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THE LEBANON WAR 2006

A country between terror and resistance

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INDEX

MAPS ..................................................................................................................... - 5 -

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................... - 6 -

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. - 10 -

1. WEAK STATES .................................................................................................. - 14 -
   1.1 Spillover effects from weak states ................................................................. - 16 -
       1.1.1 Terrorism ................................................................................................. - 16 -
       1.1.2 Weapon Proliferation ............................................................................... - 17 -
       1.1.3 Environmental Degradation .................................................................... - 18 -
       1.1.4 Transnational Organized Crime .............................................................. - 18 -
       1.1.5 Pandemics ............................................................................................... - 19 -
   1.2 Weak State Lebanon ..................................................................................... - 19 -
       1.2.1 Failed State Index .................................................................................... - 22 -
   1.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................... - 23 -

2. SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF LEBANON .......................................................... - 24 -
   2.1 Sects ............................................................................................................ - 24 -
       2.1.1 The Maronites ......................................................................................... - 24 -
       2.1.2 The Druzes ............................................................................................. - 25 -
       2.1.3 Sunnis ...................................................................................................... - 25 -
       2.1.4 Shiites ...................................................................................................... - 26 -
       2.1.5 Other communities .................................................................................. - 27 -
       2.1.5.1 The Palestinians in Lebanon ................................................................. - 28 -
   2.2 Confessionalism ............................................................................................ - 32 -

3. HEZBOLLAH .................................................................................................. - 34 -
   3.1 The beginning of Hezbollah .......................................................................... - 35 -
       3.1.1 Socio-economic and political reasons .................................................... - 35 -
       3.1.2 The Amal movement .............................................................................. - 36 -
       3.1.3 Israel’s invasion in Lebanon .................................................................... - 36 -
   3.2 Ideology and worldview ............................................................................... - 38 -
   3.3 Goals ........................................................................................................... - 40 -
   3.4 Financing Hezbollah .................................................................................... - 41 -
   3.5 Hassan Nasrallah speech ............................................................................ - 41 -
   3.6 Hezbollah’s electorate .................................................................................. - 42 -
   3.7 Hezbollah’s demonization of Israel .............................................................. - 43 -
# Maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Map 1</td>
<td>Southern Lebanon</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 2</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 3</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 4</td>
<td>Symbol of Hezbollah</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Armed Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGL</td>
<td>Observer Group Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMACC</td>
<td>UN Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map 1: Southern Lebanon

Source: UN Carthographic Department – Map No. 4140 Rev. 1 – July 2006
Map 2: Lebanon

Source: The University of Texas at Austin - Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection
Map 3: UNIFIL

Source: UN Carthographic Department – Map No. 4144 Rev. 20 – June 2008
Introduction

The war in Lebanon of 2006 took most people by surprise. In spite of its short duration of 34 days, the war had a major impact on the Middle East and its relationship with outside parties. New concepts of the enemy appeared. The results of the war were little: Israel’s goal to destroy Hezbollah’s network did not work; Hezbollah influence in Lebanon and in the Muslim World is stronger as before.

The year 2006 was a very important year for the Middle East conflict. The gridlocked situation experienced a turnaround with the rising of Hezbollah to a local and regional player in this region. The Hezbollah was able to fight the world's fourth strongest army for 34 days undefeated. For the first time in the history of the Jewish State, Israel did not emerge as the winner against an Arabic State. At the same time, the Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territory won the elections against the PLO.

Neither development came too unexpectedly, as both organizations gained popularity due to their social engagement with the society and their followers. Their strategic strength lies in the community, as both organizations run schools, hospitals, kindergartens and offer scholarships. They listen to the mainly simple society and act right away according to their needs. (Krech in Wunder 2007: v) That secures them the solidarity and support they need to achieve their political goals.

The Israeli invasion in Lebanon in 2006 made it clear that the Israeli army was not ready for the new phenomenon, the asymmetric warfare. This was a very important acknowledgement in this war as otherwise Israel’s clampdown is not explainable. (Krech in Wunder 2007: v-vi)

2006 was also the year for fundamentalists and hardliners in Lebanon, Palestine and Israel as it seemed that both sides preferred the military escalation over reconciliation. The animosity against each other was so strong, that the majority of the people supported the military escalation over the reconciliation which would actually easy tensions. (Krech in Wunder 2007:viii)

Worldwide the majority of Muslims supported Hezbollah’s and Hamas offensives in 2006. It is also believed that the conflicts between the West and Islamic actors will continue and intensify. (Wunder 2007:4)
Beside the success of Hezbollah in 2006, more Islamic actors celebrate worldwide. The Taliban in Afghanistan are gaining back their power over the country while the NATO and the USA with their mission, *enduring freedom*, keep losing the country to the Taliban. In Somalia a new Islamic State was founded, and Pakistan made a ceasefire with the radical Islamic actors in the North and handed governing over to them.

The dispute over the Mohammad-caricatures in 2006, which send a clear message, lead to the successful spreading of the Islamic Law worldwide. (Wunder 2006:3)

Israel and the USA have to admit that, against their will, their enemies in this region have gained strength and popularity. (Wunder 2007: 3) The success of Hamas in Gaza, the collapse of the USA in Iraq, the questioning of the pro-West government in Lebanon and the increasing influence of Iran led to a shift of power, favoring the Middle East. (Wunder 2007:5)

Israel and the USA are publicly considering negotiating with their enemies such as Iran, Syria, Hamas and the Hezbollah. This is very unique, as both countries always stood up for their policies of not talking or negotiating with countries or organizations involved with terrorism. Their failed policy no longer offers many other options. This step is seen as a sign of weaknesses from the enemies of Israel and the USA. At the same time it again reassures their behavior and extremism. The USA and Israel are not seen any longer as separate actors; they are seen as a single unit.

In this context, Iranian Secretary of State Mottaki called Olmert’s explanation for the possession of nuclear weapon in 2007 as a sign of weakness and fear of the government of Israel. (Wunder 2007:4)

The aim of my paper is twofold. First, I will try to reconstruct the war itself and the reasons why a war between a non-state actor like the Hezbollah and Israel was able to arise at all. Second, I will try to filter out the consequences and the outcome of the war. In this context I will test my hypothesis at the end of my paper: that the main consequence of the Lebanon War 2006 was the rising of Hezbollah to a national and regional player in the Middle East.
The paper starts off focusing on Lebanon as a weak state, which comprises the theoretical background of my paper. After the description of weak state and its effects on the country and on the international community, the paper goes on with the social structure of Lebanon. Here, a closer look will be taken at the different existing sects in Lebanon and on Lebanon’s political system, which is based on confessionalism.

Chapter 3 gives an historic overview on how the Shiite movement Hezbollah was founded. This chapter discusses everything that relates to the organization. Hezbollah’s ideology, worldview, goals and relations to its important strategic partners Syria and Iran will be the core issues this chapter concentrates on.

With chapter 4, the analysis of the Lebanon War 2006 begins. It starts off with the chronology of the 34 day war that includes a brief introduction to what happened before the outbreak of hostilities, a timeline of the actual war, as well as international and national positions on the war.

Chapter 5 sheds light to the UN Attacks while chapter 6 outlines the war plans of this short summer war.

The following chapter deals with the UN Resolution 1701. It reflects the text of the Resolution as well as Siniora’s Seven-Point-Plan; while in the end of the chapter all different views on the Resolution are presented.

Chapter 8 describes the international law aspects of the war. Here a closer look is drawn at possible war crimes committed by Israel and Hezbollah. The disregard of international humanitarian law, the use of cluster and phosphorus bombs as well as the bombing of Qana will be discussed in this chapter.

Chapter 9 and 10 outline the outcome of the war as well as the social, economical and environmental consequences for Lebanon and Israel.

The next chapter reflects Lebanon’s reconstruction activities. In the centre of this chapter are Hezbollah-sponsored as well as state-sponsored reconstruction activities. The rebuilding of the existing political system is another discussion point in this chapter.

Chapter 12 deals with the Winograd-Commission. The most important findings of the final report which was presented on January 30, 2008 are reviewed.

In Chapter 13 a closer look at the foreign policy of Syria in Lebanon is taken while chapter 14 describes Lebanese-Israeli relations.

The last chapter is dedicated to my findings and my conclusion.
After outlining the aim of my paper, I would like to go on to describe the methodology which was used in order to produce this study.

Material was collected during my three months stay at the Columbia University in New York City, USA. I was able to research at the Middle East Institute of Columbia University where I also conducted narrative interviews with Professor Saliba. The limited information on the conflict is due to its recentness. Therefore my research stay abroad was very useful in order to gather information. Another interview was conducted with Karin Kneissl, an expert on Lebanon and Middle East in Vienna.

Additionally, I relied on secondary literature such as sociology and political science journals, monographs and the internet. The medium of internet played a key role in my paper. Because my topic was so recent, not too much academic material was available. Therefore I had to rely on current press releases. Besides evaluating secondary literature, UN and other official documents were studied.

Not only the recentness of my topic but also my lack of language skills in Arabic and Hebrew limited my research. In this sense my resources are limited to material in English and German.

Now, I would like to take the opportunity to express my gratitude to the people who helped me writing this paper.

Many thanks also go to my supervisor John Bunzl from the Austrian Institute for International Affairs for providing me with advice and who supported my research stay abroad. Thank you for taking your time and listening to my ideas and providing me with essential material.

Special thanks go to Professor Saliba of Columbia University. I want to thank him for his inexhaustible efforts in supporting me writing this thesis. He took his time listening to me and providing me with necessary information. Without his help I could have not done the research I was able to do.

I also want to thank my parents and my sister Birgit in supporting me finishing writing my thesis.

The person I want to thank most is George. Without him, none of these things would have been possible. I want to thank him not only for his support in my thesis; I also want to thank him for his constant support in my five years of school. Thank you.
1. **Weak States**

The concept of weak states will be the theoretical background to my study of the Lebanon War 2006. In order to understand the emergence of Hezbollah and Hezbollah’s “state within the state”, a closer look at Lebanon and its structure needs to be drawn. Hezbollah was only able to be in a war with Israel, as Lebanon does not have the necessary resources to eliminate the organization. Its poor military and political performance allows insurgency organizations such as Hezbollah to be institutionalized in the country. This missing capacity will be explained in the next few pages.

When we speak about weak states, we do not deal with a new phenomenon, instead with a dilemma that became more widespread in the last decades. The amount of weak states in the world increased tremendously, since the end of the Cold War. The new independent former Soviet Union states join the community of weak states, the majority of which are situated in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The problems that come along with weak states have scientifically proven effects on the security and economy of the International Community. (Rakipi 2002: 1)

There are numerous definitions of weak states. I refer to Robert I. Rotberg, who links a weak state to its ability and capacity of providing the population with political goods. He constitutes a hierarchy of political goods where the state’s supply of security- human security- is the prime function of a state. This includes securing the state from cross-border invasions and infiltrations, preventing crime, expunging domestic threats and attacks and giving the population the possibility of resolving their differences in a humane, non-violent way.

Any other political goods can only be provided within a framework of security. A functioning and reliable law system is the underlying category of security. It is inevitable to maintain an effective judicial system that encompasses the rule of law.

Other political goods citizens can expect from their state, includes medical and health care, schools, infrastructure, a money and banking system, business environment, promotion of civil society and methods of regulating environmental commons. (Rotberg 2003: 4-5)

Citizens have the right to claim these political goods. They gave up their power in former days to a sovereign and nowadays to a state. In return, citizens have the right to expect to be protected so that they are able to live in peace. In which way the state complies with its
obligations, gives information about the social contract between the government and its citizens. (Rotberg 2003: 4)

States can be weak due to geographical, physical or economic constraints or because of internal antagonisms, greed and despotism. A typical indicator for weak states is religious, ethnic or linguistic tension, what can end in a conflict between the opponents. Weak states are not in the position to provide their citizens with the proper amount of political goods the citizens can expect. Another earmark for weak states is the deteriorating infrastructure, the negligence of schools and hospitals. Furthermore the GDP per capita often falls in a dramatic way. Corruption is unfortunately high and continually rising, while the rule of law is not getting properly enforced. Often times the civil society gets harassed. In numerous cases despots are ruling. (Rotberg 2003: 2)

In order to sum it up, weak states are not in the position to fully fulfil essential governmental functions such as:

1.) “securing their population from violent conflict;
2.) to completely meet the basic human needs of their population (i.e. food, health, education), and;
3.) to govern legitimately with the acceptance of a majority of their population.” (Rice 2006: 1)

Further more, you can classify weak states into four categories:

- “autocracies
- conflict countries
- countries transitioning from conflict or autocracy
- fragile, young democracies that appear on a path to sustainable security […]” (Rice 2006: 7)

These categories cannot be seen as fixed classification. Countries may not fall into one single classification, sometimes different attributes from more than one category fall in place. (Rice 2006: 7)

Another classification of weak states comes from Stewart Patrick, who says that “State weakness is not just a question of capacity but also of will.” (Stewart 2006:30)

He distinguishes between:
“relatively good performers
States that are weak but willing
States that have the means but not the will, and
Those with neither the will nor the way to fulfil the basic functions of statehood”

(Stewart 2006: 30)

The past showed us, that there are also leaders in the world like Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, who purposely mismanaged a promising country for his own gain. Zimbabwe belongs to theses sort of countries with low will but who are high in capacity, like Burma. Relatively good performers combined with high capacity are Senegal or Honduras. Weak but willing are for example East Timor or Mozambique, but they have unfortunately low capacity. The worst combinations are countries like Sudan or Haiti who have low capacity and low will. (Stewart 2006: 30)

1.1 Spillover effects from weak states

The occurrence of weak states constitutes the most danger to their own citizen. In a globalized world we live in, problems coming a long with weak states impose a threat not only to the country itself, also to the neighbouring countries as well as global security. (Rice 2006: 7) Terrorism, proliferation, crime, disease, energy insecurity and regional instability are spillover effects that can emerge from failing but also from weak states. (Stewart 2006: 33)

1.1.1 Terrorism

Weak states do not need to fail or collapse in order to serve as a breeding ground for terror. Weak states are ideal for insurgency groups to train insurgents, gain control of resources, to launder money and for obtaining illegal weaponry. (Rotberg 2003: 1)

Weak states offer great benefits to terrorist organization as they are safe in the sense that the countries law enforcement is not functioning. Such a country already has conflict experience and therefore it is easier to train and indoctrinate potential members.

Access to weapons, equipment and financial resources is possible, and they can fish out of a pool of recruits. It is easy to find future organization members as the local government is not able to provide its citizens with jobs and civil services. There are always people who were left back and therefore they are easy to manipulate and ready to take any job.
Al Qaeda, for example, uses Afghanistan, Sudan, and the tribal areas in Pakistan for their training camps. Saudi-Arabia, for example, was the home to a lot of the hijackers of September 11.

There are efforts from the United States to deny terrorists access to weak states in order to prevent future attacks. Another measure is the training of security forces in weak states, mainly in Africa, in order to improve their border controlling system and to protect the state’s territory as a whole. The fear of further transnational terrorist attacks, exercised from terrorist which were trained in weak states, show first reactions of the International Community. It tries to bolster state capacities and alleviating poverty. (Stewart 2006: 33-34) With these measures the international community tries to stop weak states from becoming hotbeds for terrorists.

The link between terrorism and weak states is much more complicated than we may think. Weak states are not necessarily hosts to terrorists. Not every weak state is the home base of terrorists. In the least developed states hardly any terrorist activity is taking place.

It is more the region which plays an important role. The Middle East or the Muslim world is more susceptible to terrorism activities than Central Africa for example is. Political, religious, cultural and geographical factors play a vital role as well. Weak but still functioning states have the advantage that certain infrastructure is available which can be used on their behalf. That matter plays a key role for insurgency organisations. There are countries like Columbia where insurgency organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) exist, but they do not act transnational, rather only within their own Nation. The existence of such guerrilla organizations has effects on the country itself, but not necessarily on the International Community.

This should highlight that not every weak state is the home to transnational terrorism. (Stewart 2006: 35)

1.1.2 Weapon Proliferation

Along with transnational terrorism comes a related problem, the so-called weapon proliferation issue. Weak governments are accused of not being able to control their stocks of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. The International Community does not trust that WMD-related technology is not getting passed on. They are not trusted that WMD-related
technology is not getting passed on. Out of the recent 17 states with WMD programs, 13 are countries at risk. The frightening part here is that nuclear or biological weapons can fall into the hands of terrorists if a state fails.

It is evident that weak states are playing an important role in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This could also happen to nuclear and biological weapons. In order to pass WMD technology on, information from the highest level of state apparatus is needed. This is difficult to get but the same time weak states are not able to police the countries’ black market. (Stewart 2006: 36-38)

1.1.3 Environmental Degradation

There is a strong tie between state weakness and environmental degradation. Due to the high infant mortality rate, the population is growing very fast in the developing world. The increase in population leads to a higher demand for energy. Wood burning and the need for agricultural land accelerate deforestation. Weak states lack will to stop deforestation. For them, more serious problems need to be tackled. The deforestation has serious consequences for the world. Flooding, silting of waterways as well as the rising of hunger due to soil degradation go back to deforestation.

Another very important consequence is the climate change. The deforestation process is responsible for 25% of carbon released into the atmosphere every year. Tree burnings release a lot of CO2 emissions as well. As a result global temperatures rise, lakes are drying out and coastal areas are prone to flood. Environmental degradation is a serious consequence of weak state performance. (Rice 2006: 15)

1.1.4 Transnational Organized Crime

Weak states are ideal for criminal activities such as trafficking of drugs, human beings and weapons. Transnational organized crime is nowadays the biggest booming criminal enterprise. Every year, billions of dollars of turnover is made. The illegal trade of narcotics is a 300 to 500 million dollar business every year. Money-laundering is very appealing as between $8 billion-$2 trillion is made a year.
The Globalization accelerated the rising of organized crime, which is due to the removal of economy barriers. Criminal networks have an easy game as week states miss on successful enforcement of the rule of law. Border controls are exercised insufficiently. Poorly governed states are also leading in human trafficking, a business worth $7-$8 billions a year. Approximately 800,000 women and children are suffering from forced labor and slavery. Weak states seem to be a magnet for transnational organized crime. (Stewart 2006: 38-40)

1.1.5 Pandemics

There are fears that poorly governed states are breeding grounds for pandemics as they lack the capacity to condemn the spread of infectious disease. This described situation endangers global health. HIV AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, cholera, and Ebola are disease which needs to be condemned. Mass traveling can threaten life around the world due to these existing and badly treated diseases in developing countries. Weak state would have to improve their health system with preventive measures and condemn outbreaks of deadly diseases. (Stewart 2006: 40)

These were just some examples that should show how dangerous weak states are and what potential of destruction they carry. The international community needs to react more intensely to the problem of weak and failing states in order to secure global security.

1.2 Weak State Lebanon

Lebanon can be characterized as a weak state. Since its establishment in 1920 the country had potential for State building but no strong state was ever built. Nothing changed till its independence in 1943. During the Civil War, Lebanon as a state collapsed completely. Lebanon has been very weak from the beginning and was never able to carry out all of its functions. One of the biggest problems has always been the monopoly of legitimate use of force in form off a state-controlled military and police, which is mandatory for a strong state. The countries army has always been weak, inefficient, and always had problems with prevailing Para-military organizations. First, the army is characterized by its small size and its
poor weaponry. Also the ethnic structure and the missing political consensus of the designated role of the army led to its weaknesses. The ethnic structure foresees Maronites in leading positions like in the officer corps, although the Percentage of Maronites represented in the population is smaller than other ethnicities. Further, there are also ethnic divisions between units. (Atzili 2007: 7)

In 2004, the country spent $540.6 million on military expenditures, equal to 3.1% of the GDP of the same year. That amount is much too little if your country is situated at a hot spot like the Middle East. This became obvious with the battle between the Lebanese army and the Fatah al-Isalm fighters in the Nahr El Bared refugee camps last year. It took the Lebanese army a long time to overcome the small amount of fighters. (Atzili 2007: 8)

Besides the military components, Lebanon was not able to put up a centralized taxation system. This is inevitable in order to provide the population with social and military services. Since its foundation, the taxation has been very low. During the civil war from 1975 to 1990, parts of the country were not controlled by the central government, more by different militias or foreign forces. At this time, these areas had to pay taxes according to taxation system of the militias, which was most of the time much higher. The strength of a government depends on the ability to collect taxes. If the country has to rely on a weak taxation system, it will have problems with maintaining a strong army and offering social service.

Next to these two already mentioned components, another reason for Lebanon’s weakness is the bureaucracy. Instead of a modern centralized and rational bureaucracy, you find a traditional and feudal system. Just like the political and military system, also the bureaucratic system is based on the confessional system. Further more, the bureaucracy is high in the patrimony. The concentration of power lies in the hands of a few. This patrimonial structure demonstrates the weakness of state institutions and also preserves status quo. (Atzili 2007:9)

Another sign of weakness is the government's ability to provide the population with public goods and services. This includes running water and electricity, infrastructures, schools and hospitals. The government's capacity is very low. In peripheral areas such as the South of Lebanon and the mystery belt of Beirut, movements like the Hezbollah, instead of the government, is providing the population with these essential goods. (Atzili 2007: 9) For exactly this reason, the resistance movement is so popular in the population and enjoys so much support because it is them and not the government who satisfies their personal needs.
The last evidence that shows the state's weakness is the low degree of legitimacy. That has something to do with the question whether the country should have been annexed to the neighbouring country Syria or whether its own state should be created.

In the end, Lebanon emerged as its own state, while the identification of the Lebanese population with their state was and is still limited. The Muslim majority favoured and still favours a Greater Syria while the Maronite and the Druze preferred an independent state. The Lebanon has to be seen as a country where all theses different religious groups live loosely next to each other. A national identity is missing that would keep the country together. This weakness ended in the long lasting Civil war, where the invasion of Syria was more seen as a sectarian matter instead of a national one. (Atzili 2007: 10)

Lebanon is weak in its institutions and identity. Such weaknesses make it easy for insurgency groups to intervene, just as the PLO and the Hezbollah did in Lebanon. When a government lacks on enforcement it is easy for insurgency groups to install their basis there. Weak governments are attractive to insurgency groups as they cannot enforce its own rule and therefore they do not have to fear consequences for their actions.

In the case of Hezbollah, things were a bit different. The problem was not that the LAF was not able to legitimate its use of force, but more that the government lost control over the South of the country since Civil War was going at the time when Hezbollah was founded. Hezbollah used this time to install its bases in the South of Lebanon. Later on, the government was no longer able to gain authority back over Southern Lebanon. The weakness of the government was demonstrated with letting the Hezbollah create a state within a state in the South of Lebanon. The government could only watch while this process was going on. It lacked resources due to various reasons. Lebanon’s poor military and politically performance allows resistance organizations like Hezbollah, as a challenger of the government, to perform its activities. The government does not have the necessary resources to smash the organization in order to gain full control back over the countries’ territory. Only weak states do not have full control over its territory. Strong stats do.

In the meantime the Hezbollah fulfils so many state-responsible chores in the civil service sector and enjoys so much support from the population, that the government is no longer in the position to stop Hezbollah’s action. It could never support Hezbollah’s community with the same amount of the public goods as Hezbollah does. Money and resources are missing.
The July war did not take place between two countries. It took place between a country and an insurgency organization. This makes the situation much more difficult. More about that issue will be discussed in chapter 8.

1.2.1 Failed State Index

The tool of the “Failed States Index” provides international organizations and policy-makers every year with a ranking of sovereign countries at risk of failure or collapse. It should provide early warning to the international community. The Fund for Peace, a non-profit organization, and the magazine Foreign Policy publish the Failed State Index since 2005. (The Failed States Index 2008)

Altogether 12 indicators of state vulnerability - four social, six political and two economical indicators - are used. The social indicator includes demographic pressures, refugees and displaced persons, group grievance and human flight. The economic indicator contains uneven development and economy. The military/political indicator covers legitimacy of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention. (Fund for Peace 2008, country profile)

The Index should not be seen as a tool that predicts state failure or collapse, more as an instrument that measures state vulnerability to failure or collapse.

For the year 2008, Lebanon unfortunately holds spot 18 out of 177 countries and therefore belongs to the hot spots states which are of high “Alert”.

