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# Table of Contents

1) **INTRODUCTION**

A) **THE CASE OF FRANCHISING**

   A.1) Franchising: An Introduction
   A.2) Characteristics of the franchising network
   A.3) Benefits of franchising
   A.4) Single-unit franchising vs. multi-unit franchising: An introduction
   A.5) Multi-Unit Franchising
      A.5.1) Types of multi-unit franchising
      A.5.1.1) Subfranchising
      A.5.1.2) Area development multi-unit strategy
      A.5.1.3) Sequential multi-unit strategy
      A.5.2) Literature examination
      A.5.2.1) Multi-unit franchising - a franchisor's perspective
      A.5.2.2) Multi-unit franchising - a franchisee's perspective

B) **THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES**

   B.1) The resource-based view and organizational capabilities
   B.1.1) Competitive advantage
   B.1.2) Resource management process
      B.1.2.1) Structuring the resource portfolio
      B.1.2.2) Bundling resources
   B.1.2.3) Leveraging capabilities
   B.1.3) Contradictions to the resource-based view
      B.1.3.1) Agency argument for franchising
   B.2) Theories of multi-unit franchising
      B.2.1.1) Life cycle theory
      B.2.1.1.1) Resource scarcity
      B.2.1.2) Assumptions to verify the resource scarcity view
      B.2.1.3) Two perspectives on the resource scarcity view
      B.2.1.3.1) Financial resource scarcity
      B.2.1.3.2) Local market assets
      B.2.2) System-specific assets in view of organizational capabilities

C) **EMPIRICAL STUDY**

   C.1) Introduction
   C.1.2) Sample and Data
   C.1.2) The survey instrument
   C.1.3) Measures
   C.2) Variables
   C.3) Results
      C.3.1) Descriptive statistics of the respondent profile
      C.3.2) Descriptive statistics of ownership patterns
      C.3.2.1) Financial resource scarcity
      C.3.2.2) Local market assets
      C.3.2.3) Local market uncertainty
      C.3.2.4) System specific assets
   C.4) Regression Analysis

3
C.4.1) RESULTS
C.5) CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: ABSTRACT IN GERMAN
APPENDIX B: THE QUESTIONNAIRE
APPENDIX C: CURRICULUM VITAE
I) Introduction

In the modern economic environment franchising is a key tool. This type of operation has its origins in the early 1880s and according to Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005) since then grew in importance. It can be defined as an arrangement between the franchisor and the franchisee, whereas the franchisor as the founder of a unique business formally sells the right to use its trade name and operating system to the franchisee. Why firms prefer this type of franchising over other organizational forms has been tried to be explained by different theories over time. One of the main theories is the resource-based view. According to Barney, Wright et al. (2001) the resource-based view may be the “most influential framework for understanding strategic management.” Due to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) two dominant forms of ownership strategy of franchising, emerged over time: single-unit franchising and multi-unit franchising. With regard to the last, the franchisee is obliged the right to “own” more than just one outlet. Based on Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005) as well as Kaufmann and Dant (1996) multi-unit franchising has major advantages over single-unit franchising, as accelerated company-growth, scale economies, greater market penetration or greater financial strength. In past years literature focused more and more on this topic, but it still lacks empirical background. In this study we will link multi-unit franchising with the resource-base view, focusing on financial resource scarcity, local market knowledge and system specific assets. Using a broad study of the Austrian Franchise Sector we tested our hypotheses about the ownership strategy of franchising empirically which is the objective of this thesis.

The remainder is structured as follows: the first part gives an overview about the topic franchising in general, its origin, development and characterization. The two big groups, single- and multi-unit franchising are examined in detail. The next section focuses on the resource-based view and organizational capabilities. As this is the basis for further analysis we then focus on the interaction between multi-unit franchising and the resource-based view. In the empirical part the established hypotheses are statistically analysed and further discussed.
A) The case of Franchising

Franchising is a key tool of today’s business. Meldelsohn (1985) states that the impact of franchising has grown tremendous since the birth of this entrepreneurial form in the late 1940s and 1950s in the US and its brisk spreading to other countries around the world. According to the International Franchise Association (2005) the total output of all franchised businesses in the United States in the year 2005 amounted to $ 880,000 billion. This number results from approximately 910,000 established franchised businesses, which corresponds to 3.3 % of the total U.S. private sector.

A.1) Franchising: An introduction

According to Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) the first franchising distribution networks were initiated in Europe in the early 1880s when beer brewers made special arrangements regarding the exclusive sale of beer and ale with certain bars. Some years later, in 1863 the first consumer product franchise system was created by the Singer Sewing Machine Company in US. At this time, franchising as a type of distribution network, grew in importance and in the 1890s most soft drink or automobile industries adopted this type of network. Some 40 years later, also petroleum producers trusted in franchising. This early period of franchising is classified by Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) as the “first generation of franchising” and is called to date “product and trade name franchising”. According to Preble (1995) it is most common in the automobile, retail gasoline as well as soft-drink industry. The main characteristic of this system is that a franchisee sells and distributes a product under the trade name of the franchisor.

Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) further reveal that in the 1950s the “second generation” of franchising began to emerge. The idea shifted from the mere distribution of goods under a foreign trade name to a more market–oriented view: the franchisor enabled the franchisee to rent his entire business idea. The first step toward this new business format evolved in 1935 as Howard Johnson initiated the
first franchised restaurant chain. This type of franchising is characterized as “business-format franchising”. The franchisee duplicates the entire business format of the franchisor, including quality control, marketing-strategy, operating-manual and standards.

According to Norton (1988) as well as Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998) franchising in general refers to a relationship whereas the franchisee buys the right of using trade name, operating system or product specifications of the franchisor. The franchisor, as the entrepreneur, is the founder and builder of a unique business format with a developed product or service and carries out the duty of managing the franchising network of independent business owners. According to literature (Caves and Murphy 1976; Justis and Judd 1998; Combs and Ketchen 2003) the franchisee is admitted the right to sell the products or services of the franchisor in a specified region for a certain time. Grünhagen and Dorsch (2003) wrote that the franchisee is obliged to pay an entry fee, recurring royalties as well as advertising fees in return for the possibility to use the business format of the franchisor which also includes services. Those may comprise legal advice, consultations regarding the location, trainings, or campaigns of national advertisements. In other words, according to Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) a franchise organization can be seen as a network of the franchisor which is the parent organization and the franchisee who is acting as the local manager. The term franchising in a more narrow sense thus determines the contractual arrangement according to which the network is built up and developed.

Kotabe (2009) explicates that a franchise system typically appears in an environment with a relatively high ratio of competition or quickly changing customer needs. Particularly the fast food industry is dominated by franchising, due to its highly competitive environment. On the contrary franchising companies appear less in high-risk industries or in markets with high wages, as these circumstances reflect a relationship with high technical competence or more segmented markets.
A.2) Characteristics of the franchising network

According to Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) franchising can be separated from other organizational forms by three aspects:

- Geographic dispersal of organization units
- Replication across units
- Joint ownership

The authors state, regarding “geographical dispersal of organization units”, that franchising is seen as a way to amplify the existing distribution channels. The access to resources such as financial or managerial, franchised units permit a quicker expansion than under full company ownership. Considering Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968 - 1969) and Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) franchisors often buy the franchised units if the internal resources have risen enough. This is amongst others the case if markets tend to be overexploited and a further expansion is not beneficial anymore. Cochet, Dormann et al. (2008) state that the geographic dispersion of units due to system-wide standardization, allows to realize economies of scale. Thus franchising is a way to pursue growth strategies and to benefit from the expertise and knowledge of the franchisees.

Other scholars depict franchising as a form of vertical integration (Harrigan 1985; Carnery and Gedajlovic 1991; Grünhagen and Dorsch 2003). Carnery and Gedajlovic (1991) reveal that in this case the benefits of franchising units reside in the saving of investments in the required assets. Furthermore financial resources needed for full integration can therefore be used elsewhere. Nevertheless a company that chooses franchising as its entrepreneurial form rarely franchises all of its units but owns some itself.

In the article “The nature of the firm” Coase (1937) the question why franchising would be more beneficial than company ownership is discussed by two contrary types of economic organizations: markets and firms. In markets, beneficial exchange transactions can be realized. However, if positive transaction costs arise, firms are able to carry out transactions more efficiently and at the same time are able to save costs. Consequently Norton (1988) reckons that hybrid forms of organizations are also possible as that they allow firms to incorporate advantages of both types, . With
regard to franchising the quality resulting of market-like entities lies in the bargaining between two unities that are operating in product, labour or capital markets. The other aspect, the firm-like benefit is the bilateral network between the two unities. As previously mentioned, the franchisor provides the franchisee trainings, advertisements or managerial assistance during exhibiting considerably control with extensive performance criteria.

A.3) Benefits of franchising

One of the principal reasons for firms to adopt a franchise perspective, is outlined in the “growth thesis” (Kaufmann and Dant 1998; Gómez, González et al. 2010). Gómes, Gonzáles et al. (2010) state that firms want to expand their networks and by making use of franchising, achieve economies of scale. In the field of purchasing as well as marketing a higher brand-knowledge can be created. Therefore the use of franchising allows the franchisor to enhance the profitability of his investment.

According to Kaufmann and Dant (1998) entrepreneurs lack certain resources, that are indispensable to pursue a growth strategy. Furthermore opening up new units contains unique risks. Thus if firms come to the point, where they cannot monitor or control their company-outlets anymore, entrepreneurs often choose franchising as a strategy that allows to align the incentives and interests of franchisees and those of the franchisor. In this sense, franchising could also be labelled as entrepreneurial partnership.

Shane (1996) conducted a study whether franchised firms would have a higher probability to survive than other forms of organizations. He stated, that through the rapid growth of franchised systems, economies of scales could be accomplished quickly. In order to persist in a competitive environment, firms have to establish a competitive cost structure. Through rapid expansion, firms can reach a necessary competitive level before cash flow problems can emerge.
A.4) Single-unit franchising vs. multi-unit franchising: An introduction

A franchisor seeking to expand his business, can either open up company-owned units or follow a franchise strategy (Windsperger and Hussain 2010). With regard to the second point, two strategies are to succeed: A single-unit strategy or a multi-unit strategy. Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005), and Windsperger and Hussain (2010) state, that due to growth strategies single-unit franchising has been the dominant research area regarding franchising systems in recent decades. In the case of single-unit franchising a franchisee is limited to just one business unit (Garg, Rasheed et al. 2005).

Weaven and Frazer (2006) conducted an analysis on the incentives of single-unit franchisees to enter a franchise-contract. They identified some important factors concerning the franchise opportunity. The first factor is that single-unit franchisees commonly do not attempt to further expand their business units as it is the case with multi-unit franchising. Second, single-unit franchisees concern brand name, reputation and the market position of the franchised company when choosing the right franchising company. Third, the initial training and support is of great importance for single-unit franchisees and they expect to determine their own working hours as in contrast to a salaried employment. Weaven and Frazer (2006) further conducted research about the employment history of single-unit franchisees. In case of a self-employment history franchisees believe more in an opportunistic behaviour of the franchisor regarding re-investing of advertising fees into product or service modernization.

