastern Africa and that in Brazzaville also in 2005 which focused on energy policy in Central Africa. The EC proposed in 2004 a financial instrument to be named the ACP-EU Energy Facility, which was consequently approved by the joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers in 2005, initially credited with some €220 million. Another financial instrument is the Intelligent Energy COOPENER established in 2003, with a budget of approximately €17 million and concerning some 40 countries in SSA, Latin America and Asia. The EUEI Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF) is another joint instrument of EC and some EU MS aiming at supporting developing countries, mainly in SSA. The EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, was launched in 2007 and dotted with some €383.7 million so far concerning 47 eligible SSA countries.

One of the partnerships agreed at the Lisbon summit in 2007 was the Africa-Europe Energy Partnership (AEEP), which is to be understood as a forum and ‘long-term

---


167 Detailed information of ACP-EU Energy Facility I can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/energy/energy-facility-formercalls/former_calls_en.htm, last accessed on 15.03.2008

168 Detailed information of COOPENER can be found at: http://www.euei.net/activities, as well as EC 2007 ‘COOPENER Energy Services for Poverty Alleviation in Developing Countries: 24 Projects for Sustainable Energy Services in Sub-Saharan Africa’, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/library/doc/ka_reports/subsaharan_africa.pdf, both last accessed on 15.03.2008

169 More on the Trust Fund can be found at: http://www.eu-africa-infrastructuretf.net/about/index.htm, last accessed on 15.03.2008.
framework for structured political dialogue and cooperation between Africa and the EU on energy issues of strategic importance’. The AEEP is financed through the above mentioned financial instruments\textsuperscript{170}. The EU, out of an ethics of responsibility\textsuperscript{171}, has established herself in the leader’s role concerning global environmental protection\textsuperscript{172}.

‘As Europeans and as part of some of the wealthiest societies in the world, we are very conscious of our role and responsibilities\textsuperscript{173}.

Elgström argues that the EU, because of the recognition of her expertise and economic power, exercises a high influence on African countries. Protection of the environment and especially climate change has increasingly become a part of the EU’s agenda in Africa, where the EU does not shy away from using adherence to international frameworks on environment and climate change as a conditional to her development and/or trade cooperation such as GSP+ mentioned above. Although, adherence to the Kyoto Protocol stigmatised the US opposition, it was coherent with the development interests of African countries, who sustain that there is an urgent need to address global warming and its consequences, such as desertification, since they have a considerable negative effect especially on the agriculture sector. The African continent believes its interests are better served when cooperating with the EU. For instance, the President of Tunisia during the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, expressed a positive view of the cooperation between the European Union and the African Union and stressed ‘[t]he need to establish a long-term African-European partnership that helps our countries rationalize the use of energies extracted from oil

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170} More on AEEP can be found at: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/ partnerships/energy, last accessed on 15.03.2008.
\item \textsuperscript{171} Elgström, O 2006 ‘Leader or Foot-Dragger: Perceptions of the European Union in Multilateral International negotiations’, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm.
\end{itemize}
product, and promote the use of environment-preserving alternative energies\textsuperscript{174}. As a matter of fact the resulting document, JAES, links environmental protection and economic development by highlighting the need for a comprehensive approach to environmental protection and climate change.

‘Africa-EU cooperation in this field will link positively with economic growth, job creation, social stability, and the building of capacities for adaptation to, and mitigation of, negative effects of climate change. It will address interrelated areas such as food security, sustainable agriculture and land management and will cover a vast number of interrelated areas and issues such as land degradation, desertification, the preservation of biodiversity, bio-safety issues including GMOs, prevention of toxic waste dumping, environmentally sound waste management, sustainable use and management of natural resources including forest, fish stocks and integrated water management, weather observation and early warning systems to improve disaster risk management’\textsuperscript{175}.

Under these terms, out of the €20 million provided through the EC Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEA) programme with the ACP countries, some €3.3 million were earmarked for the implementation and compliance with the international agreements on climate change, biodiversity, chemicals and desertification; another €20 million is provided under the 9\textsuperscript{th} EDF in implementing the African Monitoring of Environment and Sustainable Development (AMESD)\textsuperscript{176}. Under the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)\textsuperscript{177}, which aims at greater


\textsuperscript{176} Quotation from the JAESP joint website of AUC and EC at: http://www.africa-eupartner ship.org/partnerships/climate-change, last accessed on 21.06.2010.

\textsuperscript{177} EC 2007 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Building a Global Climate Change Alliance between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change’, available at: http://ec.euro
dialogue and exchange between the parties and provision of technical and financial support to developing countries, the EC as a start up package has pledged around €110 million. The intra-ACP funds of the EDF have earmarked some €40 million to the GCCA. For instance under this last instrument has provided COMESA and ECOWAS with each €4 million for capacity building purposes as well as better integration of climate change issues within the concerned strategies.

By concluding on the EU’s energy and climate change agenda in Africa, the above analysed best mirrors EU’s civilian/normative nature for, as Hill argues, ‘civilian models’—such as EU—rely on persuasion and negotiation in dealing with third parties, encouraging so regional cooperation with and within other parts of the world, supporting global and regional institution building. If, by arguing in Whitman’s terms, from looking at the vast variety of instruments the EU has at her disposal one might define the EU’s role it internationally plays, then the instruments used within the energy and climate change agenda in Africa are thoroughly normative in nature for they highlight the predilection for the use of economic and diplomatic measures and a preference to use persuasion, positive incentives and constructive engagement178.

THE EU MIGRATION AGENDA IN AFRICA

‘The EU’s goal is to manage legal migration coherently and to address the root causes in countries with high emigration rates (especially low/middle-income countries)’179.


179 European Commission, Migration and Development available at EC’s official website http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/9interventionareas/migration_en.cfm, last accessed on 20.08.2010 (original emphasis).
Concerning the root causes, migration is seen as being mainly originated by poverty, civil wars, violent conflicts and forced displacements. Africa as the continent of almost 300 million people living in abject poverty and the continent of endemic conflict and war is particularly hard hit by migration. To the above are added natural and other man-made disasters that cause a severe and lasting damage on the environment. Such environmental degradation deprives Africans of their livelihoods.

Migration on this side on the Mediterranean is associated with discourses of fear and exclusion and EU is referred to as ‘fortress Europe’. At the same time though, as certified by the first quotation of this section, the EU has attempted to approach migration comprehensively, by connecting it closely with developmental policies such as those concerning employment issues, governance and demographic developments. On October 2005 in Hampton Court, UK the EU Heads of State called for a comprehensive approach to tackle migration, by stating that ‘the Commission would develop a list of priority actions for improving global migration, with a special focus on the African region’. Such list of priority actions addressed both the security and development issues related to immigration. A couple of months later, the European Council deliberated on ‘The Global Approach to Migration’, which it focused on Africa and Mediterranean and calls for working in partnership with countries and regional organisations in tackling legal and illegal migration, development, refugee protection and trafficking as well as for a greater coordination among EU policy areas such as external relations, development, employment and justice and home affairs. In these terms the EU has recognised the potential positive


182 Ibid.

role that it can contribute to development concerning remittances, skills transfer/’brain train’, limiting ‘brain drain’, and setting up of transnational networks\textsuperscript{184}. A year after the EC underlined once more the close link that exists between migration and development, by stressing that ‘[t]he EU must recognise that creating jobs in developing countries could significantly reduce migratory pressure from Africa. Migrants should be supported in contributing to the development of their countries of origin’\textsuperscript{185}. Migration remained a central topic at the Troika Meeting between ECOWAS and the EU in May 2006 and both parties stressed the need for close cooperation at the national, regional and continental level\textsuperscript{186}. For instance, at the national level, regular political dialogue has been based on Article 13 of the CPA\textsuperscript{187}.

On 10-11 July 2006 at the Ministerial Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development and as expressed in its Rabat Declaration, partner countries agreed to focus on the central and west African migratory routes to Europe\textsuperscript{188} as well as it adopted an action plan laying out the concrete measures in tackling migration\textsuperscript{189}. In November 2006 at Tripoli, was held the first continent to continent meeting ministers of foreign affairs, migration and development from EU MS, African states as well as


\textsuperscript{187} ACP-EC, 2003 ‘Partnership Agreement’, Art.13


representatives from the EC and AUC. At this groundbreaking meeting, it was agreed to ‘facilitate mobility and free movement of people in Africa and the EU and to better manage legal migration between the two continents; To address the root causes of migration and refugee flows; To find concrete solutions to problems posed by illegal or irregular migratory flows; Address the problems of migrants residing in EU and African countries’190.

On that same meeting it was agreed an ‘EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of Human Beings, Especially Women and Children’ aiming at effectively combat trafficking in human being, especially women and children; addressing the root causes of trafficking in countries of origin and of destination and to contribute to the empowerment of women and children191. On these same terms, but concerning the North African countries, on November 2007 in Algarve, was held the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration192. A month later, at the second Africa-EU summit, and within the JAES, Africa and EU agreed the 7th Partnership on ‘Migration, Mobility and Employment’, which aims at providing

‘holistic responses to the issues of Migration, Mobility and Employment in the interest of both partners, with the particular objectives to create more and better jobs for Africa and to better manage migration flows’193.

---


Its action plan aims at implementing the Tripoli Declaration and Migration and Development, the EU-Africa Action of Plan on Trafficking of Human Beings –both mentioned above–, as well as Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation. This last one aims at ‘creat[ing] more, more productive and better jobs in Africa, in particular for youth and women in line with the UN ‘Decent Work for all’ Agenda’194.

Apart from this political dialogue and good-willing declaration, if looking at the practices associated to migration and asylum, the picture is quite something else. For instance, in 2008 some 1861 migrants are known to have died in attempting to reach Europe, slightly better that the 2006 figure which counted 2088 dead195. EU’s image has been further stained by prosecuting, on grounds of ‘human trafficking’, Tunisian and Italian fishermen who rescued migrants at sea. Another less honouring practice has been the fact that the EU, nowadays, relies increasingly on North African countries, such as Algeria and Libya, to curb migration flows from SSA to Europe. Such reliance has caused an outcry among particularly human rights NGOs and CSOs who point at the inhumane treatment illegal African migrants are faced with in these countries once they get caught by the respective authorities. Such breaches have, though, not blocked the EU to pursue business deals with i.e. Libyan’s Qaddafi in a time when SSA countries undergo intense scrutiny concerning issues of human rights violations and democracy. This has undeniably produced an image that sustains the thesis of a double-standard EU.

In concluding on EU’s migration agenda in Africa, it can be said that, while at the one side, the EU’s preference for multilateral settings where such issues can be discussed points out at her distinct nature as a civilian/normative power, it nevertheless, the negative and exclusionary discourses and practices associated to the migration and asylum, do point at the opposite of what, at least theoretically, a civilian/normative power does, for, as argued by Bretherton and Vogler,


195 Data from the NGO Fortress Europe, cited in Johnson, D 2008 ‘How Europe Lost Africa’.
‘[p]ractices are evidently inconsistent with the inclusive, value-based understandings on the EU [...] which have been so strongly promoted by EU officials’.196

EU’S STANCE ON CHINA INTO AFRICA

‘It is good for China, Africa and Europe, because in this process China has gained room to develop itself, Africa has got new investment and Europe has been stimulated to be competitive’.197

The political dialogue between EU and China was institutionalised through the EU-China Annual Summits since 1998, but it was not until 2006, when the European Commission through a Communiqué, laid down the principles upon which such dialogue has to evolve concerning Africa. Some of the main points were: engaging in a structured dialogue on Africa’s sustainable development; support of regional efforts to improve governance in Africa; as well as better integrate China into the international efforts for improved aid efficiency, coordination and opportunities for practical bilateral cooperation on the ground. The EU wishes to intensify cooperation with China, but at the same time argues that this would mean greater responsibilities and expectations from China. Reference is most obviously made to i.e. China’s policy of ‘trade only, no politics’ in Africa.198

The situation in practice is somehow different from the rhetoric used, albeit the common concerns that all three parties share, namely, development, peace and


political stability. One of the reasons for it are the different models of development. While EU focuses more on the strategic goals of its policies in Africa, China in a more pragmatically approach, focuses on the process. Notwithstanding this China argues, as an author sustains, ‘that what might appear to be crass commercial moves are actually the result of careful thinking about mutually beneficial activities’.

China sustains that her engagement with Africa evolves within the ‘South-to-South cooperation’ framework and prefers it to evolve within bilateral frameworks rather than multilateral initiatives, which are perceived as western-driven. In these terms, China is perceived by Africans as better understanding their development needs, and ‘as a welcome alternative to Western ‘white man’s burden’ policies’.

Nevertheless, as the EC claims, ‘closer co-operation on international development issues would benefit the EU, China and partners in the developing world. There are significant downsides if we are not able to co-ordinate effectively, particularly in Africa [...]’. Under these premises, the European Commission proposed in October 2008 a tripartite cooperation and dialogue between EU, China and Africa.

‘[...] China has become a factor and accelerator in European considerations about reorienting the EU-Africa Partnership. [...]’

---


The traditional donor-recipient relationship will be transformed into a new kind of partnership. This new kind of partnership is designed to respond to common global and regional challenges and no longer focuses on a unidirectional —primarily charity-based— approach to development cooperation[^205].

Although, it has to be added that while China policies in Africa did not prompt the development of the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, it nevertheless, added new impetus[^206].

**CONCLUDING REMARKS ON EU’S 21ST CENTURY AGENDA IN AFRICA**

This chapter started by looking at the main milestones that characterised the EU policy towards Africa. In this review of the first eight years of the last decade of EU into Africa, it has become clear that considerable progress has been made. Due to her colonial past and her geographic vicinity to Africa, as well as to changes in both continents, EU has committed herself to substantial engagement in all sectors of cooperation with Africa. In short, in can be said that the EU has been on the look for a deepening and widening of the already close cooperation with Africa. The Cairo Process led the way but nevertheless remained vague, while the European Union’s Africa strategy of 2005 was an important step on the way but offered little guidance for the day-to-day relations. The last move –JAESP– provides the needed framework within which among others a more coherent and a most efficient agenda are aimed at being put at practice. Every possible field is included in the given strategy and the degree of the political commitment has never been as high as at present.

The EU’s unique institutional set-up, such as her legal order and decision-making structure, contributes to her ‘distinctive nature’[^207]. The ‘particular new and different


[^206]: Ibid.

form of hybridity’, as well the ‘experimental and innovative nature of the EU that enables it to respond to multiple agendas and Europe’s diversity in a flexible manner’\textsuperscript{208}, makes it normatively different’\textsuperscript{209}. As international political processes are increasingly characterized by fluidity, complexity and multi-level games, and as actors cannot always rely on traditional power assets, EU’s complex multi-level governance system accounts for making it ‘particularly well equipped to grasp and utilise the potential of multilateral network organisations’\textsuperscript{210}. The exceptionality or uniqueness of the EU is due also to the peculiar configuration of her external policy instruments\textsuperscript{211}. The vast wealth of literature available, has consistently pointed out that the EU has a predilection for the use of economic and diplomatic instruments, instead of military ones. Recent literature highlights the preference to use persuasion and positive incentives, rather than coercion, as well as preference for constructive engagement rather than isolation\textsuperscript{212}, but also the use of other tools such as shaming and opprobrium\textsuperscript{213}. In concluding, there is, therefore, a symbiotic relation between values and external policies determining so the nature of the processes which emphasise ‘diplomatic rather than coercive instrument, the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, the importance of long-term economic solutions to political problems, and the need for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{209} Manners, I 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, pp.249-240.
\item \textsuperscript{211} Whitman claims that the international role of the EU may be conceived in terms of the instruments available to the Union. Whitman, R 1998 ‘From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union’, p.235
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
indigenous people to determine their fate – all of these in contradistinction to the norms of superpower politics.\textsuperscript{214}

The EU can so rely on a much wider range of policy instruments than any other actor\textsuperscript{215}. Nevertheless, it is, much more difficult to argue that the EU is unique in promoting normative ambitions, as it is eminently clear that the US, and many other actors, share and pursue similar normative goals. So it is rather the vague notion that the EU ‘so far has represented something different from states in the international system in that it has not been an actor that only is guided by its self-interest\textsuperscript{216} that possibly makes the EU special. Each of the policies analysed above are integrated within the development cooperation programmes, and do point –in stark contrast and as a counterweight to the US–, at an EU, which is to be taken as ‘a model and promter of values, an alternative approach to international relations, based upon networks of communication and cooperation rather than expressions of military power and political domination\textsuperscript{217}.


\textsuperscript{216} Sjursen, H 2002 ‘Beyond the State? The Role of Identities, Values and Rights in European Security’, Paper presented at the 1\textsuperscript{st} Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, Bordeaux, 26-28 September, p.15.