The categories are Alert, Warning, Moderate and Sustainable. Each indicator has a scale ranking from 0 to 10, with obeying most stable and 10 being most instable.

Out of 120 points, Lebanon reached 95.7 points. (Failed States Index 2008) The year before in 2007, Lebanon was rated on spot 28 and reached 92.4 points. (Failed States Index 2007) In this one year, Lebanon fell 10 positions down. A big obstacle was the late nomination of President Michel Suleiman. Lebanon was, from November 2007 till May 25, 2008, without a President.

Lebanon’s economy with 6.3 points and public services 6.7 were rated the most stable while group grievance (9.4), factionalized elites (9.4) and security apparatus (9.3) were rated as the most instable fields. (Fund for Peace 2008, country profile)
The five core state institutions were rated as follows by the index:
The Leadership was interpreted as weak due to the political deadlock, since a President was missing for six months, after Emile Lahoud’s presidency ran out in November 2007. This circumstance scrutinized the legitimacy of the government. The instalment of present President Michel Suleiman is seen as a new beginning for Lebanon.
The performance of the military is also seen as weak. The Lebanese Armed Forces, (LAF) including the army, the navy and air force, was unable or unwilling to disarm the Hezbollah although numerous UN Resolutions arrogate it. The LAF does not have the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The Hezbollah and Israel are questioning this status quo.

The police are not able to protect its civilians. Brutality and detainee abuse is widespread in the country. This also leads to weak police performance.

The Judiciary system is rated moderate. Although the Napoleonic Code is used, each state-recognized sect has its own court system for family law matters. Women are often discriminated against.

The civil service is classified as moderate. While in Southern Lebanon, the Hezbollah is supporting the mainly Shia community with public services, in the rest of Lebanon the civil service is also based on the different religious groups. (Fund for Peace 2008, country profile)

1.3 Conclusion

The Hezbollah is able to increase its stockpiles of weapons. That undermines the power and legitimacy of the government. The new president Michel Suleiman is seen as neutral by both the Hezbollah and the western supported parties. With the postponing of the elections for a new president, the Hezbollah showed off its power.

Lebanon’s recent political system, which is based on confessionalism, is not representing the actual population situation. This leads to tension and so far no national unity has been found. Fragmentation can lead anytime to violence and conflict. Therefore a united Lebanese identity and nation needs to emerge. Without unity, Civil War can break out any time. (Fund for Peace 2008, Country profile)
2. Social structure of Lebanon

Altogether seventeen sects are officially recognized in Lebanon. These seventeen sects are again divided into Christian and Muslim groups. (Abdul-Husn 1998:29) This seems to be a lot, if you consider Lebanon is only 10452 square kilometers large. (Kneissl 2002: 7)

2.1 Sects

2.1.1 The Maronites

The Maronites are named after an ascetic monk, St. Maroun who lived in the fifth-century. In the sixth century they were found in the northern parts of what is nowadays Syria. The Maronites clashed with the Jacobites over the interpretation of the nature of Jesus Christ. The Jacobites insisted that Jesus only had a divine nature, while the Maronites believed that Jesus Christ had a divine and a human nature but only one will. In the twelfth century the Maronites distanced themselves from the Melkite Church and returned to the Catholic Church, accepting the pope as their supreme leader.

Since the sixteenth century the Maronites were located in the northern part of Lebanon. There, they developed their social structure and their communal identity. Soon after, the Maronites started to expand. Some Maronite groups went to the neighboring Kisrewan region. Since the Shiites had been deported, there was room left for a different religion. Other groups moved to the South which used to be the home of the Druzes. Under the leadership of the Druze’s, the Maronite and the Druze lived together in harmony till the nineteenth century. Due to internal problems the power of the Druze shrank. At the same time, the Maronites used that chance/opportunity to strengthen their own influence.

Further more, the Maronites started to intensify their relations with France and the Vatican. At one point, Pope Gregory XIII became patron to the Maronite Church in Lebanon. At the same time, a Maronites’ college was founded in Rome in 1584. Maronite clerics were educated in theses colleges and sent back to Lebanon in order to function as missionaries and reformers. With time the Maronites community grew bigger and bigger, and soon they started to challenge the Druze hegemony status in their own stronghold, called the Chouf region. (Abdul-Husn 1998: 31-33)
2.1.2 The Druzes

The Druze faith has its origin in Cairo. They pray to the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, al-Hakim, who reigned in Egypt from 966-1021. Al-Hakim is seen as the Unity of God. Muslims often do not consider the Druze as Muslims. The Druzes are often more seen as their own religion. In Egypt the Druze met a broad opposition, so they were forced into hiding. In Lebanon, Syria and Palestine the Druzes were more welcome. Five years after al-Hakim proclaimed the new faith he mysteriously disappeared. The Druzes were always persecuted. Death was often the consequence of not converting. Due to the heavy persecutions nobody was allowed to convert to Druzism after 1043.

At this time, Druzism was already well established in Lebanon, mainly in the mountainous region. The Druzes were an agricultural community which was well organized in comparison with other sects at this time. Due to three major persecutions the Druze could strengthen their solidarity and prevent their community from giving up their beliefs. In the thirteenth-century, the Mamluke rulers persecuted them with very harsh penalties. In the nineteenth century an Egyptian army commander had the Druze’s hands cut off, while in Syria they had to fight Ibrahim Pasha. He armed Maronites and had them fight the Druzes.

The constant persecution led to the disappearance of the Druze in Egypt and India. Nowadays you only find Druze communities in Syria, Jordan, Israel and Palestine. The center still remains in Lebanon. Lebanon is the only country where the Druzes influence politics. (Abul-Husn 1998:33-35)

2.1.3 Sunnis

After the death of Muhammad, the Islamic community was divided over the question of who should be the next successor and what his role should be. The Sunnis believed that the community should elect the next successor. He should be in charge of implementing the Sharia and should defend the community. The Successor needs to be the statesman and the religious leader, and he needs to be committed to both functions. (Abul-Husn 1998:35)

In Sunnism there is a big controversy on how the divine law should be used and what the divine law is. There is the agreement that the Quran and the Tradition define the divine law.
There are four different versions on implementation of the Shari‘a, the Islamic law. The Shiite developed its own school.

It is said that Sunnism came to Lebanon approximately 634-639 when the Arab-Islamic armies invaded that area. The Sunni population grew during the 300 year rule of the Mamluke, as they were under their protection. A large number of people converted at this time to Sunnism, as they were otherwise persecuted. Under the Ottoman Empire, till the end of World War I, the Sunni power grew more and more as it was the official state religion. In 1918 Syria and Lebanon came under the French mandate. Maronite pressure lead to the annexation of provinces of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, the Beq‘a Valley, and the territory of Mount Lebanon which resulted in the Greater Lebanon in 1920 and later in 1926 in the Republic of Lebanon. The annexed regions were dominated largely by Sunnis. Till 1926 the Sunnis political status was undermined simply because they were part of the Islamic religion, after decades of belonging to the ruling class under the Mamlukes and the Ottoman Empire. In 1926, with the beginning of the Republic of Lebanon, there were power sharing agreements between the Maronites and the Sunnis. The National Pact of 1943 resolved all unsettled issues. However in 1975 the Sunnis entered the war and things changed all over again. During this time the Sunnis had good relations with the Palestinians and the PLO acted as a sort of Sunni militia. (Abul-Husn 1998: 38-41)

### 2.1.4 Shiites

The Shiites believe that the next successor cannot be elected by the community. Moreover, he has to be from the same family that Muhammad was from. In other words, the next successor has to have the same blood line as Muhammad. The next successor is a so called “Imam”. The imam was not only a leader in prayers, but he was the epitome of religion, a means for salvation and a model to imitate.” (Abul-Husn 1998:35)

The Sunni, on the other hand, do not believe in the divine power of imams or into the allegorical interpretation of the Quran. In their point of view the divine law can only be interpreted by a specialist who studied it by using one of the four officially recognized interpretations of Islam.

Another feature where the Sunnis and the Shiites are distinguished from each other is the organizational structure and the legitimate authority of the religion. The Sunnis cooperate with the state structure while the Shiites associate themselves with the sovereignty of the
community they are living in. Shiites associate religious achievement with social achievements and therefore they strictly follow a religious hierarchy, which is equal to our social status in western society.

After the death of Muhammad the Sunnis elected Abu Bar, as the caliph and imam of Islam. He has both religious and political functions. The Shiites recognize him, but they consider Ali Ibn Abi Taleb, the prophet’s first cousin and son-in-law, as the real imam.

In the seventh century Shiism arrived in Lebanon and became popular in the South and the East. This happened at the same time that the Maronites migrated from northern Syria. For a long time the Shiites were persecuted, many converted to Sunnism. Till 1920, the Shiites were not linked to the political system in Lebanon at all. Furthermore The Shiites were the least educated sect in the country. Then Due to the Israeli incursions in the twentieth century, the Shiites were forced to move their communities. A popular place became Beirut, with its Shiite dominated suburbs. A lot of popular political movements like the Baathists, the Amal Movement and later the Hezbollah originated from these suburbs.

The lasting persecutions of Shiites resulted in a non-participance in Lebanese society. They proceeded with their own culture and communalism. The Shiites were offered a new unwanted national status. The memories of persecution were stronger than the little material improvement they would have received. Not enough was offered, for the Shiites to give up their cultural enclave. At the Shiites became strangers in their own new state. The same time, the state did little to include the Shiites in the new system. Under Imam Mousa al-Sadr the Shiites experienced a political awakening that ended with the foundation of the Amal Movement in 1975. With the new movement changes in the political system were made to restore social and political balance. The long overdue changes in the political system, prior to the civil war go back to the Amal movement. (Abul-Husn 1998: 35-38)

2.1.5 Other communities

Besides the before-mentioned four main communities, there are thirteen other sects in Lebanon. Eleven of these thirteen sects are Christian, one is Alawite and one is Jewish. (Abul-Husn 1998:42-43)
2.1.5.1 The Palestinians in Lebanon

In my paper, I keep referring to the Palestinians in Lebanon. As they are mentioned several times in my paper, I thought it is necessary to give an insight into the complicated Lebanese-Palestinian relationship in order to understand the status they preserve in Lebanon. In addition, the Palestinians comprise another part of the population of the multi-ethnic state of Lebanon.

The Lebanese-Palestinian relationship is characterized by violence and terror. Leaving a Palestine camp after nine at night means getting stopped by soldiers who monitor all movements in a logbook. Palestinians must give their identities, or otherwise are not allowed to leave the camp. It amounts to living in a prison. The fourth generation of Palestinians in Lebanon is a new generation who only experiences disrespect, violence, assaults and disempowerment. What they want is to live in dignity and to be treated respectfully. (Peteet 2005: 78-79)

Pre-Civil war Lebanon

According to UNRWA there were 359,005 Palestinians living in Lebanon in 1997. They arrived in 1948-49 after the establishment of the Israeli State. The Palestinians represent 10.5 Percent of the Lebanese population. From the beginning, the Lebanese government was discussing the impossibility of resettling the Palestinians. Lebanon has very limited resources and due to its confessional political system it was never possible to include this new minority into its system. The power in Lebanon is shared between the Maronites, Druze and Muslims. Lebanon is the least able to cope with such a massive refugee wave out of all other neighbouring countries, due to its complex confessional system. In Syria, Palestinian refugees were allowed to work, and Jordan extended citizenship. Lebanon, on the contrary, never made clear what rights the Palestinian refugees had. Palestinians in the camp say that the standard of living in the camp in the 1950s was better than now. Before the civil war the Palestinian militancy was growing and later blamed for the ensuing civil war as it became a trigger for mobilizing Lebanese. (Peteet 2002: 79-80)
Palestinians and the Lebanese civil war phase

The civil war in Lebanon cleared out several issues. Space, relations and rights were newly classified. Before the war there was no real border between the refugee’s camp and the surrounding areas. Now clear borders were defined. Besides the military border, a psychological border was created by using fear. During the war, marriages between Palestinians and Lebanese were very rare in comparison to the pre-war time.

In the aftermath of the 16 year civil war, there were only small discussions on why this war occurred at all and what should be undertaken to avoid another one. There has been little undertaken on how to deal with the war and how it should be reflected on for later generations. One reason for the origin of the war was simply, the blaming of others. By “others” they meant the Palestinians, as they had tried to use the war to point out their presence and missing rights. Therefore the Lebanese choose to blame the Palestinians for the civil war as a short term solution on how to deal with the past. That there must have been indigenous problems did not occur to anyone, but in order to stabilize the future of Lebanon a long-term national consensus needs to be formed on how to deal with the past war.

No open discussions were had about the war or what was needed for recovery and healing. Silence and individual traumas are the results and memories of the war. (Peteet 2002: 80-81) "In a sense, the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon serve as Lebanon's war memorials. Their continued existence is a testimony to the reputed cause of the war, and their recontainment represents a tangible victory for the Lebanese." (Peteet 2002: 81)

Post-civil war Era

With the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in 1991, the Palestinian refugees’ issue in the country had a new uprising. The Palestinians had never stopped to consider Palestinian refugees as one of their own. The refugees have never been treated differently. If they had been, it would have meant finding a humanitarian solution based on resettlement, instead of a political solution based on national sovereignty. The Palestinians in Lebanon are aware that the Lebanese government and society wants to see them leave the country for resettlement. That is why their biggest fear is being left behind due to the betrayal of the 1993 Oslo Accords, as the Oslo Accords ignored the issue of refugees in Lebanon.

Since the war, the Lebanese policy has shifted from violent containment of refugees to an economical, social and political marginalization with the goal of resettling the refugees. The behaviour of the Lebanese government pushes for another round of violence and, as seen...
recently, there are revolts going on from inside the camps against the Lebanese police and army.

The Lebanese are extremely tough on the Palestinians. In Lebanon, foreigners have to apply for a work permit. Legislation in 1962 classified Palestinians as foreigners. The only jobs available are in the construction business and work in ancillary tasks, which however exclude a long list of specific ancillary work like electrical installations or sanitation workers. UNRWA claims that there is an unemployment rate of 40 percent, while locals claim it really is closer to 90 percent. Lebanon has the highest UNRWA hardship cases in the entire region, which definitely speaks for itself.

Since the PLO withdrawal in 1982, Lebanon began its new policy towards the refugees. The PLO economic, political and social infrastructure guaranteed jobs for their refugees. The PLO complemented UNRWA with child care, education and health care. The poverty among the refugees was much lower than nowadays. At the same time there has been an economic downturn in the oil-producing states in the Gulf. It was home to a lot of Palestinians well-trained by the PLO.

In 1995 a further tactic by the Lebanese government to reduce the amount of refugees has been that Palestinians must acquire a visa in order to re-enter Lebanon. This made it very difficult for Palestinians to leave the country and to re-enter again. Another approach was to naturalize a selective number of refugees. Around 28,000 – 30,000 refugees were naturalized, but no official number was ever put out. First a number of Shea Muslims were naturalized, later on Sunni Muslims and the remaining people were Palestinian Christians.

"Beirut 2000" is a plan to develop the entire region around Beirut. It includes the building of a new international airport, highways, telecommunication systems and more. It was said that some refugee camps like Shatila, with an estimated population of 9499, and Bourj al-Barajneh (population 16,389) will be split up and families will have to be resettled. In the end, it worked out and all necessary facilities could be built around it. The initial fear of refugees and the naturalization of refugees in order to reduce the official registered number just manifested their opinion about the new Lebanese policy.

It is very sad to see because before the war, Palestinians and Lebanese were living together, socializing, sharing resources and social services. After the end of the civil war, clear borders were drawn. Nothing is how it used to be. There would be no more intermarriage, living together or socializing. (Peteet 2002: 81-87)
Future of Palestinians in Lebanon

You hear positive and negative responses from the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, both about the marginalization policy of the Lebanese government and society, as well as to their potential forced resettlement. The camps are in a sort of humanitarian crisis. There is often no water, sewage or health care. Poverty, discrimination and uncertainty cause prostitution, crime and of course, drug trading. In order to cope with their problems, the Palestine’s have created associations. These associations were to substitute for the help and assistance they had been getting from the PLO, UNRWA and other NGO's. These associations are based on traditional ties. They are people from the pre-1948 villages who were raised in camps and urban areas in Lebanon. These are males from well-known and powerful families, or who come from high political ranks of the Palestinian resistance movement. The problem is that this traditional form of organizing keeps the people from organizing themselves within the political system.

Palestinians do interact with the Lebanese government, since they would like to secure their civil and human rights. They are advocating the rights of residency, employment, medical care and education for their children. They are not asking for citizenship as it would minimize their chances of ever returning to their homeland, and that would dilute their national identity. Human rights abuse continues to be a problem. Indeed, there is a Lebanese ministerial committee which is supposed to discuss the civil rights issues face to face with the Palestinians. No noteworthy results have come out of these talks. The Lebanese still refuse anything like a permanent solution for the Palestinian issue, although the Lebanese know that the return of Palestinians to their homeland is not nearby. This antagonism results in heavily restricted living conditions that the Palestinians have to deal with.

In 1996 the Refugee Working Group started to work on that matter. The Palestinians main fear is that they are an abandoned issue and simply have to accept that they are in a host country. This would be very good for Israel. The Palestinians try to avoid that thorough various activities, like the fighting with the Lebanese police in June 2007. These are calls to the world not to forget them. At the same time, they want to put on international pressure to resolve their status problem. This is a way to raise their voice, since they are not being heard in Lebanon. (Peteet 2002: 87-89)
Conclusion

Fifty years ago the Palestinian refugees came to Lebanon. We are now in their fourth generation, and life has since become more and more of a bargaining game. The living conditions were better years ago then they are now. The community has undergone an enormous transformation. The refugees today see less of a future for themselves than 50 years ago. They are confronted with uncertainty, poverty and crime. Their refugee camps reflect Lebanon's containment and marginalization policy, despite ongoing negotiations with the Lebanese government. There is a future for the refugees, but most likely not the one either the Palestinians or the Lebanese are wishing for. Right now, the future for the Palestinians in Lebanon promises very, very little. (Peteet 2002: 89)

2.2 Confessionalism

Lebanon’s political system is based on confessionalism. The power is divided according to the confessions in Lebanon. The president has to be a Christian Maronite; the prime minister must to be a Sunni Muslim and the parliamentary speaker a Shea Muslim. The proportion between the Muslims and the Christians was fixed to 5:6. The Christians formed a 54 percent majority that is based on the National Census of 1932. No discussion about the correctness was allowed by the Christians. All top civil service posts and political and military posts are guaranteed to the Sunnis and the Christians due to this breakdown. (Jaber 1997: 10)

As already mentioned, Lebanon consists of seventeen different sects, including the Sunni Muslims, the Shea Muslims, the Christian Maronites, the Greek Orthodox and the Druzes. After World War One, the Maronites expanded their territory and were protected by the French who won the mandate from Syria and Lebanon. In 1860’s fighting between the Maronites and the Druze, France always protected the Christians. In 1920, France moved Lebanon’s border which now includes the Bekaa Valley and the South, both of which used to belong to Syria. Shia and Sunni Muslims settled the new areas. The Sunnis did not want to be part of Lebanon since they considered themselves Syrian. The Shiites decided that they do not want to be part of Sunni dominated Syria any longer. It was also in France’s interest to separate them so that the opposition in Lebanon would not strengthen. Due to this event, the Shiites became a distinct group in Lebanon for the first time. The French allowed the Shiites
in 1926 for the first time to practice their religion freely, which they were not able to do under the Ottoman Empire. In the new state of Lebanon, the Maronites emerged as the leading power. (Jaber 1997:9-10) This explains why the president of Lebanon must be a Christian, as the Maronites emerged decades ago as the leading power of Lebanon.

Such a complicated political system requires tolerance and political maturity. Some experts see in this form of political system the roots of excessive violence and the beginning of the long lasting civil war. Numerous internal political crises show the fragility and weaknesses of this political system. (Kneissl 2002: 13)

"...it becomes evident that the greatest danger in confessionalism is the declared engagement in disputes in the name of a particular sect or confession, which then cries for protection against all the other sects." (Salam 2004:76)
3. Hezbollah

The Hezbollah presents the largest and perhaps also the most prominent political party in Lebanon. The organization gained notoriety due to various alleged criminal involvements for which no concrete evidence was ever submitted. There was in the 1980s the kidnapping of over 80 Westerners, the attack on the US embassy in Beirut in April 1983, which resulted in the death of 63 people, and the bombing of the US Marines’ barracks in Beirut half a year later in October 1983, which caused the death of 241 people. In 1992, the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina entailed 29 deaths while another 100 people died in the attack on a Jewish cultural centre in London in 1994. All these incidents did not help to improve the reputation and picture people had of Hezbollah, although the organization could never be linked to any of these incidents. (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 1)

Hezbollah was also placed under the international spotlight due to its constant 18-year military struggle against the Israeli occupation forces, and because of Hezbollah’s final victory over Israel in May 2000, as Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon earlier than expected. (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 1)

“The ability of a small and ill-equipped guerilla group to thwart one of the most powerful armies in the world was met with astonishment by the international community and widespread acclaim in the Arab and Islamic world.” (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 1)

However, Hezbollah is not only linked to such incidents but also to its integration into the Lebanese political system which first happened in 1990. The organization transformed itself into a serious political party after a decade of political radicalism, which is also known as “Lebanonisation”. The combination of Hezbollah’s activities as a political party and as a resistance force earned credit in the Lebanese society. The original perception of Hezbollah as a radical religious fanatical organization changed in the post-war period. This transformation can be seen as a result of the civil war, since this brought along a change in the Hezbollah leadership and led to dialog and reconciliation.

Hezbollah’s first Secretary-General, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, stood up for his intolerant tone and had no desire to include the organization in the political system of Lebanon. The second Secretary-General al-Sayyid Abbas al-Mussawi, advocated for the integration of Hezbollah’s political party into the Lebanese political system. After his assassination in 1992 by Israel, his
successor, al-Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, continued the path of political integration. (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 2)

Both Hezbollah’s opponents and supporters agree on one matter: Hezbollah is, from all of Lebanese political parties, the only party, which was never charged with corruption or political opportunism and has always stuck to its principles. With the death of Hassan Nasrallah’s son, who died in a battle with Israeli troops in 1997, Nasrallah gained the respect of all religious sects in Lebanon. The death embodied the moral and ideological integrity Hezbollah stands for. Hezbollah was able to form a core support base, pulled the formerly-indifferent to its side and earned the respect of many opponents. (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 2-3)

3.1 The beginning of Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s existence can be explained by the following three reasons:

3.1.1 Socio-economic and political reasons

The Shiites used to live in the rural areas of Lebanon, in the South and as well as in the Bekaa region. In the 1950s they migrated to Beirut and lived in slums around the city. Among the Lebanese society the Shiites formed the most disadvantaged, excluded sect. In the late 1960s their situation improved in education, media participation and in literacy, but comparatively their social status was still below other sects. Furthermore, the Shiites were politically unorganized and undeveloped. This led, due to the Maronite hegemony in Lebanese political system, to more frustration, which resulted in radicalism. The National Pact of 1943 distributed all parliamentary, governmental and public positions according to the population census of 1932. The underrepresentation of the Shiite Community in the parliament led to frustration due to the exclusion of the Shia community. The usual reaction in Arab society would be that religion is seen as a replacement-mechanism. The political mobilization of the Shea Community happened not through the valve of religion, but through the community’s radicalization by Arab nationalist, socialist and communist organizations. The additionally loss of Palestine in 1948 led to a Shiite political mobilization.
The Shiites started to affiliate themselves with Arab nationalist parties such as the Naserists, the Ba’aath Party, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. After the Arab defeat in the 1967-war, the Shiites identified themselves with leftist organizations such as the Lebanese Communist Party, who’s member were predominately Shiites.

