Diplomarbeit

Titel der Diplomarbeit

Sectarian Differences in the Narratives of Lebanese History Textbooks
With Special Regard to the Naissance and Early Years of the Lebanese Republic

Verfasser

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To my parents and my aunt
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ii. Notes on transliteration

Arabic words and names appearing in this paper are transliterated according to the rules of the English language edition of Hans Wehr’s *Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. Consequently, the feminine ـة tā’ marbūṭa ending, commonly transliterated as a final –ah in English, will appear as a sole –a. The morphemes th, dh, gh, kh, and, sh conventionally used in English to represent the Arabic letters ꠧ, ꠧ, ꠧ, ꠧ, and ꠧ, respectively, throughout this paper.

Geographical names

Words of Arabic origin such as geographical names that have found their way into the vocabulary of the English Language has not been transliterated (e.g. Beirut instead of Bayrūt, or Mashreq and not Mašriq). Names of Lebanese localities without direct correspondence in the English Language are referred to as their Romanized spelling based on Hans Wehr’s oeuvre in addition to the official Standard Lebanese Geographic Name Rules. For example Zahla/Zahlé for the town of زحلة in the Biqă‘/Beqaa Valley.

In some rare cases, Ottoman Turkish versions of geographical names occur in the paper. These were transcribed following the practice of the İslam Ansiklopedisi (İA).3

Proper names of foreign origin

Especially foreign (i.e. not Arabic) given names will be presented in their original form (e.g. Pierre instead of Biyār or Georges instead of Jūrj), while family names and Arabic given names follow the general rules for the Romanization of the Arabic language mentioned above. However, some Arabic proper names (of mainly historical figures) commonly used in Western literatures and media, and whose spellings are thus becoming standard will retain their commonly Romanised (mainly French influenced) form as they commonly appear in most Western sources. For instance, Cammille Chamoun has not been transliterated as Kāmil Šamʿūn.

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1 Wehr, Hans; Cowan, Milton (ed.): *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Urbana: Spoken Language Services, 1994)
2 Following a conference of Arab experts in geographic naming held in 1971 in Beirut, a special order was published regulating the Romanization of Arabic geographic names in the member states of the Arab League. The so called Beirut paper with its guidelines in compliance with the English and French writing systems was made official with the UN resolution 1972(II/8). For the complete document cf. [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/gegn22wp73.pdf](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/gegn22wp73.pdf) (retrieved 01.02.2010). The official system for geographic Romanization used in Lebanon is the 1973 *variante B du système de transliteration de l’arabe “Beyrouth amendé”* which seems to be the French inspired version of the Beirut system.
3 For a comparative list of possible transliteration systems currently used for Ottoman Turkish cf. Buğday(1999) 2-3.
iii. Notes on Statistical Data

Although statistical data and figures cited in this paper are retrieved from the official website of Lebanon’s Central Administration for Statistics (CAS), or are borrowed from cited authors, they should be taken with caution, since a national census has not been conducted in Lebanon since 1932\(^4\). Consequently, the country’s religious composition lacks accurate and actual statistical figures, thus they are debatable approximations.

Furthermore, CAS publications seem to ignore the country’s current administrative divisions into governorates (\(muhāfaẓāt\)) and districts/cazas (\(aqāṭ\); sg. \(qaḍā\')). Instead, own regional divisions are employed that, for instance, treat Beirut’s southern suburbs (\(ad-dāhiya al-janūbiya\)) as separate entity and partition the south according to the extent of damage caused by the last Israeli offensive in 2006. As a result, there is merely one single statistical region, the Beirut Governorate that corresponds completely to its official counterpart. Although this paper, as most its secondary sources, prefers the use of the official administrative subdivisions by any reference, however, statistical data are inevitably had to be based on the CAS system in some marked cases.

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## iv. List of abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUB</td>
<td>American University of Beirut (Al-jāmi‘a al-āmīrikīya fī Bayrūt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Central Administration for Statistics (Idāra li-‘l-ihṣā‘ al-markāstī)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERD/CRDP</td>
<td>Centre for Educational Research and Development / Centre de Recherche et de Développement Pédagogique (Al-markaz at-tarbawi li-‘l-buḥūq w-an-nimā‘)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRDL</td>
<td>Centre des ressources sur le développement locale (Markaz al-ma‘lūmātiya li-‘t-tanmiya ‘l-maḥallīya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAPR</td>
<td>Department for Palestinian Refugee Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAES</td>
<td>Lebanese Association for Educational Studies (Al-hay‘a al-lubnāniya li-‘l-‘ulūm at-tarbawiya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCA</td>
<td>Lebanese Colloquial Arabic, al-lahja al-lubnāniya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Modern Standard Arabic, al-fuṣḥā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIP</td>
<td>Service d’Inspection Pédagogique, the later Ministry of Education during the French Mandate between 1922 and 1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SISC</td>
<td>Supreme Islamic Shi‘ite Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UL</td>
<td>Université Libanaise (Lebanese University, Al-jāmi‘a al-lubnāniya), Lebanon’s sole public institution for higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJ</td>
<td>Université Saint-Joseph (Saint-Joseph University, Jāmi‘at al-Qiddīs Yūsuf)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations of administrative units

In order to secure clear arrangement in charts and tables, Lebanese administrative units were given abbreviations based on their official French name. First-level subdivisions (i.e. governorates or muḥāfaẓāt) are assigned a code composed of two letters, while second-level subdivisions (cazas or aqdiya) have a three-letter code.

**AK** Akkar, ‘Akkār (Halba Ḥalbā)

**BE** Beirut, Beyrouth, Bayrūt

**BH** Baalbek-Hermel, Ba‘lbbak w-al-Hirmil (Baalbek Bb‘albbak)

BLB Baalbeck, Ba‘albakk

HRM Hermel, al-Hirmil

**BO** West-Biqa‘, Béqaa-Ouest, al-Biqa‘ al-ḡarbī (Zahlé Zahlā)

BQW Béqaa-Ouest, al-Biqa‘ al-ḡarbī

RCH Rachaya, ar-Rāṣayā

ZHL Zahlé, Zahlā

**LN** Liban-Nord Šamāl Lubnān (Tripoli Ṭrāblus)

BTR Batroun, al-Batrūn

BCH Bcharré, Bīṣarri

KUR Koura, al-Kawra

MND Minniyé et Dinniyé, al-Minnīya w-ād-Ḍannīya

TRB Tripoli, Tarābulus

ZGH Zghorta, Zaġartā

**LS** South Lebanon, Liban-Sud, Janīb Lubnān (Saïda, Ṣaydā)

JZN Jezzine, Jazīn

SUR Sour (Tyr), Ṣūr

SYD Saïda (Sidon), Ṣaydā

**ML** Mount Lebanon, Mont-Liban, Jabal Lubnān (Baabda Ba‘bdā)

ALY Aaley, ʿĀlayh

BBD Baabda, Ba‘bdā

CHF Chouf, aš-Šāf

JBL Jbeil (Byblos), Jubeyl

KSR Kesraouan, al-Ksrawān

MTN Metn, al-Matn
v. Preface

History and its narratives

As a French proverb states, there is no history but historians, while according to the American social psychologist Carol Anne Tavris, “history is written by the victors, but it's victims who write the memoirs”. In any case, it seems to be agreed upon that history is rather an inherently subjective perception than a monolithic fait accompli not allowing multiple – in fact, an endless number of – possibilities of interpretations, aspects, layers, or colours. Hence, questioning history, a human activity since time immemorial, has not only the simple purpose to learn about - and from - the past in the searching for answers to the matters of the present, but also a rather profane tool to achieve goals and legitimise actions. After all, history always responds to a demand and these demands in most cases reflect the interests of those who scrutinise the past. Among the many possible fields where demands grow, and target history with questions, is education. Unfortunately, this paper cannot provide the right frame to examine the relationship between history and the way it is taught, or presented. As it is well known, history – or better said its version declared to be agreed upon, common and seminal by an authority or a community – has not just a pivotal role in forming the individual, but also in the creating and maintaining of identities, legitimising power and policies, or forming of both internal and external relations. As such, the instruction of history is a fundamental and much preferred task of any organised form of education, as it both makes the instructed firm in their loyalty and allegiance, and resistant to undesirable alternative version, options, or opinions. Hence, historical narratives are brilliant tools for the dissemination of ideologies, but at the same time they also serve as excellent indicators to detect these ideologies, weltanschauung, or any kind of allegiances. It should be illustrated with an example:

Having received the first buds of my formal education in a post-communist state of the former ‘Eastern Bloc’, but having a family background anything but loyal to the country’s Soviet-dominated post-WW2 stately ideologies, I have some vivid memories of what is called change of historical narrative. My first school years fall to the 1990’s i.e. when the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of the Soviet Union finally allowed its satellite states to abolish the compulsory Marxist-Leninist track from their historical narratives and to rewrite their own national history – a version that had been labelled as seditionary and pushed underground during the forty years of constructing the socialists’ dream. Hence, I remember my parents being far more excited than me to read the chapters of my school history textbook discussing the nation’s interbellum and post-war history. According to them, what my generation was taught as the country’s rewritten official history, had been referred to as ‘imperialist propaganda’ and thus was banned from the official narrative back then in their school years. As an example, my mother was especially delighted to discover the country’s bloodily overthrown
anti-Soviet upheaval, which had been officially referred to as a ‘fascist counter-revolution’ and was attempted to be erased from public memory by the former regime, as ‘national revolution’ with a whole amount of coverage on it in my history manual and a national memorial day consecrated to it since 1990.

From this example – which is surely not a unique one – it is easy to deduct the importance, but at the same time also the arbitrariness and versatility, of historical narratives as well as the possibilities that an analysis on narrative changes and differences has to offer. Consequently, with the change of historical narrative its transmitted message, i.e. the identity it is intended to support, propagate, or create, it becomes automatically a subject of evolving. For instance, the aforementioned example’s pre-Fall-of-the-Wall narrative was most probably foreseen to legitimise Soviet military presence in the country. Hence, history and its perceptions, impact on identity, and form as narrative is the first pillar of this paper.

Lebanon and its narratives

“B-tetzakkari lammā ṭaltīlī, innak raḥ tazawważīnī/bala fīlās w-balā bēt /b-tetzakkari kāntī thabbīnī, ma’ anim miṣ dēxal dīnak/’tzakkari kif konna hēḳ/’tzakkari lammā ammā šēfīmī nēyim b-taxtak/’alat-li ʾnsa ṣannāk/w-ṭtīfa’nā nḏallīn hēḳ, bala ʿadwār w-ṭṭanēt/bala kravāt w-ṣobḥīye/bala malāyēn, bala fasāṭēn⁵

Mashrou3 Laila (Maṣrūʿ Laylā):  Fasateen (Fasāṭēn), 2010

In the search for a second pillar to this paper, or more accurately, a second component serving as an example for all what has been said about education and its role as ideological indicator and formative power for ideologies, it would be hard to think of a better option than Lebanon. Tiny in size but religiously extremely diverse, the country is currently famous for sectarian violence, Palestinian refugee camps, and clashes between Ḥizbullāh and the Israeli Defence Force. Up until the 1960s, however, the pays des cèdres had a completely different image to present. Back then, the country was known as the Switzerland of the Middle East, its capital, Beirut, as the Paris of the Orient. Due to its well organised banking facilities the city served as a global financial hub – something like a proto-Dubai – bridging the Gulf with the West. Apart from these clichés, Lebanon was indeed regarded to be the paradigm of religious tolerance and Christian-Muslim coexistence. These perceptions, however, later proved themselves to be

⁵ In one of its latest songs, Mashrou3 Leila (MSA Maṣrūʿ Laylā, Lebanese Colloquial Arabic Maṣrūʿ Laila) gives a good reflection of Lebanon’s social and sectarian divides that still coin the society. According to the lyrics of the song “Fasateen” (MSA fāṣātīn, LCA fasāṭēn, or Dresses), a marriage seeking to ignore religious and financial differences is condemned to fail. Mashrou3 Leila – a band of 6 architecture students from the AUB – is a recent figure in Beirut’s progressive alternative music scene. They songs, all written in LCA, often criticise Lebanon’s social conditions and prevailing sectarian structures.
nothing more than illusory\textsuperscript{6}. Later after the country’s submersion in the one and a half decades of civil war beginning in the 1970s fought along sectarian lines it generally became clear that the ‘Lebanese model’ was indeed a fragile and not a viable one. Inter-communitarian fights, fuelled both by fears and ambitions regarding the role and the future each sect had and aimed to have, inevitably spotlighted the diverging perception these had about the past of their respective community, other communities and nonetheless about that of the country and its identity. In fact, even after two decades of relative internal peace since the end of the Civil War in 1990, national identity in Lebanon remains a contentious issue across many spheres of society, allowing the parallel existence of competing historical memories and self-perceptions. Consequently, being \textit{miš dāxal dināk}, i.e. not belonging to the same religious sect is still an issue in Lebanon\textsuperscript{7} and has still pivotal impacts on many segments of daily life. Due to these circumstances, Lebanon’s modern history and sectarian kaleidoscope produced an exceptional microsphere serving as a perfect second pillar for this paper.

\textsuperscript{6} The most prominent example for such a spectacular U-turn has been produced by one of the most distinguished historians of modern times, Kamal Salibi (\
\textit{Kamāl as-Ṣalībī}). In 1965, his work, \textit{“The Modern History of Lebanon”}, presented his patria as an exemplar of successful cultural integration and peaceful coexistence declaring Lebanon to be the best model for the whole region. However, in his new book \textit{“A House of Many Mansions”}, published following the Civil War, he revised his theories providing a fundamentally new perception of Lebanese history interpreting it as a concurrence of separate, sectarian-affiliated narratives.

