Master Thesis

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Iraqi Diaspora and Temporary Return Migration:
The Role of Opportunity, Motivation and Expectation

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on the post-2003 temporary return migration of highly skilled Iraqi expatriates to their home country. It aims to highlight the diverse opportunities, motivations, expectations and goals within the Iraqi diaspora. These differences are based not only on religious, ethnic, gendered and socio-economic factors, but also on the particular experience of emigration from the 1950s to today and the opportunity structures available in various host countries. By studying Iraqi expatriates who have returned to Iraq temporarily to work on a consultancy level or for other professional reasons, this research shows the importance of these divisions, and the impact they have on development projects that recruit members of the Iraqi diaspora.

Kurzfassung

Die vorliegende Masterarbeit befasst sich mit der temporären Rückkehr hochqualifizierter irakischer EmigrantInnen in ihr Heimatland nach 2003. Sie beleuchtet die unterschiedlichen Möglichkeiten, Motivationen, Erwartungen und Ziele innerhalb der irakischen Diaspora. Diese Unterschiede sind nicht nur auf religiöse, ethnische, Gender- und sozioökonomische Faktoren zurückzuführen, sondern auch auf die spezifische Emigrationserfahrung seit den 1950er Jahren bis heute und auf die in den einzelnen Aufnahmeländern vorhandenen Chancen. Durch die Beforschung irakischer EmigrantInnen, die für begrenzte Zeit in den Irak zurückgekehrt sind, um als BeraterInnen oder in anderen beruflichen Feldern zu arbeiten, kann diese Studie die Wichtigkeit dieser Unterschiede und deren Auswirkung auf Entwicklungsprojekte, die Mitglieder der irakischen Diaspora rekrutieren, aufzeigen.
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List of Abbreviations

CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority
GFIW: General Federation of Iraqi Women
ILO: International Labour Organization
IOM: International Organization for Migration
IRI: Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq
IRIN: Integrated Regional Information Networks
LGP: Local Governance Program
MoPDC: Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation
MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Iraq
MPI: Migration Policy Institute
NGO: non-governmental organization
RTI: Research Triangle Institute
TOKTEN: Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.K.: United Kingdom
U.S.: United States
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Question

“Here is safety, we have everything available. But Iraq is home.”¹ This quote from an Iraqi Christian woman now living in the U.S. demonstrates the complex emotions of Iraqis abroad. Many feel strongly Iraqi, and long for a stable Iraq to which they can return. But there is the realization among many that this will not be possible during their lifetime, due to the current volatile situation. On the other hand, there has been a limited amount of temporary return and engagement with Iraq after the end of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. So then the question begs to be answered: Why do some Iraqis return to Iraq? Furthermore, what are the opportunities, motivations and expectations for this return?

Only Iraqi Kurdistan is fairly stable, and Amman and Damascus, along with other centers of Iraqi communities abroad, serve as meeting points for Iraqis around the world. From these hubs, Iraqis are able to engage in multiple ways with their home country, whether it is to reconnect with family members, to work on rebuilding schools, or to maintain their businesses in Iraq. Current Iraqi returnees can be broken down into two groups: permanent and temporary return migrants. The first group consists primarily of recent post-2003 refugees returning permanently because of limited opportunities abroad and/or they have run out of savings. The second group returns to work in Iraq or visit family in the country for a limited period of time, while continuing to live abroad. Within this temporary return migration pattern, there are a number of Iraqis returning as consultants on development programs or to maintain businesses in Iraq. This group is the main focus of this thesis, as there may be an important developmental impact from the return of these Iraqis. This group is generally tertiary-educated, and they also tend to have access to more state of the art facilities, as well as more up-to-date skills and technical knowledge that many of the Iraqi population do not have. Therefore, harnessing their potential could help fuel development in Iraq. On the other hand, when these Iraqis are recruited for participation in development programs, their background—ethnic, religious, gendered, and socio-economic—can affect the role they play within these programs, and therefore influence the

¹ Personal Interview, 3 March 2010. A quote from a Christian Iraqi woman now living in the U.S. To preserve anonymity, the names of all interviewees have been omitted.
impact of these programs. Therefore, the temporary return migration of these highly skilled Iraqis should be studied, to determine the effect their return may have on development in Iraq.

This thesis is a foray into this suggestion, aiming to highlight the diverse opportunities, motivations, expectations and goals within the Iraqi diaspora and more specifically among those who return temporarily for professional reasons. It does this by studying not only the religious, ethnic, gendered and socio-economic differences within the diaspora, but also divisions based on the particular experiences of emigration and the opportunity structures available in various host countries. These differences impact the interactions between these temporary return migrants and other actors, especially Iraqis in Iraq. In fact, there seems to be a disconnect between returning Iraqi expatriates and Iraqi society. Many local Iraqis resent those who have spent most of their life abroad and are now returning to work at higher levels, at a higher pay and for a limited time period. This can hinder the effectiveness of development programs, and so should be recognized and dealt with within these programs. Due to this disconnect, it is important to concentrate on the diverse backgrounds that guide the reasons for emigration, as well as the motivations and opportunities available for temporary return migration. These in turn interact with the agents involved: other Iraqi migrants, the people in Iraq, the Iraqi government and external actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the U.S. government. By studying Iraqi expatriates who have returned to Iraq temporarily to work on a consultancy level or for other professional reasons, this research shows the importance of these divisions, and the impact they can have on development projects that recruit members of the Iraqi diaspora.

1.2 Thesis Outline

This thesis will proceed in several steps: I will first outline the methodology for my case study. Next I will define key terms used within the thesis and elaborate the theoretical framework, emphasizing the migration-development nexus, as well as network theory and transnationalism. Then, a brief outline is presented of the current state of the country, followed by a chapter on the circumstances surrounding various waves of Iraqi emigration. The conditions for Iraqi migration are strategic to how different communities feel towards Iraq, and especially their desire to return. This is followed by a chapter focusing on the various trajectories of Iraqi migration, which are a function of the particular networks and opportunity structures to which different migrants
belong. This chapter studies the characteristics of Iraqi communities in five host countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, Syria and Jordan. The communities in these countries have a specific composition and form of interaction with both their hosts and Iraq, which also influences their activities and their perception of Iraq.

Finally, I examine specific examples of temporary return. This includes analysis of the model of institutionally organized consultancies, two development programs that recruited Iraqi expatriates (the Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq Programme coordinated by UNDP, IOM and the Iraqi Government; and the Local Governance Program of USAID and local Iraqi governments), and the concept of “re-engagement” as proposed by Geraldine Chatelard, a leading scholar of Iraqi migration. These examples were chosen based on the literature available and the relevance for developmental impact. Throughout this chapter, feedback from interviews is used to highlight the varied experiences of expatriates returning to Iraq. The last chapter concludes, bringing together the findings of the study and suggestions for future research.

1.3 Research Methods

The objective of this study is to examine the multiple motivations and expectations guiding return within an expatriate community, and how these differences may affect development. It was decided to adopt a single case study in order to focus on a specific problem in greater detail, taking into account the country's specific context. Iraq was chosen because there has been little study to date on the unique and diverse transnational communities that have been created over the years and the multiple ways they interact with each other and Iraq. For this study, I relied primarily on qualitative methods.

First, I conducted research into transnational migration and the migration-development nexus (See Chapter 2). This helped illuminate theoretical explanations for how and why people migrate and the impact on development, as well as how and why people return, especially the drivers and the impacts. To get a general picture of the Iraqi diaspora, I also conducted a review of literature on the various Iraqi communities abroad and Iraqi migration. This consisted of collecting information from governmental (Iraq, U.K., U.S., Syria, Jordan) sources, organization or private (IOM, MPI, UNHCR, UNDP) sources and academic reports. This review included research on the numbers of migrants, the different waves of migration (which reflect both
political and economic difficulties in Iraq as well as opportunities available abroad), the different forms of interaction with Iraq, and the opportunities for return migration.

This literature research is buttressed by ten semi-structured informal interviews focused on oral historical responses, using open-ended questions to allow both the interviewer and the interviewee to focus on particular points as the interview developed.\(^2\) These interviews were conducted individually with each subject, from February to September 2010, with Iraqis living abroad who had made one or multiple return trips to Iraq in the preceding two years. Three interviews were not recorded with a recording device, but all interviews were transcribed. Interviews were chosen to complement the existing literature with the supposition that individual experiences could illuminate various motivations and goals present among those expatriates who had returned to Iraq recently, either on a temporary or permanent\(^3\) basis. The interviews focused on the subjects’ reasons for return, their experiences while in Iraq and their opinions about the future development of the country. To encourage a more open discussion of the interviewee’s experience, each interviewee was reminded that they would remain anonymous in this study.

These interviewees were selected opportunistically, relying on personal contacts from family, friends and academic relationships at the University of Vienna. Because of this, there is an important limitation to the conclusions I can draw from these interviews. My family is Christian Iraqi, a very small minority in Iraq, and most interviews I conducted of family members or through family connections were with Christians (four out of the five). My family’s background provides both unique insight and limits to my understanding of the Iraqi diaspora. They are Christian Iraqis who left Iraq from the mid 1970s until the mid 1990s, emigration caused by a mixture of economic reasons and persecution under Saddam Hussein. However, two of the Christian Iraqi interviewees contacted through family connections left in 2009. Due to their specific history of persecution and socioeconomic background, their input is limited to a small percent of the Iraqi population. Christians are overrepresented in the diaspora, so these interviewees may be representative of the feelings of a large section of the Iraqi diaspora, but they may not represent the majority. Furthermore, the interviews I had with Iraqis who had settled in Austria and had returned were only with Kurds, also overrepresented in the diaspora.


\(^3\) However, only one permanent returnee was interviewed. See Table 1 in Annex.
Due to the overrepresentation of these communities in the diaspora, these interviews may be representative of the attitudes of a large section of the community abroad, but they may not represent those currently living in Iraq, or even the majority of the Christian or Kurdish Iraqi communities abroad. In the best of all possible worlds, I would have been able to sample a larger segment of the Iraqi diaspora, representative of each particular emigrant group. This is a technical problem I alleviated by contacting other Iraqi migrants of Sunni or Shi’a background. Nevertheless, the life stories and information offered by interviewees complemented the qualitative research. Even more, they offer tangible examples of the motivations and expectations of certain Iraqis for return. The personal stories of Iraqis provided insight into this specific situation that secondary literature could not provide.

Table 1 in the Annex outlines the basic characteristics of interviewees: date of emigration, ethnicity, education, religion, host countries and reason for return. Two interviews were with Kurdish Iraqis who had migrated to Austria, six were with Arab Iraqis who had moved to the U.S., and two were with Arab Iraqis living in Egypt. Four interviews were with Christians, two with Sunni Muslims, one with a Shi’a Muslim and three stated that they were not religious (although one of these stated that she comes from a conservative and practicing Muslim family). Half of the interviewees left Iraq after 2003, and the others left while Saddam Hussein was still in power (but before 1995). Only one interviewee returned permanently, and all return trips occurred within the last two years. When face-to-face or telephone interviews were not feasible, detailed surveys targeted to the specific person’s migration experience were used. I was able to tailor the interview or survey because I either knew the subject personally, or was introduced to them through a mutual contact who informed me of basic information (e.g. host country, temporary return migration experience).

Thirdly, I was able to correspond and meet with two scholars of Iraqi migration currently doing research in Iraq and/or Jordan, conducting two expert interviews. These connections proved invaluable as sources of information on the current situation, since there is a dearth of literature on Iraqi migration patterns and transnational connections, a lack of reliable statistics, and I was unable to do first-hand research in Iraq.

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4 See Annex for an example of a survey.
For pragmatic reasons I was not able to do research in Iraq. However, this study is valid as it uses the research currently available. Furthermore, it integrates input from experts currently doing research in Iraq as well as Iraqis who have made return trips to Iraq recently.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

2.1 Definitions

2.1.1 Home country, host country, diaspora, expatriate, local, skilled migrant

Each of these terms is used within this thesis in different ways. Home country and host country correspond to the country of birth and the country of citizenship or settlement, respectively. The term “diaspora” will be used to describe the larger Iraqi community living abroad, including those of the second generation and those born in Iraq but raised abroad. According to Sheffer: “Modern diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their homelands.” This term will also be used to include Iraqi Kurds, as their Kurdish homeland overlaps with the current borders of the Iraqi state. Expatriates form a subset within this group, referring to individual Iraqi-born persons residing abroad, who may or may not participate in a larger Iraqi community. This will be used to describe persons who permanently reside abroad, even if they make a short return trips to their home country, in contrast to the term “local”, which will be used to describe those within the home country who do not live abroad. A further subset is skilled migrants or professionals, whom Vertovec has defined as those with a tertiary-level education or “extensive specialized work experience.”

2.1.2 Development

For the purpose of this thesis, I use the UNRISD draft definition of development in referring to development. Development:

- can be broadly understood as processes of change that lead to improvements in human well-being, social relations and social institutions, that are equitable, sustainable, and compatible with principles of democratic governance and social justice...[moving] away from a singular focus on economic growth and material

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well-being (measured in terms of income or GDP), or concern with the agency of the abstract individual, towards an approach which reintegrates social and collective dimensions into the fundamental conceptualization, measurement and practice of ‘development’ and which rejects the widely accepted dualism of ‘the economic’ and ‘the social’.

This definition emphasizes the importance of economic growth alongside increased well-being. Development should not been seen in purely economic terms, as it encompasses economic, social and political dimensions. These other dimensions should be included and addressed, for they have important impacts on a person’s quality of life and long-term goals. Therefore, when referring to “development”, this thesis refers to a wider concept that covers the economic, social and political aspects.

2.2 Theory

Existing migration theory tends to stress the push and pull factors of migration: certain reasons “push” a migrant out of his or her country, while other reasons “pull” a migrant from his or her country, e.g. a migrant would be “pushed” from his or her home country because there are no job opportunities there, and would be “pulled” to a host country based on the opportunities offered there. These factors have often been framed as economic decisions, whether on the micro or macro level. However, as de Haas has highlighted, “an improved theoretical perspective on migration and development has to be able to account for the role of structure—the constraining or enabling general political, institutional, economic, social and cultural context in which migration takes place—as well as agency—the limited but real capacity of individuals to overcome constraints and potentially reshape structure.” Furthermore, the relationship between migration and development must also “be scrutinized as a field of struggle where different actors are involved in trying to establish their visions of development and change.” This perspective would account for both micro and macro level factors, both of which impact migration.

The New Economics of Migration theory is one such way to integrate both levels, as it places migrants in a larger societal context, taking into account family or community strategies

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7 UNRISD (2010), Unofficial draft.
for risk sharing and a variety of markets. Stark and Bloom\textsuperscript{10} especially pioneered this theory, framing migration decisions as a way to diversify risk at the meso level: neither as an individual decision nor as a result of market trends, but at the community level, between the two.\textsuperscript{11} Network theory also brings together the micro and the macro levels. Tilly has defined networks as “neither individuals nor households but sets of people linked by acquaintance, kinship and work experience.”\textsuperscript{12} These networks link populations in home countries and host countries across time and space.\textsuperscript{13} This theory, extensively elaborated by Massey\textsuperscript{14}, posits that networks increase the chance for migration. Migration costs and risks are reduced and benefits increase if potential migrants have a network abroad, as this network can serve as a support structure, establishing a migrant socially and economically in the new country. Migrant networks can make migration seem more appealing to those in the home country by easing the job search, establishment of connections to others and integration into the host country. Massey et al. have argued that at a certain point migration “becomes self-perpetuating because each act of migration itself creates the social structure needed to sustain it.”\textsuperscript{15} The first migrant establishes a network by connecting him or herself with persons in the home country, and thus improves the chances for others in the home country to migrate. Myrdal and Massey have called this process cumulative causation, as each individual migration makes it more likely for others in the home society to migrate.\textsuperscript{16} Network theory has also called attention to the inequalities created within networks, based on social relations: “social ties in pre-migration networks are related to factors affecting which people migrate, the means of migration, the destination (including locality, accommodation and


\textsuperscript{11} However, this theory has been criticized because power structures and inequalities between households and based on age, gender, etc. are not taken into account. Furthermore, it overlooks non-familial social bonds and individual agency of family members, who may migrate against family wishes. See de Haas, Migration, pp. 251-256.


\textsuperscript{15} Massey et al., Theories, p. 449.

often specific job) and future prospects for physical and occupational mobility.” If networks perpetuate migration, it stands to reason that migration would be encouraged primarily in specific sections of the home and host society, where the network operates.

Recently, more attention has been focused on the engagement of diasporas, whose networks may encourage emigration from the home country, impacting the economic development of the home country. This has spurred a “brain drain” versus “brain gain” debate. The migration of the highly skilled from low-income countries to high-income countries, largely in North America and Europe, has been termed a “brain drain” because of the loss of skills and capital this represents for poorer countries. The OECD has recently highlighted the negative role the “brain drain” has on low-income countries:

First, the loss of skilled and innovative people often means the loss of their ideas for productivity and governance and the benefits they would otherwise provide to their coworkers, students and fellow citizens.

Second, in many countries a significant portion of the cost of education is paid for out of fiscal revenues. The departure of highly educated emigrants then represents an export of human capital in which the nation has invested. In addition, there is a loss of potential tax revenue that might have been raised from the income of the emigrant, though this needs to be balanced against diminished public spending on the emigrant and his or her family as well as transfers to the home economy via remittances…

Third, the loss of key personnel makes the delivery of critical social services, such as health care and education, more difficult.

On the other hand, if these highly skilled individuals were to stay in their home countries or all return home, their skills may not be put to use, the result of which would be a “brain waste”. “Brain gain” or, more recently, “brain circulation”, has been argued by Stark, Bloom, Newland, Hugo and others as a way for development in the home country to be encouraged through the emigration of the highly skilled. In this case, migration provides an opportunity for the highly skilled to increase their economic, cultural and social capital, which can then be engaged in the home country: “For many countries, Diaspora are a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI), market development (including outsourcing of production), technology transfer,

17 Vertovec, Transnational, p. 3.
18 OECD (2007), Policy Coherence for Development: Migration and Developing Countries, Paris: OECD.
philanthropy, tourism, political contributions, and more tangible flows of knowledge, new attitudes, and cultural influence.” 20 In fact, the World Bank estimated the level of remittances to developing countries at US$325 billion in 2010. 21 However, in 2008, remittances to Iraq were estimated at only US$3 million. 22 Although remittances can have an important impact on the economic development of a country, this thesis will not concentrate on the abstract level of remittances and GDP, as the proportion of remittances to Iraq is relatively small, comparatively. Rather, attention will be focused on the return of human capital, especially that of skilled migrants. Newland and Hugo have described the attraction of circular migration for home country development, through the return of skills without forcing expatriates to permanently return. 23 Many programs have been based on this concept: the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) repatriation efforts and the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program have been lauded for their role in engaging expatriate professionals in developing countries (despite the low participation of expatriates and the high costs). The Iraqis Building Iraq (IRI) program, which will be discussed later, was in fact modeled after TOKTEN. Moreover, Meyer and Brown detected “at least forty-one formal knowledge networks linking thirty countries to their skilled nationals abroad…categorize[d] …into five types: student/scholarly networks, local associations of skilled expatriates, expert pool assistance through TOKTEN, and intellectual/scientific diaspora networks.” 24 These networks specifically target skilled migrants for work in the home country, often in the context of development work.

In fact, diasporas have a dual role. They can encourage “brain drain” as well as “brain gain”. At the same time, diasporas can be peace-makers and peace-wreckers in their home society, especially when one examines post-conflict societies. Koser and Brinkerhoff have emphasized diasporas as partners in war-torn societies, linking internal and external actors in

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peace-making activities. On the other hand, Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen have shown that in some cases diaspora involvement may prolong conflicts. Smith’s *Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers* provides ten case studies of diaspora engagement in home countries, demonstrating the spectrum of involvement. She finds that: “Diasporas can be both ‘peace-makers’ and ‘peace-wreckers’; they can be both at different periods and at the same time, and in order to assess their role it is necessary to understand the historical context, as well as their interests, aspirations, institutions and objectives.” In fact, as Raghuram emphasizes, “outcomes depend on what form diasporic interventions take.” The multiple factors at play within the diaspora, as well as the varied actors with whom the diaspora interacts, guide diaspora actions. Therefore, diaspora engagement with the home country can have ambiguous, or even contradictory, results.