3.1.2 The Amal movement

The Amal movement and Hezbollah, these two political organizations emerged during the years of civil war and resistance. These two movements put an end to the scattered politicization of the Shiite youth and took them under their wings. The goal of both is resisting Israel. (Salam 2004: 76-84)

A year before the civil war in 1974, al-Sadr formed already the Amal movement. The movement was sidelined by the beginning of the civil war in 1975. Of all Lebanese sectarian groups, it was the Shiites with the highest death toll in the civil war. With the resettlement of Shiites to the overpopulated South of Lebanon, the radicalization of the Shiite Community grew. The Amal movement gained popularity, especially with the disappearance of al-Sadr in 1978. Support for the Amal Movement grew with the Israeli invasion in 1978 and the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. This makes it clear that there was first a communal politicization and only later a religious politicization. (Comp. Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 7-10)

3.1.3 Israel’s invasion in Lebanon

The Hezbollah did not resist Israel’s occupation from the initial invasion in summer 1982, the resistance started in the fall of 1983. At this time, the Shia community still supported Israel’s battle against the PLO. Israel’s engagement was seen as a release from the PLO-domination in the South of Lebanon. As time went on and Israel started to occupy the entire south, up to Beirut, the resistance among the Shiites began, and as a result the Hezbollah-movement was established. (Kneissl 2002: 30)

Israel’s invasion in Lebanon on June 6, 1982 marks the long-lasting 18 year occupancy. The person behind this invasion was Ariel Sharon. The goal was to destroy the PLO, which had
carried out attacks against Israel since the late sixties on the northern territory of Israel. The PLO used Lebanon as their base for the raids against Israel. In order to impose Israel's political will on Lebanon, a new enemy was created: the Party of God - The Hezbollah. Israel’s invasion happened at the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the Shea Muslims took over and announced the Islamic Republic of Iran. This was an inspiration for many Shiites in other Muslim countries. They saw their chance after a long history of discrimination under Sunni Muslim rule. (Jaber 1997:7-8)

With this came the Islamicisation of the Lebanese Shiites. As described beforehand, the radicalization of the Shiite community in Lebanon happened a decade before and was reinforced by Israel’s first invasion in 1978. The second invasion in 1982 was marked by Israel’s brutal occupation of the South, which spawned the Shiite Islamic resistance group-the Hezbollah.

A new level of radicalization was experienced as Israel’s economic blockade of the region caused a mass exodus from the South. More Shiites had to live in misery. For that reason some Palestinian Camps offered shelter for Shiite refugees.

The resistance was also taken a step further with the mass detention of 10 000 Lebanese’s and Palestinians in 1983. They were held captive in and outside of Lebanon which violated the Geneva Convention as no prisoner-of-war status was guaranteed. In addition, terrible prison conditions and the practice of torture led to a further radicalization from Hezbollah’s side.

Israel penalized Hezbollah by disconnecting water and electricity supplies of villages which were suspected of supporting the resistance forces. Additionally, heavy bombardment deepened the hate and resistance activities of Hezbollah. (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 10-13)

The radicalization of the Shia Community goes back to three primary reasons: the disappearance of al-Sadr, the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 and the Iranian Revolution what led to the Iranian Islamic Republic. (Sivich 2003: 93)

Structure

The Hezbollah’s structure is as follows: the Shura, which is comprised of a 12-head-council where all important decisions are made; a Secretary-General, who is currently Hassan Nasrallah; seven leading divisions in the areas of diplomacy, military, social welfare, secret service and information. Big decisions are made in the Shura and are later acknowledged by Iran.
Strong disciplines, as well as the leading of a strict life after “Shiite traditions”, are the main principles. The Hezbollah was first situated in the Bequa Area, and later on it expanded its territory up to West Beirut. The organization claims that they have commando centers, training camps and about 5000 fighters. The official number of active fighters was never released. Experts count between 5000-10000 Hezbollah fighters. (Sivich 2003: 93-94)

3.2 Ideology and worldview

Hezbollah’s ideology is based on the tradition of Shia Islam. Especially important is the concept of Willayat Al-Faqih, which is promoted by Khomeini and other Iranian Islamic scholars. (military.com 2008).

Hezbollah is a universalistic Islamic movement where the separation of religion and politics is rejected. Hezbollah’s Shiite religious leader is also the political leader of the organization. For Hezbollah, Khomeini is the deputy of the hidden Imam and divinely empowered to legislate. Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah insists that the loyalty to Iranian Islamic leaders does not contradict with Lebanese citizenship as Islam is beyond national borders. (Ehtesami 1997: 140)

Hezbollah’s strong tie with Iran is noticeable with Hezbollah’s programmatic document of 1985, an open letter addressed to the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World”. In this document Hezbollah reveals that the organization is inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979. The Revolution is seen as a proof of what can be accomplished if one truly believes in Islam: the oppression of tyrannical regimes can be broken. (Norton 2007: 35-36) Furthermore, Hezbollah’s division of the world into two categories, the oppressors and the oppressed, goes back to this document. The US and the Soviet Union are seen as the oppressors in the time of the Cold War. Both struggled for influence in the Third world. Iran’s Revolution was based on neither the West nor the East. This point of view matches with Hezbollah’s worldview.

The main enemy for Hezbollah still remains the US, who is accused of using Israel directly and indirectly to inflict suffering of Muslims in Lebanon. Khomeini repeatedly said that the US is the origin of all catastrophes and the source of malice. The fight against it is the only means to defend Islam and the dignity of Lebanon.
France was also in the center of exercised attacks of Hezbollah, as it has supported and currently supports the Christian Maronite community in Lebanon. (Norton 2007: 35-37)

In Hezbollah’s ideology, compromise and mediation have no room. “Where fractiousness existed among Muslims, it had to have been the product of imperialism”. (Norton 2007: 37) The Islam and the creation of Islamic States are the only solutions for the Middle East in order to get rid of foreign superpowers and their imperialism. (Norton 2007: 37) The establishment of an Islamic Republic is the only form of regime that can guarantee equality and justice to all Lebanese citizens. Therefore the fight against western imperialism and its eradication from Lebanon is of significant value in Hezbollah’s ideology. (military.com 2008)

Self-help is the only answer. Therefore, Hezbollah positioned itself as a force that resists Israel and superpowers. Hezbollah’s initial goal was to get rid of Israel’s, America’s and France’s influence on the country. There should not be any imperialist power left in the country of Lebanon. (Norton 2007: 35-39). It also achieved its goal with Israel’s and Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and 2005.

The Hezbollah integrated the doctrine of the Iranian Revolution and assured loyalty to their “leader” Ayatollah Khomeyni. The “3-circle-system” represents the ideology the Hezbollah is following: the circllet represents the suppressed Lebanese collective, the second circle the entire Islamic world, and the outer circle represents the underdogs in the world. (Sivich 2003: 95)

The idea of destroying the Israeli State is the basis of Hezbollah’s principles. Therefore, the Hezbollah never acknowledged the State of Israel. Not only does Hezbollah take Israel seriously as an enemy, Israel feels the same about Hezbollah. The best example here is, when Hezbollah captured four Israelis in October 2000. Israel’s initially reacted with the threat of excessive violence. In the end nothing happened. Furthermore, since Israel respects Hassan Nasrallah, it seems that his word is taken seriously. (Kneissl 2002: 45-49)
3.3 Goals

The Hezbollah follow short-term and long-term goals:

- The number one priority of the Hezbollah is to liberate Lebanon from Israeli occupation. (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 112) One of Hezbollah’s biggest successes was Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000. Furthermore Israel left behind military materials such as tanks, which were exploited by Hezbollah. Pictures of celebrating Hezbollah fighters on Israeli tanks circulated around the world. This created the impression that one of the strongest armies in the world, and the strongest army in the region, had been defeated. The lesson of this message was, you need to fight like us in order to defeat Israel: with numerous suicide bomb attacks.

As already mentioned, Hezbollah’s main goal is to resist Israel’s occupation. Now, one may think with Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000, Hezbollah has fulfilled its goal. This would be true if there were not one more controversial subject: the small piece of land of the Shebba farms in the border triangle between Lebanon, Syria and Israel. The Hezbollah believe that every peace of Lebanese land must be captured back. (Kneissl 2002: 6)

- Israel still holds captured Lebanese people. The Hezbollah justifies its actions by stating, that all Lebanese who are held in prison in Israel need to be freed. Only when there are no more Lebanese in Israeli prison it would give up its resistance. (Kneissl 2002: 37)

- The abolishment of the confessionalism in Lebanon, as it demonstrates injustice and the under-representation of the Shia Community. Lebanon should be transformed into an Islamic State like Iran. Justice, equality, security and peace should be guaranteed through the implementation of the Sharia. (Sivich 2003: 96)

- The liberation of all suppressed Muslims, the elimination of Israel and the liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine. (Sivich 2003: 96)

The symbol of Hezbollah reflects its ideology and goals. There is an arm with a gun in front of the Al-Aksa mosque in Jerusalem, with the statement on top that the “party of God will triumph”, signed with “the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon”. (Sivich 2003: 96)
3.4 Financing Hezbollah

Targeting Hezbollah’s finances brings along difficulties. Hezbollah receives extensive support from Iran in the form of financial aid, training and help in logistical operations which are to some extent overseen by Iranian officials.

At the same time, the organization raises funds autonomously.

According to the U.S Treasury Department certain banks and bank accounts such as the former Bayt al-Mal and Yousser Company are intermediaries. A direct link between mainstream banks and suspected terrorist groups is being discovered. The mentioned intermediaries were destroyed in last year’s war and were changed and re-registered under different names.

According to Western diplomats and Lebanon analysts, Iran transfers at least 200 Million Dollars a year to the Hezbollah. In last year’s war against Israel, it was alleged to have given around 300 Million dollars. (Levitt/ Lipton 2007)

3.5 Hassan Nasrallah speech

Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah held an important speech on August 14, 2007 in front of one million Lebanese in Beirut. He warned Israel against another outbreak of war. This should not be seen as a threat and more as a deterrent. He said that Hezbollah has gained weapons which can hit any spot in Israel. Hezbollah is fully ready for another war.
although a peaceful settlement of differences would be preferable although according to Nasrallah the Zionist State of Israel and the United States are looking for war. In his speech, Nasrallah is talking about surprises which would have effects on a new war or the entire region. (Reuters 2007).

In my eyes this menace should show the capabilities of their weaponry. Most likely Hezbollah could strike back in another dispute with unexpected force. It should be a warning to Israel and the United States that another war would cause much more casualties on their sides and that Hezbollah’s powers are not exhausted yet. The big surprise refers to the unpredictable force and weapons Hezbollah has. I suppose that Nasrallah really does not want another war but he wants to make it clear that no one should underestimates Hezbollah’s force and power.

Furthermore, I believe he refers to the weapon deal between the US, Israel and Saudi-Arabia and other Arab States. President Busch offered an arms deal of $20 billion to Saudi-Arabia, including weapons like Patriot missiles, naval vessels and satellite-guided bombs in order to counter Iran, as it would not stop its nuclear program. Israel showed concerns, as these arms package could threaten Israeli territory. To calm Israel down, Bush assured Israel $30.4 billion military aid over the next decade, an increase of 43 percent. The offer for Israel was promised after Israel’s war against the Hezbollah in July 2006. Israel does not believe that the recent government of Saudi-Arabia would use the new technology and equipment against them, but that the government could be overthrown and that the weapons would fall in the hands of radical regime. (New York Times, Cloud July 28, 2007)

In another interview Hassan Nasrallah stated that if he had known that the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers would lead to a war with Israel, he would have refrained from it. (Atzili 2007:17)

### 3.6 Hezbollah’s electorate

Hezbollah’s move to participate in 1992 for the first time at parliamentary election is remarkable for the following reasons: First Hezbollah developed itself from a mobilized Shia community into a political party. Secondly, it indirectly accepted the formerly criticized proportional representation election system. Finally Hezbollah as a political party is both
respected and admired in Lebanon, but feared the same time, as the party could act as henchman for other powers. (Kneissl 2002: 53)

In 1992 Hezbollah ran for the first time in parliamentary elections and won twelve seats. Four seats, they allocated to non-Shiite allies. Four years later, in the 1996 election, the Hezbollah won again, this time only nine seats but instead the government’s legitimization of its Islamic Resistance. (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 3)

The majority of voters who support Hezbollah are the poor Shia Community, which equals however the majority of Lebanese people. In the past ten years, a new self- confident Shiite upper-middle class developed who profited from Hezbollah’s social activities. Public polls showed that former electors of the Communist Party in Lebanon became Hezbollah electors. Furthermore, the party has at their disposal a cadre of highly educated functionaries as well as excellent engineers and information scientists for their global “Dschidhad”. Not all Hezbollah supporters stand behind the idea of an armed battle against western culture and values. However, Hezbollah does not show off this conflict in public, it publicly demonstrates strength and unity. (Kneissl 2002: 54-55)

3.7 Hezbollah’s demonization of Israel

The liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine is one of Hezbollah’s long-term strategic goals. The conflict with Israel and the Jews is seen as conflict on a broader scale:

- It expresses the cultural struggle between the Western and the Islamic world
- The historical struggle between the religions of Judaism and Islam
- The struggle between the arrogance of the West and the suppressed people of the world. (Sivich 2003: 96-97)

Israel is seen as the incarnation of the evil. The West installed Israel at its current place in order to dominate and exploit the region of its resources. Israel is being exploited by the West to carry out its influence. For these reasons, Israel needs to be demolished. Israel and the US are seen as the enemy of Islam and God, and everything possible needs to be undertaken to get rid of them both. The Hezbollah identifies the US and Israel with moral
depravity, modernization and western culture. These values are interpreted by the Hezbollah as the values of evil. Khomeyni describes Israel as “cancer” or “cancerous gland” which produces more evil and spreads this illness, since Israel influences the entire world. The comparison of Israel with “cancer” is nothing new. Hezbollah’s rhetoric is influenced by Khomeyni’s words. Caricature is an instrument that is used to demonize Israel. Hezbollah’s opinion and point of view of Israel goes back to Khomeyni. (Sivich 2003: 97-99)

3.8 Syria and Iran’s role in Lebanon

Behind every social movement there lies the revolutionary paradigm that inspires it. Therefore it is otherwise unlikely that the resistance would have been launched and formed into a movement. Here Iran plays a key role. With Iran’s political, financial, military and logistical support, it was possible to transform the various Islamic resistance forces into one big movement - the Hezbollah. Without Iran’s support it could have taken another 50 years for the same achievements. One of the most significant Iranian contributions was the deployment of 1 500 Revolutionary Guards at the time of the 1982 Israeli invasion. Iran saw it as a possibility to spread the Iran Revolutionary Idea of a Shiite Islamic State. In this sense, all split resistance groups were organized into a single movement, the Hezbollah. The Lebanese political arena had been under the control of Syria since 1976. Syria accepted Iran’s intention, as it was of great interest to have a strategic ally in the battle against Israel and America. This made it possible for the Revolutionary Guards to enter through the border of Syria.

Another important milestone in the formation of Hezbollah was the split within the Amal movement. After the disappearance of al-Sadr, Nabih Berri acted as the leader of Amal. Berri’s involvement with Bashir Gemayel, the pro-Israeli Maronite leader of the Lebanese Forces, caused Amal officials such as Hassan Nasrallah and further members to split from the movement, as he broke with the al-Sadr line. This was the first step of forming Hezbollah. The final step was that all resistance groups were formed into one instructional framework, which led to the establishment of Hezbollah. In the end, the Hezbollah represents an umbrella of resistance movements. (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 13-15)

Musa al-Sadr represents a very important personality for the Shia Community in Lebanon. From 1959 to 1978 al-Sadr worked as a mufti in Lebanon. It was he who organized the Shia
community politically and gave them a new psychological focus. He founded a Shiite Council which better represented the Shiite concerns to the state. Al-Sadr gave the Shiite underclass a complete new self-confidence. The Shiites transformed themselves from passive complainers to political activists. For this reason, al-Sadr founded the Amal-movement. After al-Sadr’s disappearance in Libya in 1978, a fight between the secular Amal-leader and parliamentary president Berri and the Hezbollah, who oriented themselves towards the Iranian Islamic Republic, broke out. Both claimed to be the true successor of al-Sadr’s thoughts and beliefs. This is when the conflict within the Shia Community broke out. (Kneissl 2002: 18-19)

In the 1970s the Amal movement was the actual challenger of the PLO in Lebanon. From 1985-1988 a war within the Shia Community broke out. The Amal tried to stop the PLO from regaining control over the refugee camps, while Hezbollah allied secretly under the accordance with Syria with Palestinian groups. The result was a completely weakened political and military Amal movement, and the growth of the Hezbollah to a Shiite mass movement. This was also the actual goal of Musa Sadr, the founder of the movement. (Kneissl 2002: 50-51)

### 3.9 Teheran-Damascus Connection

There is a strong tie between Iran and Syria. There are numerous reasons for this: After a coup, former president Hafez al Assad needed to prove that he was able to act as president of Syria within constitutional low. The constitution states that the president needs to be a Muslim. Assad though, is Alawite, and in the eyes of the Sunni majority not a real Muslim. The Alawites are a split of Shiites. In 1973, Musa Sadr certified legally that Assad was Muslim. Furthermore, Assad had good connection with the clerical regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In this sense, the Shiite connection plays a vital role since Alawites are also Shiites which receive strong support from Iran. Another reason for the opposition support goes back to 1980, when Iraq attacked Iran leading to eight years of static warfare. Syria fought over the origin of the Baath Party. The Syrian Christ Michel Aflaq founded the party and after a fight with the Syrian leadership in the country, he escaped to Bagdad. During this time, from 1980-1988 Assad supported the international, vilified Iran with weaponry. Teheran will never forget this essential support. (Kneissl 2002: 38)
For over 20 years, Teheran and Damascus have supported each other and cooperated in their support of Hezbollah. While Teheran is responsible for the logistical support, Damascus organizes its transport to Beirut.

Assad tolerates Iran’s engagement, as this means there is more potential to fight Israel. In allowing Iran into Lebanon, there is more power to threaten Israel, and Syria does not have to do it alone. Assads’ plan to lift Syria to a regional player in the Middle East was easier to achieve with Iran, as he used to do it with the PLO in Lebanon. His plan flourished, and Syria became a vital player in Middle East politics. Syria is no longer the object in the Middle East conflict, rather the subject. With Hezbollah’s rising strength came Syria’s power. (Kneissl 2002:42)

3.10 Iran-Hezbollah relation

For Iran, the Hezbollah is the long arm, which allows them to be involved in the Middle East Conflict where they otherwise would not be, due to the historical and geographic reasons. In this way, Iran can continue its imperial power politics.

Iran’s engagement in Lebanon started with the deployment of Musa al-Sadr, which happened at the time of Shah Reza Pahlevi in the 1950s and kept going till the deployment of 1500 revolutionary guards in 1983. The Bekaa area was until the end of the 1980s, the stronghold of Iranian revolutionary. Schools and hospitals get financed by Iran. One of the most essential roles of Iran in Lebanon was the financial support for families of suicide bombers. This also presents one of the most difficult problems to deal with.

For how long and how intensely Iran is going to keep its current politics towards Hezbollah will most likely depend on its financial possibilities in future. Some experts have the opinion, that if Iran cuts off the financial support, Hezbollah would lose its influence and power, as there would not be money left for the social services Hezbollah offers. Hezbollah is known for these through all sects.

Other experts believe that letting Syria have the regulatory force over Lebanon in the 1990’s was the biggest problem of all, as this led to a strong Hezbollah in Lebanon who can do whatever it wanted. (Kneissl 2002: 42-45)
Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon was pushed by the withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000 and with the departure of the Syrian forces in 2003. From then on, Hezbollah played an important role in the political landscape of Lebanon.

Nasrallah says that Hezbollah is a political force and a militia in Lebanon. Hezbollah has been represented in the parliament and even in the cabinet since 2005. Therefore, Hezbollah cannot be disarmed as required by the adopted Resolution 1701, since this would cause a civil war in Lebanon and would exacerbate the war in Iraq. The widening tension between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestinian territories could lead to further rising conflicts of Shiite minorities in other countries.

The religious factor becomes more and more important in the Middle East conflicts. Islamist political parties, which proclaim Anti-Americanism and Anti-Israelism, enjoy great popularity. For the West, it is getting more and more difficult to find appropriate solutions for the Middle East.

Voices say that even if the United States is changing its foreign policy to become more involved with Iran, it would not stop Iran from further supporting Hezbollah. Iranian weaponry was used in the recent conflict and Iranian militia is at their disposal.

Iran’s role as an emerging regional leader should not be overestimated. Iran does play a key role in the region, but a couple of wrong steps could place Iran back where it used to be, and maybe also belongs.

Iran as a benefactor of the Hezbollah gives money, training, weaponry and advice. Hezbollah has just begun to make their own decisions and these decisions do not always coincide with the interests of Iran. This behavior could bring troubles along with Iran. (Mandelbaum/Grace 2006)

3.11 Lebanon’s view of the Hezbollah

The Lebanese government so far, has denied the US request to freeze Hezbollah bank accounts. For the former chief of the Lebanese Central Bank Riyad Salameh, there is too little jurisdiction to complete such a measure. There is no resolution from the Security Council or from any Lebanese court, nor does the government have a bilateral treaty with the US. Furthermore Israel treats the Hezbollah not only as a terrorist group, but as worthy military opponent.
In Addition there is little the US can do to sanction Lebanon. It could only urge the World Bank and the EU to block all credits and to boycott Lebanon. In general, the political landscape of Lebanon supports Hezbollah, although not always officially. In society the situation is more split. Especially the Lebanese economical elite doubt Hezbollah’s patriotism. (Kneissl 2002: 50-52)

First, it was believed that if you include the Hezbollah in national politics they would let go of their radicalism. Unfortunately, the exact opposite happened. All concessions which were made were used as reassurance for their radical actions. The concessions were not seen as steps toward moderation. The pro-west government in Lebanon is being questioned because of Hezbollah’s gaining of strength and their continuing aggressive behaviour. (Wunder 2007:3-4)

3.12 Terror List

There are still doubts among international lawyers on whether the Hezbollah should be classified as a terrorist organization or not. Israel, the United States and Canada list Hezbollah on their Terror List. (Lamb 2007)

Since Europe only has members of the Hezbollah movement on its terror list but not the organization itself, the United States urged the President of the European Union in July 2003 to finally list it on their terror list as well. The Hezbollah is suspected of being in charge of numerous attacks such as the suicide truck bombing of the United States Embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut 1983. It is also believed that the organization attacked Israeli targets such as the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1994. The organization is alleged to have terror cells in North-America, Europe and Africa and to be sponsored by Iran and Syria.

After adopting Security Council Resolution 425, which forbids further attacks, the Hezbollah is still carrying out hostilities against Israel. Hezbollah trains and supplies the Hamas and other Palestinian jihad groups with weapons in order to undertake further attacks against Israel. Due to these reasons, Hezbollah was put on the US Terror list. (Committee on International Relations 2004: 7-9)

All other countries such as China, Russia, members of the European Union and the United Nations have denied calling Hezbollah a terrorist organization at all. Israel and US demands were denied.
After much pressuring of Canada by the United States, Canada now labels Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The United Kingdom and Australia distinguish between the Hezbollah’s security and political wings. Due to the appearance on the mentioned T-Lists, Hezbollah is limited in raising funds and in travelling abroad. (Lamb 2007)

The United States put the Hezbollah on the T-List in 1999. A couple of years later Hezbollah was taken off the list as the organization condemns the attacks of 9/11 in New York City, then Dick Cheney placed Hezbollah once again on the T-List. The allegations are that a Hezbollah operative probably met with an Al-Qaeda representative in South America in 2001. Lebanon’s President Emile Lahoud and Lebanese officials disclaim such a meeting and call it Israeli-sponsored propaganda.

The Lebanese government refuses to freeze Hezbollah’s bank accounts and does not stop the resistance force from providing social services. The Hezbollah is a social and political movement.

Al-Qaeda is different than Hezbollah or Hamas in that it is considered a definite terrorist organization. Their actual goal is twofold. The organization is in a struggle with the West, particularly with their number one enemy, the United States. Their objectives are undefined. The activities of Hezbollah and Hamas are defined; they want to liberate Lebanon and Palestine. They are not part of the global struggle against the West. Hezbollah has, so far, always opposed attacks on foreign civilians. It condemned the 9/11 attacks, the 1997 attack in Egypt, Luxor at the Temple of Hatshepsut, the attacks on the Greek tourists and the killing of the monks in Algeria. (Lamb 2007)

There are attempts from the Bush administration to remove the Hezbollah from its T-List. The Hezbollah must give up its goal of liberating Palestine and has to accept the Bush/Olmert backed Siniora government.