\textsuperscript{7} As Lebanon’s 18 officially recognised religious groups maintain the right to oversee marriage, divorce and inheritance, couples from different religions, atheists and those who do not belong to one of the officially recognized religions cannot marry in their home country. Moreover, civil weddings are not permitted in the country, but the government does recognise those that take place abroad. The option of removing religious-group classification from the national identity cards is only permitted since 1998. \textit{“Not at home”}, \textit{The Economist} (03.09.2009)
I. Introduction

In April 2010, Al Jazeera’s Documentary Channel (qanāt al-jazīra al-waṭāʾiqiya) was the first Arab-language television channel to air Lebanese filmmaker Hady Zaccak’s (Hādī Zakkāk) award-winning documentary “Darson fel tarekh” (darsun fī ‘t-tārīḵ, A History Lesson). The 51 minute-long documentary examines the question of historical perceptions, national/sectarian identities and allegiances and the way these are shaped through the complexity of contemporary Lebanese history education. In order to represent a wide spectrum of Lebanon’s private education sector, the director interviewed students - and in a lesser extent, teachers – from different Sunni, Shiʿa, Catholic, Evangelical and secular private high schools throughout the country. As the documentary reveals, deep sectarian divisions and continual disagreements between political factions over the tumultuous series of events that have characterised Lebanon’s more recent history, is still resulting in the complete absence of a unified historical narrative including the country’s post-independence history. In private schools, holding the larger stake from Lebanon’s educational system, the situation is roughly same: although mostly following other international (but government-approved) curricula, the myriad of textbooks in use in these schools offer varying spins on Lebanon’s past and forge alternating concepts of the country. As the director remarks at the end of the film: “They all [the interviewed students] believe in Lebanon, but the concept of Lebanon differs. It becomes more, for example, a Muslim or a Christian Lebanon first, and then ‘the Lebanon.’” With their contradicting answers to the same questions, Zaccak addresses a crucial problem of the modern Lebanese educational system that has, however, far reaching consequences: the plethora of concurring historical narratives and the lack of unified national identity as the result of this deep rooting concurrence.

In line with Zaccak’s track, this paper is aimed to observe the impact that currently available history school textbooks have on the formation of identities and the forge of loyalties and allegiances. Furthermore, by providing a comparative analysis of textbook narratives, the paper also seeks to detect the ways and manners of persuasion these narratives use to attach their readers to the sectarian-affiliated historical perspective they are representing. As it is hoped, such a comparison will reveal the main lines of Lebanese history that is agreed – or not agreed – upon and at same time it will also underline the extent and layers of disagreement. However, the dimensions of such a research project are enormous. Firstly, in order to provide as representative a survey as possible, an analysis and comparison of all of those history manuals that are currently in use in Lebanon would be necessary. However, as my inquiries at relevant offices of the Lebanese Ministry for Education and Higher Education confirmed, a list of government-approved textbooks indeed exists, but – according to local officials – is ‘unavailable’. Moreover, I was also told that due to the lack of recent update and the high number of continuously authorised manuals, the official list – that is for these reasons never published – would practically be worthless. Consequently, a preliminary research on the research subject had to be undertaken, mostly by inquiring at schools and local bookshops.

8 Zaccak (2009)
selling the textbooks. As a result, an unforeseen complexity and abundance of available textbooks took form while posing a number of questions – and problems:

1) The amount and types of textbooks

In today’s Lebanon, the freedom in the conception of history textbooks and in the process of their commercialisation has resulted in an extremely high number of manuals available on the market and used by the country’s educational institutions. According to Samir Jarrar, currently there are three different types of school textbooks in Lebanon: governmental (rasmi), private (kassy), and foreign (ajnabi). Government textbooks, while being standard in other Arab countries, are playing a rather peripheral role in Lebanon. Firstly, as it will be discussed in detail later in this paper, Lebanon has neither a central stately history curriculum nor a complete series of official history textbooks. Secondly, public secondary schools do not have a leading role in the country’s educational structure. Hence, the incomplete series of governmental schoolbooks, published by a governmental organ called CERD (Center for Educational Research and Development, Centre de Recherche et de Développement Pédagogique, al-markaz at-tarbawi li-‘l-buḫāt w-an-nimā) is only used in some of the country’s governmental schools. In contrast, the huge array of private textbooks, printed by local publishing houses and written by Lebanese authors, are virtually ruling the market and are the most widely spread type. As mentioned before, the number of private textbooks currently available is practically impossible to track, despite of the fact that they must obtain governmental authorisation. Moreover, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education has clear guidelines concerning the basic content of history textbooks. This type of textbook includes religious, or sectarian-affiliated as well as secular manuals and is freely to be chosen by private schools. Among these textbooks, some are newly published editions of years-, if not decades-old works coexisting with more recently elaborated manuals. The third type of textbooks, that of the foreign published, are mostly French or English languages manuals imported from France or an Anglo-Saxon country and are originally designed to fit the needs of local, i.e. not the Lebanese curricular regulations. Consequently, these narratives are not including any reference to Lebanon or its history, and as one of Zaccak’s interviewee remarks: "We started learning history in French. We did not learn about Lebanon’s history. We learned about the first and second world wars and the French revolution. This is what we learned", while another student adds: "We learnt more about the history of Europe and the US than the history of Lebanon." However, in order to fit the requirements of the centrally regulated Lebanese baccalauréat, schools using such books often provide additional instruction of Lebanese history, with or without the use of a Lebanese manual. Moreover, as Education Minister Bahiya al-Ḥarīrī told in a television interview for LBC, the Education Ministry has no supervisory authority over foreign textbooks used in schools, as it is the General Security’s

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responsibility to monitor such manuals when entering the country.\textsuperscript{10} According to Jarrār, only an extremely small fracture of schools allows the exclusive usage of foreign textbooks.

Needless to say, this problem has a decisive impact on this paper. To begin with, the great abundance and different types of existing textbooks made a selection necessary. Due to their marginal numerical share on the textbook market, government as well as foreign textbooks were excluded from this research. As mentioned, these two types occupy a peripheral position in Lebanon’s education and only affect marginal strata of society. Consequently, further selection restricts itself on the private type of history textbooks that due to its diversity and pivotal importance serves as the most representative field for an analysis. This field, however, still accounts for an unmanageable plethora of manuals wherefore another selection shall be made. Thus, in order to keep the analysis as representative as possible, the ultimate selection includes three sectarian-affiliated manuals representing the country’s biggest sects: a Christian, a Sunni, and a Shiʿi.\textsuperscript{11}

2) The content of textbooks

In pluralistic societies, the teaching of history is a highly controversial issue. Even countries not characterised by inter-communal conflicts, e.g. Switzerland, have to some extent diverging narratives coined by one of the nation’s ethnic or religious communities.\textsuperscript{12} In these societies, the interference of communal or minority identities with a centrally proposed, and hence often even hypothetic unitary national identity frequently result in the rivalry of multi-layered, parallel or even opponent identities and historical perceptions. Consequently, this competition hinders the installation of a unified collective memory among the population. In Lebanon, the contention is not only between a proposed official and one minority identity, it is also very much coined by an inter-communitarian aspect of competing perceptions. Moreover, this inter-communitarian disagreement on a unified national narrative and the unconditional persistence to sectarian-coined perceptions are also responsible for attacking every attempt to change this situation. According to Professor Antoine Misarra, former member of a governmental committee in charge of elaborating a unified history program in the 1990s, the program was unanimously approved by the Council of Ministers and published in the official paper of the republic in June 2000. However, the resulting history book, already printed, was finally not allowed to be put on the market because of the heavy protests of all of the country’s religious communities that accused the project for interfering with their internal affairs and violating their autonomy guaranteed by the constitution.\textsuperscript{13} Nevertheless, as Misarra ads, this is not the sole problem: “What is labelled ‘History of Lebanon’ is in fact the history of one part of Mount Lebanon. Other regions are forgotten. Where’s their history?” In fact, the history of regions such as the Hermel, the Biqāʿ or the South does not form part of the so-called official history in

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{NOW Lebanon} (07.11.2008)
\textsuperscript{11} More information on each textbook is to be found in the second section of this paper.
\textsuperscript{12} Abou Moussa (1996) 8.
\textsuperscript{13} An-Nahār (2.2.2009)
Lebanon. As Misarra argues, Lebanon is not the sole country to have witnessed a territorial evolution over time, “it’s also the case of Switzerland and the USA; however in those countries the past of more recently annexed territories is accounted for.” He also remarks that in the last 30 years, Lebanese historians have made remarkable progress in their work on researching Lebanon’s regional history. Their results, however, have never been used for educational purposes.\(^ {14}\) However, Lebanese textbooks, private or state-produced, have one thing in common: In all of the cases, the taught version of Lebanese history ends at 1946, right after the country’s independence from France in 1943. As Zaccak remarks in an interview concerning his documentary: “In this post-colonial world, usually a country’s history begins with independence. Not so in Lebanon, where “it stops with independence”. This anomaly is another result of the society’s deep sectarian divisions and continued disagreements between political factions. These ongoing antagonisms permit the instruction of a unified historical narrative that goes past the independence and includes the often violent – and thus highly controversial – series of events that characterise Lebanon’s post-independence history. Consequently, information on the country’s post-independence history is only transmitted in informal ways, most importantly by parents, the community, or the internet. But as even schools are not free from sectarian divisions, other environments outside the classroom often contribute to the reinforcement of these divides. As the Zaccak ads, “the problem is what they learn from out of school, from their environment. […] What I have discovered is that no one from [each of the] communities really knows the other.”\(^ {15}\)

As the frames of this paper do not allow a complete analysis of a four-year curriculum, the focus of this analysis had to be delimited. By searching for the most suitable period, there were a number of criteria to keep in mind. Firstly, the period shall have a great impact on all of the three communities and thus on the country as a whole too. Secondly, it should also play a role in the forging of the proposed Lebanese identity. In regard of these factors, the first half of the 20\(^{th}\) century (from the end of the Ottoman era to Lebanon’s 1943 independence) seems to be the most eligible period for the analysis. As said, it is the last era to be included in the national curriculum and embraces such crucial events as the end of the 400 year long Ottoman era, Lebanon’s creation as a separate entity, the imposition of the French mandate, the promulgation of the country’s first constitution as well as independence from France in 1943.

\(^ {14}\) ibidem
\(^ {15}\) Khourchid (2009)
II.1. Structure and methods

The question of Lebanese textbooks has multiple dimensions. Besides being of educational nature, it is also a political, social, and sectarian question. Moreover, it not only tackles history, but has also an essential influence on the formation of identities. Hence, an analysis consecrated to the question of Lebanese manuals must investigate political, social, and communitarian aspects, as well as the aspect concerning identity issues. Due to this multiplicity, the paper cannot spare to put light on a number of topics necessary for the understanding of the complex background of the core topic before proceeding to the analysis itself. Therefore, it consists of two major sections.

The first section is foreseen to provide all the necessary information that reveals and underlines the importance, far-reaching roots, and function of textbooks and their narratives. Firstly, an overview of Lebanon's communities is indispensable. Thereby it is important to highlight the educational situation of each religious and ethnic community, and to examine the sectarian structure of the Lebanese state. Secondly, as the last comprehensive account on Lebanon's highly divers educational system dates back to the 1960s, it was essential to give an outline of the subject with the inclusion of later developments up until today.

The second section consists of the analysis itself. The analysed periods are divided into eras, mostly overlapping with the division of the textbooks proper. In order to demonstrate differences between the three narratives, it was useful to provide a general historical overview of the examined era, based on the many works dealing with certain epochs or Lebanese history as a whole. Thereby it is worth mentioning that so-called 'official histories', works of renowned scholars and researchers, are also highly contradictory. At some points it was indeed a hard task to find a version that was more or less agreed upon by more than two scholars. Unfortunately, the extent of these anomalies made taking them into consideration impossible. It is of itself a topic that deserves a separate analysis.

The analysis is closed with a general conclusion; additional documents, tables and maps are provided in an annex.
I.2 Review of available literature

Given the complexity of the analysis and multidisciplinary approach concerning its historical, sectarian, ideological and identity-related background, there is a large number of valuable works to consult on all of these fields.

Although a relatively recent subject, the significance of historical narratives in creating detrimental prejudices and stereotypes of the enemy as well as in bringing a common identity into being was recognised as early as at the end of the First World War, when the League of Nations started to promote international textbook revision. Since then, research and studies on textbooks in general have been gradually gaining in importance, for instance, now there is even an own institute, the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research (Georg-Eckert-Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung) in Brunswick (Braunschweig), Germany, that promotes research and conferences for the reciprocal study and revision of textbooks in order to ensure a balanced, up-to-date and unprejudiced mutual knowledge and understanding between different peoples\textsuperscript{16}. Since Abdoljavad Falaturi’s pioneering study\textsuperscript{17} on Islam in West-German textbooks from the 1980’s (and the end of the Cold War), research gradually started to focus not only on textbooks of the former enemy (and thus European) states, but also on those from the other shore of the Mediterranean. Following the initiative of this very first approach, now there are numerous studies consecrated to narrative analysis of Arab-Islamic nations, mainly by emphasising Islamo-Christian relations and representations. Among Arab, or Middle Eastern nations, Lebanon is often subject of studies of that kind. The most comprehensive example is Abou Moussa Tanos’ thesis on the role of history education in influencing identity in Lebanon\textsuperscript{18}, a massive oeuvre analysing a number of Lebanese history school textbooks – including state-created and private titles – focusing on the link between these and the country’s sectarian allegiances and identities.

Concerning Lebanon’s history, there are a myriad of works available in all major European languages as well as in Arabic, from Western and Lebanese scholars alike. The latest civil war (1975-90) resulted in a wealth of published works and studies focusing on modern Lebanese history and at the same time emphasised the need for a comprehensive, neutral and non-sectarian-based history of Lebanon. With its pluralistic approach merging historical, economic and social aspects and told through a non-sectarian narrative, Fawwad Traboulsi’s\textsuperscript{19} path-

\textsuperscript{16} Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research: History. Electronic publication available on the website of the GEI: http://www.gei.de/en/the-institute/history.html (last retrieved 08.03.2010)

\textsuperscript{17} Falaturi, Abdoldjavad [Ed.]: Der Islam in den Schulbüchern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Braunschweig: Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung 1986-1990.