PART II

PROCESSES, ISSUES & INSTRUMENTS: EU & US 21ST CENTURY POLICIES IN AFRICA

CHAPTER 5  THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN AFRICA  83

CHAPTER 6  THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AFRICA  125
GRAHAM ALLISON’S THREE LEVEL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

Part III of this research effort will analyse two US and EU pivotal policies concerning their peace and security engagement in Africa, respectively AFRICOM and JAES P&S. As stated at the introduction section of ‘Theoretical Framework’, such analysis will be done by applying Graham Allison’s approach. It is therefore, envisioned to provide with a short introductory of his three frameworks for analysing foreign policy. Reference is being made to the rational actor model (RAM), the organisational behaviour model (OBM) and the bureaucratic politics model (BPM)

Most foreign policy analysts usually utilise RAM in explaining different actor’s behaviours and their foreign policies. Since events in foreign affairs are understood as purposive acts of a given international actor, RAM provides one of the most compelling and widespread models of decision-making. This means that in trying to analyse any specific purposive act – *explanandum*, one has to focus on the goals and objectives – *explanans*, the concerned actor had in the very first place. The assumption made in this case is, that if an actor carried out such an action, it is because it must have had a goal of this type. The event is then explained when one can show that taking such action was a reasonable behaviour given the strategic objectives, the actor has. Seen in these terms, RAM links purpose with action. ‘If one knows an actor’s objective, then one has a major clue of his likely action’.

The interesting thing about this model is that it does not only include the objectives of the actor concerned, but also it takes into consideration the situation within which the actor operates. This situation or context is seen in terms of threats and opportunities as perceived by the given actor, who then chooses to behave in a certain way which best advances his interests. Summarising it can be said that, in analysing foreign policy behaviour through the imperatives of RAM, one must

---

assume that this behaviour is the action of an international actor, unified, who has a coherent utility function, it acts in relation to external threats and opportunities, and its actions are value maximising. In doing so the RAM analyst must provide answers to relevant questions such as what threats and opportunities arise for the actor and what is its utility function\(^2\).

A further analysis sees, what RAM names ‘acts’ and ‘choices’, as outputs, which originate of existing organisations functioning according to regular patterns of behaviour – the standard operation procedures (SOPs), which secure the way a given organisation acts. Here the foreign policy analyst assumes that ‘if organisations produced an output of a certain kind at a certain time, that behaviour resulted from existing organisational structures and procedures’\(^3\). This kind of analysis is basic to the organisational behaviour model (OBM). With it the utility and usefulness of RAM is not undermined, simply the analyst in this case takes into account that a government/governance is composed of a ‘conglomerate of loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own’\(^4\). Such analysis at the meso level is focused on the causal relationship between the actor and its foreign policy agencies\(^5\).

Foreign policy is also analysed by looking at the relationship between the bureaucracies involved in the foreign policy output. This is the focus of the third approach the bureaucratic politics model (BPM), which views foreign policy events neither as a unitary choice (RAM) nor as an organisational output (OBM)\(^6\). Such events are understood as resultants of bargaining games – ‘the pulling and hauling

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid, p.224.

\(^4\) Ibid, p.224.


that is politics\textsuperscript{7}—among players of the concerned bureaucracies, since these last ones fight among themselves for influence, power and resources. The resultants are so originated by a tendency to seek the first minimally acceptable solution, which require the least changes to the own SOPs. This phenomenon is else called ‘satisficing’, which though conflict avoidant engenders less optimal solutions\textsuperscript{8}.

None of these three models is comprehensive, but they complement each other. RAM concerns the broader context, the larger patterns and the shared images. Within this context OBM highlights the organisational routines (SOPs), which produce the information and actions, and the third model, the BPM, concerns the interrelationship among bureaucracies that outline the final shape of actions.

‘Each in effect, serves as a search engine in the larger effort to identify all the significant causal factors without which the decision or action would not have occurred’\textsuperscript{9}.


\textsuperscript{9} Allison, G 2008 ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis, p.227.
CHAPTER 7
CASE STUDY 1: US AFRICOM

THE AFRICOM CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF RAM

‘African states oppose US presence’
   Ghana web
‘SADC Shuns Spectre of US Africom Plan’
   IOL, South Africa
‘Scramble for an African response’
   Business Day, South Africa
‘Questions Over Real Intentions Of US’s Africa Command’ &
‘Ironically, Africom was announced as Chinese President Hu Jintao was touring
   eight African nations to negotiate deals that will enable China to secure oil flows
   from Africa’
   Daily Nation, Kenya
‘Africom would destabilise an already fragile continent and region, which will be
   forced to engage with US interests on military terms’
   Business Day, South Africa
‘[Africom is] aimed at influencing, threatening and warding off any competitors by
   using force’
   The Post, Zambia
‘[African countries] should wake up after seeing the scars of others [Afghanistan and
   Iraq]’
   Reporter, Algeria

AFRICOM, as made clear from the above African newspaper headlines, was faced
with an ‘unprecedented unity of opposition’ and hostility across Africa. Thus, it is
logical to ask why such hostility; whether AFRICOM’s intention and purpose
were/are misunderstood; and whether Bush’s foreign policy track record can be made
responsible for such opposition.
It is the aim of this section, by using Allison’s RAM, to provide with a detailed analysis of the rationale for the establishment of the new US Africa unified combatant command\(^1\) (COCOM), its ‘goal and objectives’, ‘utility function’, and ‘the perceived threats and/or opportunities’ that are tackled and/or created by AFRICOM. Through such analysis it is meant at trying to give an explanation of why AFRICOM engendered such a significant, unified and widespread resistance across Africa. In his FPA seminal work, by outlining the rational actor model (RAM) upon which the foreign policy of a given actor may be analysed, Graham Allison sustains that ‘RAM links purpose with action’\(^2\). The following statement is, in this sense, a succinct resume from where to start with Allison’s RAM analysis of AFRICOM.

‘Africa is a continent of growing economic, social, political, and geostrategic importance. […] The establishment of a new Combatant Command for Africa —AFRICOM— marks an important milestone in the evolution of relations between the United States and the governments of Africa. Through AFRICOM, the US Department of Defense will consolidate the efforts of three existing command headquarters as it seeks a more stable environment for political and economic growth in Africa. In line with this goal, AFRICOM is pioneering a bold new method of military engagement focused on war prevention, interagency cooperation, and development rather than on traditional warfighting’\(^3\).

---

1. A unified combatant command is defined as “a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” according to DOD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.


As already analysed by the previous chapter, Africa’s relevance to the US in terms of national and strategic security interests has moved up on the US agenda, from low to high politics. The end of the Cold War Era and mostly so, the event of 9/11, made peremptory for the US government to give more attention to Africa, as indeed, it is sustained by the US policy documents and statements4.

‘Simply put: a convergence of threats, vulnerabilities and opportunities created by the War on Terror […] have been able to push African-centric issues onto the government’s agenda. As the [US] becomes increasingly concerned with reducing the conditions that lead to terrorism worldwide, it has had to acknowledge that chronic poverty, conflict and violence, corrupt governments and unprofessional militaries create critical vulnerabilities for terrorist recruitment and operations’5.

Another analyst sustains that, ‘the whole idea is, to a large extent, a bureaucratic issue within the US government (State Department vs the Pentagon) on the best way of promoting American interests in Africa—securing investments and oil sources, fighting off Chinese competition and waging the war against terrorism’6.

---


CHANGE IN THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The above mentioned quotations do point out at a ‘conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa’\(^7\) that did take place within the US foreign policy agenda for Africa. Such ‘conceptual shift’ is also best mirrored by the change that the DoD’s global command structure underwent. Prior to it, Africa has been split between three regional Combatant Commands (COCOMs): Central Command (CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM)\(^8\), thus, ‘Africa has been divided up and been the poor stepchild in each of these different commands and not gotten the full attention it deserves’\(^9\). Accordingly, such division created huge problems in coordinating and ensuring coherence\(^10\) of US activities in Africa. An example par excellence were the 1998 bombings of US embassies in the capitals of two neighbouring African countries, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which however, fell within the areas of responsibility (AOR) of two different US COCOMs: EUCOM and CENTCOM. Another example of coordination and burden sharing problems arose when the US provided with airlift and training the African peacekeeping troops in Sudan, which fell on the AOR of CENTCOM, nevertheless, much of the activities


\(^{8}\) The allocation of Africa or parts of her to different US COCOMs has a long history in the post WWII era, thus, Africa or parts of her have been allocated as AOR to EUCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, LANTCOM, and STRICOM/ RDECOM. There was even a time, from 1971 to 1983, when no US COCOM whatsoever had any responsibility concerning security issues in Africa. The creation of, and allocation of AOR to, US COCOMs is done through the DoD’s Unified Command Plan (UCP), which is regularly reviewed, updated, ‘approved by the President [and] sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatants commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographic area of responsibility for geographic combatants commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders’. As to date there are ten US COCOMs, six geographic, and four functional. The last UPC, which codified US AFRICOM as well, was signed by President George W. Bush on 17 December 2008. More information is available at the official website of the US Department of Defence: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/, last accessed on 30.03.2009.


were done by the EUCOM forces\textsuperscript{11}, overstretching so their capabilities, especially since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is rather logical to sustain that in this situation with an expanded US agenda in Africa, not just in terms of GWOT, and the pressing need for coherent action within the Pentagon but not just, the US government had to take action to appropriately tackle the situation that has arisen. Indeed, although, plans to create a unified combatant command have been circulating for over 10 years, these were brought to maturation only by the end of 2006, when, finally, in order to repair the lack of coherence and coordination among the different COCOMs, the then Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, requested presidential authority to create a centralised command for Africa. On 6 February 2007, President Bush announced the creation of a new US military command exclusively for Africa, to be known under the name of AFRICOM. A special transition team, situated in Stuttgart, Germany, -EUCOM headquarters-, and composed of, predominantly, DoD and DoS officials, were assigned to guide the formation process for AFRICOM in coordination with EUCOM. Consequently, AFRICOM reached the status of a sub-unified command under EUCOM by 1 October 2007 and came into being fully operational a year later, on 1 October 2008\textsuperscript{12}.

As deducting from the above said, the rationale behind the creation of AFRICOM is self-evident. In Allison’s word, ‘[i]f I know an actor’s objective, I have a major clue of his likely action’\textsuperscript{13}, consequently, through the identification of such objective that made it peremptory to change an inefficient and incoherent command structure, it was rational for the US to create a new unified command. Thus, AFRICOM was about a reorganisation internal to DoD\textsuperscript{14} aiming at ‘greater consistency of focus’\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{13}] Allison, G, 2008 ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis’, p.223.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
and the betterment of an ‘outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War’ in a way that ‘reflects post-Cold War and post-9/11 lessons learned’. In analysing, though, the African hostility towards AFRICOM, one might arguably assume that, a greater focus on Africa which seeks to enhance the coherence and consistency of US Africa agenda should not necessarily be negative and thus it should not account for the widespread African hostility AFRICOM faced. The clue for it is to be sought somewhere else. The best spot to begin with is the President and its own words while announcing the establishment of AFRICOM:

‘Today, I am pleased to announce my decision to create a Department of Defence Unified Combatant Command for Africa. I have directed the Secretary of Defence to stand up US Africa Command by the end of the FY2008. [...] We will be consulting with African leaders to seek their thoughts on how Africa Command can respond to security challenges and opportunities in Africa. We will work closely with African partners to determine an appropriate location for the new command in Africa’.

Based on the above stated, it is assumed that AFRICOM was planned and established without having consulted the African partners. Although as David J. Francis wrights, that this is an approach which has been traditionally used by the US in the establishment of the other unified COCOMs, nevertheless, the Cold War era is long

15 Whelan, T 2010 ‘Africa: A New Strategic Perspective’, p.33. The lessons, the US, had to learn, concerned the changing nature of the twenty-first-century threat environment, as well as the importance of a holistic approach to security and stability issues. As a matter of fact, and as witnessed by 9/11, threats to states were no longer generated only from the other mighty nation-states, the poor and least developed countries were added to that list as well.


gone and Africa has considerably changed too. Both factors are deemed as extremely important in initially explaining the African opposition. As a senior AFRICOM officer had to admit

‘The Africans are changing. [...] Times are changing and the institutions are changing. Look at the institution of the African Union [...]. [Listening to the African part] is something that all of us who work with Africans need to do better. You only need to live and work in Africa to understand that we may think that we have all the answers; but we really don’t have very many answers that are going to work in many of these countries and in these institutions’20.

Thus, it becomes clear that the ability of the US government, or its agencies involved within AFRICOM, to listen to the African aspirations, is crucially important; the same about the ‘realization that the new world in which AFRICOM is operating is going to require a sophisticated kind of public diplomacy that is grounded in listening’21. Therefore, behaving like ‘we are the United States. We know what’s good for you. Do it’, and continuing doing business as usual did not work any longer in Africa, as exemplified by the very stark hostility this very paper concerns. So, while AFRICOM was about a legitimised reorganisation internal to DoD aiming at ‘greater consistency of focus’ as well as at promoting ‘greater unity of effort across the government’, it nevertheless, was not, at least not wholly, as claimed by a high rank DoD official, about ‘a way that reflects post-Cold War [...] lessons learned’22.


The issue of the location provided a further point upon which to disagree. The search of a headquarters in the continent seems to have started prior to explaining how the command would help Africa. Even from within the US there was some criticism about the way the Bush administration did approach the issue of location. Chester C Crocker, a former assistant secretary for African affairs under President Regan, puts it: Pentagon ‘rolled it [AFRICOM] out before they were ready to roll it out’\textsuperscript{23}. On the African side, to put it in the words of one African politician, Africans felt that ‘very little was really known by the majority of people or countries in Africa who were supposed to know before such a move was made’\textsuperscript{24}. Therefore, the opposition was/is quite popular among Africans, and is led by civil society organizations\textsuperscript{25}, leading African governments, as well as prominent regional economic and political organisations such as Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the AU itself. For example, the only African country who has been willing to accept AFRICOM’s location in its own territory Liberia has declared itself as ‘the US historic ally, [who] has stood resolutely with the [US], through good times and bad, and is offering its territory as it has done in the past, for the establishment of AFRICOM Headquarters\textsuperscript{26}. In direct opposition to Sirleaf’s words, Nigeria –who acts as the hegemon in West Africa–, has countered that it ‘will oppose any location of AFRICOM headquarters in all of West Africa’\textsuperscript{27}. Thus, ‘no foreign troops are

\textsuperscript{23} Quotation from Chester C Crocker, a former assistant secretary for African affairs under President Regan, cited in Hanson, S 2007 ‘The Feasibility of an Interagency Command’, in Hanson, S 2007 ‘US Africa Command (AFRICOM)’.


\textsuperscript{25} i.e. http://africaagainstafricom.org/


welcomed on African soil. Such statement is very much in line with the fear of losing regional influence by the emerging African regional hegemons such as Nigeria in West Africa, Kenya in East Africa, and, by South Africa in Southern Africa, where ‘AFRICOM seems to be clashing with South Africa’s sense of itself as an emerging African power.’

Others believe that AFRICOM may revive neo-colonialism in Africa, after the English and French experiences, AFRICOM may be seen as the perfect example of American colonial domination. Another recurrent perception concerning AFRICOM’s headquarters is that the command may be used as a Trojan horse to achieve US strategic interest and objectives in the continent. Furthermore there exists a perception that an AFRICOM headquarters on African soil would ‘inevitably set up Africa as a target for terrorists’ as, by the way, exemplified by the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Given the track record of the Bush administration’s foreign policy doctrine and that of the US in general, Africans fear that AFRICOM may be used as an instrument in achieving regime change, or for that matter prop up dictators or other unpopular regimes who act in accordance with the US interests in Africa. Such fears were sustained by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and more so by the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006-2007. Historically seen, a report of the US Sub-Committee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee brings further hold to such claims. ‘Overseas bases, the presence of United States armed forces, joint


planning, joint exercises, or excessive military assistance programs [...], all but guarantee some involvement by the United States in the internal affairs of the host government. Seen in these terms, the concerns African are faced with, when considering AFRICOM, are more than well-founded, and the dangers of becoming ‘entangled and embroiled in the activities of the American empire’ are all but misplaced. Consequently, by not having taken into consideration the colonial and neo-colonial legacy as well as current African sensitivities about outsiders, the planners of AFRICOM, convinced of their benign behaviour, have, nonetheless, paved the way for less favouring African interpretations.