According to international law, the Bush administration has to show their evidence to prove the accusations made, or it has to remove Hezbollah from its T-List. So far no evidence has been presented. (Lamb 2007)

America needs to prove what type of terrorism Hezbollah is or was involved in. For many years, the US has been breaking international law without consequences.
4. Chronology of the Lebanon War 2006

4.1 Before the outbreak of hostilities

Prior to the hostilities of July 12, 2006 the tension between Hezbollah and Israel was already growing. In November 2005, Hezbollah tried to capture Israeli soldiers in the village of Ghajar. With this activity it tried to press Israel to free Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails, including Samir Kuntar, a terrorist who Israel steadfastly refused to release. (Norton 2007: 134)

Two years after the end of the 34 day war, Israel did release Samir Kuntar in order to retrieve the bodies of the two captures soldiers who were the cause of the war of 2006.

During March, May, June and July 2006 the Israeli Defensive Force (IDF) was on high state of alert. At the beginning of February and the end of May, fire exchanges began leaving combatants, civilians and soldiers dead and wounded. Israel increased its air violations in May. Ground violations were made on a daily bases by mainly Lebanese shepherds. (United Nations Security Council 2006: 1-4)

Hezbollah attacked an Israeli border post in May 2006 which lead to the death of one Israeli soldier. Such attacks have been common between Israel and Hezbollah since Israel’s uni-withdrawal from Lebanese soil in 2000. The IDF had been firing at Hezbollah positions and command and control centres in return. This time, Israel shelled twenty Hezbollah positions along the border while Hezbollah reacted with the launching of eight Katyusha rockets at the city of Safad, the location of the northern headquarters’ of the Israeli army. Due to the inaccuracy of five of these rockets, a farm near the headquarters’ was hit. This incident should have reminded Israel of Hezbollah’s weapon arsenal, which should have included approximately twelve thousand rockets, mostly short-range Katyusha rockets as well as some longer-range rockets. These earlier incidents show that both sides were looking for a conflict. (Norton 2007: 134-135)
4.2 The beginning of the Lebanon War 2006

Hezbollah’s capturing of the two soldiers was another attempt to release Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails. In an unpopulated area in North Israel, Hezbollah fighters captured two Israeli soldiers and killed three more on July 12, 2006, 9.am. In order to do so, a motorized Israeli patrol was ambushed. The IDF forced the militants into Lebanon where five more soldiers were killed and an Israeli tank was destroyed. The incident took place on Israeli soil which should demonstrate Hezbollah’s great offensive abilities and tenacity. This action happened at a time, when critics were becoming louder on disarming Hezbollah.

As Nasrallah admitted later on, the organization miscalculated its actions. It did reach its goal of capturing soldiers in order to press for the freeing of Lebanese soldiers, but Israel’s strong reaction of starting an entire war with its enemy Hezbollah was not expected. Within one day, on July 13, Lebanon was blockaded from sea and air. This is not what Nasrallah had anticipated with its original idea of capturing soldiers in order to free Lebanese prisoners. On July 14, Nasrallah’s offices were bombed, and instead of responding with conciliatory actions he said that if Israel wanted an open war, they could have one. Hezbollah would be ready for it. (Norton 2007: 135-136)

On July 14, a patrolling Israeli gunboat exploded, resulting in a soldier’s death and missing IDF personnel.

On July 15, Ayatollah Fadlallah’s home was destroyed by Israel forces. This came unexpectedly, as Nasrallah’s and Fadlallah’s relation were known for being tense due to Fadlallah’s critics of Hezbollah’s political inflexibility. (Norton 2007: 137-139) The same day, the IDF requested the inhabitants of the towns Ayta ash Shab and Marwahin to vacate their homes. A massive exodus took place. People were looking for shelter in the UNIFIL operation area, but safety and shelter could not be guaranteed. They were sent back to their villages’ despite the Israeli warning. UNIFIL armoured personnel carriers were moved to Marwahin to protect its citizen.

Eighteen Lebanese civilians were killed that day as they were about to flee on the highway from Marwahin. As UNIFIL tried to retrieve the dead bodies, they came under fire. One soldier was seriously injured. The next day UNIFIL evacuated 283 people from Marwahin to Tyre as requested by the Lebanese government. The convoy came under fire but no injuries were sustained by this attack.
The same day, the UNIFIL was informed that Israel was about to install a special security zone which would be placed around and inside of the blue zone and the UNIFIL operation area. Any vehicle in this zone would be shot at. This would imply that UNIFIL is not able support other UNIFIL positions in this area and freedom of movement was no longer guaranteed. Concerns were brought forward to high Israeli officials and the Prime Minister. (United Nations Security Council 2006: 1-4)

IDF air strikes had hit the city of Tyre where 150 United Nations personnel and its dependants resided. The bombings on Tyre continued despite several requests to stop from the UNIFIL commander and the United Nations headquarters. A bomb hit the residence of a UNIFIL international staff member and his family and the residence collapsed. Because of these incidents, non-essential staffs of the United Nations of Tyre were relocated due to the unstable conditions. Repeated request to stop the IDF attack in Tyre on United Nations staff were ignored by the Israeli government.

Israel started to conduct small incursions into Lebanese territory. Two hundred and fifty Lebanese civilians and an unspecific number of Hezbollah fighters had been killed by the Israeli air strikes and by the ground troops up to this point according to the Lebanese government. (United Nations Security Council 2006: 1-4)

According to UNIFIL and the government of Beirut, more than fifty percent of the local citizens have left their homes. The humanitarian situation for the people left in their houses was inhumane and help was urgently needed. The people did not have running water and food was scarce. Two centres were established to relocate people.

Because of the ongoing hostilities and the bombings of infrastructures, UNIFIL’s freedom of movement was no longer guaranteed.

UNFIL requested from the IDF the allowance for Blue Line patrolling and the crossing of logistical convoys to support their positions. Only two convoys were allowed to pass, patrolling was denied.

On July 17 three UNIFIL positions near Hula, Tiri and Marwahin were attacked by the IDF. In these onslaughts, one soldier was seriously injured and needed immediate medical treatment. Until the 17th of July, 48 firing instances were reported that took place close to UNIFIL positions. UNIFIL was not able to fulfil its mandate under Security Council Resolution 425 of 1978. (United Nations Security Council 2006: 1-4)
On July 18, Helicopters and ships were dispatched in order to evacuate foreigners. July 19 was the deadliest day since the Israeli offensive had begun in Lebanon. Approximately, 70 Lebanese civilians were killed that day. The next day, foreigners were heading out of Lebanon by land, sea and air to Syria, Turkey and Cyprus. On July 21, Hezbollah rejected the UN plan to halt the hostilities and realising the captured Israeli soldiers. The foreign exodus continued while Lebanese were fleeing from the southern area. Israel gave out a warning that it might invade Lebanon. Approximately a thousand additional Israeli reservists were deployed at the Lebanese border on July 22. The same day Israel hit transmission towers for television stations and mobile telephone networks. Israel tried to destroy Hezbollah’s TV station al-Manar. The next day, Syria put a warning forwards that it would respond if Israel invaded Lebanon. The Israeli Defence Minister acknowledged that it would support the instalment of an international force in South Lebanon. On July 24, Rice visited Beirut to show support for the Lebanese people and told them that she will do her best to put a ceasefire in place. In a combat helicopter crash in northern Israel two airmen died. Another two Israeli soldiers died in a combat with Hezbollah. Israel proclaimed a small victory in the war on July 25, as it supposing had taken control of the border town of Bint Jbeil. The town is a Hezbollah military stronghold. July 26 marks a very sad day in the conflict as four UN observers lives were taken on the Lebanese border. Kofi Anan called this attack deliberate. The same day in Rome a summit on the Middle East was held where 15 nations participated. Although Annan was calling for an immediate cease-fire, no commitment could be achieved at the end of the day. The only positive achievement of this day was that a UN aid convoy was able to get down to war-torn South Lebanon. Apparently 13 Israeli soldiers died in a fighting with Hezbollah in South Lebanon. On July 27, the EU promised to send peacekeeping forces if UN resolution would allow it. Israel increased its air strikes. July 28th was the 17th day of Israeli air attacks on Lebanon. Tel Aviv, Patriot anti-missile batteries were deployed. July 29 marks a very sad day for environmental issues. Lebanon’s coast became polluted with oil due to an Israeli air strike. Additionally, Israel denied a 3 day humanitarian truce and killed 14 civilians that day. (Daily Star 2006)
The worst day of the war was July 30, as it was first believed that 52 people were killed in an air strike on the town of Qana. This number was later revised to 28. This incident was declared a war crime by Lebanon, and they demanded an immediate ceasefire. Hamas became involved after the Qana bombing and threatened Israel that all options were open. The same day, a cross-border incursion took place and Israeli ground troops were fighting Hezbollah. This marked a very sad day in the history of Lebanon.

On the next day, July 31, Israel agreed to a 48-hours halt to air strikes on Lebanon, because it was receiving strong criticism worldwide for it’s bombing of Qana on the previous day. This should have given the remaining people in the South time to leave the area. In a statement, Israel said it would expand its war on Hezbollah and that the war would “change the face of the region”. (Daily Star 2006)

On August 1, 2006 the Israeli army received the green light to march 30 kilometres into southern Lebanon. This would be necessary for the deployment of the international force later on. Additionally, Israel avowed that they would not be able to completely destroy Hezbollah’s weapon arsenal. At the same time Israeli ground troops were engaged in battle with the militia in the border town of Bing Jbeil.

On August 2, Hezbollah landed the biggest strike so far in the war. One hundred and sixty rockets hit northern Israel, which killed one man and left nineteen people wounded. So far this was the deepest strike that could be reached by Hezbollah, as the rocket struck in sixty kilometres away from the border.

Israel, on the other hand, was able to push up to one hundred kilometres into South Lebanon. Five supposed Hezbollah combatants were killed as well as sixteen civilians, among them seven children. Israel’s devastation of Lebanon after these three weeks of war amounted to 2,5 billion dollars, according to Lebanese official statement.

After the arranged halt of air strikes, Israel launched new ones on Beirut on August 3. This day also was also the bloodiest day for Israel as four soldiers were killed as well as eight civilians. Muslims nations called for an immediate ceasefire.

Hassen Nasrallah threatened to hit Tel Aviv. Official figures from Lebanon declared that so far 900 civilians had died in the war while 3 000 were wounded.

The electricity was cut off to the Bekaa Valley and South Lebanon on August 4, after Israel hit a power station. Israel officially announced forty three killed soldiers and thirty one wounded civilians. In return Hezbollah fired 220 rockets at Israel. One went so far that it
reached the town of Hadera which is only 40 kilometres north of Tel Aviv. This was the deepest strike by Hezbollah into Israel so far. (Daily Star 2006)

Day 25, August 5, marked the day with the heaviest bombardment on Lebanon so far. Beirut’s southern suburbs were getting hit for the third night straight. The US, UN and France could not agree on the first UN resolution on the conflict. For Israel August 6 was the bloodiest day in the conflict as 12 soldiers died in a rocket attack near the border. Another 3 were killed and 160 were wounded during the attacks on Haifa. Syria again warned that a regional war would break out if they were to be attacked. The Franco-US draft resolution which demanded the “full cessation of hostilities” was rejected by Lebanon. Hezbollah said it would only stop fighting if Israel left the territory of Lebanon. In an Israeli raid 12 Lebanese civilians were killed. The next day, in a raid, 69 civilians were killed by Israel which caused the official death toll to rise to over 1 000 Lebanese and to over 3 500 wounded people. The same day only 3 Israeli soldiers died in a battle in Bint Jbeil.

Lebanon began the deployment of 15 000 troops at the border by mobilising reservists. Prime Minister Siniora looked for support for his own peace plan and demanded changes to the UN draft. Ministers of the Arab League met in Beirut. On August 8, Arab ministers met with UN Security Council. Kofi Annan reminded Hezbollah and Israel to respect the international humanitarian law. Israel dropped leaflets in which it warned of attack to any moving vehicle. 50 civilians died in Israeli raids. The security cabinet of Israel decided to expand its ground offensive. From the creation of the Jewish state in 1948 until August 9, 2006, the town of Kiryat Shmona was the first that ever had to be evacuated. A Hezbollah official and his five children died in warplane attacks with another 5 Lebanese across the country, while the Israeli casualty toll rose to 65 military and 36 civilian deaths. (Daily Star 2006)

On August 10, Kofi Annan called for a UN Resolution which to stop the war by the end of the week. Israel wanted to give diplomacy a chance and waited with further offensives. Israel occupied Lebanese army barracks and moved tanks into Lebanon. The next day, UN peacekeepers had to evacuate Lebanese security forces and civilians from the Israeli occupied barracks in the town of Marjayun, which is mainly Christian. In Israel, opinion polls disclosed a sharp drop in support for the government on its handling of the war. After no large diplomatic efforts were made, Olmert gave green light for expanded
ground offensives. Another 12 civilians were killed while 15 remained wounded due to Israeli raids. Hezbollah in return killed 1 Israeli soldier while leaving 16 wounded.

While the UN Security Council decided unanimously for the adoption of the resolution on August 12, Israel expanded its ground offensive and lost 24 soldiers in the battle, which was the highest single-day toll of Israeli soldiers killed. Fighting continued although it seemed that Israel and Lebanon would accept the resolution. Finally, the Lebanese cabinet accepted Resolution 1701 and Israel and Hezbollah agreed that the war would be over at 0500 GMT on August 14.

On August 13, the Israeli cabinet accepted the Resolution 1701 as well. Even Syria and Iran supported the UN resolution. Another 13 civilians were killed as Israel continues to push the Lebanon offensive. A Hezbollah rocket caused the death of one man. (Daily Star 2006)

On August 14, 2006 at 0500 GMT the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel stopped, as decided in the adopted UN Resolution 1701. Seven people were killed only minutes before the deadline came into effect. Israel kept the air and land blockade up, as well as the ban on road traffic as displaced Lebanese people started to return to their homes. Israel was trying to avoid Hezbollah’s rearming.

One Hezbollah combatant was killed that day in what was the first post-truce casualty. Some Israeli troops were withdrawing from Lebanon. A UN aid convoy rushed to the city of Tyre as no aid had been provided for a couple of days in a row.

Residents of Northern Israel emerge from their shelters in order to return to their homes. Israel dropped leaflets over Beirut and blamed Hezbollah for the destruction in Lebanon. If anything further happened, new strikes would be the result. Hezbollah on the contrary, proclaimed “divine victory”. (Daily Star 2006)

Altogether 1 287 Lebanese died in the war while 4 054 people were wounded. This number underlies some fluctuations. 1140 civilian had to die while 43 Lebanese army and police troops lost their lives. 30 percent of them were children under the age of 12. Hezbollah admits to the death of 74 Hezbollah combatants. Israel declares that 117 Israeli troops were killed. (Daily Star 2006)

General Guy Zur, an Israeli Brigadier, called Hezbollah “by far the greatest guerrilla group in the world.” (Norton 2007: 140 cit. after USA today, September 14, 2006)
4.3 International positions to the war

At the beginning of the war, Israel enjoyed broad international support while Hezbollah was attacked for violating Israeli territory and capturing soldiers. Hezbollah’s actions were strongly condemned. The US was strongly supporting Israel while key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia disapproved of Hezbollah’s actions and called them “uncalculated adventures”. Jordan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates followed Saudi Arabia’s voice. A different reaction was expected from their Arab neighbours, as normally the Arab states are strong allies. The coalition of Arab States and America had different interests. The Sunni Arab governments were whipsawed by the rising Shiite power in Iran and in the Arab World, in countries like Iraq or Lebanon. The fear in these countries was that the opposition would be inspired by Hezbollah’s move, as Hezbollah’s activity enjoyed broad enthusiastic support even among the Sunni population in the Arab World. (Norton 2007: 136-137)

The Arab World did not seem to agree with each other. It appeared to be divided over Hezbollah’s attack on Israel. There were two blocks confronting each other: On the one side we have Hezbollah’s financing sources Iran, Syria and Yemen. On the other side we have the rest of the Arab World, which believed that the attacks did not serve Arab interests. Jordan, Egypt and the Arab League did not support attacks against Israel. Without consultation or coordination of the Arab league, the Hezbollah had to now bear the full responsibility alone for their actions. This point of view was shared all through the Arab World.

Saudi Arabia stated that they used to be completely committed to the resistance in Lebanon during the time of the Israeli occupation. Since the Israelis had moved out in 2000, it was irresponsible to place such attacks as they endangered the Lebanese civilians and the entire region.

Kuwait issued a similar response on the attacks. Lebanon could have been destroyed by such adventures, which were lead from the outside of the country. South Lebanon had turned into a satellite state of Teheran. Hezbollah took Lebanese authority and fought a fight that only Teheran and Damascus were benefiting from. (Stalinsky 2006)

A turning point in the war was the bombing of Qana, where 28 civilian were killed by the IDF on July 30, 2006. Further details of this incident will be provided in chapter 8.1.5.
“After this tragedy, support for Israel’s campaign in the Arab capitals melted under the heat of public outrage and demonstration.” (Norton 2007: 140)

In Egypt for example, numerous demonstrations occurred throughout the country after the bombing of Qana, as well as in August. The largest demonstration involve 8 000 people. The anger in the Egypt population about the developments in the July war 2006 brought along a reversal of tone in the Mubarak regime. (Norton 2007: 140)

4.4 Position of Lebanon in the war

Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the cabinet were distancing themselves from Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel. After an emergency cabinet meeting on July 13, Siniora said: "The government was not aware of and does not take responsibility for, nor endorses what happened on the international border." (Qawas/Rafei 2006)

The Lebanese government called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. At the same time Lebanon recalled its Ambassador to Washington as it was said on CNN that Israel should think of a prisoner exchange in order to see their captured soldiers returned alive. The Ambassador’s statement seemed to be too close to Hezbollah’s policy. The recall strengthened the anti-Syria Coalition in the government which has dominated since last year. (The Guardian 2006)

“My Government, which had no advance knowledge of the Hezbollah crossing of the Blue Line and abduction of two Israeli soldiers and has disavowed it, condemns in the strongest possible terms the violent Israeli response and its aggression in contravention of international laws, conventions, and norms. It also rejects the claim that this aggression is in the context of the legitimate right to self-defence,” says Prime Minister Siniora at the Rome Conference on July 26, 2006 (lebanonundersiege 2006)
5. UN attacks

During the Lebanon war of 2006, UN personnel and posts came under numerous attacks. The heaviest incident cost the lives of four unarmed UN observers.

On 25 July 2006 an aerial bomb hit the building inside the patrol base of the OGL in Khiyam. The three-story building was entirely destroyed. Four unarmed observers were killed. A UNIFIL rescue team was on the location immediately after the incident but they could only retrieve the dead bodies.

Before the incident occurred, extensive bombardments and shelling from the IDF was reported. Fourteen cases of close firing within six hours were reported at this position. UNIFIL commander Pelligrini was in constant contact with the Israeli army but the deadly incident still happened. (UNIFIL press release 2006:1)

The four victims were Canadian, Austrian, Finish and Chinese nationals. Maj. Paeta Derek Hess-von Kruecder, a Canadian who was working for UNTSO was one of the four victims. Prime Minister Harper did not think it was a deliberate act by Israel, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated.

Austria’s foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik officially said that the bombings were unacceptable and Israel should stop the attack on the area. (CBC News 2006)

Chinese UN observer Du Zhaoyu was another victim of the deadly Israel air attack. China strongly condemned the Israeli attack and called for an immediate truce. Moreover, China ordered the Israeli ambassador into his office and asked for an official apology. China said it was deeply shocked by the incident and was referring especially to Israel to guarantee security to UN personnel.

Finland called the death of its UN observer a terrible and unacceptable incident. These deaths should have increased the pressure on Israel to agree to a truce. (Spiegel online 2006)

“The Security Council is deeply concerned about the safety and security of United Nations personnel and in this regard, stresses that Israel and all concerned parties must comply fully with their obligations under international humanitarian law related to the protection of United Nations and its associated personnel and underlines the importance of ensuring that United Nations personnel are not the object of attack.” (United Nations Security Council b 2006: 1)

“I have written to the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, stating that I would have preferred that the Government of Israel and the United Nations carry out a joint investigation into the events that led to the deaths of the military observers at patrol base Khiam. I understand that the Government of Israel will carry out its own investigation, and I have urged that this be comprehensive and that its results be made public. I have asked in particular for information about what actions the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) took in response to the repeated communications from UNTSO and UNIFIL on the recurring incidents of close firing in the hours before the position was hit directly” notes Kofi Annan in his letter to the President of the Security Council on 29 July 2006. (Security Council c 2006:1)

The bombardment of the United Nation observer post can be seen as a challenge to the United Nations. Before the final bombardment constant communication was going on between the UN observers and the IDF, but the bombardment still happened nonetheless. This cannot be seen as a sad accident that unfortunately occurred. Israel forfeited a lot of sympathy worldwide due to its hard response in the Lebanon war.

Israeli Prime Minister Olmert publicly apologized for the four deaths caused by an Israeli aerial bombardment and called it a tragic accident. He recalled all allegations that the attack was deliberate. Israel’s ambassador in Germany, Schimon Stein said that Kofi Annan’s accusations of a deliberate attack on UN staff were backbiting and demanded an apology for these accusations. (Spiegel online 2006)

In a phone call from Prime Minister Olmert to Kofi Annan, in which he expressed his deep regret over the killing of the UN personnel, he once again said that the incident was not deliberate and that an investigation would look into the matter and that he would share the results of the investigation with Anan. Olmert also stated that he could not understand why Annan had called the attack deliberate despite the fact that no investigation so far had been
undertaken. Some observers see in Annan’s statement an indication of the alleged UN anti-Israel bias.

At a press conference after the Rome conference, Annan softened his tone and said that he accepted Olmert’s deep sorrows. (Jerusalem Post 2006)

A July 18th email from killed Canadian Maj. Paeta Hess-von Kruedener revealed that the UN compound was under constant direct and indirect fire from the Israel artillery and aerial bombing. Hezbollah was using the UN post as a shield.

In the email, the Canadian stated that Hezbollah combatants were close by the compound and were firing rockets at Israel’s territory. Israel responded with attacks as close as 2 meters away from the compound in order to destroy Hezbollah. With UN presence close by, Hezbollah thought that Israel would not respond to their rocket attacks. Hezbollah was wrong; it cost the lives of four international UN observers. (Kom 2006)

Additionally, one UNIFIL international civilian staff member and his wife were killed on July 17, 2006 in Tyre. Their dead bodies were found under the rubble of a collapsed house due to an air bombardment of the area of Hosh in Tyre. (UNIFIL press release 2006: 1)

Furthermore, four Ghanaian, three Indian and three Chinese soldiers and one OGL military observer were wounded in the Lebanon War 2006. (UNIFIL press release 2006b:1)

An Israeli airstrike killed 35 civilians. 20 of these civilians, most of them children, were killed in a single strike on a convoy of families who were trying to flee from the battle in Marwaheen near Tyre, after Israel had told them via loudspeakers that they had hours to flee. It was UN peacekeepers who found the bodies. Residents first tried to seek shelter at the nearby UN base. As officials could not confirm the Israeli warning, the residents left. Relatives of the killed families blamed the UN for the deaths. If they had taken the families in, this would have never happened. As a result, the peacekeepers were pelted with stones. (Guardian, the observer 2006)

After the bombing of Qana, thousands of protesters, consisting of Christians and Muslims, stormed the UN compound in Beirut, smashing glass doors, burning curtains and destroying furniture in rage. Approximately, 100 UN staff was hiding in the underground basement. A UN spokesperson said that everyone was sad and angry about the Qana bombing, but they were not the ones who should be blamed and attacked. (My wire 2006)
6. War Plans

6.1 The real reasons of Israel’s invasion

The obvious main goal was the destruction of the Shiite organization Hezbollah. Israel attempted that by using three strategies:

The first idea behind the invasion is the bombardment of Hezbollah. Fighters should be killed, Hezbollah’s infrastructure should be destroyed and specific killings of key figures such as Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, should have taken place. The goal was to weaken the organization or leave the organization without a leader.