A.5) Multi-Unit Franchising

Weaven and Frazer (2007) state that in past years literature focused more and more on multi-unit franchising, as this is a relatively new field in research. Based on Chalupnik (2009) multi-unit franchising has major advantages over single unit franchising as e.g. accelerated growth, greater financial strength, a better market penetration strategy or a reduction in training or assistance needs.
A.5.1) Types of multi-unit franchising

Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) depict that multi-unit franchising has grown in importance over the past years, as it is now the prevalent type of franchising in the US. This franchise system enables the franchisee to operate more than one unit at a time and at multiple geographic locations. In this sense there exist three different systems of multi-unit franchising:

- Subfranchising
- Area development multi-unit strategy
- Sequential multi-unit strategy

A.5.1.1) Subfranchising

Corresponding to Kaufmann and Dant (1995) the first form of franchising, namely “sub franchising” is also called “master franchising”. It has two important differences to the single-unit franchise system: First, it gives the franchisee the right of using an exclusive territory, which goes far beyond the area of a single-unit and second it establishes another form of controlling body between the franchisor and the manager of the franchised unit. A master franchisee, (also called the subfranchisor) is enabled from the franchisor to give franchises to others (so called subfranchisees) in a predetermined area. Thus the subfranchisor is responsible for his franchisees and undertakes the tasks of the franchisor for his geographical division. As compensation for this function, the subfranchisor is paid royalty payments. This form of franchising mostly takes place internationally, as the underlying additional control body would just complicate the relationship between the franchisor and the franchisees domestically.

A.5.1.2) Area development multi-unit strategy

Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) suggest that the other two franchise systems, namely area-development multi-unit strategy and sequential multi-unit strategy are
the preferred form domestically as both types allow the franchisee himself to open up additional business units.

In the case of area development multi-unit strategy the franchisor requires the franchisee contractually to establish a certain number of units in a predetermined time frame. As the franchisee is obliged to open up additional units the growth process of this so established “mini-chain” is a quick one. Normally area developers trade in a specific geographic area, which is specified by the franchisor.

A.5.1.3) Sequential multi-unit strategy

In contrast to area-development multi-unit strategy, the sequential multi-unit strategy allows the franchisee to open up additional business units without the contractual obligation (Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt 2000). Each unit is therefore initiated by a separate franchise contract. The franchisee obtains the right to subsequently grow his business with respect to his financial opportunities and economic situation. Franchisees in this franchising system generally operate fewer units than area developers, as their growth process is a slower one. Regarding the allocation of franchised units there exist two types that have to be distinguished:

- Non-projected sequential multi-unit franchising
- Projected multi-unit franchising

Windsperger and Hussain (2010) state, that regarding the first system “non-projected sequential multi-unit franchising” the franchisee is allowed to open up additional outlets until his performance reaches a certain level. Therefore the growth process is based upon performance criteria. In the other form “projected multi-unit franchising” the franchisor calculates and plans the assignment of new units to existing franchisees disregarding performance but considering their effects.
A.5.2) Literature examination

The following chapter focuses on the literature examination regarding multi-unit franchising. We will focus on the perspective of the franchisor as well as the franchisee and highlight the benefits of multi-unit franchising.

A.5.2.1) Multi-unit franchising - a franchisor’s perspective

Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) suggest that growth is one of the main arguments why firms choose franchising. This view is in accordance with Chalupnik (2009), who depicts, that by using multi-unit franchising companies are able to expand more quickly. In this sense, according to Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) through the development of economies of scale, e.g. advertisement costs, administrative expenditures, etc. costs can be distributed to a larger amount of business units.

Company-owned units do not have the financial or managerial resources as well as local market know-how to spur expansion of their business. This is even amplified in the case of small franchises that operate in uncertain environments or fierce competition, as they would otherwise not survive. On the other hand large-scale franchises that are arranged in very price-sensitive environment need greater economies of scale to be competitive. Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) proved that the expectation of the franchisor to add additional units is positively related to the use of multi-unit franchising. Additionally the scholars tested whether the use of area development multi-unit franchising was also affected by the expectation of unit additions.

Weaven and Frazer (2007) stated, that mature and sophisticated franchise systems are more likely to adopt a multi-unit strategy. In the case of a very competitive environment multi unit franchising facilitates strong reputation and unit growth which is of special importance. In the initial growth phase most franchisors do not possess the required market presence or a strong brand name, which turns them into high-risk ventures. Therefore it is difficult to attract adequate franchisees. A disadvantage in the early life cycle of franchises is that franchisors lack important know-how or administrative capabilities necessary for the development of a multi-unit strategy.
This is the same for continuous training, supervision or mentoring as well as monitoring abilities.

Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) proposed a theory that mature franchise systems which possess more reputation and organizational routines inhibit less risk to potential franchisees and can in fact attract higher quality multi-unit franchisees. Accordingly franchisors can show their solidarity in later phases of the life cycle by preserving long-term relationships with franchisees. Weaven and Herington (2007) further mention that multi-unit franchising encourages the growth of the system as it minimizes the costs of searching possible new candidates for further business units.

Gómez, Gonzáles et al. (2010) found a positive relationship between the size of the franchise network and the use of multi-unit franchising. They hypothesized that as the network grows, the brand name value is going to increase equally and therefore sales and market shares as well. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be amplified. If the network grows, a single franchisee will find it easier to free-ride as he does not have to cope with the negative consequences on his own. Instead the growing number of franchisees will absorb the effects.

Weaven and Frazer (2007) proved significant correlation between a franchise system that adopts plural forms of distribution and multi-unit franchising. Multi-unit franchisors stated, that prior to adapting a multi-unit strategy company-owned stores were established for further training and mentoring. Through the plural form of distribution, franchisors could develop and enhance service as well as product quality and delivery, support procedures, or logistical functions. Thus internal learning took place and the new built capabilities were transferred from company-owned stores to multi-unit franchisees that in turn made the expansion strategy easier.

The authors also found a relationship between the franchise system complexity and multi-unit franchising. At one hand, through the installation of mini-chains, the franchisee works as an additional control layer within the units. Notwithstanding monitoring costs or administrative efforts by the franchisor cannot be alleviated.

With regard to the organizational form, Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) found a positive relationship between area development franchising and system uniformity. They stated, that area developers could more easily retain system uniformity, as they first of all already possess multi-unit skills that are needed. As the beginning of the
franchise relationship, franchisees already possess the information and will to open up additional units and thus start from the outset to learn and acquire the intellectual and physical resources that are needed to retain uniformity. On the other hand also franchisors would spend more training hours and support with multi-unit franchisees.

Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) present the argument, that multi-unit systems disaggregate ownership and control of local business units because franchisees have to position local unit managers. Hence, a hierarchical structure is created whereas the positive features of franchising, as described above, would be destroyed by the use of multi-unit franchising.

**A.5.2.2) Multi-unit franchising - a franchisee’s perspective**

Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) concentrated on the reasons why franchisees would prefer multi-unit franchising to single-unit franchising. They hypothesize that a franchisee that favours multi-unit franchising has more possibilities or money to invest in this business. Weaven and Frazer (2006) support this theory with their findings and state, that multi-unit franchisees would engage in franchise systems that advocate the expansion of mini-chains.

Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) question why a franchisee would engage in franchising instead of investing the money somewhere else as e.g. in the equity market. Therefore the authors mention that another possible explanation for the investment in a franchise chain is that franchisees are better able to gain advantages through “larger, geographically dispersed operations” (Grünhagen and Mittelstadt (2000)) as their business grows. Another presumption is a philosophical one. Franchisees, particularly those that open up units sequentially exhibit or establish entrepreneurial spirit.

The findings of Weaven and Frazer (2006) concerning the franchise opportunity for multi-unit franchisees accentuate the importance of ongoing training as well as support for the franchisee. As contrary to single-unit franchisees they tend to trust the incentives of the franchisor regarding marketing or advertising costs.
B) The Resource-based View and Organizational Capabilities

According to Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005) the franchising strategy has been
tried to explain since the 1960s with the start of the franchise company McDonald’s.
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2002) state, that research about franchising, has
developed different perspectives about why firms prefer this organizational form to
others. Aliochue and Schlentrich (2008) state that the two main theories in this field
are the resource scarcity view that is built upon the resource-based theory and the
contradictory agency theory. According to Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2005) the first
assertion about this topic was the resource-based view. The resource-based view
may be “the most influential framework for understanding strategic management ”
(Barney, Wright et al. 2001). Due to Dant and Kaufmann (2003), one of the first
authors that tried to explain the use of franchising in terms of the resource-based
view was Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968 - 1969). They assumed that the lack of
resources, mainly in the early life-cycle stage could be overcome by the use of
franchising.

The aim of the following section is to delineate the resource-based view and
organizational capabilities. At first a broad description of the topic is provided.
Following the theory of the resource-based view the resource scarcity theory, local
market assets and system specific assets will be defined.

B.1) The resource-based view and organizational capabilities

The resource-based view is concerned with the topic why some firms outperform
others (Ordóñez de Pablos, Peteraf et al. 2007). Accordingly the resource-based
view attempts to measure how economic value is created and sustained (Kim and
Mahoney 2007). Penrose (1959) stated, that economic rents are achieved through
the utilization of resources of a firm. The productive services, which are obtained
from these resources, are a driving force in firm heterogeneity.
According to the literature on resource-based theory the existence of intangible assets are a major part in describing firm heterogeneity (Mahoney and Pandian 1992). Normally high performance-firms possess many types of intangible assets like know-how, marketing assets, patents, or designs. These kinds of assets are quite likely to be subjects to market failure. All in all idiosyncratic physical, human and intangible resources are the main drivers for firm heterogeneity. Kim and Mahoney (2007) reveal, that in order to develop economic rents, resources have to be valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable. Combs, Ketchen et al. (2010) further depict, that those resources that inhibit all these criteria are called strategic resources.

Mahoney and Pandian (1992) assert that a portfolio of different resources, skills and especially the coherence across resources is the key of sustained business performance. Thus, the source of a firm’s uniqueness are its organizational capabilities (Ulrich and Lake 1990). A more complex definition of organizational capability is provided from the authors, namely “a business’s ability to establish internal structures and processes that influence its members to create organization-specific competencies and thus enable the business to adapt to changing customer and strategic needs” (Ulrich and Lake 1990). In this means, the successful implementation of organizational capabilities depends on teamwork; it is the creation of organizational policies and procedures that can be influenced through engagement of employees. In order to gain competitive advantage, the firm has to supplement its activities with organizational capabilities. The internal company-own systems and processes should be directed towards the realization of benefits and goals of a firm as an entity to efficiently satisfy customer needs.

Tan and Mahoney (2005) argue, that modern businesses emerge because of the existence of economies of scale, which is enabled through innovations. Innovations and technologies are an outcome of organizational capabilities that are dynamically developed over time. For the process of adapting resources and capabilities to be economically competitive, firms will bear dynamic adjustment costs. If the adaption process of resources disturbs or even averts current working processes, adjustment costs arise. According to Tan and Mahoney(2005) , these expenses are one of the main reasons, why limits to the expansion of a firm exist.
During the growth phase of a firm its managerial capacities are insufficient to overcome the rapid changing process of the system. This managerial constraint on the system growth rate is also called the “Penrose effect”. In 1959 Penrose stated, that a firm is consisting of a bundle of different resources. Consequently its managers are of duty to effectively control and guide the resources and also produce new capabilities. Therefore only managers that have internal know-how about the complex structure of the firm and a good relationship to the other employees can carry out this duty. As it takes time to educate managers from outside firms are limited to their inherent managerial capacity in process of expansion. If the company grows at a level that transcends this managerial constraint, problems are likely to emerge and the system growth is going to stagnate. Thompson (1994) suggested, that the Penrose effect could be overcome by a franchising strategy. In order to grow initially franchising is a good way to circumvent the managerial constraints. Due to organizational learning managers will acquire sufficient knowledge and will substitute franchised outlets to company-owned during the franchise life cycle.