Thus by coming back at, and speaking in terms of Alison’s RAM, the Bush administration decision to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa was self-evident, –there is, arguably, little to oppose to the logic for an African headquarters of a COCOM just for Africa, at least with the intention to keep AFRICOM in sync with local African issues–. The US government must have assumed this as a given, since all other regional COCOMs have, as a matter of fact, their headquarters situated in their respective AORs. Where they seem to have failed, is in predicting the consequences which such action would have brought with. Little effort seems to have been made in understanding the African sensitivities and consequently they were not included in the planning of this new COCOM. The resultant of such approach is that AFRICOM headquarters will remain for the foreseeable future outside Africa. It seems that the Pentagon has accepted such reality and has settled for a ‘distributed command’ with five regional centres on the continent.

‘This was a rare ‘victory’ for Africa and a major challenge to the US stranglehold on the continent, demonstrating that Africa has


33 Ibid.

34 On 18 February 2008, President Bush announced a major policy shift by stating that AFRICOM’s headquarters will remain in Stuttgart, Germany, where the EUCOM headquarters are as well located. On a funny note, it has to be said that, on that same day, General Ward, did not speak at all in terms of such a major policy shift, instead he reasserted that the location of AFRICOM in Africa had yet to be discussed. General Ward delivered a keynote address at a London RUSSI conference titled ‘AFRICOM and US-Africa Relations’ on 18 February 2008. More is available at: http://www.rusi.org/news/ref:N47BB07643AB7E/, last accessed on 30.03.2009.
come of age and could no longer be taken for granted in the post-
Cold War era35.

AFRICOM’S MISSION: A COCOM ‘PLUS’?

AFRICOM, which within the DoD officials is sometimes also referred to as a combatant command ‘plus’, is supposed to be a wholly new approach to US security concerns; apart from fulfilling the conventional roles as other traditional unified command, it attempts to pioneer the ‘Three-D’ approach by aiming to carry out ‘soft power’ activities such as creating a stable security environment. For this purpose, it is composed of both military and civilian personnel, the later one coming from DoS, USAID, agriculture, treasury, and commerce36. The Commander of AFRICOM itself, a four-star General, William E. ‘Kip’ Ward, has both a military and a civilian deputy. Such structure is seen as pointing at the relationships between security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa and thus AFRICOM would carry out both traditional military activities as well as programmes which are funded through the DoS’s budget. AFRICOM, in this sense, is as such a direct consequence of some of, what Whelan above names, ‘the lessons learned from the post-Cold War era and post 9/11’. The approved mission statement declares that the

‘[AFRICOM], in concert with other US government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of US foreign policy’37.


36 Quotation from Rear Admiral Robert T. Moeller, head of the transition team for standing up AFRICOM, cited in Hanson, S 2007 ‘The Feasibility of an Interagency Command’, in Hanson, S 2007 ‘US Africa Command (AFRICOM)’.

Further, it has four core objectives which include: bolstering security and stability in Africa; improving cooperative security and partnership between US and African states in addressing transnational terrorism; and developing and sustaining enduring efforts that contribute to African peace, security and unity by focusing on capacity building to prevent, rather than fight wars.

AFRICOM is so designed as a new US approach to the security challenges in Africa, ‘to prevent problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming catastrophes’. As assured through the mission statement above, AFRICOM seems to be more about African security rather than US strategic interests in Africa. By taking this as a given, then the question of why the establishment of AFRICOM was confronted with such a unified, stark opposition across the continent, becomes more than legitimate to ask. In trying to give an answer to this question, this section will start by first looking for clues at the mission AFRICOM was mandated with. Even after having been trimmed off, the mission statement did create the heart of the critical challenges AFRICOM is faced with. Such, is best reflected by the assertion of Ambassador Mark Bellamy that there is ‘a great deal of scepticism and misapprehension in regard to AFRICOM’s mission in Africa and elsewhere’, [and that] the main public diplomacy task that AFRICOM is going to face for the next

---


39 When first announced the draft statement of mission was: ‘US Africa Command promotes US National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the AOR. US Africa Command leads the in-theater DoD response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and strategies. In concert with other US government agencies and other international partners, US Africa Command conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, US Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises. […] Its main objective is that of building partner capacity through coordinating the kind of support that will enable African governments and existing regional organizations, such as the African Standby Force, to have greater capacity to provide security and respond in times of need’.


year or so is really going to be one of explaining its mission.42 Furthermore, because AFRICOM ‘will be operating in an environment of skepticism and suspicion [...] it is essential that AFRICOM take public diplomacy seriously [... since] public opinion in African countries will be a powerful force that will help or impede AFRICOM’s mission.43 These statements receive a greater meaning when compared with the speculations, in Africa and abroad, concerning AFRICOM’s ‘real mission’. It is felt that the establishment of AFRICOM had little to do with US altruism towards Africa; rather, it is thought, it had more to do with US selfish motives such as assuring access to oil and natural resources, the GWOT, and countering China’s growing influence on the African continent.44

As a result, DoD officials felt that AFRICOM’s mission has been misunderstood, and in May 2007, a ‘strategic communications’ campaign was launched to respond to these negative attitudes towards AFRICOM aiming at winning over African leaders and media. This campaign crafted a less interest–based message about AFRICOM, and focused on the uniqueness of its hybrid structure, emphasising the interagency and non-kinetic side of AFRICOM. Many officials highlighted such attributes and used them as evidence that the new command has only benign purposes.

‘Some people believe that we are establishing AFRICOM solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China. This is not true [... those are] not AFRICOM’s singular mission.45

President Bush asserted as well that AFRICOM was created with the aim of ‘help[ing] Africans achieve their own security, not to extend the scope of the war on

42 Ibid., p.68.


terrorism or secure African resources.\textsuperscript{46} Having said that, it is clear that US interests in Africa include not just GWOT, access to resources and counterbalancing China’s influence but also HIV/AIDS, conflicts, humanitarian disasters etc. Whelan herself, implies that these three objectives – access to oil and natural resources, GWOT, counterbalancing China – are part of the AFRICOM mission, albeit, not the only ones (not AFRICOM’s singular mission). What critics sustain as ‘disingenuous’ is the fact that the Bush administration maintains ‘that accomplishing the former three objectives is not the main reason that Washington is now devoting so much effort and attention to the continent.’\textsuperscript{47}

‘It’s one of the problems with the rhetoric […] around AFRICOM [which] defies belief when people hear that this has nothing to do with China. […] US national interest is to ensure that we have enough oil and we know that 25 percent of US oil will be coming from Africa in the near future, why wouldn’t this be about ensuring that the natural resources that we need can come to us? When the Gulf of Guinea is filled with oil platforms from China and we have very few, when the Niger delta is overrun with rebels, why wouldn’t this be about ensuring that we can attain these natural resources? I think that it’s difficult for people on the continent and for civil society in the US to believe that it has absolutely nothing to do with China, and that this has nothing to do with the war on terror, nothing to do with resources. It kind of defies what you would think this would truly be about if this command is to ensure that our [US] national interests are ascertained.’\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{46} Cited in Glaros, G, E 2007 ‘The New Africa Command: A Hedge against Neo-Colonialism or a True Agent of Change?’, in Signal, Volume 62, p.120.


Indeed, disingenuous, inasmuch above-mentioned statements of US government officials about the rationale for the stand-up of AFRICOM were contradicted by yet other statements by i.e. professional military officers who actually run AFRICOM. Vice Admiral Robert Moeller, who led AFRICOM’s transition team, told journalists on a press conference that the rationale behind the creation of AFRICOM had to do with the increasing importance that Africa accrued as related to the US interests, seen in strategic, diplomatic and economic terms. Yet in other briefings DoD high ranked officials sustained that the command ‘will focus on some efforts [...] to defeat or preclude the development of terrorists or terrorists’ networks’, and that ‘Africa is of significant strategic importance to the United States [...] for its natural resources [...] and you can see our main objectives include defeating terrorists’. A high ranked DoD official has summed it up by stating that the underlying cause to the US in creating AFRICOM was fighting terrorists in Africa, countering Chinese diplomacy on the continent, and gaining access to Africa’s natural resources, especially oil. As late as one year after the announcement for the stand-up of AFRICOM and half a year later after AFRICOM having reached the status of sub-unified command, General Ward referred to America’s growing dependence on African oil as a priority issue for AFRICOM and that combating terrorism would be ‘AFRICOM’s number one theatre-wide goal’.


The so much sought-after soft power image aimed through the ‘strategic communications’ campaign failed because as Nye says:

‘a communications strategy cannot work if it cuts against the grain of policy. Actions speak louder than words, and public diplomacy that appears to be mere window dressing for hard power projection is unlikely to succeed’\(^{54}\).

**AFRICOM, SECURITY & THE SECURITY – DEVELOPMENT NEXUS**

An issue upon which African states are apprehensive concerning AFRICOM is that they believe that US, through AFRICOM, will posit itself unilaterally as the best arbitrator of African security priorities and policies\(^{55}\). As it is well known to all of us, Africa faces multiple security threats and challenges which fundamentally differ from the traditional militaristic conception of security, which, last one has been largely state-centric, both in terms of policy and practice\(^{56}\). Such conception seem to be outdated in a time when more than 60 percent of territories in Africa are governed and ruled by non-governmental actors such as chiefs\(^{57}\). Consequently, security in Africa is about ‘[...] nation building, the search for secure systems of food, health, money and trade’\(^{58}\). Africa, as already mentioned in previous chapters, is plagued by


\(^{58}\) Thomas, C 1987 ‘*In Search of Security: The Thrid World In International Relations*’, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, p.1.
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria and other preventable diseases; climate change is another threat, not to mention, extreme poverty, under-development, and bad governance. Accordingly, African perceptions of security are about the so called human security which concerns the survival on a daily basis and issues of basic human needs. Such has, obviously, created huge gaps on how Africa and the US see security. Accordingly, Africans feel frustrated for

‘[...] Americans are always looking for terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Yes, we have those things in Africa. We have terrorism: it is poverty, HIV/AIDS and malaria. We have weapons of mass destruction as well: it is an AK-47 usually carried by a child”.

Through AFRICOM, the US, in this sense, failed to make an approach which would have accounted for greater African ownership in security matters. Consequently, it ‘has led to the increasing neglect of African traditional approaches, societal agencies and indigenous resources [...]. Little wonder, then, the widespread opposition to AFRICOM for its lack of consultation with Africa and its neglect of core African security imperatives. As an analysts has pointed out, if the US wants to maintain relevance in the eyes of Africans, then there is a need, on the US side, to shift from imposing what it sees as right definition of security for Africa towards what Africans themselves see as relevant definition for their own security.

One of the much heralded features of AFRICOM is its merging of traditional US military thinking and activities with the humanitarian and development foreign policy issues.


‘[T]he new command will enhance our [US] efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa’63.

Such statement clearly illustrates the linking between security and development matters, which, as a result of 9/11 security threats and the ensuing ‘politics of fear’ further reinforced such link64. For instance, US NSS in 2002 established an association between poverty, bad governance, weak and failed states, terrorism and organised crime, all phenomena present at different degrees in Africa. This approach, endemic not just to the US government but also to international policies in Africa, has contributed considerably that the mainstream security community is increasingly preoccupied with the securitisation of development and on the other side, the development community is forced to engage with ‘developmentalising security’65.

The securitisation of development, in our case AFRICOM usurping the development lane, is best reflected by the nature of AFRICOM. DoD endowed the command as a combatant one, meaning that AFRICOM would command US forces in combat, but at the same time it was advised that while ‘AFRICOM [would] be responsible for any necessary military action in Africa [...] many of the missions of AFRICOM will be non-kinetik’66. Accordingly, Ryan Henry, a high DoD official, confirmed that AFRICOM’s primary missions include humanitarian assistance, civic action, and response to natural disasters67. The choice by the DoD officials to emphasize the

non-military roles of AFRICOM, has created much controversy within the US and among US, Africa and the broader international community, especially the NGO one. This kind of ‘messaging’ on the part of Bush administration’s officials, has amplified especially African concerns, creating the impression that the Pentagon, through AFRICOM, is taking charge of US development policy and humanitarian assistance in Africa. By this ‘Pentagon taking charge’ many fear a militarisation of US Africa policy. They, arguably rightly, pose the question of why it is necessary to use the military, in a time when other effective civilian methods, like USAID, or Peace Corps, were very effective in their work in winning the hearts and the minds of African people68. It is also feared that, since the DoD has at its disposal much larger budgets than DoS, or USAID –it is not for nothing called the ‘600 pounds gorilla’–, AFRICOM may as well exacerbate such situation even further69.

It has, though, to be said, that when considering the total amount that the US invests in the continent, –some $9 billion–, 97 percent of it is done through the civilian arm of the US government: the DoS, USAID, etc. Only about 3 percent goes through the DoD, most of it is consumed by the CJTF-HoA, this last one, actually, having changed from a combatant to a civil affairs mission. Other main instrument being financed through this same 3 percent is i.e. the Pan Sahel Initiative, which concerns the terrorist threat in the continent. Consequently, as sustained by DoD officials, less than 1 percent goes in other military-to-military activities with partners in the continent. Accordingly, ‘[t]he leadership is clearly in the developmental and the diplomatic end. The defense end is only a very small part’70.


Under these circumstances, AFRICOM’s hybrid structure highlights the ‘whole-of-government’ approach and the underlying principle that the ‘military cannot do it all alone’. It is argued that, with the 3 percent DoD has at its disposal, it could do, in this sense, a better job of supporting that other 97 percent.

For all the good wording, the mistrust that the African side has, is, though well founded, since, historically seen the sustainability of US foreign policies is not necessarily an example to follow. Thus,

‘[w]hen you look at history, whether it’s two years, or ten years, or twenty years of US military engagement on the continent of Africa, it has been a selective engagement that very rarely has had anything to do with the interest of African peoples. […] One of the major concerns that comes up, is this notion that we need to whitewash or erase the past US involvement on the continent. […] We say: forget about that because what we are really doing now is building schools and health clinics for our long-term benefit. […] What we are asking people to do on the continent is believe what you hear not what you see. […] All of these things continue to breed mistrust. [Therefore] it’s not merely going to be, ‘Just believe us, we really are trying to do the right thing’.”

Accordingly, AFRICOM’s mission continued to remain vague to Americans and Africans alike.

---

*Proceedings of the UCS Public Diplomacy Conference, University of Southern California, February 7-8, 2008*, p.33.

71 Ibid, p.29.


'When Pentagon strategists sought to create a new military command to oversee Africa, they believed they could build one that deemphasized military might and would serve as an exemplar of what so-called US soft power could do around the world’74.

They were proved wrong. DoD officials struggled to straighten the misunderstandings about AFRICOM’s mission concerning its non-kinetic activities. They put great effort at showing that the fears about AFRICOM becoming the lead US government interlocutor with Africa and AFRICOM representing a militarisation of US policy in Africa were unfounded75. The first step they had to do, in convincing the audiences, be they African or else, was to admit the shortcomings in their ‘strategic communications’ campaign:

‘At its core, public diplomacy or strategic communications is about harmonizing our actions with our words to generate an alignment among key stakeholders — an alignment of their perceptions with our policy goals and objectives. That has proven much harder in execution than it might seem, since the American government operates in a very competitive international marketplace of ideas’76.

AFRICOM failed to send out a soft power message, in large parts because its ‘belated and clumsy outreach generated suspicion about the military’s true motives’77. Africa did not buy AFRICOM’s claim to ‘help development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth’.


77 Bellamy, M, Hicks, K, Morrison, J, S 2007 ‘Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case’.
AFRICOM & UNILATERALISM VS. MULTILATERALISM

There exist a large number of Africanists which sustain that a multilateral approach directed to the AU, African regional economic communities and other regional organizations is the only viable approach to help Africans solve their problems. It perfectly marries the adage ‘African solutions to African problems’. The establishment of AFRICOM, in this sense, is seen as a unilateral US approach to Africa, thus ‘unneeded and unwarranted’. There is a rather surprising statement pertaining to AFRICOM, which sounds conciliatory with the above said.

‘By nature, Americans are individualistic, which is probably one of the reasons that we tend to act more than we tend to listen, while European countries are more communalistic. But to be successful, America has to adapt its approach to a more multilateral, supporting and less dominating way of dealing with African partners.

Surprising, because the rhetoric usually rolled out by the US administration on the case of AFRICOM, wants us to go at the exact opposite direction. It contends that AFRICOM’s leadership, just as that of the AU, envisions an Africa that is secure and prosperous and aims at sustaining the AU security apparatus to contribute to the realization of such vision. The literature on the topic is bifurcated, inasmuch there are two different concurring views. On the one side, there are those who suggest that there is a complementary relationship between AFRICOM and AU and on the other side, those who sustain that such relationship is at best conflictual. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Liberian President, a sustainer of the ‘complementary relationship’, points out that even though AFRICOM

---


79 Ibid.


‘is undeniably about the projection of American interests […] it does not mean that it is to the exclusion of African ones. […] For it seeks to empower] African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, build security capacity, and developing good civil-military relationships’82.