Secondly, Israel tried to make Hezbollah responsible for the tragedy with the goal of putting a wedge between the organization and its followers. This implies that Israel had to destroy infrastructure, houses, and even whole villages of Shiites so that their strategy would work. Moreover, Israel dispersed leaflets from the sky, a tactic which was characterized as clumsy by the Lebanese Shiites.

This was not the first time that Israel had used this inhuman technique. In 1978, when Israel was fighting the PLO in South Lebanon it constantly bombed housing units. PLO fighters were seen as a sort of Mafia due to their corrupt attitude, so the support started to diminish little by little. Exactly what Israel expected to happen did happen.

However, the situation with Hezbollah is by far more complex and therefore this old technique did not work during the 33 day war. The support for Hezbollah did not shrink at all. On the contrary, the Hezbollah became more popular. The Hezbollah is better integrated in Lebanese society than PLO ever was which is why the technique did not work this time for Israel. (Achcar 2006: 38-39)

The third strategy included the limitation of social life in Lebanon. With sea, air and land blockades Israel tried to make the life of millions of people as miserable as possible. Israel hoped that this would help to stir up the non-Shiite Lebanese population against the Hezbollah. Israel believed if the people no longer stood behind Hezbollah, it would make it easier for the Lebanese government to take military actions against the organization. (Achcar 2006: 38-39)
Israel, which is the country that holds the record for disregarding UN Resolutions, insisted on the implementation of Resolution 1559, which meant the disarmament of Hezbollah. (Achcar 2006: 39) This seems to me like a farce.

6.2 Results of the war plan

This three step strategy plan did not work at all. Israel’s attacks did not diminish Hezbollah’s influence. Hezbollah is stronger than ever. It also enjoys more popularity in the Arabic and Muslim world than ever. It not only strengthened their influence in the Shiite community, but also in the other confessional groups in Lebanon. On the contrary, Israel was not even able to free the captured soldiers.

Adding more to Israel’s defeat, the power shifted in Lebanon dramatically, but not in a way the US or Israel would have preferred. The Hezbollah is feared more than ever by its enemies such as the US, supporters of the US policy and Saudi-Arabia.

The Lebanese government protested more against the Israeli invasion than Hezbollah’s actions. Israel had to admit that it was a mistake to think that their plan would lead to a disarmament process of Hezbollah through the Lebanese government. (Achcar 2006:40)

6.3 Israel’s war goals

From the beginning, the problem with the Olmert administration was that the war goals were not precisely defined. The political and military goals were never openly discussed. This became an important issue in various discussions on the war and later in the various committees of inquiry when they took stock of the war. (Warschawski in Achcar 2006:54)

It was clear from the beginning, that Israel had planned the war against the Hezbollah for a long time. The capture of the two still missing soldiers was only the pretext for invading the country. It was obvious that the USA and Israel wanted a war with Hezbollah.

It was definitely not the first time that the Hezbollah abducted Israeli soldiers in order to free imprisoned Lebanese people. The only thing different on July 12, 2006 was, that this time the mission was successful. Israel could not handle two captures in a row. Let’s not forget the captured soldier Gilat Shalit.
Israel had to react in order to be taken seriously. The question remaining is why Israel reacted so drastically if it only wanted to free its soldiers. (Warschawski in Achcar 2006: 54-55) How can such massive bombardments help free captured soldiers, I wonder? This makes it clear that the kidnapping was only an excuse for starting the war with Hezbollah in order to try and smash it.

The second argument brought forward was, that Israel tried to free its soldiers unconditionally. Israel was not open for discussions or/and a prisoner exchange. Israel really believed that the Lebanese people would celebrate Israel as the winner instead of the well-linked and integrated Hezbollah. This seems like a farce to me if you put in consideration that the Israelis destroyed, in only couple of days, important infrastructure like roads, bridges, houses or the international airport with their heavy air strikes. A million people had to leave everything behind them; they had to flee their homes. Inhabitants died while leaving their homes, although Israel had told them to do so. In fact, they did not even wait for them to leave. This did not only concern the Hezbollah, this concerned the entire country.

Although their reaction was completely out of control, Israel still thought it would turn the country’s non-Shiites onto their side. One must be really self-confident in order to think that way.

As Israel started to notice that their goal of freeing the captured soldiers could not be realized, their new goal became smashing the Hezbollah. Self-confident Israel twice proclaimed the killing of Hassan Nasrallah. Both times it was wrong information.

In spite of heavy air strikes, Hezbollah’s operations were not disturbed. Even all these bombs could not interfere with Hezbollah’s fighting. It was only most of their long distance rockets that could be destroyed within about two days by Israel.

Hezbollah launched rockets which reached as far as the third largest city in Israel, Haifa. (Warschawski in Achcar 2006: 56)

For a third time the war goal was revised. From now on, Israel only was only trying to protect its cities and villages. Hezbollah was still able to bomb Israel till the last day of war.

As Israel noticed that all three war goals failed, the only option left was, to restore their military deterrence. The image of the IDF was affected by the untiring Hezbollah fighters. They reacted with the release of hundred tons of bombs to prove to the entire world that Israel is still a dangerous military power which needs to be taken seriously. (Warschawski in Achcar 2006: 56-57)
In this way the war ended in a pure disaster. It is difficult to find positive things in this lost war. Still, there were some approaches made by Israeli authors, such as that you should never underestimate the Israeli army. If it sees red, anything can happen. (Warschawski in Achcar 2006: 56-57) For me, this looks more like an effort to not stand up to the mistakes which were made. Israel completely underestimated the strength and endurance of the Hezbollah combatants. The asymmetric warfare left big damages for Israel.

6.4 War Strategies

Israel counted on heave air strikes and on artillery bombardment from Northern Israel into Lebanon. The main objectives were the cut off of routes which Hezbollah used for re-supply, to strike Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal, to hit Hezbollah’s command and control stations and to hit media stations such as Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV station. Especially Hezbollah’s long distance rockets which could reach far into Israel needed to be destroyed. Due to these objectives Israel bombed roads, bridges, seaports and airports throughout Lebanon. Several times the al-Manar TV station was hit but only interruptions of few minutes were the effect. The station never went off air.

It only took few days until Southern Lebanon and even part of North Lebanon were hit. The people were forced to flee en mass. Not only military objectives, but as food stores as well were targeted. Details of Israel and Hezbollah’s targets will follow in Chapter 8.

Hezbollah’s response was the firing of rockets at Israel. Approximately 150 rockets were fired a day. On the last day of war 250 rockets were fired. On July 16, the city of Haifa was targeted with a longer-range rocket which is believed to be have been provided by Iran or Syria. This first attack on a city caused the death of 8 people. Israel claimed that almost all long-distance rockets which could hit Tel Aviv were destroyed in the first days of the war. The short-range rockets on the other hand can be fired so quickly that the Israeli detection equipment had no time to find it. Long-distance rockets need more time to be launched which is bad if you have an enemy like Israel who is superior in air strikes and detection capability. (Norton 2007: 137-139)
7. **UN Resolution 1701**

In order to end the war in Lebanon, UN Resolution 1701 was implemented. All parties involved in this conflict, the Hezbollah, Israel and the Lebanese government, as well as international and regional key actors agreed surprisingly on the text of the Resolution. The Resolution came about at a time of high tension and diplomatic battles and all parties needed a face-saving solution. No one was satisfied with the Resolution’s final text as it contained many ambiguous sanctions, but everyone could accept it in the end. The war could be stopped but the underlying conflict was not addressed.

Possible stumbling blocks were the release of the Israeli soldiers and Hezbollah’s armed presence in the South. Despite previous UN resolutions concerning these matters they were not significantly dealt with. This met with criticism as these stumbling blocks were the triggers causing the war.

Israel and the Hezbollah were both aware of the limits of their military power. Although Israel at first said it would not stop fighting unless the captured soldiers were freed and unless the Hezbollah was disarmed, Israel agreed on the Resolution. All the hope was put into the UN and its mediation to free the soldiers.

Hezbollah had accepted their defeat as well. Over 1,000 civilians died in the conflict. Further deaths would have been not justifiable in their own constituency, not to mention the whole country. Due to the Resolution, the Lebanese army was deployed in the south, which Hezbollah was not happy about, as it was the first time in over three decades that this had happened. In the end it was worth it to give it a try as the Hezbollah wanted to avoid further domestic tensions. Despite the Resolution it was possible for them to keep their presence in the south, though as mentioned above the disarming was not one of the prerequisites. (ICG 2006: i) Considering that Hezbollah fighters abducted two soldiers on foreign soil they were able to preserve a lot of status quo as they are still present in the South of Lebanon.

The Resolution brought no sustainable peace to the Israeli-Lebanese border. Goals in the Resolution were not defined with exact time lines. The further missing specificity opened up various interpretations of certain paragraphs about which long lasting battles over their interpretations can be started. It reflects the time pressure.
and the different standpoints within the Security Council members when the resolution was pushed through.
The casualties were already very high and expected to rise even further due to the violent approach in the war on both sides involved. A fast Resolution was needed.

7.1 The Text of the Resolution

Parts of the Resolution 1701 addressed core issues of the ceasefire:
Certain core issues were addressed in a clear distinct way, such as the withdrawal of Israeli troops across the Blue Line, the respect of the official border and the deployment of an enlarged UNIFIL and LAF in the South of Lebanon.

Paragraph One of the resolution 1701 states “…that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
1. *Calls for* a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;”

“…its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,… at the earliest,…” (Security Council Resolution 1701: 1)

“…the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers.” (Security Council Resolution 1701: 1)

“…Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line” (Security Council Resolution 1701: Paragraph 4)

“*Welcoming* the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from the UNIFIL as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties…” (Security Council Resolution 1701: 1-2)
Next to the above discussed distinct core issues further unclear matters were addressed in the Resolution. Those meanings could be described as ambiguous. Paragraph eight seems to be the most ambiguous paragraph out of all of them.

“… there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon…” (Security Council Resolution 1701: Paragraph 8)
This refers distinctively to Hezbollah without explicitly calling upon the organizations name.

“…that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;” (Security Council Resolution 1701: Paragraph 8).
The disarmament of all armed groups and the authority other than that of the Lebanese State refers again to Hezbollah without mentioning its actual name.

The Resolution mentions the respect “…for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders…” (Security Council Resolution 1701: Paragraph 5)
This is a reference to the Israeli air violations and the sea and land incursions. It might refer as well to the Syrian and Iranian interference in Lebanon.

The final paragraph of the resolution 170, paragraph 18, 1 is marked by its vagueness as the resolution “...Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,…” but no time schedule was attached to it.

7.2 Siniora's Seven-Point-Plan

On 26 July 2006 Prime Minister Siniora introduced his Seven-Point-Plan in order to stop the war between Hezbollah and Israel. (Lebanon under siege 2006) The plan was backed by the Hezbollah (Kais 2006) Syria, EU (EJP 2006) and most of the members of the Arab League. (UNIFIL homepage)
The plan calls for “An immediate and comprehensive cease-fire and a declaration of agreement on the following issues:

1. An undertaking to release the Lebanese and Israeli prisoners and detainees through the ICRC.
2. The withdrawal of the Israeli army behind the Blue Line, and the return of the displaced to their villages.
3. A commitment from the Security Council to place the Shabaa Farms area and the Kfarshouba Hills under UN jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully settled. While in UN custody, the area will be accessible to Lebanese property owners there. Further, Israel surrenders all remaining landmine maps in South Lebanon to the UN.
4. The Lebanese government extends its authority over its territory through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons or authority other than that of the Lebanese state as stipulated in the Taef national reconciliation document.
5. The UN international force, operating in South Lebanon, is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, as needed, in order to undertake urgent humanitarian and relief work and guarantee stability and security in the south so that those who fled their homes can return.
6. The UN, in cooperation with the relevant parties, undertakes the necessary measures to once again put into effect the Armistice Agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel in 1949, and to insure adherence to the provisions of that agreement, as well as to explore possible amendments to or development of said provisions, as necessary.
7. The international community commits to support Lebanon on all levels, and to assist it in facing the tremendous burden resulting from the human, social and economic tragedy which has afflicted the country, especially in the areas of relief, reconstruction and rebuilding of the national economy” (Lebanonwire 2006)

The final UN Resolution 1701 is based on Prime Minister Siniora’s Seven-Point-Plan. The first UN draft had been worked out between France and the United States. Though, the Arab League refused to sign such a draft because of the United States favouring Israel’s position, more and more nations of the 15 members of the Security Council began signing Siniora’s plan. The first draft contained a clause that would allow Israel to launch strikes in case of another
Hezbollah attack. The United States tried to push the draft through but the majority of the Security Council members denied such an access to resolve conflicts. Furthermore the United States wanted to call for only a “full” cessation of hostilities instead of an “immediate” cessation of hostilities. France and other members stood up for an immediate halt on violence without any conditions. Since the Lebanese Government wanted a UN backed truce, Saad Hariri, the parliamentary majority leader and son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Hariri, went to see President Putin to discuss this delicate situation. In the end United States vision on how to end the war was out voted by the rest of its Security Council members.

The United States got its way though, as it insisted on an enlarged international force that would monitor the border verses France’s initial plan that the existing UNIFIL mission and the LAF should patrol the border. The Israeli army stayed in south Lebanon until the international forces were deployed. (Landis 2006)

Siniora attacked Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki as he was “going over the limit” by criticizing his plan to end the war. It would not be Mottaki’s right to officially state that there was no need to discuss anything further than a truce. Iran’s influence on Lebanon needs to be limited. (Landis 2006)

A meeting between Spain’s foreign minister Miguel Angel Moratinos and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Marotinos noted that Syria is backing Fuad Sinira’s Seven-Point-Plan. Syria understands that no conflict in the Middle East can be settled by war. A political package needs to be designed to resolve problems. At the same time, he warns that “Syria will exercise its influence on Hezbollah if circumstances change in Lebanon.”

“The Syrians are going to exercise all their influence on Hezbollah, but the circumstances and political and military context of Lebanon must change,” Moratino says after a press conference.

Spain’s involvement reflects the EU’s deep commitment to end this war and to find a suitable solution on how to deal with further peace process activities. Moratino’s meeting was a sign that the EU is trying to reach out to Hezbollah’s main backers Iran and Syria in order to negotiate. (EJP 2006)
7.3 Results

Israel pulled out of South Lebanon as the troops of UNIFIL and LAF moved down south. The complete pullout would begin as soon as 5 000 UNIFIL troops were deployed. On October 1st 2006 IDF troops moved back across the Blue line.

On September 6, 2006 Israel ended its comprehensive blockade on Lebanon. This included a naval presence in Lebanese waters, the no-allowance on flights from and to Beirut International Airport and air strikes against any movement at the Lebanon-Syrian border. The blockade should prevent Hezbollah’s rearming from abroad. European naval vessels and 8000 Lebanese troops along the border with Syria replaced Israel’s blockade. New technology sponsored by European nations will support the monitoring at the border crossing and the Beirut airport. (ICG 2006: 2-3)

7.4 The different views

7.4.1 The United Nations view on the Resolution

UN officers in the field were lightened by the adoption of Resolution 1701 as it was based on a robust mandate in comparison to former UN Resolutions. The deployment of a 15 000 man UN force and an arms embargo would definitely help matters. The Resolution was not only accepted by its involved parties but also by its influential outsiders like Iran, Syria and the Arab League. (ICG 2006: 11)

One of the unclear questions is what should happen with the arms of Hezbollah. The United Nations put that matter on the agenda of the Lebanese government. With the strengthening of the Lebanon’s state authority throughout the country the disarmament process should be possible one day. A disarmament too early would heighten the chance of civil war. UNIFIL should enforce arms embargos in an assisting position to the national government. The former commander of UNIFIL, Alain Pellegrini, stated that the mandate includes detecting illegal weapons and any hostile actions. Their job is not to go after potential Hezbollah fighters and disarm them. If there are hints that illegal weapons are expected at a specific location they would pass this information on to the LAF. They have to respond to it
and if LAF needs assistance they can come to UNIFIL. If nothing is undertaken from LAF’s side UNIFIL can take the necessary steps, such as informing the national government, reporting the incident to the United Nations headquarters or in extreme cases UNIFIL going out and finding the weapons themselves.

Paragraph eight of the Resolution 1701 calls for the disarmament of any armed groups but it does not indicate that it has to be done immediately, nor who is in charge of it.

A senior UN official of UNIFIL II predicted that big problems will occur if the International Community does not resolve this issue of Hezbollah or, better stated, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel is very much upset that Hezbollah is still armed and Hezbollah, on the other side, tries to provoke another dispute. They are looking to test the UN on how far they can go. (ICG 2006: 12) Troops cannot replace a political solution. If nothing is changed, another boundary dispute is bound to break out.

Kofi Annan believes that the disarmament of Hezbollah has to be achieved through negotiations. It needs, as well, an internal Lebanese consensus. UNIFIL cannot be responsible for this process nor can it be a substitute for that. (ICG 2006:12) Furthermore, he stated that he was deeply disappointed that it took the Security Council so long to find a way to stop the hostilities on both sides. For weeks he called for an immediate cessation of the hostilities as war destroys human and capital resources. “All members of this Council must be aware that this inability to act sooner has badly shaken the world's faith in its authority and integrity” (UNIFIL homepage: background)

The text of the Resolution, mainly negotiated between the US and France, was introduced on August 5th but it met with denial by the Arab leaders as it was in favour of Israel and would not meet Lebanon’s concerns.

Therefore, a senior official of the Arab League flew to New York to have a face-to-face meeting with the Secretary General. The modified version found enthusiasm from the Secretary General. The Arab backed deal was presented to the Council and finally went through on August 11th. The Resolution now calls for a prisoners exchange between Hezbollah and Israel, and the Lebanese government seeks a broad ceasefire backed by the UN.
By visiting the troubling areas of Israel, Lebanon, Syria, the occupied Palestinian Territory and further surrounding countries in the Middle East, Secretary General Annan wanted to point out the importance of the implementation of Resolution 1701. He further encouraged security, peace and stability across the Middle East. This conflict should be seen as a chance to work on an enduring Peace in the Middle East. Within the 30 days as defined in the resolution, the General Secretary reported twice to the Security Council. Once on the 18th of August and the second time on September 12. He stated that he is delighted about the progress made in the aftermath of the conflict. The IDF is pulling back across the blue Line and the LAF is starting to become settled in the South with assistance of UNIFIL. No further violent hostilities have been noted except on August 19th as the IDF carried out a raid in eastern Lebanon. Although the General Secretary appreciates the efforts made in the aftermath, he calls for conflict solutions in the entire region, focusing on the unresolved Palestinian-Israel conflict. If all conflicts are not settled, the entire region will be destabilised and may end in a regional war. The fighting in this 33 day war caused the death of five United Nations staff members and left 16 people injured. (UNIFIL homepage)

7.4.2 The Lebanese Government's view on the Resolution

Initially the Lebanese government stood behind the Resolution 1701. Only for some members, the Resolution did not go far enough. A long-lasting solution on the matter in the South of the country was set. Important questions and issues such as landmine maps, policing the border, prisoners exchange and the status of Shebaa farms were addressed. Everyone was positively surprised by the successful deployment of the LAF in South Lebanon. The large presence of the troops created an atmosphere of security and control. Everyone was satisfied with the role of the LAF. They have to defend the country against any outside aggression, especially from Israel, they should guarantee state sovereignty, security and stability throughout the country and they should remove any enemies. The collaboration between the LAF and UNIFIL works without problems, although an international troop force at the border of Syria would have not been accepted. A civil war between the pro and the anti-Syrian powers in Lebanon could break out, if this was to occur.
The disarmament of Hezbollah fighters is not a military problem, but rather political. Shiites are very proud of their land, which they have defended against Israel’s various occupations. They used to be very poor and if they were attacked they fought back. International pressure on the disarmament of Hezbollah would not be tolerated and it would only worsen the situation. (ICG 2006: 7).

Hezbollah’s defeaters claim that the majority of Lebanese civilians do not feel victory. For them, a major catastrophe happened that left their country in pure chaos. Therefore Hezbollah’s weapons are seen as a very important issue as it endangers the countries security. A political solution is needed over a violent disarmament.

Hezbollah’s supporters say that they have done what the government could not do. They stood up against Israel and defended the country. They showed that Israel cannot win wars in this way and therefore Israel will not try it again. That is the reason why the question of Hezbollah’s weapon stays alive.

Prime Minister Siniora does not want to provoke either Hezbollah or Syria. The country should rebuild; the LAF has to be strengthened to show that they can also defend the country against any outside aggression. In this way Siniora wants to undermine Hezbollah’s argument that they need weapons to protect the country against Israel’s aggression. (ICG 2006: 6-8)

7.4.3 Israel's view on the Resolution

Only few officials believe that Israel won the war. The official mission of getting the two abducted soldiers back and to disarm the Hezbollah was not accomplished. With massive air strikes and killings of about seven Hundred Hezbollah combatants the IDF made sure that the Hezbollah would not want another such war occurring. All together it was a big setback for Israel. The Capacity of the Hezbollah army had been completely underestimated. Some officials do believe in Israel’s victory, as the South is now dominated by the LAF and no any longer by the Hezbollah.

The new Resolution reiterates Hezbollah’s disarmament and insists on an arms embargo. Other particularly ambitious goals of the UN Resolution will not be accomplished soon, but as long as the Hezbollah does not regain strategic weapons and access to the border, Israel is
satisfied. Nobody is able to prevent the rearming of light weapons. They can be smuggled in from anywhere.

Another concerning matter is the Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon. It is often argued that the Hezbollah is part of the Iranian Army, trained and structured by the Revolutionary Guards. The Iranian involvement is tremendous. It reaches from commanding and controlling Hezbollah’s operations to general guidance.

The smuggling of explosives across the border from Syria is another main concern of Israel. Israel hopes that the UN Resolution will address these matters as well as they are vital in keeping the Hezbollah movement weak. Israel expects the UN to expand UNFIL II’s mandate as close as possible to Chapter VII. If the UN is not following up on this it could end in another round of violence. (ICG 2006: 4-6)

7.4.4 Hezbollah’s view on the Resolution

The Hezbollah sees itself as the winner of the war. They were able to defeat their enemies’ attack. It was they who stood up against the aggressions from outside, not the Lebanese government. Hassan Nasrallah publicly declared the victory of the God’s army on September 23, 2006 in Beirut. He said that the newly arising, strong Lebanese state needs a resistance movement and its own weapons.

Nasrallah welcomes the UNFIL expanded mission as long as it is doing its job and not spying on Hezbollah or attempting to disarm the resistance movement. He defends Hezbollah’s war as the Lebanese army was not there when Lebanon’s sovereignty was attacked. When the Lebanese government did not execute their duties, Hezbollah took over and defended the country.

The Hezbollah respects the Resolution since the United Nation can finally report and respond to Israel’s constant violations, to which the Hezbollah had so far never reacted. Air violations, kidnapping Lebanese citizens, firing at fishing boats and the continued military presence on Lebanese soil were some of the complaints on Hezbollah’s list.

Furthermore, the Resolution is based on Siniora’s Seven-Point-Plan and therefore, in the interest of the Lebanese country.

Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government. At the time of the war, two Hezbollah followers were in cabinet posts and all decisions made during that time were unanimous. The
disarmament is an internal political matter and should be resolved within this framework. It has nothing to do with the International Community. Hezbollah sees the strengthening of the LAF officially as positive because then there is no more need for resistance. What they do not want is an army that counters the resistance.

The Hezbollah would prefer a change in policy, since they would like to be both present in the south but at the same time hidden. An agreement with the LAF was reached. As long as Hezbollah fighters are seen without weapons in their hands the LAF will not go after them. UNIFIL is only assisting the LAF. This was a major victory for Hezbollah, in order to prevent the disarmament process.

Hezbollah claims that it wants to have more involvement in the government. Decisions should be able to be blocked so that more discussions can emerge. (ICG 2006: 8-11)
8. International law aspects of the war\(^1\)

Lebanon and Israel are international legal personalities in this conflict. For that reason, they have to live up to their duties and rights that come along with this status. The Hezbollah as a non-state organisation does not meet the requirements of an international legal personality and in this sense the state of Lebanon is responsible for their actions. Lebanon as a country has to stop attacks from its territory on other countries. If the country is not in the position or is unwilling to do so, then the attacked country- in our case Israel- is allowed to treat Lebanon as the attacking country instead of Hezbollah, as Hezbollah does not have the position of international legal personality.

