Dissertation

Titel der Dissertation
The EU Boycott Policy of Elected Hamas in 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary Elections. Islamophobia, is it?

Verfasserin
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أرى صوتي بحثاً عن استثناء يغير النهايات لأشكرك بنفسك فلا أجد إلا ما أ瞿عته في حتى تهباً لي أني أبي... يا أبي
أم أن ذلك اسمك الأول بعيد ترتيب حروفه في قلبي... سلام
Preface

This dissertation is a product of my life history, and all the significant and insignificant incidents that contributed to shape my personal political labels up to this moment. In that sense, I feel the need to narrate the notion of different benchmarks in creating the fabric of my doctoral work.

I was the Director of Quaker Palestine Youth Program in the West Bank- AFSC, when I received a PhD scholarship award from the Austrian Exchange Service- Austrian Cooperation Development. This is shortly after the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election when Hamas’s sweeping victory stunned Israel, USA, Europe and the Arab regimes favoring Hamas’s main rival secular Fatah movement that had led the Palestinian national movement for almost half a century without interruption. How could Hamas, the “terrorist organization” as it has always been labeled in the West, with an image of terror as it has always portrayed in the Western media, emerge as a victorious popular political power? Yet, persistence and prevailing misconception of Hamas have been stunning in the context of the Palestinian election. Contrary to the Western reductionist approach of Hamas as a terrorist organization, Hamas on the ground of Palestine has been seen by many Palestinians as a popular-based socio-religious and political movement. Taking double paths in resisting the occupation, including military confrontation, and providing charitable and social work, religious mobilization and networking with other movements and states.

The Quartet’s boycott of the elected Hamas government left no room for many NGOs including my employer to decide whether to engage with Hamas or not. As a result, there was a withdrawal from work- activities with any national- political question, including the reality of the occupation, while maintaining civic work regardless the incapability to articulate the civic without politics. This reflects the absence of long term vision or strategy for how NGOs can contribute to the national transition. At that point, I did not have much time to consider how this scholarship will fit with my future plans in the rise of the unbelievable human stories along internationally isolated elected government. This was followed by the Palestinian employees’ strike for the lack of salaries, implying further obstacles in arranging any civic-work activity with young students in school settings. A bit later, there was the catastrophic Palestinian in-fights leading to a deep division of not only political views between young Palestinians but also imposed geographical one dividing further the Palestinian territories and denying the rights of Palestinians including the young Palestinians I am working with, in
movement and in every basic freedom under Israeli occupation. For example, I was hardly able to organize any event between two neighboring villages in Jenin or one side of the city of Jerusalem and the other. Advanced technology was sought to resolve such problem such as video conferences. One video for example was organized between one Public achievement (PA) young group in the West Bank with a Minnesota-USA (PA) young group and another one with Gaza Strip (PA) young group. However, this was hardly managed due mainly to the restriction of movement for young people coming from places where such technology is not available to another place within the cantoned territories provided with such facilities. The obstacles go beyond the availability of advanced technology but also and not limited to its related high cost.

For example, one video conference between the Gaza PA group and Jenin PA group was cancelled suddenly for air plane attack had begun and returning young participants to “safe home” was prioritized. As another example, in an exchange of Irish- Palestinian PA experiences, an Irish PA group after long coordination visited the Palestinian PA projects in the West Bank. During one activity though, only the Irish participants were allowed to cross the checkpoint to Jericho and the Dead Sea, while the Palestinian PA group was inclusively forbidden by soldiers to cross the checkpoint. Needless to mention, Palestinians, mainly young work-target group hungry to freedom trapped under siege in Gaza; trapped in Hebron's old city neighbored by militant settlers; trapped in Nablus under closure; trapped behind the wall in Qalqilya, Palestinians trapped in their homes during curfews; by which I felt completely helpless in the face of powerful political and military forces and actions of the Israelis.

Rethinking my life in those days of angst and fear while stripped completely from any binds of secure feeling and amenity of my self or those young Palestinians I am responsible to look after, I decided to take the opportunity and flee for some time to Vienna. Initially, I was planning to carry out a research on None- Governmental Organizations (NGO) in Palestine and donor policies for it is more related to my work and MPA studies in the states and my professional experience but with focus this time on the EU policy for basically my doctorate work is taking place in central Europe in Austria- Vienna.

I was placed in political science department in the University of Vienna, not thinking exactly whether political science as a discipline was suitable for my thoughts and ambitions. My background with political science was modest, and the way I understood it was based on the
basic of political science courses, which I had taken during my Masters studies. Within my
doctorate program, I also took a few more political science courses that left me with an
impression of complication: I don’t know if that is due to language challenges, for I am
enrolled in an English scholarship program but in a German speaking country and university
where few English courses are offered. Also, most time, students and professors carry on
intense discussions in the German language that I do not understand. Or was it for being a
Palestinian given a hard time by some students where the holocaust legacy took place to
speak up my mind when taking a critical position to Israel policy.

I went through long discussions with my Jewish Austrian supervisor John Bunzl. Professor
Bunzl has influenced me in his way of thinking and his experience as well as an expert of the
Middle East in the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIIP). He touched on several
accounts of my research to an extent I gradually, started to think Israel-Palestine conflict in
association with concepts such as Holy land, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. This was a first
and perhaps the main benchmark that directs my research work in the following manner:

Firstly, Professor Bunzl provided me with an article of the European views on the Middle
East which highlighted its perception, prejudice and projection. I read more with respect to
the complex feelings embodied in European thought reflected in their policy towards Israel-
Palestine. I started to understand why a critical position against Israel policy is taken as ‘neo
anti-Semitism’ by some in Europe and it became clear then why this ‘neo-’ term should be
further explored and analyzed. Secondly, I thought of the political, economic and military
power of Israel which prevails in different forms as an occupying power of Palestine.

Moreover, I started to reflect on the interrelations between global powers such as those of
USA and the EU and Israel, and the fact that the latter is not only a strong ally of the USA on
almost all political fronts but also Israel security seems as a leading principle in the EU
foreign policy in the Middle East. Thirdly and importantly, I started to learn more about
Islamophobia in Europe and abroad. The Palestine- Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and
culture on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia was an asset for tackling Islamophobia and anti
Semitism from different angles. More comparisons between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism
were made while pointing out similarities and differences. Consequently, I reached another
benchmark in my research. I decided to shift research focus from NGO- EU policy to
Islamophobia- EU policy.
I read more and reflected on Israel’s active role in term of the politics and research of anti-Semitism that is tackled often in ways that are still unknown to Arab-Muslim neighboring countries and Islamic movements such as Hamas and Palestinian society at large. On the one hand, Israel seems to take advantage of the limited cognition of anti-Semitism among the Middle Easterns, including the occupied. On the other hand, it enforces an Islamophobic approach towards Hamas making an over-simplified connection between Hamas and other Islamic movements or states such as that of al-Qaida or Iran.

At that point, it was clear how my dissertation could be a means of reducing misconception. I decided to write down my thoughts, everything I have gathered and written which I either presented in lectures, seminars and conferences or handed to professors and also discussed with students. I eventually received some comments, feedback and critiques in the content, structure and arguments that have supported the process and context of dissertation. Eventually, the purpose of my research has become more refined and the thematic questions became clearer for I was keen to revise my course of thinking in dealing with the research theme and paradigm and eventually the direction towards the exit.
Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the thinking and writing of many other scholars and the assistance of a list of interviewees and friends who, in one way or another, contributed to make the completion of this dissertation possible. I hope that those I omit from acknowledgment will forgive my forgetfulness. I thank all of them in advance.

I must gratefully acknowledge the helpful and critical interest of my supervisor, John Bunzl, for his guidance, support, and fortitude. Also and equally, I would like to thank Professor Otmar Höll, for his advice and encouragement. As well, I must thank Sally and Steven for their painstaking editing and patience, Flora Tedjiootsop and Walid Awad for their sincerity and technical support.

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Last but not least, I must thank my mother, Zaher Shafi-Katanani, for her outstanding devotion and endless love. I should also thank my two sisters, Diana and Amal, for being my inspiration as I hurdle all obstacles from the beginning of this dissertation to its conclusion, and my two brothers, Mohammad and Mohannad, for their enthusiasm and loving support. Without you and yours, my life would not have been such a marvellous experience. Above all of us, the omnipresent God, thank you so much.
Abstract

The term ‘Islamophobia’ has become popular in Europe, where the Islamic threat is considered the enemy within, and has also been on the rise, where the enemy is perceived to be external: but what exactly does it refer to?

Internally, it is noted that a considerable volume of research has been published on Islamophobia within Europe. Researchers have studied the socio-economic, political, and cultural differences in reference to patterns of fear, prejudice and discrimination against Muslims and the position of Islam in Europe.

Externally, very little research has examined Islamophobia in foreign policy. Nevertheless, the US-led war on terror is widely perceived as a war on Islam. However, Muslim relations with Europeans involve more than fear of the former by the latter. One needs to take into account the multiple layers of history, sociology, and politics in relations among Christian, Jewish and Muslim populations whether secular or not.

Arguing that the phobia in Islamophobia reduces the complex set of imbalanced power relations against Muslims, this dissertation advances various options open for debate regarding the definitions and manifestations of Islamophobia. It proposes an abstract and operational model of the EU’s foreign policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). This thesis illustrates how imbalanced power relations operate and identifies key factors influencing EU foreign policy. The dissertation subsequently illustrates the model’s relevance through the examination of a specific instance: the EU’s boycott policy of elected Hamas government in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election. In this investigation, this work draws on expert interviews conducted and interpreted on a comparative basis.
Kurzfassung

Islamophobie ist in Europa zu einem gängigen Begriff geworden, um die islamische Bedrohung als einen Feind im Inneren zu bezeichnen. Gleichzeitig wird der Feind als von außenkommend wahrgenommen. Worauf bezieht er sich genau?

In Europa gibt es umfangreiche Forschungen zu Islamophobie. WissenschafterInnen haben sozio-ökonomische, politische und auch kulturelle Differenzen hinsichtlich Ängste, Vorurteile und Diskriminierung von MuslimInnen und dem Stellenwert des Islam in Europa untersucht.

Wenig bis gar keine Forschung gibt es bisher zur Rolle der Islamophobie in der Außenpolitik Europas, obwohl der US-amerikanisch geführte Krieg gegen den Terror im Allgemeinen als Krieg gegen den Islam wahrgenommen wird. Dennoch beinhalten Beziehungen zwischen MuslimInnen und EuropäerInnen mehr als nur die Angst der EuropäerInnen vor den MuslimInnen. Um Islamophobie zu erklären müssen die unterschiedlichen geschichtlichen, soziologischen und politischen Ebenen der Beziehungen zwischen Christen, Juden und Muslimen, egal ob säkular oder nicht, in Betracht gezogen werden.

Die vorliegende Dissertation zeigt auf, dass die Reduktion der Islamophobie auf die Phobie die komplexen unausgewogenen Machtsbeziehungen zwischen MuslimInnen und EuropäerInnen ignoriert und eröffnet zahlreiche Optionen für eine Debatte über Definitionen und Manifestationen von Islamophobie. Im Zuge dieser Arbeit wird ein abstraktes und operationalisiertes Modell für die EU Außenpolitik in Bezug auf die Besetzten Palästinensischen Gebiete entwickelt. Es wird aufgezeigt, wie unausgewogen die Machtsbeziehungen sind und warum sie funktionieren. Dabei werden Schlüsselfaktoren identifiziert, die die EU Außenpolitik beeinflussen.

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<td>AMA</td>
<td>Agreement on Movement and Access</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood and Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>EU Border Assistance Mission</td>
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<td>EUPOL-COPPS</td>
<td>EU Police-Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support</td>
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<td>HCJ</td>
<td>High Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
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<td>IMFA</td>
<td>Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MEPP</td>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>NUG</td>
<td>National Unity Government</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OPT</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PLC</td>
<td>Palestinian Legislative Council</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union (TEU)</td>
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<td>TIM</td>
<td>Temporary International Mechanism</td>
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<td>UFM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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1 Introduction

In view of the victory of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections and its subsequent entry into the Palestinian Authority (PA), the European Union (EU) alongside the Quartet partners, immediately imposed several conditions on the legitimately elected government. They insisted on three “principles” (an end to violence, recognition of Israel and acceptance of previous agreements), which soon evolved into strict conditions for the recognition of the government.¹

Initially for EU policymakers, the first condition stood in the forefront since Hamas has been included on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations since 2003. Apparently, the Quartet went beyond calling for Hamas to renounce terrorism. The latter two conditions in particular were disputable. Hamas was called upon to recognize Israel, despite the fact that states (or in this case the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a legal representative of the Palestinians - of which Hamas is not a part - which had recognized Israel) recognize other states while the borders by which Israel would be recognized were left undefined. Regarding the acceptance of previous agreements, ironically, it was the Israeli government led by Ariel Sharon, which first asserted that it would only respect, rather than accept previous agreements in 2001.²

In this research, the question is what does the EU response to the victory of Hamas in the “legitimate and democratic”³ election of 2006 suggest? What are the main factors influencing EU policy towards Palestine? Could ‘Islamophobia’ be a factor? Why? How? The response is not a simple yes or no answer. These questions hint to larger issues about the relationship between Islamophobia and the EU boycott policy.

1.1 Research Problem

This section connects the EU boycott policy towards the elected Hamas government to the research problem. The research problem is divided accordingly into four main parts: (1) research scope (2) research aims (3) research questions and (4) the inner structure of the research.

³ The international community including the EU had accepted Hamas participation in the parliament election. The conduct of the elections was monitored by EU observers and viewed them as being free and fair
Through the literature, it shows that no research was conducted on the impact of Islamophobia on EU foreign policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), and the EU boycott policy of Hamas in particular. Most literature describes Islamophobia around Muslim minorities in Europe but neglects to answer how Islamophobia can be manifested in different forms and how it eventually can be prevented from being a factor in EU foreign policymaking.

1.1.1 Research scope
The research scope can take many tracks. The tracks can be divided into two categories: (1) local and (2) international

1.1.1.1 Local
This local research scope can potentially deal with numerous topics. For example, Islamophobia and Hamas (strategy, ideology, leadership, structure and finance), Islamophobia and Palestinian national struggle, Islamophobia and secular Palestinian parties, Islamophobia and Palestinian Islamic movements, or Islamophobia and anti-Semitism.

1.1.1.2 International
Likewise, many topics internationally-related could be derived including: Islamophobia and international Islamic movements, Islamophobia in Muslim countries, Islamophobia in Israel, Islamophobia in Europe, Islamophobia elsewhere, Islamophobia in foreign policy “compared”, Hamas and global Islamism, or Islamophobia and anti-Semitism globally.

However, the researcher selected a scope with an international notion, which is summarized as follows:

The EU boycott policy of elected Hamas in 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election. Is it Islamophobia?

Examining Islamophobia in EU policymaking is an attempt to provoke further debate and thought on such a pressing matter so as to be prepared to respond to the challenges Islamophobia presents to successful EU policymaking towards Palestine.

1.1.1.3 Limitations
Several factors have influenced the researcher to limit the research to the scope defined above:
- The escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict beginning at the starting phase of this research implies the following:

  - The territories occupied in 1967 are still occupied and further fragmented.
  - Existing illegal Israeli settlements continue to expand and new ones have been erected on confiscated Palestinian land. Jerusalem is being de-Arabized.
  - Violation of Palestinian fundamental rights continue along various forms of collective punishments, including the separation wall, home demolitions, closures of entire areas, checkpoints, detentions and imprisonments.
  - Palestinian in-fighting and the separation between Hamas-controlled Gaza and Fatah-controlled West Bank.

- The lack of detailed official documents regarding the EU policy towards Palestine and that of a formulated EU boycott policy of Hamas.

- The researcher personal interest in the EU policy.

- The researcher personal interest in Islamophobia.

### 1.1.2 Research aims

The aims of the research depend on the research scope and problem statement in the following manner:

#### 1.1.2.1 General aim

To uncover, understand and explain the relationship between Islamophobia and the EU boycott policy of the elected Hamas, in 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary election. This is by providing an analytical lens to fill the gap between research and public debate over Islamophobia, in the EU boycott policy. As well, reflecting on Islamophobia and its manifestation, in articulation with imbalanced power relations, in the EU foreign policy towards Palestine.

#### 1.1.2.2 End product aim

It is to examine Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy. In doing so, it analyzes the EU boycott policy, as a case study, along the political dynamics underpinning the EU position and policymaking process.
1.1.2.3 Analytical aim
It is to analyze the relationship between the EU boycott policy of elected Hamas and imbalanced power relations. Further, related European and Palestinian views, at comparative basis, are analyzed. This includes the views of Palestinian academics and politicians including Islamists, European diplomats and academics working in Palestine and in Brussels.

1.1.2.4 Contribution aim
It is to contribute to the definition and, eventually, the theorization of Islamophobia in foreign policy. This is as much as related to one case study, namely, the EU boycott of elected Hamas.

1.1.2.5 Utilization aim
It aims to serve political scientists who embark on issues of Islamophobia and policy-making. It is a document particularly for policymakers who are involved in international development and cooperation.

1.1.2.6 Research approach aim
It aims at exploring and analyzing policy that already exists but not at collecting and presenting views as ultimate truth. Consequently, the research aims have drawn the guidelines for deriving the main and secondary research questions.

1.1.3 Research Questions

1.1.3.1 Main question
What is the relationship between Islamophobia and the EU boycott policy of elected Hamas, in articulation with imbalanced power relations, in 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections?

1.1.3.2 Secondary questions
What are the definitions and manifestations of Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy towards Palestine?

- What is the political context in which the EU reactions to the victory of Hamas in 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election are constructed and pursued?
- What is the relationship between the EU boycott policy and imbalanced power relations?
- How is Islamophobia related to those imbalanced power relations?
How do informed EU policymakers, Palestinian and Europeans experts view Islamophobia in the EU boycott policy of elected Hamas?

1.1.4 Inner structure of research

In this section, a brief description of the contents of each chapter of the research is set out in a general matter. The first chapter is an introductory chapter. Chapter two specifies the research methods and methodology. Chapter three presents theoretical analysis and theoretical findings about Islamophobia. Chapter four analyzes EU policy towards Palestine with a focus on the EU boycott of elected Hamas. Chapter five presents, respectively, a conceptualized EU policy model, and an operationalized EU policy model formulating the final findings. Chapter six explores and compares the views of European and Palestinian experts on Islamophobia in the EU boycott policy of Hamas. Finally, chapter seven concludes the dissertation results and recommendations.

1.1.4.1 Chapter one

The introduction is in the form of preparatory information as a prerequisite for understanding the subsequent chapters of the research. This chapter formulates the research problem and consequently the research scope, aims and questions. The research problem is highlighted within a case study, namely, the EU boycott of the elected Hamas government in 2006, which stimulated the idea of Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy towards Palestine.

1.1.4.2 Chapter two

This chapter presents the research methodology. It also outlines the two major methods carried out through the research, respectively, interpretative policy analysis as well as interviews comparative analysis in chapter six.

1.1.4.3 Chapter three

This chapter compares and adopts one theory among four theories, as related to Islamophobia, in consideration of imbalanced power relations, as a major analytical lens in the EU policy towards Palestine. It investigates Islamophobia as conceptualized and theorized. Further, it sets the analysis in the debate over Islamophobia as compared to anti-Semitism in the EU policy towards Israel-Palestine and suggests basic definitions of Islamophobia.

1.1.4.4 Chapter four
The “EU policy” discusses the EU foreign policy towards Palestine over time. More specifically, it sets the socio-economic and political context. Then it explores the EU common strategy and instruments in a contextual particularity around the 2006 election.

1.1.4.5 Chapter five

Firstly, it explains the role of Islamophobia, in articulation with imbalanced power relations, in the EU boycott policy towards the elected Hamas government. Secondly, it suggests an abstract model and an operationalized model of the EU policy towards Palestine.

1.1.4.6 Chapter six

This chapter, “Interviews,” compares and analyzes different views among European and Palestinian experts on the issue of Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy towards Palestine. Focus is placed on the EU boycott policy against several question-parameters.

1.1.4.7 Chapter seven

This chapter is an outlook of the discussion and debates about the EU boycott policy of elected Hamas and Islamophobia. It demonstrates common and different views on this issue. Also, it aims at elucidating the misconceptions caused by Islamophobia and the potential contribution of the EU policy towards Palestine in solving such misconceptions in regional disputes. Finally, it suggests future research directions on Islamophobia.
2 Methodology and methods

Islamophobia means different things to different people and is consequently interpreted differently. There is also no intention to use the word as though its meaning is self-evident. Therefore, a qualitative research is most convenient in this research.

In doing so, this research starts and maintains dialogue between data and theory, where preliminary insights guide the selection of data, and new data result in new theoretical explanations or reformulation of existing theories.

The general methodology scheme is presented in term of three phases (observatory phase, analytical phase, and model formation phase). This three-phase scheme is sufficiently flexible to allow for free movement between the phases whenever necessary.

1. Observatory phase: this phase is the stage where the main observations of research were originated through reviewing related literature. The observation have led to the formulation of research scope where the interest of the researcher played a major role in focusing the research aims and eventually framing the research problem as demonstrated in chapter one. The research problem was translated into detailed research aims and questions which in turn helped in setting a clear direction for the research.

2. Analytical phase: in this phase, the investigation and discussion is undertaken through the review of theories, and theoretical perspectives on Islamophobia. It explores Islamophobia as conceptualized, theorized and compared and also brings attention to power in the analysis of related theories to Islamophobia.

3. Model formulation phase: The findings from the analytical phase are used to formulate an abstract conceptual model for Islamophobia. The abstract concept is then operationalized through the insertion of suitable social, political processes that help in achieving the end product aim of the dissertation as set out in chapter one.
## Methodology and methods

| Observatory phase | Observation reading and writing | Literature review on Islamophobia  
|                  |                                | Review of the EU policy towards Palestine  
|                  |                                | Review the EU boycott of elected Hamas in 2006  
|                  | Research problem               | Research scope  
|                  |                                | Research aims  
|                  |                                | Research questions  

| Analytical phase | Conceptualized Islamophobia | Theoretical investigation, and analysis  
|                 | Theorized Islamophobia      |  
|                 | Compared Islamophobia       |  

| Model formulation phase | Model                      | Research findings and discussions  
|                         | Abstract Model             |  
|                         | Operational Model          |  

Figure 1: General methodology scheme
As for the research methods, two major methods are used in this research. Each method is explained explicitly in the following order:

1. Interpretive Policy analysis of the EU common strategy, the EU instruments via Israel-OPT, and the deployment of the EU policy between the elections and the collapse of the national unity, and
2. Interviews comparative analysis of Palestinian and European’s views in order to examine Islamophobia in the policy making process.

2.1 Interpretative policy analysis

In social science research, the customary dual taxonomy of quantitative and qualitative research methods is increasingly being challenged by tripartite taxonomy: quantitative, qualitative, and interpretative methods. Yonow (2008) further argued that all research is interpretative. The question then is not whether or not there is interpretation, but rather how much interpretation is involved in a particular analysis, determined in large part by the nature of the problem under investigation.4

Yanow also highlighted that qualitative and interpretative approaches share the same set of methods for accessing or generating data: observing (with different degrees of participation); talking (from “ordinary language” conversations to more formal interviews); and/ or the close reading of relevant documents. However, when it comes to analyzing those data, interpretative approaches draw on a variety of methods that contemporary qualitative research focuses on less, such as semiotics, ethno-methodology, and discourse analysis.5

Basic to interpretative analysis is the study of the frames that defines policy problems and the way different participants understand them. More specifically, how various communities in a given policy arena frame the situational contexts that attribute social meanings to the problem under investigation. Also of significance are the ways languages is used to call attention to the conflict that reflects different communities views. For example, the method of “thick description” is used in explicating the core norms and values.6

Yanow also stated that knowing which words and actions are more important can come only from familiarity with the situation and what is significant to stakeholders and policy-relevant

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4 Yanow (2008), Interpretative Policy Analysis course, University of Vienna
5 Yanow, (2008), ibid.
6 Yanow, Dvora, (2008), ibid. Supplemented by additional articles and papers and a lecture by D. Yanaw at the university of Vienna.
groups. This familiarity obtained from social interaction by probing the balance between strange-ness and insider-ness to move back and forth between seeing things as they are and as they are not.  

In this research, interpretative policy analysis is directed not only at the specific language of a policy document but also at what people do in response to it. In other words, it explores the contrasts between policy meaning as intended by policy makers- authored text and the possibility variant meanings- constructed texts made of them by other policy- relevant group. Therefore, policy analysis cannot be restricted to policy language or ideas as understood and intended by their authors. Others whose understandings of the policy are or will be central to its enactment are also of analytical concern.

The author takes on the analysis of the EU common strategy in term of the EU position, declarations, legal obligations, the EU instruments via Israel- OPT in term of diplomacy, contractual and capacity building, and the deployment of the EU policy between the elections and the collapse of the national unity. Moreover, the understanding of EU- policy towards OPT by informed Europeans and Palestinians. Category analysis, metaphor analysis, space analysis, framing (or frame- reflective analysis), and political and organizational ethnography are the ones the author proposed to engage whereby writing and reading as, themselves, are methods

The elements involved in interpretative policy analysis as outlined by Yonow are:  

1. Who? Is explained in term of actors (individual, collective) where relevant interpretive/discourse communities (communities of meaning) = stakeholders with respect to the focus of analysis [impact of Islamophobia on the EU policy].

2. How? Is explained as a vehicle in identifying key symbols (language, objects, and/or acts) which have significant meanings for these interpretive communities.

3. What? Is explained in terms of a content in identifying meanings (note plural: multiple possible meanings) that key symbols have for each stakeholder group/community of meaning, and their similarities and differences.

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7 Yonaw, Dvora, (2000), Conducting Interpretative Policy Analysis, qualitative research methods, Sage Publications, California
8 Yanow, Dvora, (1996), How does a policy mean? Interpreting policy and organizational actions, Georgetown University Press
4. Intervention? Is explained in term of a frame-reflection leading to a resolution of conflict that requires frame-breaking!

In relations, Yonaw outlined four basic methodological steps for interpretative policy analysis by identifying (1) art crafts or objects (2) interpretations (3) relevant discourses, and (4) point of conflict.  

2.2 Interviews Comparative Analysis

Interviews comparative analysis method is the most convenient in this research. It details information that is still scarce on the Palestinians’ views on the EU foreign policy and initiatives. Further, it examines Islamophobia from a comparative perspective by interviewing informed Palestinian academics and politicians including the Islamists as well as European officials, diplomats and academics “experts” working in Palestine and in Brussels.

While seeking a common structure in the case study, the author recognized the need for variation given a wide range of interviewees. For example, those who were elected for Hamas government, and those who were nominated by Hamas to the joint unity government. As well, those who belong to other Palestinian political parties such as Palestine Liberation Movement (Fateh), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLPF), etc. and those informed academic professors from Najah National University in Nablus and those in Bir Zeit University in Ramallah. The Palestinian interviewees and the only interviewer with no exception were nationals of Palestine, all living in West Bank. It was impossible to conduct interviews with Palestinians in Gaza as it is under siege by Israel. Interviews with Palestinians were conducted in Arabic whereas the interviews with Europeans were conducted in English.

In addition, the European representative interviewees come from different European countries. Most of them occupy political positions in their representative offices in Palestine-Ramallah. Those in Brussels occupy official policymaking and advisory positions. Interviewing European diplomats in Jerusalem was impossible for the author has no access to the city of Jerusalem as a Palestinian from the West Bank. The researcher was however allowed to conduct phone interviews and this was approved by one office only, namely, the

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European commission. The author could not get an Israeli permit to enter the city of Jerusalem.

Therefore, the interviews were guided by a common questionnaire set out in Annex A in English and Annex B in Arabic. The questionnaire was adapted from a research-paper titled Political Islam and European foreign Policy; perspectives from Muslim Democrats of the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{10} In consultancy with the research advisor and other professors and several colleagues in political science in the University of Vienna, the questionnaire was divided into three parts in the following consequences:

**Part A: EU policy**
A.1 Pre- election EU Policy
A.2 Post- election EU Policy

**Part B: Islamophobia**
B.1 Islamophobia Meanings and Manifestation
B.2 Islamophobia and Anti- Semitism

**Part C: Evaluations**
C.1 Islamophobia and the EU Policy
C.2 what is next?

The questionnaire was also tailored in a way to answer the paper’s main question; what is the relationship between Islamophobia and the EU boycott policy of elected Hamas in 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections? In answering this question, the author reports the views of the interviewees without intervening judgment over whether these views could be contested or not. The author thus is not necessarily in agreement with all the views presented in this research. However, in analyzing the interviews, the raw interview data is transformed into analytical categories while the author became more sensitized to which data provided theoretical insights.

\textsuperscript{10} Emerson, Michael (2007), Political Islam and European foreign Policy; perspectives from Muslim Democrats of the Mediterranean, Centre for European Policy Studies CEPS, Brussels
2 Theories

Currently, there is no legally agreed upon definition of Islamophobia, nor a political social science- developed common definition. Even in narrowing the debate over related literature to identify it, diverging conceptions of Islamophobia and its broad application remain a contested issue. In addition, data on Islamophobic incidents in Europe remains limited. Moreover, Islamophobia and its manifestation are unexamined in foreign policy.

Therefore, this chapter sets up starting points for a socio-political legal or official definition since the author seeks to research Islamophobia and its relation to EU foreign policy.

However, it is necessary to clarify whether the definition of Islamophobia is an academic issue or a politicized enterprise. It is difficult to make a sharp distinction though between diverging opinions and conclusions on Islamophobia explained by different scientific traditions and academic observations, and those explained by the political or perhaps biased viewpoints and opinions about Islam, Muslims and the future of Europe.

With this said, the author attempts to stipulate a methodologically sound definition of Islamophobia while recognizing that it would require more discussion and debate than what this dissertation allows. To take a step forward, this chapter explores Islamophobia in the following manner (1) concept (2) theory and (3) comparison.

3.1 Islamophobia Conceptualized

This section takes three tracks to explore Islamophobia (1) in language (2) in the work of NGOs, and (3) in the work of the Council of Europe.

3.1.1 Islamophobia in language

Islamophobia is not defined in English dictionaries. However, there are definitions of Islam and of phobia. Both are defined separately and structured independently. To demonstrate the different meanings and angles upon which the meaning of Islam and phobia are structured, definitions of each term are presented as follows:

3.1.1.1 Islam

In Oxford dictionary, Islam/Iz-lam is defined as:

1. The religion of Muslims based on a belief of one God and revealed through Mohammad

as the Prophet of Allah. Allah is the name of God among Muslims (and Arab Christians).

2. The Muslim world.

Searching further on line,\(^\text{12}\) Islam refers to:

1. The religious faith of Muslims, based on the words and religious system founded by the prophet Muhammad and taught by the Koran, the basic principle of which is absolute submission to a unique and personal god, Allah.

2. The whole body of Muslim believers, their civilization, and the countries in which theirs is the dominant religion. Also, in the same search, Islam is found as a monotheistic religion characterized by the acceptance of the doctrine of submission to God and to Muhammad as the chief and last prophet of God. It is also related to the people or nations that practice Islam; the Muslim world and to the civilization developed by the Muslim world.

The cultural dictionary refers to Islam as a religion, founded by Mohammad whose members worship the one God of Jews and Christians and follow the teachings of the Koran. Islam means “submission to the will of God”; adherents of Islam are called Muslims. The fundamental belief of Islam is “There is only one God, and Muhammad is his prophet.” Muslims are obliged to pray five times a day, to fast in the daytime during the holy month of Ramadan, to abstain from pork and alcohol, and to make gifts to the poor. All of them are expected to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, Muhammad’s birthplace, at least once in their lives. It also notes that Shi’a and Sunni Muslims make up the two main branches of Islam. As well, Islam is the dominant faith in Arab nations, a number of countries of central Asia, and Malaysia and Indonesia.

In addition, the smart thesaurus shows synonyms, related words and phrases that make up this topic Islam including (Allah, Fatwa, hajj, hijab, jihad, Mecca, minaret, Mohammad, Mohammadan, mosque, Muslim, prayer, Ramadan, salam, sharia, Shiism, Sunni, Koran and the Taliban).\(^\text{13}\) From those synonyms, it is worth to note definitions of currently and widely spread ones as follows;

1. Muslim (also Moslem) is defined as a noun as a follower of Islam and as an adjective: relating to Muslims or Islam.

2. Shia (also Shi’a) is defined as one of the two branches of Islam regarding Ali, the fourth

\(^{12}\) http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/islam

\(^{13}\) http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=42152&dict=CALD&topic=islam
caliph, as Muhammad’s first true successor. Compare with Sunni, the Shi’a is a Muslim who adheres to his branch of Islam with Arabic origin “party of Ali”.