Shane (1996) also examined the Penrose effect of firms particularly in hybrid organizations. The author states that franchising is a good way to overcome managerial constraint as it reduces monitoring costs that would occur in the existence of company-owned units. During the growth process of a firm, managers have to appoint new employees. First of all the entrepreneurs would need a lot of time to elect possible and qualified employees as they differ in experiences, knowledge and capabilities. Employees are likely to shirk about their education and thus it takes more time for the manager to find the right information about the background of appropriate employees. Hence the placement of candidates involves costs and problems of adverse selection. Despite the problem of finding the right candidate, managers also have to monitor existing or new employees. As managers, which are not entrepreneurs in case of company-owned businesses, also tend to shirk regarding the agency view; entrepreneurs have to monitor them as well. In this case also the concern of moral hazard emerges. Franchising as a hybrid forms of organization allows to mitigate these problems. First of all franchisees act as residual claimants and the problem of monitoring new employees is therefore moderated. Second, franchisees that buy franchised business units show their qualification as they agree to be remunerated on uncertain profits of the units. Therefore the costs of the firm are reduced, as the entrepreneur does not have to scan potential salaried
outlet managers. Still franchisors have to monitor their franchisees as they may shirk on quality in expense to the business brand, but according to Shane this “misdirected effort” is less costly to monitor. As an outcome firms engaging in franchising can grow faster and at a lower cost than other forms of organizations.

B.1.1) Competitive advantage

According to Foss (2003) the resource-based view is concerned with resources and internal capabilities that are inherent in a heterogeneous firm. Those resources or capabilities that are superior to those of the competitors can involve the potential of being basis for competitive advantage. Due to Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) the resource-based view tries to explain the evolution of competitive advantage with basis of resources that create value to the firm.

Based on Teece (1997) one of the driving forces of firms conducting a business is to gain competitive advantage. Michael Porter presented one of the first main theories in the field of competitive advantage in 1980. It is seen as an approach of how firms can defend themselves against competitive forces. In this respect the company is seen as a part of the environment it competes in. In the five forces model, these five forces, namely “entry barriers, threat of substitution, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers and rivalry among industry incumbents” (Teece 1997) are the basis of an industry and thus the potential of gaining competitive advantage. The paradigm of the competitive forces therefore states that the rents, which are gained through the circumvention of the competitive forces, are monopoly rents. The strategy through which these rents are generated is mainly based on changing the position of the company compared to the position of its competitors or suppliers. In this respect main attention is drawn upon industry characteristics, as some industries are more favourable than others in terms of impediments to competitive forces.

The author further state, that the resource-based view bases competitive advantage on the existence of different assets, resources and capabilities that are inherent in the company as well as isolating mechanisms that as well present the basis of firm performance. Thus, firms are not profitable because of the industry they compete in,
instead rents are generated through scarce firm specific resources, which are inherent in the company.

Peteraf (1993) developed a “parsimonious model” for describing a strategy of how to establish individual competitive advantage. It is consisting of four major assumptions, namely heterogeneity of the firm, ex post limits to competition, imperfect resource mobility and ex ante limits to competition.

According to the author the first important factor in establishing superior firm performance, through competitive advantage, is heterogeneity of the firm. As stated, Penrose (1959) highlighted the importance of different resources and capabilities, which are heterogeneous across firms. This implies, that some resources or, according to Peteraf (1993) productive factors, are varying in their efficiency. Therefore, firms holding superior factors are able to gain higher rents.

The next indispensable factors for companies in this regard are ex post limits to competition. Firms are just able to gain rents if the condition of heterogeneity is sustainable over a long-term. Therefore in the absence of ex post limits to competition, heterogeneity is quite likely to be short-lived and thus susceptible to competition. In order to erode or limit ex post competition two factors can be taken into regard: imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability. Firms can shelter themselves through the use of isolating mechanisms. These mechanisms maintain the rent streams of companies through protection of imitation. Examples for isolating mechanisms are property rights to scarce resources or information asymmetries. Lippmann and Rumelt (1982) highlight the existence of causal ambiguity, in the sense that uncertainty can emerge in regard to the causes of efficiency discrepancies among companies. Thus, causal ambiguity impedes that potential competitors know exactly what or how to imitate. Of course, intangible assets like reputation, buyer search costs or producer learning also make huge contributions to isolating mechanisms.

The third factor in the model of Peteraf (1993) is imperfect mobility. It is described as resources that can be traded and are “specialized to firm-specific needs” which incorporates the fact that these are more valuable to the firm as to its competitors. Therefore, as competitors view these resources as less valuable, they are a source of competitive advantage because they remain in the firm over the long-term.
The last assumption, *ex ante limits to competition* denotes that before the firm is building a superior resource position it has to make sure that only a limited amount of competitors is already in the same position. Barney (1986) extends this statement by adding that the performance of a company does not only depend on economic rents, but also on the costs of implementing a strategy. Scholars as Barney (1986) or Peteraf (1993) state, that imperfections of strategic factor markets, where resources can be obtained, are of great importance, as firms are just able to gain superior revenues in such a situation. According to Peteraf (1993) each of the four assumptions has to be investigated on their own as they all play a particular and distinct role in creating competitive advantage.

**B.1.2) Resource management process**

Based on Combs, Ketchen et al. (2010) the resource-based view argues, that firms can beat rivals because of their strategic resources. This of course has an impact on the performance of the firm. They way through which this performance is created concerns the resource management process, that is composed of three strategic actions: at first the structuring of resources, second bundling of resources and third, leveraging resources. Still, the exclusive possession of resources does not necessarily result in competitive advantage or further in the creation of value. The environment of a company can help to enhance the value of its resources, but entrepreneurs have to know which strategic actions further amplify their potential. According to Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) a strategic resource management process is indispensable for the creation of value. In his Model, Sirmon describes the value creation for the customer through structuring, bundling and leveraging resources, which also has important implication for franchising and in this study primarily for multi-unit franchising.

Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) depict that through the synchronization of all three processes the value creation path can be optimized in a way that the difference between the costs for the firm and the revenues or prices it receives by costumers can be meliorated.
Further the authors state that two important variables of the whole resource management process are organizational learning and environmental uncertainty (Sirmon, Hitt et al. 2007). Regarding organizational learning, new knowledge can be acquired and thus applied to decision-making, which is of major importance concerning dynamic environments. Environmental uncertainty, which is defined by Carpenter and Frederikson (2001) as "a consequence of environmental factors that generally result in a lack of the information needed to assess means-ends relationships, make decisions, and confidently assign probabilities to their outcomes".

Due to uncertainty that firms are confronted with they accordingly change the management of their resources (Sirmon, Hitt et al. 2007). This may inhibit the uncertainty of competitors' actions, changes in the market environment or demand and environmental shocks. Figure 1 shows the resource management process in detail.
Figure 1: A Dynamic Resource Management Model of Value Creation (Sirmon, Hitt et al. 2007).

B.1.2.1) Structuring the resource portfolio

Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) state that the first part, namely “Structuring the resource portfolio” deals with the accumulation of resources and is split up into three sub-processes: acquiring, accumulating and divesting. The first process, acquiring means the extern acquisition of resources that a firm does not possess. Michael (2003) states that businesses lack financial resources as well as local market knowledge
and people with managerial skills to expand his business. Franchising is thus a way to overcome the resource scarcity problem.

According to Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) the *accumulation* of resources deals with the internal advancement of resources. This is necessary to build up isolating mechanisms and prepares the firm for uncertain environmental changes or strategic strokes by the competitor. Generally the accumulation of resources is developed through organizational learning. Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) depict that franchising in this sense offers the opportunity to learn from and with the partner franchisee. Furthermore franchise systems allow a much better opportunity for organizational learning than company-owned businesses.

The third process, namely *divesting* refers to disposing of resources that can do not contribute to the competitive advantage of the company. Thus firms need to monitor continuously its inherent resources and capabilities (Sirmon, Hitt et al. 2007).

**B.1.2.2) Bundling resources**

The second part of the resource management process is about bundling resources to build capabilities. Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) depict that each capability consists of a special combination of resources which develops value and performance. Three processes can be differentiated: stabilizing, enriching and pioneering. *Stabilizing* refers to amelioration of already existing capabilities. As an example for this process, managers could be trained some hours per year to refresh their know-how. In the same sense, franchisors should not just practice and instruct the franchisee at the beginning of their relationship. Ongoing training may be difficult if the franchising chain consists of several single-unit franchisees, as the costs for support would be unbearable high. If the franchisor would just have to train the executives of mini-chains, as it is the case in multi-unit franchising, costs would be much lower. The multi-unit franchisee on the other hand would therefore be responsible himself to circulate the information to his outlets. If both partners believe in the wealth-creating opportunity through the right management of resources, monitoring costs will be low and the franchisee will ensure that all his business units receive the right amount of information.
According to Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) in the process of enriching, existing capabilities should be extended. Through organizational learning know-how can be developed and added to already consisting capabilities. Pioneering further extends this process, as in this case new resources should be acquired through learning.

B.1.2.3) Leveraging capabilities

Leveraging capabilities refers to the extent to which a company can create customer value. In this regard Combs, Ketchen et al. (2010) indentified two resources that are of prior importance in leveraging capabilities namely firm-specific top management team experience and specific knowledge that is grounded in the operation. The management team of a company has generated important knowledge and long-built relationships that are important for the wealth of a business. Regarding franchising, franchisors established relationships with their franchisees that may be related to trust in order to implement organizational changes or other activities. In this way it is important for the franchisor to have enough information about standardization and quality to enhance this resources in the case of expansion of the company. Managers that have close relationships to the franchisees may be able to gain idiosyncratic resources or knowledge. This may be the fact in e.g. local market adaptations or service quality, which is of major importance to customers. Thus, from learning of the different partners of the network, managers or franchisors could further enlarge their firm specific top management team experience. Accordingly with the growth of a franchising company the intern firm specific knowledge as well can be amplified (Combs, Ketchen et al. 2010).

Summing up, as all parts of the resource management process are important on their own, to create and enhance value of the company, the processes have to be adjusted. The franchisor has to see his franchise chain as a whole organization, consisting of different resources that have to be managed in the right way (Sirmon, Hitt et al. 2007).
B.1.3) Contradictions to the resource-based view

There are some theories that contradict the resource-based view. The most explored thesis in this regard is the agency argument for franchising which is described in the following section (Garg and Rasheed 2003).

B.1.3.1) Agency argument for franchising

According to Garg and Rasheed (2003) the agency argument for franchising is well examined in respect to the single-unit franchising strategy. Generally the agency theory examines the delegation of assignments from the principal to the agent. The principal is one party that assigns a job to another party, namely the agent (Eisenhardt 1989). Due to Garg and Rasheed (2003) the interest of the principal and the agent can disperse whereas the agent may try to cheat in regard to information he is passing on to the principal. If this information concerns the education and skills of the agent this is called the adverse selection problem and concerning effort it is called the moral hazard problem. Two theories aim at alleviating these problems: residual claimancy and monitoring (Garg and Rasheed 2003).

Regarding the first theory, residual claimancy, Garg and Rasheed (2003) state that the interests of a company-hired business-unit manager are more likely to diverge from the interests of the entrepreneur (here the franchisor) than those from the franchisee. The underlying reason is that franchisees will attempt to maximize their own present value and will not shirk on their efforts accordingly. Company-hired managers commonly receive fixed pay-offs and therefore won’t bear the costs of shirking. This implies the assumption that a franchising strategy will involve less monitoring costs than by running company-owned outlets. Due to Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) franchise systems can grow faster and install more units then other company structures when costs are alleviated. Garg and Rasheed (2003) state that although monitoring costs can be saved through franchising another problem still remains: free riding. If the franchised business possesses high brand name capital, the franchisee might act in an opportunistic way. The franchisee could abuse the brand name in a way, that he diminishes the quality of service or products for example and can thus free-ride without anxiety of loosing his business, mainly in a
low repeat purchase location. The issue of free riding is amplified by higher brand name capital, as customers underlie the estimation that each business unit offers the same amount of quality and cannot easily detect quality differences.