It is predicted that AFRICOM will positively impact the AU, inasmuch as a creature of the transformational diplomacy approach, it will cooperate with the AU security regime ‘to build and sustain democratic, well governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system’83, will strengthen AU’s security architecture, especially the African Standby Force (ASF)84, and it will provide training and technical support to AU’s counter-terrorism activities.

Opposed to these views there are those who emphasize the lack of a synergy between AFRICOM and AU. For instance, there have been previous efforts such as the Africa Crisis Response Initiative and various other initiatives to strengthen security arrangements on the continent. But with the dawn of AFRICOM, observes suggest that the US is not, in fact, as interested in multilateral approaches to strengthening Africans’ own capabilities to handle their own security arrangements.

‘Instead we [the US] are saying [that] ‘This didn’t work and so we are coming in on our own now’’85.


It is further stressed that US policy-makers have failed to provide an outline of how AFRICOM intends to improve AU’s security institutions, especially the Peace and Security Council’s objectives, rather it is feared that AFRICOM will undermine the security policy of AU. For instance, AU’s ability to engage in proactive interventions may be undercut, if AFRICOM uses its military presence to determine African security priorities, thus weakening the chances for a deployment of ASF. US’ scepticism about pan-continental structures exudes through the following statement of a high DoD official:

‘[T]he Standby Force looks like it could potentially be a viable mechanism in the future if it’s built right. That’s a big ‘if’.’

African fears are fuelled by such reluctance, together with past experiences which show that western states are unwilling to act even when they do have troops stationed on the ground. Related to this last condition ‘the [US] in particular often discourages and even deters others from intervening in areas in which it has a strong military presence’. The use of proxy African states, especially of those who are key member states of AU PSC, such as 2006-7 Ethiopian incursions into Somalia, have left a bitter taste and had a negative long-term impact of AU security. The negative attitude towards AFRICOM among key AU members is further sustained by the unilateral US approach to counter-terrorism. It is felt that the US chose the bilateral approach because it was unwilling to work within AU rules and structures. A reason for this choice is probably the fact that Americans feel that AU and its member states do not take terrorism seriously enough, and see AU as neither willing nor capable of strong counter-terrorism programmes, as made clear from the above-comment on ASF.

Another area which is increasingly important to the AU is the fight against international organised crime. AFRICOM again has shown little enthusiasm for a multilateral approach and coordinating their work with African regional


organisations\textsuperscript{89}. As General Ward and other high ranked DoD officials made a visit to the AU headquarters back in November 2007, AU officials felt that the ‘consultation meetings’ were a bit too late, since Washington has already finalised every detail on the establishment of AFRICOM. Thus, no great deal could be expected from such ‘informational sessions, courtesy calls, or even, educational tours’.

‘Neither was there any indication that the officials who visited the AU headquarters were interested [sic] in knowing the genuine opinions of the AU, nor were they interested in involving the key PSC officials in the operationalisation of AFRICOM’\textsuperscript{90}.

THE AFRICOM CRISIS THROUGH THE LENS OF OBM & BPM

The OBM theory sustains that resistance to given policies, in our case AFRICOM, engender as a result of organisational inertia and broadly speaking of innovation/change\textsuperscript{91}. Change, within the decentralised bureaucracies is unwelcome since it means that routine or standard operating procedures (SOPs) are disrupted and/or have to be altered. Thus, when innovation/change comes as a result of reforms that make necessary coordination between agencies, resistance to it becomes even bigger. AFRICOM’s interagency structure, as the name says it, calls for extended coordination between different US administration agencies. According to the OBM theory rationale, resistance to AFRICOM was to be expected. Consequently, the structural differences between the different agencies involved within AFRICOM prop out as significant sources, which have hindered coordination and furthered resistance to AFRICOM’s unique structure.

\textsuperscript{89} AFRICOM’s programmes on this field focus on providing funds to militaries and police in individual African states, by extension one might presume that, at the given status, there is no multilateral component.

\textsuperscript{90} Tieku, T, K 2010 ‘The African Union and AFRICOM’, p.141.

This section will start by looking at the SOPs, which are defined as determining how an organisation acts allowing it to operate systematically. They may generate, though, inefficiencies and become so in fact enemies of innovation. In these terms, SOPs can retard ‘the performance of new tasks’ and thus the organisations will prefer to continue functioning the way they always have and when forced, they will seek the first minimally acceptable solution. Such phenomenon is called ‘satisficing’, which accounts for less than optimal outputs. Consequently, when different organisations with varying SOPs try to coordinate their actions, as a result of the rationale stated above, they will be faced with greater than usual resistance and challenges.

AFRICOM’s activities require daily or regular coordination between the personnel of different US agencies, which are embedded within the AFRICOM’s structure. This has proved very difficult, since each agency has its own chain of command. For instance, the position of the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA), a senior DoS staff, has caused concerns within the military, since the DoD chain of command orders that, except the US President and the DoD Secretary, no other civilian can give legally binding orders to any military personnel. Such situation persists also with other low level interagency personnel, inasmuch they continue to be accountable to their respective agencies in Washington, -who continue to pay them-, and not to the Commander of AFRICOM. Under this point of view,

---


95 Ibid, p.375.


AFRICOM gets so expertise from other agencies without having to pay for it. It is clear that such situation has engendered fiery debates on resources.

Budget planning, provides another clear SOP conflict between the DoD and other US administration agencies, such as the DoS. For instance DoD plans in seven-years cycles, which it, thus, requires for long-term strategies. The DoS, on the other hand, has shorter planning cycles due to the nature of its actions, which are reflective of diplomatic compromises. Another feature concerning the budgetary discrepancies is the fact the DoD has been continually favoured and as a matter of fact makes use of huge resources, be they of financial or human nature. The civilian agencies, who suffer from endemic understaffing, fear that rather soon than late, DoD resources will overwhelm their owns.

On the other side, DoD’s ability, to conduct humanitarian assistance is limited by the US Code’s Title 10, which governs the armed services:

‘Humanitarian and civic assistance may not be provided under this section (directly or indirectly) to any individual, group, or organisation engaged in military or paramilitary activity [and can only] serve the basic economic and social need to the people of the country concerned’98.

Title 10, thus prohibits DoD to use its humanitarian budget for i.e. governance programmes and police training. This may put Pentagon at disadvantage, since it must rely on the resources of other agencies. Given DoD’s clout on the national security structure, it nevertheless can put considerable pressure on civilian agencies in order to support its own humanitarian aims. Thus, here we have the DoD, with the largest budget of any agency by far, and yet it asks for resources by other agencies.

The civilian agencies have all the reasons to feel such since the Bush administration, in order to overcome Title 10 limitations, it has set in motion a, for many worrying, trend in authority transfers. Reference is being made of the transfer to DoD of authorities which once were executed exclusively by civilian agencies, most notably

the Department of State and USAID. An *exemple par excellence* is provided through the sections ‘1206’ and ‘1207’ authorities of the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) of 2006\(^99\), through which the DoD can in predefined circumstances train and equip non military counterparts and transfer its funds to the State Department for purposes of security and stabilisation requirements. This authority transfer has obviously created frictions between the two departments. Such function has been followed with suspicion and distrust not just by the State Department but also the Congress itself, as well as the broader developmental and nongovernmental community over an alleged erosion of civilian command within the assistance programmes. It is thought that this ‘militarisation’ –programmes, including the non-military ones, funded and / or executed by DoD- has progressively expanded to include large percentages of the US policy towards Africa\(^100\). Generally speaking, in 1998 USAID managed 64.3 percent of US official development assistance; the State Department 12.9 percent; DoD only 3.3 percent. Meanwhile in 2006, USAID dropped to 45 percent while DoD rose to 18 percent. Other agencies, apart from State, USAID and DoD, saw an increase in official development assistance as well, from 19.3 percent to 23.6 percent\(^101\).

---


Under these conditions, ‘[the US civilian agencies] can’t help but feel like their turf’s being invaded by the gun-toting crowd, hell-bent on opening a new front in a new war’\textsuperscript{102}.

Another facet that may be analysed through the lens of the OBM, and which points out at another explanatory fact of the inter-agency resistance AFRICOM faces, is the different organisational culture that Pentagon and US civilian agencies, i.e. DoS, have.

‘Organisational culture is [...] the set of beliefs the members of an organisation hold about their organisation, beliefs they have inherited and pass on to their successors’\textsuperscript{103}.

The DoD, as it may be expected, has a strong culture of planners. Plans are seen as essential, and the SOPs require that directions, commands, etc are passed up or down the chain of command in well defined paths. While on the other side DoS, by its own admission does not have a planning culture, as mentioned above, due to the nature of its activities, which involve, predominantly discussion and compromise. These two organisational cultures account for two very different approaches: DoD’s is rather unilateral and DoS more bilateral and/or multilateral. Accordingly, in an interview, the AFRICOM’s Deputy to the Commander had to accept:

‘[...] And, again, it's not been easy. But because we work together, because our cultures –and we do have different cultures– meet on a daily basis, we are understanding each other more and more. We laugh about things, you know, whether it's phraseology or terminology, and the way we play, which is sometimes different. The cycles are different. [...] So it's going to be an iterative process [...]’\textsuperscript{104}.


\textsuperscript{103} Allison, G, Zellikow, P 1999 ‘\textit{Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis\textquoteright}', p.153

The basic tenant of the bureaucratic politics model (BPM) is that bureaucratic behaviour consists of power struggles between rival agencies\textsuperscript{105}. Accordingly, agencies will resist changes that appear to threaten their physical size and their general ability to fulfil their mandates as they interpret them. Thus organisational interests play a crucial role in decision-making, since, as Allison argues, ‘career officials are prone to believe that the health of their organisation is vital’\textsuperscript{106}, since such health will assure that the agency will continue to ‘maintain influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the necessary capabilities’. Health, under these conditions, is ‘[...] defined in terms of bodies assigned and dollars appropriated’\textsuperscript{107}.

So, while each agency is seeking to maximise it power, budget and mandate, the resultant is very much depending on the bargaining process, as Allison calls it ‘the pulling and hauling that is politics’\textsuperscript{108}. The ‘pulling and hauling’ goes on within the larger bureaucracy as individuals and agencies act within the limits defined by SOPs and on behalf of their particular position\textsuperscript{109}.

Thus, in attempting to maximise tasks to be delegated to own organisation, interagency coordination is seen as a threat, since most agencies believe such will dilute their interdependence and authority. The resultant tends to be interagency turf wars. Relating it to AFRICOM, US civilian agencies feared that their abilities to carry out their mandates in Africa will be diminished. An argument for it, as sustained by mostly DoS and USAID officials, was the so called ‘politicisation of aid’. DoD, through AFRICOM, aimed at increasing its soft power capabilities, by using humanitarian and assistance aid to win hearts and minds. Many feared that,


\textsuperscript{108} Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, p.144; Allison Zelikow, p.255

\textsuperscript{109} Allison, G, T 1971 ‘Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis’, p.144.
under these terms, aid will be used as a political, strategic and defence tool failing to make lasting changes for the neediest people. This goes against any accepted definition of humanitarian aid, which ought to be ‘impartial, neutral and independent’\textsuperscript{110}, as well as need-based\textsuperscript{111}.

Thus, politicising aid may mean that aid will go where politics will benefit the most, so the respect for the above mentioned principles may disappear. The perception that aid provided by the US may no longer be impartial as well as the perceived affiliation of humanitarian/civilian agencies with DoD, is rightly arguably, very damaging for USAID, which it also fears that under such conditions its influence will shrink and mistrust will be brewed concerning projects in Africa, be they as part of a DoD-USAID coordinated effort or even the independent ones. Similar to the issue of politicisation of aid, experts raise concerns about the ‘militarisation of humanitarian and development assistance, as well as US policy in Africa’\textsuperscript{112}. The use of development funds may, thus, be made on grounds of military/security objectives and not under humanitarian ones. In this case, a militarisation of aid means that USAID may lose its independent ability to create and implement its own development strategies.

There exist also discrepancies on the purpose of humanitarian assistance in furthering US national security interests. As Allison argues, ‘[r]easonable men can disagree on how national security interests will be affected by a specific issue’\textsuperscript{113}. While DoD’s and AFRICOM’s humanitarian projects are short-term and aim at securing immediate friendships abroad, USAID sustains that long-term, sustainable economic development helps not only the advancement of US interests but also enhances democracy and decreases extremism, thus diminishes threats to the US national


\textsuperscript{113} Allison, G, T 1969 ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missiles Crisis’, p.707
security. Both agencies are convinced of the rightness of their approach and resist any decrease in their respective abilities to carry out concerned tasks.

USAID and DoS also believe that AFRICOM will reduce civilian control over the military, as, by the way, shown by practices in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the military has authority over the projects of civilian agencies such as DoS and USAID. Furthermore, USAID had a tough time during the Bush administration years, which saw it going from an independent government agency to having to answer to the Secretary of State. Thus, USAID has well grounded reasons for its hostility to DoD’s/AFRICOM’s usurping the aid lane. A further issue of discordance is the loss of staff. AFRICOM’s interagency structure requires staff from other agencies, mainly USAID and DoS, in a time when they themselves are faced with capacity deficits. This is best mirrored by the personnel asymmetries in even quite small embassies throughout Africa, where DoD has an abundance of personnel114.

‘Asymmetrical power dynamics arise from this imbalance and can easily cause friction between the agencies even when none intended harm’115.

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON AFRICOM CRISIS

AFRICOM was intended as a new kind of military command, aimed at integrating traditional security functions with humanitarian aid and development, through application of i.e. hard power for counterterrorist and security issues, and soft power for military training, officer exchanges and humanitarian projects. This was to be achieved through a greater and closer cooperation between the DoD, State Department and USAID. In this sense, the AFRICOM’s potential to increase US soft power is given, since ‘the military can sometimes play an important role in the


115 Ibid.
generation of soft power [...] with its] broad range of officer exchanges, joint training, and assistance programs with other countries in peacetime.\textsuperscript{116}

Given the fact that Africa has not traditionally been of high importance to the US, it seems that, by using the RAM rationale, to the AFRICOM’s decision-makers, the costs derived by a possible African decline were not considered as relevant. Consequently, consultations with the African states and institutions were deemed futile. Once the error was noticed and AFRICOM was vested with a soft power message, it nevertheless, failed in large parts because of its ‘belated and clumsy outreach [which] generated suspicion about the military’s true motives.\textsuperscript{117}

Perceptions, that AFRICOM ‘was an inappropriate and knee-jerk US militaristic response to clumsy Chinese mercantilism\textsuperscript{118}, ran rampant. The so much looked-after soft power image failed because as Nye says ‘a communications strategy cannot work if it cuts against the grain of policy. Actions speak louder than words, and public diplomacy that appears to be mere window dressing for hard power projection is unlikely to succeed’\textsuperscript{119}. Accordingly, Africa did not buy AFRICOM’s claim to ‘help development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth’\textsuperscript{120}.

Turf wars between the different concerned US agencies have provided the heftiest reasons for resistance to AFRICOM. In using the OBM & BPM rationale, due to the fact that the DoD is seen as the ‘600 pound gorilla’ among the US departments and agencies, DoS and USAID feared that by working in AFRICOM, part of them would be subordinated to the DoD. Under such conditions, DoS and USAID feared of losing autonomy about relevant strategic goals, meaning less influence on US Africa policies which in its own turn meant further cuts of budget and human resources.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{117} Bellamy, M, Hicks, K, Morrison, J, S 2007 ‘Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case’.
\bibitem{120} Bellamy, M, Hicks, K, Morrison, J, S 2007 ‘Strengthening AFRICOM’s Case’.
\end{thebibliography}
CHAPTER 8
CASE STUDY 2: THE JAES P&S PARTNERSHIP

‘We believe that this summit will be remembered as a moment of recognition of maturity and transformation in our continent to continent dialogue, opening new paths and opportunities for our common future’1.