What does not change for Hezbollah is that it still needs to observe the international humanitarian law. (Ipsen 2006)

Israel does have the right to self-defence, but only in order to stop the ongoing attacks from Hezbollah. In this context the return strike needs to be under the restriction of commensurability. Israel violated the principal of commensurability while exercising its right of self defence. It caused the death of four UN employees. (Ipsen 2006)

Since Israel and Lebanon are attacking each other with force of arms, the law of war needs to be observed. Both parties are member of the Hague Convention. The Convention states that it is illegal to target civilians in times of war. Only military objects are allowed to be hit. Moreover, the Convention requires that the uses of weapons which lead to unnecessary suffering of civilians are prohibited. Cluster bombs as well as phosphorus bombs fall into this category, although always proclaimed differently by Israel. Undefended towns, cities and buildings are not allowed to be targeted at all. Israel’s extensive bombardments right from the beginning of the war makes it clear that Israel did not always regard the law of war. (Ipsen 2006)

The same time, it needs to be said that not only Israel violated the international law. Lebanon hosts an organisation that wants to eliminate a whole country, with its citizens. The Hezbollah led an asymmetric warfare against Israel. The international law is not made for such a type of warfare. Therefore the international law could only be applied indirectly between Israel and Lebanon instead of directly to Hezbollah. (Ipsen 2006)

\(^1\) http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libanonkrieg_2006#V.C3.B6lkerrechtliche_Aspekte
Israel asserted that it responded to the action of the sovereign state of Lebanon and not only to the actions of Hezbollah. If the LAF were to fight the IDF, the Geneva Convention to which both parties are obliged would fall in place. “Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 sets forth minimum standards for all parties to a conflict between a state party such as Israel and a non-state party such as Hezbollah.” (HRW 2006b)

In case of war, the Geneva Convention needs to be observed. This means that launched attacks need to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Only military goals may be targeted, and even then -as already mentioned- it must be under restriction of commensurability. (Bohte 2006)

According to Professor Bothe if military personnel are trained to distinguish between a building which is home to civilians and a building which houses a missile station, then there should be no problem in distinguishing them. With the right technology such distinctions can be drawn easily.

The only question is: what if a missile station is in a civilian housing area? Just because it is in such an area, it does not mean that this military goal is not allowed to be targeted. Here the notorious principle of commensurability comes into place. Just because there is a risk of civilians getting hurt if such a military goal is targeted, this does not mean that it is prohibited.

What needs to be considered is that the military profit may not be disproportionate to the civilian damage.

This principle of commensurability contains a contradiction in terms. It is impossible to say how many civilians are allowed to be killed in order to achieve military goals. It is also a question of humanity. (Bohte 2006)

Israel came under criticism because it destroyed so much civilian infrastructure and accepted the high number of Lebanese civilian deaths. With this action, Israel disregarded the principle of commensurability. Not only did Israel violate the international law, Hezbollah did as well. This will be further discussed a little later.

In the case of Lebanon, Hezbollah is known to have placed rockets in civilian housing areas. This does not justify declaring the entire area as a military goal. Furthermore, it needs to be said that Israel targeted houses which were not military goals, as only children were hiding inside, for example. It would have been different if military goals were attacked where
unfortunately civilians died. At the same time, Hezbollah violated the international law as it used civilians as a human shield. (Bohte 2006)
But it is not only Hezbollah that places its military facilities in populated areas, so does Israel. The IDF has, throughout the North of Israel, military bases which are in the vicinity of civilian housings. The IDF’s northern command headquarters’ is located in the city of Safed. In Haifa, the Israeli navy has a training base next to a major hospital and homes. (HRW summary 2007: 16)

Israel defended its reaction of starting a war and refers to its self-defence right according to the United Nations Charta, Article 51:

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” (UN Charta)

8.1 War crimes

Hezbollah constantly claimed that its rockets only hit military goals, and in case they did hit civilians, this is justified by Israel’s indiscriminate attacks in the South of Lebanon. At this point it is important to state that criticizing the other party of violating international humanitarian law does not excuse the violations of one’s own party. Unfortunately, this is what happened in this case.
Both the Hezbollah and Israel were accusing each other of violating international humanitarian law but nobody felt responsible enough for the numerous deaths the attacks caused to stop targeting civilian goals. (HRW summary 2007: 3-4)
8.1.1 Possible war crimes committed by Israel

Israel is guilty of committing war crimes due to the disproportional amount of civilians who died in the war.

Human Right Watch accuses Israel that numerous of its IDF attacks were indiscriminate in Lebanon. Attacks took place when there was no evidence that Hezbollah fighters or equipment like weapons were in close vicinity. Israel tried to justify its action by repeatedly stating that Hezbollah was hiding its weapons and rockets in villages and towns. As already discussed further up, this is no legitimate reason to attack civilian infrastructure. (HRW summary 2007: 6)

Israel, as opposed to Hezbollah, often did warn civilians to evacuate certain areas. At the same time, if people did not leave these warned areas –for example because they were too old, sick, wounded the taxi fees too high or because of other reasons - they were still treated as combatants as they had remained. Other times, Israel targeted civilians because Israel was convinced that they were in military or political cooperation with Hezbollah, although no evidence was ever found. (HRW summary 2007: 6)

Also, civilians often did not flee as the roads were under Israeli attack. Israel justified its air strikes on roads by saying it wanted to avoid the moving of arms and wanted to block Hezbollah’s transport routes. Israel also fired at civilian vehicles although they were flying white flags. Human Right Watch examined numerous of such cases and came to the conclusion that such attacks did not result in the destruction of Hezbollah weapons. It only wounded and killed civilians who tried to flee from areas where the IDF gave instruction to evacuate. (HRW 2006a)

In my eyes, Israel committed war crimes by attacking areas which they had first told to evacuate. The remaining people were treated as combatants and whole areas were bombed where no further distinction between combatants and remaining civilians was undertaken. These indiscriminate attacks violated international humanitarian law.

Furthermore, the IDF hit humanitarian aid vehicles. One was hit on July 18, a convoy of the Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates which carried medicines, vegetable oil, sugar and rice. The vehicle was destroyed, the driver was killed.
Two clearly marked Red Cross ambulances came under fire on July 23 in Qana. (HRW 2006b)

Israel limited information about certain aspects of the war, referring to national security concerns. Full information was not provided on where the Hezbollah rockets had struck. Soldiers reported that they were prevented from publicizing accurate positions of Hezbollah rockets. (HRW summary 2007: 16-17)

The inhabitants of the city Haifa in the North of Israel had 60 seconds time to flee to their bunkers. That’s approximately how long it took Katjuscha-rockets to get from South Lebanon to Haifa. This early warning system saved a lot of human lives. In the cities close to the Lebanon border, the siren cried about five to ten times a day. Approximately, 3800 rockets landed on Israeli soil. Alone 400 rockets were launched onto the city of Kiriat Schmona. The city is directly at border to Lebanon, and was therefore under constant fire. (Schäubl/Flug 2008)

8.1.2 Possible war crimes committed by Hezbollah

Hezbollah launched thousands of rockets on Israeli soil, which caused the death of civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. Hezbollah states that approximately 8 000 rockets hit Israel during the entire conflict. Israel on the other hand state that 3917 rocket attacks were counted. 23 percent of them hit populated areas. (HRW summary 2007: 10)

“Hezbollah’s means of attack relied on unguided weapons that had no capacity to hit military targets with any precision. It repeatedly bombarded cities, towns, and villages without any apparent effort to distinguish between civilians and military objectives.” (HRW summary 2007: 3)

Human Right Watch is accusing Hezbollah of violating international humanitarian law, as its rockets killed people in homes, on the streets, in villages and cities. Hospitals in Safed, Mazra and Nahariya were damaged as well as an elementary school in Kiryat Yam and a post office in Haifa. Hezbollah should have foreseen such consequences when launching the rockets. Therefore it must be concluded that some of these targets were intended.

While Israeli authorities also acknowledged that Hezbollah did target-military goals, Hezbollah’s rockets kept hitting populated areas in Israel where no military target was in close vicinity. Therefore numerous attacks seem to be deliberate.
In other cases, there were military objectives in the near vicinity but Hezbollah’s imprecise rocket technology could not distinguish between military and civilian goals. (HRW summary 2007: 3-6)

While the conflict was going on, Hezbollah did confirm that it was targeting civilians and tried to justify it with following reasons:

- The Hezbollah said it saw no other way but to target Israeli civilians in order to stop the excessive Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians.
- With the civilian attacks, the Hezbollah tried to force Israel into ground offensive in Lebanon which would have given Hezbollah certain fighting advantages as it lacked the capacity of the Israeli air strikes.

Neither reason justifies Hezbollah’s actions, as the international humanitarian law only allows the attack of military goals. Civilians have to remain immune from attacks under the laws of war.

- Hezbollah announced that another reason that its rocket attacks on towns and villages in Northern Israel were not violating international law was that most Israeli civilians had fled to other parts of the country or into their bunkers. Therefore the unguided Hezbollah rockets should not be considered indiscriminate as only few people were at risk. (HRW summary 2007: 6-8)

This argument is also used from Israel’s side and brings along problems with it. It is correct that people fled in both countries to more secure areas. However, the villages were not completely empty as official evacuation was not always ordered. People had to stay in their homes due to various reasons.

The international humanitarian law simply prohibits parties from treating areas as free-fire zones. The involved parties in the conflict have to count on the fact that there will be remaining civilians. Why and for what reason they stay does not matter. Indiscriminate attacks and targeting civilians violates, no matter what the reason, international humanitarian law. (HRW summary 2007: 6-8)

Human Right Watch also criticizes Hezbollah’s warnings of attacking further Israeli towns in the close future. This sort of warning is not effective as it is not specific enough in time and place. “An ostensible warning that is too vague or inaccurate to actually help protect civilians,
but is primarily intended to generate broader panic and fear, would be unlawful, even if the
attack is never carried out.” (HRW summary 2007: 8)

The Lebanese government never announced that it would undertake an investigation on
Hezbollah’s attacks and whether they had violated international humanitarian law. (HRW
summary 2007: 14)

8.1.3 Cluster bombs

In October 2006, Hezbollah confirmed that cluster bombs were fired into civilian areas. The
Chinese-made Type-81 122mm rocket was used for the first time worldwide in a conflict.
According to Human Right Watch two of such cluster shells hit the Galilee village of Mghar

Human Rights Watch’s Arms Division chief Steve Goose said that it is sad to see that cluster
munitions were used in civilian-populated areas, as cluster bombs are unreliable and
inaccurate and therefore their use is not justified.

Moreover, a lot of countries are turning away from these weapons due to their major impact
on civilians. Only Sudan and the United Arab Emirates stockpile them. (HRW 2006)

Israel used by far many more of these inhumane bombs than Hezbollah did. The United
Nations estimated that about four million cluster shells hit Lebanon. One million
submunitions never exploded and are still threatening human lives. In addition, these
unexploded shells keep the country from recovering economically from the war. (HRW 2006)

Cluster bombs are dangerous in two ways: Submunitions become widespread over a broad
area, which causes a lot of damage when fired into a populated area. Secondly, the
unexploded shells are in the end landmines which need to be detected in order to not harm
human life. (HRW 2006)

Israeli police said that 113 cluster rockets were reportedly hit Israel. It caused the injury of 12
and the death of 1. 113 cluster bombs would contain 4407 individual submunitions. This
example should show how dangerous such cluster bombs are as they carry so much individual
submunitions in themselves. Israel did admit how many of these submunitions they were able
to detect. Hezbollah violated International law as it used inaccurate cluster munitions models in populated areas. (HRW 2006)

Furthermore, Israel fired artillery-fired cluster bombs into populated areas which resulted in the deaths of civilians. On July 19, such an attack killed in the town of Blida a sixty year old woman, wounded twelve civilians, among them seven children. Such cluster bombs attacks which take place in populated areas violate international humanitarian law. (HRW 2006b)

Israel used the United States produced M483A1 shells which deliver 88 submunitions per shell. The failure rate is very high with 14 percent. This high failure rate also leads to deaths when the battle is over as the area is basically equal to a mine field. Such inaccurate cluster bombs cannot be used in populated areas as it brings along with it the loss of many civilian lives. (HRW 2006d)

According to the United Nations, almost 90 percent of the cluster munitions were fired in the last 72 hours of war into South Lebanon. The majority was delivered by artillery or ground rockets, only a few by air. The UNMACC destroyed, with its contractors the UNIFIL and the LAF, 58 000 submunitions by November 2006. Approximately three people are killed by these unexploded submunitions a day. As already mentioned the undetected submunitions not only harm people’s lives, they also keep residents from returning and threaten humanitarian workers and peacekeepers. Farmers still have a difficult time to cultivate their land. (HRW 2006e)

Israel used a lot of cluster munitions which resulted in the death of 24 people and over 100 injured people a year later in 2007 according to the UNMACC. (HRW summary 2007: 6)

8.1.4 Phosphorus bombs

Israel officially acknowledged that phosphorus bombs were used in the Lebanon war of 2006. Lebanon’s president Lahoud claimed that phosphorus bombs were used against Lebanese civilians, but Israel initially denied this. The announcement, made in October 2006, disproves Israel’s initial reaction of claiming that phosphorus bombs were only used to mark Hezbollah targets and territory.

Jacob Edery, a Minister who is in charge of the government-Knesset relations, defended Israel’s action and also pointed out at the same time that the phosphorus bombs were used
according to the rules of international law which does not generally forbid the use of phosphorus. (Rappaport 2006)

During the war, the Media kept reporting that Lebanese civilians were being brought to hospitals with typical symptoms which occur if you are in contact with phosphorus. Phosphorus causes serious and very painful burns. Doctors in hospitals claimed that they had numerous patients with phosphorus related injuries, like intensive body burns. (Rappaport 2006)

Experts as well as the International Red Cross believe that phosphorus bombs should be entirely banned due to the severity of injuries the substance causes. It should be characterized as a Chemical Weapon which would make it illegal. The third protocol of the Geneva Convention on Conventional Weapons states that the use of “incendiary weapons” is restricted. Phosphorus falls in this category. The only problem is that Israel and the United States have not signed the third protocol. Israel keeps saying that the use of phosphorus is not illegal in itself. (Rappaport 2006)

8.1.5 The Bombing of Qana

On July 30, the IDF killed 28 civilians in Qana. (HRW 2006c) Among these 28 people who died 16 were children. (BBC 2006)

The incident only happened because since July 12, Hezbollah had launched approximately 150 rockets from Qana to northern Israel. The IDF stated that it only tried to stop these attacks with the bombing of this three story building.

In order to justify its drastic action, the IDF said that it only attacked the building because it was believed that no civilians were left, and that the building was being used as a hiding spot for Hezbollah. Eyewitnesses report that at the time of the attack no Hezbollah fighters were in the building nor in the vicinity. Additionally, Human Rights Watch researchers who visited the town of Qana a day later reported that no evidence of destroyed military equipment was found in this area. No retrieved bodies could be identified as Hezbollah fighters. The IDF further failed in explaining why it assumed that Hezbollah fighters should be in this building rather than civilians. Israel also tried to justify the bombing by saying that the residents of
Qana were warned and asked to leave. In this sense, it would have been their own fault that they had remained.

Israel did not put in consideration that some residents were simply not in the position to leave, as they were sick and wounded. As Roth executive director of Human Right Watch said “the warnings are not an excuse to shoot blindly at anyone who remains.” (HRW 2006c)

Lt Gen Dan Halutz, who is chief of the staff later on, states that they are sorry for the incident and if they had known that civilians were in the building the attack would not have been carried out. After an inquiry into the attack, the Israeli military said that militants lived in the building and that Hezbollah used civilians as human shields. (BBC 2006)

Israel halted further attacks for 48 hours and gave the residents in South Lebanon the possibility to flee their homes so that no more unintentional accidents could happen. Everyone who wanted to leave South Lebanon had enough time to do so. This is why these 48 hours were arranged. The halt of hostilities was also used to investigate the incident. (CNN 2006)

The international community strongly condemned the attack. (BBC 2006) Secretary of State Condolezza Rice said that she regretted the deaths of Qana and returned to the US in order to push for a cease-fire.

Prime Minster Siniora cancelled talks with Rice, as he said that there was no time for anything but an immediate cease-fire and an international investigation into the Israeli massacre. (CNN 2006)

The Security Council released a statement in which they deplored the loss of lives in the Qana attack. The statement further said that the attack was a shock and distress but it did not call for an immediate cease-fire, for which Secretary-General Kofi Annan earlier had already appealed. (BBC News 2006a)

After the incident took place early Sunday morning, protesters gathered in front of the United Nations building in Beirut with Anti-Israel and Anti-American slogans. “Demonstrators attacked the building, ransacked offices and burnt UN and American flags, in anger at the UN's failure to prevent Israel's attacks.” (BBC News 2006a)

In 1996, Israel had already bombed a UN building in Qana which led to the deaths of approximately 100 people. Israel’s “Grapes of Wrath” offensive was already aimed at that
time for Hezbollah’s demolition. For Lebanese people, the Qana bombing still holds bitter memories. (BBC News 2006a)

9. Outcome of the war

In my point of view, Hezbollah emerged as the winner of the conflict. The organization is the winner because they could prevent an Israeli victory. Approximately 3 000 Hezbollah fighters took the Israeli force of 30 000 soldiers. Hezbollah had to give up its full control in the South to the Lebanese Army and to the UNIFIL. However, in the Arabic World the Hezbollah was still seen as the winner of the conflict. (Wunder 2007:81)

Furthermore, it needs to be said that both parties agreed on the ceasefire, which means that both parties had undergone a lot of pressure.

9.1 The winner: Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s biggest success lies in perception. As already mentioned, the organization is celebrated as the big winner of the conflict. This goes back to 1967, when Arabic Governments were defeated after only seven days by the Israeli army. The Hezbollah, on the other hand, was able to fight Israel for over a month without being officially defeated. They even emerged as the so-called winner due to the long resistance they were able to put up. Further successes for Hezbollah were Israel’s unrealistic war goals. Hezbollah was not smashed nor were the captured soldiers released.

Israel's strategy was to emphasize on air strikes to destroy Hezbollah’s armoury; that strategy went wrong. Only 1500 rockets could be destroyed out of the approximately 15 000 total. Throughout the entire battle, Hezbollah was able to keep launching rockets.

Israel expected that the UN Resolution would make it clear that the Hezbollah would be disarmed. However, if Israel expected to influence the Lebanese people by its strategic military action, it failed. On the contrary, during the war the support for Hezbollah rose.
The war unveiled the fact that the Hezbollah was in the position to harm public life in Israel. The rocket attacks on Israel soil made it inevitable that 500 000 had to flee their homes. Approximately 12 000 homes were destroyed. It is believed that approximately one Million Israelis spent the day in shelters in order to prevent further deaths. Some cities were completely evacuated. Israel’s government was criticized because it was not able to protect its own people. This bad publicity had positive effects on the perception of Hezbollah as a winner. The national pressure on Hezbollah to disarm began to sink. The Hezbollah has used the raising Lebanese support to extend its power in Lebanon. (Wunder 2007: 81-82)

9.2 The winner: Israel

Although Hezbollah is celebrated as the big winner, Israel did achieve some political and strategic successes, although it could not minimize the number of rockets launched onto their soil, nor could it free its captured soldiers. In fact, Israel could not fulfil any war goals.

With little input, Israel destroyed one fourth of Hezbollah’s abilities. It is uncertain how many Hezbollah fighters were killed, but Hezbollah claims only 250 men were killed, while Israel believes that the number was between 400 and 800 fighters. Eighty percent of the men killed were stationed at the Israeli-Lebanese border. For Israel, this was a major victory in this war. We do have to put in consideration that due to the high support of Hezbollah, new fighters could be recruited easily. However, 90 percent of the long distance rockets could be destroyed, and it would be very difficult for the Hezbollah to replace them as the production and import is very difficult. This should have been a warning to the Lebanese people. The undisputed biggest success for Israel was that the Hezbollah is no longer in full control over South Lebanon. The deployment of the expanded UNIFIL mission and of the Lebanese army in the South weakened Hezbollah’s influence in their main region. (Wunder 2007: 83-84)
10. Consequences

10.1 Consequences for Lebanon

10.1.1 Social Consequences

During the war 900 000 civilians were evacuated, nearly a quarter of the entire Lebanese population. Almost the entire region of South Lebanon was emptied. Additionally, Israel claims that it killed about 500 Hezbollah combatants, although this number is believed to be overrated. Approximately 200 Hezbollah combatants as well as 28 Lebanese soldiers were killed. The war took the lives of 1109 Lebanese civilians. (Norton 2007: 142). However, this number various a lots and depends on the source. The well respected Lebanese newspaper Daily Star states that 1287 Lebanese lost their lives. 1140 civilians and 43 army and police troops were killed. Hezbollah announced the death of 74 combatants while Israel admits the death of 117 of their own soldiers. (Daily Star 2006).

It is difficult to say how many casualties the war brought, as no involved party wants to admit to the actual amount of lost lives. The true number could increase or decrease popularity, reputation and credibility.

Altogether, Israel destroyed approximately 30 000 homes in Lebanon. (Schäubl/Flug 2008)

In order to rebuild the country, Lebanon may be forced to cut down on social services because of the lower income taxes. (Wunder 2007: 84) This would favour the Hezbollah, as it already supports the country with a good amount of social services. People would receive further social services through the Hezbollah instead of the government, which would increase Hezbollah’s popularity rate.

The situation two years after the end of the war is still not stable in Lebanon. From the former conflict parties there are rumours about new attacks, war warnings and war scenarios. Experts even predict another civil war in Lebanon due to the unstable political situation in the country.
10.1.2 Environmental Consequences

On July 13 and July 15 Israel’s air force attacked a power station close to Beirut. As a Result up to 35 000 tons of fuel oil ran into the Mediterranean Sea. Out of the 225 kilometres long sea coast of Lebanon only 80 kilometres was spared of the oil. A huge black oil slick lay in front of the Lebanese coast. For Lebanon, this incident is rated as the worst environmental catastrophe in the history of the country. Such oil slicks have big effects on the environment, the vegetation and life in the sea. The damage is rated at 50 million US Dollars. (Spiegel Online 2006) Ongoing fighting and Israel’s sea and air blockade led to delayed relief actions. (Wollschläger 2006)

10.1.3 Economical consequences

Lebanon calculates the war damages at 3, 5 billion Dollars. (Amnesty 2006) Since the country is not fully stabilized, it has also had a major impact on foreign investments in Lebanon. (Wunder 2007: 84) Foreign investors do not want to invest where the political situation is not completely settled. Too many speculations and doubts keep investors from putting their money into the country, because if another dispute breaks out, all of their investments would be gone. The risk is simply too high.

All over the South of Lebanon there remain Israeli submunitions. The farmers cannot use their land for agriculture, and 25 percent of all the land is unusable. The fishing industry was also hurt because of the oil spill which happened when Israel destroyed power plants. According to the FAO the agricultural sector lost 232 Million USD. (Wunder 2007: 84)

The tourism sector also experienced a major setback. Approximately 2 Billion Dollars in income was lost due to the war in 2006. In the near future, the tourism industry will continue to suffer from the war, as tourists will take into consideration whether it is better to visit Lebanon or a safer place where another boundary dispute is less likely. (Norton 2007: 152)

For Lebanon, the tourism industry is very important, as Lebanon survives off of its service sector. Three years after the Iraqi war of 2003, the tourism sector started to recover again in many Arab states, as well as in Lebanon. In 2005, approximately 900 000 tourists visited Lebanon. After the assassination of Rafiq Harriri, tourism decreased slightly, but for 2006 20
percent more tourists were expected due to easier visa regulations. By 2010 Lebanon will try to attract 2 million tourists a year. (Harms 2006)

10.2 Consequences for Israel

In these 33 days of fighting, half the population of northern Israel was displaced. (Norton 2007: 142)

Israel had to take the loss of 150 people; the majority of them were soldiers. The damage is calculated at 1.8 Billion Dollars, all caused by the destruction done by Hezbollah rockets. (Amnesty 2006)

Kiryat Shmona was the city which was hit the worst. Approximately 2000 buildings were destroyed or damaged.