\textsuperscript{18} Abou Moussa (1996)

\textsuperscript{19} Traboulsi (2007)
breaking recent Lebanese history being the most eminent example. I would also like to mention Georges Corn’s inevitable *Le Liban contemporain*\(^{20}\) that gives a great insight not just into the fundamental problems of Lebanese historiography, but also into the many facets of Lebanese sectarianism and communitarianism. Earlier œuvres, such as an analysis of Syro-Lebanese politics of the interbellum era by Albert Hourani, Zamir’s monographies on recent Lebanese political history, or Kamal Salibi’s reconsidered Lebanese history are also important and much cited sources.

Being a complex, controversial and much disputed issue, Lebanon’s education has always received much academic attention. Theodor Hanf’s massive and detailed monograph of the pre-civil war Lebanese educational situation is the best and most valuable source on this field. Even though not being the most recent, Maurice Saliba’s *Privatschulwesen im Libanon*\(^{21}\), a study on the country’s private education sector, provides an in-depth analysis on broad historical fundament. I would also like to mention Abdullatef Hares’ dissertation on education and national integration\(^{22}\) in Lebanon that gives a well-founded analysis of the obstacles of Lebanon’s educational system providing detailed ideological and historical background information. For further studies on various aspects of Lebanese education, communal perceptions and curricular difficulties cf. the bibliography list of this paper.

As for the examination of Lebanon’s multilayered identities, the topic has continued to generate interest by scholars resulting in such truly magnificent works as Kaufman’s *Reviving Phoenicia*, Pipes’ *Greater Syria* on the ideological and political currents shaping the history of this never realised ambition, as well as Fabiola Azar’s unique study on Lebanese communal identity and confessional appartenance.

As regards for the exact subject of this paper, as far as I am informed, no comparative study has been published on the Lebanese historical perception(s) of the Mandate era based on textbook-analysis. For an analysis on the image of the Crusades in Arab history textbooks, Matthias Determann’s final thesis is a useful title, as is Namir Frayḥa’s\(^{23}\) study on the image of the West in Lebanese history school textbooks.

\(^{20}\) Corm (2005)
\(^{21}\) Saliba (1974)
\(^{22}\) Hares (1985)
\(^{23}\) Frayḥa (1998-1999)
1.4 Notes on Terminology

At the very beginning of this paper some notes on par excellence historio-geographic, terms must be made in order to avoid confusion caused by context-related ambiguities. In the case of historical and/or geographic terms it is necessary to distinguish between geographic and historical regions; historical or contemporary political entities as well as, in some cases, between historic and/or contemporary, mainly not realised concepts, ideas and proposals.

Syria

(Arabic سوئییا Sūriya; French Syrie)

In contemporary context, the term ‘Syria’ refers to the modern state of the Syrian Arab Republic (الجمهورية العربية السورية, al-Jumhūriya ‘l-‘Arabīya ‘s-Sūrīya; République arabe syrienne), a political entity in the Middle East existent since her independence from France in 1946 with Damascus as capital.

In other contexts, however, the same term can refer to:

Greater Syria (سوئییا الکبری Sūriyā al-kubrā or بلاد الشام bilād aš-Šām), sometimes also Natural Syria (سوئییا الطبیعیة Sūriyā āt-tabi‘a) or geographical Syria marks both a historical and a geographical region stretching across the Levant including prominent urban centres such as Damascus, Jerusalem, Aleppo, Beirut and Tripoli. Most commonly, its territory is bordered by Anatolia’s Taurus Mountains in the north, the Mediterranean in the west, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gulf of ‘Aqaba in the south-west and the Arabian and Syrian Deserts in the south and the west. Thus, it includes the territories of modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Territories as well as the now Turkish provinces of Gaziantep (Ar. ‘Aynṭāb), Diyarbakır (Diyār Bakr) and Hatay (Iskandarūn), the latter formerly known as the Sanjak of Alexandrette. This territory can also be described as the western, mountainous part of the ancient Fertile Crescent. In a broader (and thus mainly political) sense, Greater Syria can refer to the same region extended with Mesopotamia, or modern Iraq and the Sinai Peninsula.


25 cf. EI2, vol.IX. s.v. Al-Šām

26 “Running in a semi-circle around the edge of the Syrian Desert is the ‘Fertile Crescent’, a belt of cultivable land bounding the area of pasturage. It may itself be divided into two parts. The western part is a land of mountain-ranges, valleys and plains; this is geographical Syria. The eastern part is a vast plain, created and maintained by the two great rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, which run southwards to it, finally meeting and flowing together into the Persian Gulf; this is Iraq and Mesopotamia.” Hourani (1954) 6.
This concept was mainly advocated by the influential Syrian Social Nationalist Party (and by its prominent leader Антун Садде) beginning from the 1930s in order to propagate Pan-Syrian ideologies that emphasised the cultural, linguistic and racial unity of the region’s distinctive, ‘Syrian’ population and thus, wished to establish a ‘united Syrian nation’ within the boundaries of Natural Syria. Elements of this ideology were adopted by many political forces of the Levant, most notably by Syria’s still ruling Ba‘th (Baath) régime that never really ceded to work on the realisation of its Greater Syrian aspirations.

It is worth mentioning that despite of its long history, Syria or Greater Syria had never taken the form of an independent polity before 1946, but always formed a part of a larger entity (such as the Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad or Ottoman Empires) or was fragmented into smaller units (like it was during the Crusades or the Mandate period). Consequently, distinct regional loyalties and identities have always been hindering to that sort of ‘national’ cohesion that is to be found in other parts of the Arab world, most prominently in Egypt.

Ottoman Syria, 1516-1920: Both the territory of modern Syria and that of Greater Syria described above came under Ottoman rule in 1516 and remained so until the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in 1920. During this long period, Syria was initially divided into the wilayets of Damascus (Şām vilāyeti, Şām-i şerif vilāyeti or vilāyat aš-Šām) and Aleppo (Ḥalep vilāyeti, wilāyat Halab), thereby roughly covering the territory of geographic Syria described above. Further divisions, such as the creation of the Beirut wilayet (Beyrūt vilāyeti, wilāyat Bayrūt) and the autonomous mutašarriefiyāt of Mount Lebanon (Cebel Lübnān müteşarriefiğī, mutašarriefiyat Jabal Lubnān) and of Jerusalem (Ḳudūs-i şerif müteşarriefiğī, mutašarriefiyat al-Quds) are later developments that, however, accelerated the emergence of smaller-scale regional cohesions along existing political, cultural or religious lines. So as we see, during the Ottoman period, Syria did not exist as political or administrative unit, thus the word refers to a number of neighbouring, linguistically predominantly arabophone but religiously heterogeneous provinces occupying the geographical area known as bilād aš-Šām for locals and as Syria for Europeans. The official usage of the term Syria (or Sūrīya) only reappears at the beginning of the Ottoman Tanzimat-era in the 1840s; when Ottoman decrees increasingly

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27 For a comprehensive description of Greater Syrian aspirations cf. Pipes (1990), an outstanding œuvre about this crucial but severely neglected issue.

28 As for the Ottoman administrative divisions, on the highest level, the Empire was divided into wilayets, or general governments (Ottoman Turkish vilāyet, Arabic wilāya), led by a wali (OT ‘vālī, Ar. wālī) or governor general directly appointed by Constantinople. Wilayets were further subdivided into sanjaks or districts (OT sancăğ, Ar. sanjāq), with a mutasarrif on their peak. Sanjaks were composed of a number of cazas or departments (OT kaḍā‘, Ar. qaḍā‘) and were led by qa‘yamaqm (OT ka‘īm-ma‘kām, Ar. qa‘īm maqām), cf. Cooke (1968) 5.

29 Tüccarzade (1905) 43.

30 cf. EI², vol.IX. s.v. Al-Shām

start to use the term as a reference for bilād aṣ-Ṣām. Finally, in 1865 the Damascus wilayet was officially renamed wilāyat Sūriya by the authorities. Its territory however, consisting of today’s southern Syria, eastern Lebanon, Jordan, southern Israel and the Gaza Strip, is not correspondent to modern-day Syria.

French Mandate Syria, 1922-1946, (al-intidāb al-faransī ʿalā Sūriyā w-Lubnān; mandat français de la Syrie et du Liban): Following World War I Syria was made into a distinctive polity, first in the form of Emir Faisal’s short-lived Hashemite Syrian Kingdom in 1920 lacking definite boundaries or international recognition and later as a separate entity with distinct, however, arbitrary colonial borders mandated to France according to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided the Ottoman Levant between the British and the French. The territory of this new Syrian entity under the rule of a (Beirut-based) French High Commissioner is not corresponding to that of historical Greater Syria: in addition to present-day Syria, its boundaries include modern Lebanon, the in 1967 Israeli-captured Golan/Jawlān-Hights as well as the province of Hatay, the former Sanjak of Alexandrette ceded to Turkey in 1939. Hence, the novel ‘French Syria’ found herself delimited from her “southern Syrian” territories which became the British mandatory states of Palestine and Transjordan (the later State of Israel and the Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, respectively). Additionally, following the immediate separation of Greater Lebanon, this newly established “Smaller Syria” was further partitioned into semi-autonomous petty statelets by the French Mandatory, viz. the State of Aleppo (État d’Alep, dawlat Ḥalab); an ʿAlewite State (Territoire des Alaouites, dawlat al-ʿAlawiyyin) centred in al-Lādiqīya; the State of Damascus (État de Damas, dawlat Dimašq) and an as-Suwaydā’-centred Druze State (État Druze, Jabal ad-Durūz), forming a so-called “fédération des États Syriens”. Hence, in a context concerning the Mandate period, the term Syria corresponds to this French-made conglomerate of artificial formations.

33 According to Pipes, before their existence as distinctive political or administrative entities, Palestine, the later Transjordan and occasionally even the Sinai Peninsula were often referred to as ‘southern Syria’ by Europeans well up until the late 19th century. (Pipes (1990) 14.)
34 cf. EI², vol.IX. s.v. Al-Shām
Syrian
(Arabic السوري šārī; French syrien)
Contrarily to the many layers marked by the term Syria as well as the absence of a well distinguishable Syrian entity before 1920, the adjective Syrian does not necessarily correspond with the existing or obsolete historic, geographic or cultural entities listed above. Although in historical sense, the adjective Syrian can denote appartenance to historic Greater Syria (such as in the case of the Syrian Protestant College, the predecessor of the American University of Beirut in present-day Lebanon), due to strong and deep-rooting ethnic, religious and regional segregation, other, more accurate denominations (e.g. Druze, ‘Alewite; Palestinian, Damascene, etc.) are often more appropriate. Furthermore, thanks to the existence of these particular sectarian and regional identities, the residents of bilād aš-Šām had never evolved into a single ‘(Greater) Syrian nation’ with common identity or appartenance to the region as a whole.35 On the other hand, however, Arab Muslim, especially Sunni inhabitants in the early 20th century rather placed themselves and their homeland into a wider Arab and/or Islamic framework, a concept that gained its modern political manifestation in the form of European-influenced Pan-Arabism in the late 19th Century and opposed the creation of smaller, artificial entities.36 Thus, when not explicitly explained, in contemporary context, the term Syrian will unanimously indicate affiliation with modern Syria (and her post-1967 boundaries), or Syria excluding Lebanon, in historical context.

Lebanon
(Arabic لبنان Lubnān; French Le Liban)
In contemporary context, the term Lebanon refers to the modern state of the Lebanese Republic (الجمهورية اللبنانية al-Jumhūrīya ‘l-Lubnānīya; République libanaise), a Beirut-centred political entity in the Middle East existent since its independence from France in 1943.

As for the other contexts:

The Lebanon Mountains (Ar. جبل لبنان Jabal Lubnān; Fr. Mont Liban) most commonly Mount Lebanon or ‘the Lebanon’: As a geographical term, it denotes a chain of mountains stretching parallel to the Mediterranean littoral in the west, and the Biqā‘ Valley (known as Coele-Syria or Κοίλη Συρία in the Antiquity) and the Anti-Lebanon (Ar. Jibāl Lubnān aš-šarqiya, Gr. ‘Αντίλίβανος) in the east that gave all the later political entities their names. In early times, however, the

36 Cf. Corm (2005) 54: “Pour eux [the Sunnis of Greater Syria], le seul successeur légitime de l’Empire ottoman est un grand État arabe qui maintiendrait les liens sœculaires entre ces grandes villes. À leurs yeux, druzes, chiites, maronites […] ne sont que les éléments marginaux dans la société arabo-musulmane. Dans leurs perception, c’est l’impérialisme occidentale qui joue les minorités pour consolider son pouvoir dans la région.”
term Lebanon simply designated this geographic unit without having any political or administrative connotations. On the other hand, as the mountains provided refuge to persecuted since time immemorial, they began to serve as cornerstone in the identities and historical self-perceptions among the modern country’s numerous communities, *par excellence* in the case of the Maronites, a uniate Christian sect making up the majority of the mountains’ population for the last few centuries and playing a decisive role in the formation and extension of their homeland into a sovereign state. Furthermore, the mountains are also known for their iconic forests of Lebanese cedar (the Biblical *cedrus libani*) that evolved to the symbol of the whole country, depicted on its national flag, coat of arms and mentioned in its anthem. Thus, thanks to its geographical, historical and cultural importance, Mount Lebanon is the core region of the country and the cradle of its Christian and Druze cultures; hence it is often synonymous to the country as a polity, mainly in historical context.