3. Sunni (also sooni) is defined as one of the two branches of Islam, differing from Shia in its acceptance of the first three caliphs. Compare with Shia, the Sunni is a Muslim who adheres to this branch of Islam with Arabic origin “custom, normative rule”.

4. Islamic (Izlammik) s defined as an adjective relating to Islam along the derivate of Islamicize (also Islamicise)- verb.

5. Mohammedan (also Mohammedan) is defined as a noun and adjective archaic term for Muslim (not favored by Muslims) with Arabic origin from the name of the Arab Prophet and founder of Islam.

3.1.1.2 Phobia: -phobia

It is defined in Oxford English dictionary as extreme or irrational fear or dislike of a specified thing. Also, it refers to anxiety, aversion, dislike, and dread, informal hang- up, hatred, horror, loathing, neurosis, obsession, repugnance, and revulsion, see fear. However, -phobe refers to a person having a fear or dislike of a specified thing.

- It is defined in the Cambridge Advanced Learner Dictionary,\(^\text{14}\) as a noun, as an extreme fear of a particular thing or situation, especially one that cannot be reasonably explained. Phobia as a suffix, whereby Xenophobia is defined as hatred of foreigners. Phobic as an adjective or a noun defined as having a strong dislike of something.

The author searched the Oxford dictionary for anti- Islam and anti- religion but none was found. Only anti- as a prefix was found. It is defined as (1) Opposed to; against: antisocial. (2) Preventing or relieving: antibiotic. (3) The opposite of: anticlimax with Greek origin “fit for life”. However, Anti- Semitism was found and it is defined as a noun as hostility to or prejudice against Jews.

Reviewing the definitions of Islamophobia, some remarks can be made:

- If the combination of Islam+ phobia (Islamophobia) means extreme or irrational fear of Islam or dislike of Islam or a specified thing, and this thing is related to Islam, whether, a follower of Islam, or the religion of Muslims, or the Muslim world, then, the weight of the term Islamophobia is placed on irrational feelings.

\(^{14}\) [http://dictionary.cambridge.org/results.asp?searchword=phobia\&x=43\&y=4](http://dictionary.cambridge.org/results.asp?searchword=phobia\&x=43\&y=4)
The theories of Islamophobia

- The two latter derivatives, namely, Islamist- noun and Islamize (also Islamise) as a verb show the extreme irrational fear of the action of Islamizing carried out by Islamists as a feature Islam. Such definitions suggest irrational and extreme fear of Islamizing a non-Muslim society. Consequently, the definitions see the act of Islamizing as an independent act, not as a product of social interaction or other social processes, systems and relations which integrate Islamic acts.

- The definitions related to Shi’a and Sunni present two branches of Islam. Here, one can observe that these meanings vary in time and space. What is appropriate for an individual to be a Shi’a or a Sunni is not appropriate for another individual. It can be also collectively carried out (e.g. inherited by the society in the form of Shia or Sunni formal and informal traditions and teachings of Islam) or is constructed by small groups/ individuals and sometimes enforced through institutional mechanisms with executive powers. Whereby, the differences between the two branches of Islam is unclear to many Shi’a and Sunni themselves, it is even less clear for non-Muslims. Consequently, it is least clear in term of reasoning the irrational extreme fear of Muslims irrespective to which branch a Muslim belongs to.

- As for Islamic (Izlammik), it is as an adjective relating to Islam. Here Islamic can refer to countries, traditions, and cultures. The everyday use of the adjective can be misleading. This is because the meaning of Islamic is mainly based on what can be observed. The definition ignores the existence of much Islamic informality and what is practiced privately away from state mechanisms and formal or spiritual space by which the Islamic also inhabits. Also, it brings about different queries regarding the right of the different segments of society to contribute to the definition of what is Islamic.

| Islamophobia: extreme or irrational fear or dislike of Islam/ Muslims/ Islamic and Islamization |

**Reflections**

- Islamophobia as irrational fear or dislike is directed against not only Islam and Muslims and Islamization but also whatever related to Islam. In other words, whatever is Islamic. This is challenging for it potentially includes all Islamic political parties including Hamas with no distinction.

- This fear or dislike of Islam in a society could be reflected in a formal form (e.g. in laws, buildings, etc) and an informal form that is defined by unwritten rules or feelings which are based on a particular context.
Contextual particularity of in/formal forms of Islamophobia is more likely to change over time and space whereby it is neither inherited nor passing from one generation to another. However, there might be some inherited components of (e.g. religious, military) systems exerting a historical influence on the rules and structure of society in dealing with issues relating to Islam.

There can be varied degrees of agreements over such rules between people as individuals or groups in order to define what Islamophobic is and what is not.

Certain forms of Islamophobia informally and formally can exist unless this form of Islamophobia is disagreed upon by some groups or individuals resulting in more contested definitions of Islamophobia.

Here, power relations interplays in different forms, essentially, in producing a formal unified definition of Islamophobia.

The definition provided earlier is insufficient to define or explain Islamophobia and its manifestations in different contexts.

Nevertheless, there are quite enough Islamophobic incidents in Europe that are documented and debated among different actors. Such incidents contributed to define Islamophobia. This will be demonstrated in the following section/s.

### 3.1.2 In the work of the NGOs

Some NGOs attempted to define Islamophobia and to record relevant incidents against Muslims especially in Europe. Most notably, the term Islamophobia became first part of the contemporary political discourse, in one of the UK, Runnymede Trust’s publication. It published a report, namely, Islamophobia: A challenge for Us All in 1997. In explaining Islamophobia, it draws a key distinction between closed views of Islam on the one hand and opened views on the other as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distinctions</th>
<th>Closed views of Islam</th>
<th>Open views of Islam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Monolithic / diverse</td>
<td>Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities.</td>
<td>Islam seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Separate / interacting</td>
<td>Islam seen as separate and</td>
<td>Islam seen as</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theories</th>
<th>other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them.</th>
<th>interdependent with other faiths and cultures – (a) having certain shared values and aims (b) not affected by them (c) enriching them.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Inferior / different</td>
<td>Islam seen as inferior to the West- barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist.</td>
<td>Islam seen as distinctively different, but not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Enemy / partner</td>
<td>Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in ‘a clash of civilizations’.</td>
<td>Islam seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Manipulative / sincere</td>
<td>Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.</td>
<td>Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, practiced sincerely by its adherents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Criticism of West rejected / considered</td>
<td>Criticisms made by Islam of “the West” rejected out of hand.</td>
<td>Criticisms of ‘the West’ and other cultures are considered and debated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Discrimination defended / criticized</td>
<td>Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.</td>
<td>Debates and disagreements with Islam do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Islamophobia seen as natural / problematic</td>
<td>Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and “normal”.</td>
<td>Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reviewing open and closed views of Islam-phobia, here are some remarks:
The distinction between closed and open views of Islam took eight tracks. The first five tracks only addressed those views. The last three tracks did not actually address any views of Islam.

Track number 6 addressed criticisms of the West. The last two tracks addressed discrimination and Islamophobia as perceived or acted upon against Muslims and not by Muslims.

The closed views of Islam are respectively, monolithic, separate, inferior, enemy, and manipulative. The open views are respectively, diverse, interacting, different, partner, and sincere.

The closed views are not always opposite to the open views. However, closed views are considered negative while the open views are considered positive or at least less negative.

| Islamophobia: closed views vs. open views of Islam as monolithic/ diverse, separate/interacting, inferior/ different, enemy/ partner, and manipulative/ sincere. |

**Reflections**

- It is clear that Islam is viewed in negative as well as in positive terms. The extent to which and context in which Islam is viewed negatively or positively is not clear though.
- The more negatively Islam is viewed, the more Islamophobia is assumed.
- The dichotomy between good/positive Islam and bad/negative Islam is evident.
- The dichotomy between Islam and the West appeared in the sense it is only Islam/ Muslims criticizing the West whereby who else is critical of the West is not clear or important, perhaps. In addition, the West itself is presented as monolithic.
- This dichotomy demonstrates further reinforces Islam as the enemy- other that is feared in opposition to the West.
- The closed views of Islam holders seem to justify their reaction in term of discrimination and exclusion. Islamophobia for them is natural. The holders of the open views of Islam debate and combat discrimination and exclusion of Muslims. Islamophobia for them is problematic.
- those views are more likely addressing Islam and Muslim minorities in Europe. Contextual particularities are not addressed.
3.1.3 In the work of the Council of Europe

In the work of the Council of Europe (CoE) on discrimination, race-based discrimination is related to religion in many cases and it is found in different times. The advocates of anti-discrimination considered religion to be a key factor in discrimination.

However, it is difficult to deduce particular measurements for Islamophobia in the EU policy towards Palestine for Palestine is out of Europe and out of the Council frame. Therefore, the definition of Islamophobia in this context cannot be held as a universal norm to measure the processes of Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy. Therefore, in the development of a definition of Islamophobia, it is important to note the contextual particularity at least in term of (1) space- the EU and the Palestinians’ definition/s of Islamophobia and (2) time- two years around 2006 Palestinian elections in order to capture the phenomenon.

3.1.3.1 Space

It is necessary to note that debate over Islamophobia has taken place in Europe rather than in Palestine. The Council of Europe has responded initially to two main obstacles with respect to Islamophobia in Europe. The first obstacle is in defining Islamophobia and the second is in the limited related data about Islamophobic incidents.

As for the first obstacle, in response to the absence of a legally agreed upon definition of Islamophobia, or a social science-developed common definition, policy and action to combat Islamophobia is taken within the broad concept of racism and discrimination. Therefore, the approach to identify the phenomena is based on internationally agreed standards on racism and the ongoing work of the Council of Europe and the United Nations that are largely accepted by governments and international organizations. To that point, the CoE’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) published relevant general policy recommendations in accordance with the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) as follows: 17

No. 5- (CRI (2000) 21). In combating intolerance and discrimination against Muslims, it notes that Muslim communities are subject to prejudice that

“May, manifest itself in different guises, in particular through negative general attitudes but also to varying degrees, through discriminatory acts and through violence and

harassment”

No. 7- (ECRI (2003) 8) on the national legislation combating racism and racial discrimination, it defines racism as

“The belief that a ground such as race, color, language, religion, national or ethnic origin justifies contempt for a person or a group of persons or the notion of superiority of a person or a group of persons”.

No.8 (ECRI (2004) 26) notes that

“As a result of the fight against terrorism ... vulnerable to racism and/or to racial discrimination across many fields of public life including education, employment, housing, access to goods and services, access to public places and freedom of movement”.

In 2005, another publication of the CoE referred to Islamophobia by addressing its consequences on young people as:

“The fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and the matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion”.

As for the second obstacle, namely, the limited data on Islamophobic incidents, the EUMC has set up and coordinated a Racism and Xenophobia European Network composed (RAXEN) of 25 National Focal Points (NFP)- one in each EU member state. The task of the NFP is to provide the EUMC with objective, reliable and comparable data on Racism and Xenophobia. The two channels for data collection focusing on racist violence and crime are firstly, official criminal data including police reports, prosecution reports and case files and secondly, other related data including NGOs reports and research, surveys and media.

RAXEN showed that police and criminal justice data identifying Muslim victims is absent in all EU states with the exception of the United Kingdom. Also, country data is limited and most reports refer to incidents in the “old” EU 15 states where the relatively larger EU
Muslim populations live.\textsuperscript{18}

It is worth noting that accounts of incidents against people who are characterized as Muslims could be difficult to be labeled as Islamophobic. In comparison, an anti Islamic statements or drawings is clearly Islamophobic. On the other hand, incidents of crimes against Muslims may be driven by other motives than Islamophobia such as anti- migrant/ refugee/ asylum seeker sentiments – and these can be labeled as a hate crime instead.

Moreover, the existence of empirical data depends on a definition of Islamophobia that has been officially accepted by specific states. In other words, it is almost impossible to have any empirical data for measuring a term that is undefined. Nevertheless, the lack of empirical data should not be seen as an indication that there are no expressions, opinions, or actions that could be related to Islamophobia in Europe.

Interestingly, most of what is reported as Islamophobic incidents in Europe refers to incidents against people from countries of origin predominately Muslim. Eventually, EUMC recognizes that perception plays an essential role in the manifestation of Islamophobia in the following manner:\textsuperscript{19}

1. The victim perception of a crime as Islamophobic as a first step for potential Islamophobic incident as it might be.
2. The perpetrator perceives a target of abuse as a Muslim although s/he might be a non-Muslim can also be an Islamophobic incident.

Therefore, perception of the other, in two directions, plays a crucial role in defining Islamophobia

\textbf{3.1.3.2 Time}

Francisco (2007) argued that anti- Muslim stereotypical and negative schemes go even further back in history to the Middle Ages, the Crusades and the Reformation. The reformer Martin Luther in 1483- 1546 held for example negative opinions about Muslims. Anti- Muslim literature, especially against the Quran, was part of the Christian self-image and the construction of European boundaries in association with negative and essentialistic images

\textsuperscript{18} EUMC, ibid, p 60-67
\textsuperscript{19} EUMC, ibid, p 63
Theories

according to stereotypical schemes and the fear of the other.\textsuperscript{20} Further, Andre Gingrich (2005) argued such constructions might lead to the identification of a new variant in the present that nevertheless, arguably, is the transformation of its not-so-recent predecessors.\textsuperscript{21}

However, Öyzürex, Esra, (2005) argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 fundamentally transformed the nature of political alliances in Europe. When European leaders met at Maastricht, in 1991, they agreed to change the basis of the supranational European entity from an economic to a political confederation. Hence, in the transition to this new form of union, the question of the place of Islam in Europe has been central in the search for common basis.\textsuperscript{22}

Following Sep 11\textsuperscript{th}, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas pointed out that some of today’s political leaders adopting an apocalyptic discourse enforce the prejudices towards Islam. For example, when they talk about the struggle against evil, speak in the name of God, and try to impose their perception of the good.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, the Swedish national council for crime prevention detailed annual report showed an increase of Islamophobic crimes since 2001.\textsuperscript{24}

Parallel to this, EUMC critical assessment of available data on Islamophobia reveals incidents directed against Muslims including incitement to hatred, threats, and actual acts of violence. In the aftermath of September 11, and in light of subsequent attacks in Europe, the Council of Europe general recommendation no. 8- (ECRI (2004) 26) mentioned earlier also indicates, that Arabs, Muslims, Jews, immigrants and persons perceived belonging to such groups have become subject of discrimination in many fields.

However, the same period witnessed, arguably, Islamophobic attitudes in politics. To this point, Strindberg and Wärn argue that whereas Hamas is a domestic Islamic movement focused on Palestine, a political effort to lump together diverse resistance movements into a homogenous terrorist enemy is evident. Al Quaida has come to serve as explanatory matrix for a range of dispute militant groups in the Middle East and beyond. It mattered little that

\textsuperscript{20} Francisco (2007) in Göran, Larsson, (2009), current Debates about Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia within the Academia, in September, 16-21, 2009 series of lectures, Oslo
\textsuperscript{21} Gingrich, Andre, (2005), Anthropological analysis of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in Europe, the American Ethnologist, Vol. 32, No., 4, p513-515
\textsuperscript{22} Öyzürex, Esra, (2005), The politics of cultural unification, secularism, and the place of Islam in the new Europe, the American Ethnologist, Vol. 32, No., 4, p 509- 512
\textsuperscript{23} Chahuan, Eugenio (2005), An East- West Dichotomy: Islamophobia, p47
\textsuperscript{24} Göran, (2009), current Debates about Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia within the Academia, in September, 16-21, 2009 series of lectures, Oslo.
Hamas had not been involved in global terrorism. However, Hamas was placed beyond reason and dialogue and found itself to the head of key enemies in the new war on terror.\textsuperscript{25}

Time and space along the perception of the other are important factors in defining Islamophobia. In terms of space, Islamophobia is a phenomena-taking place in Europe. In terms of time, Islamophobia is addressed because of the fight against terrorism in the aftermath of Sep 11\textsuperscript{th}.

**Reflections**

- It is necessary to note that debate over Islamophobia has taken place in Europe rather Islamophobia is present in Europe.
- Islamophobia manifests itself in different forms through general negative attitudes such as fear, prejudice and violence, leading to discrimination on the bases of religion (Islam), race, etc, leading to violence and violation of human rights.
- Islamophobia contextual particularities are little addressed in different EU member states. Further, it is unexamined in foreign policy. However, contextualizing Islamophobia shows its particularities in a more subtle way and often beyond a simple antiforeign sentiment.
- Time and space are crucial in defining Islamophobia not only inside Europe but also in connection to the EU foreign policy in an international context in the aftermath of Sep.11\textsuperscript{th}.

### 3.2 Islamophobia Theorized

In this section, the author explores and discusses Islamophobia in four theories and theoretical perspectives in relevance. A reflection on the socio- political discourses of Islamophobia at the end of the debate is also made.

#### 3.2.1 Clash of civilization Theory

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new world order emerged and Islam became a potential new enemy. The historical delineation of Islam is borrowed from Huntington. He did most to generalize and popularize the clash of civilization model on which Bernard Lewis had long relied upon in the debate over Islam and terrorism in the wider debates over the post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{26} Lewis goes further in time and presents a longstanding framework. He argued


\textsuperscript{26} Lewis, Bernard, (1990), the Roots of Muslim Rage, the Atlantic monthly, September, 1990, Vol. 266, no. 3, p4-60
that the ongoing struggle has taken place between the “rival systems” of the Judeo-Christian and Muslim “Blocks” for nearly fourteen centuries. He specifically says:

“It has consisted of a long series of attacks and counter attacks, jihads and crusades, conquests and reconquests”

According to Lockman Zachary, the advocates of various books, articles, and media argued that different ideological circumstances dominated between the First World War and the end of the Cold War. They also suggested that the conflict of nation-states was supplemented by the conflict of ideologies. Further, they argued that Islam-ism in this case had replaced communism through the 1990s as a big threat facing the West as well as Israel and that only a firm aggressive stance, including military force, could eradicate it. Meghand Desai makes demarcations, arguing that what caused terrorism was not Islam as a religion or the lifestyle or culture of Muslims but Islamism as an ideology. He based this assessment on his analysis of Osama Bin Laden’s speeches.

Islam as an ideology of terror is a threat to the West and only an aggressive stance could eradicate it.

In this specific situation immigrants in Europe, and Muslims in particular, became the new enemy that better serves the new political landscape. This is seen in political publications and political manifests of some of the right wing parties in Europe in the 1990s. An example is the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn and his book Against the Islamization of our Culture, a publication that clearly addressed immigrants and Muslims in particular as a problem for Europe.

In disagreement with the ideological link, Huntington starkly argued that the fundamental sources of conflict in the world would not be primary ideological or economic but rather cultural lines between groups or nations belonging to different civilizations defined by language, history, and religion and also by how people identify themselves. He argued that the conflict is no longer between different ideologies as it was in the cold war but between distinct cultures, often influenced by religious overtones. Consequently, the analysis of

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27 Lewis, (1990), ibid.. See also, Lewis, Bernard, (1982), the Question of Orientalism, New York Review of books, XXIX,No. 11, p49-56
28 Lockman, Zachary, (2004), Contending Visions of the Middle East, the history and politics of Orientalism, Cambridge, UK, p233-236
Huntington differs substantially from those that framed the analysis of the Cold War. To Huntington, this new global conflict is potentially more intransigent than the Cold War had been because the people tend to have deep, and sometimes nonnegotiable attachments to their own civilizations.

Islam as a distinct culture is a fundamental source of conflict

3.2.2 Orientalism

Huntington is often credited for having remarkable foresight in the aftermath of September 11th, but it was in fact, Orientalism that was the prescient work. Edward Said’s book engaged the relationship between the Orient and its forms of knowledge, enabling scholars to recognize in arguments, such as those put forth by Huntington, an imperial vision that would work to make real the very clash of civilizations that Huntington “foresaw”. After all, Orientalism lays out “the pattern of imperial culture”31 that made imaginable, even natural, imperial vision of the Arab- Muslim as a space demanding intervention; a space radically, even incommensurably, different from the West and one that had to be remade by and in the image of European civilization. He said that,

“No one writing, thinking or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitation on thought and action inspired by Orientalism.”

In 2003, Said wrote 25 years after its initial publication,

“Orientalism once raises the question of whether modern imperialism ever ended, or whether it has continued in the Orient since Napoleon’s entry into Egypt two centuries ago”.32

Of importance, Orientalism raises the questions and seeks to understand the specific terms and institutions through which imperial power operates. It examines an “internally structured archive”33 of the character of the Arab and Muslim East among other things that helped to generate and make possible the imperial policies. In Said’s words, Orientalism is still a book “about culture, ideas, history and power”.34 In other words, it is methodologically and historically attempting to answer how culture, history and power articulate within specific contexts of empires.

33 Said, Edward, (1978), ibid
In this research, the author deals with the institutional power highlighted in Orientalism for it examines Islamophobia in foreign policy making towards the Orient- in this case Palestine by the EU as an institution and a global power. To this point, the author notes a relevant definition among Said’s overlapping definitions of Orientalism:

“corporate institution for dealing with the Orient- dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, and ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style of dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the orient”.  

This definition engages distinct aspects of knowledge, representation and empire. Said also questions how human societies distinguish between selves and others and with what consequences:

“can we divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly?”

Of significance, Islam is mostly read in Orientalism as the alien, foreign. Exotic terms are also found. Said argues that this is not merely a matter of distaste or prejudice, but when the idea of others as less than human gathers revolutionary force, it leads to destruction of human beings.

For a scholar such as Foucault, representation is very important. For example, he assumes that what we take to be the truth is in fact always really the product of a certain way of representing reality, of a certain “discourse: a structured system of meaning which shapes what we perceive, think and do”. This “way of seeing” is not a misrepresentation, a false or distorted perception of reality, because there is no truth and no accurate representation. Taken this argument to the extreme, once can state there is no reality out there. This makes it, however, challenging if not impossible to come up with any definition, for example, a definition of Islamophobia.

Therefore, Orientalism contributes to somehow resolve this problem. It sought to understand how in a context of specific historical encounters Europe represented Arab Middle East

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36 Said, Edward, (1978), ibid., p45
otherness, demarcating the difference between East and West, between Christianity and Islam- generated imperial power in the West, and helped to elaborate the patterns of thought and culture that made that imperial endeavor imaginable, sustainable and quite centrally “morally- good”.

In doing so, Said started to analyze how Europeans had perceived the (Non- Western) peoples and cultures over which Western power was increasingly being exerted during the colonial era and afterward generating a colonial discourse. This way, Orientalism traced the transformation of Islam from “alien into colonial space” in the late 19th century. Precisely, Orientalism traced how the former- a persistent discourse about alien made it possible the latter- a colonial space. He analyzed the transformation of a largely imagined and often fraught relationship between the world of Christendom and that of Islam, into a colonized one.

Islam as an alien transformed into a colonial space

Some scholars such as Lewis (1982)39, critical of Orientalism raised the question of whether or not Said engaged in a reverse Orientalism, in “Occidentalism”. However, this question can only be asked from within a partial reading of Orientalism. Such a reading is stripped of its entanglement with forms and institutions of power in which the Orientalist discourse was and remains embedded. In other words, this question requires that historical and institutional elements of Orientalism particular argument be sidelined. This way, the question of empire must be treated as either irrelevantly or at very least not central.

3.2.3 Nativism Theory

Nativism is defined in Merriam- Webster 40 dictionary as: “(1) a policy of favoring native inhabitants as opposed to immigrants, and (2) the revival of perpetuation of an indigenous culture especially in opposition to acculturation”.

However, Anti- immigration can be a more neutral term that may be used to characterize opponents of immigration. Anti- immigration is also a typical pressing concern in the 20th and 21st century.41 It is often argued, that immigrants will distort existing cultural values, and perhaps that immigrants cannot be assimilated. In the United States where the so called white

38 Said, Edward, (1978), ibid., p210
natives are themselves non-native, authors such as Samuel Huntington have seen recent Hispanic immigration as creating a national identity crisis and presenting problems for social institutions in the United States.\(^{42}\)

Regarding Nativism in Europe, Lucassen (2005) argued that religiosity and nationalism were fundamental in generating nativism and intergroup hostility. He gave the example of the religious divide between the Protestants and Catholics of the Irish in British society. Another example is the Poles in the mining districts of Western Germany before 1914. In this example, it was nationalism which kept Polish workers separate from the host German society. Further, Lucassen sees the post-1950s wave of immigration in Europe as fundamentally different from the pre-1914 patterns. For example, the Algerian migration to France escalated a debate over the impact of cultural differences, race, fundamentalism, poverty, poor education on nativism.\(^{43}\)

Further, in regards to economic competition and the global economy, Brodkin (2005) pointed out that racism’s resonance rests on institutionalized and persistent racial and ethnic segregation in the labor force, and in neighborhoods whereby new groups of immigrants become racial others. She also argued that the Bush administration has rivaled European governments in Islamophobic state policies and discourse; this, despite the fact that Muslims are not the primary focus of popular xenophobia in the USA. Still, many Americans stereotype Mexican and Central American immigrants for taking USA jobs and public services in much the same way that Europeans blame Turks and other Muslims. It seems that much of those attitudes in Europe rest on earlier decades of immigration of workers from the Middle East. Most of working class post-World II rebuilding and industrialization came from Turkey and former North African colonies. Those immigrants are also vulnerable to exploitation because they are sometimes subject to state imposed restrictions on work and/or conditions of residence.\(^{44}\)

As far as national security is concerned, Brodkin (2005) argued in relation to previous point that despite the national trauma inflicted by September 11\(^{th}\), there has been little nativist sentiments in the United States targeting immigrants from Islamic countries. In Europe, after September 11\(^{th}\) and the subsequent attacks in London and Madrid, there has been a

\(^{42}\) Huntington, Samuel, (1996), the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York.

\(^{43}\) Lucassen, (2005), Nativism, [http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Nativism_%28politics%29](http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Nativism_%28politics%29)

\(^{44}\) Brodkin, Karen, (2005), Xenophobia, the state, and capitalism, American Ethnologist, Vol. 32, No.4, p519-520
considerable rise in anti-Islam sentiments.\footnote{Brodkin, Karen, (2005), ibid., p519-520}

Betz and Meret (2009) reflected on the connection between Europe and Islam. The former is seen as civilized and the latter is seen as a barbarian savage who is driven by violence with a so-called medieval mentality.\footnote{Betz, Hans-Georg, (1994), Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe, Scholarly and Reference Division, St. Martin’s Press, New York. See also, Betz, Hans-Georg and Meret, Susi, (2009), “Revisiting Lepanto: the political mobilization against Islam in contemporary Western Europe”, Pattern of Prejudice, Vol. 43, Issue 3&4, July, p313-334} Putting the argument this way does not depend on racial theories but on essentialistic way of presenting Islam and Muslims that is driven by cultural explanations and consequently it is a representation of the new racism. They argued further that whilst racial theories are biological constructions, the essentialistic cultural way of pressing Islam and Muslims is often based on a preconceived cultural construction.

In conclusion, the distinguishing feature of nativism is the opposition between established inhabitants and recently arrived immigrants. In addition, it can be understood as racial/social/cultural constructions. It is also noted that whereas nativism can vary widely over time and space, anti-Muslim sentiments was and is more present in Europe than the USA.

| Nativism might be driven by religion such as Islam, nationalism, culture, race, economy, and national security. |

\subsection*{3.2.4 Populism Theory}

Canovan, Margaret argues that populism pits a homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous others who are together seen as depriving (or attempting to do so) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, and identity.\footnote{Canovan, Margaret (1982)Populism, The Journal of Politics (1982), 44:893-895 Cambridge University Press} Betz, Hans-Georg argues that populism often implies a rhetorical style in a way that can take different forms of politics that bring people of different views together without claiming a certain position of the political spectrum.\footnote{Betz, Hans-Georg, (1994), ibid.} In doing so, populist politics often represents politics of horizontal interactions among equals who are different for the sake of problem solving.\footnote{Harry C. Boyte, “A Different Kind of Politics,” Dewey Lecture, University of Michigan, 2002. Online at Project Muse}

In Europe, Gingrich argues that there are different political parties advocating Islamophobia by going back to old myths and traditions and revitalizing them in the new contexts of migration. There are many incidents in Europe on history, where Islamophobia is used for instrumentalizing these incidents. For example, Islam was able to pose a real threat to
European powers during the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{50}

To this point and to make use of the term Islamophobia by synthesizing it with the notion of populism, Farid Hafez, argues that while populism is about simplification, dichotomization and a duality, such as in the paradigm of Islamophobia, “confrontation and antagonism” is possible between the West – and Islam. In this sense, Islamophobia can play a role in the production of xenophobic affects. Those affects can be enforced and instrumentalized by populist actors in a form of populist Islamophobia\textsuperscript{51} constructing Islam in opposition to the “good” West as a monolithic, static, homogenous, reactionary, and hostile.

\begin{boxedminipage}{0.95\textwidth}
Islamophobia as dichotomizing stereotypical views of “bad” Islam vs. “good” West can play a role in the production of xenophobic affects in a form of populist Islamophobia
\end{boxedminipage}

Interestingly, the author compared several classical features of Islamophobia, as outlined in clash of civilization theory, Orientalism, nativism and populism. In doing so, Runnymede Trust report was useful in suggesting starting points for comparison in term of opened and closed views about Islam as follows:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Gingrich, Andre,(2005), ibid., p513-515
\item \textsuperscript{51} Hafez, Farid, Islamophobic discourse strategies in Green and Blue. Paper presented at the GSA conference “New Nationalisms and Conservatism in Germanophone Countries: Realities, Representations, and Responses” by the German Studies Association, October 2 - 5, 2008 St. Paul, Minnesota
\end{itemize
## Specific features of Islam-phobia in relation to theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islam-phobia</th>
<th>Clash of civilisation</th>
<th>Orientalism</th>
<th>Nativism</th>
<th>Populism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Monolithic / diverse</strong></td>
<td>A monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities</td>
<td>Alien, other, static, primitive, hostile, incompatible with the West/Christianity</td>
<td>Alien, foreigner, different and immigrant</td>
<td>Alien, foreigner, homogeneous with no internal differences, and hostile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Separate / interacting</strong></td>
<td>Exclusionary culture</td>
<td>Exclusionary geo-political block</td>
<td>Exclusionary communities</td>
<td>Exclusionary project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Inferior / different</strong></td>
<td>Islam seen as different distinctively compared to the West</td>
<td>Different and inferior to the West</td>
<td>Distinctively different, but not deficient</td>
<td>different compared to the West-Christianity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Enemy / partner</strong></td>
<td>Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism</td>
<td>A constructed threat to the West-Christianity</td>
<td>Feared of invasion or competition</td>
<td>A threat to national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Manipulative / sincere</strong></td>
<td>A hostile culture</td>
<td>A politicized, anti-imperialism religion</td>
<td>A practiced faith and culture</td>
<td>A politicized-militarized faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Criticism of West rejected / considered</strong></td>
<td>Islam in opposition to the West and its criticisms of “the West”</td>
<td>Incompatible with the West democracy and modernity</td>
<td>Criticisms of “the West” and other cultures are considered upon specific</td>
<td>Islam in opposition to the good West and Jude-Christianity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Theories

| 7. Discrimination | rejected out of hand. | A dichotomy debate is used to fuel cultural differences internally and to justify “war on terror” abroad driven often by culture | Debates over Islam support efforts to combat exclusion of Muslims and wars against Muslims abroad whereby culture, religion, race, and power relation differences are key factors | Debates over discriminatory practices against Muslims is combined and sometimes driven by religion, race, language, power relation in term of economy and education | Anti-Islam theses is used to justify discriminatory practices driven by religion, nationalism, race, and national security |

| 8. Islamophobia seen as natural / problematic | Hostility and clashes with Islam is accepted as natural and “normal” | Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate | Natural and also problematic |

Reflections

It is worth noting firstly that most of the features of Islamophobia have much more in common with the closed views about Islam than the opened views. A threat, alien, other, foreigner, hostile, terrorist, violent, static, monolithic, backward, primitive, different, inferior are quoted often.
The driving force of Islamophobia is from religion (Islam) as much as from race, culture, linguistics, economy, and nationalism, and even psychology in term of fear and superiority/inferiority complex, and national security (and at varied degrees).

It should be noted that those features are presented in a stereotypical fashion that is mostly oversimplifying, generalizing, dichotomizing and sometimes imagining and/or constructing. In other words, the West - Islam dichotomy has played a role in dividing the worldviews.