A transnational perspective integrates these complexities, emphasizing the multiple connections migrants may have. It recognizes that migrants may engage simultaneously with two or more societies and that migration is often transitory and recurring. This concept evolved in contrast to the previous assumption that migration was unidirectional, direct and permanent. Transnational theories emerged in the early 1990s, and focus on the cross-border activities in which migrants engage, linking countries of origin, destination and transit through family, social, economic, political, organizational and religious connections. The “transnational turn” has brought new insights to migration theory, drawing attention to that which has been previously overlooked, such as inequalities based on social differences, the new effects of globalization, and

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the overlaps between political and economic migrants. Due to the boundary-crossing nature of these connections, Pries, Faist, Özveren and others have studied the non-national spaces within which migrants and their networks now operate.

In particular, the concept of transnationalism has recognized the inequalities at play among migrants. Transnational activity is characteristic of many Diasporas, who often participate simultaneously in their home and their host countries, as well as with their diasporic communities in other countries. Gender, age, class, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, regional differences and even specific experiences of conflicts are all important factors at play within a diaspora. Davies, Al-Ali and Koser have highlighted the significance of various levels of power relations that change over time and space, especially as globalization has amplified these inequalities. Davies has outlined various forms of domination and subordination that affect power relations:

- local, regional, national and global levels;
- class;
- non-reductionist and non-essentialist means of examining, negotiating and contextualizing properties of social identities; and
- inclusion of political, ethnic, and ideological components within an autonomous political dynamic.

Inequalities are also especially noticeable in terms of gender across these levels, as elite males tend to lead the community, despite the increase in female-headed households in post-conflict societies, and as gender relations affect the networks available to migrants. All of these different forms of power hierarchies not only interact within each level, but also among them,

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33 Davies, Reconceptualising, pp. 69-71.


35 Vertovec, “Transnational, p. 5.
creating complex arrangements of power that affects who migrates and to where, as well as who returns, with which means and to where.

Al-Ali and Koser in particular have discussed the importance of motivation for diasporic engagement. There are differences between the motivations for migration, which are reflected in “push and pull” factors, and the motivations to be involved in transnational activities, which may reflect nationalist sentiments, political motivations, desires for an improved status, social pressure, and feelings of guilt, all of which interact with the manifold power structures at play. Furthermore, Levitt and Nyberg-Sørenson et al. add the important factor of the destination country, the latter noting that migration should be understood within a “framework of interests and obligations that results from migrants’ simultaneous engagement in countries of origin and destination.”

Therefore, diasporic engagement reflects motivations driven by various experiences in the home country, host country and/or within the diaspora. At the same time, these motivations are deeply rooted in the power relations at play in these spaces and at all levels. This means that while one refers to a “diaspora” as the national community living outside the country, this community is not homogeneous. Rather, the different power structures impact an expatriate’s goals, frame of mind and opportunities concerning the home country.

These concepts have implications for the developmental role that transmigrants play; positions of power in the home and host countries favor some groups over others, and the reasons for transnational activity may not be conducive to sustainable development. Newland has highlighted this complex role: “Such differences within and among Diaspora groups will influence the nature and scale of their capacity (and willingness) to act as agents of poverty reduction.” So, when analyzing diaspora engagement, it is crucial to be mindful of the inequalities at play within a diaspora, as they can be reproduced within diaspora activities, which may not be conducive to certain development goals.

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37 Newland with Patrick, Beyond, p. 29.
Case Study: Iraq

Context

Iraq is an oil-rich country in the Middle East, bordered by Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. It has a population of 31.5 million\(^\text{38}\), with an Arab majority\(^\text{39}\), but a significant Kurdish minority\(^\text{40}\) and a small population of Turkmen, both based largely in the northern part of the country. Many within the Kurdish population do not identify as Iraqi but rather as Kurdish, and aspire to an independent Kurdistan. Iraq’s population is 95% Muslim, of which the majority is Shi’a, although Sunnis have traditionally held power.\(^\text{41}\) The remaining population is mostly Christian, of which there are various sects (Chaldeans, Assyrians, Roman Catholics), and a small number of Mandeans (who follow an ancient religion) and Yazidis (whose religion integrates elements of Islam and Christianity). Assyrians and Chaldeans come from the North, and tend to speak both Aramaic and Arabic, and Kurds speak Kurdish, although as part of the Arabization policy of the Ba'ath regime in the late 1980s most were forced to learn Arabic.

Iraqi citizenship can currently be obtained through birth in Iraq or by having a father and/or mother who is an Iraqi citizen, and “any Iraqi, who was denaturalized on political, religious, racist or sectarian grounds, shall have the right to restore his Iraqi nationality” except for Jews who lost their citizenship in 1950 and 1952.\(^\text{42}\) Furthermore, visas can be issued without reference to the ministry for: wives of Iraqis, foreigners of Iraqi origin and their families, foreign students, truck drivers, accredited diplomats and foreigners born in Iraq and their families.\(^\text{43}\) Therefore, Iraqi citizenship or entry visas can be obtained easily by many of those who lost their citizenship during Saddam Hussein’s regime, as well as their children, but this excludes Jewish Iraqis.

Iraq’s recent history has been dominated by the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, who

\(^\text{40}\) According to Sirkeci, Iraqi, p. 43: 12-15% Kurdish minority.
\(^\text{41}\) According to Sirkeci, Iraqi, p. 43: approximately 95% Muslim population, of which 60-65% is Shi’a and 32-37% is Sunni.
ruled the country from 1979 until 2003. He presented himself as the leader of the Ba’th party, a pan-Arabism political party, and a Sunni Muslim. During his dictatorship, Iraq experienced two wars and severe sanctions: the Iran-Iraq War from September 1980 to August 1988, the Gulf War from August 1990 to February 1991, and economic sanctions from August 1990 until May 2003. While the wars destroyed Iraq economically and militarily, the sanctions led to a severe humanitarian crisis, characterized by a lack of medical supplies, food and clean water. Moreover, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thist totalitarian regime suppressed all perceived opposition, through extensive surveillance systems, forced displacements, organized mass killings and torture. On May 22, 2003, Saddam Hussein’s regime fell following a month-long U.S.-led military invasion of the country and a Provisional Government was set up.

Post-invasion, unemployment soared, especially among Sunnis, due to the policy of de-Ba’thification, which dismissed around 30,000 Iraqis in middle-management jobs in ministries, schools and hospitals. In addition, there was nothing put into place to productively channel the large numbers of police or military members who were immediately dismissed from their jobs. The high unemployment levels likely fed into the growing power of militias, who soon gained control of various parts of the country, inciting civil warfare. Militias forming along sectarian or tribal lines offered protection in return for service, for which every adult man had been trained due to their mandatory military service under Saddam Hussein. Violence escalated, and all international organizations withdrew from Iraq the 22 September 2003. Although elections were held and a new constitution written in 2005, the February 2006 bombing of the sacred Shi’a mosque Askariya in Samarra, a city just north of Baghdad, provoked a resurgence in sectarian violence. Due to sectarian violence, counter attacks by the occupation forces, and corruption at all levels of government, among the many problems Iraq faces, its infrastructure is in tatters. Regardless of the current weakness of the Iraqi state, in September 2010, the U.S. ended its combat mission in Iraq, withdrawing the last combat brigade on the 20 August 2010. This withdrawal occurred despite the lack of a coalition government nearly six months after the March 7th election, in which Ayad Allawi of the al-Iraqiya coalition won by a mere 0.5% over

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44 Supported by troops from the U.K., Australia and Poland.
outgoing president Nouri al-Maliki of the State of Law Coalition. A tentative coalition was finally formed in November 2010, a full eight months after the elections.

Iraq continues to be overwhelmed by corruption, lack of services and violence, among the many issues the country faces. Since 2003, the controversial Iraq Body Count has estimated over 100,000\(^{46}\) Iraqi civilian deaths and UNHCR has estimated five million\(^{47}\) displaced to neighboring countries or regions, and there is currently a critical situation for Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons. Nevertheless, there has in fact been a limited amount of return of expatriate Iraqi professionals. This group tends to have left Iraq prior to 2003 and to return for short-term consultancies on reconstruction efforts at higher levels of society.

Because these expatriates tend to have left Iraq before 2003, and are considered members of a larger Iraqi diaspora, I first must outline the Iraqi population living outside the country and the circumstances under which they left the country. I will refer to them collectively as the Iraqi diaspora, although all members of the population do not necessarily identify themselves as part of this larger community. The reasons for emigration and the place of settlement affect motivations for return and their view of the home country. Shi’a Muslims, Ba’thists fleeing after 2003, Kurds, Christians and Jews all think differently about Iraq because they tended to leave under different circumstances and used different networks to immigrate to different host countries. As Chatelard, a prominent Iraqi scholar, notes, Iraqis “were themselves fragmented along strong class lines, various experiences that had prompted the migratory decision, political outlook, and, at times, religious or ethnic affiliations. Under these conditions...there existed no unified Iraqi exile community in any given reception country to speak in the name of an Iraqi migrant constituency.”\(^{48}\) Thus the characteristics of Iraqi emigration are key to how various communities feel towards Iraq, and especially their desire to return. Each community’s memories of Iraq vary, as do their views of the future, so the recruitment and return of any of these groups would affect development projects in Iraq. Therefore, in order to understand the role of Iraqi expatriates in development planning, it is important to first understand that their motivations, desires and expectations differ based on specific historical, cultural, religious, social, gendered and/or ethnic characteristics.

Because of Iraq's tumultuous history, Iraqis have migrated in significant numbers since the late 1950s, for political and/or economic reasons. In 2003, one out of every six Iraqis was abroad, and in 2004 this population was estimated at four million persons. To demonstrate the diversity of the Iraqi diaspora, I will first outline the history of Iraqi international migration, which began in the 1940s and 1950s, and over time affected particular groups during certain periods. It can be broken up into two periods: from the 1950s until 1990, and from 1990 to today. The first period is primarily migration for political reasons, while in the latter period, economic reasons become increasingly important. Then, in Chapter 4, I will discuss the most significant host countries for Iraqi migrants: the United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, Syria and Jordan. The Iraqi communities in each country vary due to the specific networks based on social, ethnic or religious ties that brought them there and their legal, social and economic situation in the host country, which affects the forms of engagement the communities have with Iraq. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will turn to the temporary return migration of skilled Iraqis, occurring through international programs and individual endeavors. In this last section I will use findings from my interviews evoking the various motivations for and experiences of return to complement the analysis of programs that recruited members of the Iraqi Diaspora (in particular Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq and the Local Governance Program) and the concept of “re-engagement”, or transnational activities of Iraqis in neighboring countries.

Chapter 3: A Short History of Iraqi Emigration

3.1 1950s to the 1990s

Beginning in the 1940s, Iraq experienced classical chain migration on a small scale: primarily men went abroad to pursue higher education and greater economic opportunities, and when some decided to stay abroad, they brought over their families. Soon, others were encouraged by the first generation's success and joined them abroad, but in the 1950s this group was supplanted by political migrants, who characterize the first wave of Iraqi emigration.

The first large-scale forced migration from Iraq was the expulsion of the Jewish Iraqis following the establishment of Israel. The community of 130,000 Jewish Iraqis was well-integrated within the Iraqi population and, although there were rare tensions, it was not until the establishment of Israel in 1948 that there was systematic harassment of Jews. Over the next few years, Jewish Iraqis were forcibly moved to Israel, and by 1952 only a few thousand remained. Then, in 1958, a coup d'état of the Iraqi Army overthrew the monarchy, establishing a government friendly to the Soviet Union. With the fall of the monarchy, the Sunni upper-classes, politicians and landowners, those who made up the monarchy bureaucracy, fled the country, mostly towards Jordan and the United Kingdom.

But this government lasted only to 1963, when it was overthrown by a coup of the Ba’th Party, led by Colonel Abdul Salam Arif and General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakir. This coup pushed most of the communist sympathizers out of the country through door-to-door assassinations of supposed communists. For those in the exiled communist party, Paris and various Italian cities served as important poles, due to the historical significance of communist parties in France and Italy. However, Salam Arif died in 1966 and his brother took over, who was then overturned by a coup in 1968 that successfully established the Ba’th Party, with the aging al-Bakir as president and Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti as his vice president. Members of opposition groups, especially the few remaining communists, left soon after, but the increasing instability signaled by the

51 Ibid, p. 27.
53 Al-Ali, Untold, p. 20.
numerous coups caused many others to leave as well. Sassoon notes that “some of the best physicians left in 1969 and many of the teaching faculty of the Baghdad Medical School emigrated to the West.” The exodus of the highly educated and skilled was soon recognized by the government, which tried to discourage further emigration. In the 1980s, Dowty analyzed emigration policies worldwide, placing Iraq among 21 states that impose the most stringent limits on emigration: “Although large numbers [of people] may occasionally leave such states, legal exit is basically viewed as a privilege to be granted by the government rather than a right to be exercised.” Passports were obtained based on individual or family loyalty to, or at the very least compliance with the regime. Once a passport was obtained, there were still multiple requirements in order to leave. Among the measures taken if one was leaving the country, the government required a guarantor who would be held responsible if the migrant did not return. Moreover, there were surveillance systems in place to ensure that people were not planning to leave, and if the hopeful migrants were discovered, they would be imprisoned and likely tortured.

The government also tried to win back those who had left during the 1970s and 1980s by developing the education sector and emphasizing secularism and women’s participation in society. The Iraqi Provisional Constitution of 1970 granted women equal rights. Women attended universities, in the same courses as men, had the right to a year’s maternity leave, integrated into the workforce, owned property, voted and ran for office. In addition, the Personal Status Code, which was updated in 1978, restricted men’s ability to divorce their wives and increased women’s rights to divorce, extended women’s child custody, regulated inheritance requirements and placed limitations on polygamous, child and forced marriages. The General

58 The Personal Status Law, originally written in 1959, was applied to Muslims (Christians and others were governed partly by state law, partly by tribal law) and ensured women’s rights and equal treatment between Shi’as and Sunnis. Immediately after the 1963 coup, Ba’thists and Arab nationalists amended the code to make it more consistent with shari’a Muslim law. In 1978, the new Ba’th regime revised it again, extending more rights to Iraqi women. For an overview of the developments in the Personal Status Law, see: Noga Efrati (2005, Autumn), “Negotiating Rights in Iraq: Women and the Personal Status Law”, The Middle East Journal (59)4, pp. 577 – 595.
Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) was set up to replace women’s organizations, as the coup disbanded civil society groups. The GFIW had a contentious role, as it:

...grew to play a significant role in implementing state policy, primarily through its role in running more than 250 rural and urban community centers offering job-training, educational, and other social programs for women and acting as a channel for communication of state propaganda. Female officers within the GFIW also played a role in the implementation of legal reforms advancing women’s status under the law and in lobbying for changes to the personal status code. On the other hand, some Iraqi women have argued that as a political arm of the Ba’ath party, the GFIW was destructive to women’s issues in Iraq and ‘did not reflect or represent the struggle of millions of oppressed Iraqi women.’\(^{59}\)

So, although women’s rights and participation in society were encouraged, this was at times at the expense of others. The government co-opted women’s issues for its own agenda, and while it tackled concerns related to illiteracy, access to education and women’s rights, its disbanding of the entire independent civil society sector ensured that there was no independent voice was heard. This was obvious to many intellectuals at the time, many of whom chose to immigrate to Western countries where freedom of speech was protected.

At the same time as it was trying to win back the highly skilled, the government was deporting those it considered undesirable. From 1969 onwards, the Fayli Kurds, a Shi’a minority within the Sunni Kurdish population, were forcefully deported to Iran along with any others considered of Iranian origin as part of the policy of Arabization.\(^{60}\) This grew to later include “mass deportation of Kurds (and later Turkmen), confiscation of their properties, and the implantation of Arabs in their houses. This well-calculated ethnic cleansing, which remained in force for more than three decades, not only produced tens of thousands of refugees and IDPs, it also created ethnic tensions in an area that previously had been spared similar manifestations.”\(^{61}\)

The open war of the Kurds against the Iraqi regime led to a large-scale Kurdish emigration, and their early establishment of migratory networks served to facilitate further Kurdish migration through communal and familial connections. But it was not the violence against the Kurds, which would only increase in the 1980s, that would serve as the real wake-up call for most Iraqis. Rather, it was July 1979, when Saddam Hussein consolidated his power, forcing al-Bakir

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\(^{59}\) Human Rights Watch, Background.

\(^{60}\) Al-Ali, Untold, p. 54.

\(^{61}\) Wanche, Assessment, p. 5.
to resign and executing several top members of the Ba'th Party. From this moment until the American invasion in 2003, Saddam Hussein remained in power and migration steadily increased.

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 meant the amplification of violence, especially against Kurds and those considered of Iranian origin, as Hussein’s policy of Arabization targeted all those considered insurgents. The genocidal al-Anfal campaign between 1986 and 1989, which caused the destruction of villages and the gassing of thousands of Kurds, caused mass panic in northern Iraq and the migration of thousands to neighboring countries. The majority of migration during the 1980s was to Iran, through either expulsion or migration caused under extreme duress. The regime expelled thousands of “urban Shi'ite religious and economic elites and members of the middle-class whom the regime considered a threat to the consolidation of its power and who, in many cases, had no family links to Iran...” Among these were supporters of the Iranian revolution, deserters from the army, refugees and Kurds, who used the established cross-border networks based on commercial, religious, political and family ties.

Up until 1990, migration was dominated by people leaving for political reasons. It was rarely solely for employment, as Iraq was an importer of labor for its oil industry. In fact, an estimated one million unskilled migrant workers lived in Iraq in the 1980s. Chatelard highlights the political and economic factors at work in Iraqi migration before 1990:

The characteristics of Iraqi migration reflected the political and economic circumstances of the country that was producing it: its economic prosperity based on oil-extraction and trade; the developmental choices made by the regime that had allowed the emergence of a class of cadres and professionals who were granted employment; an unstable and contested state challenged by a variety of political movements; a problematic national construction in which some ethnic and confessional groups were targeted collectively by the regime; and a territorial sovereignty which was disputed internally and externally.

Between 1948 and 1990, Iraqi migration consisted largely of migrants along the spectrum of forced migration: from being physically moved out of the country to political persecution—

62 Al-Ali, Untold, p. 54.
63 Chatelard, Migration, p. 6.
64 Ibid, p. 7.
represented by censorship and surveillance—pressuring a person to leave. During this time, Iraqis left largely for political reasons rather than economic, as Iraq’s oil industry made the country wealthier than its neighbors and actually contributed to a growing middle class. But the increased violence under Saddam Hussein's regime, despite its rich resources, was a crucial factor in the emigration of a large part of the Iraqi population, especially the skilled and educated. Jews, monarchists, communists, Kurds, in fact anyone viewed as opposition to the ruling party, were targeted during this time and chose to migrate due to the unfriendly political situation. Because of the ethnic background and specific circumstances for leaving, many of these minorities remained in their distinct groups while abroad, especially as some groups had targeted others while in power, but this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

3.2 1990s until today

As Nyberg Sørenson, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen have highlighted, poverty often becomes the final “push” for people to leave a politically harsh environment. For Iraqis this proved especially true: the majority of emigration happened during or after the Gulf War, as Iraqis, primarily of the upper- to middle-classes, realized that their chances were severely diminished by two consecutive wars and the subsequent economic sanctions. The exile community before the Gulf War has been estimated between one and one and a half million, but between 1990 and 2002 another one and a half million Iraqis left for long-term settlement elsewhere. The eight-year Iran-Iraq war constituted a major drain on the economy, but the Gulf War and the sanctions completely isolated Iraq from the rest of the world, disconnecting its income and effectively destroying its economy, which was based on oil revenue. Iraqis increasingly migrated for a mixture of reasons; political reasons still featured prominently, but the destruction of the Iraqi economy by wars and sanctions caused thousands more to emigrate for economic reasons. Iraqis left en masse as a result of the American-encouraged uprisings of the Iraqi Kurds and Shi’as (the intifada) in 1991 and their subsequent bloody repression, the drainage of the marshlands and dispossession of the Marsh Arabs from 1991-1995, and especially the imposition of economic

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68 Chatelard, Migration, p. 13; and Sassoon, Iraqi, p. 140.
sanctions from 1990 to 2003, during which food and clean water were at times scarce.

The economic sanctions had a disproportionate effect on women, whose advancements were reversed as women were pushed out of the workforce to make way for men, the financial ability to send children to school was severely reduced and tribal and conservative religious groups gained power. It is important to note the high amount of female-led households in Iraq in the 1990s. The Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s repression of opposition groups (especially targeting adult men, as was the case with the Marsh Arabs, for example) and especially the Iran-Iraq war stripped Iraq of a large amount of adult men: the Iran-Iraq War was devastating to both sides, but Iraqi casualties estimated at between 200,000-500,000 killed or wounded, in addition to thousands of civilians who died from air attacks. While there was a welfare and childcare system for women, they were increasingly excluded from the labor market and especially hard-hit by poverty, inadequate health care, no electricity or clean water, violence and lack of security.