**Smaller Lebanon** *(Ar. Lubnān aṣ-ṣaġīr; Fr. Petit-Liban):* With its distinguished cultural, religious and political nature, Mount Lebanon has always been playing a particular role in the region’s history. Consequently, the mountain was often home to a number of political entities bearing certain degrees of autonomy throughout history. Among these polities, it is the *mutaṣarrifiya of Mount Lebanon* (*mutaṣarrifiyat Jabal Lubnān*), an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire established in 1861 and governed by an Istanbul-appointed Christian governor, that is of relevance for this paper, as it can be regarded as the embryo of the later Lebanese state. Due to its distinguished political situation, for the first time in history, ‘Lebanon’ was not solely a geographic appellation, but the name of a political entity bearing international recognition European powers with separate administration within Ottoman Syria. Although the governorate had no clearly defined borders, its territory, guaranteed by European powers, comprising seven, mostly Christian and Druze populated *cazas* of the Mount, *viz.*: aš-Šūf/Le Chouf, al-Matr/Metn, Kasrawān/Kesraouan, al-Batrūn/Batroun, Jazzīn/Jezzine, al-Kūrā/Koura and Zahla/Zahlé as well as the separate *qaṣba* of Dayr al-Qamar and the exclave of al-Hirmil/Hermel in the Orontes-valley. (It is important to

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37 As Abou Moussa remarks, with the term Mont-Liban, the inhabitants of the area seem to denote the north-western, Maronite-populated section of the mountain chain, excluding its Druze-populated southern areas. Cf. Abou Moussa (1996) 60-62.

38 Cf. Hitti (1957) 11 and 37.

39 For a detailed description of Mt. Lebanon’s political history before 1861 including the Emirate of Mt. Lebanon (1523-1824) and the Muqatʿaji System (1842-1861) cf. Traboulsi (2007) 3-41.


41 Caza (pl. cazas) is the anglicised form of the Arabic word *qaṣba* (pl. *aqdiya*) denoting an administrative district (a third-level subdivision of a *sanjak* in the former Ottoman Empire or a second-level subdivision of a *mubāṣfa*za [governorate] in modern Lebanon). The anglicised orthography follows the Ottoman Turkish and Levantine Arabic pronunciation of the letter *dād* as *z*.

42 Cf. Tüccârzâde (1905) 253.
point out that Beirut, an Ottoman provincial port of relatively low importance up until the mid-19th century, was not forming the part of the autonomous mutaṣṣarriḥiya but, as an exclave embedded into its territory, the city proper stood under direct Ottoman rule as the seat of the homonymous wilayet). Hence, thanks to its distinct geographic, cultural, religious and social features, the mutaṣṣarriḥiya was a compact unit boasting of a society very much different in its outlooks, character and interests to that of its Syrian hinterland. As a result, the term Lebanon or more accurately, Lebanon proper as well as Mount Lebanon, Mount Liban or just simply the Mount as its synonyms occurring in a pre-1920 context connote these seven special cazas situated in the Mount Lebanon range.

Greater Lebanon (Ar. لبنان الكبير Lubnān al-kabīr; Fr. Grand-Liban): Lebanon as entity in its boundaries defined in 1920 by the French Mandatory power had no precedence in history. With the creation of the State of Greater Lebanon (dawlat Lubnān al-kabīr, État du Grand Liban) the former Christian dominated mutaṣṣarriḥiya found itself extended with waste, predominantly Muslim territories with closer historical, cultural and economic ties to the Syrian hinterland than to the Mount proper. These attached territories43, viz. Beirut, the ‘Akkār region and Tripoli in the north, the Biqā‘ (al-Biqā‘, La Béqaa) in the east as well as the southern Jabal ‘Amil region with the coastal cities of Tyre (Ṣūr, Sour) and Sidon (Ṣaydā, Saïda). Even though with the promulgation of the constitution in 1926 the state was officially renamed the Lebanese Republic, however, its disputed borders remained unchanged until today. Ipso facto, reference to modern Lebanon indicates the country with its post-1920 frontiers and territory (the Mount proper and its annexed areas) created in 1920 and vice-versa.

Mount Lebanon Governorate (Ar. محافظة جبل لبنان muḥāfaẓat Jabal Lubnān; Fr. gouvernorat du Mont-Liban): It is important to note that confusingly, the territory of the Mount Lebanon governorate, one of modern Lebanon’s six muḥāfaẓāt is not entirely identical with the historic mutaṣṣarriḥiya, as some cazas, historically belonging to this core region, are currently forming parts of other muḥāfaẓāt, viz. the cazas al-Batrān/Batroun, Bišarrī/Bcharré, al-Kawra/Koura, Zaġartā/Zgharta and al-Minnīya w-ad-Dinniyā/Minniyé-et-Dininyé in the north (i.e. the muḥāfaẓat aš-Šamāl/gouvernorat Liban-Nord) as well as Jazzīn/Jezzine and parts of the Sidon caza in the south (i.e. the muḥāfaẓat al-Janūb/gouvernorat Liban-Sud). These minor discrepancies between historical and current administrative divisions have the result that any reference to the modern governorate is not exactly synonymous with the territory of the homonymous historiogeographic region and thus shall be treated with attention.

43 These territories were sometimes referred as ‘the four cazas and the coast’ (indicating the cazas of Baalbek [Bā’albakk, Baalbeck], the Western Biqā‘ [al-Biqā‘ al-garbī, La ouest Béqaa], Ḥāṣbayyā [Hasbayya] and Rāšayā [Rachaya] as well as the littoral stretching from Ra’s Naqūra in the south to the Nahr al-Kabīr in the north), ‘les territoires annexés’ or ‘Le Liban périphérique’ and are mainly referred to as arḍ al-wilāya (land of the wilayet) in contemporary Arabic usage (cf. Traboulsi (2007) 81 and Christian textbook p. 10.}

25
**Lebanese**

(Arabic لُبنانيّ; French libanais)

In contrast to the term *Syrian*, the adjective *Lebanese* allows a more exact way to mark appartenance to the historically different territories named Lebanon during history and listed above. Consequently, the term *Lebanese* describes affiliation to the historically relevant Lebanese entity. Hence, in a pre-1920 context can refer to the *mutaṣarrifiya* but not, for instance, to the *Biqā‘*, a region belonging to the Ottoman Damascus wilayet up until 1920. The Arabic terms *ahl al-jabal* and *jabaliyûn*, ‘people of the mountain’ (or French ‘*montagnards*’), denoting the residents of both the historic mutaṣarrifiya, and contemporary Western Lebanon can also serve as useful means of distinction. *Lebanese*, however, is ordinarily connoted with modern Lebanon, a polity bearing this name officially and having a well distinguishable territory and frontiers.

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44 Hitti (1957) 15.
II

Background
II.1 Lebanon’s communities

Apart from minority ethnic and immigrant groups, consisting mainly of Armenians, Kurds and Palestinians, the majority, about 94% of the Lebanese population is of ethnic Arab background strongly sharing a common language (Levantine Arabic), the Arabic culture and historical experience. Although the question of origin still constitutes a major point of disagreement and evokes emotionally laden discussions, a long row of Arab historians has affirmed that all of Lebanon’s confessional communities are in fact descendents of Arabic tribes from the Peninsula having arrived in successive waves to the Levant. However many Christians, especially Maronites refuse any adherence to Arabity and continue to claim their supposed Phoenician origin. Hence, communal differentiation has to be made by religious sect, in the first line between Christians and Muslims.

According to Harris, in the late 1980s Christians made up less than 40% of the estimated Lebanese resident population of 3.5 million. Despite their shrinking number, Lebanon is still having the largest portion of Christian population among the Arab countries. Conversely, Muslims comprised about 60% of the Lebanese in the same period, rapidly increasing in number since the end of the Civil War due to higher fertility rates and less emigrants than among Christians. However, as mentioned before, exact figures regarding the actual sectarian composition of the nation are absent as a potential census, conducted in 1932 for the last time, would seriously contest the delicate confessional equilibrium and would result in the repartition of public functions based on the 1943 National Pact.

Presently, the Lebanese Constitution recognises 18 sects in Lebanon, but political weight and public functions are only divided between the two tiers of seven major sectarian communities. The first tier is made up by the three great communities - the Shi‘i Muslims, the Maronite Christians, and the Sunni Muslims – each of them containing more than 20% of the total population and holding the principal regime offices in accordance with the 1943 National Pact. Four other communities – Orthodox Christians, Druze, Greek Catholics, and Armenians (Orthodox and Catholic) constitute the second tier by bearing subsidiary stakes in the regime.

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46 Azar (1999) 42.
47 For July 2010 the CIA World Factbook indicates a total population of an estimated 4,125,000
49 Similar shares appear in the CIA World Factbook
50 Azar (1999) 42.
51 Harris (1997) 68.
II.1.1 Religious Communities

II.1.1.1 Maronite Christians

الموارنة al-mawārina

(about 21% in 1990)

As Harris aptly puts it: “Lebanon would not exist without the Maronites, as the country is an expression of the determination of this compact and relatively coherent mountain population to achieve political insulation from its Islamic surrounds”. The Maronite sect originally emerged at the early seventh century AD as a result of the Monothelite controversy adopted as compromise by the Byzantine emperor Heraclius in order to eliminate the divide between Orthodox and Monophysite views concerning the human and divine natures in Christ dividing contemporary Christianity. Among some of the Christianised Arab tribes in the northern parts of present-day Syria who had adopted Monothelitism there was a small group of monks from a monastery of the hermit Mār Mārūn, and under the leadership of Yūḥannā Mārūn, that asserted a certain degree of ecclesiastic autonomy under Islamic rule. However, due to the recuperation of Northern Syria by hostile Orthodox Byzantine in the tenth century, Maronites were forced to move southwards into the remote valleys of Mount Lebanon in order to remain in Islamic territory where they were assured religious tolerance. During the Crusades the patriarchs of the tiny Maronite community established formal contact with the Church in Rome resulting in a union that, however, only became complete after the Maronites fully dropped their Monothelite views around the 1590s, and thus became fully conform with Catholic doctrines. From that point, the Maronite church counted as the prototype Uniate church and

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52 Harris (1997) 68.

53 The patron saint of the Maronite church lived in the latter parts of the fourth century and died around 410 in the wilderness near Antioch. Following his death, their disciples migrate to Apamea (Afāmīya, in present-day NW Syria) and erect a monastery for his relics. Due to ongoing feuds with Jacobite Christians, the Maronite community migrates further southwards to Mount Lebanon in the 7th century. (cf. Hitti: pp.247-248)

54 Following the Maronite migration to Mount Lebanon in the second half of the seventh century, Yūḥannā Mārūn (or Joannes Maro, † 707) settles down his community in the Wādī Qādıšā (Holy Valley) as their first patriarch. (cf. Hitti (1957) 249.)
started to maintain close ties not just with Rome\textsuperscript{55}, but gradually with the Western civilisation as a whole. Due to these western links and influences, by the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Maronites achieved a leading role in Mount Lebanon attaining demographic majority in the Kasrawān/Kesraouan, and al-Matn/Metn districts as well as strong presence in the traditionally Druze-populated aš-Šūf/Chouf and Jizzīn/Jezzine areas. Moreover, thanks to the political support of European powers, Mount Lebanon also gained political autonomy within the Ottoman Empire with European guarantees. Throughout the centuries Maronites kept Syriac and Arabic as their liturgical language\textsuperscript{56} and a distinctive religious hierarchy headed by the Maronite patriarch who had possessed the community’s political leadership.\textsuperscript{57} The patriarch’s political power has reached its peak during the patriarchate of Elyās Ḥuwayyik (Ilyās Hoyek) who represented Lebanon at the Versailles peace conference in 1919 and achieved the creation of a Maronite-led Greater Lebanon under initial French mandate. Since then, however, the role and political power of the Maronite patriarchate have been decreasing\textsuperscript{58}. Maronite political power, however, continued to be on the rise during Lebanon’s naissance as a distinct, Maronite-dominated polity under French Mandate, and culminated in the country’s 1943 independence marked with the intercommunitarian agreement of the National Pact assuring the Maronites’ political dominance over the new nation.

\textbf{Educational situation}

Historically, Maronites played a pivotal role in the implantation of Western-style education in the country. Thanks to their close ties to Western Christianity that enabled the schooling of Maronite clergy in Rome’s Pontifical Maronite College founded in 1582, the returnees catalysed an educational boom inexperienced in the region. Additionally to local school establishments, the Mountain’s Maronite population was the primary target of Western missionary activity beginning from the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, predominantly driven by French missionary orders most prominently by the Jesuits. From that point, the Maronite community has inextricably became exposed to French cultural influence, adopting French school system and introducing French as primary language of instruction and social prestige. This development, however, was only the impetus of the Lebanese-Christian educational sector’s further expansion taking place in the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, as additionally to the French orders, American, British and in a smaller extent other European missionaries set foot in Beirut and Lebanon by establishing their own educational institutions. Despite of the educational growth of other non-Maronite

\textsuperscript{55} The Maronite church, however, remains autocephalous, meaning that it refuses obedience to Rome by electing its own patriarch who resides in Lebanon and not in one of the traditional patriarchal sieges of the Arab East such as Antioch, Jerusalem or Alexandria. (cf. Corm (2005)14.)

\textsuperscript{56} Corm (2005)14.

\textsuperscript{57} Harris (1997) 68.

\textsuperscript{58} Kuderna: p.159.
Christian communities encouraged by these new foreign missionaries concentrating their activities on them, the Maronites retained their unchallenged leading role in private education throughout the French Mandate era and the early decades of independence well up until the eruption of the 1975-1990 Civil War. According to Hanf, Maronite affiliated foreign and national (i.e. local Lebanese) private schools made up the slight majority of the private educational sector prior the Civil War, representing a much larger stake in from the total of private schools than the community itself from the population. The Civil War brought fundamental changes: on the one hand, the mass exodus of the Maronite population as well as of Lebanese and foreign teachers weakened the community and made regular instruction in many cases impossible; on the other hand however, constant fighting, sectarian homogenisation, and political cantonisation made market for new schools and even satellite campuses of Beirut universities in core Maronite regions and elsewhere. Since the end of the Civil War and the ratification of the 1989 Ṭāʾīf agreement, private sectarian education experienced a novel upsurge. Parallel to this tendency, Maronite-affiliated establishments retain their social prestige and keep expanding their educational network of every level.