Almost no impact was felt by the Israeli economy during the 33 day conflict. The economy still rose by about 4.5 percent. Only the tourism sector was damaged, which was not that serious as it only makes up 2 percent of the gross national product.

The production industry also suffered from the war, while the budget deficit rose from 0.6% to 2%. Shopping centres and restaurants were closed while tourism stopped, and although there were high temperatures the beaches were empty. (Wunder 2007:87)

In 2005, 2 million tourists visited Israel. Israel had an ambitious plan of redoubling this number by 2011. (Harms 2006) It is doubtful whether this will still be possible.

Israel experienced the heaviest forest fires in history during the war. The Hezbollah rockets destroyed approximately 750,000 trees. The entire forest fire damages added up to 12 Million USD. (Wunder 2007:87) Altogether 700 hectares of forest and 1500 hectares of natural landscape were destroyed. The reforestation will take up to 20 years. Reseeding actions were continuous but were kept limited due to the ongoing bombardment by Hezbollah. The worst part for Israel was that it had to use water for the reseeding actions which was supposed to be for agricultural work. These fires had a major impact on Israel who suffers from water shortage. (Wollschläger 2006)
11. Reconstructing Lebanon

11.1 State-sponsored reconstruction activities

Reconstruction is a field where Hezbollah and the Lebanese government were in a competition. The government of Lebanon was guaranteed a lot of help worldwide. Governments like Saudi-Arabia, Qatar or Kuwait granted Millions of Dollars in loans to Lebanon. These are countries who feel threatened by Iran. In the past, these kinds of loans never needed to be paid back. Arabic countries like Syria or Qatar rebuilt certain cities. Syria reconstructed towns like Qana or Siddiqin, and Qatar, for example, was very active in the cities of Bint Jbeil and Khiam.

In the end of August of 2006 at the international conference on reconstructing Lebanon, the international community assured Lebanon aid in the value of 900 million USD.

Due to the unexpected high amount of financial aid, the Lebanese government was able to pay 33 000 USD to any family who lost their house in the battle.

The USA emphasized on rebuilding bridges and on getting rid of the after-effects of the oil spill.

In January 2007 another conference on Lebanon took place in Paris. Germany decided to provide 103 Million Euro for the reconstruction process. Altogether six Billion Euro could be generated from European countries, the USA and Saudi-Arabia. The money was linked to economical reforms. (Wunder 2007:85-86)

11.2 Hezbollah-sponsored reconstruction activities

As soon as the cease-fire was installed, the Hezbollah began its professional reconstruction activities in the South of Lebanon, in the Bekaa-Valley and in Southern Beirut. The Iranian government sponsored the Hezbollah officially with 150 Million USD.

People who were living in buildings which were hit in the battle, received rent for one year and money so that they could buy new furniture. (Wunder 2007: 86)

Hezbollah was able to pay 10 000- 12000 Dollars to people who lost their homes.

Approximately 15 000 homeless families accepted this offer. Hezbollah-employed architects and engineers constructed new homes, while doctors distributed free medicine.
Approximately 25,000 free meals were dispensed daily for the first couple of weeks after the instalment of the cease-fire. (Norton 2007: 140)

In some cities, such as Bint Jbeil, one found more reconstruction workers than inhabitants. Additionally, Hezbollah used the reconstruction phase for building tunnels and bunkers, and silently imported new weapons. (Wunder 2007: 86)

Siniora counts on foreign donors in order to rebuild the county. The Hezbollah reacted faster in offering cash to people whose houses were destroyed so they could rent homes till their own houses were rebuilt. The government has been slower in rebuilding housing units and infrastructure and thus has been less visible.

The Lebanese army is the least equipped and trained army. Ninety percent of the budget is used to pay salaries and only 10 percent is used for the equipment and training. For the people in the South, the army is considered ridiculous and is not taken seriously. Therefore, Siniora has his hopes for foreign equipment and training so that Lebanon will be taken seriously again. (ICG 2006: 8)

Reconstructing does not only mean repairing damaged infrastructure and putting faith back in the countries economy. It further includes detecting unexploded sub-munitions which lie scattered around in the countryside and villages. Hidden cluster shells and rockets make it very difficult, if not impossible for displaced people to come back to their villages and homes. De-mining experts note that there are still lethal weapons in the ground which go back to the 1996 conflict and the withdrawal of Israel in 2000. Antipersonnel landmines were left behind. So far, Israel has handed over some records of where these sub-munitions were launched. De-mining experts say that they cannot do anything with these records because they are not precise enough to actually find the placed weaponry. Logbooks with target coordinates and digital records of launching sequences and maps exist but are not given out by the IDF. This makes the process of the return of displaced people more difficult and the land cannot be used for agriculture and shepherding. (ICG 2006: 4)

“Postwar reconstruction will require not only engineering prowess to rebuild scores of bridges but also the political and moral courage to build political bridges to traverse the gulf of anger that continues to divide the two Lebanons.” (Norton 2007: 159)
11.3 Rebuilding the political system

Lebanon’s recent political system, which is based on confessionalism, is not representing the actual population situation. Therefore, Lebanon needs to reform its political system in order to represent all confessional groups in the government and parliament equally. The disenfranchised Shia community in the South of Lebanon needs to be represented in the country’s political landscape. Further social marginalization will end in a civil war or an even more empowered Hezbollah. Integration is a better solution than marginalization.

More than ever, Lebanon needs a change in internal politics. This change has to be an internal process and should not be pushed or threatened by external force. It is a political issue that must be resolved internally.

In order to enforce United Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, a strong government is needed which can enforce such measures. A strong government has to represent all confessional groups as the nonobservance of certain ethnic groups holds government back from doing its job. There is a constant resistance that needs to be challenged. All these efforts should be used to fully focus on the countries problems. Therefore the first step should be the restructure of the current political system.

This demand goes far back to the Taiff Accords. A government can only have control over its territory if it governs with the consent of all segments of the society. (Zogby 2006).
12. The Winograd Commission

The Winograd Commission was installed by Israel after the end of the War. The purpose of the Commission is to filter out what happened in the war and how the war was managed by the political and military echelons. The commission’s report should also help to draw lessons from the mistakes made in this war. The final Report was published on January 30, 2008. (Council on Foreign Relations 2008) The Commission is named after 81 year old Eliahu Winograd, a former judge at the Israeli High Court. (Engelbrecht 2008)

Following statements point out the most important passages of the Final Report of the Winograd Commission:

“11. Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon war as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages. The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel's civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it. The fabric of life under fire was seriously disrupted, and many civilians either left their home temporarily or spent their time in shelters. After a long period of using only standoff fire power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive, very close to the Security Council resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed. These facts had far-reaching implications for us, as well as for our enemies, our neighbors, and our friends in the region and around the world.

12. In the period we examined in the Final Report - from July 18, 2006, to August 14, 2006-again troubling findings were revealed, some of which had already been mentioned in the Interim Report:

- We found serious failings and shortcomings in the decision-making processes and staff-work in the political and the military echelons and their interface.

- We found serious failings and flaws in the quality of preparedness, decision-making and performance in the IDF high command, especially in the Army.
· We found serious failings and flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning, in both the political and the military echelons.

· We found severe failings and flaws in the defence of the civilian population and in coping with its being attacked by rockets.

· These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequacies of preparedness and strategic and operative planning which go back long before the 2nd Lebanon war.

13. The decision made in the night of July 12th to react (to the kidnapping) with immediate and substantive military action, and to set for it ambitious goals - limited Israel's range of options. In fact, after the initial decision had been made, Israel had only two main options, each with its coherent internal logic, and its set of costs and disadvantages. The first was a short, painful, strong and unexpected blow on Hezbollah, primarily through standoff firepower. The second option was to bring about a significant change of the reality in the South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, including a temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and 'cleaning' it of Hezbollah military infrastructure.

14. The choice between these options was within the exclusive political discretion of the government; however, the way the original decision to go to war had been made; the fact Israel went to war before it decided which option to select, and without an exit strategy all these constituted serious failures, which affected the whole war. Responsibility for these failures lay, as we had stressed in the Interim Report, on both the political and the military echelons.

17. As a result, Israel did not stop after its early military achievements, and was 'dragged' into a ground operation only after the political and diplomatic timetable prevented its effective completion. The responsibility for this basic failure in conducting the war lies at the doorstep of both the political and the military echelons.

18. The overall image of the war was a result of a mixture of flawed conduct of the political and the military echelons and the interface between them, of flawed performance by the IDF, and especially the ground forces, and of deficient Israeli preparedness. Israel did not use its military force well and effectively, despite the fact that it was a limited war initiated by Israel itself. At the end of the day, Israel did not gain a political achievement because of military
successes; rather, it relied on a political agreement, which included positive elements for Israel, which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win.

19. This outcome was primarily caused by the fact that, from the very beginning, the war has not been conducted on the basis of deep understanding of the theatre of operations, of the IDF's readiness and preparedness, and of basic principles of using military power to achieve a political and diplomatic goal.

29. True, in hindsight, the large ground operation did not achieve its goals of limiting the rocket fire and changing the picture of the war. It is not clear what the ground operation contributed to speeding up the diplomatic achievement or improving it. It is also unclear to what extent starting the ground offensive affected the reactions of the government of Lebanon and Hezbollah to the ceasefire.

31. Against this background, we make the following findings on the main decisions:

· The cabinet decision of August 9th to approve in principle the IDF plan, but to authorize the PM and the MOD to decide if and when it should be activated, according to the diplomatic timetable - was almost inevitable, giving the Israeli government necessary military and political flexibility.

· The decision to start in fact the ground operation was within the political and professional discretion of its makers, on the basis of the facts before them. The goals of the ground operation were legitimate, and were not exhausted by the wish to hasten or improve the diplomatic achievement. There was no failure in that decision in itself, despite its limited achievements and its painful costs.

· Both the position of the Prime minister who had preferred to avoid the ground operation and the position of the Minister of Defense who had thought it would have served Israel's interest to go for it had been taken on the merits and on the basis of evidence. Both enjoyed serious support among the members of the general staff of the IDF and others. Even if both statesmen took into account political and public concerns a fact we cannot ascertain - we believe that they both acted out of a strong and sincere perception of what they thought at the time was Israel's interest.

37. The 2nd Lebanon War has brought again to the foreground for thought and discussion issues that some parts of Israeli society had preferred to suppress: Israel cannot survive in this
region, and cannot live in it in peace or at least non-war, unless people in Israel itself and in its surroundings believe that Israel has the political and military leadership, military capabilities, and social robustness that will allow her to deter those of its neighbors who wish to harm her, and to prevent them - if necessary through the use of military force - from achieving their goal.” (Council on Foreign Relations 2008)

As we can see from these passages, the Commission stated that Israel’s political and military echelons made severe wrong decisions in this war. At the same time, the Commission supports Olmert’s decision for a ground offensive against the Hezbollah in the last 60 hours of the war. Despite its limited success and all the pain it caused, the decision was right, according to Eliahu Winograd. (Engelbrecht 2008) This was always one of the most discussed questions and issues of the war. Therefore Winograd’s statement came as a surprise, as this decision by Olmert was always described by the Israeli media as the most severely wrong decision made in the entire war. On August 11, 2006 Olmert gave the green light to this ground offensive in South Lebanon, although at this time the UN Resolution 1701 had already been concluded. The Resolution ended the war. (Engelbrecht 2008)

Although the commission stands in this one issue behind the Prime Minister; it calls the entire war a “serious missed opportunity”. The Hezbollah was able to resist the strongest army in the Middle East while Israel’s ground offensives could not stop Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Israel. According to Winograd, the army was not well prepared. The commission sees mistakes in the political and military leadership. It further missed strategically concepts from both the military and Olmert. Israel was going into war without clear war goals or a clear strategy. (Engelbrecht 2008)

It was expected that the report would have ill effects on Olmert. His political disappearance was forecasted by his critics, although the report does not advise Olmert to resign. Olmert himself saw the report as an acquittal. The most important question of the late ground offensive was not questioned by the Commission; it was even considered necessary. The commission’s standpoint on this matter brought relief for Olmert, although the majority of Israel wished him to resign. (Engelbrecht 2008a)
The Interim Report which was released on April 30, 2007 made former defence minister Amir Perez as well as Olmert responsible for wrong decisions. As a consequence Perez and the former chief of staff Dan Halutz resigned. (Kruse 2008)
13. The foreign policy of Syria in Lebanon

After the post-1973 peace process halted, Lebanon became a conflict zone between Israel and Syria. Asad formed a coalition, including states that had unsecured borders with Israel, in case of occupation. The alliance had a dual purpose, as it stopped other states from negotiating separately with Israel and it avoided an attack on Syrian soil through Lebanon or Jordan. Lebanon had been a hot spot, as it was a home to Palestine and its civil war with Israel. The PLO presence in Lebanon left it opens to whoever controls Lebanon controls the PLO. Asad saw Lebanon and Palestine as parts that had fallen away from the former Greater Syria. The reason for Syria to intervene in 1976 in Lebanon was that Syria was scared that the civil war in Lebanon would open the doors for Israel to come in. Therefore, Damascus played out its card as an arbitrator and attempted to bring Lebanon under its politico-military wing. In this way, Syria limited the crises and exploited it for its own good. Syria supported the beginning of the conflict that left the Palestine-Muslim camp against the right Maronite. Syria tried to stop the fighting by giving reforms which were meant to appease both sides. Since this was not what they wanted, Syria intervened in 1976 more intensely against their former allies, the Palestine-Muslims, as Syria tried to stop a Maronite defeat. Asad knew that the Maronites would call the Israelis for support for their side. Asad feared that he would lose Lebanon to his enemy Israel. Palestine defied Asad and so Asad was scared that there would be a Palestine-dominated Lebanon. This could be a problem because the Palestine-dominated Lebanon would form a coalition with its allies in Iraq, sponsor guerilla war against Israel, and evade peace pressures. This would cause Israel to invade Lebanon, and that was not what Syria wanted. Asad did not want to be encircled by Israel. He was scared that the sectarian strife could spill across the border and so intervened. At this time Assad had no interests in incorporating Lebanon, he only wanted to have an influence there. Furthermore, he installed the Syrian army in the Bekaa Valley to guard the Syrian western border. (Ehteshami/Hinnebusch 1997:71-75)

After the left Palestine-camp resistance was shattered, Asad reconstructed Lebanon to a less sectarian state under Syrian leadership. The Maronites now resisted Syria and its influence on the national government. When the Maronites and Israel worked together in order to form a southern enclave at the border, Syria was on the left Palestine-camp side. Due to various military drives, Syria placed the Maronites back in the centre of Lebanon. The Maronite connection to Israel never broke apart.
Under Begin, Israel enforced its connections with the Maronites and started to look for ways to remove Syria from Lebanon. The Maronites tried to extend their control into the Syrian-held Bekaa Valley. Syria tried to push them back, but Israel intervened on the Maronites behalf. As a result, Syria moved anti-aircraft missiles into eastern Lebanon. When Israel threatened to destroy them, the US jumped in to restrain Israel and to ease the missile crisis. Both Israel and Syria became the arbitrators of Lebanon. Syria’s contradictory behaviour ended up in what it most feared: the 1982 Israeli intervention in Lebanon to achieve hegemony status. Israel’s aims were to shatter the PLO, to abandon Syria from Lebanese soil and to crush resistance in Camp David so that Israel would not have to make allowances to Syria. Both sides had to take a lot of losses. Israel assumed that Syria was retreating from Lebanon although it did not, and Israel could take over strategic sectors of Lebanese terrain. Israel was able to expel the PLO from Lebanese soil and reach a virtual peace treaty on Israeli terms with help from their allies, the US.

Furthermore, they tried to impose a Maronite dominated regime in Beirut. There was a 1983 accord that would have opened Lebanon to Israeli influence and military forces and products. The US and Israel believed that a military weakened and isolated Syria would go ahead and accept the accord so that Israel could continue occupation of Lebanon. Syria refused though, and struck back and ended up in a balance of military power. It used the growing resistance of Muslims in Lebanon to arrange alliances and to strike back one more time. The Muslim militia, mainly Shiites and Druze’s, fought a guerrilla war against the Israeli occupation forces. Nothing could stop the Muslim’s militia, not even the American guns and war plans. As the Israeli army was wearied by the ongoing occupation, it decided to withdraw. They only kept their army in Southern Lebanon in the so called "security zone". Israel knew another drive against Syria would be hard to win, as Syria was getting weaponry from the Soviet Union. Asad knew that if Israel’s security was not threatened that they would withdraw. The US withdrew too, as they saw that their involvement had cost too many casualties.

As a result of this fighting, the weak Maronite government had to annul the accord with Israel and Asad went out of this conflict as the winner. (Ehteshami/Hinnebusch 1997:71-75)

Asad turned his attention to the PLO. Arafat did not like that Asad was playing the 'Palestinian Card' and that he should break off with Egypt. He felt that Asad wanted to be a
protectorate over the PLO but at the same time, Asad did not take the necessary responsibilities that come with that. Asad did not defend the PLO during the Israeli invasion. Syria felt threatened by Arafat and Jordan when they started to explore the Reagon Plan. When people heard about Arafats' flirtations with Jordan, Egypt and the Reagon Plan, Syria wanted to form a pro-Syrian PLO, which did not work out the way Asad had planned it. For Syria, it was elusive to reconstruct a stable pro-Syrian Lebanon. Although the Maronites were weakened after 1983, Syria could not find a suitable leader who was willing to cooperate. In 1984, at the Lausanne conference, the Maronites rejected releasing power to the Muslims. When a Maronite leader accepted the Syrian reform plan, the so called 'Tripartite Agreement,' the Maronite community protested. Cantonization would be preferred over equalization or Syrian leadership. "Syria's position was further complicated when its post-1983 conflict with Arafat's PLO began to split the pro-Syrian Muslim camp and the radical Islamic Hizbollah challenged Syria's project for a secular Lebanon." (Ehteshami/Hinnebusch 1997: 75).

In 1988, Syria made a big mistake when it allowed that the election of a new Maronite President conditional on Christian acceptance. Since then, Lebanon has been divided between two rival governments. Syria's influence became weaker in 1989 when a Maronite General, Michel Aoun, questioned Syria’s presence in Lebanon altogether. Lebanon started to become ungovernable due to the growing fragmentations and armed mobilization. Israel had to prevent Syria from finding a violent solution. The 1989 Taif accord legitimized Syria's role. Syria defeated Aoun militarily and ended with a Pax Syrianna. The 1991 Syrian-Lebanese Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Friendship made it possible for Syria to institutionalize its control over Lebanese foreign and security policies officially.

Syrian interests in Lebanon always had strategic motives. However, this has now changed. Syria hopes that it can harness Lebanese entrepreneurship instead of competing with it. There is an economic integration between Syria and Lebanon. Lebanon tries to live up to its historic economic role. It is said that if Syria does not attempt to stabilize Lebanon, economic recovery will not be possible. (Ehteshami/Hinnebusch 1997:71-76)
14. Lebanese-Israeli Relations

There has always been a strong connection between Israel and Lebanon. Close ties had developed with the Lebanese Maronite community, because both believe they live in a hostile environment where they are minorities. Since 1948 there has been good trade relations and tourism between these two states. Furthermore, the emerging Jewish State and Lebanon were both Mediterranean, linking the West with the East. Lebanon was considered a friendly neighbour. Even when the border between Israel and Lebanon was closed and they were in an official state of war, it did not change the way they saw each other. The Maronite-Israeli relationship soon became the Lebanese-Israeli relation. The relations became even tighter in 1970 when the PLO moved to Southern Lebanon. Both countries were afraid. Lebanon, because it did not want the PLO occupation out of fear they could start questioning the status quo, and Israel out of fear of attacks from south Lebanon. This tightened their relations. In 1975 Lebanon received military aid from Israel and full alliance between these two countries was reached in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon. Israel considered the Maronites as the leaders of the country and saw in them an ally and a partner to share peace with. Lebanon has always seen Israel as an ally. Lebanon was also important in securing the northern border and in restructuring the Middle East.

With the invasion things changed radically. Since the Israelis were involved in Lebanese internal affairs against their will, the friendship only reached so far as to protect the northern border. The Maronites were no longer considered the leading role in Lebanon. As a result the alliance between these two minorities in the Middle East began to vanish. Israel started to become scared that Lebanon would align with Syria. (Schulze 2002: 52-55)

"Lebanon's geostrategic position, however, dictated that it would be the last country in the Middle East to make peace with Israel, regardless of Lebanese desires for a peaceful relationship." (Schulze 2002: 55)

The Middle East process began in 1991 and was about normalizing the relation between Israel and its Arab neighbours, which was needed for regional stability. Numerous attempts have been undertaken. There has been the Oslo Accords of 1993, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and various bilateral trade arrangements between Israel and Qatar, Oman and Morocco. Professional anti-normalization campaigns in Jordan, Egypt and Syria occurred on a professional level and gained strength with every stalemate, such as during the Netanyahu
government from 1996-1999, and during the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000. These were the only times when the Israeli-Palestine talks remained silent.

Lebanon can only sign any agreement with Israel if there is an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty. If negotiations ever start, main concerns will be security, the Palestinian refugees, water rights and economic development. (Schulze 2002: 52)

There are no real obstacles that would allow normalization between Lebanon and Israel. Both would benefit in the sectors of tourism, infrastructure, transport and water.
Conclusion

In this chapter I will try to verify my initial hypothesis that the main political consequence of this 34 day war is the rising of Hezbollah to a national and regional player in the Middle East. Hezbollah was able to strengthen its position in Lebanese politics and its reputation in the Muslim World. The Party of God now plays an important role in Lebanese politics and became an enemy to take seriously for Israel and enjoys strong support throughout the Muslim World.

Following explanations will undermine my statement of the rising of Hezbollah to a national and regional player in the Middle East:

- Although the War was a zero-sum-game, Hezbollah took the chance and promoted the war as “divine victory”. They celebrated themselves, as they were able to stand up for 34 days undefeated to the world’s fourth strongest army. This perception of being the winner made them the actual winner. Especially in the Muslim World, Hezbollah was celebrated as the big winner of the conflict. Also in Lebanon, the Shia community as well as different parts of the population celebrated the Hezbollah as Heroes, as it was them who defended the country against Israel’s aggression. Let’s not put in consideration that it was the Hezbollah who captured the two Israeli soldiers.

- An indication for Hezbollah’s empowerment in the war was that Israel did not fulfill any of its war goals. Its main goal of smashing Hezbollah did not work in the way Israel planned it. Israel’s three step strategy plan missed its goal. No key figures, such as Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, were killed, nor did many Hezbollah combatants died. The death toll was the highest among the civilians and not among Hezbollah combatants. Israel tried to blame Hezbollah for the whole tragedy as it wanted to put a wedge between the organizations and its supporters. For this reason, Israel destroyed massive Lebanese infrastructure, houses and villages. In the end, exactly the opposite happened. The population showed solidarity with Hezbollah due to the inappropriate Israeli bombardments of Lebanese infrastructure. This strategy worked in 1978 when Israel attacked the PLO with just the same intensity. The
difference is that everybody wanted the PLO out of the country and that the PLO was not linked with the society. Hezbollah on the contrary is well integrated and linked in the Lebanese society.

The war ended in a mess for Israel. It could not fulfill any of its war goals and, as a result, to show that nobody can question Israel’s power, massive bombardments were exercised till the last day of war. Israel’s strong approach in this war was not only condemned in Lebanon, moreover worldwide. Israel was criticized over and over for its heavy aerial bombardments which were not under restriction of commensurability.

• Israel could only achieve little successes, such as the deployment of an expanded UNIFIL mission at the security zone, and Hezbollah’s loss of full control over the Southern region. The deployment of the Lebanese army in the South after the war weakened Hezbollah’s influence in the region. Gradually, the Hezbollah will gain its influence back, due to the army’s weak performance. At the same time, this cannot be seen as a big success, as Hezbollah is still present next to the Lebanese army.