In this sense, Islam gets converted into not only the basis of anti-West, antimodernism and anti-civilization but also the primitive and yet aggressive and terrorist other all in one.

However, the author finds the orientalism concept more helpful in explaining Islamophobia in the EU boycott policy of Hamas. First of all, and in connection to Foucault, Orientalism as a discourse had been a specific form of knowledge of the premises, rules, conventions and claims to truth produced by the power relations that western states exercised (or sought to exercise) over the (Orient) in this case, Islam. This specific knowledge is related to EU policymaking over time towards Palestine and eventually Hamas. Secondly, Israel has made great efforts to delegitimize any critique of the Zionist project of colonizing Palestine, presenting any Palestinian rejection of the state of Israel as a hatred derived from culture and religion, namely, Islam. Consequently, this dilutes any rational behaviour against colonisation by the Palestinians. This is argued by Said as well as by Massad (2000) and others. Further, today’s Orientalist terrorist discourse is a part of a Western tradition of vilification of critics and opponents as an instrument that sustains neo-colonial interests. This particular point is strongly debated by Strindberg and Wärn (2005) while giving the example of Hamas.

Therefore, Orientalism not only deals with the universal problem of representation. This is in terms of West-East/Islam or that of the EU-Hamas, which is an important issue in defining Islamophobia as explored earlier. More importantly, it contributes to the question of power in the EU policy towards Palestine whereby it is intimately entangled with distinct colonial histories and imperial institutions of power. This is more explored and discussed in the EU policy abstract and operationalized models.

52 Massad, Josef, (2000), Palestinians and Jewish History, recognition or submission, journal of Palestine studies, Autumn, vol. 3 no. 1, 2000, p52-67
3.2 Islamophobia compared

This section draws attention to the comparisons between Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism made by some authors worldwide in order to proceed further in defining Islamophobia in foreign policy. The author finds it useful to do the comparison for the following reasons: Firstly, due to the long history and rich debate about anti-Semitism in Europe. Secondly, the rise of both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the aftermath of Sep.11th. Thirdly, the international attempts to place Islamophobia as well as anti-Semitism as a form of religion based-discrimination. Finally, it is a step forward to explore the connection and interaction between Christian Europe, Islam as well as Judaism. For example, this research examines Islamophobia in the EU boycott policy of Hamas in a country perceived to be predominantly Muslim, namely Palestine. Palestine is also occupied by a self-defined Jewish state, namely Israel.

In this sense, the author considers the Swedish national council for crime prevention detailed annual report. Firstly, it included what can be linked to the definition of Islamophobia as well as anti-Semitism. Secondly, the report did not only show the increase of Islamophobic crimes since 2001 but also underlined a connection between international terrorism and the political development in the Middle East. Thirdly, it also showed that Jews and Muslims have suffered from discrimination and exclusion in Europe and both have a common enemy in right-wing Christian fundamentalism.

Nevertheless, Matti Bunzl argues that specific historical trajectories must be considered when comparing Islamophobia to Anti-Semitism. For example, anti-Semitism was at its peak as part of the project of modernity in the late 19th century, culminating in a genocidal fantasy of creating racially pure nation-states in the mid 20th century. Today, even right-wingers in today’s secular Europe have abandoned this project. Parties in different European countries have disavowed Nazi ideology and court Jewish voters. By now, the memorialization of the holocaust is a primary feature of the EU and European identity. In a vivid form, Europe defines itself as a Judeo-Christian entity.

From a different perspective, Göran (2009) argues that some authors such as Cesarani seem to


neglect reports that documents Islamophobia in the EU and that Muslims are suffering from discrimination and anti-Muslim attitudes in contemporary western societies. He also noted that Cesarani seems comfortable with the EU anti-discrimination laws that prohibit the rise of any ideology to discriminate, imprison, and murder people on ethnic, religious or ideological grounds.\textsuperscript{56} However, Cesarani is also well aware that there are gaps between what the laws stipulate and what the actual situation is for many people of a Muslim cultural background.\textsuperscript{57}

The author finds it more useful to identify starting points for comparison between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Related views of scholars involved in comparison are briefly presented in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Anti-Semitism</th>
<th>Islamophobia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time:</td>
<td>Old phenomenon!</td>
<td>Old phenomenon!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old phenomenon/ New forms</td>
<td>- Anti-Semitism is far older than anti-Islam for Jews had a central place in Europe’s Christian culture in a way that Muslim never did.</td>
<td>- A phenomenon of at least the “late 20\textsuperscript{th} or 21\textsuperscript{st} century” in particular and it goes even back further in history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- It is transformed into an “ideology in reserve”. For example, integration into the EU might influence local attitudes but it does not determine them.\textsuperscript{58}</td>
<td>- Anti Islam theme might be transformed into the identification of a new variant of Islamophobia in the present.\textsuperscript{59}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving forces:</td>
<td>By race!</td>
<td>By religion!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other forces such as</td>
<td>Anti-Semitism took its</td>
<td>Islamophobia is not</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{56} Göran, Larsson, (2009), current Debates about Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia within the Academia, in September, 16-21, 2009 series of lectures, Oslo
\textsuperscript{57} Cesarani, David, (2009), ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Gingrich, Andre, (2005), ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Gingrich, Andre, (2005), ibid.
Theories

culture, nationalism, linguistics, economy and national security are also debated at varied degrees and sometimes in combination to race and religion

| Assimilation/ Integration: | peak as part against modernity late 19\textsuperscript{th} century culminating in a genocidal fantasy of creating racially pure nation states mid 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{60} | analyzed thoroughly in most European countries whereby so called practicing/ believing Muslims are represented as all people of Muslim background.\textsuperscript{61} |
| - Islamophobia may be in fact a variant of race thinking.\textsuperscript{62} |

| Assimilation/ Integration: | Whether Jews can be good Germans, Austrian, etc.? | Whether Muslims can be good Europeans? |
| Present political moment | By now, the protection of the Jews and the memorialization of the Holocaust have become defining features of the European Union. |
| - (Europe defines itself as a Judeo- Christian entity).\textsuperscript{63} |

| Present political moment | Anti Islamic theme in Europe is related to a project of solidifying a European identity by portraying Islam as dangerous other. One repeatedly given example as a critical expression of identity is the rejection of the Turkish accession as a Muslim country to the EU |

| Local vs. Global: | Israel is seen as: |
| Particularly when it comes to the Middle Eastern | - A Jewish state by even |

| Local vs. Global: | Islam is seen as: |
| Particularly when it comes to the Middle Eastern | A threat to Israel and anti-

\textsuperscript{60} Bunzl,Matti, (2007), ibid., p11-13
\textsuperscript{61} Göran, Larsson, (2009), ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Schiller, Nina Glick, (2005), Racialized nations, Evangelizing Christianity, Police States, and Imperial Power, by the American Ethnologist, Vol. 32, No.4, p526- 532
\textsuperscript{63} Bunzl,Matti, (2007), ibd., p 7-26, 30-36
relations with Western powers. | its own definition. | Semite.
---|---|---
- It is not seen first and foremost as a European colony but also as the unwavering ally of the United States as a global superpower. 64 | - An enemy to the western powers with negative and essentialistic images and often as a parcel of Western identity constructions. 65

### 3.3.1 Driving forces

With more focus on Islamophobia, the comparisons made between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are directed towards the driving forces, eventually, to reach a definition more relevant to Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy.

#### 3.3.1.1 Race

Nina Glick Schiller highlights the interplay between a number of factors influencing the new variant of Islamophobia. She argued that it is urgent to note just what is happening in Europe and elsewhere around the question of race. On the one hand, the crimes of Nazism are condemned; on the other hand, other kinds of discrimination based on essentialized cultural difference often go unnoticed in ways that reintroduce and normalize processes of racialization. For example, it is failing to connect the growing attacks on Muslims to the persistence and revival of ideas of essential racial difference. 66

#### 3.3.1.2 Religion

As religion is concerned, Christianity was not vanquished as a category of identity by the growth of nation-states but went hand in hand with the penetration of capitalism, modernity, and nationalism. Most people in Europe may not be religious, but acknowledging Christianity within the EU constitution was hotly debated rather than readily dismissed as an outdated and discredited idea. 67

#### 3.3.1.3 Nationalism

Dorms of Christian identity mixed with essentialized nationalism and its racialized logic of blood and belonging, Schiller (2005) argues, is alive and well in Europe. These complex

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64 Gingrich, Andre, (2005), ibid.
65 Schiller, Nina Glick, (2005), ibid.
66 Schiller, Nina Glick, (2005), ibid.
67 The Independent article, “Tussle over God Threatens to Delay EU constitution”, February 2003, by Stephen Castle, [http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/article120698.ece](http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/article120698.ece)
modes of belonging must be understood within the context of a generalized sense of insecurity. All contribute to the legitimization of old and new instruments of state repression in the name of the need to safeguard “national security”. Therefore, the campaign against Islamic bodies is part and parcel of the current resurrection in many European states of nation-state building projects constructed on the basis of racialized concepts of culturally homogenous nations- whose cultural commonality is singled out by physical appearance.  

3.3.1.4 Assimilation and integration

Göran, (2009) argues that Muslims who adapt integration and assimilation projects do so only because of specific local and national ideologies and political discourses. For example British multicultural policy is different from that of France or Germany or Sweden. It is therefore unlikely that immigrants of different Muslim cultural backgrounds will have similar attitudes towards assimilation and integration policies. It is more plausible that they directly or indirectly have adjusted to the expectations of the political system.

However, Abduljalil Sajid, (2005) argues that Islamophobia is heightened by one contextual factor. Namely, a high proportion of refugees and people seeking asylum are Muslims. Demonization of refugees is therefore frequently a coded attack against Muslims, for the worlds “Muslim”, “asylum seeker”, and “refugee” and “immigrant” become conflated in the popular imagination. The common experiences of immigrant communities of unemployment, rejection, alienation, and violence have combined with Islamophobia to make integration particularly difficult. To that point, instead of arguing that Muslims are unwilling to assimilate (a position that some Muslims of course also embrace) that they do not want to become British or Swedish, it is more fruitful to ask if the large majority of Muslim immigrants have a real chance to become integrated into the society or are they excluded by discrimination and xenophobia.

3.3.1.5 War on Terror

War on terror is used to increase dramatically the ability of the state to control and spy on its citizenry. Islam that is feared is an embedded one. It is increasingly confined as a dual legal system that denies citizen rights to those racialized as outside of the culturally- racially-homogenous nation. This is on the ground that such persons may in the future be linked to

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68 Schiller, Nina Glick, (2005), ibid.
69 Göran, Larsson, (2009), ibid.
some form of terrorist or anti-democratic activities. On the other hand, she argued that mainstream Christians see members of the “free churches” as fanatical, but state security agencies do not categorize, label, spy on, or deny citizenship to members of such organizations the way they do members of Muslim organizations, who because of their religious values alone are declared a threat to the constitution. German law differentiates between good and bad Muslim organizations but it does not distinguish between good and bad Christian organizations.

Furthermore, in a study carried out by CEPS, it is found that the war on terror is also perceived as a war on Islam with regard to various conflict situations around the world, including the Israel-Palestine conflict. Abduljalil Sajid argues that EU foreign policy seems to side with non-Muslims against Muslims, agrees with the view that the terms “Muslims” and “terrorists” are synonymous and that for example the UK government supports Israel against the Palestinians. Such perceptions of UK foreign policy may or may not be accurate. The point is that they help fashion the lens through which events are interpreted- not only by Muslims but by non-Muslims, too.

3.3.1.6 Political discourses/efforts

Currently, according to Abduljalil (2005), there are two broad perspectives that dominate discussions about Islam in the EU; those on the right who argue that the basis of European culture and civilization is Christianity. These people claim that Islam is external and even antithetical to the culture of the EU. Those on the left argue that what makes Europe special is its secular, democratic and humanitarian values. Despite this universalistic approach that dissenters Christianity, leftists often critique certain Islamic practices such as veiling and ritual slaughtering of animals. They do this not because it is not Christian but because it presents a culture that promotes submission to religion, on that does not allow individuals to subscribe to secularist values. Also, there is a skeptical, secular and agnostic outlook with regard to all religions. This outlook is expressed in the media, perhaps particularly the left liberal media, and is opposed to all religions, not only to Islam.

72 Schiller, Nina Glick, (2005), ibid.
73 Emerson, Michael and others, (2007), “Political Islam and European Foreign policy, perspectives from Muslim democrats of the Mediterranean”, CEPS, Brussels
75 Sajed, Abduljalil, (2005), ibid., p31-46
Therefore, despite the differing rationales, both the left and right in the EU, Öyzürex, Esra, (2005) argue that they adopt exclusionary stances against Muslims whether those Muslims are secular or religious.\(^{76}\)

### 3.3.2 Present Political moment

There are tempting arguments made by a number of researchers that discuss how Jews and Muslims have suffered from discrimination and exclusion in Europe and that both have a common enemy in right-wing Christian fundamentalism. However, it is necessary to note that political parties in different European countries have disavowed Nazi ideology and court Jewish voters whereby no single party espouses anti-Semitism. However, these some of these same political parties can go into xenophobic and anti-Islamic directions. In this xenophobic and Islamophobic context, old myths are reconfigured and reassembled together with new elements and contexts for present purposes.

This becomes apparent when one listens to influential members of the European press; politicians and social scientists describe Islamic residents of Europe as so radically different that they are inassimilable. Why else that these “frightening” others lack the capacity for change? Why else assume that the line of demarcation that allows one to detect this threatening difference is where one’s ancestors were born? The very concept of immutable difference, however, seems to build on a historical view of cultural difference as a product of biological essence.

The assumption that the Islamic population can be recognized and denied rights and legal protections guaranteed to other citizens is a central part of the antiterrorist laws that have been instituted in various European states. It is also puzzling to not recognize the growth of nationalist rhetoric in all the states of the expanded European Union. The anti-immigrant sentiment that is so widespread in every state in Europe is one way that national identities are being maintained within the context of a broader European identity.

Consequently, the EU and its rhetoric do not mark the end of the moment of nationalism on either the European or the world stage but rather the intersection of national, regional and global forces. The world continues to be divided up into nation-states, although ones of very unequal power and degrees of autonomy.

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\(^{76}\) Öyzürex, Esra, (2005), The politics of cultural unification, secularism, and the place of Islam in the new Europe, by the American Ethnologist, Vol. 32, No., 4, p 509-512
For example, what is happening at the level of localities, nation-states and Europe as a whole cannot be separated from the global economy and its political fault lines. To talk about Europe and Islamophobia without talking about more global forces is to miss the triangulation and contention of USA and European interests over sources of oil in the Middle East, Africa and central Asia. Recently discussions of globalization have revived and updated scholars’ understanding of imperialism.

### Islamophobia as a new variant of historical anti-Islam theme driven by different forces such as religion/s, nationalism, national security, and a racialized discourse about culture and a central part of instituted anti-terrorist laws.

#### 3.3.3 The question of Palestine

Initially, this author draws on Matti’s Bunzl two views in terms of the “alarmist” and the “deniers,” that will be explored a bit later, arguing that anti-Semitic forms have different functions nowadays. In the past, it was associated with the right wing attacking the Jews so as to purify the nation of alien elements. More recently, young Muslims who assault Jews do not aspire to that goal but rather as a political expression against events occurring in the Middle East. However, the author interplays the meanings of the two terms; the “alarmist” and the “deniers” differently as related to Islamophobia along the current political discourses.

According to the author, the deniers of Islamophobia are those who downplay the manifestation of Islamophobia. For example, Cesarani presents data from Allen and Nielsen’s summary report on Islamophobia in the EU after September 11th, 2001 that seems to support the idea that there is hardly any Islamophobia in the European Union. The impression that Cesarani is underestimating the importance of Islamophobia is also strengthened when he continues by presenting data illustrating that anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish crimes have increased between 2000 and 2006. It is unfortunate that he has paid so little attention to contemporary literature on Islamophobia and reported incidents that can be linked to anti-Islam in Europe.77

As for the alarmist, the author draws on Paul A. Silverstein’s elaboration on the two terms in his commentary on Matti Bunzl. He argues that the alarmists have a tendency to stress that there should be an incompatibility between Islam and Europe and that the growing number of Muslim cultural backgrounds will foster an Islamization of Europe. Further, any attempt to

77 Cesarani, David, (2009), ibid.
make Muslims and Jews equal partners in the societies of Europe, for example by the establishment of Muslim umbrella organization that can function as interlocutors with European states, is wrong and should be ended as long as Muslims are unwilling to accept the state of Israel. Interestingly, the issue of the acceptance of Muslims in Europe being conditioned on their acceptance of the state of Israel is far more complicated.

However, denying anti-Semitism will somehow, as elaborated by Silverstein, dilute a narrative of Jewish persecution that in certain versions justified the creation of the state of Israel and its continued existence. This way, the alarmist of anti-Semitism seem to be alarmed that an increased attention to European Muslim (alarming Islamophobia) or further attention to the discrimination of the (Palestinians) will break the Jewish monopoly on victimization, and hence threaten the recognized need for a Jewish state. In other words, they have a political interest on insisting on the ongoing threat of anti-Semitism in Europe, particularly by Muslims and in linking Muslim anti-Semitism in Europe and the Middle East to the Palestinian struggle. This argument is also supported by Klug (2003). However, this linking between anti-Semitic and Islamophobia according to John Bunzl is also dangerous. He argues that:

“Branding hostilities emanating from Middle East automatically or intentionally as Anti-Semitic is dangerous because doing so would banalize and trivialize genuine Anti-Semitism. It would, I suggest, also constitute a misjudgment of hostility by Muslims. Anti-Semitic prejudice and bigotry of the Christian-European variant is not driving the big majority of Muslims and not even the few perpetrators of violence. The hostility toward Jews is rather a regrettable by-product of more recent events in the Middle East and the world over. A more detailed analysis would yield more specific results according to country, origins of immigrants, social status, area if residence, etc. To blame Non-Europeans of Anti-Semitism might also conform to mechanisms of projection and/or externalization”.

This way, anti-Semitism of the Christian-European variant does not drive Muslims behavior in Europe. Rather, it is the events in the Middle East and the suffering of Palestinians under the occupation of a self-defined Jewish state of Israel that instigates behaviors against Jews in Europe. Consequently, according to the author’s reading, a critical position of the state of Israel and its policies against the Palestinians amount to anti-Semitism by Muslims and

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78 Göran, Larsson, (2009), ibid
Palestinians. Moreover, anti-Semitism in Europe is reduced to acts carried only by Muslims in Europe (Middle Eastern migrants of Muslim background in particular) while non-Muslim Europeans are portrayed to be no longer anti-Semitic. Extending the logic of this argument further, the new anti-Semite is not only a Muslim living in Europe - but also the anti-Semitic Muslims living in countries such as Iran and Palestine.

In summary, whereas the deniers and the alarmists are different groups, neglecting one of the groups does not contribute to uncover, explain and understand the phenomenon of Islamophobia. Therefore, the author attempts to identify both alarmist and deniers as related to Islamophobia along three categories in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>The alarmist</th>
<th>The deniers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>who alarm (stress more) the manifestation of Islamophobia</td>
<td>who deny (stress less) the manifestations of Islamophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>who stress less on anti-Semitism made by Muslims and (Palestinians)</td>
<td>who stress more on anti-Semitism made by Muslims and (Palestinians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>who stress more on the (Palestinian-Muslim) struggle</td>
<td>who stress less on the (Palestinian-Muslim) struggle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The author takes on the above three categories in identifying the alarmist and deniers of Islamophobia in connection with the definition of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia outlined by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention as follows:

The fear of, hostility or hate against Islam and Muslim population [Judaism or Jewish populations], which activates an anti-Islamic [anti-Jewish] reaction against Islam [Judaism], Muslim [Jewish] property, its institutions or an individual or persons that are perceived as Muslims [Jewish] or as a Muslim [Jews] representative.

As for the first category, it involves the classic definition of Islamophobia [anti-Semitism] alarmists and deniers.

However, John Bunzl brings attention to the Merriam-Webster International Dictionary

81 Göran, Larsson, (2009), ibid. Also see Klingspore and Molarin (2009:50-51) and the English summary of Bra report no 2009:10 can be retrieved from http://www.bra.se/extra/faq/?module_instance=2&action=question_show&id=521&category_id=9
(2004) redefining the term “new anti-Semitism” in the following manner:

1. Hostility towards Jews as a religious or racial minority group, often accompanied by social, political or economic discrimination.
2. Opposition to Zionism
3. Sympathy with opponents of Israel.

Bunzl argues in his article “Perception and interest in the Israel/ Palestine Conflict”\textsuperscript{82} that the extended definition of anti-Semitism as outlined above in the points (B) and (C) was promoted by the Israeli establishment, official Jewish communities and American Jewish organizations! At times, the latter might have been additionally motivated after Sep. 11\textsuperscript{th} by a desire to present Israel and the Jews as victims of “international Islamic terrorism”. Another element is Israel’s need to delegitimize critique, opposition or resistance that is older than the conflict over Palestine itself. Arab objection to the Zionist colonization of Palestine was “explained” for internal and external consumption not as a rational and predictable behavior but, as Bunzl argues, in the following manner as:

“Groundless hatred deriving from culture, religion and – Anti-Semitism”

Israeli leaders including Ben-Gurion tried to transfer the European articulation of anti-Semitism to the Middle East. Even today we often hear that Israeli settlers or soldiers are not attacked because:

“They represent an occupation regime but simply because they are Jews”

A similar mechanism is used to attempt to delegitimize accusations in Europe against Israeli state policies. In a vicious circle then the diagnosis of a “New Anti-Semitism” is used to prove the justice of the Zionist cause:

“Jews should leave Europe for a “safe haven” in Israel/Palestine”

In contradiction, any meaningful definition of anti-Semitism follows number (A), i.e. hostility towards Jews “because” they are Jews irrespective of what they do or think leads to a conclusion that (B) and (C) could only be constructed as anti-Semitic if and when they are directed against Israel. To that point, Israel defines itself as State of the Jewish people officially. This is also because of the ascribed and stereotyped “Jewish” characteristics of this

state. So, according to Bunzl, it is not true that only anti-Semites associate Jews with Israel.\textsuperscript{83}

Further, Bowen argues that a debate is going on for example, in France about whether any anti-Zionist position inevitably contains elements of anti-Semitism to the extent that the issue is no longer Israel’s right to exist but the right to criticize Israel.\textsuperscript{84}

As for the second category of Islamophobia, it is related to the perpetrator of anti-Semitism. Muslims and Palestinians are of concern in this case. However, this category serves to explain the extended definition of anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, it can be implied the other way around in relating the perpetrators of Islamophobia to the Jews in Europe and in Israel. Literature can indicate this tendency in both ways.\textsuperscript{85} In other words, there is Islamophobic actions carried out by some Jews in Europe and in Israel as well as an anti-Semitic actions made by some Muslims in Europe and in Palestine. This, however, leads to exclude the European type of non-Jewish Islamophobia and non-Muslim anti-Semitism.

As for the third category of Islamophobia, it is a pressing necessity for Israel not only to justify its existence by placing a greater emphasis on anti-Semitism made by Muslims in Europe but also by reducing or even denying the Palestinian struggle. Again, it can be implied the other way around by stressing more on the Israeli struggle.

\textbf{3.3.3.1 The Influential factors in the EU policy}

The author argues that an incomplete analysis of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in Europe plays a role in determining the extent to which the EU policy is pro-Israel or pro-Palestine. For example, a higher manifestation of anti-Semitism in Europe might determine a pro-Israel EU position. In the other direction, it is questionable whether a higher manifestation of Islamophobia in Europe might determine a pro-Palestine EU position or not.

However, a new variant of anti-Semitism extends the classical definition of anti-Semitism and implies further two more definitions, namely, opposition to Zionism and sympathy with opponents of Israel. The extended definitions of anti-Semitism, however, have no parallel definitions for Islamophobia.

\textsuperscript{83} Bunzl, John, (2005), ibid., p8-14
\textsuperscript{84} Bowen, John, (2005), commentary on Bunzl, Washington University in St. Louis, American Ethnologist, 32, No. 4, p 524-525
Taking this on, the author suggests a line of analysis related to the EU foreign policy towards Israel-Palestine with two ends, one is pro-Palestine and the other is pro-Israel in the following manner.

### EU Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro-Israel</th>
<th>Pro Palestine</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a higher manifestation of anti-Semitism</td>
<td>a higher manifestation of Islamophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stressing more on anti-Semitism made by Muslims in Europe and in Palestine</td>
<td>stressing more on Islamophobia made by Jews in Europe and in Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stressing more on the Jewish struggle</td>
<td>stressing more on Palestinian struggle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In determining the extent of which the EU is willing and in fact pro-Israel or pro-Palestine, it is important to explore the contextual factors influencing the EU foreign policy towards Palestine.

#### 3.3.3.1.1 Psychology

Fear and prejudice of the other (Muslim) in Europe is fueled by conspiracy theories. Some parties in Europe are proposing the theory that Muslims are striving for world domination or Europe Islamization. Fear and prejudice as mentioned earlier involve condescension towards Islam, colonialism and post war hatreds and ordinary racism (black Africans have harder time sometimes than northern Africans do for example, regardless of their religious affiliation).

Psychology factor in Europe is also a crucial factor in the Israel-Palestine conflict. To a certain extent, it determines whether the EU is pro-Israel or pro-Palestine for the relationship evolves from European feelings of guilt towards the Jews because of European Christian anti-Semitism that culminated in the Holocaust. Further, a psychoanalytic concept of projection “attribution of one’s own attitudes, feelings, or memories to others” plays a role in projecting old hatred and anti-Semites in Europe on Arabs-Palestinians and Muslims. It is disturbing though to describe it new-anti-Semitism in an attempt to deny old traditional hostility by projecting it on non-Europeans, currently, Hamas.

In another direction, there is the feeling of sympathy in Europe with the occupied Palestinians. This can be viewed for example in the EU humanitarian assistance at largest to Palestine and European solidarity movements.

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3.3.3.1.2 Political discourses/efforts
Some scholars in the West have studied and depicted Islam, focusing on how the East/West dichotomy came to be an important way to divide the world. As well, power relations have influenced scholarly knowledge. As shown in Orientalism, many of today’s critical issues in respect to Islam and foreign policy are related to broader historical, political and intellectual contexts. More specifically, Said argues that Orientalism had been produced by certain power relation which western states exercised (or sought to exercise) over the (Orient). Furthermore, “no one writing, thinking or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitation on thought and action inspired by Orientalism.” Many Europeans did not need Samuel Huntington to feel as they do towards Muslims, and the whole complex of anti-Islamic sentiments is far older in history.

However, in a post-Cold War climate where the clash of civilization theory has been widely accepted and when the atrocity of Sep.11th and subsequent attacks in Europe have been attributed to Islam, a climate has been created where Muslims have been stigmatized collectively in and out of Europe. For example, Al-Qaida has erroneously come to serve as an explanatory matrix for all of the heterogeneous Islamic militant groups including Hamas.

3.3.3.1.3 Race and culture
Race, sometimes combined with culture, continues to play an important role within individual European states. The former is seen in the fear of demographic decline of the white European. The latter, according to Abduljalil, is seen in the fear of Islamizing Europe – if not by the old fear of Muslim force, then by the present fear of Muslim immigration irrespective to the wide range of racial and cultural backgrounds of Muslims. In other words, this campaign against Islam is constructed on the basis of racialized concepts of culturally homogenous nations- whose common culture is singled by the physical appearance even though it is very difficult to distinguish between anti-Arab racism from the fear of Islam.

It is important to understand that concepts of racialized difference can persist and are sometimes reinvigorated. The concept of race is not only modern but also continues to remain deeply embedded within the concept of the Jewish people. A form of racialized thinking underlines European acceptance of the Zionist project in Israel in ways that pave the way for other processes of racialization.

88 Sajed, Abduljalil, (2005), ibid, p31-40
According to Bowen, today’s racial theories have for at least two reasons been disputed. First, Muslims in Europe do not belong to the same race. Often, they are accepted as long they stay in their so called Muslim countries. Second, distinguishing anti-race from fear of Islam is difficult. For example, French attitudes towards Muslims are not new; they are deeply rooted in Algerian colonization in 1830 onward and the Algerian war in 1954-62 and continuing violence in North Africa and elsewhere. However, it seems as if the cultural theories and explanations (i.e. it is in his/her culture/nature to behave and think in a certain way- it is because of he/she is a Muslim or a Kurd that behaves in a certain way) have grown more popular in recent years.

Nevertheless, Schiller further argues that racialized difference has become the bedrock of citizenship laws of the state of Israel and of European support of Israel. Through its right of return, the state of Israel legitimates the ideological links between biology and nation. Israel law defines national belonging by descent. It is a biologically based logic that allows a person newly arrived from Brooklyn, New York, to claim the West Bank as his home land and defend it with arms while denying the rights of Palestinians born there (including the right of defense). It is a racially-based logic that justifies the collective punishment of Palestinians by imprisoning them in massive, walled ghettos.

3.3.3.1.4 Religion

While the Palestinian people compromise Jews [Samaritans], Christians and mostly Muslims, Palestine is often perceived to be a place with a Muslim majority where recently, Hamas is an elected “terrorist” movement, and also in conflict with, according to Bunzl, a self declared Jewish state of Israel. This Western perception evokes deep emotion in Europe.

As an example given by Schiller, German youth have explained that the reason why there is much cancer in Germany is because by following Hitler and killing millions of Jews, their ancestors made a pact with the devil. The only way to get free of the curse that continues through generations is to apologize to the Jews, support the state of Israel and accept Jesus. A broader network of organizations and websites preach support for the war on Islamic terror. Islam is often portrayed as the enemy. Often, heard the Christian crusades against the Muslims that evokes as a model for today. Spiritual warfare, military warfare, the war on terror, anti-Muslim crusaders are all part of a global fundamentalist Christian campaign.

89 Bowen, John, (2005), ibid, p 524-525
90 Schiller, Nina Glick, (2005), ibid, p526- 532
92 Schiller, Nina Glick, (2005), ibid
3.3.3.1.5 Political efforts

Political efforts play into the hands of a xenophobic politics. Islamophobic incidents in Europe are present and also enforced by political efforts. Further, this perception is carried out along an apocalyptic political discourse when political leaders talk about the struggle against evil and speak in the name of God and try to impose their perception of the good.\(^93\)

Political effort in generalizing negative assumption ignores domestic circumstances. This is in the case of firstly, in the presentation of right-wing of Muslims by assuming that Muslim immigrants are capable of turning the Christian continent into a Muslim one whereby, the status of Christians linking it to the Jews will be subordinated. Secondly, by assuming Muslim immigrants are less capable of integrating into Europe due to their culture, religion and race. Thirdly, the left-wing variation of Islamophobia assumes that Islam is a monolithic religion that does not allow for room for others from within.\(^94\) It also ignores reasons and tensions, which for example can explain outbreaks of violence in occupied Palestine much better than just the adherence to a certain religion.

3.3.3.1.6 Realities

Much research demonstrates that Muslim residents have the lowest levels of income, the highest levels of unemployment, receive the fewest health services, do poorly in school system and have the worst living conditions. Despite the variety among Muslim populations and European policies towards them, these findings are more or less valid for many members of the EU.

Islamophobic incidents, including verbal and sometimes physical attacks against Muslims, are present throughout Europe; similar incidents such as these have also been carried out against Jews. This is not a new phenomenon. For some decades, these kinds of incidents have increased when there is high tension or violence in Israel-Palestine.\(^95\) A recent study shows that both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are on the rise in Europe.\(^96\) Besides, a new anti-Semitism variant is increasingly ascribed to the Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East, of particular, in Palestine.

However, John Bunzl argued that it is problematic to describe verbal and physical attacks

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\(^94\) Sajed, Abduljalal, (2005), ibid., p31-40

\(^95\) The Independent article, “Must Jews always See Themselves Victims?” By Antony Lerman, 7 March 2009

against Jews that have increased since 2000 in Europe as the new Anti-Semitism for two reasons: the suffix new implies the continuity and/or transformation of traditional hostility. In addition, this diagnosis ignores the objective situation of Jewish communities where the EU perceives itself after all as the antithesis to Nazism and the Holocaust. To that point, no state or relevant party has anti-Semitic platforms. Even right wing parties court Jewish candidates and see them as well as Israel as allies against Islamic threat. Moreover, Jews are seen as Europeans while Muslims are not manifested in memorials, museums and culture. Drawing on Bunzl own words, he says that Israel “is not in but from Europe”.