According to a statistical bulletin issued by the CRDP in 2006, the Maronite community has the largest number of schools in Lebanon, and the largest number of students compared to other Christian and Islamic confessions. Their schools make up 18.4% of private schools in Lebanon, and their students 30% of all students in private schools. A comparison between the confessions shows that the Maronite confessions owns 44% of religiously affiliated schools and have 51.2% of students. Moreover, there are three Maronite-founded universities, while other prestigious institutions, such as the USJ, the UL and the AUB continue to have traditionally high portions of Maronite students.

59 Hanf (1969) 139.
60 Besides new establishments such as the Université Notre Dame de Louaizé (1987), the stately Université Libanaise and the Jesuit Université Saint-Joseph opened satellite campuses to escape fighting in Beirut (cf. Havemann: pp.104-115.)
61 Data published on the CRDL website (http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5190)
62 The Université de la Sagesse (Jāmiʿat al-ḥikma), founded by the Maronite Archdiocese of Beirut ; the Université Notre Dame de Louaizé (Jāmaʿat Sayyidat al-Luwayza), founded by the Maronite Order of the Holy Virgin in 1978, and the Université Saint-Ésprit de Kaslik (Jāmiʿat ar-Rūḥ al-qudus fī ’l-Kaslik) by the Lebanese Maronite Order in 1961. (cf. Havemann: pp.105-114.)
II.1.1.2 Other Christians

(about 14% in 1990)

In addition to the Maronites, the Lebanese Constitution recognises a number of other Christian denominations too, viz.: the Melkite Greek Orthodox (kanīsat ar-Rūm al-Urṭuḏūks), the Jacobite Syrian Orthodox63, and the Chaldean Assyrian church.64

Beside these indigenous communities, which constitute some of Christianity’s most ancient sects, Western missionary activity resulted in the existence of three uniate (or autocephalous) churches of the Greek Catholics, Syrian Catholics and Chaldean Catholics65 as well as of tiny Protestant and Roman Catholic communities.66 In present-day Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox make out by far the biggest of these non-Maronite Christian sects (roughly half of the total), followed by the Greek Catholics – an offshoot branch of Orthodoxy since their union with Rome in 1683 retaining Orthodox liturgy but setting up their own patriarchate (with a double residence in Lebanon and Egypt)67. Historically, Greek Catholics (Rūm Malakī or Rūm Kāṭūlīk) formed a strong community in Aleppo before having been persecuted to Mount Lebanon by their original church. The community had strong ties with the Austrian Habsburg Empire.68 Greek Catholics, making up about 4-6% of the Lebanese

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63 Just like their sister church in Syria, Ethiopian Christians, and the Copts of Egypt, the members of the Syrian Orthodox church (al-kanīsa as-suryānīya al-urṭuḏūksīya) accept Monophysite doctrines, i.e. they exclusively believe in the divine nature of Jesus. They retain Syriac as language of liturgy, while their patriarch resides in Damascus. (cf. Corm (2005)13. et Hourani (1954) 123.)

64 The followers of the Chaldean Assyrian church (also called Nestorians, after their founding father, Nestorius) believe in the two distinct and equally important natures of Christ. The church is widespread in Iraq, but also has followers in India and China. The liturgical language is Syriac. (cf. Corm (2005) 13. et Hourani (1954) 123.)

65 All these uniate churches are the autocephalous splinters of their respective orthodox communities.


67 Hitti (1957) 255.

population in 1990, are overwhelmingly urban, concentrated heavily in the country’s larger cities and towns. They are considered to be the most prosperous community per capita.

Lebanon’s Greek Orthodox church, the direct heir of Byzantine tradition, is under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox patriarch of Antioch, who—unlike all the other heads of the major Lebanese sects having their residence in the vicinity of Beirut—resides in Damascus. As an adherent to Byzantine dogmas, the church is a sister organisation to the Greek Orthodox, the Russian Orthodox, and the other Arab Orthodox churches under the obedience of the patriarch of Jerusalem. As Arab Orthodox in general, Lebanon’s Greek Orthodox form predominantly urban communities and historically have been living in symbiosis with Sunni Muslims in the traditional commercial class of the Arab East, and particularly in the commercial hubs of Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon on the Lebanese coast. Consequently, Greek Orthodox shared greater attachment to the Arab nation and regarded the Occident with distrust refusing any assimilation to the Maronites, and fearing Latin supremacy, earning them a good image with their Muslim partners. However, the inability to realise the dream of a unified Arab nation and the emerging dissension within the Arab world forced the community to change their political perspectives. Fears of being treated as secondary citizens in a unified, Muslim-dominated empire drove the Orthodox into the Maronite camp, and even made them favour a French and Maronite dominated Lebanon built up on sectarian basis offering more guarantees to preserve Orthodox particularities and identity. Since independence, and especially during the years of the Civil War, Greek Orthodox politics, alliances and strategies were serving this wish to retain their community’s traditions and role.

In 1975, non-Maronite Christians comprised at least 60% of Greater Beirut’s Christian population, and probably one quarter of its total inhabitants. The Orthodox were half of Tripoli’s 20-25% Christian fraction, and the Greek Catholics formed the largest community in the 90% Christian city of Zahla in the Biqā’ Valley. Predominantly an urban-based community, the Orthodox rarely dominate rural areas. Some exceptions, however, are to be find in the Kūra, near Tripoli; and historically, in the ‘Akkār, al-Matn, and the aš-Šūf districts of Mount Lebanon, while Greek Catholic were prominent in the north Biqā’ and the east of Sidon.
Educational situation

Due to their numerical weight among Lebanon’s non-Maronite Christian minorities, only the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic communities have a significant network of their own denominational schools. Historically, the establishment of the Greek Orthodox schools in Lebanon began in the 19th century in order to create an own network of schools in opposition to the Catholic and Protestant missionaries' educational activities that had been soliciting Greek Orthodox Christians to join their schools. According to Harris, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch complained to the Pope about the activities of the Catholic missionaries in proselytizing Greek Orthodox students to Catholicism. As a result, Orthodox charity organisations proclaimed their objective to establish schools in order to enable free schooling for every Orthodox child. In line with these efforts, Imperial Russia’s rapprochement to establish Orthodox schools in Beirut and the Mount financed by the Tsarist court was more than welcomed. In these primary and secondary schools, organised in accordance with the French system, Arabic was the main language of instruction, while Russian was thought as first foreign language. After the collapse of Russia’s Imperial regime during the WW1, Orthodox charitable organisations took on these former Russian missionary schools and introduced tuition fees and replaced Russian with French as thought language.

Today, the Orthodox school system is represented at every level, crowned with a patriarchal university in Balamand, south of Tripoli, established through the merge of the Académie Libanaise des Beaux Arts and the Balamand convent’s Institute for Theology in 1987. As Havemann remarks, “obwohl die Universität von der orthodoxen Kirche als Symbol für die politische Bedeutung ihrer Religionsgemeinschaft betrachtet wird, sind über die Hälfte der Studenten keine orthodoxen Christen; ein deutliches Zeichen für die traditionellen Bemühungen der Griechisch-Orthodoxen um eine nichtkonfessionsgebundene bzw. überkonfessionelle, säkulare Orientierung.”

According to the statistical bulletin issued by the CRDP in 2006, there were 15 schools affiliated with the Orthodox Church in Lebanon, three private-free schools, and 12 private non-free schools making up 0.54% of the total number of schools in the country. With their 10,812 students, Orthodox schools educated 1.18% of Lebanese students. In comparison with the communities demographic weight (about 14% in 1990), Orthodox educational institutions, which admit both Christian and Muslim students, are severely underrepresented and do not occupy a prominent position in the Lebanese educational sector.

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75 With the exception of the two Armenian churches to be highlighted later in this chapter
76 Harris (1997) 70.
77 Hanf (1969) 81.
79 Data published on the CRDL website (http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5090)
As stated in the same statistic, there are 49 Greek Catholic (indicated as Greek Melkite by the CRDP) schools in Lebanon, making up 3.5% of the total number of private schools, and taking 21,111 students; 3.96% of the total of Lebanese private school students (532,662). With these numbers, Greek Catholics are well represented in the educational landscape, and achieve a surprisingly balanced portion in comparison with the situation of the Greek Orthodox community displayed above. Greek Catholic schools are well represented in the Zaḥla/Zahlé, and al-Matn/Metn cazas. These schools include a number of prominent institutions such as the prestigious Collège Patriarchal, established in 1864.

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80 Data published on the CRDL website (http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5106)
81 Hanf (1969) 81.
II.1.1.3 Shi’i Muslims
الشعبيون

(about 35% in 1990)

Shi’i simply means the faction of the imām ‘Ali, cousin and son-in-law of Muḥammad, who confronted those who emerged as the Sunni elite of the early Islamic world resulting in a major schism still dividing Islam. Shi’ism acquired a tradition of martyrdom and resistance to established Sunni authority when ‘Ali’s son Ḥusayn rebelled and was killed at Karbalāʾ in present-day Iraq. Consequently, Shi’is tend to regard mainstream Islamic history after ‘Ali as a wrong path, under illegitimate regimes.

From the 7th century Islamic conquest and the eleventh century Crusader invasion, the Levant was dominated by Sunni dynasties, making the Lebanon Mountains a central refuge for persecuted Shi’ite communities, hence Shi’is’ presence in the area – most notably in the Kisrawān – is broadly contemporary with that of the Maronites. By Crusader times, Shi’is formed the main population in the south of Mount Lebanon, in much of the Biqāʿ Valley, and also in large parts of central Mount Lebanon later dominated by Maronites and Druze. In the sixteenth century, they supported Iran’s transition to Shi’ism, and thereafter their connection with the Iranian Şafavid empire, chief Middle Eastern enemy of the Ottomans, made them a suspect element from the Sunni Ottoman perspective. Shi’is were pushed out of the Kasrawān and the Şûf by Maronite and Druze expansion, and the late-eighteenth-century Ottoman punitive expedition ransacked Shi’i religious institutions in their southern heartland of Jabal ʿĀmil. As Harris remarks, “such experiences left them with little empathy for either Maronite or Druze visions of Lebanon, and little interest in Sunni Muslim authority, whether Ottoman or Arab.” The community became thus geographically segregated, each developing very specific social characteristics. While the Biqāʿ Shi’ites retained a vigorous tribal structure leaving large portions of the community living as semi-nomadic goat-herds down to modern times, the Shi’rites of the Jabal ʿĀmil traditionally led

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82 Apart from a brief period between 969 and 1099, when Shi’ites were able to establish a number of local dynasties in Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre, ended abruptly by Crusader invasions from Western Europe. (Cobban (1985) 19.)

83 Harris (1997) 72.
a more settled and stable life. Both of these territories were not affected by the Lebanese political system until the creation of Lebanon as a territorially extended polity by the French in 1920 resulting in their peripheral situation within the redrawn borders. Just like against their former Ottoman masters, Shi‘ites remained hostile against the French mandatory power identifying them with their Maronite protégés. Shi‘i abhorrence against the new state was further strengthened by their peripheral situation alongside the borders separating Lebanon from Syria and Palestine and ongoing economic, social and political marginalisation by the Maronites and Sunnis who continued to treat Shi‘ites as junior and peripheral in the Lebanese political scene well up until the eruption of the Civil War. Consequently, Shi‘ites remained largely exposed to the influence of their traditional feudal landlords or joined the rows of leftist political organisations demanding the amelioration of state services, public infrastructure, and political representation. As one of the first results, the management of Shi‘i legal affairs finally became separated from the Sunni judicial system in 1969, when the Iranian-born imām Mūsā aṣ-Ṣadr succeeded in having parliament establish a Higher Shi‘i Islamic Council. Moreover, the steadily trickle of Shi‘ites into Lebanon’s urban centres – most prominently into Beirut – broadened into a flood from the beginning of the 1960s transforming the capitals southern suburbs (called collectively ad-Ḍāhiya or “misery belt”) into vast, poverty-hit slums forming the third and most novel Shi‘i regional stronghold. The beginning of the Civil War “opened a new avenue for the community in accessing the state’s resources through violent means.” During the conflict, Shi‘i positions were strengthened by the collapse of stately structures, the naissance of powerful new militias such as the Amal Movement, and later the Ḥizbullāh,

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84 Cobban (1985) 21.
85 Harris (1997) 72.
86 Azar (1999) 44.
88 Harris (1997) 73.
90 The Amal Party, abbreviation of Afwāj al-muqāwama al-Lubnāniya (Lebanese Resistance Detachments, or just Harakat Amal, literally ‘Amal movement’, while the acronym amal means hope), originally an armed militia founded right at the beginning of the Civil War in 1975 in order to defend the Shi‘i community and its interests. Enjoying Syrian support and having close ties to Iran, the militia played a pivotal role during the fights and could reinvent itself as a political force after 1990. Since the end of the strife, however, Amal loses its popular basis to the Ḥizbullāh, another Shi‘ite force that seriously challenged Amal during the last years of the civil conflict. Finally, Amal declared its solidarity for the combat against Israel in 2006. The movement is headed by the Speaker of the National Assembly, Nabīh Berry, and is member of the March 8 Alliance, currently in opposition; cf. Vannier (2009) 21.
91 Founded as a Shi‘ite militia to fight Israel’s offensive against Lebanon in 1982, the ‘Party of God’ became a prominent figure of the Lebanese political scene following the 2005 elections calling for a transition to a deconfessionalised proportional system. Led by its iconic leader, Hassan Ṣanqalāḥ, the party’s resistance against Israeli military actions in 2006 reinforced its prestige not just among Lebanon’s heavy Shi‘i community, but also among non-Shi‘ites. Considered as a terrorist organisation by the United States, the party maintains close ties to Iran’s ruling
supported by Syria, and Iran’s new regime since 1979. Since the end of the Civil War, the disintegration of traditional feudal structures\textsuperscript{92}, its demographic majority, and bourgeoising political influence gives pivotal impetus to the reinvention of Shi’ite political role in the Lebanese state.