B.2) Theories of multi-unit franchising

In this section the three main theories of this paper are examined in detail: the resource scarcity view, local market assets and system specific assets. Before going into detail in the resource scarcity theory we will outline the life cycle theory, developed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly in 1968.

Further we will link the ownership strategy of multi-unit franchising with the resource-based view. Following this theoretical foundation we will derive the hypothesis for the empirical work.

B.2.1.) Life cycle theory

The life cycle theory was first developed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968 - 1969) and states that in order to overcome the lack of scarce resources companies would prefer franchising in the initial phase. Based on Combs and Ketchen (2003), small companies would try to spur expansion in order to achieve economies of scale, which would not be possible with company owned outlets. Thus if a critical rate would be reached and economies were realized the company would not longer need to expand and therefore try to spur returns at each business unit. The firm would therefore buy back the most lucrative franchised outlets and in the end the chain would mainly be company-owned. Mature franchising companies reduce their share of franchised outlets and studies show that the proportion of company-owned outlets will not change to full ownership over time as proposed by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968 - 1969).
B.2.1.1) Resource scarcity

The resource scarcity view states that one of the main arguments for franchising is the absence of resources that would be needed for expansion or growth of business (Kaufmann and Dant 1996). According to Michael (2003) the franchisor is in the need of investment capital, as well as local market knowledge, which include desirable locations for the units and also sources of labour supply. The third important resource for the franchisor is managerial knowledge, meaning business unit managers that have enough information and know-how to efficiently handle the business concept at certain locations.

Combs and Ketchen (2003) depict that for the purpose of investigating the resource scarcity view, three variables are used generally: age, system size and growth rate. In literature contrary studies exist, some in purpose of the resource scarcity view and others contradicting it (Castrogiovanni, Combs et al. 2006; Aliochue and Schlientrich 2008; Gómez, González et al. 2010). In a study by Combs and Ketchen (2003) the following assumptions were tested regarding the resource scarcity view: first if firm age and system size were negatively correlated with the use of franchising and if the firm growth rate and capital scarcity were positively related to the use of franchising. Combs and Ketchen could not support the resource scarcity view, whereas other authors found the contrary. Dant and Kaufmann (2003) examined franchised companies in the fast food industry. The authors found indeed support for the hypothesis, that the mature and the more resources franchised companies inhibit, the more the tendency toward company-owned businesses. The authors further state that the view of limited resources would perfectly capture the real market environment in North America. Dant and Kaufmann depicted anther argument, namely that the role of multi-unit franchising was not embraced in their study. In case of mini-chains it would be much easier for the franchisor to buy back units. The authors highly recommend to take a closer look at the resource based view coupled with multi-unit franchising as some factors may be explained easier and be more viable.

B.2.1.2) Assumptions to verify the resource scarcity view
Michael (2003) states that two important assumptions are necessary in order for the resource scarcity model to be true. The first one is related to the “first mover advantage” (Michael, 2003) of franchisors that try to grow and expand quickly in the product market of their franchise chain. Barney (1991) states, that firms that are the first in conducting a certain strategy can develop sustained competitive advantage over other companies. This could be the access to certain markets or distribution channels, or even goodwill.

This view is also in accordance with the theory of Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969) as they depicted that a reason to initiate franchising would be the penetration of markets as “widely and rapidly as possible, thus pre-empting valuable territory from competitors” (Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1968 - 1969). Michael (2003) also supported this theory through a study with franchising units in the restaurant industry. The author proposed three hypothesis: “chains that franchise earlier will achieve higher outlet share”, secondly, “higher outlet share will be associated with higher market share” and “higher market share will be associated with higher profitability of the chain”. All assumptions could be verified and thus franchising as a means for resource acquisition as well as superior growth and profitability could be verified.

Based on Michael (2003) the second assumption for the resource scarcity theory to be true concerns the market for resources. Barney (1991) explicates that according to the resource based view, resources that inhibit the potential of sustained competitive advantage have to fulfil four attributes: they have to be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and the not-existence of strategically equivalent substitutes. According to Michael (2003) the resource scarcity view therefore contradicts with the capital market theory that states that financial resources are not rare. In this sense a risk-averse franchisee would rather possess multiple units instead of just one single unit to diversify his risk. So if the franchisor would grant the franchisee only one single unit, he also has to offer higher returns. The following assumption is that the franchisor cannot be capital constrained if he chooses the single-unit alternative and therefore the more costly one.

**B.2.1.3) Two perspectives on the resource scarcity view**
Due to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) the resource scarcity view is composed of two fields: financial resource scarcity and local market assets.

B.2.1.3.1) Financial resource scarcity

Based on Kaufmann and Dant (1998) the financial resource scarcity view is also referred to as the capital acquisition model in literature. This view explains the existence of franchising as an opportunity to overcome the lack of financial resources an entrepreneur faces when attempting to grow his business. According to Combs and Ketchen (1999) the capital that is derived from franchisees may be less costly than capital from equity market or debt. According to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) multi-unit franchisees should have better opportunities to invest in local units, than single-unit franchisees. Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt (2000) suggest, that through the incremental growth of multi-unit franchising the franchisor gains rapid increases in earnings. This assumption is also supported by Chalupnik (2009). The author states that multi-unit franchisees possess much stronger financial stability as well as resources. Additionally multi-unit franchisees inhibit the possibility to establish a partnership with less-developed franchisees that do not exhibit the financial capital to expand their units. Chalupnik (2009) further states, that multi-unit franchisees have a stronger balance sheet and a greater overall cash-flow. Due to Windsperger and Hussain (2010), the financial resource scarcity of the franchisor is positively related to the use of multi-unit franchising, as this form of franchising establishes superior growth opportunities through the stronger financial strength of the multi-unit franchisee. Hence, the following hypothesis is derived:

H1: “Franchisors financial resources scarcity is positively related with his tendency toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010).

B.2.1.3.2) Local market assets
Based on Bradach (1998) businesses often rival a great amount of competitors in different markets and environments. To face different customers needs in varying geographic positions is therefore a main task for growing businesses. Companies often challenge this requirement centrally by specialists who are in charge of local responses. Franchising on the other hand offers the opportunity to install a business unit manager, namely an individual franchisee that operates the local unit. Hence the franchisee is directly rewarded for his competence to sell products or services to customers. Thus contrary to a company, in a franchise arrangement the franchisee is per se the specialist for local market assets. The author investigated, that franchised systems could better, faster and more efficient react to local responses than company arrangements could do. This findings support the view that a decentralized strategy of franchised systems is more efficient than a centralized and specialized company arrangement. Garg and Rasheed (2005) support this view. The scholars state, that franchisors particularly highlight the importance of local market assets and customer satisfactions. The ongoing learning and new knowledge can then be shared across the business units in the franchise system.

Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) conducted a study in Texas about the relationship between multi-unit franchisors and their local market knowledge. According to their assumptions, the reason to conduct franchising lies in the specific know-how of franchisees. This may be special skills about specific market types. Other scholars such as Mathewson and Winter (1985) also justified franchising amongst others because of the franchisee’s knowledge of local markets. Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) reveal that knowledge of local demand as well as customer tastes and unit productivity as well belongs into the list of needed resources, which the franchisee can provide to the franchisor. Thus, if the franchisor wants to expand its business units he is in the need of a high quality franchisee that already could acquire the necessary information. Therefore the franchisor has two options: either search for a new suitable franchisee or choose to give an already proven partner-franchisee additional units, which then is by definition multi-unit franchising. The authors suggest, that for the franchisor the second possibility would be easiest. Giving franchisees the right to own concentrated units in geographically close market that are demographically similar would minimize the costs of monitoring and capitalize the local market knowledge of the franchisee best. This also would imply the chance of clustering franchisees in special markets, as competition for the franchisee would be
low and thus would have a positive effect on the partnership between franchisor and franchisee. According to the authors this exact problem of too much competition already has emerged in America.

Another point of interest in their study was the hypothesis that single unit franchisees could not benefit of learning or experiences of other business units. Multi-unit franchisees could therefore be more productive, create economies of scale and their business units due to increased resources, capabilities and knowledge would stay longer in the market. In the empirical study, Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) found out that franchisors by opening up additional units would choose franchisees that are geographically close to their already established business. The same is verified for demographic variables. Franchisors prefer franchisees that already conduct business in similar demographical markets, which also presumes that the same type of customers. According to their study it is also more possible that franchisors assign larger scale franchisees additional units than smaller multi-unit franchisees. This still may not be due to growth- but quality reasons. The same holds true for franchisees that did not obtain units for a longer time. On the other side the effect of longer distance to units and already established company-presence was tested. In that case franchisors prefer company-owned units instead of franchisees. In market environments that are highly competitive it is less probable that franchisees are granted additional units. This could be due to the fact that because of immense competition the management of units gets very complex and difficult.

Gómez, González et al. (2010) also supported the theory of Kalnins and Lafontaine. In their study, they could empirically verify a positive relationship between geographical concentration of units of a franchise network and an amplified use of multi-unit franchising. For this correlation the scholars presented two opposite arguments. First, with the use of multi-unit franchising agency problems, as described in the first part, such as free-riding or shirking could be alleviated if the proximity of business-units is very close. Second, the franchisor uses the talents and resources, such as knowledge or experiences of already existing franchisees if he grants them other units in similar markets. This is, as already Kalnins and Lafontaine stated, dependent of market conditions that have to be the same the franchisee already operates in.
Gómez, Gonzáles et al. (2010) depict that the use of multi-unit franchising increases, if market conditions are the same and geographical proximity of business units is very close. They tested the correlation between network growth and the use of multi-unit franchising. This hypothesis could not be verified statistically. The scholars argue that this effect is due to the expansion of franchise networks into new areas, where no units have been before. Thus single-unit franchising may be the only possible and meaningful way to occupy unknown local areas.

According to Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) as well as Windsperger and Hussain (2010) the single-unit franchisee will exhibit more knowledge and incentives to efficiently respond to customer requirements than a multi-unit franchisee. A single-unit franchisee will also have more knowledge about local markets and therefore about its customers. Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) further reveal that usually single-unit franchisees live longer in a certain local area than hired managers of a mini-chain in the case of multi-unit franchisees. Based on Bradach (1998), company managers that are installed and paid by the firm tend to move often and therefore do not exhibit the necessary experience to appropriately serve and respond to the market. Therefore company-owned units use standardized and centralized structures, which are not the best way to address customer needs. Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) as well as Windsperger and Hussain (2010) state that single-unit franchisees also tend to exploit market chances for local adaptation as this would provide additional returns and profit opportunities by offering extra particularities and charging higher prices. Another point of interest of Garg and Rasheed et al. (2005) is that single-unit franchisees won’t shirk as they are residual claimants. Thus, following the work of Windsperger and Hussain (2010) we can derive the following hypothesis:

\[ H_{2a}: \text{“The Importance of local market know-how of the franchisee is negatively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)} \]

As already brought up in section B.3 “the resource-management process”, Sirmon, Hitt et al. (2007) state, that environmental uncertainty plays a major role in how
managing resources affect a company's performance. It is important that business-unit managers examine their geographic environment for certain changes that could have an effect on customer relationships and accordingly company performance. The company has to react to differing scales of uncertainty and competitors. Based on Penrose (1959), the best way order to overcome uncertainty is the possession of as much knowledge as possible. In this sense, Windsperger and Hussain (2010) depict, that the local market knowledge of the franchisee will alter positively with the environmental uncertainty. The derived outcome is that as environmental uncertainty rises, so does the importance of local market knowledge of the franchisees. According to these facts the next hypothesis is derived according to the view of Windsperger and Hussain (2010):

\[ H2b: \text{“The negative effect of local market know-how on the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF increases with local market uncertainty” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)} \]

B.2.2) System-specific assets in view of organizational capabilities

Regarding the view of March (1991), Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) as well as Windsperger and Hussain (2010) organizational learning and thus organizational capabilities can be split up into two activities: exploration and exploitation. Both are vital for organizations to compete in the marketplace. Due to March (1991) exploration is the “creation of new knowledge” which includes experimentation, discovery, innovation or risk taking. According to Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) exploration helps the franchise system to adapt to new environments. The authors further state that exploitation refers to the enhancement of already established organizational routines in order to improve overall performance.