The sanctions not only weakened women’s status and effectively destroyed the Iraqi economy, but it also had a devastating effect on education, causing a huge wave of brain drain: “No research journals were allowed to arrive in Iraq once the sanctions took effect. Also, there was a total embargo on Iraqis participating in international conferences. At that time, the internet was not prevalent and so research journals and conferences were the main channels for learning and development, particularly with regard to scientific research.”

Iraqi education was hit hard, and migration snowballed; the higher classes, those with connections to obtain money for exit or skills desired for labor contracts in other countries (especially Jordan, Yemen and Libya), left the country. In response to the exodus of the Iraqi upper- to middle-class, educated, urban community, the regime implemented an exit tax in 1993 and then in 1994 a deposit of one million Iraqi dinars (US$665) as a guarantee of return for all those with university degrees, in addition to various other requirements.

Migrants also had to pay large sums to obtain travel documents. There was also the social pressure that punished the families of those who left illegally, putting them under surveillance by the secret police and in potential danger. On the other hand, amnesties were also granted for some who had sought asylum (who, under the law, could be sentenced to death) in the 1990s and 2000s in an attempt to bring Iraqi professionals

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69 Sassoon, Iraqi, p. 146.
70 Chatelard, Migration, p. 16.
These measures did discourage two groups of the middle-class from leaving: “First, those who were under no direct physical threat but were affected by the deterioration in living standards resulting from the economic blockade. Second those whose access to financial means was limited or who, having insufficient capital, were unable to mobilise such capital within their own social groups.” Therefore, those that left were either under direct pressure or had sufficient funds (on their own or with help from networks) to leave and establish themselves in a new country. Nonetheless, migrants used their class and professional assets, as well as communal networks (especially in the case of Assyrians and Chaldeans) to emigrate, and by the time of the American invasion in 2003, the Iraqi diaspora had doubled in a little over ten years, with estimates ranging from two to four million Iraqi exiles.

The American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the defeat of Saddam's regime, rather than reversing the Iraqi brain drain, accelerated it by worsening the humanitarian crisis and destroying infrastructure. Although there was originally no large refugee or emigration movement post-invasion (save for high-level Ba’thists fleeing the country), and in fact some Iraqis returned, hoping to play a role in post-Saddam Iraq, the poor handling of the country post-invasion plunged the country into violence and contributed to higher levels of emigration:

The state under the Ba’th regime functioned despite being constrained by severe and inhumane sanctions. The occupation authorities, on the other hand, dismantled the key pillars of the state before setting up new ones. As a result, many parts of the functioning machine imploded, leading a dramatic degradation in the provision of essential services, health care, education and the civil service. Corruption...spread and permeated all levels of government. There is no doubt that the decline in all vital sectors began in the 1990s, but after the invasion the state could barely function.

Although the networks facilitating migration were much the same, Sassoon sees a crucial difference between the decision-making process for migration during the Ba’th regime and migration after 2003. During the Ba’th regime, Iraqis were forced between the decision of either submission or flight, while now they are faced with an impossible situation plagued by violence, low public services, high unemployment, growing poverty, corruption, and smuggling. Nonetheless, from 1990 until today, economic reasons became deeply intertwined with political

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71 Ibid, p. 17.  
72 Idem, p. 20.  
73 Idem, p. 3.  
74 Idem, p. 139.
reasons for leaving, as the Iraqi economy went from bad to worse under economic sanctions and then post-2003 mismanagement.

Part of the reason for the disintegration of the state was the policy of blanket de-Ba'thification: “Overnight almost 30,000 Iraqis…were dismissed from their jobs. The senior management of the country had already fled or been arrested and now middle management were kicked out. The result was a huge vacuum the Americans could not fill.”75 That, in addition to the disbanding of the 500,000 member Iraqi Army, created hundreds of thousands of unemployed, which may have fed into the growing sectarian violence. The unemployment rate for Iraqi professionals soared: a UNDP and Iraqi Ministry of Planning survey estimated unemployment for men with secondary or tertiary education at 37.2 percent.76 Many of those of the middle class that had not left before now fled, taking much-needed capital away from the country.

As Iraq descended into civil war, women, minorities and returned exiles became the most vulnerable for attack in Iraq, as they lacked the connections needed for protection. One Christian interviewed for this study highlighted the change within her neighborhood, “Under Saddam, we had no problems, and lived in a mixed neighborhood. But the feeling changed after, and we had more worries. For forty years we lived there and knew the families, and then we started getting threats, threatening snipers and bribes to leave.”77 The increasing sectarian violence has especially had disastrous effects on women’s rights: women are now prevented from attending classes with their male colleagues and are vulnerable to attack if they are unaccompanied or deemed to be inappropriately dressed. Due primarily to the lack of progress in women’s issues, in February 2009 the Minister of Women’s Affairs Nawal al-Samaraie resigned, accusing the government of “ignoring what she called an ‘army’ of uneducated women, widows, victims of domestic violence and female internally displaced persons who were in dire need of assistance.”78 Moreover, unemployment is high for women, and many have turned to domestic work despite their college credentials.79

At the same time, women have also been at the forefront of improving conditions. Al-

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75 Idem, p. 130.
77 Personal interview, 20 February 2010.
Ali’s work with Iraqi women has highlighted the main issues mobilizing women in Iraq today\textsuperscript{80}:

(1) the attempt to replace the relatively progressive personal status law governing marriage, divorce and child custody with a more conservative law (Article 137 in 2003, and Article 41 of the new constitution 2005/06); (2) the issue of a women’s quota for political representation …; (3) the struggle against sectarianism and for national unity; (4) struggle against Islamist encroachment both from political parties and from militias and terrorist organizations; (5) the debate over the Iraqi constitution, mainly with respect to the role of Islam, the personal status laws and the demand to include an article covering international conventions… and (6) the targeted murders of professional women and women’s rights activists.\textsuperscript{81}

To work on these issues, women have organized themselves, and have emerged as particularly strong civil society actors. Although civil society organizations were disbanded under Saddam Hussein, they reemerged after 2003 and women’s groups especially have flourished. Many of these groups are founded by diaspora returnees (who left before 2003), members of appointed interim governments or prominent professional women with ties to political parties. Although the groups are founded and represented by elite women, some have broad membership with branches throughout the country and varying views of the occupation.\textsuperscript{82} Especially of note are the National Council of Women (NWC), Iraqi Women’s Higher Council (IWHC), Iraqi Independent Women’s Group, Society for Iraqi Women for the Future, and the Iraqi Women’s Network (Al-Shabaka), the latter of which brings together “thirty-seven women’s grassroots organizations across the country. Their activities revolve around humanitarian and practical projects, such as income generation, legal advice, free health care and counseling, as well as political advocacy and lobbying.”\textsuperscript{83} These organizations have been especially active in the debate over the Iraqi constitution, and many were founded by or involved diaspora women (especially from the U.S. and the U.K.). Their activities have been hindered by the violent conditions in Iraq: foreign passport holders, middle class professionals, emergency service providers and teachers have been targeted, putting Iraqi women, especially returnees, in grave danger. Furthermore, Iraqi minorities are under increasing pressure, as they are also targets of violence. Although minorities make up only ten percent of the Iraqi population, in 2007 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees determined that they make up about 30 percent of Iraqi refugees around the

\textsuperscript{80} Although she notes that these issues mainly concern urban, educated middle class women.
\textsuperscript{81} Al-Ali, Untold, p. 254; and Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt (2008), Women’s Organizing and the Conflict in Iraqi since 2003” Feminist Review 88, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{82} Al-Ali, Iraqi Women, pp. 253-254.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., pp. 253-4.
world. Christians in particular are targeted, especially following Pope Benedict XVI’s critical remarks of Islam in September 2006. The Christian population has drastically shrunk: the last Iraqi census in 1987 counted 1.4 million Christians; in 2006 the population was estimated at less than one million; in 2008 they were estimated at between 550,000-800,000, and there are thought to be even fewer now.

Additionally, Iraqi professionals, doctors and academics began to be targeted, either for being associated with the Ba'th regime, for speaking freely or for their assumed ability to pay ransom if kidnapped. As of September 2010, the Brussels Tribunal website listed 448 Iraqi academics killed, 79 threatened or kidnapped, and 120 student and teacher casualties. The Iraqi Lawyers Association estimated in 2007 that since the 2003 invasion, at least 210 lawyers and judges had been killed and legal services had decreased by at least 40 percent. Physicians were also especially targeted, as the Department of Health was corrupted by gangs and militias, and by 2006 the global health charity Medact estimated that 25 percent of Iraq's physicians had emigrated. Emergency medical staff have admitted that “more than half of those killed could have been saved if trained and experienced staff were available. Our experience has taught us that poor emergency medical services are more disastrous than the disaster itself.” This brain drain has severely impacted Iraqi development, as the best minds of Iraq and much of the necessary capital to rebuild it have left. Moreover, unlike other countries, Iraq is not repaid for this loss through remittances. In 2008, remittances were estimated at only US$3 million, an

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extremely small number to sustain an estimated population of 31.5 million. Moreover, Iraq experiences “reverse remittances”, whereby refugees use their savings or pensions in Iraq to support themselves and their families abroad.\(^{93}\) The exodus of Iraqis from 1990 to today has been even more damaging to Iraq, as Iraqis have left at a higher frequency than during the first wave, taking away economic capital and skills from an already seriously deteriorated country.

The Iraqi diaspora has been formed by migrations along the forced migration spectrum, the majority leaving to escape from persecution or due to the degraded and volatile conditions in Iraq. Chatelard illuminates the primary characteristic of Iraqi migrants:

> Although the volume of the various displacement episodes…has been variable, one constant has been their collective nature: the displaced have been members of social groups identified by various political regimes as sharing an identity both cohesive and primordialized (ethnic, confessional, ethno-confessional or ethno-national, but also based on kinship ties within a patriarchal system) deemed incompatible with and/or a threat to some notion of an Iraqi national order.”\(^{94}\)

Since the creation of the Iraqi state until today, certain groups of Iraqis are targeted based on the potential threat they pose to those in power. Kurds, Shi’as, Marsh Arabs, Christians, women: these groups have been threatened or attacked at one time or another for the singular reason that they belong to one of these (or multiple) groups. This has only added to the divisions within the Iraqi diaspora, as each group has a particular history of persecution that it tends to emphasize over those of others. Moreover, these ethnic, religious or other forms of ties are strengthened because it has been these networks that have influenced the direction of Iraqi migration. Iraqis have spread across the globe through class, professional and communal networking, and although they have left, they continue to have the potential to affect Iraq based on the particular political opportunity structures available to Iraqis in host countries.\(^{95}\) The next section will address the various Iraqi communities in the U.S., the U.K., Iran, Syria and Jordan, which have developed in specific ways due to the make-up of the Iraqi community in the host country in conjunction with the respective host country’s policies towards the Iraqi community.

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\(^{93}\)Sassoon, Iraqi, p. 149.

\(^{94}\)Chatelard, Politics, p. 6.

\(^{95}\)Denise Natali uses the analytical framework of “political opportunity structures” to explain the different opportunities at home and abroad that influenced Kurdish involvement in the Iraq War. Denise Natali (2007), “Kurdish interventions in the Iraq war” In Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (Eds.), Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers, New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 196-217. Rebecca Davies and Mandy Turner also highlight how changing opportunities and constraints affect diasporic activities. Davies, Reconceptualising; and Turner, Three.
Chapter 4: Where they went: Iraqi trajectories

Besides the different circumstances surrounding departure, which affect an emigrant’s perception of Iraq, the chosen host country affects the development of each emigrant group. Each host country offers different opportunities based on structures at work within both the host country and the Iraqi community. Class, religion, gender, regional and ethnic differences all play a very important role in each country and Iraqi community. Some minority groups are overrepresented in certain host countries because family, religious and social connections encouraged migration to already established communities, which were created within specific historical moments outlined in Chapter 4. This means not only that the hierarchies at play within an ethnic or religious group are reinforced, but also that those who do not fit within this specific Iraqi community may be excluded from Iraqi diasporic activities in the host country. Furthermore, the status of Iraqis in the host country accords different freedoms: Iraqis in the U.S. without citizenship have had to be careful about their activities and in some cases reduce their return trips, but have been included and active in U.S. government projects concerning Iraq. In contrast, Iraqis in neighboring countries have had more regular contact with Iraq, and social interactions are well established with the homeland, but they have had little interaction with their host societies and tend to be excluded from government plans.

Due to these differences, it is necessary to outline the communities in a selection of prominent host countries because the development of each Iraqi community affects their views of development, the opportunities and motivations for return, and the role an individual might play if they return to Iraq. Denise Natali has used the framework of “political opportunity structures” to explain the different opportunities at home and abroad that influenced Kurdish involvement in the Iraq War.96 This approach can be widened and applied when examining Iraqi involvement in development programs in their home country. If an Iraqi expatriate is consulted on development planning in Iraq, his or her time of emigration, as well as participation in a particular Iraqi community in a host country would have an important effect on his or her opinion of and participation in said development programs.

96 Natali, Kurdish. The book in which this article is found, Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers, offers many different examples of Diaspora engagement in their respective home countries and the various ways they have affected these countries. Natali’s contribution, however, is the only one to address Iraq.
The majority of Iraqi emigration has been to neighboring Arab countries: Iran, Jordan, Turkey, and Syria, but there are also large populations in Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Gulf states. For the Western world, it has been primarily to the UK, the US, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, but there has also been notable migration to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Malaysia. However, it should be noted that, while five nation-states (six, including Iraq) have been chosen as examples, Iraqis have circulated within and across various social, religious, political and economic spaces. This is due in a large part to its history as part of the Ottoman Empire, which established trade, pilgrimage routes and other networks across the empire and whose dissolution in 1918 led to the creation of arbitrary territories by European victors and not those in the region. People in modern day Iraq have been connected within and beyond the region for centuries, and this project looks at only a snippet of this time. Despite this, this chapter will look into five specific host countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, Syria and Jordan) because at the moment immigration and citizenship policies are developed at the nation-state level. These five countries have been chosen because each has a strong and unique Iraqi community that has evolved based on the migrants’ experiences in Iraq and reasons for leaving, in conjunction with the specific opportunity structures available in the host country. The following section will outline the specific characteristics of the Iraqi communities in these five countries.

4.1 The United States: Detroit, Michigan and San Diego, California

In 2009, the number of persons born in Iraq and living in the U.S. was estimated at 102,393, less than 0.5 percent of all foreign-born in the country. However, the majority of this migration has not happened post-2003. Rather, the majority of Iraqi immigration to the U.S. occurred in the

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97 Turkey has a significant Iraqi community, as many Iraqis escape the violence in Iraq through the more stable Kurdistan. Also, many Kurds from northern Iraq have chosen to migrate to Turkey because of the large ethnic Kurdish minority in the country.
98 Al-Ali, Untold, p. 52.
99 MPI Data Hub, Accessed 26 October 2010.
100 This is because from 2003-2007 the U.S. government avoided accepting Iraqi refugees, as this would admit the failure of U.S. policy in Iraq as well as pose a security risk. From April 2003 until the end of 2006, the U.S. received 466 Iraqi refugees. (Sassoon, Iraqi, p. 110). Until June 2007, the U.S. accepted only 50 linguists per year from both Afghanistan and Iraq, even though they were especially targeted and under extreme danger in Iraq. Current policy has changed, and special provisions have been added for Iraqis working for the U.S. government in Iraq, often as translators. In June, 2007 the quota increased from 50 to 500. One interviewee gained access to the U.S. through this provision only once the quota increased, as there were no visas available at the time of his original application.
1990s, and after 1991 around 3,000 Iraqis arrived in Detroit each year.\textsuperscript{101} Most of these immigrants in the 1990s were Shi’a Muslims from the south who were targeted after the \textit{intifada} uprisings, when the U.S. encouraged them to revolt against Saddam Hussein. These migrants had little education and low-income jobs, were largely rural and poor, and struggled with English.\textsuperscript{102} There were also many more Christians arriving—around 18,000 Chaldeans after 1991—as they were even more systematically discriminated against and openly persecuted in Iraq in the 1990s, because Christianity was associated with US imperialism.\textsuperscript{103} However, the Iraqi community in the U.S. has a much longer history, and it has had an important impact on the subsequent waves of Iraqi immigrants—not only on who has come to the U.S., but also often on where they settle.

The Iraqi community has strong bases in Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; and San Diego, California. In 2007, Michigan had the largest population of Iraqi immigrants, at 36,172, or 35.3 percent of the community—of which 35,010 were in the Detroit metropolitan area—and California had the second largest community at 16,715, or 16.3 percent.\textsuperscript{104} Sally Howell and Andrew Shryock outline the Arab community in Detroit\textsuperscript{105}: Dearborn, the suburban area of metropolitan Detroit where most Arabs live, is made up of Lebanese, Yemenis, Iraqis, and Palestinians. The “Seven Mile Road” in Detroit is mostly made up of Chaldean Catholics, and at times it is more common to hear Aramaic in the streets than English. However, when these immigrants are able to save enough money, they move out of the area to the suburbs, “where Chaldeans and other Arabic-speaking immigrants are widely recognized as an influential business and professional community. Detroit's grocery and liquor store trade is dominated by Iraqis…[and] there are over 5,000 Arab and Chaldean-owned businesses in greater Detroit.”\textsuperscript{106}

As can be noticed in this description, the community is largely segregated along class, religious and ethnic lines: Chaldean Christians live within their own communities, where they are able to speak to each other in Aramaic rather than any other language; wealthier Iraqis move to suburban areas. Detroit’s community is predominantly Chaldean Catholic (a community of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{101} Al-Ali, Untold, p. 34.
\bibitem{102} Ibid.
\bibitem{103} Idem., pp. 30-32, 39.
\bibitem{105} Sally Howell and Andrew Shryock (2003, Summer), “Cracking Down on Diaspora: Arab Detroit and America's ‘War on Terror’” \textit{Anthropology Quarterly}, 76(3), p. 445. In fact, Detroit is home to the largest Arab community in the U.S.
\bibitem{106} Howell and Shryock, Cracking, p. 445.

\end{thebibliography}
and in fact, Christians make up half of the Arab community in Detroit, even though they constitute only five percent of the Arab world. This characteristic, as well as the geographic displacement of the two largest communities, is due primarily to the first Iraqi migrants to arrive in the US.

In the early 20th century, Assyrians and Chaldeans were the first group of Iraqis to arrive, choosing Michigan (due particularly to the burgeoning auto industry in Detroit) and California to work or study, and to escape religious persecution. Most Chaldeans came from the Tal Kayf village near Mosul in the north. Some of these migrants decided to settle, and brought their families over through chain family migration. The reason why this has been particularly decisive for the development of the Iraqi-American community is because of the change in the immigration system in the US in 1965. The new immigration law of 1965 dismantled the old quota system and instead placed greater emphasis on family ties and highly skilled immigrants. This meant that the vast majority of those who immigrated after 1965 were highly educated and upper- to middle-class, and that they were encouraged to use their already strong family and social networks to immigrate to the country, and to encourage immigration from Iraqis with similar profiles. The first Iraqi migrants were already fairly wealthy and educated, and so when U.S. immigration law changed, their social and religious communities directly benefitted.