**Educational situation**

Historically, Shi’i is remained largely unaffected from the Mount Lebanon’s pre-WW1 educational boom leaving them in a seriously disadvantaged educational situation throughout the most of the twentieth century. Despite governmental efforts to improve their infrastructure, Lebanon’s Shi’i-dominated peripheral regions continued to be the most underprivileged corners of the country. The small Shi’ite elite continued to send its children to Catholic missionary schools. After decades of marginalisation and neglect, Shi’i-run educational centres only experienced a dramatic rise in number during and after the Civil War, as a result of growing Shi’i awareness of the role education plays in improving and change the community’s position in society and politics, according to its demographic majority.\textsuperscript{93}

Currently, there are four specifically Shi’ite-run, private, fee-charging school networks in Lebanon: ʿĀmilīya-schools, Muṣṭafā-schools, schools of the Amal Educational Centre, and Mahdī-schools, most of them centred in Beirut and its southern suburbs as well as in the Shi’i dominated rural areas of the south and the Biqāʾ.

As the oldest of these, the ʿĀmilīya-schools (*madāris al-ʿāmilīya*, denoting the Shi’ite dominated Jabal ʿĀmil region) were first established as early as in 1929 in order to fight discrimination and socioeconomic difficulties confronting rural and poor Shi’ite migrant to Beirut. ʿĀmilīya schools are primary financed by the Al-ʿĀmilīya Islamic Charity Organisation (*al-jamʿīya al-kayrīya al-islāmīya al-ʿāmilīya*), student fees, state subsidiaries and foreign government donations. Since the ʿĀmilīya network had close ties to Iran well prior its Islamic revolution in 1979, the 1960s witnessed a brief period when Farsi as a foreign language had been introduced optionally additionally to French and English.\textsuperscript{94}

In 1974, i.e. shortly before the eruption of the Civil War, the Islamic Religious Educational Council (*jamʿiyat at-taʿlīm ad-dini al-islāmī*) established a small number of Muṣṭafā-schools (*madāris al-Muṣṭafā*) e.g. in Beirut, an-Nabaṭiya and Tyre in order to avoid the loss of Shi’i students to Christian missionary schools, and increase the weight of Shi’ite educational institutions as countermeasure.\textsuperscript{95} The school lays emphasis on religious instruction and is more

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\textsuperscript{92} Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 31.
\textsuperscript{93} Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 51.
\textsuperscript{94} Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 58.
\textsuperscript{95} Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 63.
expensive than any of its Shi‘ite counterpart. Since 1979, the network has close ties to Iran, but in the same time, it persists in proving its loyalty to the state and Lebanese nationalism by “emphasising the resistance activities in South Lebanon. A ‘Week of Resistance’ in schools is celebrated with special programs for the students.”

Unofficially known as madāris al-ḥaraka, Amal Educational Centres (mu’assasāt Amal at-tarbāwīya), or simply Amal-schools (madāris al-Amal) – referring to their primary donor, the Amal-Movement – only appeared at the end of the Civil War in 1990 as a result of a wider intra-communitarian competition between Lebanese Shi‘a’s two most prominent political representatives of the post-Civil War period, the Amal Movement and the Ḥizbullāh. In order to ensure its social presence and ideological basis, the Amal party opened a total number of seven schools in Lebanon’s Shi’ite-dominated regions in the period between 1992 and 2002 providing education to around 10,000 students. Among the stated goal of Amal Educational Centres is the “promotion and solidification of belief in God”, “the promotion of the idea of national belonging”, and “the promotion of the idea of belonging to the soil of a Lebanon that is united and independent, while understanding its history and geography within the context of its Arab identity”.

As a reaction to its rival’s educational initiative, Ḥizbullāh began to establish its own network of private, fee-charging schools in 1993. Officially named after the Mahdī (madāris al-Mahdi), and simply referred to as madāris Ḥizbullāh (Ḥizbullāh schools), the network of currently 14 schools is sustained by the Islamic Association for Education and Teaching (al-mu’assasa al-islāmīya li-ttarbīya w-at-ta‘līm). Among its primary goals, Mahdi-schools try “to establish the foundation of religious values and Islamic morals in the Lebanese society and the consolidation of human relations between its members […]”

According to Shaery-Eisenlohr, all of these three school types perceive themselves as non-religious, non-confessional schools open for every community. Sectarian dominance is explained by geographic and demographic circumstances. Furthermore, all of them are linked to a larger institution such as a benevolent organisation or a political party. Although they emphasis loyalty to Lebanon and its social unity, all of the schools justify their existence in terms of filling a gap caused by the shortcoming of public schools in the country and

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98 As the web site of the Mahdi-schools states, the system maintains a school for children of the local Lebanese community pursuing its studies in the Shi‘i seminary in the Iranian city of Qom:
77 78 79 80 81 82 83
99 According to Shaery-Eisenlohr, all of these three school types perceive themselves as non-religious, non-confessional schools open for every community. Sectarian dominance is explained by geographic and demographic circumstances. Furthermore, all of them are linked to a larger institution such as a benevolent organisation or a political party. Although they emphasis loyalty to Lebanon and its social unity, all of the schools justify their existence in terms of filling a gap caused by the shortcoming of public schools in the country and

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legitimise the religious instruction offered by them in terms of their goal to rise moral standards in society.\textsuperscript{101}

Concerning the tertiary level of education, the Shi’ite community established its first institutes of this kind during and after the Civil War, par excellence technical colleges, predominantly in Shi’ite majority regions such as Tyre, or the Biqā‘, and Beirut. Mainly financed by the ʿĀmilīya initially, sponsorship was \textit{peu-à-peu} taken on by the political movements Amal and Ḥizbul-lāh since the end of the Civil War. Since then, Shi’ite tertiary education has been experiencing a rapid rise in the number of establishments, as well as in that of its students.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008) 54.
II.1.1.4 Sunni Muslims

Sunnis, "exponents of the original and unadulterated Islamic orthodoxy" have always been the dominant component of the Islamic world constituting the vast majority of Muslims not only in the Levant but in most of the Muslim countries. In their views they are adherents of the *sunna* (custom, practice) of the prophet Muhammad, the first four caliphs (three of whom are cursed by many Shi'is), and other Islamic traditions (e.g. the *ḥadīth*). Sunni Islam’s jurisprudence is regulated by four major schools of religious thought, which vary somewhat on interpretation: the Ḥanafī, Ḥanbalī, Mālikī, and Ṣafī’ī. Lebanese Sunnis follow the somewhat more liberal Ḥanafī law school; while the community is headed by the chief mufti of the Republic residing in Beirut and having authority over the muftis of Tripoli and Sidon.

In the vicinity of Mount Lebanon, Sunnis have always represented a minority, although for the most of the period after the advent of Islam, up to the First World War, the region was ruled by co-religionist dynasties. Predominantly an urban community without major rural hinterland, Sunnis formed the ruling *commerçant* class in the coastal towns of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, garnering their commercial and municipal power from their close association with the Mamelukes and then with the Ottoman Turks. Hence, Sunnis have always perceived themselves as “les membres d’un réseau de villes islamiques – Le Caire, Damas, Bagdad, Alep, Jérusalem – qui a structuré la vie des grands empires musulmans ou des divers sultanats. Pour eux, le seul successeur légitime de l’Empire ottoman est un grand État arabe qui maintiendrait les liens séculaires entre ces grandes villes.” Consequently, they have experienced the creation of the Greater Lebanese State not only as the loss of their numerical majority, privileges, and political

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103 Hourani (1954) 122.
104 Harris (1997) 73.
105 Harris (1997) 73.
107 Corm (2005) 54.
domination but as the forced segregation from their greater Arab-Muslim waṭan.108 After initial refuse and disinterest of the new state tailored to the dimensions of a Christian minority, the Sunnis were the first Muslim community to accept their appartenence to Lebanon and to participate in its government, culminating in the 1942 National Pact based on the power sharing of the novel states dominant sects.109 For their part, Sunnis accepted the “myth of the Maronite majority” and gave up their claim to reunion with Syria.

During the Civil War, the Sunni community failed to build strong militias like the other major sects (par excellence the Maronites and the Shiʿites) and thus were not directly involved in major inter-communitarian fights. The reasons for this relative disinterest laid in the lack of sense neither for the Lebanese, nor for the Palestinian cause. Moreover, Sunnis continued to maintain a brighter outlook by focusing on the larger Arab region instead of tiny Lebanon. Another factor is that the community had much less to lose as the politically overrepresented Maronites, nor much less to gain as the marginalized and underprivileged Shiʿites. Finally, the end of the war and the ratification of the Ṭāʾīf agreement resulted in the preservation and even the increase of Sunni political power.110

As the symbol Lebanon’s post-war era changes, Sunni-Muslim Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī, a Sidon native, launched an ambitious plan to rebuild the country, both physically and economically, and to restore its political sovereignty. Serving two terms in office as Lebanon’s Prime Minister, his cabinets could achieve little to abolish confessionalism, a primary goal set in Ṭāʾīf.111 His assassination in 2005, however, led to massive protests called the “Cedar Revolution” (tawrat al-arz) resulting in the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country.

Today, Sunnis still hold the position as largest sect in Tripoli, and Sidon, and constitute one of metropolitan Beirut’s dominant sects, especially in its former western sector112. Outside of these urban centres, they only make a significant showing in the caza of al-Miniya w-ḏannīya (where they constitute the vast majority) as well as in some rural areas of the ‘Akkār, the Šūf, and the Biqāʾ regions.113

110 Cf. Traboulsi: pp. 123.
112 Beirut’s Sunnis first became outnumbered by Christian migrants by the mid-nineteenth century, and during the past two decades also by the massive influx of Shiʿi rural migrants and refugees. (cf. Harris: pp.73-74.)
113 Harris (1997) 74.
Educational situation

Currently, there are 102 Sunni-affiliated schools in Lebanon divided between fee-charging private schools (60) and schools without fees (42). With an overall number of 39,872 students, these Sunni schools account for 7.3% of the students in those schools.

Historically, the Sunnis were Lebanon’s first Muslim community that became inspired by the benefits of the Western-oriented Christian educational model and established its first association promoting the community’s educational development, the Jamʿiyat al-maqāṣid al-ḵayriya al-islāmiya, or the Muslim Society of Benevolent Intentions, in 1878. Even though being the first and most prominent of its kind, the association had only gained weight in the Lebanese educational sector in the post-war era.114 Today, the Maqāṣid Association operates 41 schools in the country: 8 in Beirut, and 33 in other muḥāfaẓāt, most notably in the Biqāʿ and the North. In its mission statement, the Association “is to ensure the basic education with emphasis on a moderate Islamic education for the largest number of its community’s youth. It also aims at giving them an integral understanding of Islam’s mission and its noble values. The goal of the Association also is to strengthen the understanding of our Arab heritage and to develop the spirit of teamwork amongst each other to strengthen their sense of responsibility and self-confidence“; and describes the ideal Maqāṣid student as “attached to his Lebanese citizenship that is not distinct from his Arab identity. He is also attached to Islam of which he has a modern, integral and open understanding. Tolerant towards other races, religious beliefs and political convictions, the Makassed student is self-confident, independent and creative in his thinking and able to cope with the scientific and technological changes.”115 Moreover, the Association established an own university, the Jāmiʿa al-Islāmiya al-Maqāṣid fī Bayrūt in 1982 with faculties for nursing and health sciences, management and information technology, pedagogy, and Islamic studies. According to Havemann, the university has a good academic reputation due to its distinguished library and renown publications. Other institutes of Sunni learning include a number of colleges in Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon, mostly financed by the Maqāṣid, or the foundation of the late PM Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī such as the Kullīyat al-Imām al-Awzāʿī for Islamic studies and management, or the Kulliyat ad-daʿwa al-islāmiya, both located in the capital, as well as the Islamic Centre for Education (Al-markaz al-islāmi at-tarbiya) in Sidon, and the Al-Manār University in Tripoli.116

115 Both citations are from the official web-site of the Maqāṣid Association available under http://www.makassed.org.lb/education.html
116 Havemann: pp.113-114
II. 1.1.5 Druze
الدروز: ad-durūz; eigenbezeichnung: muwahhidān
(about 5% in 1990)

Although well known for their closed and secretive nature, the Druze have played a pivotal role in the history of Mount Lebanon for centuries, and largely have been shaping the fate of the modern country as well. Established by the Persian Ismāʿīlī mystic and scholar Hamza ibn ‘Alī as an offshoot of Ismāʿīlī Shi‘ism in Cairo in the early tenth century, the small community regarded the sixth Ismāʿīlī Fāṭimid Caliph of Egypt, al-Ḥākim (996-1021 AD), as divine manifestation on earth. Initially, the small sect enjoyed the support of the Caliphate, was however soon declared heretic. Some of the surviving members of the persecuted group found refuge in the remote parts of the Lebanon and southern Anti-Lebanon ranges in the eleventh century. Druzism, named after eleventh-century missionary Muhammad ibn Ismāʿīl Naštākīn ad-Darāzī117, an early follower of al-Ḥākim, secured a strategic location in the Šūf hills, proselytised the majority of the local feudal families, stopped missionary activity, and closed the gates to new converts after 1043. From that point, the Druze are known to be adept in taqiya, or dissimulation, a practiced means of self protection based on close-knit communal solidarity and military prowess.118 Despite of its small numbers, the Druze became the dominant sectarian affiliation on Mount Lebanon’s rural social order between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, before displacement by the Maronites.