According to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) exploitation capabilities correspond to monitoring-, knowledge, as well as entrepreneurial capabilities. Based on Shane (1996) franchisors are able to generate monitoring capabilities. This is the fact if the
franchise system size increases, resources are assigned due to the expansion of this capability or if knowledge is established through learning mechanisms. As monitoring refers to the direct supervision of franchisees, Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994) postpone, that administrative costs occur due to the high effort. The monitoring costs are affected by entrepreneurial capability, importance of local market knowledge, proximity of business units and the distance of the units to the headquarters. In this regard, Windsperger and Hussain (2010) as well as Weaven and Herington (2007) state, that through the use of multi-unit franchising economies of monitoring can be implemented as the franchisor can delegate tasks to the multi-unit franchisee and his mini-chain. Therefore multi-unit franchising involves higher monitoring capabilities compared to single-unit franchising.

Based on Bradach (1998) and Weaven and Herington (2007) multi-unit franchisees foster and facilitate the systemwide adaptation process in franchise chains. In terms of the franchisor, it is much easier to deal with few franchisees that manage mini-chains instead of multiple single-unit operators. This in turn reduces the effort of the franchisor to implement new ideas or processes. According to the author multi-unit franchisees dispose of a higher level of business acumen that single-unit franchisees. In summary, the adaptation process of the franchise system is amplified through multi-unit franchisees in three ways: quality of adaptation, velocity of discovering new opportunities and treats regarding adaptation as well as implementation.

Regarding human resource management, Weaven and Herington (2007) indicate that multi-unit franchisees do not require a great amount of initial training or support. Instead multi-unit franchisees are “sophisticated investors” and advocate low levels of stuff development. According to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) multi-unit franchise systems result in higher levels of human resource capabilities contrary to single-unit systems.

As stated above exploration capabilities refer to innovation. Windsperger and Hussain (2010) suggest that multi-unit franchising fosters innovation capabilities and thus system growth. In this regard Kaufmann and Dant (1998) depict that multi-unit franchisees tend to promote innovation. The authors further suggest that franchisors choose multi-unit franchising particularly if local-market innovations are of great importance. Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) explicate that managers of a company-
owned unit do not possess the necessary motivation to foster innovation as they would not be able to gain the full benefits contrary to franchisees.

Summing up, multi-unit franchising facilitates the development of exploration and exploitation capabilities. This in turn, according to the view of Windsperger and Hussain (2010) permits the emergence and exploitation of system specific know-how. Jensen and Meckling (1992) define the term specific knowledge as “knowledge that is costly to transfer among agents”. Therefore in accordance with Windsperger and Hussain (2010) as the levels of system specific knowledge increase, so does the importance of monitoring-, knowledge transfer- and human resource capabilities. The following hypothesis can be derived:

H3: “System-specific assets are positively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)
C) Empirical Study

C.1) Introduction

The following part focuses on the empirical analysis of the proposed hypotheses. With the background of the two parts A) The case of franchising and B) The Resource-based View and organizational capabilities the statistical analysis is conducted. At first we give an overview about the data and the questionnaire. In the next section the variables that are used in the analysis are explained.

C.1.2) Sample and Data

For the empirical study, data were obtained from the Austrian and German franchise sector. At first, all franchised businesses that were registered as members of the Austrian Franchise Association (AFA) and German Franchise Association were obtained.

C.1.2) The survey instrument

For the survey of the ownership patterns of franchised systems regarding single-and multi unit franchising an ad hoc questionnaire was developed.

The basis of the questionnaire is a work of Associate Professor Dr. Windsperger and Dildar Hussain. Some development of the questionnaire was accomplished as to facilitate the fill-in out of a franchisors perspective. As a pre-test the questionnaire was sent to an analyst of the Austrian Franchise Association. All together the questionnaire contains a number of 120 questions regarding the ownership patterns of franchised businesses. For accomplishment of the questionnaire it takes around 20 - 25 minutes. The complete questionnaire is attached in the Appendix. The questionnaire includes open as well as single-choice questions. Regarding the last, a 7-point Likert-type scale was used.
The questionnaire, together with an incentive letter of Prof. Dr. Windsperger was sent by mail to all Austrian and German franchise businesses. After a first time frame of three weeks the questionnaires were sent out a second time to those companies that did not respond.

C.1.3) Measures

The franchisors were asked to provide details of their ownership pattern: number of company-owned units and franchised units, number of franchisees, establishment of the franchised business, number of employees in the central office, investment costs, duration of franchised contracts, training activities. Furthermore the questionnaire included several questions regarding specific investment, environmental uncertainty, behavioural uncertainty, brand name, local market assets, financial resource scarcity, system specific assets, contractility of local market assets and contractility of system specific assets. One part of the questionnaire includes specific questions developed for the statistical analysis of the stated hypotheses with the differentiation of single-unit franchising and multi-unit franchising.

C.2.) Variables

Financial resources

According Combs and Ketchen (1999) the resource scarcity view of the firm states that franchising as a business option would provide the opportunity to overcome the lack of financial resources which the company is in the need of if it in the state of growth. Windsperger and Hussain (2010) further suggest that multi-unit franchisees possess stronger financial possibilities than single unit franchisees. This further implies that the use of multi-unit franchising makes it easier to overcome financial resource scarcity. The variable FINRES measures the availability of financial resources regarding the distinction between multi-unit franchisees and single-unit franchisees. Respondents were asked to rate the availability of financial resources for opening new outlets in the form of a seven scale. The scale is built up as followed: 1 would be a great advantage through the use of single-unit franchising
and 7 would be a great advantage through the use of multi-unit franchising. In the middle of the scale the number 4 would imply no distinction between single – or multi-unit franchising.

**Local market assets**

Following Bradach (1998) for companies to grow and to expand it is of major importance to react to different customer needs and tastes. In a franchise agreement the franchisee operates at his local unit and is per se the specialist for local market assets in the specified geographic position.

Regarding multi-unit franchising two contrary views were stated in section B.2.1.3.2. According to Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) as well as Gómez, Gonzáles et al. (2010) a franchisor would favour one franchisee having multiple units in geographically similar markets, which is by definition a multi-unit franchisee. Multi-unit franchisees could therefore create economies of scale, and would be more productive than single-unit franchisees. Still, if the franchisor expands into unknown areas single-unit franchisees may be the only meaningful way to overcome the lack of local market assets. Windsperger and Hussain (2010) as well as Garg, Rasheed et al. (2005) reveal that single unit franchisors are better able to serve different customer tastes than multi-unit franchisees. They usually live longer in certain areas, are possessing more local resources and are therefore quicker in responding to changing environments.

The variable LOCALAS measures local market knowhow. Franchisors were asked to rate the advantages of higher local market know-how on a 7-scale range, whereas 1 has the meaning of a great advantage through the use of single-unit franchising and 7 would be a great advantage through the use of multi-unit franchising.

**Local market uncertainty**

According to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) as environmental uncertainty increases so does the importance of local market assets and thus the local market
resources of the franchisee. We used the variable, LOCALASxUNCERT to measure local market uncertainty.

**System-specific assets**

As defined by Windsperger and Hussain (2010) or Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) in section B.2.2 system specific assets can be split up into exploration and exploitation capabilities. Exploration refers to the creation of new knowledge whereas exploitation implies the meaning of developing already established organizational routines. Both, exploitation as well as exploration capabilities are vital for the growth of the business. According to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) the use of multi-unit franchising is positively related with system specific assets. In this sense we use the variables SYSAS1 and SYSAS2 to measure the degree of system specific assets. In the case of SYSAS1, respondents were asked to rate if their franchise system enjoys higher brand recognition as compared to their competitors on a 7 scale range whereas 1 refers to strongly agree and 7 refers strongly disagree. The variable SYSAS2 refers to the question if the franchise system enjoys a good reputation for quality. As before the answer 1 refers to strongly agree and 7 strongly disagree, regarding a 7 scale range.

**Reliability analysis**

To test the internal consistency of our two variables, SYSAS1 and SYSAS2 cronbach´s alpha is calculated. Here, cronbach´s alpha has the value 0.861.

**Dependent variable**

The dependent variable, MUF, is calculated by dividing the number of franchised outlets by the number of franchisees. As stated, a multi-unit franchisee is defined as a franchisee that operates more than one unit at a time. The variables for this calculation are covered by the open questions “How much franchisees do you have in 2009?” and “How much franchised units do you have in 2009?”. Accordingly a value of MUF equal to 1, refers to single-unit franchising and a value of MUF greater than 1 refers to multi-unit franchising.
Control variables

In the study we additionally used two different control variables. The first control variable refers to the size of the franchise network, namely SIZE, which includes company outlets and franchised business units. According to Gómez, Gonzáles et al. (2010) the size of the franchise network is positively related to the use of multi-unit franchising. As the network grows, the brand name value increases equally and thus sales and market share as well. The authors further mentioned, that trough the increasing size of the network system, adverse selection and moral hazard problems may emerge. A single franchisee will find it easier to free-ride and does not have to cope with the negative consequences on his own.

The second control variable in this study is related to the age of the franchised system. This variable is calculated by subtracting the year of opening of the franchise system from the year 2009. According to Weaven and Frazer (2007) mature and sophisticated franchise system are positively related to the use of multi-unit franchising. In the first growth phase most franchisors do not possess a strong brand name and thus do not attract high quality franchisees. Franchisors further lack the important know how or administrative capabilities that are necessary for the development of a multi-unit strategy.

C.3) Results

C.3.1) Descriptive statistics of the respondent profile

To conduct a thorough statistical analysis it is important to examine the respondent profile of the franchisors that account for the present study. A total number of 137 filled questionnaires were sent back and also could be used. Regarding the type of business in the present study the following question “ What kind of franchising is your business conducting?” was used. Here, 2,9% of our respondents claim to use
product franchising, 30.7% are in the sales/distribution industry and 59.1% conduct business in the service industry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of franchising</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product franchising</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales / distribution</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Type of franchising

Regarding the type of franchised system, we can find out if the franchisor uses multi-unit franchising or single-unit franchising. As stated, some questions concerning the ownership structure of the franchised business were posed. In this respect the two queries, that matter are: “What is the number of franchised units in 2009?” and “What is the number of franchisees in 2009?”. Through this context, we can easily conduct the number of multi-unit franchisors, as those companies that inhibit more franchisees than franchised units use per definition multi-unit franchising as their strategy (one franchisee operates more than one unit at a time) (Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt 2000). In the present sample, 57.6% use multi-unit franchising, and 42.4% single-unit franchising.