The same rule holds true for the Muslim migrants who arrived in the U.S., especially Shi’a Muslims and Kurds. From the 1950s to the 1970s, upper middle-class Shi’a Muslims arrived in the U.S. They were highly skilled, professional, and educated in Iraqi Shi’a history and tradition and the American way of life. In the 1960s especially, while Iraq was going through multiple coups, Iraqis chose the U.S. because it was more liberal and stable than Iraq, where the upper classes, landowners, communists, Muslim elite, monarchists, and any opposition group were potentially in danger. Moreover, around 1976, when Kurds began fighting the regime,

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107 Al-Ali, Untold, p. 31.
108 Howell and Shryock, Cracking, p. 446.
109 Al-Ali, Untold, pp. 30-32.
111 Al-Ali, Untold, p. 35.
many came to the San Diego area, followed by refugees or others arriving through family reunification and even more after the 1990s post-Gulf War uprisings.\textsuperscript{112}

Therefore, the first communities to arrive played an important role for those coming after, encouraging skilled migration and folding the new immigrants into an already established communal structure. This system favored the groups that had already arrived, while simultaneously encouraging only highly educated (and thus usually higher class) immigrants. They “managed through mechanisms of family and communal solidarity and reproduced in the diaspora the socioeconomic, confessional and kinship patterns which had existed in Iraq within these…communities.”\textsuperscript{113} The same structures and relations based on social, class, religious or ethnic ties that were in place in Iraq were transplanted to the U.S. and, as a result, within these Iraqi-American communities there is a strong sense of hierarchy, with clearly delineated identities based on class, religion and ethnicity. While other countries may experience similar patterns, as is noted in the other countries analyzed in this chapter, the strongly hierarchical organization in the U.S. seems especially pronounced, due to the specific and early established framework set up within the immigration law. This can have two contradictory effects on Iraqis arriving to the U.S.: First, those that do immigrate to an area of the U.S. that has a large community of Iraqis have to play by the rules of the community, which is very hierarchical and can be discriminatory against those who do not belong to a specific religious or social network. In fact, the communities are also segregated by class, so newer arrivals (especially after 1991), while belonging perhaps to the same religious group, are still excluded from certain sections of the community. On the other hand, most Iraqis in the U.S. (an estimated 58.3 percent)\textsuperscript{114} do not live within a larger Iraqi community, but rather are spread out among the fifty states. Often the only contact they may have with other Iraqis is with their own family, if they managed to also settle nearby. Therefore, the support structures available through the larger Iraqi religious and social networks, which are often instrumental in finding a job, acclimating to an American way of life and giving emotional support, may not be available to them. Furthermore, concerning the focus of this study, this also means that Iraqi-American diaspora activities, because they are based within these communities, may not represent the whole of Iraqis living in the U.S.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{113} Chatelard, Migration, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{114} According to statistics cited by Terrazas, Iraqi Immigrants.
One form of engagement of Iraqi-Americans with Iraq that has received particular attention has been the role of the diaspora in the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq. Kurds and Christians, especially those wealthy and well-established in the U.S., cooperated with the U.S. government. Kurdish involvement was largely due to their hope for an autonomous Kurdistan, which they believed could be created in a post-Saddam Iraq. The Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC) was hired by the U.S. Department of State to consult on reconstruction issues, and was made up primarily of Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, as well as a number of Shi’a Muslims. The Pentagon consulted with Iraqi-Americans in planning for a post-Saddam Iraq: the U.S. Department of Defense held a job fair near Detroit for Iraqi-Americans to get involved, the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz met with Iraqi-Americans in the Detroit area to speak on his policy and potential military action in Iraq, and many Iraqi-Americans enlisted or joined private contractors as interpreters. In addition, Iraqis in the U.S. lent their voices in support of the invasion, giving witness to the atrocities of Saddam Hussein’s regime. One Iraqi-American activist, Emad Dhia, was among many Iraqi-Americans to support the war, “Iraqi-Americans worked very hard for this moment, this moment of the truth when President Bush announced on the TV Saddam and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours.” Others voiced their enthusiasm and desire to return:

“The reason for all these people—and I’ve been talking to every single one of them—most of them they victimized by Saddam Hussein and his bloody regime. Most of these people, me personally, I got two brothers executed back in ’87.”
Mahdi Altwabaa

“My dad told me to leave Iraq when I was 14 years old, and I was arrested twice because I said something against the government, and it’s really time to get rid of this…it’s really hard to see him [Saddam Hussein], that he’s still in power.”
Mohammed Ahmad

“I think that’s the duty of every Iraqi who feels that he’s still tied to that country, that’s his responsibility to…from his position to help in any way that can be possible.”
Samir Shoukri

Iraqi-Americans were excited about the prospect of a free and democratic Iraq, and wanted to be involved in the reconstruction. They could not have known that the U.S. government was not

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117 Unknown, Iraqi-Americans.
prepared for post-Saddam Iraq, and that the invasion would lead to civil war and the destruction of the very country they worked to liberate. At the same time, since the invasion, certain restrictions have been applied to Iraqis who return. Nadje Al-Ali interviewed a woman in the Iraqi Shi’a community in Detroit who returned to Baghdad to help with reconstruction but had her Green Card taken away when she returned to the U.S.: “They asked me a few weeks ago: ‘Have you ever opposed your government?’ This is a trick question. If I say no, they will accuse me of having been a Ba’thist, if I say yes, they might not give me U.S. citizenship because I am a troublemaker. Am I allowed to be active here? This is a double standard. If you are not a US citizen, you do not have the right to speak.”

The American government’s role in preventing or facilitating migration has been crucial to the opportunities available for Iraqi-Americans to return. If facilitated by the government, return has been encouraged, but has been limited in some cases for non-U.S.-citizens, partly due to security concerns. On the other hand, certain activities in which members of the diaspora were involved were recognized as non-representative, even at the time: “Said Bremer: ‘I told the G-7 [Iraqi Liberation Council] then that you didn’t represent Iraq. You were exiles. I challenged you to broaden yourselves to include Iraqis who had lived here under Saddam, to add women, Christians, Turkmen, and tribal leaders. You agreed to do it, but you haven’t’. “

In this case, it was the members of the diaspora themselves that restricted access to the council, refusing to diversify despite the input of an American official, L. Paul Bremer, who was in charge of Iraqi reconstruction following the 2003 invasion.

Despite the emphasis on Iraqis’ relationship with the U.S. government, there are a multitude of Iraqi diaspora organizations and community centers looking to connect Iraqi-Americans to Iraqis in Iraq and also to others within the U.S. They are primarily organized along sectarian divisions, and are also centered on the poles of Detroit and San Diego. Among them are: Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS); Arab and Chaldean Council; Chaldean National Congress; Iraqi-American House; Karbala Islamic Educational Center; Iraqi Medical Sciences Association (IMSA-USA); Iraqi-Islamic Organization in America; the Kurdish Community Center of San Diego; and Kurdish Human Rights Watch

These organizations (save for KHRW, which also serves Arabs, Kurds and Chaldeans) primarily serve their own ethnic or confessional communities, reinforcing the divisions within the Iraqi-American community.

To conclude, while the Iraqi-American community is strong and active in organizations, they are characterized by strong divisions and hierarchy, which manifests itself in the Detroit and San Diego communities. Furthermore, their relationship with the U.S. government, particularly during and following the 2003 invasion has profoundly affected their opportunities. This affects diaspora engagement because not only does each group have their own organization with its own priorities and activities, but they also have to deal with limitations based on U.S. policy towards non-citizens, within the Arab-American community in particular. The Karbala Islamic Educational Center may have different priorities and focus groups than either the Chaldean National Congress or the Kurdish Community Center. The Chaldean National Congress would come from a different religion, while Kurdish Community Center’s members would also be primarily Muslim, but probably of a different ethnicity than the majority of members within the Karbala Islamic Educational Center. All of them, however, would have to be mindful of the political climate within the U.S., especially if members are not American citizens.

4.2 The United Kingdom: London, England

For the United Kingdom, the majority of its Iraqi community is concentrated in London, England. This is not surprising, as “migrants are geographically much more concentrated than the UK population as a whole—more than 40 per cent of migrants live in London, making up 26% of London’s population.” In 1990 the community was between 70-80,000 persons, but by 2007 it was estimated at over 100,000. The majority of Iraqis in the U.K. are Kurdish and/or Muslim. As is typical for Iraqi migrants in Europe, most have come from a higher class and educational background, and before 1991 rarely arrived as refugees, as it was easy for those in the upper class or upper middle class to get student or employment visas.

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120 Al-Ali, Untold.
124 Chatelard, Migration, p. 8
Similar to the situation in the U.S., the Iraqi community in London is fairly divided. Madawi Al-Rasheed’s study of the Iraqi community in London confirms: “Each [Arabs, Assyrians, Kurds] has its own community center, voluntary associations, and clubs whose members are predominantly from one ethnic group. Upon arrival in Britain, refugees find themselves automatically drawn towards their own ethnic group and voluntary associations.”

Although Al-Rasheed highlights the religious and ethnic divisions that play an important role, there are also differences based on political orientation, profession, time of arrival and living conditions. However, it should be noted that some of these divisions overlap, which is a key dynamic when looking at the community. As noted in Chapter 3, certain political, ethnic or religious groups left at certain times, so divisions along these lines could also be attributable to their time of arrival. Assyrian Christians were among the first Iraqis to arrive in the 1940s and 1950s after serving for the British in Iraq, while Kurds arrived largely in the 1970s fleeing the violence and persecution directed at Kurds by the B’ath regime. Various scholars have noted that their communities remain generally separate, attributing this to ethnicity and religion; but their distinctive experiences in leaving their home country, the differences in immigration status and the generational gap are also important features of these groups and reasons for why they remain separated in their own groups.

For the U.K., there have been two waves of Iraqi immigration, of which the Assyrian community is exemplar of the first, and the Kurdish community of the second. The earliest wave was composed of those leaving for ideological reasons. After the 1958 revolution, the monarchy (which had been supported by the British) bureaucracy came primarily to Britain: Sunni upper class professionals, politicians, landowners and those who had served in the British army. During the 1960s, when Iraq was undergoing multiple coups, many intellectuals and members of the upper classes came to the U.K. for personal security and a liberal political environment. This group was composed of “exiles [who] had not been directly repressed in Iraq

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125 Al-Rasheed, Myth, p.205.
126 After World War I, when the Ottoman Empire was dissolved, Iraq became a British Mandate. Although independence was granted in 1932, occupation ended in 1947. In addition, the monarchy was propped up by Western powers (especially Great Britain), as it ensured Western countries' oil supply.
127 Iraqis serving in the British army would likely have an easier immigration process than Kurds migrating in the 1970s. Also, in the 1970s, the 1950s arrivals as well as their descendants would have been well-established in the U.K., with little common ground or common contact points with the recently arrived Kurds.
128 This discounts the very limited number of arrivals after 2003.
129 Al-Ali, Untold, p. 22; and Al-Rasheed, Myth, p. 205.
but were members of the professions and intellectuals for whom the political context of Iraq under its successive regimes was uncongenial.”130 For them, “it was relatively easy…to adjust to their new life in Britain. They belonged to the professional middle-class, or in some cases the landed gentry of Iraq, who were pushed aside by the nationalization programmes which took place in the 1960s.”131 This group was wealthy and highly educated, and in many cases had travelled or studied in foreign countries, including in Europe, and spoke multiple languages. Their departure from Iraq was marked by ideological differences, whereas those leaving in the second wave are characterized by violence and persecution under the Ba’th regime. Ba’th repression of opposition groups pushed out Iraqis of different ethnic, religious and social classes. Communists, Arab nationalists, Shi’as, non-Saddam Ba’thists, Kurds, in essence anyone considered opposition, was pressured or forced to leave, and many arrived in the U.K. From 1982 to 1993, the number of refugees granted asylum in the U.K. increased due to the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. While previous arrivals came largely from the upper classes, the refugees came from “a cross-section of Iraqi society, with a greater proportion from the lower classes.”132 In spite of this, these refugees were not necessarily poor or poorly educated; most urban Iraqis were of the middle class, which was well-developed before the sanctions, and they benefited from a fairly developed education system, which was one of the best in the Middle East, until the imposition of sanctions. However, their reception in British society was tangibly different from the previous arrivals, due in part to the change in British immigration laws that were increasingly restrictive regarding asylum seekers.

As seen with the Iraqi community in the U.S., the immigration regime in the U.K. has had a lasting effect on the evolution of the British-Iraqi community. The U.K. is a traditional emigration country, with much emigration centered on settlements in North America and former colonies, but has more recently become an immigration country, attracting immigrants particularly from the former colonies and the Commonwealth. By 1972, immigrants allowed entry must be “holders of work permits or people with parents or grandparents born in the UK”.133 In 1972, a new Immigration Act entered into force, which still forms the basis of immigration law. It “established a new immigration regime structured around the pillars of

130 Chatelard, Migration, pp. 8-9.
131 Al-Rasheed, Myth, p. 204.
132 Ibid., p. 205.
and was far stricter: “the only immigrants who could enter after the enforcement of the 1971 Act (apart from the small proportion who still qualified for a visa on the grounds that their skills were in very short supply) were the dependants or fiancés of those already settled here, and special categories of UK passport holders such as those in Hong Kong.”

However, with the increase in the number of asylum seekers from the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s, “focus shifted towards asylum-seekers, with new laws enacted to restrict asylum claims in the U.K.” Therefore, while the earlier arrivals of Iraqis may have adjusted “relatively easily” to life in the U.K. due to their intellectual background, it may also have been because the immigration regime at the time encouraged their integration and path to citizenship. On the other hand, those arriving as refugees from the 1980s onwards had to deal with stricter immigration laws, which may have had a negative impact on their integration and interaction with the previous wave. More recently there have been even more restrictions on immigration and asylum: in 2002, the government expanded economic immigration, introducing visas for the highly skilled to enter the U.K. without a job offer, while implementing more restrictions for asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, including tougher controls and prohibiting asylum seekers from working. Furthermore, in order to naturalize, immigrants must demonstrate “an adequate level of English (or Welsh, Scottish or Gaelic) and ‘sufficient knowledge’ of ‘life in the U.K.’… Overall, these changes certainly represent a significant attempt to restrict the perceived openness of the British model of immigration and citizenship.”

As immigration and citizenship regulations become stricter, more recent immigrants and asylum seekers are often put in a precarious situation, while earlier migrants do not have to deal with these new controls. When one examines the British-Iraqi community in London, one sees that the majority of leaders of the Iraqi community are British citizens, and the community services are used primarily by Iraqis with a permanent status in the U.K. Thus, irregular Iraqi migrants or those without permanent status are not included in most of these activities. This suggests that the Iraqi community in London is led by the earliest arrivals and the

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135 Brah, Cartographies, p. 37.
136 Somerville et al., United Kingdom.
137 Somerville et al., United Kingdom.
highly skilled, who have a less-demanding immigration process than those arriving since the 1980s and/or as refugees. As noted before, these early arrivals were of higher classes and rarely arrived as refugees. The predominance of this group in the British Iraqi community can also be seen in the preponderance of artistic and political organization in London.

Due to the well-established Iraqi intellectual community in London, the immigration regime in the U.K. and the general trend of high migration to London, much of the Iraqi diasporic activities revolve around artistic or political organization in the English capital. Iraqi scholar Nadje Al-Ali notes the importance of socializing for Iraqi opposition intellectuals and artists in cafes in Camden, London: “I would eagerly seek out their company, and listen to the stories about their lives inside and outside Iraq. We would also discuss novels, films and exhibitions, philosophize about this and that, and sometimes exchange news and gossip.”

Iraqi civil society groups have also been active, particularly in the campaign against the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. Furthermore, political, independent, religious and ethnic groups all exist, actively working on a range of issues concerning Iraq. The Kurdish Cultural Centre and the Iraqi Association (Muntada al-Iraqi) in West London are universally recognized by Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers. Other organizations of particular note are the Women in Black London and Act Together (campaigning against war and violence), the Iraqi Women’s League (IWL), the Iraqi Prospect Organization, the Assyrian Club of London and the Shi‘i al-Khu‘i Foundation. Although there are some Iraqi organizations outside of London they tend to lack financial support and do not function well.

Therefore, while the British-Iraqi community is characterized by a large amount of civil society activity, it is led by the earliest arrivals and tends to exclude those without permanent status (most notably asylum seekers). Furthermore, access is restricted for those living outside of London. The organization of this community and its activities is a function of the ethnic, religious and socio-economic make-up of the different waves of migration to the U.K. together with the restrictive trend in immigration controls, a particular hardship for the more recent arrivals.

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140 Al-Ali, Untold, p. 19.
4.3 Iran

The bulk of Iraqi asylum-seekers have found refuge in Iran, partially due to its geographic proximity, but also because of its Shi’a religious rule. In fact, it has been the second base for political exiles, alongside London. In 2003, Iran was host to 202,000 Iraqi refugees, although this probably does not include those Iraqis deported to Iran from Iraq over the course of decades.\footnote{Lisa Raffonelli and U.S. Committee for Refugees (2004), “World Refugee Survey 2004, Middle East Regional Summary”, <http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=1161> Last accessed 7 December 2010; and UNHCR (2003, December 9), “Small groups of Iraqis go home from Iran, Saudi Arabia”, <http://www.unhcr.org/3fd5d0297.html> Last accessed 7 December 2010. According to an Iranian government census in 2001, Iran hosted 203,000 Iraqis. U.S. Committee for Refugees (2002, June 10), World Refugee Survey 2002. p. 167.}

Many of these refugees chose to return to Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, between 2006 and 2008, at the height of the violence, more than 4,000 Iraqis migrated (or for some perhaps, re-migrated) to Iran.\footnote{Vivian Tan, UNHCR (2008, May 22), “Resolve, resources run low among silent trickle of Iraqis in Iran”, <http://www.unhcr.org/483591e82.html> Last accessed 7 December 2010.} Some Iraqi Shi’as have chosen Iran because they feel a sense of religious affinity with the country. The city of Qom is central to numerous Shi’a schools of thought and there are established networks with religious groups in Damascus and Lebanon,\footnote{Chatelard, Migration, p. 10.} which makes the country particularly appealing for the devout.

However, the majority of Iraqi refugees in Iran arrived because they were forcibly moved there during Saddam’s regime under the pretense that they were of Iranian origin. As mentioned in Section 3.1, Shi’a Muslims were targeted and expelled from Iraq from 1969 onwards, beginning with the Fayli Kurds, a Shi’a minority within the Sunni Kurdish population. They, along with economic elites and those of in the middle class considered a threat—anyone considered of Iranian origin, even if they had no ties to the country—were deported to Iran. In addition, about 40-60,000 Marsh Arabs managed to flee to Iran during and after the drainage of the marshes from 1991 to 1995.\footnote{Chatelard, Migration, p. 17.} This population was largely rural, with strong kinship systems and low education levels. At the same time, refugees fled to Iran en masse following the 1991 Shi’a uprisings that were brutally suppressed. These Iraqis were from the middle class and urban areas such as Basra, Nasiriya and Amarah but lacked the social base to allow them access to the labor market.\footnote{Idem., pp. 31-32.} They moved to Iran to work, accumulate capital and in some cases try to further migrate to the West by taking advantage of connections to the growing Shi’a diaspora networks.
in liberal asylum countries in Europe, North America or Australia. Concerning those arriving in the 1990s, there was a high proportion of the elderly, children and women, as hundreds of thousands of adult men died during the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, and the repression of Marsh Arabs specifically targeted adult men. Iran naturalized about 100,000 of these Iraqis, while the rest largely remained stateless refugees.

The Iraqi community in Iran, therefore, has been made up of those who were forcibly removed as they were considered a threat to Ba’th power or did not fit in to the regime’s concept of Iraqi national identity (i.e. Kurds, as they are not of Arab ethnicity). They have received refugee status, and those who were stateless have the right to their Iraqi citizenship again after 2003, but they still remain in a very vulnerable community. Although Iran was host to a number of political and intellectual Iraqis (including Nouri al-Maliki, the current Prime Minister of Iraq) and certain portions of the urban middle classes, the majority has been low-skilled, and has not yet experienced the kind of return discussed here on a noticeable scale. Therefore, Section 5.4 on Iraqi re-engagement from neighboring countries does not apply to Iran, but rather, primarily Syria and Jordan. However, it has been briefly included in this chapter as it has been an important host country for Iraqis, especially the current Iraqi political elite.

4.4 Syria: Damascus

Syria has a population of 22.5 million, and hosts arguably the largest Iraqi resident population, estimated at over a million. The majority have settled in the Damascus area after 2003. However, Iraqis have been migrating to Syria since the 1970s. In the beginning, Syria served primarily as a transit country for Iraqis migrating to western or socialist bloc countries, but they tended not to settle, instead moving onwards after a few months. But after 1992 the migration scheme changed, with the poorest migrants (who were still not the poorest Iraqis, as they could afford to leave Iraq) staying in Syria and the richer ones continuing on to Europe, North America or Australia. Following the US invasion in 2003, many Iraqis in Syria returned to Iraq, hoping to play a role in the reconstruction, but with the increase in violence most were forced to emigrate again. They were joined by a new wave of Iraqi refugees.