3.3.3.1.7 Media efforts

Ridiculing religion by the media in Europe appears to be even-handed, but since Muslims have less influence and less access to public platforms, attacks are far more undermining. In relation to Israel-Palestine, the mainstream media presents Israel as a modern state. This is often in contrast to states where the primary religious practice is Islam. Further, Jews are perceived as European, while Muslims (and Arabs) are perceived as the non-European, backward other.\textsuperscript{97}

Further, Israel’s self-defence against Palestinian “barbarism”, Arab aggression and Islamic terrorism, including Hamas, serves as powerful images of a non-civilised other that understands only brute force and repression.\textsuperscript{98}

3.3.3.1.8 Global events

In the aftermath of September 11\textsuperscript{th} and consequent attacks in Europe, a growing number of individuals of Muslim cultural background suffered from anti-Muslim tendencies and Islamophobia in both Europe and the USA even though they were not involved in the attacks. Despite that, many Muslims organizations condemned the violence against innocent peoples in the name of Islam, many Muslims experienced that they were held responsible, that they had to explain and take a strong stance against actions even though they had nothing to do with the attacks.\textsuperscript{99}

The following war on terrorism launched by the USA has also had a negative effect on many individuals of a Muslim cultural background in Europe. As a consequence, Muslims often

\textsuperscript{97} Massad, Josef, the Post Colonial Colony: time, space and bodies in Palestine/Israel in the persistence of the Palestinian Question, Routledge, NY, (2006), p13-40
\textsuperscript{98} Strindberg and Wärn, Realities of Resistance: Hizballah, the Palestinian Rejectionists, and al-Qa’ida Compared, Journal of Palestine studies, (Vol. XXXIV. no. 3, Spring, 2005)
Theories

suffer the negative stereotype of being constructed as so-called home-grown terrorists and the enemy from within.

In a similar way, Jews have been attacked in both North Africa and Europe after the second intifada that was initiated after Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, an area known to Muslims as al-Haram al Sharif, on September 28th, 2000. Afterward, the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip on 27th of December 2008, a growing number of Jews have felt and experienced increasing anti-Semitism in the West. Resembling what happened to many Muslims after September 11, Jews were attacked in Europe following the political development in the Middle East. More examples could easily be added to the list. It is clear that local ethnic, cultural and religious minorities are closely linked to global developments.100

As the debate continues over Islamophobia, the author meanwhile suggests four qualities of Islamophobia that can be helpful in understanding how EU foreign policy is shaped. Subsequently, from this point onwards, Islamophobia is examined in term of:

- “Patterns of prejudice based on socio-economic and educational grounds against Muslims”

- “Patterns of prejudice that rests on the notion of a dichotomy between the good West- and bad Islam, mainly on the basis of religion, culture and race constructed differences”

- “Patterns of prejudice fuelled by September 11th as a part of a Judeo-Christian campaign against Islamic terrorism”

- “Patterns of prejudice rest on the notion of superiority of a European Jew to an Arab-Muslim Palestinian”

Reflections

- Disregarding any global dimensions in the analysis of Islamophobia is misleading. Could anyone denounce Islamophobia without raising broader questions about imperialism, capitalism and its embodied structures of power? These questions have a contemporary relevance; the dismissal of efforts to link Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, racism, fundamentalist Christianity, and critiques of capitalism deserves further refinement.

100 Göran, Larsson, (2009), ibid.
Developments in Europe that have global resonances should be studied more carefully before passing a judgment on its significance and character. Equally important is to ask the question: who is saying what, when and why? In other words: an examination of the speaker’s motivation is crucial.

The European feeling of guilt due to the “awareness of European Christian anti-Semitism culminating in the Holocaust” is a key factor affecting the European emotions towards Israel-Palestine. Also, it is a crucial factor in determining the EU policy towards a space and people that evokes emotions because of concepts such as Holy Land, Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Furthermore, it is a necessity not only to establish a common definition of Islamophobia that is accepted by academics but also, to establish a legitimate discourse that reflects realities in Israel-Palestine that is guided by a perspective of justice and takes historical responsibilities and power relations seriously into account. Such a discourse has to be distinguished from mechanisms of projection that use the drama in occupied Palestine in order to feed old hatreds or serve new identity constructions.

It is absurd to assume that either anti-Semitism or Islamophobia constitute a reason or even a justification because genuine anti-Semite or Islamophobe will use any pretext to demonstrate passion. Denial is also not the answer. Despite that one might fall into the logic of a highly emotive and dichotomized debate between the alarmist and the deniers, it is useful to see the two polarities while still recognizing the many others who lie in-between, such as those who see both anti-Semitism and anti-Islamic attacks as a forms of xenophobia.

The promoters of the new anti-Semitism differentiate it from earlier anti-Semitism often by (1) relating it to Muslims which in turn linked to Europe’s continuing efforts to colonize the Muslim world (or occupation of Palestine). This scenario produces at least three problems; firstly, it fails to distinguish between the attacks against Jews because they are Jews according to European classic anti-Semitism and the attacks against Jews as supporting and allied with the state of Israel (or Israelis). Secondly, it fails to distinguish how and to what extent today non-Muslim Europeans are perpetrators of anti-Semitic acts and on what bases. Thirdly, it fails to differentiate anti-Semitism in a more personal form than the institutionalized form. Is it a church/mosque or state supported anti-Semitism or manifested in hate crimes in which individuals or small groups attack individual Jews or visibly Jewish symbols?

On the other way around, relating Islamophobia to Jews (Israelis) which in turn is linked to the Israeli conflict with the Muslim world and ongoing occupation of Palestine. In a similar way, this scenario is problematic. Firstly, it fails to distinguish between the attacks
against Muslims because they are Muslims and the attacks against Muslims as supporting stateless Palestine (or Palestinians). Secondly, it fails to distinguish how and to what extent today non-Jewish Europeans are perpetrators of Islamophobic acts and on what bases. Thirdly, it fails to differentiate Islamophobia as a more personal one from institutionalized one. Is it a church/ Synagogues or state supported Islamophobia or that manifested in hate crimes in which individuals or small groups attack individual Muslims (Palestinians) or visibly Islamic symbols?

To reach a common understanding of a social phenomenon is very complex. For example, Muslims can easily understand an expression addressing Muslims as a blunt form of Islamophobia, while the critic can hold that his or her view or analysis of Islam is a correct and objective description of the real situation that reveals the true nature of Islam. Similarly, Jews can experience Muslims’ criticizing the state of Israel as being anti-Semitic while Muslims can argue that they are describing the true nature of the state of Israel. To diminish this problem, it is necessary to study the sayings (i.e. the statement, the text) in its historical and philosophical context and to analyze the EU contextual and power relations and to track down the intention (if possible) that motivates the expression made by the EU. How to describe social phenomena and come to a common understanding is generally a very difficult task, but the problem should however not be used as an excuse for avoiding precise definitions, on the contrary.

With this critic in mind, it is also important to underline that political discourse has changed dramatically over the last decades in regard to Islam and immigration in particular. While no established political parties in Europe supports or articulates anti-Semitic opinions, it is evident that a growing number of right-wing parties are articulating stronger and stronger anti-foreign and anti-Muslim attitudes.\textsuperscript{101} The lesson to be learnt from the heated debates is that it is necessary to defend the European constitution and its defense of human rights, freedom of religion and equality regardless of ethnic, cultural, political, sexual or religious affiliation. Instead of debating who is to blame or who is suffering the most, it is important to work out a definition that could be used for fighting all forms of discrimination in Europe and in the EU foreign policy no matter if it is related to Jews or Muslims.

\textsuperscript{101} Betz and Meret (2009), ibid.
3 The Deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian

This chapter analyzes the manner in which the EU deployed its foreign policy around the 2006 Palestinian elections with the question “how did the EU boycott of the elected Hamas representatives occur?” at its core.

When answering this, one is tempted to echo the man in the Irish joke, when a visitor looking for Dublin asks him for directions, and he responds, “Well, I wouldn’t have started from here.” Nevertheless, one had to start from here.

4.1 Setting the Context

The focus of this section is placed on the socio-economic political background of the EU boycott of the elected Hamas representatives in 2006, particularly in the second Intifada which led to a sweeping victory of Hamas. Emphasis is placed on the second Intifada, because of the EU’s relations with only one actor in the conflict– Israel – and its lack of contact with the other – Hamas.

It is worth stressing here, that the point of this section is to reveal the socio-economic and political background leading to the victory of Hamas in the election

It is almost impossible to contextualize Palestinian socio-economic and political development, especially the boycott of the Hamas-elected government, without touching on the Israel-Palestine conflict, especially because Hamas has taken an increasingly active role in it. This will allow for an informed discussion of the development on the ground in Palestine that led to Hamas’s sweeping victory in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election. This socio-economic and political development is linked to (1) The failure to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian lands and people (2) the failure of the Oslo peace process and (3) the second Intifada and finally an (4) Introduction to Hamas.

4.1.1 The failure to end the occupation

Palestinian loss and frustration has never ended since the creation of Israel in 1948 against the will of the native populations. In creating Israel, the Palestinians lost around 78% of the territory of historic Palestine including the western part of Jerusalem. What remained were two separate pieces of land known as the West Bank (of the Jordan River) and the Gaza Strip along the Mediterranean Sea and bordering Egypt. Over 700,000 Palestinians were driven away from their land to neighboring countries and became refugees. The problem of refugees became a major problem in the Israel-Palestine conflict because of the growing numbers of
refugees over the generations, with the descendents totaling more than 6 million by the year 2006. In 1967, Israel won another war and occupied the West Bank and the eastern part of Jerusalem that had been under Jordanian rule and the Gaza Strip which had been administrated by Egypt. In addition, Israel occupied the Syrian Golan heights in the north and the Egyptian Sinai in the south. For Palestinians, the losses were multiple. Israel forced another major transfer of Palestinian refugees, some of whom had been uprooted to the West Bank in the 1948 war were once again uprooted and became new refugees again due to this 1967 war.¹⁰²

Two years prior to the 1967 war, Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian activists in the West Bank, in the Gaza Strip and in neighboring countries established Fateh- the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. Fateh did not declare an ideological affiliation and had a secular outlook. Around the same time and together with other leftists’ factions, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established as a national umbrella for the Palestinian national struggle. From the mid 1960s- 1980s the PLO led the Palestinian national movement and embraced armed struggle. However, weakened Arab countries together with the newly established PLO failed in their military efforts to liberate Palestine. The position of the PLO was further weakened in the aftermath of the Gulf War, when the PLO sided politically with Iraq against the US- led coalition. After months of secret talks, in 1993, an initial agreement was reached between the PLO and Israel, namely, the Oslo agreement/s, eventually, the PLO made two historic concessions, in the following consequences:¹⁰³

1. It gave away its long term goal- the liberation of Palestine by recognizing Israel and its right to exist.
2. It dropped the armed struggle for the sake of negotiations for an agreement that hoped to regain the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem and establish a Palestinian state by the 1967 borders.

4.1.2 The failure of the Oslo agreements
The opinion of the Palestinians differed widely in response to the Oslo agreements. Those who supported Oslo argued that it was the best deal the Palestinians could hope to achieve given the unfavorable conditions they faced and the imbalance in power relations propitious to Israel. Those who opposed Oslo argued that it constituted surrender to Israel by officially recognizing the Israeli state and dropping the armed struggle without concrete gains. In the

¹⁰³ Hroub, Khaled, (2006), p xii-xiii
historical context of Israel receiving unreserved support from the international community, most particularly, the US, these same people also thought that Oslo was designed to prioritize Israeli demands over Palestinian demands during peace negotiations.

Unlike the PLO, Hamas rejected negotiations with Israel. The PLO and other neighboring countries took up negotiations because they were mainly based on the condition that the right of Israel to exist be recognized. Hamas also readopted the old call for liberation of Palestine, as was the case with the PLO in the mid 1960s. The reasons for Hamas's opposition did not change during the eight years of the Oslo peace process. Hamas was not ready to recognize Israel while not gaining anything tangible in return, which would eventually lead to a viable Palestinian state. According to some pragmatic Hamas leaders, the recognition of Israel should serve the Palestinians during the negotiation process and could be spelled out at the end of the negotiation process but should not be a precondition to start the negotiations. Later on, the reality strengthened the opponents of the Oslo agreements. Thirteen years later, a viable Palestinian state seemed to be less realistic than at any time before.104

In the process, and due to the vague decision-making structure of the Oslo agreements, the Palestinians were completely dependent upon the good will of the more powerful state of Israel.

- Control over vital resources such as land and water in the OPT are either left to the Israeli side or referred to joint committees. The joint committees required consensus which effectively provided Israel with a veto power at a time when it was the Palestinians who needed to make changes and build up their state.

- There was an absent outsider, preferably, a neutral and independent, arbitrator who could have ironed out some of the deficits of the Oslo agreements. For Palestinians and others who supported the Palestinians, it was also doubtful whether the US administration could be an honest broker. This is not only because it views Israel as a strategic partner and negotiates mainly on the basis of Israel’s security but also because it supplies Israel with military aid that is used against the Palestinians.105

In theory: the Oslo agreements were divided into two phases:

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1. A five- year interim phase meant to explore and test the competence of Palestinian self-rule and its ability to control “illegal” armed resistance, while at the same time not addressing any of the major Palestinian issues. This, if proved successful was to be followed by

2. A second phase negotiation on a “final settlement” for major issues such as refugees, Jerusalem, borders and Israeli settlements.

On November 8th, 1999, the Oslo final status negotiations began to deal with the five “red lines” set out by Barak: no return to the 1967 borders, a united Jerusalem as Israel's capital, no foreign army west of the Jordan valley, no return of Palestinian refugees to Israeli territories and most settlements to be absorbed by Israel. Thus, the peace process quickly became deadlocked.

In principle: the Oslo agreements were based on the following three main principles:

- The first is the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO bringing the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) into being. This constituted a step that was for a long time considered to be a taboo by Israelis. On the Palestinian side, in 1974 the PLO implicitly recognized Israel by abandoning its demand for a Palestinian state in a unified Palestine and instead calling for a national authority on any territory liberated from Israeli occupation. This was also spelled out in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence on November 15th, 1988 in reference to the UN General Assembly partition resolution 181, and finally in the PLO Chairman Arafat’s speech in December, 1988 referring to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 aiming to reach a comprehensive settlement among the parties concerned, including Israel. 106

- The second principle was marked not only by the limited territorial and administrative autonomy of the Palestinians but also the PNA was supposedly to take full responsibility for education, health and social services for all Palestinians in areas A, B, and C. As a result, while the West Bank and Gaza were to be viewed as one territorial unit and Palestinian police were supposedly to be deployed in area B, Israel freed itself from the cost of public services while retaining total territorial control over East Jerusalem and partial control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 107 So handing over the administrative autonomy and financial

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responsibility to the PNA appeared to be an Israeli goal in itself. The provision of security to
Israel by a Palestinian police force added to the benefit Israel gained from the redeployment/
autonomy arrangement rather than a withdrawal/autonomy that is often directed in a selective
Israeli manner.

- The third major principle of Oslo was the deferral of all critical issues to a final status
negotiation. Those issues included the Palestinian water resources, the demarcation of
borders, and most importantly the future of settlements in the OPT and annexed East
Jerusalem and most controversially, the refugees’ right of return. Contrary to Olso, permanent
status, “will commence as soon as possible but not later than the beginning of the third year of
the interim period”\textsuperscript{108} turned out not to take place anyway. Up to that point, one can argue
whether the rational per se was flawed or the flawed implementation of the Oslo agreements
was the reason for its failure.

From the Palestinian perspective, this postponing of major issues has been made deliberately
by Israel so that the resulting confrontational disorder will fail to meet minimal requirements
for the restitution of Palestinian rights. This argument can be further explored in a given
example such as the settlements. The expansion of settlements and the continued development
of an elaborate Israeli-only bypass road system throughout the West Bank and inside and
around Jerusalem continued. From 1992-1996, under the same Rabin and Peres Labor
government that initiated and signed the Oslo agreements, the number of settlers in the West
Bank grew by 49\%. When the second intifada broke out in 2000, the number of settlers in the
West Bank and Gaza reached 198,300 while in 2005, the number of settlers reached
247,000.\textsuperscript{109} At the same time, the continued buildup of settlements and the expansion of the
encroaching bypass roads created a situation where Palestinian lands were divided and cut up.
This policy directly contradicted the spirit of the Oslo agreements’ suggestion- and only
served to undermine any trust-building between Palestine and Israel.

From the Israeli perspective, the Palestinians clearly failed to prove that they were fit to be
peace partners. Thus, advancement could be jointly undertaken to solve the conflict, given
that the Israelis were confronted by suicide attacks by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and individual
cells that the PNA could not prevent, just as IDF was not able to prevent them. Despite

\textsuperscript{108} Declaration of principles on interim Self-Government Authority, Washington, 13 September (1993), Article
V.2
\textsuperscript{109} Israeli Central Bureau of statistics, (2006), “Statistical Abstract of Israel 2006”. See also, Pulfer, Gerhard,
(2008), on donor engagement in fragile states and situations with Palestine as a case study- draft paper
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extremely limited control over Palestinian land and security, the full blame was placed on the PNA for the failure to stop attacks on Israel.\textsuperscript{110}

In consequence: the implementation of the Oslo agreements went hand in hand with strangling the Palestinian economy and the unprecedented rise in unemployment and poverty. A policy of closure was carried out by Israel in 1993 marking the beginning of a lasting policy that ultimately resulted in the building of the separation wall. For Israel, the wall prevents infiltration of Palestinian “terrorists” and stops suicide bombings in Israel. For Palestinians, the “Apartheid” wall is designed to de-facto annex more land of the OPT to Israel. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled its illegality.\textsuperscript{111} However, the policy of closure and separation along Israeli defined lines has continued to have far reaching consequences up until today. The impact of such policy on the following Israeli measures created further Palestinian economic dependency on Israel as follows:

- The Palestinian labor market. The number of legally employed Palestinian workers in Israel decreased in the first years of Oslo from 116,000 in 1992 to 51,000 in July 1997. Needless to say the number of illegal workers amounted to 1/3 of those workers who made the difficult choice on a daily basis whether to cross the checkpoints illegally or stay at home with no source of income.

- Exports and imports. Almost 90% of Palestinian imports in 1986 came either from or via Israel. As for exports, 65% of exports from the West Bank and 85% from Gaza strip were exported to Israel.

- The restriction of movement, the separation not only cut off the West Bank from Gaza Strip and created de facto a split of the two territorial entities. This is in contrary to the Oslo agreement but also the wall separated the annexed East Jerusalem and thus served to separate even more Palestinian land and people from each other.

The international donor community pledged $2.4 billion in support of the Oslo agreements in a conference in Washington in October in 1993.\textsuperscript{112} As a result of the closure policy, these and other donor funds had, in spite of their large volume, to be reprogrammed to short term emergency measures that could not alleviate the negative impact of the closure policy.

\textsuperscript{110} Palestinian- Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip[Oslo II], Washington 28, September, (1995), Article XIII, 2a
\textsuperscript{111} Vermonters for a just peace in Palestine/Israel,2004, (http://www.vtjp.org/background/wallreport9.htm )
\textsuperscript{112} Secretariat of the Local Aid Coordination Committee for Development Assistance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, (1996), partners in peace, July1996, p5
As a result, the Oslo period was characterized by growing poverty, unemployment and frustration that manifested itself in violence. The mutual trust between Israelis and Palestinians that was supposed to be building up from the Oslo peace process never occurred. Finally, the failure of Oslo served to corroborate Hamas’s position from the beginning that peace negotiations with Israel were useless and this ultimately proved to be an impetus for the rise of Hamas as a political power in the OPT. This is largely synonymous with the ascent of Hamas during the second Intifada to political power—a process that also culminated in the 2006 election.

4.1.3 The Second Intifada

With Ariel Sharon’s visit to the al Aqsa mosque on September 28th, 2000, the fate of the Oslo peace process was sealed. Large demonstrations erupted the following day after Friday prayers. The response of the Israeli forces can be characterized as disproportionate, as stone throwing crowds met with snipers and rubber coated steel bullets. On September 29th, 2000, 4 Palestinians were killed and more than 200 wounded. In contrast, 14 Israeli police officers were wounded by stone throwing. This singular event developed into a second Intifada with far more devastating consequences than the first one. In the following two days, another 15 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank, among them 4 children.113 In Gaza, unarmed protesters were killed and injured every day. During the first three months of the second Intifada, 237 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli forces, among them 83 children. At the same time, Israeli settlers killed 6 Palestinian civilians, among them a 2-month-old baby. Moreover, 35 Palestinian policemen were killed. Inside Israel, 12 Israeli Arabs were killed during demonstrations in October 2000.114

A few days later, it was the Palestinian mainly Fateh-affiliated groups that took the lead in exchanges of fire and shooting on the Israeli army and the settlers. Thus 18 Israeli settlers and 19 soldiers were killed in the OPT during the three months.115 As a result of the high death toll, the character of the intifada changed from a popular Intifada to an armed struggle.

Interestingly, Hamas abstained from becoming involved in the intifada in the beginning. Fateh was about to regain its image of being a resistance movement and increasing its popularity amongst Palestinians by confronting the Israeli occupation forces as Hamas had positioned itself during the whole Oslo agreements period. Over time, “gains” were being calculated by

113 Baumgarten, Helga, (2006), ibid, p141
114 Pulfer, Gerhard, (2008), on donor engagement in fragile states and situations with Palestine as a case study-draft paper
115 Baumgarten, Helga, (2006), ibid, p141-142
assessing the losses inflicted on the enemy. After over two years of intifada, the death toll stands at approximately 600 Israelis and 2,000 Palestinians. The objectively higher number of Palestinian deaths led some Israelis to believe that they are “winning” the struggle. The relative “gains” made by Palestinians in terms of Israeli casualties mean to some Palestinians that the intifada is paying off. In the first intifada the ratio of casualties was approximately 10:1, whereas in the second intifada, as a result of the suicide bombing, this ratio was lowered to 3:1. In many ways, then, body counts became the definition of success.\textsuperscript{116}

On March 28\textsuperscript{th}, a suicide bomber blew himself up at a gas station close to Qalqilya killing himself and two Israelis. This was the first suicide attack for which Hamas claimed responsibility since the outbreak of the second Intifada. More attacks followed in June, August, and December 2001. In the following year, the suicide bombings reached their peak with 220 Israelis killed in such attacks- 80 of them during Hamas suicide bombings.\textsuperscript{117} Hamas became well known for its suicide bombings and also for mortar attacks mainly on settlements inside Gaza Strip and later on for its trademark homemade Qassam rockets.

Before his assassination in August 2003, a Hamas leader, namely, Ismail abu Shanab said: “I want to affirm that at the beginning of the Intifada, we in Hamas did not commit any acts of violence. Nothing. Israel, however, killed scores of Palestinian civilians” and “The Palestinians turned from a cat into a tiger, because they put us in a cage with no chance to move”.\textsuperscript{118}

At the same time, Barak applied repressive measures including bombing Palestinian police stations, re-invading Palestinian towns, villages and refugee camps and putting some under siege, destroying infrastructure and agricultural lands. After taking over office Sharon only intensified those measures and squeezed the Palestinians tighter. In the end, 2002 was marked as the deadliest year for Palestinians as 989 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces in the OPT.\textsuperscript{119} Sharon’s political perspective was a long-term interim solution making a conscious decision not to negotiate with the Palestinian counterpart unless there was a complete end to violence, at time when ending violence based on political settlement should have been regarded as the aim of negotiations. He also took the opportunity to isolate the PNA Chairman

\textsuperscript{116} Emerson, Michael and Tocci, Nathalie, (2003), The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East, Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, p25. Also, Pulfer, Gerhard, (2008), on donor engagement in fragile states and situations with Palestine as a case study- draft paper
\textsuperscript{117} Information provided by the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs: www.mfa.gov.il
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Arafat both politically and physically and in April 2002, the Israeli army re-invaded most of the West Bank and leveled the Jenin refugee camp during “Operation Defense Shield” arresting 7,000 Palestinians, and killing 497 Palestinians between March 1st and May 7th, 2002, destroying 11 schools and vandalizing 9 others. Consequently, the second Intifada has far reaching negative impacts leading eventually to an in-viable Palestinian state based on the following factors:

- Separation wall: It aimed at preventing any infiltration into Israel from beyond the “Green Line”. This wall is not built on Israel’s border and thereby de facto annexes more Palestinian land (7% of the West Bank) and cages in 290,000 Palestinians (including East Jerusalemites) finding themselves living between the wall and the ‘Green Line’ (see Map 4 in Annex A). Israel also isolated Palestinian population centers from one another by building electric fences around Areas A, restricting freedom of movement of individuals and goods and services. In this way, the Palestinian population of the West Bank is divided into 54 enclaves separated by walls and checkpoints

- Settlements: Israel has continued to expand settlements. Thus, there exists an internal form of separation in addition to the external one. There is the expanding network of settlements and highways connecting them, which are being built at an alarming pace. This is leading to the envelopment of East Jerusalem and its isolation from the rest of the West Bank as well as the separation of the northern parts from the southern parts of the West Bank. The present plans do not include withdrawal from the settlements.

- Destruction of the PNA infrastructure. The infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority (PNA) has been progressively destroyed, marking a clear reversal along the path towards Palestinian statehood. A further exacerbation to the ability of the PNA to govern effectively is the withholding of Palestinian tax revenues collected by Israel.

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121 Separation wall: A new reality is the construction of a physical barrier that has assumed different forms in different locations (walls, electric fences, physical obstacles, monitoring systems and military and police forces kept on high alert) to separate Israelis and Palestinians. See also, Working Paper: Baskin, Gershon, (2003), The New Walls and Fences- Consequences for Israel and Palestine, working paper no.9 in the CEPS Middle East and Euro- Med Project, forthcoming
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- Reoccupation: Israel has also reoccupied the West Bank by military force.\textsuperscript{123} The reoccupation, devastating use of force, curfews, closures, checkpoint and human rights and humanitarian law violations, resulted not only in a rapidly rising number of civilian Palestinian casualties but also by mid 2002, the humanitarian situation according to UNSCO was as follows:\textsuperscript{124}

- A rise in the rate of unemployment to above 50\% (370,000 workers) compared to 11\% (71,000 workers) during the nine months of 2000.
- A rise in the poverty rate defined as consumption of less than $2.10 per day/ per person by almost 300\%. The poverty rate in Gaza Strip in particular is above 70\%.
- Approximately 42\% of Gazans are entirely dependant on food aid and 70\% have reduced the quality of the food they consume.
- An average closure day is estimated to cost the local economy about $7 million.
- Near bankruptcy of the Palestinian authority, and the possible collapse of municipal services.

Nevertheless, Al Haq reports, that the Israeli occupying forces continue to subject the Palestinian civilian population to numerous measures that violate their fundamental human rights. For example, “extrajudicial killings and targeted assassinations, property destruction, movement restrictions, mass arrests and arbitrary detentions, torture and ill-treatment, forced transfer and deportation”, Al- Haq adds that those violations are perpetrated by the security forces with complete impunity and have led to “the emergence of a humanitarian crisis of rising proportions, including malnutrition and poverty”.\textsuperscript{125}

In this context, the Palestinians found themselves politically isolated and economically deprived. Consequently, Palestinians increased their support for Hamas. More Palestinians grew frustrated by the Israeli occupation. Furthermore, while Sharon was hailed as “a man of peace” by US- President Bush particularly in the aftermath of Operation Defense Shield, the Palestinians realized increasingly that they could not rely on international support. The feeling

\textsuperscript{123} A and B areas refer according to the Oslo agreements to the following: In areas A, the PA was in control of civilian and security affairs, while in areas B Israel retained control of security
\textsuperscript{124} UNSCO, (2002), “the impact of the closure and other mobility restrictions on Palestinian productive activities, 1\textsuperscript{st} January, 2002- 30\textsuperscript{th} June, 2002”, October 2002, pi-ii. Also, Pulfer, Gerhard, (2008), ibid.
of isolation further increased in the wake of the ICJ ruling of the illegality of the separation wall in July 2004 when no tangible measures against Israel ensued.\textsuperscript{126}

The mainstream Israeli narrative is that the Palestinians foolishly rejected the generous offers made by Barak at Camp David in July 2000 and opted for a violent strategy as an alternative means to reach the objective of a single state in historical Palestine. The Barak offers at Camp David can be criticized for not providing for a viable Palestinian state, notably because of a lack of contiguity between the north and south of the West Bank and Gaza. Yet this was later changed between Camp David and Taba in January 2001 (see Map 2 in Annex 1). More fundamentally, many Israelis regard Palestinian suicide attacks on civilians as a confirmation that the Palestinians were not striving for an end to the occupation, but were still determined to destroy the state of Israel itself.\textsuperscript{127} The rhetoric of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their rising support, especially among younger Palestinians, is cause for considerable concern and mistrust. Also, different messages can be heard from Islamic leaders and supporters, the consistent rhetorical line remains that Hamas has not abandoned the objective to liberate all of Palestine, i.e. the “Palestine from the river to the sea”.\textsuperscript{128}

However, according to the Mitchell report, it was only after the disproportionate use of Israeli force that the Palestinians increasingly endorsed violent means, including the suicide bombings. Despite this, for the majority of the Israeli population the suicide bombings within Israel’s 1948 frontiers confirm their most dreaded fears.\textsuperscript{129} The fact that many Palestinians doubt whether the extremist Islamic movements would retain public support following a two-state solution did not sway the Israeli population. The struggle with the Palestinians has once again become an existential one justifying any and all means of attack and reprisal. The minimum level of public trust necessary to reach a negotiated deal has completely dissipated.

As for the Palestinians, the Israeli violence in the second Intifada intensified disproportionately, causing Hamas to gain increasing support. The Islamic movements argued that in as far as “Israel only understands the language of force”; violence aimed at the greatest possible damage to Israel is the only means to achieve the end of occupation. Alternative approaches condemning suicide attacks as ethically repugnant and “war crimes”, as well as

\textsuperscript{126} Vermonters for a just peace in Palestine/Israel,(2004), (http://www.vtjp.org/background/wallreport9.htm)
\textsuperscript{127} Emerson, Michael and Tocci, Nathalie, (2003), ibid., p25. See also, Working Paper: Levy, D., (2003), Strategies of Regional Actors in the Middle East Conflict- Israel, working paper no.11 in the CEPS Middle East and Euro- Med project, forthcoming
\textsuperscript{128} Hamad, Jawad and al- Bargouthi, Eyad.,(ed), (1999), A study in the political ideology of the Islamic Resistance Movement, MESC, Amman
\textsuperscript{129} Emerson, Michael and Tocci, Nathalie, (2003), ibid., p25
counterproductive to the Palestinian cause, gained increasingly less sympathy in the light of
Israeli actions when the greater the level of Palestinian violence, the greater the support for
Israeli extreme right-wing views. This includes both secular and religious persons, who
implicitly reject the notion of negotiations with the PNA and the end of conflict through a
viable Palestinian state on the 1967 borders.

Both societies but most critically the Palestinians, have suffered tremendously. The
Palestinian economy is in a state of collapse, the humanitarian situation in the occupied
territories is disastrous, and exacerbated by the constant curfews and closures. The second
Intifada and the segregation of the Palestinian communities both from Israel and from each
other have dramatically increased the unemployment level to about 50%, leading to a
situation in which approximately 60% live below the poverty line. In addition the curfews and
closures have also prevented the smooth delivery of humanitarian aid through UNRWA and
other agencies.

4.1.3.1 Increased popularity of Hamas

The economic collapse increased the popularity of Hamas and its wide supporting network
penetrating almost every aspect of life in the OPT. Hamas was able to provide its services to
Palestinians effectively at a time when the PNA was not able to provide effective relief and
could hardly maintain its basic services due to increased demands and declining availability
of funds. Nevertheless, the importance of the Hamas network is often overestimated for there
are no accurate figures relating to Hamas’s overall annual budget. The figures are provided by
different sources upon more or less substantiated estimates. Those estimates range between
$25-30 million per year outside the OPT for ‘Dawa’ activities to $70-90 million per year.
Even if this figure is accepted, it should be noted that this figure does not exceed, as an
example, the Swedish International Development Agency annual budget for the Palestinian
people. While its importance is inflated, it could not lessen absolute poverty or even prevent a
slip of 60% of the Palestinian populations to below poverty level by mid 2002. 130

Thus the macro level impact of Hamas’s welfare network is practically negligible; however, it
has been highly appreciated by the Palestinians. Support through Dawa activities is usually
not provided based on political or family affiliation (in perceived contrast to the PNA
institution) and is perceived to be handled by clean hands (uncorrupted) and decent persons
(also in contrast to PNA institution). Hamas, being outside the political institutions, has had

130 Israeli Ministry of Foreign affairs, (2003), “Hamas use of charitable societies to fund and support terror”, 22
September 2003.
the additional advantage of not being obligated to provide such services to the Palestinians. They were voluntary services. The PNA, on the other hand, could hardly fulfill its basic functions and obligations. Thus Hamas did not fear any disappointment as anything it provided was appreciated. Also, Hamas could take the credit without incurring the blame of failing and in contrast to aid agencies Hamas did not have to bother about building up institutions and infrastructure. Its support went directly to people that were unconcerned with the issue of sustainability. Therefore, Hamas’ relatively small support contribution was highly tangible and visible.