In the early sixteenth century, Druze lords of the Mountain helped the Sunni Muslim Ottoman Turks to seize control of the area from the also Sunni Muslim dynasty of the Egyptian Mamlukes. As a reward, the Druze were awarded inner autonomy within the frames of a ‘princeedom’ ruled by the Ma‘n dynasty (1523-1697) securing the prosperity and stability of the region, and laying down the fundaments of an inter-sectarian Lebanon119. Despite this stable continuity, the politics of the great Druze leaders remained mainly characterised by long-

117 Even though being one of its first prominent leader, ad-Darāzī is considered to be a heretic by modern Druze (Benke: p.59.)
118 Harik: p.43.
lasting factional rivalries. From the early eighteenth century right down to modern times the principal tribal division within Druze society was that between the ‘Yazbaki’ and ‘Junblăț’ factions.  

This means that the Druze community generally remained subordinate to the sect’s strong familiar ties organised as a pyramid-like structure of clans and clan-based factions allowing the ruling families to retain their feudal power and privileges. However, after the discontinuation of the Ma‘n dynasty, the Druze experienced stark marginalisation and the decline of political power for the benefit the French-backed Maronite community sowing the seeds of hostility between the two dominant sects of the mount, and culminating in the 1840 civil strife. These experiences encouraged the further closure of the community resulting in the strong feeling of distinctiveness, minimal interaction with other sectarian groups, geographic clustering, and the continuous social, territorial, and political separateness.

Opposing Ottoman Turkish, French mandatory, and Maronite-Christian political dominance over Lebanon, the Druze community retained its assertive behaviour whenever its autonomous rights were jeopardised by the central authority. During the civil war, the sect established its extra-legal civil administration on its ancestral hinterland in 1983, after a victorious but disastrous battle with the Maronite Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese army. This “own version of the state”, demonstrating the sect’s seclusion, and self-reliance in the face of a hostile environment, is still functioning, albeit at a reduced level.

As a faith, Druzism favours a neo-Platonic view of God as an impersonal universal intellect, embraces reincarnation, believes in the transmigration of souls, and rejects the traditional “pillars” of Islam such as fasting and set prayer times. Moreover, polygamy and concubines are prohibited, as well as conversion (either into or out of the sect), and proselytising. Further characteristics include the lack of shrines, or places of worship, as well as the custom of endogamous marriage. The community is thus regarded as grossly heretical for orthodox Muslims, and appeared as a synthesis between Muslim teaching, the doctrine of more eastern religions, and some Hellenic and other pre-Islamic beliefs for Christians.

As a community, the Druze are divided into two distinct classes along the lines of a strict religious hierarchy. The majority of the population, the juhhāl (‘the ignorant’), while observing the religious teachings of the faith, never become initiated into the esoteric details of religious

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120 According to Cobban, a 1980 study was able to produce a list of all of the 333 family names currently occurring in the Druze community, of which 29 were still clearly identified as denoting ‘aristocratic’ families. Additionally, the researchers’ interviewees were clearly able to agree on the affiliation of each of the 333 families to either the Yazbaki or Junblăț party. (Cobban (1985) 23.)

121 Corm (2005) 16

122 Harik: p.45.

123 Cf. Harik: pp.41-42.

124 Harris (1997) 75.

125 A prominent exception was, ironically, that of the Junblățs (Cobban (1985) 22.)

126 Cobban (1985) 22.
knowledge guarded by a class of religious initiates, termed ‘uqqāl (‘the wise men’). Sitting at
the apex, the šayḵ al-‘aql conducts both the secular, and the political life of the community as
its highest religious leader. While originally designed to channel inner-communitarian political
rivalries, as well as to represent the community to outsiders, the position of the šayḵ al-‘aql was
split between the rival Junblāṭī and Yazbākī factions after 1825, creating a double spiritual
leadership. “In 1962, the šayḵ al-‘aql became a governmental official responsible for the legal
affairs and the religious property of the Druze community, equivalent to the Sunni Grand Mufti, and
in 1970 Kamāl Junblāṭ and Majīd Arslān, as factional chiefs, agreed on the de facto reunification. In
other words, there would be only one šayḵ al-‘aql at any one time.”

Currently, the political leadership of the community is in the hands of the former warlord
Walīd Junblāṭ, nominally the chief of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP, al-ḥizb at-taqaddumi
al-īštirākī)127. The BBC describes him as “the country’s political weathervane - consistently emerging
on the winning side through the twists and turns of the 1975-90 civil war and its troubled
aftermath.”128

Today, Druze are spread in the rural areas of Jabal Lubnān’s southern ranges, and on the
southern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, constituting a minority in the cazas of aš-Šūf,
‘Ālayh, Baʿbdā, and to a lesser extent in Ḥāšbayā, Marjaʿūn, the West-Beqaa (al-Biqaʿ al-ḡarbī),
and ar-Rāṣiyā. Outside of Lebanon, Druze maintain important communities in the Ḥawrān
region (in and around the city of as-Suwaydāʾ, capital of the French mandate-statelet Jabal ad-
Durūz) in southern Syria, as well as in Galilee (al-Jalīl) and the Golan-heights (Hadbat al-
Jawlān) in northern Israel.129

According to Harik, the community’s social structure remains close-knit, assertive, and
predominantly rural. A small upper class (an estimated 9% of the community) is made up by
traditional landowners and entrepreneurs, while a strong petite bourgeoisie of shopkeepers,
and producers account for a share of more than 50%. The rest, about 40% of the community’s
population is considered as members of the lower class.130

127 Founded in 1949 by the Druze political leader Kamāl Junblāṭ, the party advocated for the abolition of Lebanon’s
confessional system, and for an Arab socialist policy free from western influences. During the Civil War, party
militias supported the progressive factions of the Palestinian side, and thus were heavily involved in the fighting. In
1977, Kamāl had been assassinated, probably for his opposition to Syrian intervention. The party’s leadership was
taken on by his son Walīd, who allied with Syria after the letter broke with the party’s main Christian adversaries.
Following the war, the pro-Syrian Ėmil Lahoud’s (Imīl Lahūd) presidency forced Junblāṭ to brake his fidelity to
Damascus and turn to Sunni-Christian opposition, finally joining al-Ḥarīrī’s government and the March 14 Alliance in
128 BBC World Service
129 Harris (1997) 75.
130 Harik : pp.42-43.
**Educational situation**

Among Lebanon’s non-Christian communities it were the Druze who firstly profited from western-style education after the British colonel Charles Henry Churchill established a Druze primary school in the Mount in the 1840s. As the next step, the Ottoman mutasarrif, or governor of Mont Liban, Dāwūd Pasha founded the first secondary school for Druze in 1862. However, due to the lack of a complete and widely spread educational network, Druze children often frequented Christian, *par excellence* Protestant schools available in the Druze-inhabited rural areas. The situation has little changed during the mandate years, or after the nation’s independence; according to Hanf’s 1969 study, Druze schools still made out an insignificant percent of the private educational sector at the time of writing.\(^{131}\)

During the Civil War, the de facto autonomous Druze civil administration that controlled the Druze ‘canton’ in the Šūf, took charge over the educational sector as well. Its Education Committee, ordered by the community leader Walīd Junblāṭ, went even so far to introduce a new series of history textbooks displaying the community’s history, and promoting Lebanon’s historical narrative from a Druze point of view.\(^{132}\)

Today, there are 19 Druze schools in Lebanon, 9 private-free, and 10 private fee-charging taking an overall number of 7,211 students they account for the 1.37% of the total of Lebanese private school students.\(^{133}\)

In addition to these private schools, Druze-inhabited regions of the country have also a number of public educational institutions. As a recent study showed, children of the Druze community’s socio-economically privileged upper class often frequent these public schools instead of their private counterparts as it could be assumed. Half of these students were enrolled into the Baʿqlīn public school, a model institution with good library and laboratory facilities. Another reason for this unexpected phenomenon is the lack of private schools in some of the Šūf Mountain’s remote rural areas.\(^{134}\)

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131 Hanf: p.244.  
132 Havemann: p88.  
133 Data published on the CRDL website ([http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5085](http://www.localiban.org/spip.php?article5085))  
134 Harīk: p.45.
II.1.1.6 Jews

Prior to the 1975-1989 Civil War, Lebanon had a small Jewish community centred in Beirut but also spread in the coastal towns of Sidon and Tripoli. Surprisingly, the number of the Lebanese Jewry had been significantly increasing up until 1958, from approximately 3,300 in 1923 to around 7,000 in 1939 and exceeding 10,000 in 1958. This unique tendency was the result of the major influx of Syrian Jews following the birth of the Jewish State in 1948 and the increasing pressure caused by the war between Syria and Israel. Additionally, despite of its open sympathy for the Zionist movement, the anti-Zionist atmosphere and anti-Jewish sentiments of the 1930s and 1940s left the community largely unaffected. The Lebanese Jewry had no organised leadership and based on their low numbers, the sectarian political structure of the Lebanese state allowed them no political representation or influence. Hence, around 90% of its members lived from commerce. The majority of the Lebanese Jewry was arabophone additionally to a smaller stratum of francophone elite.

Following the 1958 Lebanese civil strife and the events of 1967, whereby the PLO established itself as a pivotal actor in Lebanese politics, mass Jewish exodus begun from Lebanon too, so that at the beginning of the Civil War no more than 1,000 Jews remained, most of them leaving for France, Canada, and the United States. Thus, the Civil War ended Jewish presence in Lebanon, leaving only a tiny community a few dozen of (mainly elderly) Beirut Jews by the end of the conflict.

Educational situation

Adjacent to traditional midraš schools existing in Beirut and Tripoli, beginning from 1860, Jewish education was provided by the École de l'Alliance Israélite in Beirut founded by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, a Paris-based international Jewish organisation maintaining Jewish schools across the Middle East and North Africa and subventioned by the Quay d'Orsay. Consequently, the school was based on the French model and had French as its main language of instruction with additional courses in Hebrew, Arabic and English; while religious education was provided by rabbis. After obtaining their brevet, AIU pupils often continued their education at the AUB or USJ. Tuition fees were defined according to the parents' financial

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135 Courrier: p.65.
136 While the wealthy stratum was concentrated in Beirut's Eastern Christian districts, financially disadvantaged families continued to inhabit the capital's traditional Jewish quarter called Wādī Abū Jamīl in the Western section of the city.
137 As only exception, the generally rather poor Sidon community had almost entirely left for Palestine as early as the beginning of the 1930s.
situation, a policy that allowed the inscription of children with financially less privileged background.\textsuperscript{139} The building of the AUI school had been destroyed during the Civil War and has not been rebuilt ever since.

\textsuperscript{139} Cf. Hanf (1969) 172-173.
II. 1.2 Ethnic Communities

Similarly to the uncertain figures concerning Lebanon's sectarian communities, the numeric proportion of the country's ethnic immigrant population is also a subject of approximations. While Harris speaks of a share of 6% (which would mean approximately 210,000 souls from Lebanon's estimated total population of 3.5 million), Corm places the number of non-Lebanese residents between 800,000 and 1 million\(^\text{140}\). The great majority of these immigrants is undoubtedly formed by Palestinians, Syrians and Kurds who typically remain socially segregated from Lebanese society, even though they are majorly Muslim arabophones. The number of Palestinians, mainly living in refugee camps, is estimated to be between 250,000 and 425,000, while Syrians, par excellence guest labourers could have 500 to 700,000 strong community. In contrary to the recent immigration of Palestinians and Syrians, the Kurdish presence has a long history in the region dating back to the 12\(^\text{th}\) century. However, the Kurdish population has rarely received any attention or reached political or cultural significance remaining without any official recognition or political representation.\(^\text{141}\) Since the end of the Civil War, the number of ethnic immigrants has been further increased by the influx of Sri Lankans, Philippines and Africans, mainly working as domestic labourers and only temporary residing in Lebanon. Their number is estimated to reach 80,000.\(^\text{142}\)

As an exception, ethnic Armenians retain their special position in Lebanon and are well integrated into its society. Due to their distinct educational structures, this community, as well as that of the Palestinians are to be further examined here.

\(^{140}\) Corm (2005) 10.

\(^{141}\) Meho: p.1.

\(^{142}\) Cf. Smith
II.1.2.1 Armenians

As the largest non-Arabophone community of the country, Lebanon's approximately 150,000 plus Armenians make up an estimated 4% of the population. There are three officially recognised Armenian denominations: the Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic and a small community of Armenian Protestants. Apart from these religious structures, Lebanese Armenians are well organised on numerous other fields: with three major political parties and currently 6 seats in the Lebanese Parliament as well as with a myriad of Armenian-language dailies, two own radio stations and regular Armanian-language programming provided in some of the country's major commercial broadcasting channels their representation in Lebanese politics and media is well assured.

Moreover, Armenians count own sports clubs, charity, social and scouting organisations. Thanks to these structures, Armenians are well integrated into (Christian) Lebanese society but at the same time succeed to maintain their language, religion, and cultural traditions. Armenian presence in Lebanon dates back to the 1915 Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire that resulted in the massacre of more than one million ethnic Armenians in Eastern Anatolia and the forced expulsion of the remaining population by the Ottoman Army. From these refugees, an estimated 30,000 reached the later Lebanon and settled down in Beirut's Christian districts of Mār Miḵāʾīl/Mar Mikhaël and al-Ašrafīya/Achrafié, and the eastern suburbs of Burj Ḥammūd/Borj Hammoud and Anṭiliyās/Antelias. Following the attachment of the Alexandrette Sanjak from French Mandate Syria to Turkey, a second wave of Armenian refugees arrived to Lebanon settling down in the village of ʿAnjar/Aanjar on the Syrian border. These communities continue to inhabit their original settlements up until today, often constituting the majority of local population.

143 The three major parties are: Tashnag, Huchnag and Ramgavar, each of them having its own daily newspaper.
144 Informations retrieved from the official website of the Armenian community in Lebanon: http://www.lipananahay.com/
Educational situation

Similarly to their political and social presence, Armenians have an extensive network of educational institutions of every level financed by one of the Armenian churches or private, mostly Armenian-affiliated bodies. Generally, Armenian schools are having Armenian as their main language of instruction but follow the official Lebanese curricula with significant amount of additional classes in Armenian language, literature, and history. Given the tight contacts with the large American Armenian diaspora, private schools are often organised according to the Anglo-Saxon model emphasising English as their first foreign language beside Arabic.