Since the chosen case study –JAES P&S is an integral part within a broader JAES Partnership, agreed between Europe and Africa at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 it is deemed necessary to provide a short introduction of the rationale behind the broader strategy, for this is expedient in analysing the rationale behind the JAES P&S itself. As it has been mentioned throughout this dissertation Africa’s standing on the EU’s agenda received a big boost up since the dawn of the century. The changed contexts in both the continents and abroad have had a big role in that. On the African side is, of course, the creation of the AU together with its socio-economic programme NEPAD, across the Mediterranean, the EU’s grows from a union of 15 to 25 and 27, and broadly speaking the world has changed too, since the emergence of new post 9/11 international global challenges, which together with an accelerating of the globalisation have pointed out at an increasingly interdependent world. This is seen as the broad rationale for the intensified cooperation between the EU and Africa2. On the road to the agreement of a Joint Strategy both parties have


attempted to develop political strategies and policy documents aimed at providing
guidance to their cooperation. The ones mentioned at the European section in Part II
of this writing, need not to be named again, but they did create a momentum upon
which to forge the new EU-Africa cooperation. The JAES is seen to have brought the
Africa-EU relationship at new highs strategically as well as politically. One of the
important features of this partnership is the fact that it is based on a shared consensus
on values, common interests as well as common strategic objectives. Principles, such
as the unity of Africa, interdependence, ownership and joint responsibility as well as
respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and the right to
development, lay at the foundation of this partnership. Its four main objectives
concern, firstly a strengthened Africa-EU political partnership, by which is meant a
strengthening of institutional ties, and treating Africa as one which ensures a strong
and sustainable continent-to-continent relationship, with the AU and EU at the
centre; secondly promotion of peace, security, democratic governance, fundamental
freedoms, gender equality, sustainable development and regional/continental
integration in Africa, all of which contribute to the attainment of the MDGs by 2015;
thirdly, an effective multilateralism and fourthly the promotion of a broad-based
people-centred partnership by facilitating civil society participation. The JAES is
thus a wide-ranging strategy considered as the ‘capstone doctrine of EU-Africa
relations’3, which takes stock of the fifty years of cooperation originated with the
Rome Treaties. The JAES and its first Action Plan for 2008-2010 identify eight
priorities for cooperation, with peace and security featuring prominently4.

THE JOINT AFRICA EU STRATEGY – PEACE AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP
As a result of geographic proximity and historical experiences, but also as mentioned
on Part II EU-relevant chapter, both continents agree that peace and security are
preconditions to development, be it in political, economic or social terms, thus, the


4 The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan, EU-Africa
BF42-4CB3-B566-407591845C43/0/071206jsapenlogos_formatado.pdf, last accessed on
22.05.2010.
imperative for a comprehensive and holistic approach to security issues. This is translated in, firstly, a necessity for a strengthened dialogue and institutional cooperation which addresses both the African and EU security challenges\textsuperscript{5}, ensuring so the facilitation of a better coordination of efforts within the international arena, with a special reference to the UN Security Council\textsuperscript{6}. The main objective for the first priority action is to ‘reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges to peace and security in Africa, Europe and globally’, which is translated in common understanding of root causes to conflict, strengthened cooperation, improved coordination all of which should increase the influence of EU and Africa within the international and global fora. Secondly, the EU has committed, by taking into account the emergent AU’s APSA, to support its operationalisation and its various components, especially CESW, Panel of the Wise and the ASF, which is mostly translated with training exercises, exchanges and logistics. Thirdly, support the establishment of a predictable and sustainable funding mechanism for African-led peace support operations. This will be achieved by building on the experience of the African Peace Facility (APF) and the Additional Voluntary Contributions (AVCs) of EU MS\textsuperscript{7}. These main issues are the points of departure for the work carried out within the partnership and contain clearly specified objectives, expected outcomes and planned initiatives\textsuperscript{8}. The three priority actions of JAESP&S point at a remarkable similarity with the priorities set within the EU Strategy for Africa (ESA) adopted by the EU in 2005. JAESP&S takes advantage of a number of key mechanisms, such as the APF\textsuperscript{9}, the EU concept for Strengthening African


\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{9} APF was created in 2003 upon a request by African leaders. It is funded through the EDF: €440 million for the period 2004-7; €300 million for 2008-2010. In 2007 it received additional funding through the voluntary contributions of EU MS. African countries also contribute, i.e. South Africa. APF is at the centre of JAESP&S priority action three. Its aims were twofold:
Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts\textsuperscript{10}, the EU Delegation to the AU\textsuperscript{11} and the Special Adviser for African Peace-Keeping Capabilities\textsuperscript{12}. The first two mechanisms were established prior to JAES P&S and the last two ones at about the same time.

THE JAES P&S THROUGH THE LENS OF RAM

After having presented the broad rationale and actions intended for the JAES P&S, the chapter will continue by applying Allison’s approach to JAES P&S. Allison sustains that

‘By observing behaviour and considering what the actor’s objective might be, when I identify an objective that is advanced effectively by the action, I have a strong hypothesis about why [concerned actors – in our case EU] did whatever they did’\textsuperscript{13}.

support African led PSOs and capacity building for APSA including RECs. For instance, to African PSOs: €300 million to AMIS; €15.5 million to AMISOM; € 23.4 million to FOMUC/CAR; €5 million to AMISEC.

\textsuperscript{10} Initiated through an agreement between France and the UK in 2005-6, and adopted by the EU in May 2006 and was intended as the framework for implementing ESA, with the focus of supporting the establishment of AU APSA, including the creation of ASF, focus which has been transferred to JAES P&S. For more see: European Council 2006 ‘The EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts’, Brussels, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/91667.pdf, last accessed on 22.05.2010.

\textsuperscript{11} The EU Council established the position of an EU delegation exclusively dedicated to the AU. The position of ambassador Koen Vervaeke, is a double-hatted, meaning it represents both the Council as the EU Special representative (EUSR) and the Commission as the Head of its Delegation. For more: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1397&lang=EN.

\textsuperscript{12} Established by the European Council in February 2008, with the aim of providing with decisive resources in order to implement the JAES P&S, ‘coordinating all related activities’ within the Council Secretariat. For more see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=942&lang=EN, last accessed on 22.05.2010.

RAM, though, broadens this angle by including in its analysis the calculations, – threats and/or opportunities–, about the situation in which the actor finds itself\textsuperscript{14}.

**WHY ENGAGE IN AFRICA?**

The European Union is seen as the ‘natural partner’ for Africa. There are several reasons for it. Firstly, due to their geographical proximity which accounts for the long history on the relationship between the two continents which spans many centuries, -a relationship not always harmonious, though, as witnessed by the colonialist legacy of the past. Despite this legacy, former colonial powers such as France and UK have maintained close ties with their former colonies. Secondly, the European trade and investment have continuously remained of particular importance to Africa – over 50 per cent of global Official Development Aid (ODA) in provided by EU which it still holds the commitment to increase ODA to .56 per cent of GNI by end of 2010, being so on the best way to reach the UN target of 0.7 percent by 2015. And thirdly, the increased concerns about security problems in Africa and their repercussions in Europe\textsuperscript{15}. Fourthly, the continent’s abundance in natural resources, is an important factor as well, especially energy. EU is looking for other sources to secure supply and Africa is an alternative to the volatile Middle East and to her disadvantageous dependence on Russia\textsuperscript{16}.

Another subjective factor may be seen on the EU’s perception of being about to ‘miss the boat’, since Africa has been placed at the centre of foreign policies of old and new powers. Undoubtedly, the engagement of US in Africa and the establishment of AFRICOM, as well as the huge amounts on investment flowing to Africa from the emerging powers especially from China, do point out at this direction. Thus, the scramble between major players, such as the USA, China, India, etc., for access to the African market, has pointed to the importance perceived by the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} This factor will be handled at greater length on the following section of this same chapter ‘Conceptualisation of Security & Securitisation of External Borders’.

EU to continue to remain the biggest partner in Africa, for out of this positions can the EU ensure her influence on the continent\(^\text{17}\).

Some argue that the EU action, concerning the strategic partnership with Africa, was exclusively pushed due to an imperative not to ‘miss the boat’. For instance:

\begin{quote}
‘The planned EU-Africa Summit [Lisbon 2007] is one example. This high-level meeting between the two continents had been put on the back burner for the past seven years. And then out of the blue, the EU made it a pressing issue. Without such a summit, the EU fears that it may lose its foothold in Africa. [...] Africa has now become the continent to be won over’\(^\text{18}\).
\end{quote}

Such argument is also sustained by the following rhetoric used by African journalists in Lisbon who saw the summit taking ‘place at a time when there is growing Chinese investment and influence and a recognition that the continent is no longer ‘Europe’s private hunting grounds’’\(^\text{19}\). Others, though, would argue that ‘[Such] did not prompt [the] development [of JAES] but gave it new impetus’\(^\text{20}\).

\section*{Conceptualisation of Security & Securitisation of External Borders}

EU’s internal development process has also to be taken into account when considering the reasons for the new found eagerness to engage in Africa. The deepening of integration has brought EU MS together to coordinate their standpoints,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
including aspirations for a greater role within the international arena. The subsequent development concerning CFSP/ESDP raised issues on how to deal with i.e. Africa. In the 1990s and at the dawn of the new century the centre-stage was occupied by issues concerning security, be it in terms of wars and conflicts within EU’s very own backyard but also in Africa or in terms of new threats and their transnational nature such as the phenomenon of terrorism. The EU had to first and foremost, identify what her security interests as well as threats were, and what instruments it had to develop in order to deal with them. Therefore in analysing the JAES P&S, of utmost importance is the inclusion within the discourse of the conceptualisation of security and how this is related to the African realities and sensitivities. The EU had to provide answers to questions such as what are her values and goals, what security instruments it intends to use to protect those values and attain those goals, as well as what is the security threat to the EU. The answer to such questions came not easily since the EU traditionally has not been conceived of as an international security object –it does not have a collective defence in the traditional sense– nor has it been analyzed as a subject pursuing an active security policy because ‘security policy’ was competence of the EU member states (or to be taken care of in other organizations such as the NATO). Therefore, the EU has mostly been viewed as an outcome or reflection of the considerations of other players, rather than an actor in itself. This lack of own international security identity has been addressed by one of the main strategic documents of the EU’s security policy: the European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood, which in some geographical areas, especially Africa, are negatively affected by conflicts, poverty and poor governance and require an active engagement. This marked what has been called ‘the end of territorial defence\(^{21}\) for the EU. Its objectives are in a more narrow sense of course the protection of the EU citizens and the protection of EU as space but they do also include the protection of universal values wherever they are threatened in the world\(^{22}\). So seen, threats to the


EU security are best defined as those who threaten the core values of the EU (such as those defined within the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), as well as the international law. In that case, EU security would equal international security, which would imply that the EU has no specific external security space. This rationale has made imperative to develop a foreign policy which requires an active engagement within the international security arena, making so crucial the development of a capacity which outlines a common focus on the promotion of peace in ‘distant places’. Today’s security threats —from climate change to avian influenza, from terrorism to failed states— pose new and complex challenges, since they seem to originate from many sources, cross political and functional boundaries with ease and have the potential to affect a wide variety of critical infrastructures. The EU also recognises that the 21st century security picture has fundamentally changed: ‘the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’. Consequently, poverty and pandemic diseases as well the cyber security and climate change were added to threats such as terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, international organized crime and regional conflicts. Thus, the divide between external security, such as i.e. wars, international order and internal security matters such as terrorism, public order, and organised crime, has become to be considered largely inexisten,


24 Ibid.


27 Ibid., p.2

pointing so to the emergence of a security continuum. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in US but also the ones in own ground like the 7/7 in London and Madrid bombings in 2004, proved the interdependence that has come to characterise the international order. In terms of EU policies this resulted with a growing assimilation of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and EU external affairs, as indicated by the fact that addressing the instability of the African continent advanced as one of the major security concerns for EU MS. The JAES P&S, at the request of EU MS aims to address these issues, since they feel to experience repercussions in terms of drugs and arms trafficking, illegal immigration, transnational organised crime, illicit trade in natural resources and terrorism, originating from Africa.

In summarizing, there appear to be three major motives that seem to ‘function in a conceptual and practical symbiosis and are mutually inseparable’ which help shed light on EU’s conceptualisation and approach to security: morality, legality and self-interest. The EU is morally committed to helping those who are lacking, or threatened to their, basic security. The legal motive as shaped within the international law, concerns the fact that the EU is obliged to secure human security for all people.

‘Europeans have to take on their full responsibility and their role in their security and that of the world’.

Finally, an understanding that Europeans cannot be safe as long as others live in insecurity, for ‘external insecurity’ will ultimately affect Europe.

EU’s conceptualization of security provides a ground for agreement with the African counterpart, for they too see security not only in traditional terms but also in terms of


32 Quotation from French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the French Amabassodars Conference on 27 August 2007.

33 Ibid.
human security, as Chapter II of this same work already evaluated. By applying Allison’s concept of RAM, the EU has a clear objective and strategy pertaining to security which is ultimately instrumental to the attainment of her security interests and that provides a common ground with the African conceptualisation of security; all in all it seems that such perfectly marries with the JAES P&S partnership.

SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS:

The EU, especially since the Goteborg Programme in 2001\textsuperscript{34}, has developed into a key actor in shaping and defining the agenda about issues concerning the security-development nexus. The EU has increasingly sought to influence the debate on this matter at an international as well as national level. For instance, it has provided a platform for launching discussions in i.e. the making of a ‘Human Security Doctrine for Europe’, and in these terms, the EC has proposed that the human security (HS) concept should be at the basis of bridging development and security policies. Internationally seen the HS is disputed, but at the EU level, the HS is sought with the aim to ensure that EU security policies do take into account the human security needs\textsuperscript{35} in concerned countries, regions and continents such as Africa. The EU, with its ‘multi-functional approach’, as it is also claimed by the ESS, promotes a holistic approach, through which it aims to position itself as a major actor on the international arena. The reasoning behind this is that the EU, inasmuch an international actor offering a multi-dimensional approach to security issues, can claim the status of an international power\textsuperscript{36}. EU’s added value as a multi-institutional


and/or hybrid structure is likely to provide all types of crisis management tools – from humanitarian to civilian to military – within one unique framework. Due to the complexity and multiplicity of problems faced – poverty, conflicts, wars, and humanitarian catastrophes – the African continent fits perfectly within this EU approach. Such debate is also welcomed by Africa/AU since it too it looks to tackle security comprehensively. African perceptions of security include poverty, pandemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, food insecurity, child soldiers, bad governance etc.

At the EU, the security-development nexus is seen as to embrace two dimensions, the one concerning the politico-legal facet mentioned above, and the other, the implementation through instruments that comprehensively tackle the security and long term development agendas. This second dimension is fully included within the i.e. instruments funding JAES P&S such as the EDF, the African Peace Facility (APF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), etc. Although, it has to be said that, the fact that APF funds are sourced from

---


the EDF has raised some restrictions on the type of support to be provided, i.e. APF funds are earmarked for personnel and logistical needs and cannot be used for direct military assistance, which it has created complications for the AU to effectively employ APF funds in supporting peacekeeping operations.

Coming back to the EU and African conceptualisations of the security-development nexus, it can be said that the main objective for both actors, rather than finding common grounds on what security for each of them is (they seem to share most of these common grounds), would instead be

‘[...] to come out with the framework and measures to promote a common policy to help out fragile African states or those in difficulty, taking into account the socio-economic and humanitarian dimensions of human security’40.

From the official statements remarked at the Lisbon summit, it becomes clear that the JAES, its P&S partnership and especially its Action Plan aim at doing exactly this.

THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AS A TEST CASE FOR EU’S PEACE AND SECURITY CAPACITIES

‘Once the EU knew where it stood, there was an urge to try the ideas in practice. [...] Africa is the opportunity – an ideal incubator, some argue – to develop greater EU coherence in foreign policy making and to further improve the external relations’ capacity. Africa is also an arena in which the EU can fulfil its commitments under the 2003 Joint EU-UN Declaration on Crisis Management41.

---


and where the battle groups concept could start to be implemented\(^{42}\).

The dawn of the new century evidenced a growing desire on the EU’s part to become increasingly involved in the resolution of Africa’s security problems. It started with the launching of Operation Artemis from June to September 2003 in DRC\(^{43}\), which is seen as a founding act in the mobilisation of the second pillar instruments in Africa\(^{44}\). Operation Artemis opened the way to a new form of cooperation between the EU and the UN. Moving away from Operation Artemis, the EU’s engagement in Africa’s conflict management and resolution has a deeper rationale which aimed at providing legitimacy, from an internal as well as external perspective, to the new EU security structures. Africa’s conflicts were instrumental to prove that the EU and her military structures –the Military Committee (EUMC) and Military Staff (EUMS)–, were able to plan military operations autonomously without resort to i.e. NATO means and instruments. Such has accordingly pointed out to the fact that the EU has found a niche where her ESDP can gain increasing international credibility. Internally seen, the EU’s engagement on Africa’s peace and security matters, would serve to test the decision-making procedures at the politico-military level\(^{45}\). The relative success of ESPD missions in Africa has served to consolidate the EU’s contributions to peace and post-conflict reconstruction, which in their own terms, consolidate the legitimacy of EU activities in and beyond Africa, placing so the EU as an international security actor which is to be taken seriously. EU’s engagement in Africa is also seen in terms of boosting EU’s image as a provider of innovative solutions for peace and security


\(^{43}\) Operation Artemis was launched on 12 June 2003, with the aim to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Ituri, in the North East of DRC, as a result of violent fighting between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The operation was explicitly mandated by the UN’s Security Council (Resolution 1484) in order to maintain the security in the camps hosting the internally displaced, secure the airport in Bunia and protect civilians, UN staff and humanitarian agencies in the region. It was intended as a bridging mission till the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was reinforced and its strength increased.