• For me, the massive destruction of areas and infrastructure unrelated to Hezbollah in this 34 day war explains Israel’s helplessness in this asymmetric conflict. Israel’s drastic steps in this conflict strengthened Hezbollah and also partly the Hamas support and reputation in the entire region. Hezbollah is now able to play a more vital role in Lebanese politics than ever before.

• Hezbollah was able to stand up to 34 days of constant Israeli bombardment. This bolstered their support not only in the Shia community, but outside it as well. Hezbollah’s impressive and fast response to the needs of the people, who lost their homes and lives in the war, was amazing and underestimated. Hezbollah’s after-war reconciliation helped people both inside and outside the Shia community. The state-sponsored reconstruction work of rebuilding housing unites and infrastructure took longer than Hezbollah’s reconstruction work. Hezbollah was able to react faster than the government.

• The Winograd Commission was installed by Israel to analyse the war. In its final report, the commission acknowledged Israel’s failure in the war. This official commitment empowered Hezbollah again, who saw itself from the beginning as the winner of the war.

- 106 -
“Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon War as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages”

Passages like that only undermine Hezbollah’s power and strength. After the report was released, there was no longer a doubt of Hezbollah’s “divine victory” in this war as it has itself proclaimed since the end of the war. The report was seen by Hezbollah as an empowerment of its own action and of its strength.

- Hezbollah’s success lies in its popularity in the Muslim world as well as in the Lebanese society. Before the war, Hezbollah was well liked not only in the Shia Community, but also across the other sects. With the social services it provides to Lebanese citizens, it always had strong backing in the population.

In my eyes, all the good Hezbollah does needs to be seen in a different way. Iran’s money is used for military operation as well as for social services like running schools and hospitals. The manipulative part lies in the social service, as it is the most dishonest. Parts of Hezbollah’s supporters are “victims” of the social service programs. They are very grateful for Hezbollah’s support because the government leaves them behind. Hezbollah fills that gap and receives in return understanding, support and help for its military and often radical political movements.

Therefore, I see Hezbollah’s followers divided into two groups: The followers who stand behind Hezbollah’s ideology and battle against Israel and the second group who are the “social service victims”. As long as Hezbollah can keep up with its social program they do not have to fear having a lack of supporters. If Iran decides to cut off money, Hezbollah’s position would be questioned over a longer time of period. At the same time, no signs that this will happen any time soon are in sight.

- Till today, the Hezbollah is still not disarmed. Although Resolution 1559 already calls for Hezbollah’s disarmament, the last Resolution 1701, which ended the war, called again for a disarmament process of Hezbollah.

The exact opposite has happened. Hezbollah was able to receive more weapons and, as Hassan Nasrallah said in his speech held on August 14, 2007, the organization is ready for another war if Israel challenges Lebanon again.
There are different positions on why the Hezbollah is not disarming. In my eyes it is a mix of inability and unwillingness. The LAF does not have the capacity to disarm Hezbollah, as it supposedly has the stronger army in the country. Besides the question of resources, this matter also needs political willingness and consensus. So far, this consensus has not been reached.

In addition, the problem exists that the government does not have enough money and resources to support the Shia community in the South of Lebanon with the same amount of political goods as Hezbollah does. This could lead to chaos in the country and an outbreak of Civil War is a possible consequence. As we can see, there are numerous of reasons why Hezbollah is still armed.

According to Dr. Karin Kneissl, whom I interviewed, there were efforts from the government to include Hezbollah’s military wing into the LAF. Ping-Pong diplomacy between Hezbollah and the government began. First, Hezbollah agreed, but then took its promise back and as we know, Hezbollah is still acting as a state-challenger.

- Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was rated the most admired world leader in the Muslim World. The Survey has taken place every year since 2000 in the six Arabic countries of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Lebanon, Morocco and the UAE. In second place came Jacques Chirac and in third place Mahmoud Achmedinejad in 2006. (Telhami 2006) In every Arab Country, except in Saudi-Arabia, Nasrallah seems to enjoy the most popularity and trust.

In the poll for 2008, Hassan Nasrallah could increase his popularity to 27 percent and is therefore still the leading most admired world leader. In 2008, Jacques Chirac took again second place while Bashar al-Assad came in 3rd. (Telhami, 2008)

According to the interview I conducted with Professor Saliba from Colombia University, NY, Hassan Nasrallah enjoys so much popularity because he is a politician who is honest and who always holds to his words. Therefore he is trusted in the Muslim World. It is the same with Israel in that they respect Nasrallah because he is known to be honest.

- 30 percent of the Lebanese citizens sympathize most with the opposition led by Hezbollah, while only 24 percent favour the current government. 19 percent support both and only 9 percent do not sympathize with any.
The biggest group of supporters of Hezbollah is of course the Shia Community; the second strongest backing it enjoys is from the Christians, while the Sunnis seem to have the least sympathy for the Shiite Hezbollah. (Telhami 2008: 58-59)

When the different confessional groups were asked how they see Hezbollah after the July war in 2006, all sects except the Shiites said that their view of Hezbollah had changed for the negative. (Telhami 2008:60)

For me, the interesting point of this survey is that the Hezbollah still enjoys more sympathy in the country than the actual government, although the organization started a war that took its toll on the country. This just reveals again the weakness of the western-backed Fouad Siniora government. It enjoys very little support from its citizens, which strengthens Hezbollah’s position in the country. Although Hezbollah involved the Lebanon in a war that devastated the country, the organization is still more popular than the official government of Fouad Siniora.

- In May 2008, combat between government-supporters and the Shiite Hezbollah cost about 80 human lives. (diepresse.com 2008b) Hezbollah was able to take control over Western Beirut. (El-Gawahry 2008) Additionally, the Hezbollah cut off the airport the harbor and closed down major roads in Beirut. (diepresse.com 2008c) Reason for this was that the government in Beirut had decided that Hezbollah’s own phone-network, as well its installed surveillance cameras at the airport of Beirut, were illegal. In addition, the Cabinet laid off the security chief of the airport who is associated with supporting Hezbollah. (Main-Netz 2008)

This incident shows Hezbollah’s way of demonstrating against the western-backed Siniora government. In November 2006, Hezbollah removed its ministers from the government to show resistance. This demonstration should show how strong Hezbollah is, and How they will use violence if necessary to put their interests through.

After 18 months of resisting, Hezbollah left. With this action, Hezbollah wanted show off how much muscle, power and influence it possesses in Lebanon. Hezbollah wanted to show that if they would want, it would be no problem to take over. The message was that Hezbollah does not lack the resources and capacity to induce a coup d’état.

- The “Doha agreement” ended the battle between the government-supporters and the opposition, Hezbollah. Because Lebanon was standing on the edge of another civil war, the sheikdom Qatar and the Arab League invited a peaceful solution in Doha.
On May 21, 2008, after five days of negotiating, the conflicted parties agreed on a government of national unity and on a new election law. After 18 month of conflict and a half year with no president, Michel Suleiman will be the next president and should be able to keep the country together. Hezbollah’s constant postponing of electing a new president showed again the power it holds.

A major victory for Hezbollah was that originally Hezbollah’s arms should have been negotiated. The host Qatar took this off its negotiating list and decided that this topic should be discussed internally in Lebanon.

The new Cabinet will have 16 posts for the government, 11 for the opposition and the three posts which the president is allowed to announce.

This new set-up allows the opposition to block decisions – the opposition now has a veto-right. Hezbollah got exactly what it was always asking and demonstrating for.

This is a major victory for Hezbollah, as it has always wanted a veto-right. This veto-right should not only be seen as a right that can stop decisions from the Western-backed government, it should more be seen as a right that allows longer discussion about new decisions and laws.

The Secretary-General of the Arab League said that there are now winners and losers. In the end it only was a major victory for Hezbollah.

The new elections law foresees smaller electoral district in Beirut so that the confessional groups will be better represented.

After the meeting, Hezbollah pulled out of Beirut and promised to cover all costs and damages the eighteen month of resistance had caused. (Leukefeld 2008) In this sense, a civil war was avoided. The political crisis was solved, favoring Hezbollah immensely.

- On July 16, 2008 almost exactly 2 years after the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, a prisoner swap between Israel and Hezbollah was reached. In Beirut, the five released prisoners received an official welcome on the red carpet from president Suleiman, Prime Minister Siniora, other officials and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah.

"Your return is a new victory and the future with you will only be a shining march in which we achieve the sovereignty of our land and the freedom of people," President Michel Suleiman said in his address. "I congratulate the resistance (Hezbollah) for this new achievement." (MSNBC 2008)
The welcoming of the five militants on a red carpet and president Suleiman’s words reflect Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon. This prisoner swap closed the chapter of the Lebanon War of 2006. The government’s close engagement with Hezbollah shows the respect it has for the resistance organization.

Of the five militants who were released is Samir Kuntar, a terrorist who is responsible for the killing of two police officers, a father and of his four year old daughter in 1979. It was highly criticized that the Israelis let go of this terrorist in order to retrieve the bodies of the two captured soldiers from July 2006, which were the reason for the beginning of the 34 day war between Hezbollah and Israel. (diepresse.com 2008a)

This unequal prisoner-exchange shows how much power Hezbollah holds in its hands. In order to retrieve the dead bodies, Israel released a brutal terrorist. The negotiations to bring the 2006 captured soldiers home took its toll on Israel.

Israel’s uneven prisoner swap was also criticized as it would encourage further hostage-takings, which would support voices that kidnapping is the only language Israel understands. (Associated Press 2008) Although Israel claims that it does not negotiate with terrorists, in the past it never missed a chance to negotiate prisoner exchanges.
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Maps

Map1: South Lebanon

Map 2: Lebanon

Map 3: UNIFIL

Map4: Symbol of Hezbollah
http://content.grin.com/binary/hade/682/0.gif

„Ich habe mich bemüht, sämtliche Inhaber der Bildrechte ausfindig zu machen und ihre
Zustimmung zur Verwendung der Bilder in dieser Arbeit eingeholt. Sollte dennoch eine
Urheberrechtsverletzung bekannt werden, ersuche ich um Meldung bei mir.“
Annex

A. Interview with Professor Saliba – Columbia University New York City

B. Interview with Karin Kneissl - Middle East Expert in Vienna
In order to understand the July war, a closer look at the past needs to be taken. The war did not start on July 12, 2006. The reasons for Israel’s declaring war on Hezbollah on July 12, goes back to their past. Israel’s constant air violations of flying over Lebanon’s territory as well as Lebanese sheep farmers crossing Israel’s border on a daily basis only contributed to the already tense situation between Israel and Hezbollah. This aspect of the past often gets forgotten. It is very important to go back and see what actually happened before the outbreak of hostilities in order to draw a correct picture of the ongoing situation. Sometimes stories are told in a misunderstood way that leads to incorrect interpretations of an actual situation. Therefore the history should always be respected, according to Professor Saliba.

The next questions concerned Iran’s and Syria’s influence on Lebanon and on Hezbollah. According to Professor Saliba, Iran has a lot of religious influence on Hezbollah. It used to be that Lebanese Shiite clerics were taught in Iran and sent back to Lebanon. They were taught the “right form” of Shia Islam. At this point Professor Saliba refers to Lebanese cleric Fadlallah who was originally Hezbollah’s religious mastermind. Now it is known that Hassan Nasrallah and he have a tense relationship due to some of Fadlallah’s statements on Hezbollah’s political orientation. Syria has an important role in smuggling weapons into Lebanon in order to support Hezbollah. Iranian weapons are smuggled into Syria and from there on to Lebanon.

Professor Saliba sees the US engagement in the war as a contradiction. The US officially said that Israel should do a “good job” in smashing Hezbollah, as they want to see them weakened. That is also the reason why Secretary of State Condolezza Rice denied a Resolution for a cease-fire at the end of July in order to give Israel more time to destroy the organization. Israel took the chance but also had to pay its price. In return, a weapon deal of 30 Billion Dollars for new weapons over the next years was arranged between the US and Israel. Israel claimed that it did not have enough military equipment such as warplanes and weaponry in the war. This seems a bit scary if you consider that Israel is a well trained army and the strongest one in the Middle East.
On the issue of Iran’s involvement in the summer war, Professor Saliba denies this as a conspiracy theory. He believes that Hezbollah had only planned a retaliation action with the capturing of the two Israeli soldiers. It was not a plan backed by either Iran or Hezbollah; as such kidnappings often happen quietly if you take a look into the past. It was only another try to press for the freeing of Lebanese soldiers who are held in Israeli prisons without charge, just as potential terrorists are in Guantanamo Bay. Hezbollah tried several times to do a prisoner swap but Israel did not react. Israel only acts as an oppressor and tries to get the most out of a situation for its own gain. It was for these reasons that Hezbollah kidnapped two soldiers. He sees no Iranian involvement in this action.

The only possibility is that Iran wanted to show off what kind of weapons it possesses, since it is known that Hezbollah is being supplied with weaponry by Iran. Maybe Iran wanted to send a clear message during the war that Israel and the US should think twice if they want to attack Iran. Iran has, left over from the Soviet Union, rocket detection systems which have been upgraded and work surprisingly well, and which are supposed to be superior to Israel’s. There is a good possibility that Iran wanted to show their excellent weaponry off in order to scare away Israel and the US.

A good example here is the explosion of a ship during the war. When this incident was revealed, Nasrallah went on the air and declared that it was Hezbollah who had destroyed that ship. Everyone was surprised as Hezbollah was not supposed to have the necessary technology or weapons for such an attack.

The war should also tech Israel a lesson. In case of an Israeli attack on Iran, approximately one to two million people would lose their lives. This is acceptable as Iran consists of around 75 million people. The question is if Israel could risk losing 100-150 000 people.

Professor Saliba refers to an Arabian study in which Hassan Nasrallah is rated the most popular politician in the Middle East. His popularity goes back to his honesty. Nasrallah is known for standing to his word, which is therefore trusted. So far, the soldiers are still in Hezbollah’s custody. They only will be released under certain conditions. In this study, Mahmoud Achmadinejad comes in second place, which is explainable by the fact that he is the politician who stands up to America. The Arab World is not fond of America and therefore Achmadinejad is well liked as he has the guts to stand up to the superpower. It is not
important who stands up to them or how they do it, it is more important that someone does it at all.

Israel’s old attitude of extortion and only putting through its own interests is not working any longer. In order to get your way you need to seduce people. You have to try to bring them onto your side in order to get what you want. Israel has to learn that. So far it is still trying its old way of “negotiating”.

In a speech on August 14, 2007 Hassan Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah own weapons of which they have not make use so far. Therefore the US and Israel should think twice if they would like to risk another war with Hezbollah. His statement was taken seriously as everyone knows that Nasrallah always sticks to his word.

In the eyes of Professor Saliba, the Lebanon War of 2006 was planned about one year in advance. Israel only attacked as it had no doubt it would destroy Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s strength was completely underestimated.
B.

Interview mit Karin Kneissl am 10.07. 2008 an der Webster University in Wien:

Zu Beginn des Interviews befragte ich Frau Kneissl zu den völkerrechtlichen Aspekten des Krieges. Vor allem ihre Meinung zur Diskussion über die Verhältnismäßigkeit des Krieges war für mich von großem Interesse.


Auf der israelischen Seite gab es 112 bis 120 Tote davon 80 Prozent Militärs. Die Hisbollah hat hier in ihren Kriegszielen militärische Ziele ausgewählt. Israel hingegen hat zivile Ziele ausgewählt, mit dem Argument der Feind verstecke sich in den zivilen Bereichen. Die Israelis haben bewusst diese schweren Zerstörungen in Kauf genommen. Sie dachten, je mehr die
libanesische Zivilbevölkerung leidet desto mehr kommt es zu einem Aufstand gegen die Hisbollah. Dieser Hintergedanke war völlig verfehlt. Die Israelis glaubten, dass die Hisbollah als Fremdkörper im Libanon wahr genommen wird, wie die PLO einst.

Die PLO war auch tatsächlich eine fremde Besatzungsmacht im Libanon, die niemand dort haben wollte. Als die Israelis 1982 im Libanon einmarschieren, sind sie von den Schiiten willkommen geheißen worden. Schließlich wussten alle die PLO los werden. Im Sommer 2006 war das nicht so.


Meine Frage zielte darauf ab, ob Frau Kneissl der Meinung ist, dass die Hisbollah nach dem Krieg noch mehr in der Bevölkerung verankert ist oder nicht.

Frau Kneissl befindet, dass die Hisbollah zum einen sehr starken politischen Rückhalt im Lande hat. Was die Bevölkerung betrifft herrschen unterschiedliche Positionen vor. Unter den Christen ist die Hisbollah manchmal angesehen manchmal wird sie aber mit Angst beäugt. Viele Libanesen haben die Hisbollah ursprünglich sehr geschätzt.

Der Krieg hingegen änderte ihrer Meinung. Die Hisbollah habe die Israelis ins Land geholt indem sie sie provoziert haben. Nasrallah meinte im Herbst nach dem Krieg wenn er gewusst hätte dass die Israelis so reagieren würden, hätte er diese Kampfhandlung nicht gesetzt. Frau Kneissl fragte sich ob die Hisbollah überhaupt wisse was sie tut und ob sie die Folgen ihres Handelns abschätzen können.

Auf meine Frage warum sie die Hisbollah nicht als verlängerten Arm Irans sieht, antwortete Frau Kneissl, dass es unzählige Verbindungen zu Teheran wie in Logistik und Ideologie gibt, jedoch sei dies nicht ausreichend.

Innerhalb der Hisbollah gibt es mehrere Denkschulen. Die Frage stellt sich ob sich die Hisbollah als eine libanésische nationale Partei sieht und in der libanésische Politik agieren will, oder ob sie für eine panislamische panschiitische globale Aktion steht. Hier streiten sich die Geister.

Es hat vor ein paar Jahren so ausgeschaut als würde sich die erste Denkweise durchsetzen, dass sie eine libanésische politische Partei mit einem bewaffneten Arm sei. Mit Irans neuen Präsidenten Achmadinejad hat sich da einiges geändert. Achmadinejad trägt diesen Exportgedanken der Revolution und die vermehrte Präsenz im Nahen Osten stärker in sich. Unter Chatami war das nicht so.

DieIraner haben den Libanon immer als ihren eigenen Vorgarten gesehen um Einfluss im Nahen Osten auszuüben. Mit Achmadinejad ist diese Idee neu aufgeflammt. Mit Hisbollah und Hamas sind sie stärker und haben somit mehr Möglichkeit gegen Israel zu agieren. Grundsätzlich ist es schwer das Machtgefuge im Iran einzuschätzen, so Kneissl.


Auf die Frage was die Hisbollah will, ist die Meinung von Frau Kneissl gespalten. Einerseits finden Denkschulenrivalitäten statt und andererseits ist sich Frau Kneissl sicher, dass Nasrallah nicht alle Karten auf den Tisch legt.

Als politische Konsequenz des Krieges sieht Frau Kneissl eine Stärkung der Hisbollah und des Irans. „Die Hisbollah ist zweifellos gestärkt aus diesem Krieg herausgegangen, sie hat den Israelis die Stirn geboten, in einem sehr intensiven Schlagabtausch.“


Eine Woche später kam es zu den Doha Verhandlungen wo der Hisbollah mehr Zugeständnisse bei der zukünftigen Regierungsbildung gemacht worden ist als den anderen.

Abstract

My thesis deals with the Lebanon War of 2006 and its consequences and outcome of the war. The hypothesis I tested was the rising of Hezbollah to a national and regional player in the Middle East as the main consequence of the war. The final chapter of my thesis proves my hypothesis true.

The paper starts off focusing on Lebanon as a weak state, which comprises the theoretical background of my paper. After the description of weak state and its effects on the country and on the international community, the paper goes on with the social structure of Lebanon. Here, a closer look is taken at the different existing sects in Lebanon and on Lebanon's political system, which is based on confessionalism. An historic overview on how the Shiite movement Hezbollah was founded will be the next part of my thesis, in which everything that relates to the organization is discussed. Hezbollah's ideology, worldview, goals and relations to its important strategic partners Syria and Iran are the core issues I concentrated on.

The next part of my thesis is dedicated to the analysis of the Lebanon War 2006. It starts off with the chronology of the 34 day war that includes a brief introduction to what happened before the outbreak of hostilities, a timeline of the actual war, as well as international and national positions on the war. In this context the UN Attacks, as well as the war plans of this short summer war are essential and discussed.

The United Nations Resolution 1701 is a very important matter in this war. Therefore the text of the Resolution as well as Siniora's Seven-Point-Plan is reflected; while all different views on the Resolution are presented.

In every war the question of whether the international law was observed plays a vital role. Therefore international law aspects are discussed, and especially a closer look is drawn at possible war crimes committed by Israel and Hezbollah. The disregard of international humanitarian law, the use of cluster and phosphorus bombs as well as the bombing of Qana are described closely.

As I stated on the beginning, my thesis is devoted to the outcome and the consequences of the war. Therefore social, economical and environmental consequences for Lebanon and Israel will be outlined.
In every war reconstruction activities play an important role in the aftermath of the war. For this reason, a closer look to the Hezbollah-sponsored as well as state-sponsored reconstruction activities will be drawn. The rebuilding of the existing political system is another discussion point in this context.

The Winograd-Commission evaluated the war for Israel. The most important findings of the final report, which was presented on January 30, 2008, are reviewed.

The foreign policy of Syria in Lebanon as well as the Lebanese-Israeli relations is described in order to understand the complicated relationship every country is in. The last chapter is dedicated to my conclusion.
Zusammenfassung


Beschrieben wird die soziale Struktur des Libanons und dessen Vielfältigkeit an Religionen, sowie der Konfessionalismus auf dem das libanesisch politische System aufbaut. Eine zentrale Rolle in diesem Konflikt spielt die schiitische Bewegung Hisbollah. Im Mittelpunkt meiner Analyse steht aus diesem Grunde die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Organisation, bis hin zu ihren Verbündeten Syrien und Iran.


Von höchster Bedeutung für die Beendigung des Krieges ist die UN Resolution 1701. Der Text der Resolution und der Sieben-Punkte-Plan von Premierminister Siniora stehen hier im Mittelpunkt meiner Untersuchung. Die unterschiedlichen Sichtweisen der partizipierenden Kriegsparteien auf die UN Resolution 1701 werden wiedergegeben.


Wie eingangs erwähnt, konzentriere ich mich auf die Konsequenzen des Krieges und bin deshalb auf die ökonomischen, ökologischen und sozialen Konsequenzen eingegangen. In einem weiteren Teil habe ich die Wiederaufbaubemühungen durch den Staat und durch die Hisbollah aufgeschlüsselt.

Um Einblick und Verständnis in die Beziehungen der benachbarten Länder untereinander zu erhalten, wurde Syriens Politik gegenüber dem Libanon und die libanesisch-israelische Beziehungen untersucht.

Das letzte Kapitel meiner Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Konklusion und Testung meiner eingangs beschriebenen Hypothese die ich aufgrund zahlreicher Argumente in meiner Arbeit verifizieren konnte.
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| October 2003 – November 2008 | Political Science, Masters Degree Course, University of Vienna, Austria |
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| 2002 – 1997 | Business School, Handelsakademie, Linz, Austria |

**Languages**

**English**

- Fluent (written and spoken)
- 2002 - 2003 Au-Pair Year in New York

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- Good (written and spoken)
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- **Basic** (written and spoken)
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**Accountant**, computer company (“Level 1” comp.) Vienna, Austria
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**September 2006**

**Federal State Government of Upper Austria**, (Intern)
- Department of Social Policy
- Analysing new policy proposals
- Administrative work

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**Project co-ordinator**, “The World of NGOs”, Vienna (Intern)
- Support of the organisations work concerning the EU-project “Rural-In!” a project directed to successful social integration of immigrant people in rural areas in Europe. Funded by the European Commission.


**United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), New York, USA** (Intern for a period of six months)
- Assisting in implementing the “Nile Basin Programme” (financial management, monitoring field activities, recruitment action, etc.)
- Preparing completion reports for the “Montreal Protocol” projects

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**Press Department Correspondent**, Christian-Democratic Party (ÖVP) of Austria, Vienna (Intern)
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Computer Skills

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Arts & Science
Photography, Reading, Music, Movies