According to the sample of the present study, the typical franchisor owns on average 31 company outlets and 123 franchised outlets. The first outlet was opened on average in the year 1998. The initial franchise fee amounts to 12,668 €, whereas the average investment required by a franchisee to start a new franchised outlet amounts to 452,263 €. Concerning the monthly fixed royalties the average amount is 205 €
and the fix advertising/marketing fee about 72 €. The length of a franchise contract amounts to 7 years on average.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of company owned outlets</td>
<td>31,89</td>
<td>95,632</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of franchised outlets</td>
<td>123,36</td>
<td>302,06</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year when first outlet was opened</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8,3</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franchise/entry fee in Euro</td>
<td>12668,57</td>
<td>14701,979</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average investment (excluding franchise/entry fee) required by a franchisee to start a new franchised outlet (Euro)</td>
<td>452263,8</td>
<td>3,571E6</td>
<td>38,500,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly fixed royalties (Euro)</td>
<td>205,75</td>
<td>764,61</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fix advertising/marketing fee (Euros per month)</td>
<td>72,44</td>
<td>294,47</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franchise contract length in years</td>
<td>6,82</td>
<td>3,28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Descriptive statistic of residents profile

C.3.2) Descriptive statistics of ownership patterns

The aim of this part of the analysis is to provide an overview about the tendencies and answers of the respondents regarding their ownership pattern. At first a descriptive statistical analysis based on the described variables is conducted.
C.3.2.1. Financial resource scarcity

The first chart represents a frequency analysis of our variable FINRES, which represents the question if franchisors would regard a higher availability of financial resources for opening new outlets as a great advantage of single-unit franchising or multi-unit franchising. As we clearly can observe, 27% of all franchisors claim that there is no difference between the use of multi- or single unit franchising in this regard. In numbers, 5% of all respondents’ state that a higher availability of financial resources for opening new outlets is a great advantage through the use of single-unit franchising, whereas 13% see this as a great advantage of multi-unit franchising.

Graph1: Frequency analysis of variable FINRES

C3.2.2. Local market assets

The following graph describes the variable LOCALAS. Here respondents were asked: “As a franchisor, how do you see the advantages of multi-unit franchising compared to single-unit franchising regarding higher market knowledge.”
About 12% answered that it would be a great advantage through single-unit franchising, whereas around 32% claimed that higher market knowledge would neither be an advantage through single-unit franchising nor multi-unit franchising. Around 13% of the respondents claimed that it would be a great advantage through multi-unit franchising.

**Graph 2: Frequency analysis of variable LOCALAS**

**C.3.2.3. Local market uncertainty**

The next graph shows the distribution analysis of the first variable to measure environmental uncertainty, namely SALES. Respondents were asked to answer the question “The sales at the outlet level is very fluctuating.”
Around 7.3% of the participants strongly disagree to the statement whereas 19% are neutral to the question. Around 7.3% of the franchisors strongly agree to the statement whether the sales at the outlet level are fluctuating.

Graph 3: Frequency analysis of the variable SALES

The next graph exhibits the analysis of the variable UNCERT. The franchisors consulted were asked if “the economic environment in the local market is changing rapidly”.

Around 8% strongly disagree to the statement, 21% adopt a neutral position, and just 3.6% of the respondents strongly agree that the economic environment in the local market is changing rapidly.
Graph 4: Frequency analysis of the variable UNCERT

C.3.2.4. System specific assets

The following chart represents the frequency analysis of the first variable for system specific assets, namely SYSAS1. Franchisors were asked to rate the statement “our franchise system enjoys higher brand recognition as compared to our competitors”.

No franchisor answered the statement with “strongly disagree”, while 13% of all respondents are neutral and 30% strongly agree to the statement.
The next graph shows the second variable to measure system specific assets, SYSAS2. Here, franchisors rated the statement “our franchise system enjoys a good reputation for quality”.

For this variable, we can observe quite similar results as for SYSAS1. No respondents strongly disagrees to this statement, 9.6% answered the question with “neutral”, while 35% of the franchisors strongly agree that their franchise system enjoys a good reputation for quality.
C.4) Regression Analysis

The following hypotheses were developed in chapter B.2.:  

Hypothesis 1: “Franchisors financial resources scarcity is positively related with his tendency toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)

Hypothesis 2a: “The Importance of local market know-how of the franchisee is negatively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)

Hypothesis 2b: “The negative effect of local market know-how on the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF increases with local market uncertainty” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)

Hypothesis 3: “System-specific assets are positively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)
To test the hypotheses we conducted a linear regression. As mentioned, the dependent variable MUF should be interpreted through the independent variables, FINRES, LOCALAS, LOCALASxUNCERT, UNCERT, SALES, LOCALASxSALES, SYSAS1 and SYSAS2. Additionally two control variables are used, namely AGE and SIZE. As described in chapter C.2.3.1 the variable FINRES is used to predict the financial resource scarcity theory. The variable LOCALAS represents the local market knowhow of the franchisor. The variables LOCALASxUNCERT as well as LOCALASxSALES represent the interaction of local market knowhow and economic uncertainty. System specific assets are displayed through the variables SYSAS1 and SYSAS2. Further two control variables are included, whereas the variable AGE reflects the maturity of the franchise network and SIZE the franchise network size. The dependent variable MUF stands for the degree of multi-unit franchisors based on the total amount of franchisors in our analysis.

According to the regression analysis we get the following equation:

\[ MUF = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{FINRES} + \alpha_2 \text{LOCALAS} + \alpha_3 \text{LOCALASxUNCERT} + \alpha_4 \text{UNCERT} + \alpha_5 \text{LOCALASxSALES} + \alpha_6 \text{SALES} + \alpha_7 \text{SYSAS1} + \alpha_8 \text{SYSAS2} + \alpha_9 \text{AGE} + \alpha_{10} \text{SIZE} \]

According to our first hypothesis the variable FINRES should increase with the use of multi-unit franchising. As already discussed in chapter B.2.1.3.1 financial resources should be positively related with the use of multi-unit franchising. Therefore we expect that \( \alpha_1 \) has a positive coefficient indicating a high benefit of multi-unit franchising. Further we suggested that local market knowledge, as measured by the variable LOCALAS is negatively related with the use of multi-unit franchising. Accordingly \( \alpha_2 \) is supposed to have a negative coefficient as an indicator for a benefit of single-unit franchising regarding local market knowhow. Further we suggest that high environmental uncertainty increases the use of single-unit franchising as it amplifies the need for a thorough knowledge of local market conditions. Thus we hypothesize the coefficient of \( \alpha_3 \) as well as \( \alpha_5 \) to be negative. The variables SYSAS1 and SYSAS2 are both either a part of system specific assets. In section B.2.2. we derived the hypothesis that exploration and exploitation capabilities are positively related to multi-unit franchising. In accordance to this view, the coefficients of \( \alpha_7 \) as
well as $\alpha_8$ should be positive. The variable AGE depicts the maturity of the franchise system. As stated in section C.2, the maturity of the franchise system is positively related with the use of multi-unit franchising as it is related to a strong brand name and necessary administrative abilities. In accordance to this view we postulate the coefficient of $\alpha_9$ to be positive as well. The variable SIZE reflects the size of the franchise network. It is hypothesized that multi-unit franchising is in favour of an increasing franchise network. With its size, the brand name value, sales and market shares increase as well. Here a positive coefficient of $\alpha_{10}$ is expected.

C.4.1) Results

CORRELATIONS
To analyze the problem of multicollinearity we have a look at the predictor variables. We clearly can observe that the only predictor variables that are highly correlated are the two variables to describe system specific assets, SYSAS1 and SYSAS2, LOCALAS and LOCALASxUNCERT, LOCALAS and LOCALASxSALES. The variables SIZE and AGE are also highly correlated which could indicate an interrelation between the maturity of the franchise system and it’s size. It is supposed that the maturity of a franchise network is correlated to the use of multi-unit franchising which in turn would lead to an increased size of the franchise network. In sum our data does not show an indicator of problem of multicollinearity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MUF</th>
<th>FINRES</th>
<th>LOCALAS</th>
<th>LOCALASxUNCERT</th>
<th>UNCERT</th>
<th>SYSAS1</th>
<th>SYSAS2</th>
<th>SIZE</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>LOCALASxSALES</th>
<th>SALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUF</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINRES</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALAS</td>
<td>-.39**</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCERTxLOCALAS</td>
<td>-.327**</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.716**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCERT</td>
<td>-.193</td>
<td>-.111</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.674**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSAS1</td>
<td>.272**</td>
<td>.181</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSAS2</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>-.207</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.757**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIZE</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>-.086</td>
<td>-.140</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>-.119</td>
<td>-.288**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>.304**</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.2227</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.453**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCALASxSALES</td>
<td>-.312**</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.727**</td>
<td>.734**</td>
<td>.325**</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALES</td>
<td>-.284**</td>
<td>-.227</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.349**</td>
<td>.409**</td>
<td>-.106</td>
<td>-.087</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.709**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Correlations
**ANOVA**

The following table displays the model summary of the regression analysis. In the third column R square is indicated. It depicts the degree of the explained variance regarding the total variance of the dependent variable. This variable has the value of 0.463, thus 46% of the variance can be defined by our statistical analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.681&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.463</td>
<td>.410</td>
<td>.78692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Predictors: (Constant), FINRES, SYSAS1, SYSAS2, LOCALAS, UNCERT, SALES, LOCALASxSALES, LOCALASxUNCERT, AGE, SIZE

Table 4: Model Summary

The regression model has a significance value of 0.000 and a value F of 8.723 as depicted in the table Anova below. The coefficients that indicate the sign of \( \alpha \) are summarized in the table Coefficients.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regression</td>
<td>54,018</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5,402</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>62,544</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>.619</td>
<td>8,723</td>
<td>.000&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>116,562</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Predictors: (Constant), FINRES, SYSAS1, SYSAS2, LOCALAS, UNCERT, SALES, LOCALASxSALES, LOCALASxUNCERT, AGE, SIZE

<sup>b</sup> Dependent Variable: MUF

Table 5: Anova
Table 6: Coefficients

Hypothesis 1: “Franchisors financial resources scarcity is positively related with his tendency toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)

As displayed in table 6, FINRES has a positive coefficient. The variable displays the financial resource scarcity theory. As Windsperger and Hussain (2010) reveal that multi-unit franchisees possess the financial background and strength of establishing further units. Chalupnik (2009) asserted that multi-unit franchisees would have stronger balance sheets and more capital to invest. As FINRES has a positive coefficient but a significance value of 0.121 (p < 0.05) we can just can observe a tendency that franchisors financial resources scarcity is positively related with his tendency toward MUF.
Hypothesis 2a: “The Importance of local market know-how of the franchisee is negatively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)

The variable LOCALAS shows a negative coefficient. Due to Windsperger and Hussain (2010) single-unit franchisees have the required knowledge and incentives to react to differing customer needs in certain locations. In this sense as single-unit franchisees have the required capabilities they are able to exploit market chances and thus earn higher profits. The variable LOCALAS shows a significance value of 0,000 (p < 0,05) thus we can support our Hypothesis and state that the importance of local market know-how of the franchisee is negatively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF.