\(^{45}\) More on the decision-making procedures with the EU are to be handled at the second section of this chapter when JAES P&S will be analysed through the OBM and BPM approaches.
problems which do take into account the security-development nexus as pertaining to i.e. good governance practices, evidenced by the Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions\textsuperscript{46}. Most importantly though, EU ‘experimentations’ in Darfur evidenced another crucial EU feature, that of being able to implement at an operational level its partnership with the AU. This exercising pointed at the EU’s preference to work multilaterally, to enhance the capacity of African structures indicating the importance it places on the principle of African ownership and at the same time building up the legitimacy of future EU-AU cooperation within the peace and security sector. Undoubtedly, that such experience did create a significant goodwill basis during the standing up of JAES P&S between EU and AU.

**MULTILATERALISM AND JAES P&S**

‘We want international organisations, [...] to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken. [...] the African Union make[s] an important contribution [...]’\textsuperscript{47}.

As a result of the intensifying of regionalism processes, as mentioned in Chapter 4, EU has been eager to assert itself as an important international actor by establishing communication channels and closely cooperating with regional and continental organisations such as the AU. Such cooperation is seen in terms of ‘contributing to order in world politics’\textsuperscript{48}, inasmuch EU is perceived as a model for successfully tackling peace and security matters at the regional/continental level. Furthermore, EU’s ‘distinct nature’ and her preference for cooperation rather than confrontation provide a significant goodwill basis for an enhanced dialogue with other international actors. The already mentioned ESS stressed the need to work with international

\textsuperscript{46} Reference is being made to i.e. EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC DRC, etc.


partners, including Africa. The EU aims to contribute to international security by exercising effective multilateralism, international cooperation and strengthening the multilateral institutions. For instance, such stance has its origins in May 2001 when the Council adopted a Common Position Concerning Conflict prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa. It is with this common position that an essential feature of EU’s security strategy in Africa was made apparent, namely that of an increased multilateralism aimed at intensifying EU’s partnership with African regional organisations and the UN on the matter and at the same time an increased EU contribution in strengthening their capabilities. This Common Position was adapted to the changing times in 2004 and in 2005 and 2007. In the later, the imperative for greater coordination between EU MS bilateral actions was highlighted with special reference for the support of AU and African SROs. Taking into consideration, on the one side, the fact that the African continent represents the most needs for international peacekeeping/building interventions, –EU has committed to deploy civilian and military personnel in the framework of ESDP, UN and NATO, and on the other side, the fact that most EU MS lack capacity to deal individually with Africa’s conflicts, EU has, thus, developed a genuine interest in reinforcing African capabilities with the aim of creating an autonomous African security system which firstly hinders security problems to reach Europe, secondly, aims at avoid increasing costs to the EU, and thirdly increases the EU’s legitimacy in peace and security matter internationally. This also supports the notion of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ that has been advanced by AU and NEPAD, by pointing out that ultimately the Africans maintain primary responsibility for the prevention,


50 EU SSR Guinea Bissau, EUSEC RDC, EUPOL RDC, EUNAVFOR Atalanta; EUTM Somalia account for the 1765 personnel deployed within ESDP missions in Africa; MINURCAT Chad/RCA, UNAMID Darfur; UNMIS Sudan; UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire; UNMIL in Liberia, MONUC in RDC MINURSO in Western Sahara, BINUB in Burundi account for the 68296 UN personnel out of which 3704 are pledged by the EU countries; EU MS who are also NATO members are involved in assisting AMISOM with airlift support as well as through the counter-piracy Operation Ocean Shield off the coast of Horn of Africa.


52 Ibid.
management and resolution of conflicts in Africa, and that the central actors are the AU and African SROs53.

The so-called ‘African Renaissance’ has gone hand in hand with the awakening of the African political elite which has pushed for a consolidation of the regional integration and developed common mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

‘I say yes to ‘Africa to Africans’, but no to Africa without the international community’54.

This newly found assertiveness of the AU to deal with peace and security has been also acknowledged by the UN, as subsequent documents bear testimony. The G8, as well has made Africa a central point of the agendas of its last eight summits. The EU has acted very much in the same way, and undeniably, the creation of AU/APS A, provided the EU with a platform for a more systemic engagement in Africa and the emergence of APSA with even clearer channels for dialogue. The JAES P&S partnership is obviously ‘not an isolated occurrence on the EU Africa sky’. Its objectives have taken stock, continued on, have been formed, strengthened and complemented by several Africa-EU contacts and EU policies, which have increasingly expanded since 200055. EU, through the JAES P&S, took advantage of these opportunities and put the regional/continental structures of Africa (AU/SROs) at the centre of the partnership, by arguing that:


55 This has been elaborated at greater length within Part II, Chapter 6, of this dissertation.
‘The EU has a privileged relationship with the AU which is at the heart of the [JAES]. As a regional organisation itself the EU has experience of institution building, a history of integration and an inclusive approach to partnership. African states can benefit from working together through regional organisations, and the EU is best-placed to assist in this process’

**THE JAES P&S THROUGH THE LENS OF OBM & BPM**

EU involvement in African peace and security matters, as it has been mentioned throughout most part of this dissertation, predates the JAES P&S. This is partly a response to the desire of certain EU MS to avoid charges of colonial interference in a direct reaction to i.e. France’s unilateralist moves in Africa, for France ‘rather than being a driving force, [...] has long been an obstacle to the EU’s further involvement in African security issues. France’s unilateralist policy in Africa has acted as a disincentive on other European states, which were reluctant to associate their image and the image of the EU with a policy often considered neo-colonial’

Thus, the actions of EU MS in Africa, at least of some of them, did not concord with the EU stance, i.e. France’s unilateral behaviour is an example. When these EU MS are the same as the main traditional actors in Africa, then, arguably rightly, the difficulties in reaching a common policy such as JAES P&S are indeed very big. Nonetheless, the JAES P&S is agreed, and this section focuses on explaining why and how EU MS chose to walk the same way. This will be done by using a specific OBM tool: the logic of appropriateness. Graham Allison, claims that the logic of

---


appropriateness is very much at the heart of the OBM to explaining foreign policy. The logic of appropriateness is a perspective on how action –policy making included– is to be interpreted and that the logic of appropriateness is seen as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organised into institutions.

‘Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community [...] and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situations.’

In our context the analysis of action within a ‘formally organised political institution’ and/or ‘membership in a political community’ will initially focus within the EU’s intergovernmental Pillar II.

**EUROPEANISATION OF EU MS AFRICA PEACE AND SECURITY POLICIES**

Concerning Africa and EU’s engagement in the continent’s peace and security matters, traditionally seen most of the EU MS have not vested in Africa any significant political or economic interest. For instance, Germany has long been

---


60 Ibid., p. 2.

61 The European Union, as delineated by the Treaty on European Union signed in Amsterdam on 02.10.1997, is structured on three pillars: the first one is the ‘Community Pillar’ concerns the economic, social and environmental policies; the second is the ‘CFSP Pillar’ which concerns foreign policy and military matters; and the third one or the ‘Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal matters (PJCC)’ concerns cooperation in the fight against crime. The three pillars function according to different decision-making procedures, the first one uses the Community procedure, which has the exclusive right to submit proposals to the Council and Parliament and a QMV is sufficient for a Council act to be adopted; while the two others use the intergovernmental procedure, where the Commission shares the right of initiative with the EU MS and unanimity in the Council is generally required for an act to be passed.
adamant about the necessity to limit peace and security interventions within the enlarged European space and been against to the idea of any EU involvement in the management of Africa’s conflicts. France hasn’t also been keen to the idea of an EU involvement into Africa security matters, for it preferred a unilateralist policy, especially within the francophone Africa. Such behaviour prompted deterrence, toward France’s Africa policy, on the part of other EU MS, especially Germany, who did not want to see themselves and EU acquiring a neo-colonial image in Africa.

It has, though, to be said that France, particularly since the dawn of the new century, has been gradually and increasingly reducing its direct presence in Africa. It has become hesitant to act unilaterally, as demonstrated by i.e. its involvement in DRC only within the EU or its presence in Côte d’Ivoire under UN mandate within the UN forces. This is also sustained by the rhetoric of French ministers, for instance the French Foreign Minister is quoted to have said that France would no longer be ‘the gendarme of Africa’. These latest developments bear witness to a sea change on France’s behaviour: it has increasingly acquired a multilateral feature, or other said France’s behaviour in Africa has ‘Europeanised’. The reason to it is that the inclusion of France within the EU framework allows France to remain involved in Africa, – perceived by France as a crucial quality to ensuring its position on the international arena, but with the bonus of an image void of a paternalist or neo-colonial trait. Such Europeanisation of France’s Africa policy allows France also to share the costs of interventions. Thus, according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’, France acts in, what it sees as, an appropriate behaviour by Europeanising its Africa policy, for such is instrumental to her international image as well as cost efficient within this specific type of situation. France would also like to see EU’s involvement

---


63 Ibid., p.25.

64 Cited from House of Lords, 2005-06 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’, p.65.

in Africa as a prove that the EU can, if necessary, act alone, rendering so dispensable the need to coordinate with other actors, most obviously NATO and USA.

Very much like France, UK, another traditional actor in Africa, has not been keen to Europeanise its Africa policies, at least initially. The UK, given the specific situation in early 2000s, perceived their Africa policies as solidly efficient, and thus, saw it as appropriate not to Europeanise them. In 2005, which was declared the ‘year of Africa’, by putting Africa at the centre stage of i.e. G8 Summit Gleneagles, but also the year when the EU MS agreed the EU Africa Strategy, UK showed a sea change to its attitude concerning the Europeanisation of its Africa policy:

‘The European Union now covers most of Europe, including all those states with particular interests in Africa; it is the obvious means by which European countries should cooperate to deliver aid to Africa effectively and ensure coherent policies in areas such as peacekeeping [...]’.

The British, also, insists on the necessity of coordinating these activities at an international level, most obviously with USA, Canada etc. As made clear from the official statements ensued, UK views, for instance, ESA and the G8 Gleneagles Plan for Africa as totally interconnected. Germany also prefers a multilateral approach and promotes a closer cooperation among EU and NATO.

Due to the importance Africa has gained as it relates to EU security, as evaluated at the beginning of this chapter, many other EU MS, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, etc., have increasingly stepped up their involvement, via EU, within the African security concerns. Such claim is sustained by the large number of participating EU MS within i.e. ESDP missions in Africa. The EU MS have developed a genuine interest in reinforcing African capabilities allowing this last one

66 UK, since 2001, has considerably invested in developing African peacekeeping capabilities in former colonies via the British Peace Support Teams, which became part of an ambitious interdepartmental programme: the Africa Conflict prevention Pool (ACPP). The departments involved are that for International Development (DfID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

to erect an autonomous structure able to tackle security matters in own space, thus ultimately, avoiding an increase in costs on the side of EU.

That the EU MS reached a common position concerning the JAES P&S, has to be seen under the prism offered from the ‘logic of appropriateness’ concept. By fulfilling the obligations, as required by the practices and expectations of the community they are members – i.e. EU’s preference for multilateral cooperation, and for moving away from paternalistic, neo-colonial behaviour–, they did what they saw as appropriate –common position concerning JAES P&S– given the specific situation they were in –as defined by the security threats and opportunities in Africa.

The process of Europeanisation has made peremptory the need for greater coordination among EU MS policies as well as for greater coherence between them and the EU institutions themselves. Accordingly, Africa’s security has offered an interesting opportunity for doing exactly that. The EU, as a matter of fact, through its security policy, especially concerning SSA, aims to ‘integrate the policies and actions of its member states’68.

The role EU plays within Africa’s peace and security, is defined by both its ‘own conception about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations and role prescriptions of other actors’69. The EU’s own conception about appropriate behaviour is enshrined by the image it projects as a civilian/normative power, which has been evaluated on the previous chapters. For this chapter is though relevant to mentioned that what is felt as the ‘EU’s obsession’ for normative behaviour i.e. good governance and democracy promotion, has raised harsh criticism, especially referring to the negative conditionality measures. This was clearly evidenced during the 2007 Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon, concerning the participation of the Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. The head of the AU Commission is quoted to have said


that, although sharing the EU’s concern, ‘we will not let ourselves be bullied or pressurised regarding who (from Africa) should attend the Summit or not’.

Concerning expectations and role prescriptions of other actors, such as the African ones, the EU due to its contribution to peacekeeping in Africa is generally viewed positively, and as a result of its long-standing commitments to conflict prevention and resolution, leaders and officials at the AU describe the EU as a ‘preferential partner’. The fact that the EU has developed an approach to foreign policy which is based on civilian/normative means and structural stabilisation processes, has found broad acceptance at the AU level. The EU is, first and foremost, seen as a model of achieving peace through integration, making the EU well accepted to provide African continental structures with capability/capacity support and advice. Although, it has to be said, the fact that the ‘African leaders and the public opinion [...] do not share the willingness [...] for a political union’, puts some restraints on the repertoire of the EU in Africa. The fact that the EU, concerning the APF, has trusted ‘the leadership of the African Union as regards its management to defend both the interests of the regional communities and the African countries’, accounts for another factor that contributes to the EU being perceived as a ‘preferential partner’ by the AU. In this sense, and seen from the prism of the ‘logic of appropriateness’, inasmuch ‘roles of actors are determined both by an actor’s own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role prescriptions, of other actors’, JAES P&S’ priority actions, concerning respectively enhanced dialogue between AU-EU, support for the operationalisation of the APSA structure and financing, dwell in already fertile grounds.


71 Ibid., p.6.

72 Ibid., p.7.

EU’s African Security, Inter-Institutional & Inter-Pillar Coordination

JAES P&S, as well as each and every new policy paper concerning EU’s security in Africa, stresses the importance for inter-institutional and inter-pillar coordination. The very success of the European approach to African conflict prevention, management and resolution relies heavily on the aptitude of the EU to overcome rivalry among its institutions. The competition is fuelled by the different interests and desire of relevant institutions to play the ‘lead role’ on the issues of peace and security. Such behaviour is best explained through the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) which sustains that bureaucratic behaviour consists of power struggles among rival agencies. Accordingly, agencies concerned will resist any change that may diminish their role as a leading agency. Career officials will seek to maximise power, budget and mandate, all of which will ensure the organisational health of their own agencies.

‘[Organisational health is] defined in terms of bodies assigned and [Euros] appropriated [which ensures that the agency will continue to] maintain influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the necessary capabilities [thus,] career officials are prone to believe that the health of their organisation is vital.’

Thus, in attempting to maximise tasks to be delegated to own organisation, the resultant, within the governance structure composed of these rivalling agencies, will be turf wars. JAES P&S requires inter-agency coordination, especially among Directorate General for Development and relations with ACP States (DG DEV) and Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX), who have ‘the overall


77 Ibid.
responsibility for policy steering, guidance and coordination and which are also involved with the rest seven partnerships of JAES. JAES P&S also requires cooperation with the General Secretariat of the Council. It is envisioned that these three institutions/agencies will ensure coherence and overall coordination for JAES P&S.

Within the EC the rival agencies are most obviously its Directorate General, particularly those with a mandate focused on Africa. The most powerful agencies in this sense are DG RELEX and most obviously the DG DEV, which often tends to see Africa as its ‘exclusive territory’. The discourse on the security-development nexus has provided DG DEV with an approach that allows it to defend their privileged geographic area of intervention and investing in a functional field which has not been traditionally theirs. Undoubtedly, that the ‘organisational health’ has received a distinct boom in terms of personnel and budget. The allocation of APF under the responsibility of DG DEV, decidedly, points at this direction. Thus, DG DEV has acted, by using BPM terminology, with the aim of enhancing organisational health which has ensured that it ‘maintains influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the necessary capabilities’.

DG RELEX plays a pivotal role in conflict prevention through its Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit, which is also ‘in charge of coordinating and mainstreaming the Commission’s conflict prevention and management activities [as well as it] provides the necessary link between the Commission’s institutions and their Council counterparts’. The fact that a Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit’s member is at the same time the Commission’s representative within the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) as well as within the


Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM), is a very good omen concerning future coordination efforts needed for the JAES P&S.