As Israel has withdrawn from the Gaza Strip unilaterally, without coordination with the PNA due to the “no partner” credo, the withdrawal has greatly strengthened Hamas and weakened Fateh and the PNA. Many Palestinians perceived that Israel was forced to withdraw due to Hamas’s continued pressure and attacks that made the Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip costly and led to loss of life. On the other hand, Abbas was weaker than before because of the unilateral nature of the Israeli decisions while Hamas was given more support and accorded more respect by Palestinians that translated into votes in the 2006 election.

4.1.3.2 Decreased popularity of Fateh

The second Intifada had so weakened and divided Fateh that it, too, found it difficult to accommodate Hamas and the other groups politically without calling into question the monopoly of authority and the position of interlocutor granted to them by Oslo. Throughout this period, Fateh was challenged by the following main issues:

Firstly, Fateh failed to discuss the key issues of defining national objectives and the appropriate tools by which to achieve them. The leadership was required to pursue them with Hamas and the other factions for fear that it could unravel their special status as the “legitimate” authority.

Secondly, the inability of any Fatah leader to do so was also, of course, bound up with the evolution of the movement itself. Fateh was having great difficulty in accommodating its own “younger” generation of leaders, let alone the other factions. Paradoxically, it was Hamas that was better positioned than Fateh with regard to leadership because it was respected by its young members and operated with a clear mandate.

Thirdly and more importantly, is the corruption of Fateh. Corruption was the attribute that came to mark Fateh top leaders, ministers and high ranking staff. As poverty and unemployment were rising, the high lifestyle of Fateh officials (sometimes referred to as the returnees) infuriated the public. The elections gave the public a chance to punish those officials. For example, when Palestinians who voted for Hamas were asked about why they chose Hamas, 43.0% said that they voted for Hamas with the hope of ending corruption and 18.8% voted for Hamas for religious reasons. Only 11.8% voted for Hamas for its political agenda.132

With the erosion of legitimacy and popularity of Fateh, the power of Hamas manifested itself in victories in student union elections and local council and municipal elections. In the course of local elections, Hamas was able to capture important positions of Mayor in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Thus, Hamas activists were elected either with an absolute majority or in coalition with the leftist PFLP against Fateh and Hamas became a dominating influential party at a local level. At this time, though, Hamas decided not to nominate a candidate for the presidential election. This decision was probably motivated by two reasons: first, Abbas, a Fateh candidate was supported by a majority and furthermore, the president of the PNA was at the forefront of dealing with unfruitful peace negotiations with Israel, something which Hamas was not eager to do. Following the presidential elections, the call for the Palestinian legislative election grew stronger. It is worth noting though, that elections had been overdue for a long time during Arafat's life time. Some argue that Arafat feared Fateh’s loss even earlier.

4.1.3.3 Security

How was it possible that Hamas, which had the trust of only 12% of the Palestinians in June 2000133 and was listed as a terror organization by the EU and US, could have such a sweeping victory in January 2006 during a democratic election? Said reflected on the political development,134 more specifically, however, from the beginning of the second intifada until 2006, Hamas’s political, social and military actions brought Palestinian voters to support this movement. In particular, polls confirm that Hamas’ strategy of suicide bombings was supported by Palestinians, reaching 72% in spring 2002 following Israel’s Operation Defense

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132 Jerusalem media and Communication Centre, (2006), poll no. 57 February 2006- poll results on Palestinian attitudes towards the elections held in 25th of January 2006. (WWW.jmcc.org )


The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian Shield – though this figure decreased to 60% in April 2003. One can argue that the growing support of Palestinians for Hamas appears to be not only confined to socio-economic and political issues especially in the Gaza Strip that suffered a devastating situation on the ground, but also to growing feelings of isolation and insecurity.

Up to that point, leading Hamas figures argued that “if there is no security for Palestinians, there will be no security for Israelis either”. Sheikh Yasin, one of Hamas’s original founders and also its undisputed spiritual leader, expounded on Hamas’s philosophy by saying “our main battle has always been against Israeli soldiers and settlers. The attacks inside Israel are operations we carry on in response to Israeli’s crimes against our people. They are not the strategy of our movement. Our strategy is to defend ourselves against an occupying army and settlers and settlement”.

Also, during the second Intifada, Hamas participated in the unilateral efforts of four de-escalation initiatives (2nd of June 2nd –9th of Aug 9th, 2001, 16th December 16th- 17th January 17th, 2002, 19th September 19th –21st October 21st, 2002 and 29th June 29th- 19th August 19th, 2003). However, during these times when de-escalation was supposed to occur, the Israeli forces continued to kill Palestinians, make incursions into the OPT, and arrest Palestinians and demolish houses. It was noted in the last ceasefire in June 2003 that the number of Palestinian deaths caused by Israeli forces indeed decreased. However, in place of this, arrests of Palestinians increased four-fold and the Israeli “targeted killings” (assassinations) continued. This confirmed what Palestinians had already known for a long time: Israel was not able to truly commit to de-escalating the conflict. This provided Hamas with the justification to return to armed operations.

There were, however, two other possible causes of the truce breakdowns: the failure of the international community to use these moments of de-escalation to develop a new political dynamic. Also, the failure to provide any feeling of “safety” to the Palestinians that could sustain the momentum towards complete ceasefire. In other words, the international community failed to deliver safety to the Palestinians. However, the renewed suicide

135 Baumgarten, Helga,(2006), p 150
136 Pulfer, Gerhard, (2008), ibid
137 Pulfer, Gerhard, (2008), ibid
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian bombings with the collapse of a cease fire prompted the EU to list the whole of Hamas, including Izz al- din al Qassam, as a terror organization on the 11th September 11th, 2003.138

In 2004, the Israeli government decided to liquidate the top political leadership of Hamas in the OPT. Thus, the spiritual leader and guiding figure of Hamas, Sheikh Yasin was assassinated in March 2004, and approximately one month later his successor Rantisi was to follow. The funerals brought thousands of Palestinians to the streets and did little to diminish support for Hamas.

Contrary to expectations though, with the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, the Director of the National Security Council confirmed: “a few months before disengagement we were sure that Hamas would escalate attacks to give the impression that Israel was retreating under fire. But Hamas chose the opposite strategy. The last seven days of withdrawal may be the most peaceful of the last five years”.139 However, aside from presenting Hamas itself as a winner during the Israeli withdrawal, the Gaza Strip remained a de facto entity encircled and controlled by Israel, with borders and cargo terminals opening only when Israel desired.

Inside the Gaza Strip, chaos and anarchy increased, with armed militants and gangs taking control at a more rapid speed than before. At the same time, tensions between Fateh and Hamas increased leading to occasional clashes and providing a first glimpse of what was to follow. When the Palestinians were asked in March 2006 about the perceived priorities of the new Hamas government, 28.2% responded that solving unemployment and poverty problems would be the top priority; for 23% combating corruption came next, followed by 19.2% wanting an end to the security chaos. As for resisting the occupation, the wall, refugees and prisoners issues fared low in the priority list.140

4.1.4 Hams’ rise to power

The point here is to discuss the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and its development in relevance to the Palestinian national struggle, moving towards the top leadership in the Palestinian political structure.

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139 International Crisis Group, (2006), ibid., p6
4.1.4.1 Hamas formation

Islamic movements, both historically and currently, differ in their understanding and interpretation of Islam. The two distinguishing elements are the perceptions of different movements concerning the ends and the means. The ends denoted the extent to which politics is ingrained in Islam, while the means reflect the controversy on the use of violence to achieve the ends. The spectrum of interpretations tends to vacillate between two extremes. At one end, there is an understanding that efforts should be focused on morals and religious teachings away from politics and state making where accepted means are peaceful ones. To this end, a small group like al-Dawa believes only in spreading religious teaching and morality. Another group is Hizb al Tahrir whose politicization of religion is very strong and purely intellectual. It believes neither in violence nor in political participation in the existing systems.

At the other end of the spectrum, there is another understanding of Islam that politicizes religion and renders it the ultimate judge in all aspects of life including politics. Here, there are groups such as al Qaeda which embrace violence wholeheartedly in their pursuit of their political aims. Along the spectrum, the Muslim Brotherhood occupies most of the center. It believes in politicized Islam and that Islamic states should be established with peaceful means as stressed by the movement founders in Egypt in 1930s. Over the decades however, splinter groups within the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria adopted violence and clashed with their governments. In the 1980s, some Muslim Brotherhood groups adhered to more peaceful means as was the case in Tunis.\textsuperscript{141}

In the spectrum Hamas stands between Muslim Brotherhood and al Qaeda but closer to the former than to the latter, by virtue of its unique specificity of using violence only against foreign occupying powers and not against national governments. Therefore, Hamas offers a contemporary case of an Islamic movement engaged in a liberation struggle against a foreign occupation. Islamic movements have been driven by various causes; the majority of which were focused on the corrupt regimes of their own countries. Other ‘globalised’ pan-Islamic movements have expanded their campaigns across geopolitical lines rejecting the notion of individual Muslim nation-states. Contrary to both, Hamas remained a nation-based political movement limiting its struggle to Palestine and fighting a foreign occupier. This is of

\textsuperscript{141} Hroub, Khaked,(2006), ibid., p 6-8
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian significance as it exposes a great misperception in the West that all Islamic movements can fit neatly into one single ‘terrorist’ category.¹⁴²

Hamas came into being officially on December 14th, 1987, declaring itself only a few days after the eruption of the first intifada- the Palestinian uprising, on December 8th. The decision to establish Hamas was taken a day after the first intifada and was in response to two opposing views on how Palestinians should move forward in confronting occupation. According to Hroub, it still remains a question to what extent the religious- political ideals constitute the make up of Hamas. At the highly politicized junctures of Hamas life, it was evident that politics occupies a leading position. With the eruption of the second Intifada, the confrontational policy within Hamas gained a stronger position, the logic being that Hamas would suffer losses if it decided not to partake in the intifada equally with all the other Palestinian militant factions considering as well extremely difficult living conditions for ordinary Palestinians. It was the moment for creating Hamas in view to another growing rivalry with the Islamic Jihad, another Islamic movement in Palestine, to defend Palestinian citizens against occupation attacks. The very first incident which started the intifada was executed by the Islamic Jihad and this compelled the Muslim Brothers Movement to speed up its internal transformation.¹⁴³

Militarily, Hamas adopted the controversial tactic of suicide bombing to which its name became attached for the rest of the world. The first use of this tactic was in 1994, in retaliation for a massacre of Palestinians praying in a mosque in the Palestinian city of Hebron where a Jewish settler fired a machine gun upon the people praying and killed 29 of them. Hamas vowed to avenge this act and did so. Since then, all of Hamas’s attacks against Israeli civilians have been in retaliation for specific Israeli atrocities against Palestinian civilians. Although it is often argued that they are no more brutal than attacks Israelis perpetrated against Palestinians for decades, the suicide attacks have damaged the reputation of Hamas and the Palestinians worldwide – especially in the West. Hamas’ justification for these attacks goes like this (1) these operations are the exception to the rule and are only driven by the need to retaliate – ‘an eye for an eye.’ (2) To keep extending an offer to Israel by which civilians on both sides would be spared from being killed- Israel never accepted this offer. (3) Arguing

¹⁴² Hroub, Khaked,(2006), ibid., p xvi
¹⁴³ Hroub, Khaked,(2006), p13- 14
that Israeli society, as a whole, should pay the price of the occupation as much as Palestinian society pays the price for that occupation—suffering should be felt on both sides.\textsuperscript{144}

\textbf{4.1.4.2 Hamas into elections}

In 2005, Hamas made historic decisions moving it firmly to the top of the Palestinian leadership. The movement decided to run for the Palestinian Legislative Council during elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas’ decision to participate in the 2006 election was completely in opposition to its initial refusal to take part in the 1996 elections, as Hamas perceived these elections to be an outcome of a corrupt Oslo peace process. A spokesperson of the first Hamas government concedes: “many things have changed. Abbas believes in democracy and institutions and has allowed Hamas to become more involved”.\textsuperscript{145}

The justification for this can be explained in the following ways; firstly, the main ideological barrier, the de facto acceptance of the Oslo agreements was less relevant because pragmatic considerations had gained more weight. Abstaining from participation in the elections of 1996 on the grounds that it would constitute an acceptance of Oslo was no longer relevant in 2005. The Oslo agreements were completely disregarded by Israel and by the Palestinians after five years of the Intifada. Secondly, the pragmatic doctrine in Hamas that favored participation in elections was achieved by gradually easing into politics by first participating only in local elections. The successful results of those local elections definitely backed Hamas’s activists who voiced their support for participation in the PNA. In contrast to 1996, Hamas could expect to become a strong opposition force in the Palestinian parliament. Hamas had been progressing politically since the 2000 intifada and had become more confident of its own strength, particularly after winning almost two-thirds of the seats in the municipal elections in 2005. Thirdly, the altered political climate after Arafat’s death given the results of the election.

Anyway, Hamas’s participation in the elections had a profound impact on the nature of the movement, the Palestinian political scene and on the peace process at large. It would help politicize the movement at the expense of its well-known militarism. On March 12th, 2005,\textsuperscript{146} Hamas announced its official decision to participate in the Parliamentary election, scheduled initially for July 2005 and later postponed to January 2006.

\textsuperscript{144} Hroub, Khaked,(2006), ibid, pxvii
\textsuperscript{145} International Crisis Group, (2006), ibid., p5-6
\textsuperscript{146} Baumgarten, Helga, (2006), p174
In the parliamentary election, Hamas benefited from having a high level of support because of its socio-economic work in helping the poor and supporting thousands of Palestinians along with a policy of political and military confrontation with Israel. This paid off considerably. On January 25th, 2006, Hamas won the election in the OPT, one that was widely accepted as a fair and democratic process. Indeed, Hamas won by a sweeping majority. Hamas won 76 seats in the 132-member parliament. Fateh, the dominant force in Palestinian politics for four decades, won 43 seats, while 13 other seats went to smaller parties and independents. While many experts on the Palestinian issue had predicted a victory for Hamas, its large sweeping victory with a majority of seats surprised everyone including Hamas.

It has often been argued that the reason Hamas won the elections was because (1) the Palestinian voters were tired of the Fateh-led PNA in almost all aspects. Not only in negotiating with Israel during the Oslo period but also internally with its day-to-day management of services to Palestinians. In particular, there was wide belief that corruption and incompetence existed within the upper leadership of Fateh. Also, (2) Fateh was held responsible for the negative socio-economic and political consequences the second Intifada. Hamas, on the other hand, steadily built a reputation as a non-corrupt, clean-handed party that could deliver better results to the Palestinian people. Palestinians trusted Hamas to build hospitals and schools or provide social services far more than they had Fatah’s old guard. Consequently, Hamas has reaped the benefits of devoted and honest work from the Palestinian people.

Interestingly, a Palestinian Christian was appointed to the Hamas Cabinet as the Minister of Tourism. In a way, it can be concluded that the vast number of people who voted for Hamas but were not actual members of Hamas suggested that the people were seeking a reform.

4.2 The EU Policy towards OPT

While focusing on the EU reaction to the run up, evolution and aftermath of the Hamas victory in the 2006 election, this section begins by setting the political, legal and policy context in which the EU’s reactions are constructed and pursued. It includes the Euro-Mediterranean Human Right Network report: (1) the EU common strategy in terms of the EU position and objectives, the EU declarations, and the human rights and international

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147 Esther, Pan, “Implications of the Palestinian elections”, (http://www.cfr.org/publication/9687)
148 Active but Acquiescent, the EU’s response to the Israeli military offensive in Gaza Strip, (2009), Euro-Mediterranean Human Right Network (EMHRN), Copenhagen, Denmark
humanitarian law obligations. (2) The EU instruments in terms of diplomacy, contractual relations and capacity building.

4.2.1 The EU Common Strategy

The EU position has developed over decades into a clear view on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and its resolution. Specifically, it is officially, as mentioned earlier, a two-state solution leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the conflict. It is based on the implementation of the road map, with the state of Israel and a democratically viable and sovereign Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with minor and mutually agreed adjustments if necessary, living side by side within secure and recognized borders and enjoying normal relations with their neighbors. This is in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolutions.149 This also includes a fair solution to the complex issue of Jerusalem, and a just, viable, realistic and agreed solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees as well as a solution to the Israeli–Syrian and Israeli–Lebanese paths along two wings:

The first wing is securing Israeli and Palestinian rights to self-determination. The EU historically recognized Israel’s right to a statehood. As for the Palestinians, the EU articulated its position beginning with the EU support of self-determination in the 1980 Venice Declaration.150 By the end of the Oslo process, the EU advanced its support to a Palestinian state along with Israel’s security.151 The EU sees a need to address political, economic, and security issues simultaneously, wherever necessary by negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It recognizes that continued and comprehensive Palestinian reform is also necessary. The EU stresses the need, however for Palestinians to be confident in their institution-building efforts, which will lead to a viable and functioning state.

The second wing is complying with international human rights and humanitarian law. The EU unreservedly condemns terrorists, violence and incitement. Terrorist attacks against Israel have no justification whatsoever and the EU has included Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and other armed Palestinian groups in its list of terrorist organizations. The EU recognizes Israel’s right to protect its citizens from those attacks but emphasizes that the Israeli government, in exercising this right, should act within international law and to take no action that aggravates

150 Declaration by the European Council on the situation in the Middle East, Venice, 12-13 June 1980
151 Conclusions of the European Council in Berlin, 24-25 March 1999
the humanitarian and economic situation of the Palestinians. Most EU declarations on the conflict since the 1970s have condemned Palestinian acts of “terrorism”, while also condemning Israeli violations, for example, settlements constructions in the OPT.

However, with the outbreak of the second intifada, the EU intensified its calls to a halt and a reversal of the settlement construction, and denounced the violation of human rights and humanitarian law, ranging from Palestinian suicide bombings to Israeli incursions, extra judicial killings, forms of collective punishment and the construction of the wall in the WB.\textsuperscript{152} Condemnations of Israel’s military incursions and closure of Gaza as well as Hamas’ indiscriminate launching of rockets into Israeli towns have also been featured prominently in the EU declarations since the unilateral Israeli disengagement from Gaza Strip in 2005 and the political separation between the Hamas- controlled Gaza Strip and the PA Fateh controlled- WB in 2007.\textsuperscript{153}

4.2.1.1 Declarations

The following EU declarations and ideas are regarded as milestones in the peace process and in developing relations with the parties:

- The 1980 Venice document: it established the right to existence and to security of all states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.\textsuperscript{154}

- The 1999 Berlin document: it introduced the notion of a viable Palestinian state by saying that the European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel’s security and Israel’s acceptance as an equal partner in the region.\textsuperscript{155}

- The 2002 Seville document: it is explicit on the expected solution to the conflict: A settlement can be achieved through negotiations and only negotiations. The objective is an end to the occupation and the early establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and

\textsuperscript{152} Conclusion on the Middle East, 21 July 2003 and 29 September 2003; European Council in Brussels on the 16-17 October, 2003; Sevile European Council in Seville, 21-22 June 2002; The ICJ Advisory Opinion, July 2004
\textsuperscript{153} EU Presidency Statement on further escalation of violence in Gaza and southern Israel, 2 March 2008
sovereign State of Palestine, on the basis of the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties. The final result should be two states living side by side within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbors. In this context, a fair solution should be found to the complex issue of Jerusalem, and a just, viable and agreed solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees.156

4.2.1.2 Obligations

The EU polices towards Palestine are governed by a complex legal framework consisting of two main sets of norms, principles and norms pertaining to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), and specific EU commitments and instruments that are of a binding or non-binding nature.

The EU member states remain bound by their obligation under IHL and IHRL, such as those which are conventional in nature or customary. When considering member states’ obligations in the context of EU external relations, two types of obligations are relevant and play specific roles. Altogether, they serve as a comprehensive framework by which the EU and its members must deploy the instruments of their policy.

Firstly, IHL lays down the states’ obligation in all circumstances to respect and ensure respect for IHL. This obligation has far reaching consequences with regard to the relations of the EU member states with a third state engaged in an armed conflict. This is in terms of respecting this body of norms, and also in taking all possible steps to ensure that IHL is respected by mainly Israel and the Palestinians. Furthermore, such obligation is imposed in all circumstances which means that member states of the EU cannot hide behind the parties of the conflict to avoid their own responsibilities.157

In 2005, the UK presidency of the EU expressed the view that article 1 of the Geneva Convention obligation must remain with the parties to the conflict. This restrictive interpretation of the scope of the obligation was rejected by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 2004 Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the OPT. It stated that every high contracting party to the convention, regardless of whether they are parties to the conflict or not, is bound by this obligation.158 This interpretation is also

157 Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid.
well founded in the practice of states and international organizations, as well as doctrinal opinions. While there is no indication of concrete measures to be taken to put such obligations into effect, the framework of the EU policy offers important tools for member states to ensure their compliance.

Secondly, the collective legal interest of ensuring compliance with fundamental norms has implications under general international law on state responsibility given Article 41 of the International Law Commission Articles on responsibility of states for internationally Wrongful Acts. It clarifies that states shall cooperate to bring an end through lawful means to any serious or systematic breach of a norm of general international law; and no state shall recognize as lawful a situation created by such a breach nor render assistance in maintaining that situation.

4.2.1.3 Commitments

Specific human rights commitments in the context of EU external relations are based on the general obligation contained in Article 6, Para. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It states that the EU:

“Shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and as they result from constitutional traditions common to the member states, as general principles of Community law”

In a more programmatic manner, Article 177 para. 2 and 181 para.1 of the Treaty laying down such policies in the field of development, economic and financial cooperation shall contribute to the objective of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the same direction, Article 11 of the treaty holds that one of the EU’s common foreign and security policy objectives is to develop and to consolidate respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. Although those commitments are laid down as objectives to be pursued, they also contribute in defining the EU policies’ legal framework, and keep the character of a binding

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159 Palwanker, Umesh, (1994), Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for IHL, International Review of the Red Cross, no. 298, Feb. 1994, p9-25
161 Advisory Opinion by the ICJ, (2004), ibid.
nature of the legal obligations. This way, the EU has implemented human rights conditionality in its relation with third countries.\textsuperscript{163}

As a result, the EU may offer benefits or may reserve the right to unilaterally withdraw such benefits due to a third country’s breach of a norm. In addition, the EU may resort to negative conditionality. The examples given are the restrictive measures or sanctions, in order to uphold respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law and good governance.\textsuperscript{164}

\section*{4.2.2 The EU Instruments}

In relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict and in order to contribute to the fulfillment of two states’ solutions concerning the respect of human rights and IHL, the EU has deployed its policy instruments as analyzed by the Euro-Mediterranean human rights network,\textsuperscript{165} under three major directions (1) diplomacy (2) contractual relations and (3) capacity building.

\subsection*{4.2.2.1 Diplomacy}

Decision-making procedures require unanimity among the EU member states and the method of influence is mostly that of socialization. Hence having determined unanimous common interests, the EU acts through awareness-raising, arguing, persuading and dialogue with the third country in the conflict, rather than by pressure and coercion. Further, the EU diplomatic role in the Middle East includes multilateral and unilateral initiatives. For example, following the 1991 Madrid conference, the EU multilateral diplomatic initiatives took the form of chairing the Regional Economic Development Working Group. In 1995 and in the context of Oslo, a multilateral forum intended to foster peace through functional cooperation in the Mediterranean, the EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP). In 2008, the EMP was incorporated in the French-inspired Union for the Mediterranean (UFM), of which Israel, the PA and the Arab Mediterranean countries amongst others were members. Like the EMP, the UFM aimed to promote mutual interest and cooperation in specific policy domains. Most noticeably, it is the EU’s participation in the Quartet alongside the US, Russia, and the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{163} Barteis, Lorand, (2005), Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p336
\textsuperscript{164} Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid.
\textsuperscript{165} Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid.
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian

In the context of the Quartet, the EU has promoted several diplomatic initiatives such as the roadmap for peace\textsuperscript{166} under the 2002 Danish presidency, and the 2002-5 push for PA reform undertaken by the Quartet task force on Palestinian Reform. The EU has also staffed and financed Quartet initiatives such as the Quartet Envoy for disengagement in 2005-6 and the office of the Quartet Representatives since 2007.

As for unilateral frameworks of action, it is the EU’s declaratory diplomacy and the roles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) High Representative Javier Solana and the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Declaring diplomacy entails the issuing of public statements during meetings of the Council of Ministers and the European Council and in response to specific situations and events. They take the form of Council of Ministers or European Council conclusions or statements by the EU Presidency, the Troika (the CFSP High Representative, External Relations Commissioner and Presidency) or the CFSP High Representative. The purpose of these declarations is both to signal the Union’s collective position and to praise, shaming particular acts and actors. Declarations are pinpointed as forms of actions for the implementation of the EU’s Guidelines on Human rights and IHL.\textsuperscript{167}

As for the roles of the CFSP High Representative and the Special Representative for the MEPP, the High Representative acts in response to and in the context of particular diplomatic initiatives (e.g. road map, ceasefire talks). The special representative, however, (currently Marc Otte, previously Miguel Moratinos) is tasked with establishing contact with the two parties of conflict, promoting compliance with agreements, human rights and international law. EU diplomacy normally takes the lead, mainly during a specific crisis (e.g. the Israeli siege of the Church of the Nativity in 2002), rather than the overall mediation of the conflict, which remains firmly in the hands of the US.\textsuperscript{168}

4.2.2.2 Contractual relations

Here decision-making is mixed-qualified majority and unanimity voting reflecting the mixed nature of agreements which the EU has concluded with the parties. Since the 1960s, the EU contractual ties with Israel- PLO/ PA have been progressively upgraded. Israel’s Association agreement which entered into force in 2000 is extensive and covers political dialogue, free

\textsuperscript{167} Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid., p21
\textsuperscript{168} Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid., p21
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian trade in industrial and select agricultural products, freedom of establishment, free movement of capital, the harmonization of regulatory frameworks as well as social and cultural cooperation. While far less developed than in the case of Israel, the PLO signed an Interim Association Agreement with the EU in 1997, providing for the partial liberalization of trade. However, as opposed to EU-Israel relations, the implementation of the EU-PLO agreement has been grossly ineffective due to Israel’s non-recognition of, and thus non-cooperation in the functioning of the agreement. Finally, both Israel and the PA have been included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), with Action Plans having been published for both in 2004. The implementation of the EU-Israel Action Plan has accelerated over the years, whereas the EU-PA Action plan remains largely a dead letter.

In the context of these contractual relations, the EU can rely on socialization, conditionality, and passive enforcement to pursue its objectives and induce compliance with human rights and IHL. However human rights embedded in contractual agreements have limited impact and the Commission and the Council have constantly refused to invoke ‘non-execution’ clauses to deal with ‘non-compliance’ with human rights in the EMP countries.

Specificially, in the case of the EU-PA action plan, clear steps were spelled out in areas of democracy, human rights, the judiciary, fiscal transparency, the security sector and the administration. In the case of Israel, the action plan instead mentions: “facilitating efforts to resolve the Middle East conflict, strengthening the fight against terrorism and arms proliferation, promoting the respect for human rights, improving the dialogue between cultures and religions, cooperation in the fight against anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia”. When it comes to international law, the action plan limits itself to stating that the EU and Israel would “work together to promote “the respect of human rights and international humanitarian law”.

4.2.2.3 Capacity building

The last policy direction is the assistance to the Palestinians including both financial aid, primarily disbursed by the commission under the majority voting, as well a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and missions deployed under the CFSP unanimously agreed to by the member states. Assistance can influence the Palestinians through capacity building and

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169 Douma, Wybe, (2006), ibid., p 440-450. The Association agreement between Israel and the EU is the main legal instrument of the relationship between the EU/EC and Israel.
170 EU-Israel Action plan, (2004), EU-PA Action plan, 9 December 2004
171 Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid., p22
172 EU- Israel Action plan, (2004), ibid., p4
conditionality. To the extent that the persistence and deterioration of the conflict is viewed as being due to inadequate ‘Palestinian’ capabilities, assistance can financially and technically support the build up of such capacities. Alternatively, the EU can engage in aid conditionality, including both negative conditionality and positive conditionality such as the suspension of aid to the Hamas government as well as positive conditionality such as the reform-related EU conditionality used particularly in the 2002-2005 period.

EU aid to the Palestinians has been disbursed to support state building ‘survival’ and economic development ‘subsistence’, although and particularly since 2000, it has increasingly taken the form of humanitarian assistance and payments to cover the PA’s recurrent expenditure. For example, the average EU annual transfers to the Palestinians have risen exponentially, reaching almost 1 bn Euro in 2008 if member state contributions are included. In the context of the ESDP, the EU has been involved in border monitoring and capacity building in the security sector. Since 2005, practically since 2007, the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL-COPPS) has provided civil police training and equipment and has engaged in the reconstruction of Palestinian security and judicial facilities. For example, prisons, courts, and police stations.¹⁷³

In November 2005, the US-brokered Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) and up until June 2007, the EU engaged in broader monitoring at the Rafah crossing through its border monitoring mission EUBAM. While not having executive power over who could cross at Rafah, Israel, beyond retaining on indirect presence and control through its liaison office at Kerem Shalom, could also determine at will when and whether to let EUBAM function in practice by allowing or stopping EU monitors placed in Israel from reaching Rafah. In this way, Israel reserved the right to withdraw its consent to the border arrangement whereby the EUBAM had no power to ensure Israel’s respect for the terms of the AMA. The AMA, and EUBAM operating within it, did not ensure free access between Gaza strip and Egypt.¹⁷⁵

4.2.3 The EU Boycott Policy of Elected Hamas

With regard to the Palestinian Parliamentary elections, on January 25th, 2006 the Quartet praised the electoral process that was free, fair and secure and called parties to respect the results of the elections and the outcome of the Palestinian constitutional process so it may

¹⁷⁴ The crossing point for the movement of people between Gaza Strip and Egypt
¹⁷⁵ Gisha (2009), Rafah Crossing: Who holds the keys, summary, March, 2009
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian unfold into an atmosphere of calm and security. It also noted that the Palestinians voted for change in their aspiration for peace and statehood as articulated by President Abbas in his statement following the polls of the elections.\footnote{Quartet statement on the PLC elections 26 January 2006 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/88161.pdf}

However, the EU was caught in the dilemma of either having to accept the democratic will of the Palestinian people and abide by their decision to elect Hamas or to join the Israeli efforts to bring down the Hamas government. Five days after the elections the Quartet decided to call upon the newly elected Hamas government to commit to three “principles”.\footnote{Quartet statement, (2006), London, 30 January, 2006 http://www.auswaertiges- amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/NaherUndMittlererOsten/Downloads/NOQ-Erkl-Jan06-engl.pdf}

Specifically, on January 30th, 2006, the Quartet affirmed that a solution for the Israel-Palestine conflict should be negotiated as a two-state solution. Its view was that all members of a future Palestinian government must be committed to nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations including the Road Map. Further, the Quartet called upon the newly elected parliament to support a government committed to those principles as well as the rule of law, tolerance, reform and sound fiscal management. The two parties to the conflict were also reminded to avoid unilateral actions which would prejudice final status issues and reaffirmed its commitment to a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement to the Arab- Israeli conflict based upon UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338.\footnote{Quartet statement, (2006), London, ibid. http://www.auswaertiges- amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/NaherUndMittlererOsten/Downloads/NOQ-Erkl-Jan06-engl.pdf}


Hamas refused to fully endorse the three conditions spelled out on January 30th, and in response the EU, along with the Quartet exerted strong conditionality on the PA by boycotting the government and withholding assistance.\footnote{Alvaro de Soto, (2007), End of Mission Report, May, 2007. Reprinted in the Guardian, June 14th, p 17-19. See at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/13/usa.israel} Further, the international community froze international bank transactions. Israel halted the transfer of PA tax revenues, arrested dozens of Hamas ministers and parliamentarians and restricted their movement within the OPT. The EU repeatedly called on Israel to fulfill its legal obligations with respect to the delivery of tax revenues, the easing of restrictions and the implementation of the AMA.
However, on the contrary, Israel did not meet its obligations. As well, the EUBAM, which required Israeli cooperation, in practice, acquiesced to the frequent closure of Rafah. The closure of Rafah increased significantly after June 10th, 2006 - two weeks prior to the capture of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit in an attack on a military base near Gaza on June 25th, 2006.¹⁸¹

With the EU monitors unable to reach Rafah, the crossing was closed 85% of the time between June 2006 and June 2007. The EU or unilateral Egyptian actions only led to its occasional opening for humanitarian and religious pilgrimage purposes up until June 2007, when the crossing was permanently shut.¹⁸² The closure of the Rafah crossing has had serious implications for the access of Palestinians to health care, academic opportunities and employment abroad, for the separation of families, for commerce and business, and in term of fuelling a general sense of entrapment amongst the civilian population of Gaza Strip.¹⁸³ EUBAM could not have opened the Rafah crossing alone and thus cannot be held primarily responsible for its closure. Yet, according to Gisha, by remaining part of the AMA arrangement despite the frequent closure of Rafah until its permanent closure in 2007, the EU has acquiesced in the collective punishment of the Palestinians caused by the closure.¹⁸⁴

On April 5th, 2006 Javier Solana, appeared before the European parliament and he described the situation on which Europe’s position should be based. In the OPT, he noted that Hamas has taken over the reins of government and the programme as presented by Prime Minister Haniyeh is unacceptable to the international community. He added that ultimately, the unwillingness of Hamas to come into line with the EU principles along with the fact that Hamas appears on the European list of terrorist organizations must inevitably have consequences for the EU in reference to the impossibility of regarding Hamas as a valid partner. He elaborated that the EU does not want principally to see the Hamas government fail but rather, besides respecting the Quartet’s three principles, also to apply the Rule of Law, democratic transfer of power, and to maintain the pluralistic nature of Palestinian society. If it does so, Hamas can be regarded as a fully-fledged political entity.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ Active but Acquiescent, (2008), ibid., p22. It is interesting to note here that while Israel’s non-cooperation at Kerem Shalom is often linked to the Shalit case, it dates back two weeks prior to the capture
¹⁸² Gisha (2009), ibid.
¹⁸³ Gisha (2009), ibid. The consequences of closure were aggravated in the same period Israel destruction of Gaza’s power plant and property, use of sonic booms, and imposed other forms of collective punishment on the civilian population in the territory
¹⁸⁴ Gisha (2009), ibid.
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian

He added further, that it is an entirely new development that a movement affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood has come to power in Palestine in democratic elections of. In principle, the EU will continue to support President Abbas in line with the Quartet statement of March 30th, and continue its aid to the Palestinian people for it is a moral imperative which the EU cannot shirk. Finally, the humanitarian crisis and instability on the OPT do no good to anyone, starting with Israel itself.\textsuperscript{186}

However, the unprecedented policies of boycott, sanctioning and closure instituted against an occupied population pushed the OPT to the humanitarian and economic brink, setting off alarm bells at UN agencies, the World Bank and international NGOs.\textsuperscript{187} In response, at the EU’s insistence, the Quartet agreed on a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM).