Hypothesis 2b: “The negative effect of local market know-how on the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF increases with local market uncertainty” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)

The variable LOCALASxUNCERT has a p-value of 0,319 (p < 0,05) and is therefore not significant. The variable LOCALASxSALES shows a positive coefficient and has a significance value of 0,000 (p < 0,05). Thus the results do not support the hypothesis2b that the negative effect of local market know-how on the franchisor's tendency toward MUF increases with local market uncertainty.

Hypothesis 3: “System-specific assets are positively related with the franchisor’s tendency toward MUF” (Windsperger and Hussain 2010)

The variable SYSAS1 has a positive coefficient and a significance value of 0,020 (p < 0,05). This implies that according to our analysis system-specific assets are positively related with the franchisor's tendency toward multi-unit franchising, and the hypothesis is supported. The second variable, SYSAS2 shows a negative coefficient, and a significance value of 0,465. As the significance value of 0,356 is higher than 0,05 (p < 0,05) the result of this variable is not significant.
**Control variables:**

The variable SIZE has a positive coefficient, but the significance value is higher than 0.05 ($p < 0.05$), thus the result of this variable is not significant. The second control variable, AGE shows a positive coefficient. The $p$-value of AGE is $0.126$ ($p < 0.05$) and thus as well not significant.
C.5) Conclusion

This paper focused on the rather new field of franchising: multi-unit franchising. We used the resource-based view to analyze three major topics in this field: financial resource scarcity, local market assets and system specific assets. Due to the empirical analysis we could show a tendency that multi-unit franchising is a way to overcome the capital restraints of the company owner, namely the franchisor as multi-unit franchisees possess more financial resources to quickly grow and expand the company. In regard to local market assets we can support the hypothesis that local market knowhow is be positively related to single-unit franchising. Another point of interest is the hypothesis that as environmental uncertainty rises, so does the importance of local market knowhow is supported as well. To analyze the relationship between system specific assets and multi-unit franchising we used two variables. We could support the hypothesis that system-specific assets are positively related to the use of multi-unit franchising.

This paper still has some limitations, as it did not distinguish between the different types of multi-unit franchising, such subfranchising, area development multi-unit strategy or sequential multi-unit strategy. For a deeper and further analysis of this topic the agency theory should be taken into account as we could prove that also monitoring is related to the proportion of multi-unit franchising.
References


Appendix

Appendix A: Abstract in German

Appendix B: The questionnaire

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Tel.Nr.: 00431-4277-38180

Betreff: Studie zum Thema „Eigentumsstrategie von Franchise-Unternehmen“

Sehr geehrte Franchiser!

Am Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Wien (Lehrstuhl: Organisation und Planung) wird unter der Leitung von Univ. Prof. Dr. Windsperger in Zusammenarbeit mit Mag. Waltraud Martius ein Forschungsprojekt über „Eigentumsstrategie von Franchise-Unternehmen in Österreich“ durchgeführt. Dabei werden folgende Fragen untersucht:

Welche Faktoren beeinflussen aus der Sicht der Franchisegeber die Wahl der Eigentumsstrategie zwischen eigenen Filialen, Single-Unit Franchising und Multi-Unit Franchising?


Im Namen der gesamten Franchise-Szene bedanke ich mich im Voraus recht herzlich für Ihre Bereitschaft zur Zusammenarbeit.

Salzburg, am 12. Juni 2009

Mit besten Grüßen

[Signatur]

[Signatur]
Unterstützt vom
Deutschen Franchise-Verband (DFV)
(Geschäftsführer: Torben Leif Brodersen)

Firmennamen und Adresse: (optional!)

Tel. Nr.
E-Mail:

Ziel des Fragebogens ist es, die Einflussfaktoren bei der Wahl der Eigentumsstrategie von Franchiseunternehmen aus der Sicht des Franchisegebers zu untersuchen.


Im Folgenden nehmen Sie zu Aussagen über verschiedene Bereiche Ihrer Unternehmung Stellung. Bitte kreuzen Sie jenes Feld an, das aus Ihrer Sicht (als Franchisegeber) der Unternehmenssituation am besten entspricht.

Hier ist ein BEISPIEL:

Unser Markennamen ist sehr wichtig für den Systemerfolg.

Wenn Sie der Meinung sind, dass der Markennamen sehr wichtig für den Erfolg ist, dann kreuzen/klicken Sie das ganz rechte Feld, 7 (Trifft vollständig zu) an. Umkehrt ist das ganz linke Feld, 1 (Trifft überhaupt nicht zu) anzukreuzen, wenn Sie der Auffassung sind, dass der Markennamen nicht wichtig für den Erfolg ist.

A. Spezifische Fragen zur Wahl der Eigentumsstrategie des Franchisegebers

In welchem Ausmaß entstehen dem FRANCHISENEHMER am Beginn der Vertragsbeziehungen Investitionsaufwendungen? (R1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aufwendungen für Schulungen am Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung.</th>
<th>Trifft überhaupt nicht zu</th>
<th>Trifft teilweise zu</th>
<th>Trifft vollständig zu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aufwendungen für spezifischen technischen und organisatorischen Support durch den Franchisegeber.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aufwendungen für die Ausstattung des Standortes am Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alle erhobenen Daten werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur in aggregierter Form verwendet. Anhand des Datenmaterials können keine Rückschlüsse auf einzelne Unternehmen gezogen werden.
In welchem Ausmaß entstehen dem **FRANCHISEGEBER am Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung Investitionsaufwendungen?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aufwendungen für Franchisenehmer-Schulungen am Beginn der Geschäftsbeziehung</th>
<th>Überhaupt nicht</th>
<th>Teilweise</th>
<th>In sehr großem Ausmaß</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aufwendungen für technische Unterstützung des Franchisenehmers am Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung</th>
<th>Überhaupt nicht</th>
<th>Teilweise</th>
<th>In sehr großem Ausmaß</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aufwendungen für den Aufbau der Organisation des lokalen Standortes</th>
<th>Überhaupt nicht</th>
<th>Teilweise</th>
<th>In sehr großem Ausmaß</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wenn Sie als Franchisegeber expandieren wollen, können Sie folgende EIGENTÜMSSTRATEGIEN wählen:
(a) Eröffnung neuer Franchisenehmer-Standorte und/oder (b) neuer eigener Filialstandorte.
Bei der Wahl von Franchisenehmer-Standorten können Sie zwei Strategien unterscheiden:

- **Single-unit Strategie** (der Franchisenehmer ist Eigentümer eines Standortes)
- **Multi-unit Strategie** (der Franchisenehmer ist Eigentümer von mindestens zwei Standorten)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worin sehen Sie als Franchisegeber (FG) die Vorteile durch Multi-Unit-Franchising (MUF) im Vergleich zum Single-Unit-Franchising (SUF)?</th>
<th>Großer Vorteil durch Single-Unit-Franchising</th>
<th>Kein Unterschied zwischen MUF und SUF</th>
<th>Großer Vorteil durch Multi-Unit-Franchising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Größeres lokales Marktwissen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effizientere lokale Serviceleistungen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Größeres Unternehmenswachstum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Größere administrative Fähigkeiten</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehr organisatorische Innovationen im Franchisesystem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schnellere Marktdurchdringung</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effizienteres lokales Personalmanagement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bessere Qualitätskontrolle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehr Produktinnovationen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effizienterer IT-Einsatz im Franchisesystem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effizienterer Know-how-Transfer zwischen der Zentrale und den lokalen Partnern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bessere Zusammenarbeit zwischen Zentrale und den lokalen Partnern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effizientere Kontrolle der lokalen Standorte</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Größere Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten bei der Eröffnung neuer Standorte</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geringere Finanzierungskosten</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nehmen Sie bitte zu folgenden Fragen als Franchisegeber Stellung: (R2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nehmen Sie bitte zu folgenden Fragen als Franchisegeber Stellung: (R2)</th>
<th>Trifft überhaupt nicht zu</th>
<th>Trifft teilweise zu</th>
<th>Trifft vollständig zu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unser Markenname ist sehr stark im Vergleich zu unseren Konkurrenten.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Qualität unseres Franchisesystems hat einen sehr guten Ruf.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unser Franchisesystem ist sehr anerkannt im Vergleich zu unseren Konkurrenten.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unser Markenname ist sehr wichtig, um einen Wettbewerbsvorteil zu erzielen.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alle erhobenen Daten werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur in aggregierter Form verwendet. Anhand des 632
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nehmen Sie bitte aus Ihrer Sicht zu folgenden Aussagen Stellung: (R3)</th>
<th>Trieft überhaupt nicht zu</th>
<th>Trieft teilweise zu</th>
<th>Trieft vollständig zu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Es herrscht großes Vertrauen zwischen uns und den Partnern.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es herrscht eine Atmosphäre von Offenheit und Ehrlichkeit zwischen uns und den Partnern.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Informationsaustausch zwischen uns und den Partnern geht über das vereinbare Ausmaß hinaus.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Zusammenarbeit beruht auf partnerschaftlicher Basis.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personen, denen wir vertrauen, sind jene, mit denen wir schon eine längere Beziehung aufgebaut haben.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die meisten Menschen vertrauen den Anderen.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die meisten Menschen sind vertrauenswürdig.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die meisten Menschen verhalten sich kooperativ, wenn man ihnen vertraut.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wie schwierig ist das Know-how des Franchisegebers auf den Franchisenehmer in den folgenden Bereichen übertragbar? (R4)</th>
<th>Sehr leicht zu übertragen</th>
<th>Teilweise übertragbar</th>
<th>Sehr schwierig zu übertragen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Markenname</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing-Know-how</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisatorisches Know-how</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administratives Know-how</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitätsmanagement-Know-how</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling-Know-how</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources-Know-how</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT-Know-how</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In welchem Ausmaß haben Sie im letzten Jahr die folgenden Ziele realisiert?</th>
<th>1-Viel schlechter als geplant</th>
<th>4-ca. gleich wie geplant</th>
<th>7-Viel besser als geplant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Einsparungen bei den Verwaltungskosten</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemwachstum</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bessere Anpassung des Produkt- bzw. Dienstleistungsprogrammes an die Kundenwünsche</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effizientere Koordination zwischen Zentrale und lokalem Standorten</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verringerung der Kosten</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steigerung der Erträge</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zunahme der Innovationen</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einsparungen bei den Koordinations- und Kontrollkosten</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Höhere Qualität der angebotenen Produkte</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gewinnwachstum</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worin sehen Sie als Franchisegeber die Vorteile durch Franchising im Vergleich zu eigenen Filialbetrieben? (R5)</th>
<th>1-großer Vorteil durch Franchising</th>
<th>4-kein Unterschied</th>
<th>7-großer Vorteil durch eigene Filialen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Größeres lokales Marktwissen</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bessere Qualitätskontrolle</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehr Innovationen</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geringere Finanzierungskosten bei Expansion</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Größere administrative Fähigkeiten</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effizienteres Human Resources Management</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Der Franchisevertrag kann die verschiedenen Aufgabenbereiche der Franchisebeziehung (wie z. B. Werbung, Produkt- bzw. Dienstleistungsangebot, Betriebsmittelbeschaffung, Festlegung der Verkaufspreise, Ausbildung und Anstellung von Mitarbeitern) durch **SPEZIFISCHE RECHTE** und **ENTSCHEIDUNGSRECHTE** regeln.

**SPEZIFISCHE RECHTE** geben im Vertrag genau an, wer unter bestimmten Umständen was zu tun hat (wie z. B. welches Werbematerial bei bestimmten Events zu verwenden ist).

**ENTSCHEIDUNGSRECHTE** geben im Vertrag genau an, wer über einen bestimmten Sachverhalt zu entscheiden hat (wie z. B. wer über den Einsatz von Werbemaßnahmen oder über die Ausbildung der Mitarbeiter zu entscheiden hat).