148 Idem, pp. 31-32.
149 Idem, p. 6.
152 Ibid., p. 2.
In 2007, of the two million Iraqis seeking protection in neighboring countries, about 1.5 million of them were in Syria. The majority of the new Iraqi migrants are urban, coming especially from Baghdad, but also fleeing violence in many other urban areas: Sunni Iraqis from Baghdad, Anbar, Salah ad-Dir and Sunni cities and neighborhoods in general; Christians from Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra; Mandeans from Baghdad, Basra, Amara and Nasiriya; Kurds, although few in number due to the stability in Kurdistan, left in larger numbers between April and May 2007 due to tensions between the Turkish President and the President of the Kurdish Regional Governate. Because these refugees tend to be urban, they also tend to be middle class, educated and have some savings on which they can depend while living in Syria. Some have also bought housing space, established businesses and put money into the Syrian economy, despite the fact that they do not have large funds at their disposal. Like many Iraqi refugees, those in Syria have left to escape violence, because they were at risk, and for a better economic, family and health care situation. This new wave is closed off from the Iraqi arrivals pre-2003 because their motives for leaving are different and the earlier migrants want to avoid being grouped together with the new arrivals. New arrivals are viewed as a disruption to Syrian society because of their large numbers, their inflationary effect on the housing market, and their detrimental effect on services. In addition, Iraqis are blamed for increased crime rate. Fagen argues:

“Syria is a country with a socialist ideology and, until recently, with an economically more homogeneous population. The combined effects of the economic modernization on the one hand, and the inflation on the other have shifted this equation. Even if the changes are not yet dramatic, more Syrians are declining into poverty, more are involved in crime (as are Iraqis), and the spread between rich and poor is greater.”

For Syrians, the cost of living has gone up and poorer Syrians feel marginalized in their own cities. However, at the same time, the new immigrants have led economic growth and established a more market-based economy in the country: Iraqi purchases of real estate have brought profits

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154 Ibid., p. 11.
156 al-Khalidi et al., Iraqi, p. 11.
157 Fagen, Iraqi, p. 21.
to Syrians.\footnote{Ibid., p. 20.} This discussion of the weight Iraqis pose on the system is also taking place in Jordan.

This belief that Iraqi immigration has destroyed Syrian services is related to the special rights granted to Iraqis in Syria. In Iraq, Syria, Jordan and many other Arab countries,\footnote{This does not include Iran, which is not an Arab country but Persian.} Arab immigrants are not considered foreigners by the country, and are not referred to as “refugees” within these host countries.\footnote{Except in the case of Palestinian refugees.} Rather, they are considered “guests”, with the right to buy property, establish businesses, invest and settle in the country. This tradition stems from the idea of “Arab brotherhood”,\footnote{This diverges from the concept of “Muslim Brotherhood”, as the policy extends to all those from Arab countries, which includes Christians and other denominations, as well as Kurds (as they are from an Arab country).} which offers a haven for all Arab brothers, while also avoiding political complications that would arise from granting refugee status to citizens of neighboring countries: “For Syrian legislation the world is thus divided into three categories: Syrian national, Arabs and foreigners (\ajānib).”\footnote{Gianluca P. Parolin (2009), \textit{Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation-State}. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, p.88.} Arabs receive temporary residence permits, usually for three months, but longer-term and permanent residence permits, as well as citizenship, are still very difficult to obtain. In Syria this tradition is particularly established, “Visitors from neighboring Arab countries may send their children to schools, use health facilities, and buy properties and businesses.”\footnote{Fagen, Iraqi, p. 5.} This right, therefore, applies to Iraqis, who enter as tourists and can use services in Syria that are all but destroyed in Iraq, an important reason for migration to Syria. Even if an Iraqi immigrant overstays his or her temporary permit and is thus in the country illegally, he or she is still allowed access to these services: Iraqis can attend public schools, enroll in universities for free and use Syrian health care. However, this tradition establishes the immigrants as temporary; governments continually refer to Iraqis as “guests”, with the view of returning them to Iraq as soon as the situation allows it. Therefore, there are not government plans to integrate Iraqis into Syria, and no consultation or cooperation with the Iraqi community in Syria as has been noted in the Iraqi-American diaspora.

Aside from the immigration regime, Syria is a prime host country because of its geographic proximity, relatively simple entry requirements,\footnote{This was true until October 2007, when Syria implemented a stricter policy towards Iraqis.} common language,\footnote{In fact, the Syrian and Iraqi Arabic dialect is very similar.} low cost of

\textbf{Hendow, Maegan}
living, presence of family and friends nearby and easy access to services. Residence permits are easier to attain in Syria, almost universally granted to Iraqis registered with UNHCR.\textsuperscript{166} As of the end of July 2010, there were 151,907 Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR in Syria, and as of November 2008 there were 1.2 million Iraqi residents in Syria with valid visas.\textsuperscript{167} The lower cost of living and the more accessible labor market (in comparison to other host countries) is appealing to poorer refugees, although they still have enough social and economic capital to leave Iraq, so they are not of the poorest strata. Furthermore, services (education and health services in particular) are more open to Iraqis in Syria than in other host countries, which has become especially important due to the profoundly deteriorated situation of education and health systems in Iraq. For pregnant women and families, this promise of safe and reliable services would be an especially strong pull.

In addition to the importance of access to the labor market and services, Syria is considered a safe haven for those suffering from religious persecution. Christians and Shi’a Muslims are overrepresented in migration to Syria, having fled persecution in Iraq. There are significant Assyrian and Chaldean Christian communities in particular. Many left in the 1990s in response to the economic crises and Saddam Hussein’s campaigns encouraging sectarianism. For many, Syria continued to be a transit country from which Iraqis could migrate to a third country: “Assyrians left from 1991 onwards to rejoin family members in America, Australia, or the UK through legal means…[but the] trend ended towards 1993, when those who were still in Syria had no family links.”\textsuperscript{168} After 2003, an even larger proportion of Christians arrived in Syria as they were targeted for multiple reasons: payment of the jizya tax for all non-Muslims; their lack of traditional tribal connections (save for the Yadizis of the north); having served the regime, even just as government employees; being associated with the international presence; their livelihood which allowed alcohol and more lenient rules for women; and the increasing frequency of church bombings.\textsuperscript{169}

Moreover, Syria is often preferable to Jordan, as the road to Amman passes through the Anbar governate, which has been especially violent, and the border guards in Jordan ask the

\textsuperscript{166}Geraldine Chatelard (2010, June 28). Personal correspondence.
\textsuperscript{168} Chatelard, La présence, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{169} al-Khalidi et al., Iraqi, p. 13.
migrant whether he or she is Sunni or Shi’a, a humiliating situation for Shi’a Muslims (Jordan is majority Sunni).\textsuperscript{170} Syria, although secular, is majority Sunni, but has significant minorities of Alawite Muslims, Shi’as, Christians and Druze.\textsuperscript{171} Syria’s diversity is important for Iraqis wanting to migrate to the country; Iraqis can find coreligionists in their host country. In June 2007, the Brookings Institute and University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement outlined six reasons why Shi’a Iraqi Muslims migrate to Syria (majority Sunni) instead of Iran (majority Shi’a and a Shi’a religious state) or Southern Iraq (majority Shi’a): (1) there are better economic conditions and more work opportunities in Syria; (2) they eventually want asylum or resettlement in third countries; (3) they are urban and religiously moderate or secular, so don’t want to live under strict religious laws; (4) for the preceding six months the southern governates had restricted entry because they were overloaded with immigration; (5) intra-Shi’a tension and fighting in southern Iraq is unappealing for those fleeing violence; and (6) many are more comfortable in an Arab country (whereas Iran is Persian).\textsuperscript{172} Syria has a better reputation among Iraqis. An Iraqi woman interviewed who lived and worked in Syria before moving to the U.S. as a refugee noted her positive experience in the country, and compared it with her experience in the U.S.: “I don’t know anyone here. I feel threatened sometimes. In Syria, we have the same culture, church and people. We feel we are at home. Here [the U.S.] we need more than that—the way they think, their culture is different. I don’t know the rules.”\textsuperscript{173} Although she was grateful to be in the U.S., because of the safety and the support accorded to her and her family, she felt a certain affinity for Syria, stressing that for her, Syria felt like home.

Furthermore, the community in Syria has contact more often with Iraq. Daily cell phone calls, frequent contact via the internet, letters sent back and forth between the countries via bus and taxi drivers or friends, and return trips are all common ways Iraqis in Syria communicate with their family and friends back home.\textsuperscript{174} However, despite their cross-border activities, they remain largely within their own Iraqi neighborhoods and communities in Syria, which are basically self-sufficient. In fact, they find little need or motivation to connect with Syrian communities and Chatelard notes that the Iraqi community in Syria is not truly transnational, as

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., pp. 20-21.
\textsuperscript{171} Fagen, Iraqi, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{172} al-Khalidi et al., Iraqi, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{173} Personal interview. 20 February 2010.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., p. 39.
they rarely interact with Syrian society.\textsuperscript{175} Iraqis in Syria have benefitted from a fairly lenient immigration regime and access to services that would not necessarily be available to them in other countries. However, increasing pressure on an already weak infrastructure and services, particularly in Damascus, has led to a negative backlash, with Syrians responding disfavorably to Iraqi immigrants and immigration controls getting stricter.

4.5 Jordan: Amman

Jordan is host to the second-largest Iraqi community, with estimates ranging from 450,000 to 800,000,\textsuperscript{176} but has a longer history than that of Syria, whose Iraqi guests arrived primarily after 2003. The Iraqi community in Jordan is also much less visible than in Syria: there are not specifically Iraqi meeting or community centers in Amman, although there are many Iraqi businesses and restaurants. Jordan has also operated under a similar immigration system to Syria, accepting Iraqis as “Arab brothers.” Therefore, most Iraqis currently in Jordan enter as guests with temporary permits. However, it is currently very difficult for them to gain permanent status or citizenship (the latter of which is the case in many Arab countries), although before the 1990s, many second or third generation Iraqis living in Jordan were granted Jordanian citizenship.\textsuperscript{177} In addition, to renew or attain residence permits, foreigners entering the country who are not investing in enterprises must prove that they can support themselves by depositing nearly US$150,000 in a Jordanian bank, and need to maintain about half of that to earn interest.\textsuperscript{178} So, while Jordan still allows immigration, and maintains a policy of non-refoulement of refugees, it has become stricter regarding Iraqi immigrants, at times even expelling migrants considered “undesirable”\textsuperscript{179} i.e. not highly educated or wealthy. This policy came about primarily after 2005, in response to terrorist attacks in Amman in November 2005, coordinated by Iraqis associated with Al Qaeda, and the subsequent discovery of several terrorist cells operating in Jordan with links to Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq’s increasing ties to Iran, the establishment of

\textsuperscript{175} Geraldine Chatelard (2010, June 28). Personal correspondence.
\textsuperscript{176} As of 2007. The Norwegian Research Institute Fafo, upon request and with the cooperation of the Government of Jordan, conducted a survey on the Iraqi community in Jordan and estimated between 450,000-500,000 Iraqi residents in Jordan as of May 2007. In the same year, Patricia Fagen and Sameer Jarrah did independent research work in Amman and estimated between 700,000 to 800,000 Iraqi residents, citing the large difference as a greater inclusion of undocumented Iraqi migrants, who may have been wary to respond to the Fafo survey. See: Fagen, Iraqi.
\textsuperscript{177} Chatelard, Migration, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{178} Fagen, Iraqi, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{179} Chatelard, La présence, p. 7.
terrorists in Iraq and the overwhelming domination of Shi’as in the government add to Jordan’s concerns: “It is particularly worrisome because, as so often occurs, the conflict has enhanced the power of extremists and fundamentalists in Iraq and all but eliminated the spaces available to advocates of tolerance and co-existence.” Therefore, Iraq’s instability is a serious concern for this neighbor, and has directly affected its immigration policies. This new dynamic has fundamentally changed Jordan’s relationship with its Iraqi residents and Iraq, as there has been a long history of friendly and cooperative relations.

The Iraqi community in Jordan is dominated by Sunnis (68%), with a smaller percentage of Shi’a (17%, the majority of Iraqi Shi’as having migrated to Syria) and Christians (12%). It consists of the wealthy or upper class elite, especially those who were close to the regime, but also poor refugees and thousands of the middle class. Jordan has been a center for Iraqi businessmen and their families, and the economic elite use Amman as a base. These groups can maintain a high standard of living and travel around the world, or, as is often the case, can use Amman as a base from which family living in Iraq, Jordan, the U.S., the U.K. and other parts of the world can meet and exchange.

Migration to Jordan on a larger scale started after the 1958 overthrow of the monarchy. Many members of the Hashemite dynasty and the monarchy bureaucracy came to Jordan, as Jordan was (and continues to be) ruled by the Hashemite monarchy, similarly set up by the British. From the 1960s to the 1980s, Iraqis continued to migrate to Jordan to escape persecution under subsequent coups and the Ba’th regime. However, the majority of Iraqis came to Jordan as entrepreneurs; wealthy Iraqis of all political affiliations invested in Jordanian business and real estate. This movement continued during the Gulf War and the period of sanctions in Iraq, as the Iraq-Jordan border stayed open, due to Jordan’s support of Iraq during the first Gulf War and continued economic relations. In fact, Jordan became the strongest economic partner of Iraq during sanctions, receiving highly subsidized oil from the country. This relationship allowed a unique opportunity for Iraqi private sector entrepreneurs, who “used Amman as a base for their regional activities and for wider international strategies.” Because of the open border, men, goods and capital were able to pass back and forth between Iraq and Jordan. Under sanctions, the

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180 Fagen, Iraqi, p. 1.
182 Chatelard, Migration, p. 8.
political and economic elite would come to Jordan for access to services (i.e. health, banking) and markets (i.e. art) not available in Iraq, not necessarily staying in Jordan but often circulating back and forth. Chatelard has enumerated four groups of Iraqis who migrated to Jordan between 1990 and 2002: 1) Refugees leaving in anticipation or because of the first Gulf War conflict. This group was demographically heterogeneous, but primarily urbanites of the upper-middle class who already had connections in Jordan or members of the middle class with enough means to (as they expected) temporarily migrate to Jordan until the end of the conflict; 2) Those who already had experience with international migration, had capital and assets outside of Iraq and did not wait for the outcome of the conflict to leave; 3) Single men as labor migrants to other Arab countries—Jordan granted 15,000 to 20,000 residency permits connected to work contracts; and 4) Families leaving for destinations in the U.K., North America and Australia, where they already had relatives. As can be seen in these categories, these migrants were primarily of the upper and middle classes, with a significant amount of social, educational and economic capital. Economic capital was especially important as migrants had to pay large sums for permission to leave the country and for travel documents. This intelligentsia was made up of those highly qualified in industrial or technical fields, members of professions not closely associated with the regime looking for better salaries as sanctions destroyed their purchasing power: doctors, surgeons, engineers, lawyers, teachers, journalists, artists and translators, among others. Some of those that settled in Jordan brought over their families, but more often they supported family still in Iraq through remittances. Most of the Iraqis in Jordan already had members of their close family in Europe, North America, Australia, and/or other Arab countries, and were typically Arab Iraqis coming from the center and the south. But starting in 1993, it became increasingly difficult to leave as financial capacity in Iraq was severely reduced and Arab countries began closing their labor markets—Libya, Yemen and Jordan are among the countries to stop recruiting labor—so Iraqis would often overstay their permits in Jordan, working in the informal labor market well below their high qualifications. In the late 1990s, families leaving for Western countries became increasingly important, and Jordan became more of a transit country for those waiting to migrate through family or community chain migration. Jordan’s Iraqi community

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183 Chatelard, La présence, p. 5.
185 Ibid., p. 27 and Chatelard, La présence, p. 5.
186 Chatelard, La présence, p. 5.
187 Chatelard, Migration, p. 27.
grew to approximately 300,000\textsuperscript{188} before 2003, making it the largest host of Iraqis during Saddam Hussein’s regime.

After the dissolution of the Ba’th regime, many Iraqis in Jordan chose to return to help rebuild the country. They felt that they had a role to play in the new Iraq as teachers, university professors, doctors, lawyers—using the skills they had developed in Iraq and abroad—and were involved in charities, humanitarian issues and women’s rights projects.\textsuperscript{189} However, as violence erupted and the country devolved into chaos, most of these members of the diaspora retreated back to Jordan. At the same time, many Iraqis chose to migrate to Jordan immediately after the fall of the regime because they already had assets in the country. The first migrants to Jordan after 2003 were Sunni, often Ba’thists fleeing the country, but with the escalation of violence, Shi’as began arriving as well. However, the preference for the well-educated and wealthy continued:

Iraqis with resources to invest have undertaken projects with generous terms, and have become important and very visible business owners and property holders. Importantly, investments in business and/or employment in jobs deemed economically important to Jordan—such as university professors—not only ensure livelihoods but also provide a path to legal status based on yearly, renewable residence permits. Only those Iraqis able to invest in Jordanian enterprises or who are employed in fields deemed to be of national interest have been able to obtain long term status. The investment entitles them to receive yearly residence permits, to seek employment in specified fields, send their children to schools and access public services.\textsuperscript{190}

The acquisition of long-term status in Jordan is crucial, as mobility is limited without a permanent residence permit—if you leave the country, you may not be allowed in again without permanent status. The number of Iraqis with permanent residence permits is currently estimated at 25,000, and UNHCR has said that 29% of those registered with them have such a permit.\textsuperscript{191} At the same time, it has become nearly impossible for Iraqis to integrate into the workforce, although Iraqi investors will sometimes reserve some of their employment for other Iraqis, referred through social networks. While the migrants continue to be highly skilled, most end up working in jobs well below their skill level, a notable “brain waste” of Iraqi skills. The Jordanian

\textsuperscript{188} Al-Ali, Untold, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p. 47.
\textsuperscript{190} Fagen, Iraqi, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{191} Geraldine Chatelard (2010, June 28). Personal correspondence. Chatelard conducted an interview with an official at the Ministry of Interior of Jordan who quoted this number.
government has not as of yet worked to integrate these members into the economy, especially as it continues to view them as “guests” who should leave as soon as the situation in Iraq is alleviated. Therefore, those who do have residence permits and are allowed to leave and re-enter the country are almost exclusively those of the upper classes and/or with unique skills.

Since most Iraqis are not employed, or are informally employed, the majority live off of savings, aid from community organizations or transfers from Iraq. Christian Iraqis receive support from Jordanian churches and the larger Christian community.\(^{192}\) Forty-two percent of Iraqis in Jordan receive transfers from Iraq.\(^{193}\) This means that, although they are skilled and were of the middle to upper class in Iraq, most are now in a precarious situation, vulnerable to both the exhaustion of their savings and the volatile situation in Iraq that may disrupt transfers. Furthermore, Jordanian services are not available to Iraqis without a permanent status. Until August 2007, Iraqi children of unregistered residents were not allowed to attend public schools (in contrast with Syria’s policy). However, King Abdullah II changed this position, putting aside large funds for expansion of the education system: hiring teachers, buying school materials, building schools and renovating classrooms in anticipation of the large number of Iraqi children of unregistered migrants.\(^{194}\) Although this represents a positive step, Jordanians still tend to view Iraqis as the cause of their problems: high prices, expensive housing, inflation, deteriorating services and infrastructure, crime and traffic. During Fagen and Jarrah’s research in Amman in 2007, every Jordanian they interviewed “singled out the rapidly accelerating cost of housing and most blamed wealthy Iraqis for having purchased or rented available space” despite the fact that Jordanians are the highest investors, and Iraqis are the fourth-largest foreign investors, after Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.\(^{195}\) This scapegoating places the blame for Jordanian problems squarely on the shoulders of Iraqis in Jordan, an already vulnerable group. Unfortunately, this tendency only grows stronger with continued economic woes. Coupled with increasing difficulty in crossing the border, obtaining residence permits and gaining access to services, as well as the expulsion of certain Iraqis from Jordan, the Iraqi community in Jordan is under intense pressure to either continue migrating to another country or to return to Iraq, and their diaspora activities have been severely limited. In fact, independent civil society

\(^{192}\) Chatelard, La présence, p. 7.
\(^{193}\) Fako, Iraqis, p. 3.
\(^{194}\) Fagen, Iraqi, p. 11.
\(^{195}\) Ibid., p. 13.
organizations are notably absent, although activists (especially women) travel to Jordan from Iraq for meetings and conferences.\(^{196}\) So, although there is some circular migration of Iraqi activists and members of the diaspora between Iraq and Jordan, their participation in diaspora activities has been limited, and, in fact, discouraged primarily due to security concerns.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the main characteristics of and forces affecting the Iraqi communities in the United States, the United Kingdom, Iran, Syria and Jordan. Each community has developed in a unique way depending on the backgrounds of the migrant group and the immigration regime of the host country. This development has affected the power relations within the Iraqi communities as well as between the Iraqi community and their hosts, with certain hierarchies created or reinforced due to the immigration regime of the host country and the immigration statuses of the migrants. Davies’ analysis of the various forms of domination and subordination that affect power relations is particularly useful when examining Iraqi communities. She recognizes that inequalities are built upon spatial, socio-economic, identity and political differences, which have their own inherent hierarchies but also overlap.\(^{197}\) She emphasizes the importance of changing opportunities and constraints within these power hierarchies for diasporic activities. These opportunities and constraints can be viewed as based on a particular person or group’s access to power. In the Iraqi case this analysis is especially useful, as the development of the Iraqi diaspora has hinged upon power relations at different times and within various spaces. It is particularly telling that in the U.S. and the U.K., the first arrivals affected the make-up and organization of the community, and often continue to be the leaders of the community. This is due in part to the immigration regimes of the host countries, which have stressed family and skilled migration, a development that has supported the organizational structure of the first arrivals. Furthermore, Iraqis in the U.S. were given particular attention due to the 2003 invasion, as the U.S. government looked to the Iraqi diaspora to help garner support. But with this attention, there were still hierarchies: those that were more established and wealthy within the Iraqi-American diaspora played a bigger role, Christian and Kurdish witnesses to Saddam’s atrocities were given the most attention, those not supportive of

\(^{196}\) Al-Ali, Diasporic, 146.
\(^{197}\) Davies, Reconceptualising, pp. 59-76.
the invasion were excluded from the discussions, and those who had permanent status within the
U.S. had greater freedom of movement to return after 2003. In contrast, the first Iraqi arrivals to
Syria and Jordan have separated themselves from the new arrivals. Iraqis in Syria, who are in a
much more vulnerable position, have not even been given the opportunity to speak on Syrian
policies towards Iraq. In fact, if they are illegally residing in the country, they would need to take
care that they were not noticed by the government, remaining silent to ensure their safety.