Nevertheless, the EC is far from being a unified actor within the JAES P&S. As a matter of fact, EC is plagued by coordination problems among its DGs as a result of unclear divisions of labour caused from the securitisation and intertwining of different fields within conflict prevention, management and resolution. For instance, DG DEV and DG Trade are required to take into account the assessment reports/watch-lists on the root causes of conflict delivered by DG RELEX through its specific Country/Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs), but they do ‘often pursue different, or even contradictory objectives’.

A further point of contention concerning coordination problems within the EC is provided through EU MS forwarding their national interests, and as pointed out at the beginning of this section, they too often are contradictory and pursue different objectives.

Moving to the second pillar, the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) together with its directorates general constitute another important actor among the EU actors for JAES P&S. DGE, which is in charge of external, political and military affairs, is of relevance here. DGE is divided into geographic and functional directorates and, as of 2007 and prior to the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon, the responsibility to coordinate the management of African security matters was hardly fought, especially among two DGE’s directorates the DGE VIII and DGE IX. DG VIII, who oversees defence matters, was animated to get involved within a turf war with DGE IX, out of a calculation that being endowed with the task of coordinating the management of African security matters would increase her legitimacy vis-à-vis other DGE directorates, since this would imply an expanded mandate, higher budgets and, arguably, increased number of personnel. The DGE IX, on the other side, oversees the civilian aspects of crisis management which include the following instruments: a Police Unit, relevant to SSR projects; a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit) responsible for strategic and geopolitical analyses at the service of HR

\[\text{82 Ibid., p.15.}\]

\[\text{83 Bagayoko & Gibert claim that important actors in EU Africa policy like the Belgian European civil servants within DGDEV are seen as promoting their national interests.}\]
CFSP; and the Situation Centre (SITCEN). The DGE IX saw itself as better positioned to coordinate the management of African security issues within JAES P&S, since it also nurtures closer relationships with the EC, especially DG DEV. A losing out to DGE VIII would mean for the DGE IX a tough setback for its organisational health. A third contender has also arisen, the civilian-military cell (CivMil Cell) which also sees a chance to grow its legitimacy vis-à-vis older DGE institutions.

The cross-pillar rivalries provide another reason to worry concerning JAES P&S. The establishment of APF, the most important funding instrument for JAES P&S, is an interesting example which highlights such claim. The Commission, with the establishment of APF in 2004, reached an important victory against the Council, inasmuch APF is an instrument which funds African-owned peacekeeping operations, in a time when CFSP/ESDP and by extension peacekeeping missions, are a prerogative of the Council.

The debate about the source of APF funding is revealing on the inter-pillar struggle. There were four possible alternatives. Firstly, it was the consideration to allocate the new funds from the then current EDF. Such would have the consequence that despite the fact that EDF are not part of the Community budget, nevertheless, EDF and accordingly APF funds are managed by the Commission/DG DEV. This means that the Commission/DG DEV’s organisational health –defined at least partially, in terms of monies appropriated– receives a great boost and accounts for assuring EC/DG DEV’s influence, fulfilling its mission, and foremost, securing the necessary capabilities. The second option saw the CFSP budget as the source of APF, which would imply a reduction of EC/DG DEV’s influence, whereas the Council would savour a Pyrrhic victory, as the following statement highlights:

‘Representatives of the Belgian government, in their evidence to us [UK House of Lords], supported keeping APF funding within the EDF to avoid diverting resources away from the under-funded CFSP, and to ensure that the EU remains fully involved in the

---

process, thereby maintaining a coherent approach between the different European institutions and the EU Member States. [...] Witnesses also considered the CFSP budget too small to support the minimum level of funding required for an effective APF [...] 85.

This option would have had only one winner, the European Parliament (EP), who as part of its competence in the CFSP budget would have a say on the use of the APF funds. The third option contemplated was the creation of a new multi-annual EDF-like fund to be managed either through EDF procedure (EC/DG DEV) or wholly managed by EU MS. The fourth option would see the control of funds according to their purpose, i.e. funds used for AU capability building would be managed by EC, while the small support for AU PSOs would be controlled by the EP.

After the provisional period of APF ended, it was decided to maintain the procedures already used, meaning the choice fell on the first option portrayed above. Nevertheless, the heated inter-pillar turf war did not recede. Contention focused on two main subjects, firstly, on the EDF funds being used for security purposes; and secondly, the different conceptualisation of the notion of ‘effective ownership’ or ‘African ownership’. The first is actually mirrored from the international dispute concerning the use of development monies for security purposes already analysed at previous parts of this dissertation. Within the European context, for DG ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office), humanitarian assistance is apolitical, neutral and impartial 86. DG ECHO disputes the definition by the Petersberg tasks which claim humanitarian assistance as eventually an important part of i.e. ESDP missions. DG ECHO argues that such reasoning would contribute towards a politicisation of aid further blurring the difference between military and humanitarian actors. Accordingly, there is a frosty relationship among DG ECHO and the Council’s DG VIII. The second concerns the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’ meaning that the responsibility for EU’s financial, technical assistance and training initiatives earmarked for supporting African capabilities in peace and security matters (conflict prevention, management and resolution), relies by the

---

85 House of Lords, 2005-06 ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’, p.74.

African partners. The Commission preferred to use APF funds to support AU, given the achievement it has booked especially with the creation of the AU’s Peace and Security Council, while EU MS and GSC would predominantly or exclusively want to earmark these funds for supporting African SROs, especially ECOWAS which actually had the operational experience. As the very JAES P&S shows, the Commission had the upper hand.

The above give concern and makes room for strengthening inter-pillar inter-institutional coherence, cooperation, and coordination focused on Africa’s peace and security issues. This seems to have been addressed as follows: Since June 2007 an ad-hoc group was established charged to draft and adopt the JAES and its Action Plan. Being an ad-hoc instrument, the Council is on the looking for a more permanent provision. Two alternatives seem to crystallise. The first concerns the creation of a Brussels-based, cross-pillar working group vested with the responsibility to manage JAES. Such working group will cover SSA (ACP) and North African countries, pan-African issues, and the preparation of Africa-EU Ministerial meetings and Summits. The second alternative sees the revision of the mandate and working modalities for the Africa Working Group (COAFR) already existing as well as the first option but with a reduced mandate, namely covering pan-African issues for both SSA and Northern Africa which would so reflect the new vision of treating Africa as one.

EU-AFRICA: EQUAL PARTNERS?

Many involved within JAES feel that the EU has been far too ambitious and has put unrealistic expectations, which will further contribute towards an EU being


88 The second option has been adopted by now. The strengthened and expanded mandate for the Africa Working Group has been adopted at the 10th Africa EU Troika on 16 September 2008. Information available at: http://europafrica.net/2007/03/17/africa-working-group-of-the-council/, last accessed on 22.05.2010.

perceived as an actor with a, already familiar term, ‘capability–expectations gap’ problem. JAES emphasises an EU and AU relationship among equals, which is in stark contrast to the recurrent underfunding and understaffing of AU. The EU has more resources and capacities, and may

‘push too much [...] and put too much pressure on the African partners by overdoing things, such as preparing ready ‘lists of things to do’. However, due to its ownership of the process, the African side controls the pace’.

The combination of unrealistic expectations with the African way of doing things may give rise to frustrations.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS ON JAES P&S**

By concluding on RAM analysis of JAES P&S, it can be said that the geographical proximity, the long history, the high trade and investment volume as well as the natural resources’ abundance of Africa make the EU the ‘natural partner’ to Africa. The renewed interest that Africa gained especially post 9/11 and the perceived scramble for its resources between traditional and emerging powers just provided an impetus for relating with Africa at a strategic level. In particular, the rationale behind JEAS P&S is to be found at the way EU conceptualises her own security, which as a matter of fact, goes beyond the spatial area of EU as well as its citizens to include the world citizens who are lacking, or being threatened to, their basic human security needs. By applying Allison’s concept of RAM, the EU has a clear objective and strategy which ultimately is instrumental to the attainment of her security interests and such perfectly marries with the JAES P&S policy. Further the EU’s added value as a multi-institutional and/or hybrid structure that is likely to provide all types of

---


crisis management tools – from humanitarian to civilian to military – within one unique framework, accounts for her being viewed by i.e. AU officials as a ‘preferential partner’. Due to the complexity and multiplicity of problems faced – poverty, conflicts, wars, and humanitarian catastrophes – the African continent fits perfectly within this EU approach. The EU has taken account of the changed African continent, and put the AU/APSA at the centre of the JAES P&S. Also the fact that the EU sees a close relationship between security and development, and that accordingly it implements policies which take into account such nexus make out of her a preferred AU partner, for it too prefers the same approach. The privileged relationship it has forged with the AU, as well as her being taken as a model regional organisation point out at the benefits that Africa may seize by working together. All these, undoubtedly, account for the goodwill basis upon which the P&S partnership is built.

By taking an OBM approach to JAES P&S, it can be argued that the EU MS common position concerning the JAES P&S, has to be seen under the prism offered from the ‘logic of appropriateness’ concept. By fulfilling the obligations, as required by the practices and expectations of the community they are members – i.e. EU’s preference for multilateral cooperation, or moving away from paternalistic, neo-colonial behaviour–, they did what they saw as appropriate – common position concerning JAES P&S – given the specific situation they were in – as defined by the security threats and opportunities in Africa.

By taking into consideration that ‘roles of actors are determined both by an actor’s own conceptions about appropriate behaviour and by the expectations, or role prescriptions, of other actors’, then the EU’s approach to foreign policy which is based on civilian/normative means and structural stabilisation processes, has found broad acceptance at the AU level. The broad acceptance is also sourced by the fact that the EU is seen by Africa as a model of achieving peace through integration and her insistence for African ownership as it is evidenced by the APF process. In these terms, JAES P&S’ priority actions, concerning respectively enhanced dialogue between AU-EU, support for the operationalisation of the APSA structure and financing, dwell in already fertile grounds.
In taking a BPM approach, the overall picture gets smudged, for its shows the many coordination problems at an inter-institutional and inter-pillar level. EU is plagued by turf wars, be they within the Commission’s DGs, as indicated especially by the thrust with which DG DEV fights to maintain and further gain an increasingly influential standing in African security matters. The picture that the Council’s agencies offer does not differ very much either.

These research results point out that while the standing up of JAES P&S did take into consideration the necessary strategic steps, the implementation of JAES P&S, as the insights gained through the BPM approach seem to suggest, faces considerable operational challenges. The JAES P&S risks to be stamped with a ‘too good to be true’.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

This research effort had as its object of interest the agendas that the USA and EU have set up with regard to Africa since the dawn of the 21st century. The main focus was placed on two pivotal policies, USAFRICOM and JAES P&S, which stated to have put Africa into the high politics agenda of USA and EU respectively. Since the reactions to these two policies diametrically differed, the research question concerned the reasons behind it by focusing on the decisions taken by the US and EU concerning Africa particularly during the standing up of AFRICOM and JAES P&S, respectively. The results from the research work point out at the fact that both actors, although, as stated, seemingly aiming the same, –support Africa in better dealing with her security problems–, chose different approaches which had a direct impact on the policy output that in its own terms attracted different reactions, especially from the African leaders.

In aiming to explain the above, the study has applied the imperatives offered by a body of theory which analyses foreign policy critically. A critical foreign policy analysis accepts the fact that a variety of actors other than the state are also capable of foreign policy, thus allowing the techniques used to analyse foreign policy to be equally transferred from the state to other significant international actors, such as the EU. Nevertheless, the use these techniques had to abide to five general rules: first, analysis should be empirical, meaning that analysis ought to look at actual cases and evidence, within an explicit theoretical framework; second, it had take into consideration both structure and agency, –decisions are always made (agency) within a set of constraints (structure)–; third, it had to accept a broad view of politics, meaning that analysis should not be exclusively focused at the governmental level but look at i.e. the influence of transnational norms; fourth, confront theoretical issues with knowledge and reality, meaning ‘search for gaps between words and deeds’; and five, recognise the contingency of the political process, meaning ‘accept that things could have always been different’.
In trying to satisfy the above-mentioned imperative one, the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a subfield within the International Relations (IR) theory, was chosen as the appropriate approach because it offered ‘a means [to bring together] foreign and domestic action under the same umbrella’ and a useful structure for a comparative analysis. By building on the premises that the essence of FPA is that it offers an actor perspective and a policy focus, the rest of the analysis was done by posing the six standard FPA questions concerning contexts, actors, processes, issues, instruments and outputs. The analysis centred on the notion of a foreign policy system in action, composed of the actors involved, the context within which they act, the policy processes, issues and instruments available and finally the policy output. This last one is seen as being generated by the interrelationship between actors, contexts, processes, issues and instruments. Such system has been mirrored in the structure that this dissertation was built upon.

The increasingly important place that Africa gained within the US and EU agendas, is explained through the remarkable changes occurred in and within Africa itself. For instance, the increased presence of new emerging powers in Africa, more than others that of China, accompanied with their unorthodox methods concerning trade and development cooperation, is found to have prompted a discourse on the appropriateness and timeliness of trade and development approaches from traditional/western donors (most prominently EU, USA, etc). The perceived scramble for access to Africa’s resources is found to constitute another important feature which sustains the need for greater US/EU influence in Africa. The rise of Africa on the respective agendas is thus due to the counterweight offered by the growing presence of new powers in Africa and their development cooperation, which seems to have enabled Africa use such presence as a leverage and place itself in a position which better allows her to negotiate and bargain with the other actors involved in the continent. All in all, they seem to have contributed to an African condition which has become a far more intensely competitive political and economic marketplace. This newly acquired feature is found to be also due to endogenous changes that Africa itself has implemented, as highlighted through the trends and challenges Africa is faced with. Obviously, the evolution and institutionalisation of peace and security structures at a pan-African level, most importantly the emergence of the AU/APSA is of utmost importance to the US EU engagements within the
African peace and security matters. It has been asserted that these last developments have provided Africa with an important structure with which to present itself as a unified actor within the international arena, as particularly, the EU Africa relations give evidence.

The agency of US and EU in Africa was also found to have been informed, at varying degrees, of the paradigm shifts in the conceptualisations of security and development, which emerged by the mid 1990s and were firmly established after the shock of 9/11. This has meant a preference for a security that goes beyond its traditional state-centric conceptualisation, having made so imperative for policies that tackle in a comprehensive and coherent manner the symbiotic interrelationship between security and development concerns. Another important paradigm has been that on regional integration and cooperation as an appropriate instrument in tackling security and instability concerns. The EU has proved a weighty example in this matter. The occurrence of 9/11 accounts for another structural transformation which has, undoubtedly, provoked a change in the way many international actors, US and EU included, modelled and implemented their respective foreign policies. For instance, within a post-9/11 environment and Global War On Terror (GWOT) strategy context, in the US, academia and policy makers alike invoked for a combination of hard and soft powers with the aim of strengthening existing alliances, bolstering potential allies as well backing up and supporting failing states who were perceived as vulnerable to extremist penetrations. This calling upon and attempts to invoke the global appeal of US values, its strengthening of partnerships with like-minded states, and imperatives for a multilateral diplomacy became paramount benchmarks for an informed and effective foreign policy.

The inclusion of hard/soft/smart and civilian/normative power discourses, not only accounted for the observance of the third rule of a critical foreign policy analysis mentioned above, but also it offered a means to effectuate an evaluation and ‘search for gaps between words and deeds’ within the US and EU agendas in Africa on these same grounds, thus obeying to the fourth rule of the same. On these grounds, the US foreign policy in Africa is found to have been ‘inconsistent, imbalanced’ and with ‘significant weaknesses’, while the EU with its distinct civilian/normative nature and new form of hybridy expressed through a complex multi-level governance system, is found to be ‘particularly well equipped to grasp and utilise the potential of
multilateral network organisations’. There seems to be a symbiotic relation between values and external policies determining so the nature of the processes which emphasise ‘diplomatic rather than coercive instruments, the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, the importance of long-term economic solutions to political problems, and the need for indigenous people to determine their fate – all of these in contradistinction to the norms of superpower politics’. Although, not everything at the EU Africa agenda is as rosier as it sounds, the EU’s trade/EPAs and migration policies are a case in point.

With the end of the Part II the first five elements of a foreign policy system in action had been concerned. The USAFRICOM and JAES P&S constitute the sixth element of the foreign policy system, the output. Of concern to this dissertation was why the US and EU decided to choose such approaches as well as the reasons behind the very different receptions these two policies obtained at their announcements. The arguments were focused around two hypotheses. It is firstly argued that

**Hypothesis 1.** if outputs are generated as a result of the interrelationship between the context, actors, issues, instruments, and processes, then a difference on how they are conceptualised by both actors as well as the partly/wholly omission of one or more of these elements at the decision-making process may/will account for less than optimal outputs,

and secondly,

**Hypothesis 2.** since bureaucracies have a clear preference for continuity as opposed to change, unless change means increase in own organisational health, then the respective bureaucracies involved would try to mould the policies (USAFRICOM, JAES P&S) in a way that would best fit their own organisational health/interests, which may account for less than optimal outputs.