### Nehmen Sie bitte aus Ihrer Sicht (als Franchisegeber) zu folgenden Aussagen Stellung: (R6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aussage</th>
<th>Trifft überhaupt nicht zu</th>
<th>Trifft teilweise zu</th>
<th>Trifft vollständig zu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Die Aufgabenbereiche des Franchisegebers werden durch ENTSCHEIDUNGSRECHTE im Vertrag sehr detailliert geregelt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Aufgabenbereiche des Franchisegebers werden durch SPEZIFISCHE RECHTE im Vertrag sehr detailliert geregelt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Aufgabenbereiche des Franchisenehmers werden durch ENTSCHEIDUNGSRECHTE im Vertrag sehr detailliert geregelt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Aufgabenbereiche des Franchisenehmers werden durch SPEZIFISCHE RECHTE im Vertrag sehr detailliert geregelt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen uns und den Franchisepartnern ist im Vertrag sehr detailliert geregelt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nehmen Sie bitte aus Ihrer Sicht (als Franchisegeber) zu folgenden Aussagen Stellung: (R7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aussage</th>
<th>Trifft überhaupt nicht zu</th>
<th>Trifft teilweise zu</th>
<th>Trifft vollständig zu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Die Absatzmenge auf den lokalen Standorten ist starken Schwankungen unterworfen.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es ist sehr schwierig, die Marktentwicklung der lokalen Standorte zu prognostizieren.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es ist sehr schwierig, das Verhalten des Standort-Managers (Franchisenehmer oder Geschäftsführer) zu kontrollieren.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es ist sehr schwierig, die Leistungen des Standort-Managers (Franchisenehmer oder Geschäftsführer) zu messen.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es ist sehr schwierig, die Kompetenzen und Fähigkeiten des Standortmanagers (Franchisenehmer oder Geschäftsführer) zu ermitteln.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Das wirtschaftliche Umfeld auf den lokalen Märkten ändert sich rasch.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Umsatzprognosen bezüglich der Entwicklung der lokalen Standorte sind normalerweise sehr präzise.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchmal gibt der Franchisenehmer relevante Informationen nicht an den Franchisegeber weiter.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franchisenehmer müssen regelmäßig kontrolliert werden, um sicherzustellen, dass sie ihre Aufgaben erfüllen.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Der Franchisevertrag enthält folgende Bestimmungen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ja</th>
<th>Nein</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Der Franchisenehmer darf neben dem Produktprogramm des Franchisegebers auch andere Produkte/Dienstleistungen vertreiben.</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Franchisenehmer muss mehr als 50 % der Betriebsmittel/ Vorprodukte vom Franchisegeber oder von vorgegebenen Lieferanten beziehen.</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Franchisegeber legt die Verkaufspreise für die vom Franchisenehmer angebotenen Produkte/Dienstleistungen unverbindlich fest.</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Das Marktgebiet des Franchisenehmers ist geografisch abgegrenzt (Gebietsschutz-Klausel).</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Franchisenehmer hat einen exklusiven Kundenschutz.</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Franchisevertrag enthält eine Wettbewerbsklausel für die Geschäftstätigkeit nach Ablauf/Kündigung des Vertrages.</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Franchisegeber ist Eigentümer oder Hauptmieter des Standortes des Franchisebetriebes.</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Franchisegeber hat vertragliche Optionsrechte bei Veräußerung des Franchisebetriebes durch den Franchisenehmer (z.B. Vorkaufsrecht).</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Franchisebetrieb ist vererbarbar.</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### In welchem Ausmaß entscheidet der Franchisenehmer über folgende Bereiche?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bereich</th>
<th>Überhaupt nicht</th>
<th>teilweise</th>
<th>In sehr großem Ausmaß</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durchführung von Investitionsprojekten am lokalen Standort</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finanzierung von lokalen Investitionsprojekten</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auswahl von Lieferanten</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anstellung von Mitarbeitern am lokalen Standort</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ausbildung der Mitarbeiter am lokalen Standort</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produkt- bzw. Dienstleistungsangebot am lokalen Markt</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verkaufspreise am lokalen Standort</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einsatz von Werbe- und Verkaufsfinanzierungsmaßnahmen</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ausstattung des Franchisenehmer-Standorten</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beschaffung der Betriebsmittel/Vorprodukte</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einführung neuer Produkte am lokalen Markt</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Einsatz des Controllingsystems am lokalen Standort</td>
<td>☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. Bitte machen Sie folgende Angaben zu Ihrem Unternehmen:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welche Art von Franchising betreibt Ihr Unternehmen?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Produktion ☐ Vertrieb ☐ Dienstleistung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wie groß ist die Anzahl der firmeneigenen **Filialstandorte** in Deutschland im Jahre 2009?
Anzahl: __________

Wie groß ist die Anzahl der **Franchisenehmer-standorte** in Deutschland im Jahre 2009?
Anzahl: 

Wie groß ist die **Anzahl der Franchisenehmer** in Deutschland im Jahre 2009?
Anzahl: 

Wann wurde der erste Franchisebetrieb in Deutschland eröffnet?
Jahr: 

Geben Sie die Anzahl der Mitarbeiter in der Systemzentrale an?
Anzahl: 

Alle erhobenen Daten werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur in aggregierter Form verwendet. Anhand des Datenmaterials können keine Rückschlüsse auf einzelne Unternehmen gezogen werden.
Wie hoch ist die **fixe Einstiegsgebühr** des Franchisenehmers zu Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung (in EUR)?
Betrag in EUR: __________________

Wie hoch sind die **durchschnittlichen Investitionskosten (ohne Einstiegsgebühr)** des Franchisenehmers am Beginn der Vertragsbeziehung?
Betrag: __________________

Wovon hängt die laufende **variable Gebühr** ab?
- [ ] Fixer Betrag
- [ ] Umsatz
- [ ] Gewinn
- [ ] Andere Größen: Welche?

Wie hoch ist diese laufende **variable Gebühr**?
Prozentsatz: __________________ oder Betrag: __________________

Wird zusätzlich eine Werbe- bzw. Marketinggebühr verrechnet?
- [ ] Ja
- [ ] Nein
  Wovon hängt diese ab?
  - [ ] Umsatz
  - [ ] Andere Größen: Welche?

Wie hoch ist diese **Werbe- bzw. Marketinggebühr**?
Prozentsatz: __________________
oder Betrag: __________________

Wie lange ist die vertragliche **Laufzeit** des Franchisevertrages?
Anzahl der Jahre:

Wie oft finden **formelle Treffen** zwischen Franchisegeber und Franchisenehmer (wie Tagungen, Ausschüsse) pro Jahr statt?
**Anzahl:**

Wie oft finden **Besuche** des Franchisegebers beim Franchisenehmer statt?
**Anzahl:**

**Laufende Schulung**: An wie vielen Tagen pro Jahr wird der Franchisenehmer vom Franchisegeber besucht?
Anzahl der Tage: __________________

An wie vielen Tagen pro Jahr werden die Mitarbeiter des Franchisenehmers geschult?
Anzahl der Tage:

**Grundschulung**: Wie viele Tage dauert die Grundausbildung und praktische Schulung des Franchisenehmers vor Eröffnung eines Franchisebetriebes?
Anzahl der Tage: __________________

Wir möchten uns für Ihre freundliche Unterstützung recht herzlich bedanken. Bei Interesse übermitteln wir Ihnen nach Abschluss der Untersuchung gerne die Ergebnisse. Bitte geben Sie hier Ihre **Email-Adresse** an:

Bitte übermitteln Sie den ausgefüllten Fragebogen an:

**UNIV. PROF. DR. JOSEF WINDSPERGER (UNIVERSITÄT WIEN)**
**BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTSZENTRUM**
**UNIVERSITÄT WIEN**
**BRÜNNERSTR. 72, A-1210 WIEN**
TEL. 0043-1-4277-38180; FAX: 0043-1-4277-38174
E-Mail: josef.windsperger@univie.ac.at

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Persönliche Daten  
Geboren am 11.07.1984 in Linz (Österreich)  
Ledig

Ausbildung

Seit 03/2006  
Studium der *Internationalen Betriebswirtschaft*, in den Sprachen Deutsch, Englisch und Spanisch, am Betriebswissenschaftlichen Zentrum der Universität Wien, mit Master Spezialisierungen in:  
- International Management  
- International Energy Management

03/2003 – 02/2006  
Studium der *Wirtschaftswissenschaften* an der Johannes Kepler Universität in Linz mit erfolgreichem Abschluss des ersten Diplomprüfungszeugnisses.

10/2002 – 02/2003  
Studium der *Psychologie* an der Universität Wien

07/2002  
Allgemeine Hochschulreife mit gutem Erfolg:  
Wirtschaftskundliches Realgymnasium Linz:  
Körnerschule Linz

Auslandserfahrung

09/2007 – 07/2008  
Studienaufenthalt im Rahmen des ERASMUS Programms an der Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, in Barcelona (Spanien)
Berufliche Erfahrung

Seit 07/2010  
Festanstellung bei Vispiron AG  
as als Junior Consultant PM/QM, in der Entwicklung  
Antriebssteuergänze bei BMW AG

09/2009 – 03/2010  
Praktikum bei BMW AG in der Entwicklung  
Licht und Sicht  
Integration eines Prozesses zur  
Funktionsentwicklung bei einem Innovationsprojekt  
Projektmanagement in der Serienentwicklung LED-  
Scheinwerfer als LEAD-Projekt  
Mitarbeit in WO-Projekt zur Telekonferenzen  
Mitarbeit bei der Integration eines neuen  
Lastenheftprozesses mit Entwicklung eines  
Lastenheft-Masters

07/2008  
Praktikum bei MAGNA STEYR Fahrzeugtechnik AG & CO KG, in den Bereichen  
Marketing, Strategisches Management, Sales,  
Marktforschung

08/2006  
Praktikum bei WIRTSCHAFTSKAMMER ÖSTERREICH  
in den Bereichen Customer Support, EDV Support

Seit 2001 bis laufend  
Angestellt bei HIPPMANN GmbH in den Bereichen  
Strategisches Management, Marketing, Customer  
Support, Human Resources,

Sprachkurse

09/2007 – 02/2008  
Spanisch, an der Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,  
in Barcelona (Spanien)

03/2004 – 01/2005  
Russisch, an der Johannes Kepler Universität in Linz
**Besondere Kenntnisse**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fremdsprachen</th>
<th>Englisch:</th>
<th>Fließend in Wort und Schrift</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spanisch:</td>
<td>Sehr gut in Wort und Schrift</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDV- Erfahrung</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft Windows, Office (Excel, Outlook, Powerpoint, Word)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apple Mac OSX, iWork, Office (Entourage, Excel, Power Point, Word)</td>
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<td>SPSS</td>
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<tr>
<td>EndNote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grundlagen SAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grundlagen Doors</td>
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<td>RPlan</td>
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**Hobbys**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>Tennis, Skifahren, Tauchen (Open Water und Advanced Open Water Diver der PADI Tauchschule), Tanzen (erster Platz der oberösterreichischen Landesmeisterschaften Latein 2001, vierter Platz der Staatsmeisterschaften Latein 2001)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kultur</td>
<td>Theater, Kabarett, Konzerte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reisen</td>
<td>Andere Kulturen und deren Menschen kennenlernen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesen</td>
<td>Literatur, Belletristik sowie Fachliteratur in Deutsch, Englisch und teilweise in Spanisch</td>
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