Beginning in August 2006, the TIM provided social allowances to civil servants and pensioners, direct financial and material support to the health, education, water and social sectors, as well as funds to pay fuel bills. Alongside growing humanitarian needs, TIM led to a surge in EU aid to the OPT. Commission and member states’ aid rose from 500 million Euro in 2005 to almost 700 million Euro in 2006 and 1 billion Euro in late 2007.\textsuperscript{188} While the boycott paralyzed the PA, thus further worsening the economic and humanitarian situation in the OPT, the TIM and the surge in aid that came with it pulled Palestine one step back from humanitarian catastrophe.

The increase of assistance through the TIM, so as to avoid deepening humanitarian crisis, entailed the de-development of the governance structures of a potential Palestinian state. However, the TIM contributed to reversing the progress made in 2002-5, which had been promoted, especially by the EU. For example, the by-passing of official institutions, with the exception of the Presidency, led to a re-centralization of power in the hands of the president, namely, Mahmoud Abbas and generated an increasingly unaccountable management of available PA funds. It was significantly harder in the Gaza Strip, where Israel’s increasing closures post disengagement along with the absence of a functioning PA, pushed the Gaza Strip into chaos and lawlessness, which increased from 2006 up until the Hamas takeover in June 2007.\textsuperscript{189} To a certain extent, the EU policies in 2006-7, alongside those of the US and

\textsuperscript{188} Active but Acquiescent, (2008), ibid.
Israel as well as international dynamics within the Palestinian political scene, had contributed to the polarization between Fatah and Hamas.

With regard to the international framework, Solana also stated in the same speech on April 5th, 2006 that the EU aimed to continue to work with the Quartet, in close coordination with the United States for they could make the EU’s role more effective and involve the Arab countries for they can and should do far more politically and economically. In working on the peace process he stressed that the Israel-Palestine conflict is part of the serious crisis which the Middle East is undergoing and described the role of the United States as being able to exert a positive but also a negative influence of the situation in Iraq.190

A year later, in view of rising factional violence between Fateh and Hamas, the EU repeatedly called for national unity.191 When the two were reconciled in the Saudi-brokered National Unity Government (NUG) in February-March 2007, the Europeans appeared willing to reconsider their approach to the PA.

At the time, the Quartet conditions were not fully respected, through the Mecca agreement the NUG, including Hamas, had made significant steps towards them, in particular by agreeing to ‘respect’ rather than to ‘accept’ previous agreements,192 the EU reaction was important in determining the future of Palestinian reconciliation in so far as the NUG could have survived only if it were allowed to function. This in turn required a resumption of aid to it, together with Israel’s lifting of restrictions on movement, release of imprisoned lawmakers and other prisoners and resumption of PA tax revenue transfers. EUPOL-COPPA could also have assisted the PA security forces, where the Fateh-Hamas divide played a significant role. However, when the US and Israel made clear that the Mecca agreement fell short of meeting the Quartet principles,193 the EU muted its initial support for the NUG. The boycott and sanctioning policies of the EU, like those of Israel and the US, has remained unchanged.

On the top of this, the US financed armed and trained security forces loyal to Fateh. Everything was set for a new round of confrontation in May-June 2007, which culminated in

191 Council conclusions on the Middle East, 17 October (2006); Council conclusions on the Middle East, 13 November (2006), Council conclusions on Middle East, (2007), 22 January 2007
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian Hamas’ take over of the Gaza Strip and Abbas’ dissolution of the NUG and nomination of a non- Hamas caretaker government in the West Bank under the Premiership of Salam Fayyad.

**Reflections**

At least, there are three points of ambiguity within the EU boycott policy of the elected Hamas:

1. The first concerns the ambiguity in defining the Hamas government and its inability to make a difference between Hamas, as a terrorist group listed by the EU, and the actual elected government. It is worth noting, that the EU acted within a wider international context.

2. The second regards the formation of a Palestinian National Unity Government, and whether the EU genuinely favors reconciliation throughout the OPT or whether the EU seeks to reinstate the PA in Gaza given its inability to conduct border monitoring, reconstruction and aid policy under current conditions.

3. The third regards the two wings of the EU position, the observer notes a gap separating the EU political objectives and the legal commitments, and the absence of concrete measures to ensure that such objectives are accomplished and commitments kept.

Specifically, the policy of boycotting Hamas and gradually isolating Gaza, financing the PA-controlled WB and unconditionally supporting Israel was not a road towards respecting international human rights law or humanitarian law or a two-state solution, but rather made the accomplishment of these EU declared objectives for a peaceful middle East less likely. The military offensive in Gaza Strip later on was the strategic testimony to this fact.
4 The EU Policy Model

This chapter elaborates on the theoretical discussion of Orientalism in connection to Islamophobia in two ways: (1) analyzing the imbalanced power relations in the EU policy towards Palestine and (2) discussing the implications of the imbalanced power relations on Islamophobia.

It is worth noting that it is not easy to reflect on the analysis of power relations in the EU boycott policy of the elected Hamas government for it is a two-legged policy, one towards the OPT and the other towards Israel. In this way, the EU is dealing with a well-established state and an occupier, or, one can also say with stateless Palestine and the occupied territories.

Therefore, the author suggests an abstract model and an operational model of the EU policy towards Palestine. Reiterating the aims of the dissertation, it aims to provide a form of abstract model and operational model that uncovers and explains the case under study. In doing so, this chapter forms a link between the main question and the secondary questions of the dissertation.

In Orientalism, Said shed light on Foucault’s main achievement in reference to knowledge and power. Foucault argued that what we take to be the truth is in fact always really the product of a certain way of representing reality, of a certain way of seeing “discourse”. This way of seeing is not a misrepresentation, a false or distorted perception of reality, because there is no truth and no accurate representation. This makes representation in connection to Foucault more challenging if not impossible to come up with any definition, for example, of Islamophobia and can be taken to the extreme that there is no reality out there.

Orientalism, however, contributes to resolving the problem of representation. This is specifically in term of West-East/Islam, not only in defining Islamophobia, but also and more importantly in this dissertation, in answering the question of power in the EU’s boycott policy of the elected Hamas government. This is intimately entangled with distinct colonial histories and imperial institutions. Hence, Said insisted that no writing, thinking or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and actions inspired by Orientalism.

194 Discourse here refers to a structured system of meaning which shapes what we perceive, think and do.
Nevertheless, it is useful to bring Foucault’s considerations into play - they are needed in the analysis of power relations as outlined in five considerations. First, it is the imbalanced relations in inherited systems. Second, the imbalanced relations generated from the types of objectives each partner possesses. In other words, the main motives behind which power is exerted to influence the actions of others. Third the instruments and channels through which power is diverted to achieve an act over the actions of others. Fourth, it is the type of institutions, which host the actors, where the exertion of power can take place. Fifth, it is the degree of rationalization used by actors in order to ensure the effectiveness of the instruments used to exert power and the certainties of their results.\textsuperscript{196} In this way, power is adjusted into processes that are more or less refined, transformed, and re-organized to suit current situations while various costs are expended to ensure the effectiveness of power.

In this respect, the EU is an institution that consists of a growing number of European states with different interests and objectives. However, the EU and its member states acted within a wider international context. Taking the EU member states’ reactions altogether, the drivers of the EU’s response come to the fore. The EU’s common approach towards a Hamas government based on free and democratic elections (as far as this was possible in the context of ongoing occupation) was that of isolation. Arguably, the EU’s cancelation of the budget and support for Hamas is not necessarily to make the Hamas-led government fail (the approach some in the US and Israel have taken) but rather to force a change in behavior on the part of Hamas.

However, as reflected earlier, there are at least three points of ambiguity within the EU’s boycott policy of the elected Hamas; in defining the Hamas government, in seeking reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas, and the gap separating the EU’s political objectives and the legal commitments.

The majority EU consensus explains the latter by way of three dilemmas. First, it is the inconsistency between diplomatic words and action. Second, there is no comprehensive rethinking of the effectiveness or even purpose of the EU’s aid to the OPT. Third, there is no majority consensuses of desisting from rewarding Israel through EU contractual relations or on ensuring that the Israel agreements are lawfully implemented.

Several factors may explain the EU’s approach and assuage the perceived need to act in the Middle East. This is felt particularly strongly by those member states whose political systems

and public opinion are sensitive to the development in the Middle East region accommodating the unwillingness of the EU majority to take a firm stance towards Israel through deeds and not only words. This unwillingness could be directed by a plurality of interests, ranging from transatlantic relations to commercial ties with Israel, alongside ideological commitments to Israel, and persists even when the EU knowingly acts against its aims and interests in the region.

Therefore, one should refer back to the historical processes of the conflict from which it has been generated and the sources of strengths and weaknesses of such power relations and actions resulting in imbalanced power relations, and similarly also to the conditions that enforce their strength or deplete their control.

5.1 Imbalanced Power Relations

Drawing on the analysis of Yasid Anani,\(^\text{197}\) of power relations, three types of imbalanced power relations were identified: (1) power relations (2) relationships of communications (3) objective capacity with the following consequences:

5.1.1 Power Relations

Two different levels of power relations are defined, in reference to Anani,\(^\text{198}\) in this part (1) global, and (2) local. Moreover, by defining possible actors, the discussion of this part takes a more practical route envisaging the possible influence of different actors through power relations in the EU’s foreign policy towards Palestine.

Now, in order to clarify global and local levels, it is important to define the actors on each level and their connection to other actors and groups in other levels, likewise, their assumed aims and interests.

The abstraction in the categorization of actors is used in order to ease the understanding of the complexity of the power structure in the EU policy towards Palestine. Abstraction does not imply that each of these actors works alone to achieve his aims, because aims can be mutual to several actors on several levels, and consequently, power can be exerted by several actors through several channels in order to reach an individual or allied aim. The plexus of actors’ relationships is complex and multileveled and these are not exerted unilaterally. Power could

\(^{197}\) Anani, Yasid, (2006), A new Common Border Space, Towards more justice in cross- Border Development, a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Spatial Planning at Dortmund University.

\(^{198}\) Anani, Yasid, (2006), ibid.
be more evident on certain levels and through certain actors where tangible measures in the form of pressure can be observed, for example, through negotiations.

The EU as a major actor is connected with other actors at different levels within different power relations and structures. Subsequently, a state of competition might have existed between the two local actors, namely, Israel and OPT. Each tries to exert power in different channels to fulfill his aims and expectations as well as gain benefit.

5.1.1.1 Global level

At the beginning, it is important to point out the potential global influence in the EU policy towards Israel-Palestine. Such global influence on the decision-making in the EU’s policy is a process which unfolds in different forms, either through trade protocols between the political entities or directly through sponsors and major donors such as the EU, USAID, UN and others.

As an example, global interactions have influenced the independency of political spaces in such a manner that instabilities and insecurity in one space interrupt the flow of transactions in other spaces. In relation, global trade sees no borders. Global interests range from exploiting natural resources and establishing new markets and regional trade infrastructure, to strategic political and social coalitions and reforms. One important global factor, which is a major global concern nowadays and has been strongly emphasized since September 11th, 2001 is security. It is seen as a basic need to sustain development and maintain the processes of world trade.

The global domains, in reference to the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), can be classified into three directions to a regional system of the wider Middle East in following manner:

- Firstly, policy domains: this is in terms of (1) Security: interstate, international terrorism, and ‘visas, asylum, illegal immigration and trafficking’. (2) Economics: macroeconomics, trade in goods and services, ‘structural, poverty reduction’, energy, regional infrastructures such as ‘transport, water, power, etc’, and finally legal movement of people. (3) Governance and human development: governance ‘democratizations, judiciary, anti corruption’, ‘civil society, media and human rights’, education, and culture.

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199 Emerson, Michael and Tocci, Nathalie, (2003), The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East, Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels
Secondly, geographic and political grouping: it includes (1) Maghreb, (2) Masreq, (3) Barcelona group, (4) Agadir group, (5) Gulf Cooperation Council, (6) Arab League, (7) Iran, (8) wider Middle East, and (9) Islamic states.

Thirdly, external actors: this as in the Quartet includes (1) EU, (2) USA, (3) Russia, (4) UN, and others ‘associated with the quartet, e.g. Norway and Japan’.

In this context, power is exerted by governments through different means and mechanisms in a certain areas. Specifically, governments have formal and informal contacts with the two entities, namely, Israel, and Palestine, as well as indirect relations with private institutions within the entities. The governments are connected to them directly through diplomatic relations. However, governments can also be in contact with different groups and factions within the same entity such as Hamas and Fateh as well as individuals through indirect and informal relations. For some reason, the governments have specific interests in the entity and tend to empower certain groups and individuals to sustain their interests. This can take one or multiple forms.

For example, to enforce political alliances within one or more of the entities by strengthening some groups or by supporting one of the entities as an ally by exerting certain powers over the other entity due to the reciprocal political and/or economic affiliations. Between governments, the main channel for communications is diplomacy and through the diplomatic bodies. Regional governments can be important actors in the Middle East region in connection with each entity but also at varied degrees.

As well, power can be exerted through international organizations and can vary in terms of political, economic or military humanitarian concerns. International organizations produce legislation and treaties, which governments collectively sign. It is important to note the power in the form of binding treaties and show the complexity of the global power and its influence on regional and local spaces. Here also, a global market can be added along a line of governments, institutions and individuals at all levels. The influence of market, information, including media, and technology is a crucial factor in defining power relations between countries on the basis not only of demands and needs, but also along the costs of production and distribution. To engage within a global market depends vitally on financial, infrastructural, scientific, institutional, and administrative resources.

5.1.1.2 Local level
The actors at the local level are connected in several dimensions to other actors at local and global levels. Possible influential actors at the local level can be categorized as follows:

- **The state**: it is the main national and local actor with its system of governance, with all its territory, institutions, regulations, managerial and executive systems. Hypothetically, the state aims at facilitating and producing collective goods and services for the majority of people living within its borders. A big share of global power is infiltrated through the government of the state via juridical, executive and administrative bodies through formal-regulations, permits and informal- individual confrontation and negotiation mechanisms. However, the power can be exerted through other actors such as agreements with influential private or media sectors.

- **The civil society organizations such as NGOs, the national society of information such as newsletters, TV stations, journals and others which affect public opinion. It represents several local groups with different sector concerns again through different forms. The civil society is often known in the OPT as non-governmental organizations. Some power mechanisms exerted by the NGOs through pressure on or complaints to the state are supported as a power relation as well as support from other global actors. The inactive role also influences the regulation and legislation and the governance of the state. As for media, it can be an instrument of power provoking public opinion and magnifying the focus on certain issues in the form of information and misinformation. How media is viewed is important as a tool of support or on the other hand as opposition to specific actors or interests.

- **The private sector with its investments and local networks is again connected to the global market. The private sector’s actors aim at gaining benefits from providing certain benefits. It is worth noting that all three above-mentioned local levels are connected to global powers and sometime convey the agendas of global powers to a certain extent.**

**Reflections**

- On an important note, there are too many global players such as the Quartet, where the EU, in addition to the US, the UN and Russia are included, the Middle East regional governments and the Arab- Muslim “world” at large along with civil societies- NGOs and private sectors.

- In the form of international political conventions over a certain line of policies, such as the measures taken for security and against terrorism, or in the form of incentives in return for political, economic and juridical reforms, new market products, investments, industries as
well as infrastructure and provision of services, the influence of international organizations is considerable.

- The state, as discussed earlier, does not exist in the case of Palestine. On the contrary, it is still occupied by a matrix of control by the state of Israel.

5.1.2 Relationships of Communications

Communication and the method by which information flows between partners influence the level of power between partners. Here, in drawing further on the work of Anani, the discussion is divided into three main sections (1) language as a medium of communication (2) language as information and (3) participation as means of communications.

5.1.2.1 Language

Flyvbjerg realized how the language of protocols does not stand strongly in front of action due to power relations.

“The written and spoken language that we used is structured by idealism, while reality and our actions as human beings are manipulated by power”.

It is worth focusing on the meaning of ‘rationalize’ as a verb, which holds a different, yet negative meaning than does rational. According to the Oxford Dictionary, rationalizing means:

“The justification of behavior to make it appear rational or socially acceptable by ignoring, concealing, or glossing its real motive; an act of making such a justification”

Consequently, power relations through means of communications such as protocols and agreements can be a source of transforming rational facts into rationalized facts, which suits the aims of the powerful.

5.1.2.2 Information and misinformation

Here, Flyvbjerg reflects on the combination between power relations with relationships of communication as a strategy used by the powerful:

201 Flyvbjerg, Bent, (1998), Rationality and Power: democracy in practice, Sampson, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, p8
“in modern societies the ability to facilitate or suppress knowledge is in large part what makes one party more powerful than another”\textsuperscript{203}

Obviously, the aim of communication is to send a piece of information, and when received determines the form of dis/agreement between the sender and the receiver. This way, information can shift the balance of power in favor of those who have it or who can process it differently and even turn it into misinformation. This can be carried out at varied degrees in three forms; the form being a complete set of hidden or unrevealed information, a form of partially or selectively revealed information, and the form of totally distorted information.

5.1.2.3 Participation

In order to convey the needs and interests of all involved partners, participation is essential. However, the degree of involvement of participants in the work of Arnstein is categorized in the following manner:\textsuperscript{204}

1. Non-participation: this is when the powerful participant fully controls information.
2. Tokenism: the less powerful partner communicates his views to the powerful participant at varied degrees according to his power to influence decision-making due to different levels of representation, the scientific and technological capacity in addition to negotiation ability.
3. Empowerment: this is shaped in the relationship between partners when all partners have equal flows of information. Therefore, empowerment is rare in the case of imbalanced power relations.

5.1.2 Objective Capacity

Up to now, it is clear that the relationships of communication, scientific and technological capacities are basic to achieving a better position of the partners. Nevertheless, the focus in this section, is placed on a more socially oriented discussion that goes beyond the technical, infrastructural, economic, and even military capacities. Accordingly, this section discusses objective capacity, in reference to the work of Anani,\textsuperscript{205} from four different angles (1) cognition (2) culture (3) the right to participate, and (3) technical capacities

5.1.3.1 Cognition

\textsuperscript{203} Flyvbjerg, ibid., p36  
\textsuperscript{205} Anani, Yasid, (2006), ibid.
In countering a powerful and less powerful partners, even if information is equally circulated between both of them on equal terms, the powerful would benefit more from what is given than the less powerful. One reason is that the difference in cognition creates gaps in power relations. This gap might influence the partners’ participation, the formulation, not only of their needs, but also in the equivalence in the use of resources. This can be viewed, to a certain extent, from the EU association agreements with Israel compared to the dead letter with the Palestinians.

### 5.1.3.2 Culture

The cultural differences between partners involved, eventually, produce considerable differences in the evaluation process. Different partners attach different meanings to different things and foresee different potentials in different resources. For example, Israel and the Palestinians have differences in identifying their needs and interests keeping in mind the different history, culture, and power relations. As a given example, the Jews in Israel, do not perceive Palestine the same way as Muslim and Christian Palestinians. The cultural development of the common space as Palestine on different sides might be vastly different due to the non-parallel line of history and consequently, a different, socio-economic and political progression and not only religion.

### 5.1.3.3 Right to participate

It was discussed earlier how important it is to possess information in order to enable one partner to engage in partnership and make the best out of the process. Hence, participation here is discussed as knowledge about the processes of how to participate and the right to participate as a capacity in itself.

Due to wide-ranging power differences and capacities around a common space as Palestine, the contribution of the people living closer to the space could be more effective and more relevant to local needs. At the same time, the people who are living on the less powerful side of the common space contribute inefficiently not only because of knowledge and cognitive skills but also because of the weak traces of the participation within the existing political systems.

### 5.1.3.4 Technical capacities

It is not only obvious that Israel possesses technological and economic capacity in the region but also it exercises it along the social structure of the society. Therefore, according to Yiftachel
(1995),\textsuperscript{206} it allows for more local participation within the legal definition of rights and freedoms. This influences Israel and the Palestinians differently, in terms of expectations, priorities and needs both locally and nationally that creates different reaction and interaction. Therefore, it is essential to find the right mechanism to overcome the knowledge capacity of the less powerful and less informed societies, especially in terms of role and rights of individuals and institutions.

5.2 An Abstract Model

The abstract model is a conceptual representation. Based on the discussion of imbalanced power relations and drawing further on Anani’s model,\textsuperscript{207} it aims at representing the finding of the dissertation. A common space in relation to the abstract idea is composed, mainly, of a special territorially defined area and the process between the entities involved.

![Figure 2: An illustration of a common space](image)

The common space is divided into two parts (1) an abstract territorial concept: it re-conceptualizes the different types of interrelated processes within a common space (e.g. territorial, social, political, etc.) between the state of Israel as one entity and the OPT as a stateless entity, and (2) the operationalized concept: it explains the different processes between the entities involved.


\textsuperscript{207} Anani, Yasid, (2006), ibid.
Consequently, the model draws not only a conceptual framework for the EU policy towards Palestine but also towards Israel. This is because of the EU’s vision in promoting peace based on a two-state solution considering the two entities. In this way, the common space is a core concern for all entities. Bringing in a common space as ‘one common space’ displays relatively a situation where the influence of the divisions of the territorial borders is minimized. This is because the model aims at looking at the EU policy towards Israel-Palestine as an interrelated complex of different social, economic, and political processes that is generated within a territorially defined space. Therefore, having a common space facilitates the illustration of this aim.

Also, the model offers a foundation for practical and theoretical discourse in the EU policy towards Israel-Palestine. It invites a new way of seeing and thinking of the particularity of the imbalanced power relations in an occupying-occupied context. In doing so, it is worth noting that a border line is a significant component in defining territorial boundaries by differentiating areas from each other socially, politically, etc., within a certain space.

Figure 3: The model of the EU policy towards Israel- Palestine

Figure 3 is an abstract chart suggesting a model for imbalanced power relations in the EU policy towards Israel-Palestine. The circle in the middle is a symbolic common space. Yet, this space itself is divided by a border line based on social, political and economic, etc. differences. At the same time, other global and local actors’ interests lie in the same space and consequently within the extent to which this border line is drawn. The arrows represent the
imbalanced power relations between the three entities, respectively, the EU, Israel and OPT. The three dimension of imbalanced power relations compromise (1) power relations, (2) objective capacity and (3) relationships of communications. The chart also shows directly and indirectly the way imbalanced power relations affect the space ‘circle in the middle’ between mainly Israel and OPT and also in connection to the EU as a highlighted actor as concerned in this dissertation. Each entity is explained in terms of possible relations with each other; however, other actors who are not highlighted in the chart within different levels influence the same common space.

Further, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the border line in a defined common space and its association with imbalanced power relations. To create a border means to create parameters for different categories. Those parameters display different qualities, such as accessibility, blockade and semi-blockade.

Moreover, the act of diminishing borders by creating new ones can be very crucial and can bring about different problems that did not exist before. Dialectically, this has both negative and positive effect on the elements, events, and systems within border areas.

Figure 4 illustrates in an abstract manner the dynamics between the two sides of the border line, namely Israel and Palestine with a wide range of differences.
However, Figure 5 demonstrates that the growth of one side of the border line tends to be higher and in favor with the powerful- Israel, eventually, pushing the border line to acquire more area from the other powerless- Palestine. This is in spite of the relative power-resistance on the Palestine side.

![Figure 5: Re-setting the border line (1)](image)

The brief review of the borders reveals a very important characteristic that plays a role in extending the differences between the two sides of the border space. The movement of the border line or in other words the transitional character of the border line creates not only a physical border, limiting mobility of people and goods between two entities, but also creates social, political, cultural differences on the two sides of the border.

However, the territorial concept alone is like clapping with one hand, as it does not explain the social, political, and economic processes. The way in which imbalanced power relations impact the EU policy towards Israel- Palestine is the task of the operationalized model, which will complement the abstract model as, illustrated in figure 6 as follows:
5.2 An Operationalized Model

This section aims to convert the abstract model into an operationalized model. More specifically, this section highlights three main strategic mechanisms formulated through imbalanced relations while drawing further on Anani’s model. This model, however, demonstrates the most common strategies that are constructed through imbalanced power relations: (1) rationalization (2) timing and (3) replacement of actors.

5.3.1 Rationalization

Rationalization according to Flyvbjerg shifts power relations by providing incomplete or misinformation as a form of relationships of communication. If one of the powerful actors benefits from maintaining a specific situation, this actor refers to several methods to rationalize the facts in the following way.

- One is through magnifying one’s own advantages and minimizing or trivializing the disadvantages of the others. Often, in the same vein, in the same way around upon one’s interest.

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208 Anani, Yasid, (2006), ibid.
For example, the EU insisted that the elected Hamas comply with three “principles”. However, those same principles soon evolved into strict conditions for the recognition of newly elected Hamas government.

Initially, the first condition stood at the forefront of the EU policy-makers for Hamas has been included on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations since 2003. However, this concerns Hamas as a political party and not an elected government nominated by different groups, among which no single group was nominated at least officially by Hamas. Besides, Hamas and non-Hamas members have both participated in these groups in the election. It is also worth noting that the vast number of people who voted for Hamas but were not actual members of Hamas suggested that the people were seeking a new liberal nationalist movement, that promised reform more so than a religious movement led by Hamas.

Besides, Hamas’s victory is significant not only for Palestinians but also for Arabs, Muslims and beyond. For the Palestinians, for the first time in half a century, the Palestinian Islamists have moved to top leadership in a peaceful way without violence, giving Palestinians as a whole, including Hamas, a sense of pride. Unlike many other Arab countries, the Palestinians embraced democracy not only in theory but in practice.

For Hamas itself, the victory provided a great challenge given the harsh reality on the ground with which it had to deal. At the Arab level, the victory of Hamas was unique. Political Islam has reached the top in a democratic process. Islamic movements in the region considered the victory of Hamas as their own victory. Arab and Muslim regimes watched the rise of Hamas with anxiety and fear it will encourage their local Islamists to pursue power. Seculars remained divided in the Arab world between supporting the nationalist liberation side of Hamas and Hamas religious substance.

Apparently, however, the Quartet went beyond calling on Hamas to renounce terrorism. The latter two conditions in particular were disputable. Hamas was called upon to recognize Israel, despite the fact that only states (or at most the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a legal representative of the Palestinians, of which Hamas is not a part, and which has recognized Israel) recognize other states and that the borders by which Israel would be recognized were left undefined. Regarding the acceptance of previous agreements, ironically,  

210 Hroub, Khaked, (2006), ibid., pxviii  
211 Hroub, Khaked, (2006), ibid., pxx
it was the Israeli Sharon government, which first asserted that it would only respect, rather than accept previous agreements in 2001.\textsuperscript{212}

- Another mechanisms would change the priorities and weight in such a way to rationalize the decision making process.

The 2006-8 periods saw a deepening of the EU- Israeli ties, irrespective of Israel’s increasingly serious violations of IHRL and IHL contrary to the second wing of the EU position. In the autumn of 2008, there were some developments regarding the misapplication of the EU-Israel association agreement, whereby EU benefits are illegally granted to Israeli settlements in the OPT such as trade preferences granted to settlement products. Suspected issues regulating the rules of origin problem were publically exposed in the autumn of 2008 by the UK, which proposed in the Council a discussion of ways to tighten the arrangement. Yet, rather than proposing to move away from the technical arrangement, to place the burden of providing the precise origin of products on Israel rather on the European customs authorities, and to seek a legal solution to the problem, the focus has shifted to the question of labeling. This is in order to allow consumers to make an informed choice between Palestinian products and products produced in Israeli settlements.\textsuperscript{213}

The awareness of refraining from assisting illegal Israeli actions in the OPT however may be slowly spreading. Yet, the EU has neither sought legal solutions to avoid rendering aid or assistance to internationally unlawful acts in the OPT, nor adopted safeguard measures to avoid extending existing misapplications of EU-Israel agreements to other policy domains. Further, the French Presidency, having secured Israel’s participation in its project- the Union for the Mediterranean- decided to proceed with the upgrade despite Israel’s conduct in the conflict. In addition, the EU member states have continued to bolster Israel’s military capacity through arms exports. For example, in 2007, 18 EU member states authorized 1018 licenses to Israel, although license authorizations do not amount to actual military exports, they signal member states’ intention to equip the Israeli army. For the period 2004-2007, the actual exports of the 13 EU member states’ conventional Military equipment to Israel, saw France

\textsuperscript{212} Ha’aretz article on 20 March, 2007, “The Syrian secret Sharon did not reveal to Olmert”, by Akiva Eldar at \url{http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/839634.html}

topping the list, (59,465,503), followed by Romania (20,990,793), and then the UK (10,470,819).\textsuperscript{214}

### 5.3.2 Timing

Timing is a very important factor. Tactical timing of events such as when to allow negotiations and to exchange views, and when to ignore them, can be used to achieve particular ends for the more powerful actors. It is a means of switching power on and off. The following text demonstrate according Anani’s model,\textsuperscript{215} two forms of timing (1) strategic timing and (2) timing in implementation.

- **Strategic timing:** when an actor is approached at a certain point in time to reflect upon a certain issue, it is a switch-on for this actor to use what power he has. The actor has to show either compliance or opposition and consequently elaborate on the process of decision-making. However, if the case was totally the opposite, meaning the actor was not approached for his reflection and even ignored through the articulation of power relationships between other actors- for example participation, then the actor’s power stays in a switched-off mode marginalized by the main power formation. This all depends also on the actor’s organizational, structural, and personal traits and conditions, and on the coalition and opposition state of the involved actors.

More specifically, and in view of the victory of Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary elections and its subsequent entry into the Palestinian Authority, it took the EU, alongside the Quartet, only five days to impose conditionality on the legitimately elected government by the occupied Palestinians.