The differences observed in the role of the various waves within Iraqi diaspora politics
could be seen solely as a function of numbers: the first arrivals in the U.S. and the U.K. are more
prevalent than the newer arrivals, while the Iraqi communities in Syria and Jordan are dominated
by newer arrivals. However, this overlooks the significance of power in creating these
differences. Earlier arrivals tend to be more established in the new community, and so they may
not identify or want to be identified with the newer arrivals; first arrivals would have more
permanent residence status, employment and perhaps children integrated into the host
community. They also tended to leave before economic sanctions, suggesting that their
experience was characterized more by choice than economic imperative. Furthermore, the role of
Iraqi-Americans in the 2003 invasion represents a particular opportunity in time when Iraqi-
American goals corresponded with a global power’s goals, providing the chance for diaspora
engagement. In Syria and Jordan, however, the Iraqi community is dominated by newer arrivals
post-sanctions and especially post-2003, who tend to be poorer (although still wealthy enough to
leave Iraq), putting them in a precarious situation. Also, regional politics represented by the
policy of “Arab brotherhood” restrict the role that Iraqis can play within Syrian or Jordanian
policies. Finally, these diasporas interact with each other and with Iraqis that have not left Iraq.
The Iraqi-Americans who supported the 2003 invasion impacted the current Iraqi diaspora
communities in neighboring countries because they tended to leave post-2003 as Iraq became
unstable and plagued by violence, due to the U.S.-led invasion. Also, the Iraqi diaspora tends to
have a higher socio-economic level than those who stayed in Iraq, as one needs a certain level of
capital (social, cultural and economic) in order to afford leaving the country.

These power relations could affect the developmental potential of the diaspora. For
example, Shi’a Muslim Iraqi-Americans have been particularly outspoken about their sense of
entitlement in the new post-Saddam Iraq, due to their persecution by the regime. Their work
within Iraq may encourage sectarian divisions and tensions by stressing Shi’a-specific
persecution while dismissing that of others. This would hinder development goals in Iraq by fueling religious and ethnic divisions, which are currently extremely volatile. Kurds, too, work towards their own goals: in particular, an autonomous Kurdish state. Therefore, their work in Iraq would focus on the separation of Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq, a movement that would have important developmental consequences for the rest of Iraq. Each group often favors those from their own group, encouraging favoritism and further separation along religious and ethnic lines. The next section will look more closely at the return activity of Iraqis from abroad within the context of development programs, paying particular attention to the inequalities at play and how they affect these programs.

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198 Al-Ali and Pratt, Women’s, p. 82.
Chapter 5: Return

From the interviews and the literature, two types of organized return of the highly skilled stood out among the ways of return: consultancies organized through international programs and short trips taken through individual initiative for work-related, personal or familial reasons. This thesis focuses specifically on skilled Iraqis living abroad, who have returned temporarily to Iraq to work as consultants or for other professional reasons, e.g. to maintain businesses, start NGOs, or attend Parliamentary sessions. The majority of the organized return has been for consultancies, although there has been a significant amount of individually-organized return for professional reasons. However, there are not numbers for this latter group, and the majority of the literature on this form of diaspora engagement focuses on official consultancies organized by international organizations or governments. It is very difficult, and perhaps impossible to measure the developmental impact of these programs: “Most development projects are measured by little more than a summary of financial accounting”\textsuperscript{199}. Still, “individual volunteers, program organizers, and development agencies may have different ideas about what constitutes a successful programmatic outcome.”\textsuperscript{200} Therefore, while this study speaks to development issues, it is not feasible at the moment to measure the precise developmental impact on Iraq. However, by focusing on the role that specific members of the diaspora have within the context of their background and the program, it is possible to see how they affect these development projects. In the following section, various forms of temporary return will be analyzed by discussing the traditional format for organized consultancies and findings from interviews, two specific international programs (Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq and the Local Governance Program) and the transnational engagement of Iraqis returning to Iraq temporarily, primarily from Jordan and Syria. These forms of return are exemplary of the ways in which skilled Iraqis living abroad have tangibly engaged in development through temporary return migration to Iraq.

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.
5.1 Temporary Return Migration

As Faist has noted: “temporary returns, visits and other forms of transactions have moved to the centre of attention.”, with a particular focus on skilled migrants, because “while many of those categorized as highly skilled do not return to the regions of origin, they nonetheless form border-crossing epistemic networks and associations”.\(^{201}\) Many different governments and international organizations have organized programs to encourage the return of expatriates living abroad, to tap their apparent skills and networks. These programs have operated on three particular assumptions: “(1) that migrants have learned something abroad and have acquired experience; (2) that what they have learned is useful in their home context; and (3) that migrants are willing and able to apply what they have gained abroad.”\(^{202}\) Therefore, in respective national contexts, professionals will be recruited from the diaspora for different capacity-building projects. These activities could include developing plans for construction of needed facilities (e.g. water tanks), offering advice to businesses, working to expand the public health and education sector, and offering policy advice. Most of the programs are modeled after the UNDP’s TOKTEN program, which, beginning in 1977, organized voluntary returns of expatriates to their home countries to counter the effects of the “brain drain” on developing countries. The use of TOKTEN as a model can be particularly noticed in regard to the Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq Program and the Local Governance Program, discussed below. TOKTEN is not centralized, but rather is organized within each country, in coordination with UNDP and UNESCO projects, as well as the respective country’s needs.\(^{203}\) It links expatriates with particular institutions (governmental, academic, private and NGO), funding their return trip and stay. Aaron Terrazas outlines TOKTEN’s main objectives: “To lower the cost of technical advice; To allow developing countries to gain access to consultants who would be more effective than other consultants due to their linguistic or cultural competencies; To seed potential return of skilled expatriates or their long-term engagement with their country of origin; To depoliticize development-oriented

\(^{201}\) Faist, Migrants, pp. 27, 31.


\(^{203}\) However, the ILO MIGRANT program outlines the program’s main characteristics: ILO MIGRANT, “The TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) Programme”, <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=26> Last accessed 7 December 2010.
volunteer work as the aegis of UNDP allows political autonomy. The basic features of each program has been: the setting up of a database of potential volunteers for outreach purposes; volunteer requirements (e.g. expatriate nationals and not second generations, over age 25, at least a Bachelor’s diploma, excellence in the field, and minimum five years of experience); recognition of the specific country’s needs (decided upon by a committee of UNDP representatives and government agencies); and the completion of the expatriate’s consultancy (funded by TOKTEN). The targeting of the highly skilled with high levels of experience aims to bring the most valuable expatriates, with whom they then try to encourage a longer-term engagement, even though the consultancies are usually only a few months. The recruitment of specialists means that they are largely from the “Global North” (i.e. Western Europe and North America), whose institutions are more widely recognized and where there is more frequent access to the newest technologies. In the case of Iraq, it is also these regions that tend to have the strongest networks.

Nonetheless, the TOKTEN programs have evolved over the years, and have changed based on the country. In addition, other programs that have been based on the TOKTEN program have adopted some principles and not others. For example, governmental programs often organize the work around government aims, which may contradict TOKTEN’s objective to “depoliticize development-oriented volunteer work.” Furthermore, some engagement of expatriates has the explicit goal of permanent return, although originally the program emphasized temporary return. The TOKTEN programs are relevant not only because they serve as the model for other programs recruiting expatriates, but also because they operate under the same assumptions: that the recruitment of expatriates will aid the development of the home country. This idea is based on the belief that expatriates will bring skills to the country for a fraction of the cost of and far more effectively than non-expatriate consultants.

However, this is not always the case. As Fagen says: “Cultural sensitivities may persist, but cultural and political realities change over time.” Ammassari has highlighted the duality of engagement of highly skilled expatriates: “...development impacts of return migration depend on the attitudes of the receivers as much as upon the efforts of the proponents. If attention is

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204 Terrazas, Connected, p. 15.
205 Ibid., p. 15.
exclusively focused on migrants and on assisting them in resettling back home, such policy measures may produce some undesirable side effects.” In particular, focus on expatriates often elicits negative reactions from those who have not left. As far as the cost factor for engaging expatriates, the original practice was that remuneration would be lower than in developed countries, and on par with consultancy services within the developing country—in line with the idea of the program more as volunteering. This has changed over time, with certain programs granting wages for expatriates much higher than those in the home country, e.g. in Sudan and Rwanda. This may lead to resentment by those in the home country working side by side with the expatriates; they may view the expatriates as disloyal, as they abandoned their home country, and are thus unworthy of higher wages than those who did not leave. Furthermore, these programs do not account for expatriates who may be ready to make fully voluntary contributions. On the other hand, in countries such as Sudan and Rwanda, and other countries recovering from civil wars (like Iraq), higher remuneration may be necessary to offset the very real security concerns plaguing the country.

More concerning is the emphasis on the particular knowledge that expatriates have of their home country, which is argued to ease the implementation of development projects. The diaspora’s knowledge of their respective home country’s culture, body and verbal language, and ability to blend into the population, have been cited as reasons for the effectiveness of diaspora consultants. Various studies have found that diaspora volunteers have been more effective, have needed less pre-departure or post-arrival orientation, and cost less, as the volunteer may still have friends or family in the home country who could house them. However, this does not account for the specific problems expatriates pose. In particular, the length of time away from the country may affect their cultural and linguistic knowledge, as the country has changed over time. This is especially true for those who have been away from the country for decades, or second- or higher-generations. In fact, ten to fifteen years of absence has been argued as the maximum for the

207 Ammassari, Nation-Building, p. 152.
208 Terrazas, Connected; and Al-Ali, Untold, p. 51.
209 Terrazas, Connected, p. 17.
effectiveness of diaspora members in their home country.\textsuperscript{212} In the case of Iraq especially, local Iraqis would be able to recognize an expatriate from language alone. One expatriate interviewed for this thesis who left Iraq in the 1970s mentioned that, although Iraqis would recognize that he was a fellow national, they would know he had lived abroad for a long time, as the language has evolved and the emigrant may have also forgotten some words. Furthermore, Iraq has undergone major changes over the past 50 years, and expatriates may no longer have up-to-date information on the country, and may have radically different opinions concerning religion, development or the role of the welfare state (just to name a few). In these cases, a volunteer from neighboring Syria or Jordan may be just as useful. In addition, favoritism can play a big role, especially within a divided diaspora like that from Iraq. If not recognized or checked, an expatriate may recruit primarily members of his or her own community, as networks are used to recruit potential returnees: “Solon Ardittis of ILO points to the potential for patronage and favoritism in diaspora volunteer programs that allow host organizations to select volunteers based on personal connections rather than merit.”\textsuperscript{213} Finally, Bob Awuor of the African Community Development Foundation has cited “‘diaspora distractions,’ or personal or family concerns, [that] can sometimes consume diaspora volunteers while on assignment.”\textsuperscript{214}

The contradictions inherent in the use of members of the diaspora are supported by the analysis of interviews conducted for this thesis.\textsuperscript{215} What has emerged from the interviews and the literature is that the Iraqi expatriates that were recruited each had different motivations for returning, views of the home country and ideas about what should be the priority in encouraging development in Iraq. As Faist has noted: “geographically mobile persons who do not permanently reside in the community of origin may hold different notions of development from those ‘at home.’”\textsuperscript{216} In fact, different interviewees stressed corruption, services, justice, education, political issues and expansion of the private sector as the priority for Iraqi development. While one’s background does not automatically determine one’s priorities, it can offer interesting insight. For example, the Iraqi who stressed justice was Christian, and expressed

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{213} Terrazas, Connected, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{215} See interview table and sample survey in Annex.
\textsuperscript{216} Thomas Faist (2008), “Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round on the Migration-Development Nexus” Population, Space and Place 14, p. 36.
\end{flushleft}
concern for minorities in Iraq. The person who highlighted the role of the private sector for a vibrant economy works for an independent think tank in the U.S. Those who had a teaching background mentioned the role of education, and each person contacted living in the U.S. stressed the importance of fighting corruption. This reflects the importance of identity and exposure to differing political, cultural and economic discourses in forming opinions about the home country.

Furthermore, the Kurds that were interviewed mentioned that they spoke exclusively of Kurdistan when they spoke of Iraq. This is in part because their only experience with Iraq has been with Kurdistan, which has had autonomous status (although not self-rule) since 1970 and was cut off from the rest of Iraq by Saddam Hussein after the first Gulf War. Also, more significantly, it is because they identified as Kurdish and not as Iraqi: “…I don’t feel connected to Iraq. It means nothing to me. For me is Kurdistan important and I want to have a democratic and independent Kurdistan.” This is an important goal for many Kurds, who want to establish an independent state where the Kurdish culture has been historically based, which covers parts of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. This goal would have a significant impact on the rest of Iraq’s development. Iraqi Kurdistan is the only part of Iraq nowadays that is stable, and it has a longer history of autonomy than the rest of Iraq, a number of oil fields, as well as a multicultural and multireligious population consisting of Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, cultures that overlap with the confessional groups of Christians, Shi’as and Sunnis. Therefore its separation would have serious social, economic and cultural developmental implications on the rest of current-day Iraq.

While an independent Kurdistan is not a priority for all Kurds, it is a strong tendency among those involved in Kurdish organizations. On the other hand, those who did not grow up around a large Kurdish community were not exposed to the dominant Kurdish diasporic discourse in the same way. A Kurdish woman who grew up in Klagenfurt, Austria expressed disappointment when she became involved with the Kurdish community in Vienna: “It was just the discourse I grew up in, nothing new: same people, same things said over thirty, forty years. And even the kids my age, the same…I was so happy I grew up in Klagenfurt, far away from all these people, because it’s so different when you actually grow up within your community. No

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217 Response to survey.
reflection, no critique, nothing.” She found that this group could not see past the old divisions, and this limited the discourse about Iraq and about return. For this reason, although she would like to return on a more permanent basis, she feels strongly that she would like to work in other parts of Iraq or even Syria, in other places that could use her skills. The same issues can be found other ethnic and religious communities. While networks offer more opportunities to get involved they can also constrain opportunities to those approved by the specific community.

A lack of a strong connection to a larger network could actually open up new opportunities that may not be available otherwise. One Christian Iraqi interviewed had little interaction with any Iraqi expatriate community, outside family connections, but had the opportunity to go to Iraqi Kurdistan to work on a project improving access to and quality of education. He identifies as American, Arab, Christian and Iraqi, but did feel a bond with the Kurds: “I did sense that it was a different country in some ways, but I did also sense that they consider themselves part of Iraq.” In particular, he noted the positive relations between Christians and Kurds, who connect on minority issues, and the positive reactions he received on his participation in the project: “I really sense that there’s this pride with the people, the Kurds we were interacting with, that an Iraqi was coming back to Iraq. [A colleague] sensed that it was a really good thing and that it was actually something positive for the project and helped make it sort of easier to work with the Kurds that there was an Iraqi was on the project.” In this case, his orientation outside of a strong community network in the end worked to his advantage. Not only was he brought into the project, but there was a positive reaction despite the religious and ethnic differences. Therefore, although the different ethnic and religious Iraqi communities in the U.S. are fairly separated, as shown in Section 4.1, growing up outside of this can offer new opportunities to engage with the home country.

Another tendency among those interviewed who had lived a long time abroad was that while they were in Iraq they spent most of their free time with other Iraqis who had lived as expatriates. This is qualitatively different than expatriates that connect with other expatriates (either from their own home country or another) while abroad, which could be seen as a general trend. In this case, when returning to the home country, they still remain among “expatriates”—other Iraqis who had spent a long period of time abroad or currently continue to live permanently.

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218 Personal Interview, 15 May 2010.
abroad. Although they would have interaction with Iraqi family members or work colleagues, they chose to live and make friends with others who had lived abroad. One expatriate explained, “Because we share the same stories. Left while we were kids and came back to serve in our country. And they are more open minded than the locals.” One woman mentioned the painful experience of being called a foreigner (ajnabi) by her family in Iraq. She highlighted the role of generational and cultural differences, but also the role of both sides in increasing understanding: “If we failed to tell them how we live, then they won’t get it. But then, on the other hand, they’re like this wall of non acceptance and it’s so hard to get through it.”

The difficulties returnees have with the home community increases the longer they’ve been away, as the mindsets of both those who left and those who have stayed change in different ways. Moreover, there is less regular contact in the cases of those who had been away longest, and for those who left as children. While they still returned to their home country, they did have more difficulties getting along with the “locals”, a reflection of the gap between the diaspora and the home country.

Two of the female interviewees cited gender relations as problematic in Iraq, citing situations when they were called names or pursued, often to the point of stalking. One of these women mentioned these problems as they related to her lack of desire to return to Iraq. As discussed in Section 3.2, the current situation in Iraq is not conducive for women to return. This, together with feedback from Iraqi women who returned temporarily and the mounting literature on women’s rights in Iraq, underlines the major continuing issues for women in Iraq that make it difficult for women to return, even temporarily.

Finally, a large proportion of those interviewed were Christian, identified through my family connections. Not one Christian interviewed expressed a desire to return to Iraq permanently:

…the most important issue there is no future for us as Christians in that country, so my decision to move out and leave to save my life and hoping one day in the future I can help my family to leave too.219

Here [the U.S.] is safety, everything is available. But Iraq is home. But we cannot return—there are not many opportunities and my kids and I would be killed for our religion.220

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219 Response to survey.
220 Personal interview, 15 May 2010.
221 Response to survey.
For me there is no future there. I’m living in this country, now I’m focusing on this country.²²³

For Christians, permanent return is not a feasible option, as they are particularly vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, as Christians leave, it feeds into more emigration, supporting Mygdal’s theory of cumulative causation. But in this case it is not only because networks are created that can present opportunities to other Christians, but also because those who remain are even more isolated.

The interviews and the literature on organized return highlight important issues for Iraqi expatriates who have made temporary return trips. They give cause to question the assumption that expatriates have a unique knowledge and homogeneous opinions of their home country. It also means that if diaspora expatriates are engaged, these potential problems must be accounted for; creating an integrated framework that harnesses the skills and the potential desire to return on the part of the expatriate and linking it with overarching planning that address the needs of the home country. In doing so, the projects may be stronger. As Terrazas of MPI notes, “there are benefits from aligning the development priorities of diaspora volunteers with the priorities of other actors…In light of their personal ties, diasporas may be more attuned to community-level challenges whereas national authorities may have a better appreciation of the macroperspective.” Development projects that engage expatriates have to account for this and other divergences among expatriates and between them and the other actors involved. The differing priorities, motivations and goals within the diaspora, as well as among governments, international organizations, NGOs, private enterprises and others rarely align with each other, as will be shown in the following analysis of Iraqi return schema.

Furthermore, opportunity structures influenced all parts of the experience of temporary return, and these issues continue within organized international programs, to which I now turn. Both organized programs discussed here recruited Iraqis for consultancies in a similar time period (2005-2007), so dealt with very similar challenges in encouraging development through the use of members of the diaspora. Not only did power structures play an important role, but during this time in particular, security and sectarian violence presented an enormous challenge.

²²² Personal Interview, 20 February 2010.
²²³ Personal Interview, 20 February 2010.
This has an important implication for development as the projects may have been compromised by these various challenges, as will be seen in the next section.