These arguments were thought as being best evaluated through that branch of the FPA which has focused on and analysed the dynamics of the decision-making process. The appropriate tool in assessing this claim is provided by Graham Allison’s
three-level framework. The analysis through the lens of the Rational Actor Model (RAM) was instrumental for setting the broader context including interests, threats and opportunities perceived out of the given context. The setting of the broader context through RAM highlighted the issues of interest and the instruments preferred or available to both the US and EU. It is here where points of discordance have been revealed, such as i.e. differences concerning the respective conceptualisation of security. It was found that while the US holds the traditional conceptualisation to security, and thus indicating on the use of military as the preferred instrument, the Africans have moved to accept a more holistic concept, namely that of human security which makes peremptory the use of instruments that aim at tackling security at a comprehensive and cohesive manner. EU’s stance and commitment to security, as by the way imposed by her distinct nature as a civilian/normative power, accounted for a goodwill basis with Africa, and the heralding of these values did not backfire as in the case of US where soft/smart power discourses about AFRICOM were seen as merely window dressing. RAM analysis also indicated at the choice of and preference for a specific kind of actors: i.e. US preferred to advance AFRICOM unilaterally and seemed to have ignored the pan-African peace and security structures; while the EU emphasised more the relationship with multilateral institutions such as the AU. This seem to have had a direct influence on the nature of processes which on the US side have highlighted the unilateral and only if needed the bilateral approach, while the EU has preferred to place JAES P&S within processes which emphasise the diplomatic, structural and multilateral kind of activities. The Organisational Behaviour Model (OBM) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) point out at the importance of recognising the contingency of the political process (last rule for a critical foreign policy analysis) in order to understand why a foreign policy (AFRICOM, JAES P&S) acquired a particular quality which accounted for the very different reactions. For instance, the turf wars among the US governmental agencies involved with AFRICOM engendered a considerable amount of inter-agency resistance, which seem to have generated on its own an image of AFRICOM that did not appeal much confidence on the side of Africans. On the EU side, the research results point out that the standing up of JAES P&S did take into consideration the necessary strategic steps, including the one of fully involving the African part on the formation of JAES P&S. It is, though, predicted that, as the insights gained through the BPM approach seem to suggest, the implementation of
JAES P&S may face considerable operational challenges. Accordingly, the JAES P&S risks to be stamped as ‘too good to be true’.

---

This dissertation does not claim to be all-comprehensive, it merely aimed to analyse the reasons for the very different reactions towards two pivotal peace and security policies, such as AFRICOM and JAES P&S. There remains still much to be elucidated on both policies, such as i.e. the influence of individual figures, – Rumsfeld/Barroso and relevant Commissioners–, on the standing up of AFRICOM and JAES P&S, respectively. Another interesting research may focus on the role of (certain) EU MS on JAES P&S –although this dissertation briefly touched upon it. A further appealing research effort may focus on the implementation of both policies, which was not embraced within the present research, simply because its set aims and goals would have otherwise burst.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Abrahamsen, R 2005 ‘Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear’, in Alternatives, Volume 30, Issue No.: 1


Aggestam, L, 1999 ‘Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy’, in ARENA Working Paper, No.: 8;


Albright, M 2003, ‘Madam Secretary’, Miramax, NY.


Allen, D, Smith, M 1990 ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena’, in Review of International Affairs, Volume 16, Issue No.: 1


Boutros-Ghali, B 1995 ‘An Agenda for Peace’, 2nd Edition with the New Supplement and Related UN Documents, UN Department of Public Information, NY


Buchanan, D 1993 ‘Europe: The Strange Superpower’, Dartmouth, Aldershot


Cameron, F 2007, ‘An Introduction to European Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon


Cox, M 1995 ‘US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower Without a Mission?’, Royal Institution of Foreign Affairs, London


CSIS Commission on Smart Power, 2007 ‘A Smarter, More Secure America’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC


European Commission 2008 ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 17 October 2008: The EU, Africa
and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation’, available at:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008
DC0654:EN:NOT, last accessed on 20.08.2010.

European Commission, 2001 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament: The European Union’s role in promoting
human rights and democratisation in third countries’, available at:

European Commission, 2001 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: Environment 2010: Our Future, Our

European Commission, 2005 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament – Priority Actions for Responding to the
Challenges of Migration: First Follow-Up to Hampton Court’ Brussels,
available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri

European Commission, 2005 ‘Communication from the Commission to the European
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Migration and
Development: Some Concrete Orientations’ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
accessed on 20.08.2010.

European Commission, 2006 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council
Year On: Towards a Comprehensive European Migration Policy’
sitory/COMM_PDF_COM_2006_0735_F_EN_ACTE.pdf, last accessed
on 20.08.2010.

European Commission, 2007 ‘Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council: Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment in Development Cooperation’, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0100:E
N:HTML, last accessed on 20.08.2010.

European Commission, 2008 ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Commission
Contributions to the Implementation of the EU-Africa Action Plan (2008-
2010)’, EC, Brussels.

European Commission, 2010 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: The EU Role in Global Health’, EC,


Fabricius, P 2007 ‘Flexing Our Political Muscle; Is South Africa the emerging African power or the top dog on the continent?’, in South African Daily News October 23, 2007


FOCAC’s official website available at: http://www.focac.org/eng/, last accessed on 20.08.2010.


Freeman, S (ed.) 2009 ‘China, Africa and the African Diaspora: Perspectives’, available at:


Gide, A 2008 ‘Kongo und Tschad’, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim/Zürich/NY

Ginsberg, R 1989 ‘Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community’, Lynne Rienner, Boulder,


Gore, A 2007 ‘Angriff auf die Vernunft’, Riemann Verlag, München


Hentz, J, J 2008 ‘Into Africa’, in *Hoover Digest No.4*, available at:
http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/5815, last
accessed on 30.03.2009.

Really Make Foreign Policy’, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

Hess, M, E 2007 ‘Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,

Hettne, B 2002 ‘The Europeanization of Europe: Endogenous and Exogenous

Hill, C (ed.) 1996 ‘The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon

issue No.: 2.

Hill, C 1990 ‘European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model - or Flop?’, in
Boulder, SF/London

Hill, C 2003 ‘The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy’, Palgrave Macmillan,
Houndmills

International Role’ in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 31,
No.3.

5th Biennial International Conference of the European Community
Studies Association of the United States, 29 May – 1 June 1997, Seattle,
Washington, available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/2616/01/002811_1.PDF, last
accessed on 30.03.2010.

Hill, C, Smith, M (eds.) 2005 ‘International Relations and the European Union’,
Oxford University Press, Oxford/NY


Holland, M (ed.) 2005 ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years

Hollis, M, Smith, S 1991 ‘Explaining and Understanding International Relations’,
Clarendon Press, London

Holsti, K, J 1970 ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, in
*International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 14, Issue No.: 3


IPA 2004 ‘*Strengthening the Security–Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice since the 1990s*’, International Peace Academy, New York


Jervis, R 1976 ‘*Perception and Misperception in International Politics*’, Princeton University Press, Princeton


Kerr, D, Fei, L (eds.) 2007 ‘The International Politics of EU-China Relations’, OUP for the British Academy, Oxford/NY

Keukeleire, S 2000 ‘The European Union As A Diplomatic Actor’, in Discussion Paper 71, Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester;


Kohut, A, Bruce S, 2006 *America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked*, Times Books, NY


Kupchan, C 2002 ‘*The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*’, Alfred A. Knopf, NY


Lubold, G 2008 ‘Pentagon Scales Back AFRICOM Ambitions: Opposition in Africa means the new command’s headquarters will more likely be in US or

Lucarelli, S, Manners, I (eds.) 2006, ‘Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon


Meads, W, R 2004 ‘America’s Sticky Power’ in Foreign Policy, Issue No.141.


Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-Operation in Africa (CSSDC), adopted later on at


Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G 2000 ‘Perspectives for a new Regionalism: Relations Between the EU and MERCOSUR’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 5, Issue No. 4,


Murray, D, 2006 ‘NeoConservatism: Why We Need It’, Encounter Books, NY


Nye, Jr, J S 2003, ‘The Velvet Hegemon’ in Foreign Policy, Issue No. 146.


Nye, Jr., J S 2008 ‘Recovering American Leadership’ in *Survival*, Volume 50

Nye, Jr., J S 2008 *The Powers to Lead*, Oxford University Press, NY


Overhaus, M, Maull, H, W, Harnisch, S (eds.) ‘Perspectives and Strategies of the European Union’s Africa Policy After the Lisbon Treaty’, in Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Volume 8, Issue 24, University of Trier, Trier


Parmar, I, Miller, L, B, Ledwidge, M, 2009 ‘New Direction in US Foreign Policy’, Routledge, Oxon


Piening, C 1997 ‘Global Europe? The EU in World Affairs’, Lynne Rienner, Boulder


President George W. Bush Speech at the National Endowment for Democracy, October 6, 2005’, available at: http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.06.05.html, last accessed on: 30.03.2009;


Radelet, S, Bazzi, S 2008 ‘US Development Assistance to Africa and the World: What Do the Numbers Say?’, Center for Global Development,
Washington DC, available at: http://www.cgdev.org/content/general/detail/15423, last accessed on 30.03.2009.


Ross, D 2007 ‘Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World’, Farar, Straus and Giraux, NY.


Sjursen, H, 2006 ‘EU as a Normative Power, How can this Be?’, in Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 13, Issue 2


Smith, H, 2002 ‘European Union Foreign Policy What it is and What it does’, Pluto Press, London


Smith, K 2005 ‘Still Civilian Power EU?’, in European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 1, LSE.


SN 106/4/00 REV 4, Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo, 3-4 April 2000 ‘Cairo Declaration’, available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/au/afreurdecl00.pdf , last accessed 17.11.2009


Summers, L 2008 ‘America needs to make a new case for trade’, in Financial Times of 27 April 2008


Thomas, C 1987 ‘In Search of Security: The Third World In International Relations’, Lynne Rienner, Boulder


Toje, A 2008 ‘America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain’, Routledge, Oxon.

Tonra, B, Christiansen, T, (eds.) 2004 ‘Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy’, Manchester University Press, Manchester/NY.


US AFRICOM, 2009 ‘Posture Statement of General William E. Ward, USA Commander, United States Africa Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee, on 17-18


White, B 2001 ‘Understanding European Foreign Policy’, Palgrave, Hampshire


ANNEXES
ABSTRACT

This research effort had as its object of interest the agendas that the USA and EU have set up with regard to Africa since the dawn of the 21st century. The main focus was placed on two pivotal policies, USAFRICOM and JAES P&S, which stated to have put Africa into the high politics agenda of USA and EU, respectively. Since the reactions to these two policies diametrically differed, the research question concerned the reasons behind it by focusing on the decisions taken by the US and EU concerning Africa during the standing up of AFRICOM and JAES P&S, respectively. The evaluation and analysis was done by applying the analytical techniques offered by the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theory, a subfield within the International Relations (IR) theory. FPA was seen as instrumental because it offered ‘a means [to bring together] foreign and domestic action under the same umbrella’ as well as a useful structure for a comparative analysis. The analysis centred on the notion of a foreign policy system in action, composed of the actors involved, the context within which they act, the policy processes, issues and instruments available and finally the policy output. This last one is seen as being generated by the interrelationship between actors, contexts, processes, issues and instruments.

Such system has been mirrored in the structure that this dissertation was built upon.

The remarkable changes, starting from the paradigm shifts concerning security and its being increasingly linked to development as well as the regional integration and cooperation having ever more acquired features as an appropriate instrument with which to tackle security and instability problems, have had a significant influence on the US and EU foreign policy conceptualisations. These last ones have been subject to endogenous changes within Africa as well. On the one side, the presence and the massive investments of the new emerging powers, above all that of China, have provided Africa a leverage with which it can place itself at a place that allows it to better bargain and negotiate with i.e. US and EU. The emergence and institutionalisation of pan-African structures concerning peace and security have
provided Africa with an important structure with which to present itself as a unified actor within the international arena. The occurrence of 9/11 provoked a change in the way many international actors modelled and implemented their foreign policies, ranging from recommendations for a mix between hard and soft power (US relevant) to appealing for civilian/normative values at the international stage (EU relevant). It is on these last grounds that both the US and EU agendas have been evaluated by especially focusing on ‘gaps between words and deeds’.

The analysis of outputs focused on the decision-making processes during the standing up of AFRICOM and JAES P&S, respectively. The arguments were focused around two hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1.** if outputs are generated as a result of the interrelationship between the context, actors, issues, instruments, and processes, then a difference on how they are conceptualised by both actors as well as the partly/wholly omission of one or more of these elements at the decision-making process may/will account for less than optimal outputs,

**Hypothesis 2.** since bureaucracies have a clear preference for continuity as opposed to change, unless change means increase in own organisational health, then the respective bureaucracies involved would try to mould the policies (USAFRICOM, JAES P&S) in a way that would best fit their own organisational health/interests, which may account for less than optimal outputs.

Graham Allison’s three-level framework (RAM, OBM, BPM) was applied. The results from the research work point out at the fact that both actors, although, as stated, seemingly aiming the same, –support Africa in better dealing with her security problems–, chose different approaches, which were determined by i.e. different conceptualisations of security (traditional vs. Human Security); preference for a specific type of actors (states vs. multilateral institutions), etc. Such accounted for different policy outputs that in their own terms attracted different reactions.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG


Das beschriebene System spiegelt sich in der Struktur dieser Dissertation wieder. Der Paradigmenwechsel betreffend Sicherheit und ‘security-development nexus’, aber auch die regionale Integration und Kooperation, sowie Veränderungen innerhalb Afrikas, haben die Konzeption der Außenpolitik der USA und der EU signifikant beeinflusst. Einerseits haben die Präsenz und massive Investitionen neuer Mächte (vor allem China), Afrika in eine bessere Verhandlungsposition gegenüber den USA und der EU gebracht, andererseits hat das Entstehen und die Institutionalisierung der Pan-Afrikanischen Strukturen in Sachen Frieden und Sicherheit Afrika ermöglicht, innerhalb der internationalen Arena einheitlich aufzutreten. 9/11 schuf eine Trendwende für die Außenpolitik relevanter Akteure. Während in den USA die Vermischung von Hard und Soft Power angeregth wurde, bevorzugte die EU das
Werben für zivile/normative Werte. Die Afrika- Agenden der USA und der EU
wurden hinsichtlich dieser Veränderungen auf Stichhaltigkeit geprüft.

Die Output Analyse basierend auf der Graham Allison drei-Ebenen-Analyse (RAM,
OBM, BPM) konzentriert sich auf die Entscheidungsprozesse während der
Entstehung von AFRICOM und JAES P&S. Das Resultat zeigt, dass beide Akteure
bei gleicher Intention, nämlich Afrikas Sicherheitsbemühungen zu unterstützen,
divergente Herangehensweisen wählten. Während beispielsweise das
Sicherheitskonzept der EU für Afrika dem afrikanischen Entwurf ähnelt, indem beide
auf die ‘root causes‘ der Sicherheitsproblemen zu zielen beabsichtigen, erweist sich
das Sicherheitskonzept der USA als eher traditionell-militärisch ausgerichtet. Afrikas
Reaktionen fallen u.a. auch deshalb dementsprechend unterschiedlich aus.
CURRICULUM VITAE

Mag.phil. Manjola RAICH, M.A.

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS:

03/2008 – 02/2011 Doctoral studies (Dr.phil.): Institut für Politikwissenschaften, Universität Wien, Österreich


01/2005 – 03/2005 Trans-Atlantic Studies: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, USA

09/1994 – 07/1998 Faculty of Foreign Languages, University of Tirana, Albania Equalised as ‘Magistra der Philosophie (Mag.phil.)’, Geistes und Kulturwissenschaftliches Fakultät, Universität Wien, Österreich


COURSES (SELECTION):


01.05 – 23.05/2006 ‘Conflict analysis – Professional Training online’, United States Institute for Peace (USIP), Washington DC, USA

LANGUAGES: English (Proficiency); Italian (Proficiency); German (Good); French (Basics); Albanian (Mother tongue)

MEMBERSHIPS:

11/2008 - The International Studies Association (ISA)
10/2008 - The Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
03/2007 - Foreign Policy and United Nations Association of Austria (ÖGAVN –UNA–Austria)
03/2007 - United Nations Youth and Student Association of Austria (UNYSA – AFA–Austria)