The EU, alongside the US and Israel, stated its will to work with the caretaker government in the West Bank, a willingness which soon crystallized into what became known as the West Bank first strategy. The logic underpinning this strategy was that of rendering the West Bank a prosperous place, signaling to the Palestinians the dividends that could be reaped through moderation and cooperation with the international community and Israel. The EU’s West Bank first strategy contained three elements. All three elements failed to deliver.


\textsuperscript{215} Anani, Yasid, (2006), ibid.
First and on the economic front, the EU immediately resumed financial transfers to the PA. At the Paris donor conference in December 2007, the EU and its member states reconfirmed their role as the most generous funder of the PA. They pledged $3.4 billion out of total of $7.7 billion in budget support, development aid and humanitarian assistance. Of these funds, the EU pledged 440 million Euros channeled to support Fayyad’s Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) for 2008-10. By February 2008, the Commission replaced the TIM with a new financial instrument- PEGASE- entirely devoted to supporting the PA caretaker government. Of the 440 million Euros pledged, 325 million Euros would be channeled through PEGASE. 216

Despite this, living standards did not improve. The World Bank argued that “aid and reform without access are unlikely to revive the Palestinian economy”. 217 Yet whereas donor assistance met and surpassed initial expectations and the caretaker government made some steps forwards in reform, Israel’s movement restrictions increased, 218 non-compliance with the AMA persisted and settlement construction accelerated. 219

The French Presidency warned of Israel’s “worrying indifference to repeated calls from international community”. 220 Yet, little action followed. The economic situation in the West Bank thus failed to improve in 2008. 221

Second and on the security front, the EU activated EUPOL- COPPS in the West Bank. The purpose of the mission was that of training and equipping the PA civil police in order to improve living standards in the West Bank by increasing security. 222 EUPOL-COPPS trained and equipped approximately 600 police officers and helped improve law and order in West Bank, particularly in towns such as Nablus and Jenin. In May 2008 the mission was expanded into a broader rule of a law mission covering the penal and judicial systems. 223

221 Word Bank (2008), ibid.
222 US concentrated, instead, on training and equipping the PA national security forces and the presidential guard
Whereas EUPOL-COPPS contributed to improved law and order in the West Bank, it failed or rather could not succeed in managing effectively the security sector. In turn, despite improved security in the West Bank, security forces remained politicized, lacking democratic practices. They engaged in human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests and detentions, particularly against tens of Hamas members and supporters in the West Bank. This is almost similar to what Hamas did with its Fatah supporters in Gaza Strip.\textsuperscript{224}

Furthermore, the efforts of the Palestinian civilian police were exploited by the frequent Israeli military incursions in the same cities in which PA forces were deployed. The EU tried to solve this by sponsoring human rights training programs among police forces, but these micro interventions were limited.

Third and on the diplomatic front, the member states, the Commission, the Council and the High Representative pledged their support for the Annapolis process launched by the US in November 2007. In the run-up to the Annapolis conference, the EU suggested an “Action Strategy for the Middle East Peace Process”, committing to support bilateral efforts between the involved parties, the mediating role of the US, and the efforts of the Quartet and of the Arab league to promote the Arab initiative.\textsuperscript{225} The Annapolis process in practice failed to advance any further by late 2008.

In 2008, the EU persisted in a vitiated strategy conceptualized during the Oslo years. It increased its assistance to the PA despite its growing undemocratic practices, and supported the diplomatic process while in practice acquiescing in Israel’s policies. The point was that this would be sufficient to provide security to Israel while improving the lot of the Palestinians so as to secure their moderation and compliance.\textsuperscript{226} Yet, as Richard Norton put it, all the Palestinians have seen is an “entrenched occupation and a weak, corrupt government that is, at best an ineffectual parody of democracy”\textsuperscript{227}


Timing in implementation: the division of implementation might not be based ultimately upon limited financial resources but could also be planned to reduce the effect of possible deficiencies or at least controversial issues on public opinion.

As outlined earlier, the EU financial resources and support to the Palestinians have increased with the boycott of Hamas, arguably, to overcome public opinions and political deficiencies.

One example as observed from the Oslo agreements, the first phase contained issues which to a certain extent, were guaranteed not to provoke public opinion and not to generate public resistance. Likewise, the most important issues were postponed to the following phases, especially, the final phase. Consequently, the phase-by-phase publication of information is somehow a timing issue using information and communication relationships to avoid negative public opinion against the Oslo agreements in Israel, Palestine and in Europe.

Another example is the EU’s border monitoring efforts. Whereas on most occasions EU initiatives are mentioned in the context of the need to secure open access and implement the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) taking the path of international law and public opinions. On other occasions, especially when it is restricted by Israel, its emphasis is on anti-arms smuggling, which could entail a further sealing of Gaza’s borders, particularly if actions are taken to detect and destroy tunnels before access is assured.

5.3.3 Replacement of Actors

The different levels of power relations between actors are not always stable. Actors’ relationships could be reformulated into new combinations of allies and adversaries. In other cases, actors can be totally dismissed depending on their capacities, communication skills as well as their power relations.

In the work of Flyvbjerg (1998) and Forster (1989), replacing and displacing actors is another mechanism of practicing power, which is used by stronger coalitions to terminate opposition and replace it with approval. Through this process, the right to participate in decision making through one’s official position and freedom of expressing scientific concerns is taken away and moved to another actor who can ratify the major interests of the strong coalition.

In this direction, the EU, alongside Israel and the US, persisted in negative conditionality towards Hamas between June 2007 and December 2008. The implicit objective remained that of “defeating” Hamas through a double-track strategy of punishment of Hamas and
consequently of the population of Gaza Strip, and rewards to the PA/ Fateh government, and thus to the population of the West Bank. Yet, an unwavering unwillingness to exert any form of pressure on Israel regarding its human rights and IHL obligations as an occupying power.

It is important to note here that the EU alone did not cause the collapse of national unity and the political separation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip that ensued, which was determined, inter alia, by internal Palestinian political dynamics, Israel, the US and other actors in the region. Yet, by supporting Israeli and American policies and imposing negative conditionality towards Hamas and the NUG, the EU played an active part in the international approach which led to these results.

Paradoxically, technical assistance and diplomatic support to the WB could not compensate for the deteriorating situation on the ground. The West Bank first approach failed with respect to its objective of positively altering Palestinian incentives in favor of the “moderation”, also because alongside it there was a second policy element, the isolation of Gaza Strip. If we turn to Gaza, on the other hand, the EU’s own isolation of the Gaza Strip through its refusal of contact with and assistance to its authorities signaled through its deeds the EU acquiescence in Israel’s strategy of curbing Hamas through collective punishment of the population. The strategy, while punishing the civilian population, ending the Palestinians’ view of democracy, had little to dispower Hamas, which remained firmly in control of the Gaza Strip. Israel, in another direction, the second wing of the EU policy towards Israel-Palestine is that of a deepening relationship, regardless of Israel’s conduct in the conflict.\(^{228}\)

Hence, since June 2007 the EU has persisted in its boycott of the Hamas government in Gaza by refusing contact with it and refraining from channeling aid through it. The approved EU sewage system and the airport project in the Gaza Strip, for example were totally dysfunctional. In terms of cash assistance, the only EU aid channeled to the Gaza Strip in 2008 was the payments to 28,500 civil employees. This includes the PA civil servants who did not go to work under the Hamas administration as well as teachers and health workers and 24,000 Gaza residents under the Palestinian Vulnerable Families program. In addition, the payments to cover private sector arrears and to pay for fuel bills to operate Gaza’s power plant, as well as humanitarian assistance under ECHO and the URWA, amounting to a total of approximately 220 million Euros.\(^{229}\) In this case, cash money to the Gaza Strip did not help

\(^{228}\) Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid.
\(^{229}\) Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid. Also, Benita Ferrero-Waldner Commissioner for External Relations and ENP (2009), “European Union Pledges Support for reconstruction of Gaza”, International Conference in support
for it must be continuously negotiated with Israel. Meanwhile, as Israel’s siege of Gaza tightened.

Further, in September 2007 Israel classified the Gaza Strip as “hostile territory”, significantly restricting the access of humanitarian goods and fuel, while effectively banning the movement of commercial goods and people in and out of the territory. The declared aim was that of exerting pressure on Hamas, essentially creating a direct link between the pursuit of political goals and the collective punishment of the civilian population.

Yet Israel’s closure of the Gaza Strip persisted leading to 50% unemployment rate and to the shut down of 95% of Gaza’s industry due to lack of raw materials and export opportunities. Israel also continued to restrict humanitarian access, including basic food and medicine. The Gaza Strip requires a daily average of 400-500 truckloads of humanitarian assistance at daily basis according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICC) and the UN. Between June 19th and November 5th, 2008, the average number of daily truckloads dropped to 120.

On November 4-5th 2008, the situation got worse when Israel carried out an incursion, allegedly in order to destroy a tunnel under construction, which killed six Hamas militants. Hamas resumed rockets attacks, including launching longer-range missiles, creating additional Israeli public pressure on the government to take action. By November 5th, Gaza’s borders were almost entirely closed as Israel allowed a mere 6 truckloads per day to enter the Strip. In a situation in which over 80% of the 1.5 million people in Gaza are dependent on food aid, the effect was devastating.

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230 The term “hostile territory” has no basis in IHL

231 In doing so Israel has violated both its obligations as the occupying power under IHL (to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel) and under IHRL (the right to life, health, movement, water and decent living). For more details, see Gisha, (2009)


However, the EU objected to Israel’s closure policy, recognizing it as an illegal act of collective punishment. Yet, beyond words, little was done to induce Israel to lift the closure, for example on fuel supplies below Gaza’s minimum needs.235

By permitting and operating under Israeli restrictions on fuel purchases and on the repair and maintenance of power plant turbines and the electricity network, the EU has implicitly recognized these restrictions as lawful. As far as EUBAM is concerned, the EU did not take further initiatives to ensure the implementation of the AMA after the complete closure of Rafah post- June 2007.236

Reflections
- Imbalanced power relations in their three forms- power relations, relationships of communications and objective capacity- exist between a complex net of actors. They also exist in many forms such as arrangements and agreements. Actors can be in groups or individuals, forming alliances and adversaries with each other. Actors can be directly involved visibly forming relations with each other, however, informal actors can generate hidden mechanisms that can indirectly influence the decision-making processes.
- As long as there is communications between actors and exchange of information, imbalanced power relations can exist and there is no way to remove totally the negative effect of these relations. However, the difference might be reduced or minimized.
- Reviewing the EU policies from a legal standpoint entails an obligation in the context of the EU external relations, stemming from specific instruments in relation to HRL, and relevant rules concerning state responsibility.
- EU policies towards the OPT thus acted as a light version of the strategy espoused by Israel as well as the US in the same period. Hence, little pressure was exerted by the EU on Israel to alter the latter’s polices on the ground.

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235 See, EU Presidency Statement on further escalation of violence in Gaza and Southern Israel”, 2 March 2008, on the EU’s definition of Israel’s siege as collective punishment see, http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/f45643a78fcba719852560f6005987ad/25d22ebc70ead21885257010056004b!OpenDocument
236 Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid. Note that Israel cut fuel supplies and electricity in September 2007 and declared it as a “hostile territory” and put a “minimum humanitarian standard”, as a standard with no basis in law
6 Expert Interviews

Up until now, the general methodology scheme was presented in terms of three phases (observatory phase, analytical phase, and model formation phase). Further, the author took on the analysis of the EU common strategy in terms of the EU position, declarations, and legal obligations, the EU instruments via Israel- OPT in terms of diplomacy, contractual and capacity building, and the deployment of the EU policy between the elections and the collapse of national unity.

In this chapter, however, the understanding of the EU- policy towards OPT by informed Europeans and Palestinians in terms of frame analysis are the ones the author proposes to deal with. To do so, interviews are compared interpretatively in the following manner:

The chapter tackles the frames that define policy problems and the way in which different participants understand them. More specifically, how Europeans and Palestinians, informed about EU policy- making, frame the situational contexts that attribute social meanings to the EU boycott of the elected Hamas representatives. The way language is used to call attention to the conflict that reflects the views of different communities is of significance.

It details information that is still scare concerning the views of Europeans and Palestinians’ namely, informed Palestinian academics and politicians including the Islamists as well as European officials, diplomats and academic “experts” working in Palestine and in Brussels, on the EU’s boycott policy. Further, it examines Islamophobia, on a comparative basis, as the interviewees perceive it.

It analyzes what the response to this boycott policy is, in terms of who is responding, how and what is the final product of this response for potential intervention to resolve the differences between the views of the different communities. Therefore, the EU policy is examined along frames that link perception with action.  

Interpretatively, Europeans and Palestinians whose understandings of the EU’s policy are central to its enactment are of analytical concern in terms of:

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237 Yanow, Dvora, (2008), Interpretative Policy Analysis course, University of Vienna, 2008. Supplemented by notes among other references, to Schön & Rein
1. **Who?** Actors (individual, collective): identify issues- relevant interpretative discourse communities of meaning with respect to the focus of analysis “the EU’s boycott policy of Hamas”

2. **How?** Vehicle: identify key symbols and intervention, and finally

3. **What?** Content: identify meanings (note plural: multiple possible meanings) that key symbol(s) has (have) for each community of meaning and their similarities and differences in the process framing the conflicts. Framing- reflection in terms of resolution of conflict requires frame breaking.\(^{238}\) In doing so, the author reports the views of the interviewees without any intervening judgment in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Int. Policy</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Palestinians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who</strong></td>
<td><em>European diplomats at European embassies located in the West Bank- Ramallah(^{239})</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>European senior officials working in the European Commission, and the Council of Europe in Brussels</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Two Professors and two students of one of the professors.</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>All European interviewees wished to remain anonymous with the exception of the two professors, Prof. John Bunzl and Prof. Roger Heacock</em></td>
<td><em>Palestinian professors at Bir Zeit and al-Najah universities</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Palestinian Ministers and parliamentary-members in the West Bank(^{240})</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Palestinian professionals and researchers working in human rights NGOs and research centers</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>The interviewees are respectively, Zahirah Kamal, Sameer abu ‘esheh, Sameeh shbeb, Samia al- botmeh, Said Kanan, Saed al- Nimr, Raed N’eerat, Naser Sha2er, Kamal Hassoneh, Hasan Fayyad, Abdullah Abdulla</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How</strong></td>
<td>Vehicle: identify key symbols (language, objects, and/or acts) which have significant meanings for these interpretative communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
<td><em>It is an economic and political partnership between 27 European countries.</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{238}\) Yanow, Dvora, (2000), Conducting Interpretative Policy Analysis, qualitative research methods, Sage Publications, California, 2000, p22

\(^{239}\) It was impossible for the researcher to interview any of the diplomats at European embassies located in Jerusalem for the researcher is a Palestinian Identity- holder from the West Bank and is not allowed to enter Jerusalem

\(^{240}\) Hamas members were not interviewed as planned for most of them at the time of the interview were detained and imprisoned. Besides, there was neither access to enter Jerusalem to interview Palestinians there nor to enter or to interview Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
It aims for peace, freedom and prosperity that has resulted so far in free travel and trade, single euro currency, and better living standards and joint action... and much more besides.

*It has three main bodies to run and adopt its legislation, namely, the European Parliament representing the people of Europe, the Council of the European Union representing national governments and the European Commission representing the common EU interest.

*It is also seen as having “influential” and less influential EU member states in the EU-policy-making process.

**strengths**

*It is considered to be a big tent for Europeans along with the principle of gradual progression, moving its members as one unit at different speeds and bringing a great number of races, languages, and religions. Many European representatives consider the formation of a common international European identity to be the strongest point of the EU.

*The supremacy of the European court authority over local courts is among the major strengths of the union as well as its economic policy with solidarity between more and less powerful countries.

*It is worth noting that most interviewees appraised the EU’s role as major donor to the Palestinians with some doubts about its effectiveness, though.

**weaknesses**

*The EU had double standards in its foreign democratization policy. Some Palestinian interviewees, particularly, questioned how they are supposedly to value democracy and desire democratic process. Giving the example that the EU neither accepted the election results when Islamists were brought to power, neither has it accepted Turkey’s accession to the EU, nor requires (expressed at varied degrees by some interviewees) its authoritarian allies to practice democracy in the Arab world.

*The lack of a common EU policy as perceived by some persons in both groups of interviewees amounts to a significant weakness. No common consistent EU foreign policy towards Palestine; Britain’s position is different from France’s and Germany’s is different from both along with changing
The degree of divergence between the member states goes far in explaining the emergence of current ambiguity within the positions of the EU member states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The first concerns Israel-Palestine violence and encounters of violence/terrorism.</th>
<th>The Palestinian resistance is seen as being a right of the occupied Palestinians to resist Israeli occupation. Some argue if resistance is conceived as occupied Palestinian violence/terrorism by the EU, why can the EU not see the disproportional violence/terrorism of the occupying/terrorist state.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*The second concerns the EU’s border monitoring efforts. Whereas the EU’s initiatives are mentioned in the context of the need to secure open access and implement the AMA, some others’ emphasis are placed on anti-arms smuggling by Hamas.</td>
<td>*The EU’s border monitoring efforts are welcome in the context of the Palestinian need to secure open access. However, it is seen to be mostly ineffective given its inability to conduct border monitoring, reconstruction and aid policy under current conditions and Israel’s control of such access. Often, they are seen as one-sided efforts especially when the emphasis is placed on anti-arms smuggling, which could entail a further sealing of Gaza’s borders, particularly if actions are taken to destroy tunnels before access is assured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*The third concerns the formation of a Palestinian national unity government, some favored reinstating the PA in the WB as well as in Gaza and thought it necessary to reach a resolution in the future, and others made it a strong condition that Hamas accept the three conditions of the Quartet.</td>
<td>*The EU is seen by some as supporting, and others see as not genuinely favoring the formation of a Palestinian national</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

241 As given examples, the British mandate in Palestine and its current role in the war against Iraq. Sarkozy’s speech at time of the interviews asserting on TV that France supported the establishment of the state of Palestine along the 1967 borders was considered positively. Some Southern European and Scandinavian states were viewed to be supportive to Palestinian democracy but not to an extent to put any pressure on Israel. The case with Germany was mostly viewed negatively in relation to Angela Merkel speech in the Knesset by then and her one-sided empathy with Israel with no consideration the the violation of human rights Israel commits against the Palestinians. One Palestinian interviewee stated “sorry Israel and no sorry, go die Palestinians”. Another interviewee suggested that her visit sent a message that injustice against Jews alone should never happen again, but it is all right to commit acts of injustice against Palestinians.
Policy

Two-state resolution: Two states living in peace within internationally recognized borders. The state of Palestine would be established in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip along the 1967 borders (with minor and mutually agreed adjustments if necessary), and would be viable, sovereign and democratic.

*The EU historically recognized Israel’s right to statehood, living in peace with its neighbors within secured and internationally recognized borders.

*A key position is in serving the security of the state of Israel in reference to Conclusions of the EC in 1999. Another key position is in building a Palestinian state with financial resources channeled for this purpose. Here, some argued that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian state would be the best guarantee to Israeli security.

*The EU’s position towards the Palestinians was articulated over time to support Palestinian self-determination beginning in the 1980 Venice declarations. As well, by the end of the Oslo process, the EC advanced its support to the Palestinian state.

*Either, it is seen as a pro-Israel policy, and furthermore as colonial in terms of supporting the occupier against the occupied. Firstly, it criticizes the conduct of the occupier less and that of the occupied more. Secondly, it limits its criticism as related to Israel by words such as condemnations, and thirdly, in the opposite direction, upgrades its agreements with Israel. Yet, its response to the results of democratic election in the OPT, by boycotting Hamas and consequently isolating not only Hamas but also the 1.5 million Palestinians living in Gaza Strip.

towards

*Some EU representatives consider the EU to be fully committed to human rights and democracy due to an ethical point of view towards a peaceful Israel-Palestine

*Some consider the EU’s ethical view to be in favor of the rights of the occupier as much as related to a feeling of guilt towards the Jewish people due to the holocaust legacy in Europe rather than the rights of the Palestinians under Israeli
conflict resolution. However, some others consider that the EU’s is acquiescing to a political agenda imposed by the USA and Israel and only pursuing further economic development. Many, however, consider the EU’s role to be limited to economic development making no sense when considering the major financial humanitarian support to the Palestinians. Yet, some wondered what else could be done if the EU was not helping the Palestinians in reference to the Arab-Muslim world at large.

**Palestine**

*The starting point used by each European diplomat is 1967 borders. Earlier it had been considered a waste of efforts to reach a two-state solution and somehow out of date.

*Essentially, Palestinians refer to historical Palestine as it was in 1948 and before the establishment of the state of Israel. Some, however, consider 1967 to be an acceptable point in history whereby the PLO as well as the international community agrees on this as a framework for negotiations in order to reach two-state solutions.

**Intervention**

**A.1**

*The EU addresses the political, economic, humanitarian and security issues and Palestinians reforms and institution-building as being necessary in building a viable state. Meanwhile, the EU calls on Israel for freezing the Israeli Settlement and for abstaining from measures in violation of international law.

*Essentially, the EU is paying the price for the occupation destruction in the OPT instead of the occupier itself.

*Some Palestinians consider the EU’s financial support to be up to the conditions laid down by donors. Others emphasize that it is in violation of international law and used to impose the donor agenda against the will of the occupied people.

*Some Palestinians see the EU’s economic focus as being due to its incapability to master its own political agenda in acquiescence to the political agenda of the USA and Israel.
The EU condemns terrorism and violence strongly, which cannot be allowed to hold up the peace process or political stability in the region.\(^{242}\)

The EU policy focused among other things on democracy, good governance and human rights, on inter-state and intra-state resolutions. However, it has been argued by some as being ineffective,\(^{243}\) and some others think that it must be improved.\(^{244}\)

The EU has opted for a strategy of negative conditionality towards the elected Hamas representatives, i.e. the threat of withdrawing benefits such as aid and diplomatic contacts until certain conditions have been met since Hamas is included on the EU’s terrorist list. However, Hamas participated in the parliamentary election and the PA and the EU, along with the Quartet insisted on three principles as they were called by some European interviewees and strict conditions as they were called by all the Palestinian interviewees. For normal contacts to take place, Hamas would have to be removed from the terrorist list and for this to take place would have to demonstrate its withdrawal from terrorism.

The EU, however called for 1) the renouncement of violence 2) the acceptance of previous agreements and 3) the recognition of the state of Israel. Those conditions were elaborated further by the interviewees in the following manner:

*Firstly, all rejected violence and some used the term along Palestinian violence. Some Palestinians,\(^{245}\)

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\(^{242}\) The EU has listed Hamas and Islamic Jihad on its list of banned terrorist organizations for their attacks against Israel. At the same time, it recognizes Israel’s right to protect its citizens from these attacks. However, it repeatedly emphasizes that it shall exercise this right within international law and takes no action that aggravates the humanitarian and economic situation of the Palestinians.

\(^{243}\) Given examples, it condemned attacks on civilians, the separation wall and settlement. However, it refrained from calling for an international independent investigation into violation of IHL and IHRL. It did not find a legal solution to the existing misapplications of the EU- Israel agreements.

\(^{244}\) The EU has repeatedly called upon Israel to deliver tax revenues and ease the restrictions of movements. The EU did not object to Israel’s decision on crossing monitoring either and thus accepted closure of the border since June 2007

\(^{245}\) Given examples, the EU called for ceasefire, yet failed to secure its goal by not exerting any pressure on Israel.
Interviews

<table>
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<th>with terrorism and often associated it with the Palestinians and eventually, Hamas. None though addressed the violence carried out by the state of Israel, unlike the Palestinians. As for resistance to the Israeli occupation, some distance themselves from this view altogether and others supported only peaceful negotiations while some others limit it to non-violent means of resistance for now and in the future, along a fixed border-space in reference to 1967. One interviewee questioned the inability of Hamas simply to reject violence, for Palestinians have the right to name and define violence and not to accept the Israeli definition. Hamas could channel it accordingly into a refusal to accept Palestinian violence internally.</th>
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<td>as did the Europeans, confused the term with terrorism while some others among the Palestinians only mixed it with resistance. Further, some elaborated that increasingly, attempts by politicians and media are more likely in Israel and the USA and less likely in Europe to link violence to the Palestinian resistance. In relation to this, at least two positions were reflected; firstly, the means of resistance, namely, violent and non-violent resistance, time in terms of the past, current and future resistance strategy, and space in terms of the 1948 and 1967 border-lines.</td>
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<td>*Secondly, some found Hamas’ participation in the election as an indirect acceptance of previous agreements, especially Oslo that brought the election into existence. Everyone, with the exception of one interviewee, regretted the EU’s</td>
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| participation in the election process as being de-facto acceptance of all previous agreements. It was often stated that it was the responsibility of the PLO, of which Hamas is not a part, and not of Hamas to carry out negotiation processes along those agreements and that was in agreement with Hamas. Some interviewees found a difference between Hamas and the nominated lists for the election, who were not necessarily Hamas members. Some questioned how the EU would be able to distinguish who was Hamas and who was not from those nominated for election and further among the Palestinians who voted for them. |
| * Thirdly, to recognize the state of Israel and/or according to some to recognize |
acceptance of Hamas’ participation in the election in the first place. Many though expressed that the election is a Palestinian issue only and to contact the elected or not is an EU decision. The exceptional view highlighted that all EU member states but one, namely, the Netherlands, rejected Hamas’ participation at an earlier stage in the election.

*Thirdly, the recognition of the state of Israel was found essential for any peace process to take place between Israel and the Palestinians. As for recognizing Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, at least two views are arguable; one finds it an Israeli issue to define itself a non-Jewish state and a second view, could predict difficulties in the implication of such recognition, especially, on the Palestinians living in Israel. Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state is strongly debatable. As for the first, all confirmed that the PLO and Arafat had already done so and some others argued that it was important to include Hamas in the PLO as a mass-based movement and therefore to make sure those voices of the Palestinians are heard irrespective of their political party. As for the second, some argued that the insistence of Israel and not the EU to recognize Israel as a Jewish state was in order to expel the Palestinians living inside Israel and to crash the right of Palestinian refugees to return and thus the whole peace process. Some others were of the opinion that whether it was a Jewish state or not, the Palestinian’s right of return was not negotiable as well as Palestinians living inside Israel. However, it may cause inequalities as it does now between Jews and non-Jews living in Israel.

### A.2 Post-election European Union Foreign Policy

*Interviewees strongly argued that the EU boycott policy of Hamas in 2006 was acted upon within a wider international context within which the escalation of conflict took place.

*The EU boycott of Hamas implied not only withholding aid to it, but the international community also froze international bank transactions in Palestine. In addition, Israel, in violation of previous agreements and international law, has withheld Palestinian tax revenues amounting to one
third of the PA’s monthly revenues, it has repeatedly arrested dozens of Hamas ministers and parliamentarians, and it has restricted their movement between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Jerusalem

*It was often argued, that the boycott of Hamas and isolating Gaza, financing the PA- controlled West Bank, made the accomplishment of the EU’s declared objectives for a peaceful Middle East less likely.

*The EU boycott, coupled with the EU’s unconditional support of Israel and Israel’s policy, made the EU’s pleas for democracy and good governance in Palestine appear to Palestinians, in particular, as a stunning illustration of the notorious double standards.

*On the EU’s aid to OPT, it engaged in humanitarian aid without demanding any compensation from Israel or investigating into its violations, despite its ongoing inability to channel funds effectively to Gaza. The Quartet agreed on this (TIM), coupled with a growing need for humanitarian assistance, and this resulted in a large increase in the EU assistance to the Palestinians.  

*Aid had catastrophic effects on Palestinian governance and society for the OPT increasingly resembled a semi-international protectorate for the international community to deliver aid to the occupied. Further, the TIM had led to re-centralization of powers in Abbas’ hands that drew much criticism during Arafat’s rule and generated unaccountable management of the PA funds. Partly, it contributed to Gaza’s chaos and lawlessness.

What?

Content: identify meanings (note plural: multiple possible meanings) that key symbol(s) has (have) for each community of meaning and their similarities and differences in frame conflicts

B.1

Islamophobia Meanings and Manifestation

Islamophobia: To the interviewees, Islamophobia has a wide range of definitions such as hostility against Islam, or fear from Islam or hatred or ill

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246 TIM: a mechanism through which funds were channeled to the OPT while bypassing the PA with the exception of the presidency.
247 This in confirmation of the words of the UN envoy de Soto “Europeans have spent more money in boycotting the PA than what they previously spent in supporting it”. Quoted in Alvaro de Soto (2007), ibid., p31  
248 While the humanitarian focus generated a culture of dependence in the OPT, the absence of an effective Palestinian government and Israel’s hold over Gaza created fertile ground for criminal gangs.  
249 The author used the same term Islamophobia as it is and in English while questioning the interviewees about its meaning, as they perceive it.
treatment to Muslims in different aspects of life or discrimination against Muslims and sometimes as a form of racism discrimination against Muslim groups. This is due to a perception that all Muslims are religious fanatics, have violent tendencies towards non-Muslims and reject the concept of equality, tolerance and democracy and, often, noted the following:

*A profound Islamophobia debate has been taking place since September 11 and subsequent attacks in Madrid and London.*

*Some interviewees noted that political leaders have started more often to adopt apocalyptic discourse, speaking in the name of God in their speeches and in the name of good and evil.*

*Further debate, particularly in Europe following the Danish cartoon against which huge demonstrations took place.*

*It is also argued that, with the end of the Cold War, America needed a new ideological enemy, in reference to Islam, to serve as a threat*

*The media, seminars and hundreds of publications worldwide started to focus on Islam.*

*Many interviewees claimed that the media has presented Islam in Europe, more likely, as a negative stereotype and has played a disproportionate role against Islamist-violence compared to non-Islamists violence as well intensifying Judo-Christian West-East Islam.*

*Some interviewees also pointed out that the term Islamophobia is not ideal because it is not clear or specific. Instead, it leaves much leeway for negative assumptions and manifestations of hostility against Muslims while some pointed out that it is not the rejection of a religion alone but a refusal to include people perceived as non-European due to their different race and names.*

*Many interviewees perceived Islamophobia to take place in Europe.*

*One form of Islamophobia outside Europe was mentioned in relation to the rise of anti-Western Islamist movements in predominant Muslim countries, and the way they are seen as terrorists in the US-led war on terror policy. For example, against the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and as claimed in Iraq, and more specifically Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as Hamas that are in direct conflict with Israel. It was further elaborated that those movements are more likely anti-USA
*Often, the term is referred to in connection with a Muslim minority in Europe and elsewhere with the exception of one interviewee, who pointed out that Islamic and anti-Western movements are examples of violent Islamists coming to power even in a democratic process.

**B.2 Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism**

*The comparison made by many interviewees between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism was highlighted according to similarities as well as differences between the two in the following manner:

*The similarity is often perceived in terms of the exclusion of minorities as well as prejudice and religion-based discrimination in Europe. This can amount to verbal or physical attacks on Muslim and Jewish individuals and groups and their holy places. 

*The difference is often viewed in terms of the historical situation of the Jews and the contemporary situation of Muslims as “double standards” for religion-based attack is no longer acceptable if it is directed against Jews but more acceptable if it is against Muslims.

*As related to Israel-Palestine, a colonial structure of a Jewish state on the ground as declared is often ignored in Europe while it continues to occupy Palestine and Palestinian-Hamas resistance is emphasized at varied degrees within and between different European countries.

*Arguably, the very concept of anti-Semitism and that of Islamophobia serve to stifle both external and internal criticism of Jews and Israel and of Hamas and Palestine and Palestinians.

**B.3 Islamophobia and the European Union Foreign Policy**

*The EU has established foreign policy and initiatives through which to pursue engagement with political Islamists. One critical element of this

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250 For example, Prof. Bunzl stated that prejudice against Muslims nowadays in Europe reminded him exactly of the prejudice that took place also in Europe against Jews.
initiative is to strengthen engagement with Islamists in and outside Europe. *This EU policy is met often with “curiosity” if not with “suspicion” by Islamists, mainly, for the EU’s position towards Turkey’s candidacy for membership of the EU that is one of the most disappointing examples given by the interviewees, and recently by the pressing EU boycott policy of the elected Hamas representatives. *It is noted by some interviewees that European governments have remained reluctant to support a democracy potential in Palestine led by Hamas while donors who distanced themselves from this could be perceived as (Islamophobic) aid.