5.2 International Programs

5.2.1 Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq

The Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq (IRI) program was a “capacity-building” project for the Iraqi government, organized among multiple international organizations. It was implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), co-managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), funded from the UN Director General Trust Fund and coordinated with the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC). It was organized to link the requests of various ministries to UN agencies and the IOM for support in capacity-building with interest from members of the Iraqi diaspora in various countries to offer their services. Therefore, the “need to identify qualified Iraqi staff from abroad has therefore been recognized to be a top priority that needs to be coordinated and integrated into the UN Strategic Plan for programme and Capacity building activities for Iraq, through the Poverty Reduction and Human Development Cluster”

The program’s goal was to recruit 60 diaspora experts as consultants for up to a year on various projects in Iraqi ministries and public institutions. Its development objective was to “contribute to the sustainable recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict Iraq by establishing viable mechanisms to bolster the country’s human resource base in the key areas of the public sector.” Its four main objectives were to “Assist Iraqi authorities to identify human resources gaps in key areas of public sector and develop professional profiles and eligibility criteria for the posts required to fill these gaps; Identify specific skills available among the Iraqi émigré community based on the needs identified by Iraqi...”

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224 Most information I received on this program was given via email correspondence with various people at IOM and the UNDP. In addition, the MoPDC released statistics regarding the IRI experts and there was an independent external project evaluation. The latter was based upon internal correspondence, a questionnaire sent to all IRI experts (although they only received 32 valid responses), interviews and information-gathering from IOM and UNDP in Baghdad and Amman, statistics from IOM and questionnaires sent to government and partner focal points, as well as the Steering Committee. Christian Bugnion, Abbas Balasm and UNDP (2010, June 15), “Independent External Project Evaluation of ‘Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq’ Phase II. Implemented by The International Organisation for Migration (IOM)”.


226 Ibid., p. 1.
public sector authorities; Develop a database and website to serve to establish Iraqi Skills Roster and to match the demand and supply of human resources; [and] Deploy and support Iraqi expatriate experts to fill identified gaps in the Ministries and other public sector institutions and to provide capacity building, professional support and training for existing staff.”

IRI had two phases: set up and preparation (from September 2004 to February 2005) and project implementation, from recruitment to completion of the consultancy (May 2005 to December 31, 2007).

In May 2005, the website “www.iraqi-iri.org” was launched by the MoPDC, with the support of IOM and the UNDP. The website was offered in three languages (Arabic, Kurdish and English) and was the primary coordination point, where interested Iraqi expatriates get information about the program, download an application form and submit it online. It was also part of a larger information campaign: “Dozens of Iraqi associations based in neighbouring countries as well as in Europe and North America were contacted…The IRI Support Centre in Amman started to receive queries and completed application forms from potential candidates and in Baghdad the IRI Support Cell had registered over 100 requests from participating ministries looking for Iraqi experts.”

The website was originally supposed to match potential applicants with potential employers, but for technical reasons this was not possible. In any case, recruitment procedure and employment was given much attention, including a “three level filtering system…for the selection of candidates, in order to avoid personal preferences and other potential biases.”

In conjunction, an Iraqi Skills Roster was developed, to be used in the future. Currently, after the completion of the project, the website is no longer operational and in fact, to gain information on the program one must contact an array of people at the UNDP and IOM, respectively. Furthermore, according to interviews conducted for an independent project evaluation, it is not clear if the roster is used.

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227 Idem., p. 2.
228 Bugnion et al., Independent, p. 6.
230 Bugnion et al., Independent, p. 8.
232 Idem.
As far as remuneration: “IRI experts are provided logistical support for their deployment to Iraq, are entitled to a roundtrip air ticket and will receive a compensation fee for their services.” However, the MoPDC pushed for lower remuneration for the experts because of anticipated friction with Iraqi colleagues: “Feedback from the focal points proved the MoPDC right, as the situation reportedly created some resentment given what was seen as preferential treatment to returning Iraqi experts.”

On the other hand, 40 percent of experts interviewed for the independent project evaluation found the compensation package appealing. While this is a large proportion, it was by no means the decisive factor, as “94% of the experts largely or completely agreed that their having an interesting role in rebuilding Iraq was a cause for application to the IRI. 76% of the experts largely or completely agreed that the possibility of returning to live in Iraq was a reason for their application”. In fact, only 16 percent of those who declined the IRI offer cited the compensation package as the reason. Therefore, in this case, lower remuneration (although not as low as those in Iraq are paid) did not hinder the recruitment of Iraqi expatriates.

In the end, the program reached its goal, recruiting 59 experts for 62 assignments (3 experts were used twice). According to statistics cited by the MoPDC, obtained through a contact at IOM Iraq: The majority (29) held PhDs, while 14 held Masters and 19 had a Bachelors degree. 90 percent of IRI experts were men. Most came from North America and Europe (46: 14 from the U.K., 10 from Canada, 8 from Germany, 5 from Sweden, 3 from the Netherlands, 3 from France, 2 from Austria and 1 from Italy), but 12 of the remaining 16 experts came from the Middle East (6 from Jordan, 3 from the United Arab Emirates, 2 from Qatar, and 1 from Lebanon). Of those recruited, the most prevalent jobs were in medicine, public administration, telecommunication and English teaching (in descending order of those recruited). Of those requested from the Iraqi side, the jobs of the highest demand were education and training, then health/medicine, computer science/web design, civil engineering, and management/leadership (in descending order of demand), in addition to a score of others.

234 Bugnion et al., Independent, p. 16.
235 Ibid., p. 40.
236 MoPDC (2007, October), “Statistics covering the period from 23rd May 2005 to 31st October 2007”.
237 Ibid.
238 Idem.
were in Kurdistan (23 in Erbil and 21 in Sulaymaniya), and 15 assignments were in Baghdad. This could be a reflection of the relative stability of Iraqi Kurdistan, or of the strong motivations for Kurdish Iraqis to return to work for Kurdish independence. Members of the Kurdish diaspora are unlikely to work in other areas of Iraq, as many feel strongly Kurdish rather than Iraqi, and work towards an independent Kurdistan rather than towards the development of the current Iraqi state. The high percentage of projects focused in Kurdistan means that the developmental impact of the IRI program was unevenly spread throughout Iraq, with a greater emphasis on Kurdistan, which is already the most stable region of the country. Furthermore, only three assignments were outside Baghdad or Kurdistan, largely excluding most regions of Iraq.

In the end, although IRI “appears to have filled a gap”, the security situation, in addition to outdated equipment, electricity and water cuts, limited resources, issues with staff and gender issues were mentioned as severely hindering its effectiveness. Although it seems that some experts continued projects after the completion of their assignment, and even more stated intentions to continue working with institutions in Iraq, it is difficult to assess the extent of the effects of IRI experts and the program in general. The independent external project evaluation found that:

The project was designed without a very clear idea of what could realistically be achieved given the prevailing context in Iraq at the time. It was essentially a pilot project to gauge the level and commitment of the government to be involved in such an endeavor and the willingness of experts to return. Therefore the project design did not fully spell out the details of the process. It did not specifically address the issue of the type of return that was foreseen under the project.

However, it did refer to the more permanent return projects in Afghanistan, and so hoped for potential permanent returns of expatriates, or at least a long-term engagement. In fact, nine of the 59 experts stayed, at least six of whom accepted jobs with the Government of Iraq. The high percentage of assignments in Kurdistan, along with the strong desire on the part of many Kurdish Iraqi expatriates to return to Kurdistan and work towards independence could be linked to the return of nine of the IRI experts. The only interviewee contacted for this thesis who returned permanently was a Kurdish woman who grew up in Vienna, Austria, but whose family is from

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239 Idem.
240 Bugnion et al., Independent, p. 11.
242 Ibid., p. 12.
Sulaymaniyah. She was involved in the Kurdish community in Vienna, and believes strongly in an independent Kurdistan. She had already planned to return after finishing her university thesis, but returned immediately when an opportunity in Erbil arose. This example of permanent return connects the bond with and participation in the Kurdish community in Austria, whose politics stress an independent Kurdistan, with the opportunities for return. This case, together with the permanent return of nine expatriates from the IRI program, suggests that not only must there be the opportunity to return, but also larger factors, such as a strong desire to return and participation in a community that encourages it.

In the end, the IRI program goal was reached despite the fact that the political and security situation was unstable, at best. The program realized its immediate objectives of assisting Iraqi authorities in identifying human resource gaps, identifying skills in the Iraqi expatriate community, developing a database and a website, and sending Iraqi expatriates on assignment in Iraq. It did this while taking into account possible issues of remuneration and favoritism in the recruitment process. Due to security issues, the program was managed remotely. The situation in the country was already dangerous at the start of the program, with international organizations withdrawing from Iraq on the 22 September 2003, but the bombing of the Shi’a mosque Askariya in February 2006 led to increasing sectarian violence, directly challenging the work of this program. Indeed, security was highlighted as the most important constraint of the project. 35 percent of those who declined the offer to work with the IRI program cited security as the reason.244 This, along with strong Kurdish nationalism, is probably one of the reasons why most projects are focused in the relatively stable Kurdistan. At the same time, it should be noted that many Iraqi Arabs have come to Kurdistan to benefit from the stable environment and access to services—especially education, which the IRI program in Kurdistan did work to develop. In conclusion, the IRI program did fulfill its immediate objectives, despite serious constraints, but its lack of follow-through after the fact has limited its impact. The IRI program’s engagement with Iraq ended in 2007 when the program officially ended, which is reflected in the absence of a working website, no attempt to prolong the program’s activities and limited feedback from the MoPDC.

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244 IRI, Programme.
5.2.2 Local Governance Program Phase One

The Iraqi Local Governance Program (LGP) is funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International, a research institution based in the Research Triangle in North Carolina, U.S. Its immediate objective at Phase One was the “the restoration of basic public services and support to local administrations with service delivery responsibility”, with the long-term objective “to establish subnational government structures and procedures that would assure responsive and transparent local services, while putting in place democratic governance mechanisms—elected councils, as well as neighborhood, city, and provincial levels—that would support the empowerment of local authorities and citizens.”

The program is currently on its third phase, beginning January 1, 2009 and due to be ending June 30, 2011, focusing mostly on support of the local councils which by now have been trained and are Iraqi-led. LGP3 has not used diaspora Iraq professionals (DIPs) and other Iraqi expatriates as was done in previous phases. DIPs were Iraqi expatriates recruited for assignments in Iraq. LGP1 (from 2003 to 2005) and LGP2 (from 2005 to 2008), used twelve and 32 DIPs, respectively, as consultants to work on the restoration of public services and support local administrations; they were an integral part of the program. However, RTI also recruited expatriates to work on the project, at its peak in January/February 2004 hiring more than 230 expatriate professionals.

Brinkerhoff, a member of a LGP policy advisory group, and Taddesse, who was posted to Iraq through the LGP, outlined the use of twelve DIPs by LGP1 from personal experience with the program, interviews with RTI recruiters and managers and surveys of DIPs. Their study focused on the important impact of the LGP in forming 437 neighborhood (hayy) councils, 195 sub-district (nahiya) councils, 96 district (qada) councils and 16 provincial (mouhafadhat) councils, and the role of DIPs in the program’s fruitfulness. LGP1 trained over 20,000 council members.

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245 The Local Governance Program (LGP) is an example of a government-sponsored program recruiting members of the diaspora (in this case, only Iraqi-Americans), but there is little information available. What is presented here is information gleaned from Briefs and online information provided by RTI International, a detailed article on the use of “diaspora Iraqi professionals” (DIPs) within the program by Brinkerhoff and Taddesse, email correspondence with those who worked on LGP at RTI International and a survey of a DIP who participated in the LGP.


247 Ibid., p. 70.

248 Idem., p. 68.
members, held 22,000 events across Iraq and reached more than 750,000 people across the country.\footnote{Idem.} It trained managers, organized national and regional conferences, as well as a score of other events, encouraged civil society work, worked on the political awareness campaign for the first elections after the CPA and hired more than 3,000 Iraqis as staff in the country. DIPs were used within this program in various ways; of the twelve DIPs, eight were civil-society specialists (although one was hired as an urban planner), two engineers worked on public service delivery and infrastructure issues, one worked as a public administration specialist and trainer (and continued working under LGP2), and one was the national information technology director for LGP (and continued working under LGP2).\footnote{Idem., p. 75.}

Brinkerhoff and Taddesse highlight the importance of the DIP’s language and cultural knowledge of Iraq as well as personal connections to the community to their job effectiveness. The quick acceptance and start-up for RTI activities are attributed to DIPs who:

were able to transmit knowledge of international best practices, relate them to the situation in Iraq, and engage their counterparts in discussions about application to Iraq. They could get into the heart of sensitive issues such as ethical codes, corruption, and transparency that would be difficult for others to do without bruising Iraqi pride…Being from Iraq provided an immediate bond, and helped to establish trust, mutual respect, and commitment. It also helped in understanding the meaning and subtleties of hand gestures, facial expressions, and other bodily movements, which form part of the spoken language, but for which there are no equivalent Arabic words…The DIPs were able to convey the purpose of the program and content of the message in precise terms, using relevant examples relating to Iraq’s past.\footnote{Idem., pp. 76-77.}

Thus, DIPs in LGP1 were integral to the success of the project. In particular, their cultural knowledge has been emphasized as a lubricant for the LGP.

However, “their deep understanding of the underlying social fabric and power relations at all levels of Iraqi society, and the rapport they were able to establish with local actors”\footnote{Idem., p. 85.} may be overstated. While the bond of being a fellow Iraqi is strong, as I have also experienced in meeting other Iraqis, the use of DIPs within LGP1 did contribute to several important issues with the local population. First, as was discussed in Section 5.1, this assumes expatriates’ continued
intimate knowledge of the language and culture, which may not be the case. In multiple interviews conducted for this thesis, including with one DIP who returned through the LGP, returnees mentioned that they generally did not mix with local Iraqis (save for family members, or when they had to interact with local Iraqis for work matters). This was because they were identified as foreign by locals, and the expatriate community is viewed as “more open-minded.” At the same time, this trend may also reflect an individual feeling of difference on the part of the expatriate. They tended to mix exclusively with other expatriates, in part because they identified more with other expatriates, in part because they were disparaged by locals. In fact, the lives of expatriates temporarily returning to Iraq for consultancies are very different from locals’ lives. The LGP DIP that was interviewed for this thesis mentioned:

I lived with expats and worked with Iraqis. My residence was in a secure compound in Mosul and a secure compound in Baghdad in the IZ. Due to the pace of the work and my short visits, confined living situation did not affect me too much since I had little time to be bothered by it. I was also so very inspired by my Iraqi colleagues who live in far dangerous circumstances than I do and always manage to show up to work on time and with a zest for their work.253

While there is clear admiration on the part of the DIP, there is also a significant gap between local Iraqis and expatriates, which can be attributed to the time spent abroad by the latter. While expatriates still identify as Iraqi and believe they know the culture well, on a basic level they do not associate with local Iraqis when they are actually in the country, unless the situation requires it. This challenges the idea that expatriates know the Iraqi culture best, if they are categorized or categorize themselves as different.

Second, aside from the tensions arising from disparate salaries, LGP DIPs were often accused of being traitors or collaborators, especially as they were Iraqi-American.254 Although often unfounded, this does present an important limitation, especially to the projects this program spearheaded. Organizations and activities created or supported by an international program have at times been shunned by local Iraqis, as has been noted in the case of women’s centers in Iraq that were funded by the Coalition Provisional Authority: “…many Iraqi women were afraid to attend the centres, which were associated with the occupation, and often regarded with suspicion,

253 Response to survey.
254 Brinkerhoff and Taddeese, Recruiting, p. 84.
if not as a target for insurgents, by the respective local communities.”

This is especially important when considering the time period of LGP1 and LGP2, which spanned a period of increasing insurgency and violence in Iraq. If Iraqis are afraid to use the services offered by an international program, the program’s developmental impact is hindered.

Third, ethnic and religious differences played a large role. Surprisingly, about 40 percent of DIPs voiced no preference to be assigned to their ethnic area, where their family line was well-known. However, for the 60 percent that did show this preference, when they were not sent to this area, some showed resentment. Much more disturbing is the fact that when DIPs were assigned near their home communities, they tended to hire Iraqis only from their own ethnic group. In fact, according to Brinkerhoff and Taddesse, “several of the surveyed DIPs suggested that to some degree a few of the DIPs abused their discretionary hiring power to establish small but effective ‘fiefdoms’…some had a small army of drivers and bodyguards, partly as protection and partly as a demonstration of status and power.” Furthermore, there were divisions among the DIPs along ethnic and religious lines. This highlights the important fact that not only are there issues between returnees and Iraqis, but also among returnees. As seen in the interviews and the literature, there is distrust between expatriates, which can lead to problems if they are expected to work together. A Christian expatriate now living in the U.S. interviewed for this thesis expressed strong distrust of Iraqi Muslims: “I take care in dealing with them. I know what they do, from my experience in Iraq. I deal with them and respect them as a person, and help when they need it because I’m a Christian. But we are surface friends and it is not deep.” In the case of the LGP, the structure of the Iraqi-American community and the distrust among various sects and ethnicities had a strong influence; the divisiveness of the Iraqi-American communities, especially along religious and ethnic lines, manifested itself in the use of these DIPs in the program. The lack of a system of checks on the recruiting of local Iraqis by DIPs, combined with the ethnic and religious issues strongly related to the Iraqi-American community, led to an abuse of power, and may have discouraged Iraqis without the same ethnic or religious background from getting involved. Therefore, it may have encouraged divisiveness along religious and ethnic lines within Iraq, hindering the very political development it hoped to promote.

255 Al-Ali and Pratt, Women’s, p. 77.
256 Brinkerhoff and Taddesse, Recruiting, p. 83.
257 Ibid., p. 83.
Despite these significant issues with the use of DIPs, the focused goal along with widespread activities of the LGP did bring important results to Iraq. In particular, members of the diaspora “used their skills to teach, facilitate, and mobilize the Iraqis they collaborated with.” DIPs were used in a strictly temporary sense; they were mobilized to build capacity in Iraq, so Iraqis could fulfill the jobs themselves, without the continued help of members of the diaspora. In fact, if one observes how the LGP program has evolved, DIPs have gradually been phased out of the program, so that now, by LGP3, the program is Iraqi-led. In this sense, the temporary and small-scale use of DIPs within the LGP was successful, despite issues during LGP1.

5.3 Individually-organized Return Migration

In comparison to the previous programs, individually-organized engagement does not operate under the same structures, but it does evoke similar issues with Iraqis in Iraq. The temporary return migration of Iraqi businesspeople, in this case primarily from neighboring countries, fits within the category of “transnational circuits”, as defined by Faist:

Transnational circuits are characterized by a constant circulation of goods, people, and information transversing the borders of sending and receiving states… along with principle of exchange, viz. instrumental reciprocity. Often, economic entrepreneurs use insider advantages such as knowledge of the language, knowing friends and acquaintances abroad to establish a foothold.

These migrants constantly move between the sending and the receiving states, to simultaneously take advantage of markets, educational opportunities, medical availability, a safe haven, etc. Many of these entrepreneurs and their families are established in one country “and use it as a sort of base from which to carry out entrepreneurial activities in others.” These transnational circuits are increasingly noticeable in the Iraqi case. A growing amount of literature, spearheaded by Chatelard, examines the role of Iraqis living primarily in Jordan and Syria and working in Iraq. This concept of “re-engagement” involves doctors, university professors, members of government (it is argued that around half of the outgoing parliament and government have

258 Idem., p. 84.
260 Ibid., p. 207.
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houses in Amman),\textsuperscript{262} business people and civil society members (especially heads of NGOs and women’s organizations), who combine access to income in Iraq with the security of living outside of the country. Chatelard has interviewed a number of Iraqis who have maintained or restarted businesses in Iraq from Amman—NGOs, architect firms, etc. In addition, one of Al-Ali’s interviewees highlights the benefits of living in Amman while working in Iraq: “My father still lives in Iraq. He goes back and forth. He has a green card. He is a lawyer and has a law firm. He does most of the work from here. It is almost useless to be in Baghdad, because even if you have to go to court, there are many obstacles, like curfews.”\textsuperscript{263} He moves back and forth between Jordan and Iraq to maintain an income, and perhaps to access certain services available in Jordan. Chatelard notes that there is a lot of business going on between Damascus or Aleppo and Iraq, with recently arrived Iraqis, journalists, artists and intellectuals playing a big role in cross-border interaction and trade: “Iraqi intellectuals in Jordan and Syria have more access to resources, social networks, cultural productions and more opportunities for interaction with foreign intellectuals than their colleagues who have remained in Iraq.”\textsuperscript{264} In Amman and Damascus they can have comfortable living conditions and security as well as access to education, services and a larger intellectual community. The concept of “Arab brotherhood” discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 on Iraqi migration to Syria and Jordan offers a unique opportunity for Iraqis to gain access to health and education services in the neighboring host countries. For Iraqi businesses and research centers especially, Amman, Kurdistan and Beirut have served as centers:

They manage responses to call for research proposals and the production of reports, receive payments from the organizations that commission the reports, generally in North America and Western Europe, and remunerate researchers spread across several locations in the Middle East. Whereas field-researchers gather data inside Iraq, keeping a low public profile and maintaining networks of protection in their respective communities, more prominent Iraqi social scientists located outside Iraq devise research methodologies and write up reports.\textsuperscript{265}

In these cases, Iraqis cross borders frequently—maintaining businesses in one country and returning to the other as needed. Iraqis in the region have “re-engaged” with Iraq on a

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{263} Al-Ali, Untold, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid., p. 19.
very different level from those organized by international programs. Their location abroad accords them safety and access to education and services such as electricity or healthcare while they simultaneously interact with their home country. As concerns Iraq, their proximity to the country allows them to engage on a more regular basis in order to retain connections, open or keep up businesses, gather information, or even maintain legitimacy as “Iraqi”.