*Some addressed the EU’s policy towards engaging with Islamists externally and internally as a growing concern to the EU. The external element concerns the role of Muslim democrat parties in the Middle East and North Africa while the internal element concerns tensions surrounding the Muslim minority communities in Europe. *Many interviewees, including the Islamists, legitimize the adoption of the European democracy model and the way it functions within Europe, provided that it serves Islamic values and does not replace them, since all belong to humanity. However, this same EU model for democracy is perceived as a double-standards model, especially as related to Islamists outside Europe.

**Evaluation**

At varied degrees, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and the EU policy towards Israel-Palestine are intertwining.

**C.1**

The Impact of Islamophobia on the EU Foreign Policy towards Palestine

*Some noted that criticism of Israel sometimes amounts to anti-Semitism. Further, September 11th played a significant role in emphasizing anti-Semitic projects and disregarding the Zionist project. * As for criticism of Israel in Europe, it is less likely and

* It is noted that the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation is increasingly being transformed into Islamic violence/terrorism (read: anti-Semitism) often inspired by anti-Jewish themes in early Islamic tradition and European anti-Semitism.

* It is less likely and when there is criticism, it is limited to words and not
Interviews

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<th>C.2</th>
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<td></td>
<td>A more coherent and consistent, credible and effective EU policy towards the conflict aimed at fulfilling the EU’s political vision and complying with the EU’s legal commitments as follows:</td>
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<td>*To promote and support both independent international and domestic criminal investigations into alleged violations committed during the conflict by all parties.</td>
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<td>*To re-assess the EU- Israel bilateral relations as a cornerstone of its political approach and to introduce the logic of human rights and IHL, *To give a longer- term orientation to the EU’s aid to the OPT, while being careful in respect of independence in channeling humanitarian assistance.</td>
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<td>*To formulate a viable and well- thought out strategy to engage with a new Palestinian government representing a first step towards Palestinian reconciliation</td>
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<td>*To re-evaluate its border monitoring activities by ensuring that member states’ anti- arms smuggling efforts take place hand by hand with the regular opening of all crossings to Gaza.</td>
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Often, it is argued that the EU’s two- state solution policy, contrary to its declared objectives, is “neither state building nor democratization”. In terms of democracy, one damaging factor for the image of the European model of democracy is the “doubled- standards” of democracy within and outside Europe. Within Europe, the EU stands for “sovereignty” of the people based on justice and freedom and equalities between individuals and groups. However, the EU is far from reality on the part of neighboring countries in a way perceived as the “EU wants democracy upon its choosing” and therefore less willing to accept produced results that they are not seeking.

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251 This is, as recommended, by either receiving binding guarantees from Israel that it would not impede the access of the EU monitors to Rafah or stationing EUBAM monitors in Egypt rather than in Israel, and/ or by confirming that the Rafah crossing is but one access point.
In term of state building, it was overstressed that the attitude of the EU towards the Israeli-Arab conflict is “partial”. According to some interviewees, it is “a pro- Israel” policy, not only by taking no enforcement measures against Israeli violations of international law to which the EU is committed, but also the lenient rules and wide margins adopted with reference to Israel is defeating the EU’s declared policy with regard to building a viable Palestinian state.

Historically, it was strongly expressed by some interviews that Europe, particularly Britain, played a primary role in planting Israeli problem in the heart of the Middle East and then developing them before conferring its guardianship on the USA as a part of “colonial” and “imperial” Western projects.

Today, many interviewees expressed, with no doubts at all, the failure of the EU’s state-building policy due to some very sticky issues. For example, the Israeli settlement expansion, checkpoints and restriction of movement for Palestinians, cantoned Palestinian territories, division between Gaza and West Bank, and most importantly the siege of Gaza and the economically underdeveloped Palestinian economy whereas the EU put neither pressure on nor took decisive action to improve the deteriorating situation on the ground and left no space for viable Palestinian state building.

Further, a gap is observed separating the EU’s political aims and legal commitments, and the absence of concrete measures to ensure that such goals can be accomplished and commitments kept. Critically, the reason for this discrepancy lies in the EU’s active role in pursuing a two-state solution while being acquiescent to the USA and Israel’s power politics. However, while the author becomes more sensitized to the quality of data from which the interviews provide theoretical insights, analyzing Islamophobia in the raw interview-data and transforming it into analytical categories is the core stone for interpretative policy analysis. This is because it attempts to identify Islamophobia in terms of possible meanings and to frame symbols that both Palestinian and European interviewees have. Therefore, the author tailored the questionnaire in a way that the research questions could be answered, thus not necessarily in agreement with all the views presented in the interviews in the following manner:

Firstly, the recent parliamentary elections in 2006 in Palestine showed how complex the evolution of Islamists is and how crucial an understanding of Islamic movement/s and the
distinct position for the EU to take actually is. Whereas Hamas is the only Islamic government in the Arab-Muslim world which has been elected democratically, the common view among Europeans and the Palestinians including Islamists and non-Islamists interviewees, is that the EU actively collaborated in the repression of the Hamas government. However, the European interviewees did not share fully the aim of the boycott policy to completely defeat Hamas but more often argued that it was to change the stance of Hamas. Nevertheless, they are aware that the EU’s refusal to accept the victory of Hamas in a democratic electoral process has undermined the credibility of the EU’s discourse on democratization in Palestine and in the region.

Secondly, some Palestinian interviewees argued that a critical reason for boycotting Hamas, was Hamas’ resistance project as a political as well as a military force. This is mainly due to its political opposition to give up the struggle for self-determination and liberation in return for a limited control and sovereignty in the Gaza Strip and parts of the WB under tight Israeli control and supervision. For the same reason, Israel’s declared strategy went beyond Hamas and it is straightforward: starving and strangulating into submission the 1.5 million Palestinians living in Gaza by imposing a blockade in 2006 that is supposed to lead the Palestinians in Gaza to replace the current Hamas government with the more dormant PA in the WB. For want of food and medicine, for want of cement and petrol, the people of Gaza live in conditions that international bodies and agencies have described as criminal.²⁵²

Thirdly, some interviewees noted that the blockade of Gaza did not occur exclusively as the result of a propaganda machine that describes Israel’s action as self-defense, while demonizing the Palestinians in Gaza and those who support them as terrorists, and was the only possible course for Israeli politicians, in particular. The terrible consequence in the Palestinian suffering of this determination does not remain a serious concern, nor does international condemnations.

Finally, the interviews contribute to the definition of Islamophobia by attempting to answer the questions of what, when and where one perceives Islamophobia in the EU’s foreign policy towards Palestine as follows:

²⁵² Meanwhile, Hamas captured an Israeli solder, Gilad Shalit, and so the blockade became tighter. It included a ban on the most elementary commodities without which human beings find it difficult to survive. Yet, there are alternative ways for replacing the captive soldier, such as swapping the thousands of political prisoners Israel is holding.
Patterns of prejudice translated into disproportionate/discriminate policy against Palestinians in comparison to the Israelis

Inspired by Orientalism and as a part of Judeo-Christian campaign against Islamic-Palestinian/Hamas terrorism

Carried out along imbalanced power relations between powerful-West and occupying Israel, and less powerful-Islam and occupied Palestine

Fuelled by attacks, carried out by Muslims in Europe and in Israel

Intertwined with anti-Semitism and the Israel-Palestine conflict

It is worth noting though, that the EU is an institution consisting of a growing number of European states, with different interests and objectives. Taking the EU member-states reactions altogether, the EU’s common approach towards the Hamas government based on free and democratic elections (as far as this was possible in the context of ongoing occupation) was one of isolation.

However, the majority EU consensus explains the reinstatement of the EU approach in at least three dilemmas. First, the inconsistency between diplomatic words and the absence of deeds with the EU affirming the need to respect IHL and IHL while not pressing for concrete action to ensure this. Second, there is no comprehensive rethink of the effectiveness and purpose of the EU’s aid to the OPT. Third, there is no majority consensus of desisting from rewarding Israel through EU’s contractual relations or of ensuring that the Israel agreements are lawfully implemented.

Several factors may explain the EU’s approach assuaging the perceived need to act in the Middle East and the measures to accommodate the unwillingness of the EU majority to take a firm stance towards Israel. Arguably, this unwillingness is directed by a plurality of interests, ranging from transatlantic relations to commercial ties with Israel, alongside ideological commitments to Israel, which persist even when the EU knowingly acts against its aims and interests in the region.

Therefore, one should refer back to the historical processes of the conflict from which it was generated and the sources of strengths and weaknesses in the EU’s policy towards Israel-Palestine, and similarly to the conditions that enforce their strength or deplete their control.
To this point, the author suggests the following figure to illustrate the EU’s boycott policy and influential factors as expressed at varied degrees by both communities of interviewees as follows:

Figure 7: An illustration of the E factors underpinning the EU policy towards Israel-Palestine

At least five points are noted: firstly, while the EU’s boycott policy is a part of the international context, what is unclear is to what extent the EU and other international actors are driven by Islamophobia as an influential factor in the EU’s boycott policy of Hamas. However, the anti-Islamic factor whereby Israel regards a domestic Islamic movement like Hamas more or less as an enemy and a part of global Islamic terrorism is imported into the USA and European Orientalism and that Hamas is just a terrorist organization. To this point, the EU and its member states are viewed differently from the American experience with what is called the Orient. In this case, it is in relation to the Middle East, Palestine and her people and eventually, to Hamas.

Secondly, anti-Semitism is also noted as another key factor playing a role in the EU’s policy towards Israel-Palestine. It is unclear though, to what extent the presence of Israel as a Jewish self-declared state in the middle of the Arab-Islamic Orientalist world is driven by the holocaust and consequently the feeling of guilt, and in which direction different actors import
it into their foreign policy and act upon it. Therefore, it is unreasonable, for example, to assume that the EU member states collectively have a guilt-feeling to the same extent. It is also unclear to what extent it is imported into the policy of the EU and its member states, but also into that of other actors such as the Middle East region.

Thirdly, it is a much politicized international context by the presence of Israel as a main ally to the USA in one hand, and a further European colony planted in the middle of the Arab-Islamic world, on the other. Consequently, the interest between Israel and Europe and the USA is different from the interest with Saudi Arabia, for example for oil. Such context inspires anti-Islam debate in combating the rise of anti-colonial (read: anti-Israel) and anti-imperial (read: anti-Europe) ‘historically’ and anti-USA ‘currently’ Islamic movements in the Middle East.

In this way, space and time and actors are influential. Space is in terms of local, regional and global, and time does not refer only to the 2006 election, but also around emerging yet related conflicts and crisis in the Middle East, for example, the war in Lebanon and the war in Iraq, and attacks such as September 11 and attacks in London and Madrid are as much as related to the Middle East, Islam and the rise of global and domestic Islamic movements and the difference between them. Often, active players are pointed out, namely, the EU, USA, and Israel and to a lesser extent the UN, Russia and the Arab world. With a note, that in this context Israel enjoys a thriving economy and an electorate that regards the dominance of the army in its life. Israel can continue the occupation and the oppression of the Palestinians as in the exclusive past, the present and future reality of life in Israel. This is often the case as long as the international community is complacent, the Arab-Muslim world impotent and Gaza contained.

Fourthly, in connection to Orientalism, it illustrates, mainly the ideological factors in acquiring knowledge about the Orient and about thinking on Palestine in general and on Hamas in particular. More importantly, it suggest how s/he pre-conceives a notion about Palestine in connection not only to the way Palestinians live and act, even if s/he has never been to Palestine and/or met anyone from Hamas, and more generally, how do we come to understand people who live and act differently? But more importantly, from discursive relations to European Jews as well as Zionism. This is reflected in a larger space over a long time and reflects the interests of interacting global powers. Europe, for example had direct relations with the European Jews and a long-standing colonial relationships to Palestine. The
American experience, however, is viewed as being less direct and based on abstraction, but increasingly and most recently, the USA has been involved directly and militarily in the region.

Orientalism is further explained in frame analyses that include/highlight something: focus such as on Hamas terrorism, as well as occlude/omit other things: blind side/spot such as the Israeli occupation. This is a pattern that suggests relationships such as upgrading trade agreements with Israel, or making order out of complexity such as imposing one-sided conditions on Hamas only for diplomatic contact to take place, or makes sense of policy issues/questions. This is where the EU’s two-legged policy towards Israel-Palestine frames and contains directions/seeds for the EU’s boycott policy of Hamas alone. This was also explained thoroughly in an earlier chapter regarding imbalanced power relations and was confirmed in terms of rationalization, timing and replacement of actors.

In relation to this, the Palestinian interviews only expressed repeatedly and strongly imbalanced power relations between Israel and Palestinians. Note that expressions like double standards, one sided, impartial, inequality, occupier-occupied relationship, disproportionate force, strengthening state of Israel and weakening, dividing and shrinking stateless Palestine, enforcing the Palestinian social split, transforming the political movements into NGOs, and creating a Palestinian elite affiliated with Western powers …etc were used. However, the Europeans remained almost silent on Israel-Palestinian imbalanced power relations and often expressed terms such as the two sides of conflict, both of them should, must… etc. Another point of difference is related to the Palestinian resistance (sometimes the right of resistance) to the Israeli occupation, along different means of resistance ranging from violent to peaceful.
Reflections

- The views of the interviewees bring a crucial perspective to the peace process mainly because the interviewees are often on the ground themselves or have networks of contacts there and are in a strong position to evaluate progress.

- While some of the views reported are not surprising, most are strong in terms of unity of views among heterogeneous Palestinian and European interviewees with the exceptions of one point, being Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation.

- It is worth noting that the level of awareness of the EU’s policy and its specific instruments was modest among the interviewees. It was also unclear how Palestinians, including the Islamists, viewed the EU’s policy differently from those views of general political trends in the Middle East. However, they could, together highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s policy.

- All interviewees favored the EU’s policy over that of the USA. Some noted that the EU’s position towards Israel-Palestine is more balanced and less partial compared with that of the USA, mainly, for the latter is seen as an imperial-colonial project. Yet, the EU is hesitant and ineffective in pursuing its objectives.

- This is why Islamists in particular desire to distance themselves from the USA and to a lesser extent from the EU’s influence. However, this careful attitude did not prohibit them from borrowing the Western models for democracy. It is just that they denounce what they experience as a selective opportunistic European approach. Nevertheless, this anti-western criticism does not imply a breaking point. The following views are expressed: (1) collaborating with Europe is viewed as a political necessity and (2) in the opposite direction, some argued that their thinking on stronger engagement and cooperation with Europe had so far not been a priority due to ineffective European influence compared to the US policy in the region and in Palestine.

- As well, Islamists’ views are formulated upon an Islamic framework and in response to their experience of the EU policy in reality and sometimes historical relations. However, they are willing to accept the EU’s policy as reflecting a particular European historical and political evolution and to recognize its positive aspects especially in comparison with the USA’s policy. In turn, they expect the EU to consider and accept the results of democracy reflecting
a particular Palestinian historical and political experience and to coexist with it impartially and without coercion as a different model.

- it is often argued, that the EU and its member states can and sometimes should undertake a review of its current foreign policy towards Palestine and mass-based Islamic movements such as Hamas for, mainly, the following reasons:

One reason is that this policy of neglect reinforced anti-democratic regimes and radical Islamism in the region including Palestine. The absence of the EU policy for dialogue and further boycott of the elected Hamas representative has been, largely argued as being an anti-democratic and anti-Islam policy on the part of the EU. This is at a time when the EU could have played a distinctive role due to its privileged position with the PA and the tools for engaging Palestinian civil society. For example, one interviewee said that “Hamas is well positioned for it is a mass-based movement and it is ready to engage in genuine democracy.” Another argued that because of the EU’s acquiescence, the EU has fallen well behind the US with regard to engagement with Hamas in recognizing them as democratic actors within Palestine.

A second reason is that the integration of Hamas into some of the processes of the EU’s policies would have allowed these policies to have a better impact on the ground, since Hamas represents a significant public opinion and enjoys popular support. This would help the EU to reduce anti-Western sentiments over questions of democracy and to avoid to be caught up with the USA in this area.
7 Conclusions

This chapter, as the concluding section of the dissertation is dedicated to providing a closing summary of what has been discussed and tackled. It closes with an elaboration on (1) the EU’s boycott policy of the elected Hamas representatives in the case of imbalanced power relations followed by two parts: (2) a summary of the findings on Islamophobia, and (3) final recommendations.

7.1 The EU boycott policy

The election experience in Palestine differs from election experiences elsewhere. Mainly, the elections take place in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) or as said in stateless Palestine for the Palestinians enjoy no sovereignty under Israeli military occupation. As well, international aid is tailored to some but not all Palestinian political parties by listing a major Islamic party such as Hamas as a terrorist group and consequently disregarding Islamists’ views in relation to the European-Middle East peace process initiatives.

From a domestic perspective, a damaging factor for the EU policy is its boycott of the elected Hamas representatives. Whereas, it is argued that Hamas’ integration in the Palestinian political system could have opened channels for re-thinking the national liberation strategy within the confines of law. Moreover, its integration could have presented a healthy transition between the PA and PLO’s political representation in a way that could have added to the PA’s reform as supported by the EU for Fateh’s ill governance and Hamas’ clean-hand reputation. However, Hamas’ possible integration is not considered in the context of EU policy and initiatives, Palestinian civil society associated with Hamas was also excluded. At a later stage, Hamas controlled- Gaza and her 1.5 million Palestinians irrespective of their political affiliation were also excluded and put under siege collectively.

The official discourse in Europe is that a very reasonable and attainable solution is just around the corner if the two sides of conflict, namely Israel- Palestine as addressed on an equal basis would make one final effort: a two- state solution. However, the only version acceptable to Israel is the one that both the Fateh-led authority in the WB and the more assertive Hamas in Gaza could not accept. It is an offer to relocate the Palestinians in stateless enclaves in return for their ending their struggle to end the Israeli occupation. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the EU boycott of the elected Hamas representatives is the main reason for the
protracted blockade and strangulation of Gaza. However, the three EU conditions seem not only ineffective but also critical, especially, in pressuring Hamas to move from being a resistance movement as implied, for it continues to be responsible for ending violence when they decide the context is right. Consequently, the EU- Hamas contact has decreased more and more. Arguably, the EU officials did not think that their policy of boycotting Hamas would work but actively and acquiescently, they have become a part of a boycott policy of the elected Hamas representatives by the occupied.

From a regional perspective, it is widespread knowledge in the region that this boycott policy is a part of a war against terrorism where Islam and Muslims have been under attack. As given examples especially after September 11th are: (1) the war against Taliban movement in Afghanistan disregarding the deterioration of Afghani people on the ground, (2) the invasion of Iraq, (3) the Danish cartoon placing a bomb over the head of the prophet disregarding the mass Muslim convictions and respect of the prophet, (4) continued support for dictatorship regimes and repressing Islamists in the region remain questionable such as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, (5) initiating no contacts with Islamists coming to power such as in Algeria, and (6) on top of that, considering Hamas and Hezbollah to be terrorist groups rather than resistance movements to the Israeli occupation. Last, but not least is the EU position on Turkey’s accession to Europe.

7.2 Islamophobia
A profound debate over Islam has been taking place since the end of the Cold War on the basis of religious category, mainly, ideology and culture. Yet, a negative image of Islam as a depreciation- constructed image of the Orient along the West- East dichotomy has been intensified, and sometimes rooted back, to the longstanding conflict between Christianity and Islam. However, in the 1980s and early 1990s, popular anti-Muslim prejudice reached its peak in Europe.

The term Islamophobia came into being for the first time in the UK in 1997 and has become popular in Europe where the Islamic threat is considered to be the enemy within and has been on the rise where the enemy is perceived to be external. Further, Islam has come under the focus of the media, seminars and hundreds of publications world- wide. Interestingly, it has been further linked to the political situation in the Middle East.
Most notably, in the aftermath of September 11th in the USA and consequent attacks in Europe, there was a whole string of attacks on Muslims related to the USA-led war on Afghanistan, and in Iraq linked to Al Qaeda. As well, Israel’s war in Lebanon is linked to Hezbollah, and the ongoing Israel military occupation of Palestine and its escalation, in the second intifada, is more likely linked to Hamas.

In the same period in Europe, attacks were not only noted against Muslims but also against Jews, foremost in France and Belgium and these have been labeled widely under the term “new anti-Semitism”. Arguably, for it is linked to a new component that separates it from the anti-Semitism of the early twentieth century, namely, a Muslim component, yet it is not exclusively a Muslim phenomenon.

On the one hand, a considerable amount of research has been published on anti-Semitism as well as on Islamophobia. More specifically, researchers have studied the socio-economic and political as well as the cultural differences in reference to patterns of fear, prejudice and discrimination around minorities, including Muslim minorities and the place of Islam in Europe.

At least three contextual factors heightened Islamophobia in Europe, respectively, a high number of Muslim refugees and people seeking asylum with whom Islamophobia is associated in a negative stereotype way that has made their integration more difficult. This is sometimes regardless of whether they are practicing Muslims or not and more associated with race, culture and economic situation. The second factor is related to religion in two ways, one is the skeptical secular and agnostic outlook with religion that is repeatedly mentioned in the media, opposing all religions including Islam against which attacks are far more undermining due to Muslims having less access to media platforms. The other is related to the transformation in European right wing politics parting increasingly from anti-Semitism and becoming pro-Jewish and Islamophobic. The third factor is connected to the widely spread perspective among Arab-Muslims in the region, regarding the war on terror as being a war on Islam and Muslims. This is together with the rise in anti-imperial and anti-colonial Islamic movements that have been targeted even when they rise to power in a democratic process, and on top of it but not exclusive to it, the elected Hamas representatives.
On the other hand, very little research ‘if any’ has examined Islamophobia in the EU’s foreign policy. Yet, Muslim relations with Europeans involve more than fear of the former by the latter that demanded looking at the multiple layers of politics.

In the work of this research, various options have opened for debate over the definitions and manifestation of Islamophobia. It also illustrated how imbalanced relations operate, through an examination of the EU’s boycott policy of the elected Hamas representatives in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election, and further the analysis of the views, on a comparative basis, of European and Palestinian experts.

In this given frame analysis, the Europeans look at Hamas to a certain extent through a lens that distorts the actual reality in a general process of stereotyping to make Hamas appear not only as equally powerful as Israel, but also different and threatening to the state of a European colony and a self-declared Jewish state, namely, Israel. Further, it appeared that the only problem was the security of Israel, with little attention paid to its long on-going military occupation that is threatened by Hamas, and the Palestinian struggle for independence and self-determination. Further, self-determination is seen as a hostility, and colored politically, as upsetting the Israeli status quo, where only Arabs and Muslims and Hamas play an irrational and violent role.

Looking at combating terrorism, anti-terrorism conflated in the war on terror (read: anti-Islam) for at least the following reasons: firstly, lumping together Islamic movements in one terrorist category. Secondly, in disregarding the differences between global and domestic Islamic movements. Taking an example of a global Islamic movement such as Al Qaeda and a domestically-based movement, such as Hamas.

Foremost, it confirms the orientalist-colonial line inspired by Said’s reading of the Orient, covering Islam and the question of Palestine and shedding light on imbalanced power relations in constructing the opposed image of the other, namely, West-Islam. Media, literature, and power politics fuel this further and have helped to fashion the lens through which to view Islam and eventually, Hamas, in their explanations for what went wrong “in the Islamic world”.

Further, it is linked to the EU’s two-legged policy towards Israel-Palestine. Arguably, it emphasizes the consequences of Israeli military occupation including curfews, closures,
settlement, wall, and restriction of movement, expansion into Palestinian territories and even performing illegal acts and attacks carried out by the powerful means of the state of Israel and its security forces. Israel’s continued occupation and violation of international law have no enforcement mechanism holding Israel responsible for such violations by the EU. In comparison, reactionary military resistance carried out by Palestinians who are viewed to be terrorists by the EU are highly condemned, and boycott policy is initiated and they are accused of being terrorists.

In this way, Islamophobia is often connected via different definitions, among other things, to the factors of religion- Islam, race, culture, nationality, economy and terrorism in Europe. Outside Europe, it is more likely associated with the latter factor, namely, terrorism via the rise of anti-Western Islamist movements in predominant Muslim countries. The EU’s policy sometimes appears to collaborate with those movements and at other times to eradicate them. Eradication is more perceived though in connection with an American-colonial and imperial project and eventually its ally in the Middle East, namely, Israel. This is an Islamophobic process of negative stereotyping of Islamic not only violence and terrorism but also anti-imperial and colonial resistance, compared to non-Islamic violence and terrorism and consequently, a disproportionate policy against it.

In the work during this research, power was examined theoretically and operationally in the EU’s boycott policy of the elected Hamas representatives, which includes, power relations, relationships of communications, and objective capacity. The analysis of the three branches in the EU’s two-legged policy towards Israel-Palestine indicated imbalanced power relations in favor of the more powerful party, namely, Israel.

More specifically, and from analyzing those imbalanced power relations, some important issues were produced and transformed into an abstract and an operational EU policy model. The operational model, however, presented three strategies for boycotting Hamas, namely, rationalization, timing and replacement of actors.

However, Islamophobia as a term suffers mainly from a problem in defining and explaining political relations in term of religious categories, and conceals the fact that real people, rather than an abstract categories, are being discriminated against. In another direction, it serves to stifle the criticism of Islam and Muslims.
As compared to anti-Semitism, it is challenging to compare the two, however, in Europe, there has been a significant rise in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia that were considered for debate and some similarities as well as differences between the two were pointed out, increasingly, in connection to the Israel-Palestine conflict. This is viewed in blurring lines in the defining process which was influenced by imbalanced power relations as follows:

Firstly, the difference between anti-Israel and anti-Semitism when it comes to criticizing the policy of Israel putting an emphasis on anti-Semitic project and disregarding the Israel occupation to which the Palestinians are subjected. To a certain degree, what is labeled as anti-Semitic (read: anti-Israel).

Secondly, it is in translating the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation into Palestinian anti-Semitism and further terrorism fueled by Israel presenting itself as a victim of Palestinian and Hamas terrorism.

7.3 Recommendations
- To revise the EU policy, in connection with Palestine-Israel, and the body of assumptions and misconceptions around the roots of the Israeli-Arab Palestinian conflict. To this point, it is more effective to acknowledge the complexities and devise an approach that recognizes the interests of all the players. To serve that point further, considering a critical assessment of the EU in particular handling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict complexities and the rise of Hamas born as a resistance movement out of the Israeli occupation and growing into Palestinian dynamic politics is viable and essential for the following reasons:

Firstly, reality: Political Islam is one of the realities in the region and in Palestine and will not dissipate in the near future. It has increasingly played an influential role. Hamas is a major political party as demonstrated by the performance of Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary elections and by their strong social presence in Palestine.

Secondly, political stability: It is a major factor for political stability in Palestine. The EU’s declared policy of promoting democracy and respect for human rights as a means of achieving stability in Palestine cannot be credible unless the EU supports the integration of mainstream Palestinian Islamists into the political process. Excluding a mass-based political party like Hamas discredits democracy and will not promote stability either in Palestine or in the region.
Thirdly, compatibility: One cannot ignore the gap between the words of the EU as a major supporter of the Palestinians and its inability to effect real change on the ground. Therefore, it is essential to radically revise its policy and show that it can help make significant progress in improving the lives of Palestinians, as well as ensuring that the Israelis take steps to end practices that engender animosity in Palestine and in the region.

- To establish, in connection with the third point, concrete measures to follow up on the failure of the Israeli authorities to meet their obligations the impact of which is disproportionally and negatively affecting the Palestinians.

- To re-view the intertwined Islamophobia and anti-Semitic themes in its policy. It is necessary to note that perceptions of Palestine and Muslim and non-Muslim Palestinians are not only what matters in formulating EU policy towards Palestine but also on the perceptions of Israel as a Jewish state.

- To engage with Islamists in a broader sense while leaving room for joint work at fields of high importance to the EU and the Islamists such as women’s rights, minority rights, law and order in public life, among other issues. This engagement would help counter the feeling that the EU only proposes a Euro-centered democratization that does not meet the local community’s needs and expectations.

- To move the focus in resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict from “what if” Israel or Palestine, for they are endless and finding definite answers to such questions is almost impossible. Thus, even before one discusses either an alternative solution - a single democratic state for all or a more plausible, two-state settlement, one has to transform fundamentally the official and public mindset and the mentality that is the principal barrier to a peaceful reconciliation. Suggesting what is the next question, raises the possibility in a more open EU frame of reference. If public discourse had not been as Kissinger once put it “wrapped by powerful engines of myth big budgets and outright falsehoods?” many fights might have been avoided and peace in some form might have been possible much earlier and the EU’s policy might have been quite different.
8 Annexes

Check-list of topics and questions for interviews

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
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**Case study: The EU boycott policy of elected Hamas in 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary Elections**

- What do you see as the strong points and the weak points of EU policies towards Palestine?
- What do you think about EU policies towards Palestine compared with those of your particular European country?
- What is the relation between the EU policy and international law?
- Do you think Europe serves as a normative reference point for human rights and democratic aspirations for Palestinians? Why not?
- Why is it that, the EU boycotted the elected Hamas government, but accepted Hamas participation in the elections?
- What do you think of the EU conditionality to reconnect with Hamas?
- What is the impact of the EU post-election policies on Palestinians?

**In connection to Islamophobia**

- What does the term Islamophobia mean for you?
- How do you compare Islamophobia to anti-Semitism in/out Europe?
- Have Islamophobia been relevant to the EU policies towards Palestine? How?

**Thank you**
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10 Curriculum Vitae

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Gender Female

Education and Training
Date 2007- 2010
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Principal subjects/occupational skills covered Political Science
Name and type of organization providing education and training University of Vienna, Austria, Vienna
Date 2004 - 2005
Title of qualification awarded MA
Principal subjects/occupational skills covered Master of Arts in Human Rights
Name and type of organization providing education and training Central European University, Budapest-Hungary
Date 2002 - 2004
Title of qualification awarded MPA
Principal subjects / occupational skills covered Master of Public Administration and graduate certificate in Gender studies
Name and type of organization providing education and training University of Southern California, USA/California, Los Angeles
Date 1995 - 1998
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Name and type of organization providing education and training Al- Najah National University
Date 1988 - 1992
Title of qualification awarded BA
Principal subjects / occupational skills Social Service
Curriculum Vitae

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Jerusalem University, Jerusalem

Work experience

Dates 2005 - 2006
Occupation or position held QPYP- West Bank Director
Main activities and responsibilities
• Provide full compliance with Quaker Service- AFSC rules and regulations of financial processes, records and reports.
• Hire, supervise and support staff and oversee program development.
• Work collaboratively with consultants to evaluate, youth- led projects and initiatives.
• Implement, monitor and evaluate work strategies and training manuals.

Name and address of employer American Friends Service Committee
Pen., USA

Dates 2004 - 2004
Occupation or position held UN and World Bank file Officer
Main activities and responsibilities
• Establish relations with World Bank and several UN programs in Palestine.
• Provide a variety standard administrative functions including preparation for agreements, archiving, entry and maintain data base.

Name and address of employer Ministry of Women Affairs (MOWA)-Department of International Relations, Ramallah, Palestine

Dates 1998 - 2000
Occupation or position held Central West Bank Coordinator
Main activities and responsibilities
• Implement “choose a future” project in...
Central West Bank in Coordination with MOE, schoolteachers and counsellors.

- Assess female students’ needs and assisted in writing proposals as well as the final project evaluation.

- Organize and conduct gender, conflict resolution, PRA and participatory video training.

Name and address of employer
Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND), Jerusalem, Palestine

Dates
1996 - 1998

Occupation or position held
Group Guaranteed Lending and Saving Program

Main activities and responsibilities
- Implemented Group Guaranteed lending and saving program (GGLS) in northern West Bank.
- Selected and recruited areas’ supervisors and GGLS groups’ leaders and treasurers.
- Gradually increased number of participants while kept 100% re-payment rate and balanced budgets.

Name and address of employer
Save the children Federation, USA

Dates
1993 –1996

Occupation or position held
Welfare Worker

Main activities and responsibilities
- Identify Palestinian refugees who were in greatest need to improve their conditions using the resources available.
- Conduct family and individual meetings and follow up field visits.
- Develop emergency intervention plans.
Name and address of employer: United Nations Refugees and Works agency (UNRWA), Nablus- North West Bank, Palestine

Dates: 1993 – 1993

Occupation or position held: Social Worker

Main activities and responsibilities:
- Identified who are unable to earn their own living due to many factors including illness, old age, physical disabilities and other financial and social problems.
- Propose and implement a social service plan for old people in Nablus.

Name and address of employer: The Governmental Welfare Office

**Personal skills and competences**

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- Several articles at home and abroad, in relation to Islam, women and disadvantaged groups.