However, as highlighted in Section 4.5 on the Iraqi community in Jordan, freedom of movement is limited, as Iraqis may not be allowed back into Jordan without a residence permit or a Western passport. In Al-Ali’s example of the Iraqi lawyer going back and forth between Jordan and Iraq, this is only made possible because he holds a green card. Without this, return is too risky, if one is not planning on staying in Iraq. These residence permits are very difficult to obtain, and are largely restricted to the higher classes and those with specialized skills considered essential in Jordan. In Syria residence permits are easier to acquire, but crossing the border to Iraq is still a risk. Moreover, aside from the issue of a residency status, if an Iraqi does have a job in Amman or Damascus, they are unlikely to leave their job for a month or more, as this may challenge their work status.

Furthermore, there is considerable suspicion within Iraq about the diaspora, and those who maintain a double residence or move back and forth (even to visit family) try not to publicize it in Iraq.\textsuperscript{266} There is a large amount of resentment and critique of members of the diaspora who “did not live it” and “did not see it.” Many Iraqis who did not leave view diaspora activities as patronizing or out of touch, and associate the diaspora with the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation: “…in the Iraqi context where, for a variety of reasons, influential figures from the diaspora have played a disproportionate role in the new Iraqi leadership supported by the U.S. Diaspora women have tried to put their mark on emerging women’s organizations and on the contestation of citizenship within Iraq, but have frequently been perceived as being patronizing or being part of a ‘western plot’.”\textsuperscript{267} It is true that Iraqi expatriates have played an enormous role in post-2003 Iraq—even Ayad Allawi and Nouri al-Maliki, the largest recipients of the popular vote in the most recent elections, spent most of their time abroad, living in the U.K., Syria and Iran. In order to gain support, though, they must recast themselves as critics of

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\textsuperscript{266} Geraldine Chatelard (2010, June 28). Personal correspondence.

\textsuperscript{267} Al-Ali, Diasporic, p. 151.
the U.S. invasion and, in some cases, pander to sectarian divisions, tribal connections and powerful militias. In any case, those who have returned (either temporarily or permanently) must hide their connections abroad to gain legitimacy among the general Iraqi population.

This suspicion is not only on the part of Iraqi citizens, but also the government, which has not made large-scale efforts towards engaging those who left more recently. In December 2008, the government hosted the first conference in Baghdad looking to attract Iraqi expatriates back to Iraq. About 200 Iraqi professionals participated, but most of the attendees had left in the 1980s and 1990s, and not post-2003.\footnote{Joseph Sassoon (2010, July 27). Expert interview.} This is mainly due to the view of those having left post-2003 as Ba’thist sympathizers:

One possible reading of the reluctance of Premier Nuri al-Maliki and most members of his government—the majority of whom lived in exile in Iran, Syria and elsewhere, some of them since the 1970s—to take any meaningful step towards engaging with those who have taken refuge abroad since 2003 is their belief that forced exile is a deserved punishment or, alternatively, that refugees are traitors who refuse to adhere to the political project of the so-called new Iraq. In this conceptualization, those newly exiled are paying the price for having caused—if only by having failed to be sufficiently active in their opposition to Saddam Hussein—the exile of those who are in power today.\footnote{Chatelard, Politics, pp. 12-13.}

This means that opportunities are limited for those who left more recently and still want to engage with Iraq. While those who left immediately following the 2003 invasion did tend to be Ba’thist sympathizers, starting in 2005 and 2006 Iraqis from all backgrounds were fleeing the violence that had erupted around the country. The Iraqi government’s reluctance is why most of the “re-engagement” going on from Jordan and Syria tends to involve those having left more recently; recruitment by the Iraqi government and international programs (often coordinated with the Iraqi government) tends to focus on those having left pre-2003. Although the Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq program did recruit several Iraqis from the Middle East, the majority of Iraqis recruited from the diaspora to work as consultants in Iraq came from North America, Europe or Australia. This characteristic suggests that these consultants left before 2003, as these regions have not accepted large numbers of Iraqi refugees post-2003, in comparison with neighboring countries. Furthermore, of those they did accept, it is unlikely that they would achieve the volunteer requirements required by international programs (i.e. education, top of the field, access
to state of the art technology) to return as expatriate professionals. Therefore, it can be assumed that those arriving via recruitment for consultancies tend to have left before 2003, and in fact, probably before 1991, while those involved in “re-engagement” activities may include a proportion of those who have more recently left.

While this new form of movement, “re-engagement”, is important to illuminate the various forms of exchange Iraqis abroad are having with Iraq, there are important limitations, not least of which is a lack of numbers to put this movement into perspective. Indeed, none of the temporary returnees interviewed for this thesis fit within this scheme of individually-organized return for professional purposes. However, it presents an alternative form of temporary return that engages more of those who have left recently. Furthermore, it can have an important developmental impact as many of these returnees are engaged in small and medium-sized businesses, civil society activities and research organizations within Iraq.

5.4 Conclusion

This section has outlined a few different types of Iraqi temporary return migration and their characteristics, showing that return has multiple forms. Each was coordinated by different entities: international organizations, governments, and through personal initiative. And in turn, they each have brought something to Iraq, through the return of skills, especially channeled towards infrastructure and government activities. Each has its own benefits and drawbacks and, in fact, there can be advantages in combining different forms. As an MPI report has highlighted: “diasporas may have a better understanding of local needs whereas foreign aid agencies and national governments may have a broader perspective—working together can achieve some alignment of objectives and better allocation of resources.” Diaspora- or individually-led forms of re-engagement can gain a broader structure from government- or international-led programs, and the reverse is true for integrating local needs into programs. At the same time, interaction may not be sustainable (as in the case of IRI) or targeted enough. These temporary returns will not necessarily lead to permanent return. In fact, the longer these professionals are abroad, the less likely they are to return. Not only is the situation in Iraq not conducive to

270 Terrazas, Connected, p. 10.
permanent return of professionals, but they may be well-established in their host communities, with a high standard of living, integrated children and a career path. In this case, temporary, circular and virtual migration are all ways to engage Iraqi diaspora professionals on a short-term basis while they live abroad.

On the other hand, the engagement of members of the diaspora has had clear problems: resentment, abuse of power, divisions among returnees and detachment from those who had not left being just a few. The interviews and the analysis of various forms of temporary return highlight important issues for Iraqi expatriates who have made temporary return trips. While religion and ethnicity play an important role in motivations for return, distance from larger Iraqi expatriate communities can offer alternative possibilities for engagement with Iraq. The interviews particularly showed the importance of identity and the exposure to different political, cultural and economic discourses for forming opinions about the home country. The differences created by exposure to different discourses created a disparity between those Iraqis who stayed and those who lived abroad, as many of the temporary return migrants felt disconnected from the home community when they returned. Moreover, in each of the interviews conducted, as well as the forms of temporary return reviewed, power structures emerged within the context of their temporary return migration: religion, ethnicity, citizenship, and gender all played a particular role in the interactions among the returnees and between returnees and local Iraqis. As concerns consultancies within specific development programs, these differences within the diaspora converged with the various goals and motivations of governments and international organizations, which may or may not align with the other actors involved. All of these factors influenced opportunities and motivations to return on the part of expatriates, as well as actions within an international development program.

Each form of temporary return discussed above has been unique based on its participants. Moreover, the possibility for return has been affected by the opportunity structures available in the host country and the features of the networks to which the migrant belongs (ethnic, religious, gendered, etc). These characteristics have important consequences on development programs using diaspora professionals, most especially its reception by and engagement of the home community. Thus, steps should be taken to reduce the negative effects that have been outlined.


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when engaging diaspora professionals, for example through multiple screenings of applicants for consultancies, integrating non-diaspora members into consultancies and into the program on a larger scale, monitoring returnees who have been sent to their specific home community or region, and increased engagement of those who have left more recently.
Chapter 6: Conclusions

Existing literature on diaspora engagement and development in the home country has illuminated the diverse effects that different diasporas can have on home countries. The diversity of effects can be seen as a result of the diverse reasons for return. In the Iraqi case, the existing divisions within the Iraqi diaspora create different forms, opportunities and motivations for engagement, creating a host of answers to the question: Why do Iraqis return? These divisions are based on religious, gendered, social, economic and regional differences, as well as experience of emigration and the opportunity structures in host countries. All these factors create differences between Iraqi expatriates and Iraqi locals, and can explain the feeling of distance mentioned on the part of Iraqi expatriates who returned. Furthermore, when skilled expatriates are recruited as consultants within development projects these differences combine with the different goals and motivations put forth by governments, international organizations and other actors involved. When Iraqi skilled expatriates return temporarily to their home country for professional reasons, either through a consultancy or personal initiative, the power structures involved have a significant role, influencing where, with whom and why expatriates engage. While the return of skills is important for Iraq, temporary return has also had unintended consequences, especially in the encouragement of divisions along confessional or ethnic lines. Therefore, it is important to keep these complexities in mind when engaging members of the diaspora in development plans: Iraqis return based on the congruence of a multitude of factors and thus have various motivations to take into account. As one interviewee for this study highlighted, when discussing his reasons for return, “It was something that came in that I found out about and got interested in…It was totally a natural fit…having an Iraqi background and speaking Arabic…So there was something going on, and it was a good fit for my professional and practical experience.”

While these differences seem to present a large obstacle to collaboration across ethnic or religious lines within the diaspora, it has not appeared to prevent women inside Iraq from...
working together.\textsuperscript{273} This seems to suggest that the divisions within the diaspora are stronger than those among Iraqis in Iraq. In this case, it could be more effective to engage local civil society actors than those from abroad, especially considering the disconnect between expatriates and local Iraqis. On the other hand, certain Iraqi diaspora activities have had a positive effect on Iraq: the IRI program established a database and website to match human resource needs with the diaspora; the LGP employed 3,000 local Iraqis, created neighborhood, sub-district, district and provincial councils, and trained 20,000 council members; and individually-organized temporary return migration has encouraged small- and medium-sized businesses, civil society activities and research organizations within Iraq.

Thus, this study has shown that diaspora engagement clearly has diverse results, even within a diaspora and one home country. However, it has only answered part of the question: Why do Iraqis return to Iraq? Its focus on temporary return migration for professional reasons over the last seven years has highlighted the diverse opportunities, motivations and expectations within the diaspora, built over the course of fifty years. However, some of these trends may be a result of inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relations over the course of hundreds of years, a time period that could not be covered in this thesis. Furthermore, there is currently little research available on the return of skilled Iraqi expatriates for professional reasons; tangible numbers are needed on how many Iraqis return within this formula, what work do they do and where in Iraq they go. More research is needed on how to encourage development without the unintended consequences that could hinder development. While it is clear that offering lower remuneration to expatriates helps the cooperation between expatriates and locals, more needs to be studied within the Iraqi context. For example, virtual return of skills, using the internet to share information between skilled Iraqi expatriates and professionals and/or academics in Iraq could be a way to tap diaspora skills while avoiding some of the issues involved in actual return.

Furthermore, a comparative study with other regions or countries would help illuminate the uniqueness of the Iraqi case or global trends. There are multiple actors involved in each country and within each diaspora, but how much of the Iraqi case is relevant to these other cases? Why, for example, have members of the Afghan diaspora returned permanently on a larger scale than in Iraq? There are clearly various factors at work motivating Afghans to return, but how do

\textsuperscript{273} Al-Ali and Pratt, Women’s, p. 82.
they differ from Iraqis?

This thesis may provoke more questions than answers. But it is a foray into an important discussion that needs to occur. Diaspora engagement has received much more attention lately, either for its negative impacts (e.g. Somalia) or its positive impacts (e.g. China and India). Many home country governments, especially the Philippines and India, are implementing programs to encourage expatriates to return, to set up businesses or to send money to the home country. These programs need to account for the variety of opportunities, motivations and expectations at play that encourage engagement with the home country, and analyze how they perhaps differ from the government’s own goals. The Iraqi case has shown that a diaspora cannot be viewed as homogeneous, and therefore, diaspora engagement has multiple results, both positive and negative. Iraq’s history is unique, and its recent history and current situation present an enormous challenge to development. Moreover, the diaspora already played a role in the 2003 invasion. Despite this, perhaps there is still a positive part the Iraqi diaspora can play to encourage Iraqi development. For this to happen, however, differences (and not just confessional or ethnic) must be recognized and managed.
Works Cited


Chatelard, Geraldine (2010, June 28). Personal correspondence.


Websites


ILO MIGRANT. The TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) Programme.


Annex

Table 1: Interviewees Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Date of Emigration</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Education or Profession</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Host Country&lt;sup&gt;274&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Reason for Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.02.2010</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>M.A., teacher</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>U.S. (Syria)</td>
<td>personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.02.2010</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>High school certificate</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>U.S. (Syria)</td>
<td>personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.02.2010</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Civil engineer</td>
<td>Shi‘a</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.05.2010</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Kurd</td>
<td>M.A.</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.05.2010</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Kurd</td>
<td>M.A. Poli Sci, Uni Wien</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Austria (Iran)</td>
<td>personal, Austrian Airways job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.06.2010</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>PhD, International Development professional</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>U.S. (Kuwait)</td>
<td>nonprofit org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.08.2010</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Translator</td>
<td>Not religious</td>
<td>Egypt (Syria)</td>
<td>personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.09.2010</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>International Development professional</td>
<td>Muslim family</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>LGP Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.09.2010</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>High school certificate</td>
<td>Not religious</td>
<td>Egypt (Jordan)</td>
<td>personal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>274</sup> The countries in parentheses represent the first host country for the migrant, from which they migrated to their current host country.
2. Sample Survey
Dear Sir or Madam,
Thank you so much for agreeing to answer a few questions on your return migration to Iraq, this survey should take 20-25 minutes. I will be conducting research until August for my Master's thesis in Global Studies for the University of Vienna, which studies return migration and Iraqi development. This interest stems from my father and his family's experiences migrating from Iraq. I am a second generation immigrant, my father having immigrated to the US in the late 1970s. I would really appreciate your responses to these questions, and please feel free to elaborate as much as possible. All answers will be anonymous, and I will keep all the information I receive protected. You may also respond in either French or English.

1. How old are you? Where were you born? What is your nationality?

2. Are you religious?

3. Are you politically active?

4. Did you study in Iraq? (high school, university, post-graduate) If so, what did you study?

5. When did you leave Iraq? Where did you go?

6. Why did you go to this destination, and how did you get there?

7. Why did you leave Iraq?

8. Did you obtain citizenship from your host country? Why or why not?

9. Do you study or work in your host country? If so, what do you do?

10. Are you involved in an Iraqi community in your host country?

11. What do you like best about your host country? What do you dislike?

12. Have you returned to Iraq or a neighboring country? If so, why? (If the answer is no, please disregard question #13)
13. In Iraq did you spend most of your time in an expatriate community or with “locals”? How did they respond to your time abroad?

14. What do you think the first priority of the government should be to encourage development? Why?

15. Do you stay in contact with those in Iraq? How and how often? (i.e. Skype, facebook, email, etc) Are these family or work contacts?

16. What do you miss from Iraq? Do you see yourself moving back permanently?

THANK YOU for your time!
3. Pictures

Iraqi translators and military working with American military during the January 2009 elections.

275 I have tried to identify the holders of image rights and obtain their consent for the use of images reproduced here. However, should I unintentionally violate copyrights, I request that messages be sent to me.
Education

Universität Leipzig and Universität Wien  |  University of California, Santa Barbara  |  Saint Francis High School
Erasmus Mundus Master’s Program in Global Studies  |  Bachelor of Arts, June 2008  |  High School Diploma, June 2004
Emphasis on Global History  |  Major: French, with Distinction in the Major  |  Mountain View, California
Expected: November 2010  |  Second Major: Global Studies, Emphasis in Socio-Economics and Politics, and in Europe  |  GPA: 3.73, Graduated with High Honors

Awards and Honors:
Erasmus Mundus award for European Masters Program in Global Studies, UCSB Dean’s List six quarters, UCSB Letters and Science Honors Program, Academic Excellence Award, UCSB French Honors Program, Hermione Chevalier Award, member of Phi Beta Kappa.

Papers, Theses, and Publications:

Professional Experience

INTERN, International Organization for Migration, Gender Department, Jan 2011 – TBD
Route des Morillons 17, 1218 Grand Saconnex, Switzerland
Supervisor Information: Sylvia Ekra-Lopez
  • Draft and coordinate a series of factsheets on gender and migration-related issues (financial remittances, social remittances, labor migration, etc).
  • Conduct background research and prepare reports on various gender- and migration-related issues.
  • Review projects and various documents to ensure the inclusion of gender-related concerns in IOM projects and program activities
  • Support the collection and documentation of lessons learned and best practices, and draft reports and summaries for internal and external use.

Gonzagagasse 1, 5th floor, 1010 Vienna, Austria
Supervisor Information: Veronika Bilger; Gonzagagasse 1, 5th floor, 1010 Vienna, Austria
  • Conducted a frame analysis of Parliamentary debates and public media (in French and German) in Switzerland for the EU project “Promoting Sustainable Policies for Integration” (PROSINT).
  • Assisted in the elaboration of the Switzerland country report.
  • Language, copy and substantive editing of the “Study on the assessment of the extent of different types of Trafficking in Human Beings in EU countries”.
  • Participated in other research projects of ICMPD as needed.

Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland
Supervisor Information: Katja Hujo; Palais des Nations, Office D-204, Geneva, Switzerland
  • Supported the preparation of a second project phase on Social Policy and Migration in Developing Countries.
  • Assisted with the preparation of several manuscripts for publication, including program papers and edited volumes on Social Policy in Mineral-Rich Countries and Pension Funds and Economic Development.
  • Edited (language, copy-editing and substantive) research papers and prepare them for publication or web uploading.
  • Helped in the drafting of new research proposals for the future UNRISD research agenda 2010-2015.
  • Conducted library and Internet searches on relevant research topics.
FAMILY CONNECTION COUNSELOR AND TEACHER, Cisco Systems Bright Horizons, June 2005 – September 2008
800 Barber Ln; Cisco Bright Horizons; Milpitas, CA 95035
Supervisor Information: Stella Bouquet; (408) 853-2197

- Acted as camp leader and teacher for children aged five to twelve.
- Organized group field trips for the camp, keeping in mind the children’s needs as well as budget constraints.
- Trained new employees as counselors.
- Developed innovative plans for the following summer and winter breaks.

PEER ADVISOR: Office Coordinator, Education Abroad Program September 2007 – June 2008
2431 South Hall; Education Abroad Program; University of California at Santa Barbara, CA 93106
Supervisor Information: Namrita Gidwani; namsgidwani@gmail.com

- Provided information concerning the Education Abroad Program for students, staff, faculty, parents, and campus visitors.
- Responded to all e-mail and phone inquiries concerning the Education Abroad Program.
- Monitored office supplies and keep front desk organized.
- Aided full-time staff in processing student applications and planning student workshops.
- Advertised and recruit for Education Abroad Program through group presentations and informational meetings.
- Wrote and edited newsletter articles for circulation to all Education Abroad Program students.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA CAMPUS REPRESENTATIVE, University of Lyon, August 2006 – August 2007
Lyon, France

- Recruited students at the University of Lyon, and the Political Science Institute to study abroad at the University of California.
- Helped French students through the exchange program application process.

Languages: English: Native language; French: Fluent; German: B 1/2 level, conversant.