On the peak of the Armenian educational system stands the prestigious Haigazian University (Jāmiʿat Hāykāziyān, or Haykazeen Hamalsaran), an Anglophone university in Downtown Beirut established in 1955.¹⁴⁶

An unwelcome addition to Lebanon’s diversity, the country’s estimated 425,000 strong Palestinian refugee-community arrived in three major waves: following Israel’s birth in 1948; after the defeat of the Arab armies by Israel in 1967; and as a result of the PLO’s expulsion from Jordan in 1970-1971.\textsuperscript{147} The most ill-fated in the Lebanese mosaic, Palestinians are largely Sunni Muslims\textsuperscript{148} and live under the most miserable circumstances. The Lebanese population, while sympathizing with the Palestinians in general terms, resented their presence in the country, blaming the PLO for its role in the 1975-1989 Civil War. However, in order to maintain Lebanon’s delicate sectarian balance, the government discourages Palestinians from becoming permanent fixtures by refusing them the right to own property, obtain working permit, to access public health care, and became integrated into Lebanese society.\textsuperscript{149} Even though they are making out a large portion, an estimated 10%, of Lebanese population, Palestinians are formally citizens neither of Lebanon nor of another state, but are classified as foreigners by the government since 1962. Thus, they are excluded from basic human rights and are not able to claim the same rights as other foreigners living and working in Lebanon. The majority of refugees and their descendents are living in one of the 12 refugee camps\textsuperscript{150} administrated and maintained by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees on the Near East (UNRWA) that defines a Palestinian refugee as “\textit{any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost their home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict}”\textsuperscript{151} and divides these into three distinct categories:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{147} Shafie (2007).6-7.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Fisk (2002) 470.
\item \textsuperscript{149} Klaushofer (2007) 221.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Currently, these are: Ḳalīyūn, Ṭābāṭān, Ṣāḥīḥ, Ṣaḥāb, Sūḥāb, Gādid, and Wārāyūn in the South; Burj el-Barajna/Burj El Barajnè, ḷāḥā/Bayda, Ṣāḥīḥ, Mār Iliās/Mar Elias and Ṣāḥīḥ/Chatila around Beirut; and al-Baddāwī/Beddaoui and Wīfīl/Wavel in the North. The camps of Ḳalīyūn, Ṣāḥīḥ, Tāًr, and Wārāyūn are now destroyed. Cf. \textsc{National Institution for Social Care and Vocational Training}: ‘Institutionalized Discrimination against Palestinians in Lebanon: Report submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’, Geneva (February/March 2004), p.5. \url{http://www.hicmena.org/documents/NISCVT-HIC%20CERD%2004.pdf}
\item \textsuperscript{151} Shafie (2007)1-3.
\end{itemize}
1) Refugees registered with UNRW and the Lebanese authorities: 406,342 in number in June 2006, mostly 1948 refugees and their descendants. They were issued passports and ID cards but are refused to enter civil service or obtain the privileges and services of Lebanese citizenship.\textsuperscript{152}

2) Palestinian Refugees registered with the Lebanese authorities but not with UNRWA (non-registered Palestinian refugees): According to the European Union’s Humanitarian Aid Office, their estimated number is between 10,000 and 40,000. Half of these refugees were registered by the Red Cross and later by the Lebanese Government, and are also 1948 refugees, while the rest arrived after 1967.\textsuperscript{153}

3- Non-ID Palestinian refugees: the recently discovered group of refugees without any identity papers has an estimated number between 3,000 and 16,000. Completely stripped of any rights, they fear imprisonment for illegal residency.\textsuperscript{154}

**Educational Situation**

Due to their disadvantaged status within Lebanon, Palestinians are denied access to Lebanese public schools, while private education is beyond the means of the majority of the refugee population. For the inhabitants of officially registered camps primary education is provided by UNRWA. It maintains a network of 75 schools with approximately 33,000 pupils or 95% of Palestinian schoolchildren. While secondary education is not considered to be within UNRWA’s temporary mandate, Lebanon is its only field of operation where it maintains secondary schools (six in number).\textsuperscript{155} However, in the case of Palestinians without identity documents, secondary school education is inaccessible altogether due to their inability to sit for the intermediate schooling exam taken at the age of 15.\textsuperscript{156}

Additionally, as the official website of the UNRWA states: “\textit{budgetary cuts meant fewer classrooms had to cater to a higher number of students; in addition, parents had to meet part of the schooling costs, which proved to be prohibitive in most cases. Access to Lebanese schools remained extremely limited due to cost, distance, or both.}”\textsuperscript{157} Moreover, UNRWA school facilities are reported to be in bad condition and the school buildings are in need of repair or replacement. Due to poor socio-economic conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon many students are compelled to leave school and seek work in order to support their families. Palestinian schools in Lebanon have the highest drop-out rates in all of UNRWA’s areas of operations and with an average of 53 pupils per classroom, the largest classes as well.\textsuperscript{158}

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\textsuperscript{152} As Fisk remarks, the passport issued by the Lebanese government have the same pale blue colour as their former British Palestine passport, but with the Lebanese cedar printed on it. Cf. Fisk (2002) 69.

\textsuperscript{153} Data retrieved from: SHAFFE: pp. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{154} Klaushofer (2007) 223-224.


\textsuperscript{156} Shafie (2007) 12.

\textsuperscript{157} Cf. the UNRWA website’s section for Lebanon under http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=65

\textsuperscript{158} Shafie (2007) 12.
According to the UNRWA, camp-schools follow the host authorities’ curricula and textbooks and are supplemented with the agency’s own materials on human rights. In the case of Lebanon it is, however, unclear which of the many available and stately approved manuals are meant.

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159 UNRWA website
II.1.3 Lebanon’s confessional system

Modern Lebanon’s pre-‘Tā’if constitutional order is based on the combination of the 1926 written Constitution (dustūr al-Jumhūrīya ‘l-Lubnānīya) and the 1943 unwritten National Pact (al-mīḥāq al-waṭanī) representing a compromise between the leaders of the nascent country’s most prominent communities brought together into one single polity without historical precedence by the French mandatory in 1920. To make this new entity work safe, the ruling Maronite and Sunni political class concocted a system referred to as confessional democracy enabling equilibrium through communal power sharing based on the first – and until today, last- census conducted in 1932, which showed a marginal Christian majority of 51%, compared with a Christian proportion of approximately 75% within the former Mutasarrifiya. As its earliest fundament, the 1926 Constitution – that formally renamed Grand Liban to the Lebanese Republic, leaving the state within its 1920 borders and under the same French mandatory rule – defined the republic’s different governmental components and organs setting up the presidency (ri‘āsat al-jumhūrīya, président de la république), the cabinet (majlis al-wuzarā’, conseil des ministres), the parliament (majlis an-nawāb, chambre des députés), but without defining sectarian distributions.  

As second fundament, the 1943 National Pact, the founding stone of Lebanon’s independence, included an oral understanding about the proportioning of governmental, military, and bureaucratic positions among sectarian communities. “In essence, the Maronites hung onto the maximum possible prerogatives compatible with keeping non-Christians in the political system, while the Sunni leadership dominated non-Christians.” According to this – basically Maronite-Sunni – deal, the former held the powerful, French-style executive presidency, while the subordinate but strategic post of the prime minister was reserved for the latter. The country’s than third largest, but notoriously underprivileged community, the Shi‘ites were given chairmanship of parliament, referred to as “the second presidency” which was in fact little more than a representative position in the early decades of Lebanese independence. In addition to the presidency, the Maronites also secured the most prominent positions in the military, security institutions, and the single-chamber parliament where they succeeded to enforce a 6:5 Christian-Muslim ratio by allowing electoral districts to have seats divided

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160 On the other hand, article 24 on Electoral Laws had defined the principle of equal representation of Christians and Muslims in the parliament, stating: “[…] the distribution of seats is according to the following principles: a. Equal representation between Christians and Muslims. b. Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each religious community. […]” The Lebanese Constitution (1926)
between sectarian proportions, with the same quotas introduced in public bureaucracy:

As it is visible from the chart, a 29:25 Christian-Muslim ratio as well as well 18 Maronite (out of the total of 55) seats secures the sect's dominance, further emphasised the disproportionate representation of the Christian-majority governorates of Mount Lebanon (ML) and Liban-Nord (LN).\textsuperscript{161}

Despite of significant demographical shifts in the Christian-non-Christian population ratio to the disadvantage of the former since 1932 caused by differential natural increase and continuously high emigration rates, political allocations remained frozen according to the 1943 portioning for decades. Consequently, the Maronite ruling elite avoided conducting another official census in order to preserve the delicate balance of 1932 resulting in the absence of reliable and up-to-date statistical data and demographic studies. Estimates from the 1990s, however, indicate a significant Christian decline from 51% in 1932 to 35-40% in the late 1980s, and mainly a widening Christian-Muslim fertility and emigration gap as its main cause.\textsuperscript{162}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lebanese resident population</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
<th>% Maronite</th>
<th>% other Christian</th>
<th>% Sunni</th>
<th>% Shi'i</th>
<th>% Druze</th>
<th>remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>414,858</td>
<td>census</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>the Mutassarrifiya's territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>609,069</td>
<td>census</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>enlargement to Grand Liban; WW1 losses; Armenian refugee influx; Shi'i increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>782,415</td>
<td>census</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>no census after 1932; trends: Christian and Druze decline, Shi'i rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,046,421</td>
<td>official estimate</td>
<td>52% Christian</td>
<td>48% non-Christian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,265,000</td>
<td>adjusted Ministry of Planning survey</td>
<td>42% Christian</td>
<td>58% non-Christian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>growth rate somewhat depressed by civil war, accelerated out-migration more significant than casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>Hariri Foundation estimate</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Lebanese Residents in Lebanon: Numbers and Sectarian Proportions (based on Harris (1997) 84.)

As it is clear from the table, the most prominent feature cutting across the dividing line between Christian and non-Christian sects is the Shi'ite community's vast growth from one-fifth of Lebanon's population in 1932 to over one-third within 50 years, overtaking both the Maronites and the Sunnis – the leading partners of political sectarianism – as the country's largest sect. Parallel to this trend, the population's Sunni-Shi'i ratio has changed from 22:20 in 1932 to an estimated 24:35 by the beginning of the 1990s, while Maronite decline resulted in

\textsuperscript{161} Table based on Benke (1987) 72.

\textsuperscript{162} For more information on these and a number of other studies and estimations cf. Harris (1997) 82-85.
the loss of the position of the country’s largest minority – 29% in 1932 counting for only the 
21% of the population – and only the third largest – sect in 1990. Naturally, this demographic 
evolution is not without considerable political importance. Recently, traditional Christian-
Muslim sectarian distinction seems to have given way to a more complex, triangular distinction 
between Christians, Sunnis, and Shi‘ites. This tripolarity seems to be the result of sharpening 
Suni-Shi‘ite divide fuelled by the rapid demographic rise of the latter as well as the Maronites 
increasing gravitation into a more cohesive communal block with other Christians. Due to its 
unusually late debut on the Lebanese political stage and fragmented political representation, 
the Shi‘ite community’s coherence has been fragile and thus failed to present itself as the 
country’s largest minority. Although being Lebanon’s sole community without substantial 
numbers of coreligionists in the neighbouring countries and thus with no communal interest 
across the borders, Shi‘ites have only recently started to show interest for active participation 
in the Lebanese state, i.e. well after the formal end of the Civil War.163

On 21 September, 1991, the Lebanese parliament ratified the Document of National 
Accord adopted in the Saudi-Arabian city of Ṭā‘if one year earlier to put an end to the 15 years 
of the Lebanese Civil War. The Ṭā‘if Accord, as it became known later, aimed to replace 
Lebanon’s political structure based on the duality of the 1926 Constitution and the 1943 
National Pact and envisaged a solution to the Lebanese crisis in two periods. It gave birth to 
the Second Lebanese Republic conceived to be leading to a future Third Republic in which 
political sectarianism would be abolished. The system would be inaugurated by the election of 
the first non-sectarian parliament, while the sects would be given representation in a Senate-
like second chamber of parliament to vote on issues of national character. In the reality, 
however, the solution found little support among the country’s community leaders and 
resulted, in practical terms, in the reproduction of the sectarian system, but at least with some 
pivotal modifications. First and foremost, the Agreement modified the hitherto 6:5 Christian-
Muslim ratio in the distribution of parliamentary seats increasing their number from 55 to 
128.164

163 Cf. Harris (1997) 85-90
164 Traboulsi (2007) 244-245
As it becomes clear from the chart, the two major Muslim sects are still given a much weaker representation in the post-Ṭāʾīf parliament than the country’s Christian and Druze sects that represented by a higher number of deputy per voting member, while Christian-majority governorates, most notably the gouvernorat du Mont-Liban, are also disproportionately overrepresented.

In addition to these modifications, sectarian quotes were abolished in the governmental bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military, and the police, with the exception of the so called Degree One posts, that is, general directors in ministries, where parity and rotation were to be applied, meaning that no Degree One post is reserved for a fixed sect. Concerning the posts of the president, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament, the 1943-system to reserve them to the Maronite, the Sunni and the Shiʿi sects, respectively, remained intact. The prerogatives of the president of the republic had seriously been curtailed practically loosing most of his executive power remaining head of the state and symbol of the country’s unity and guardian of the constitution, while the prime minister, previously appointed by the president of the republic, “would henceforth be designated by ‘obligatory consultations’ that the president carried out with the members of parliament, and he was bound by the decision of the majority. […] This ruling troika arrangement created one of the most unstable power relations imaginable. In that sense the Ṭāʾīf Accord merely created another system of discord. Conflicts between the holders of the three top posts became endemic.”

Table 3 Sectarian distribution of deputies according to geographic regions since Ṭāʾīf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>AK</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>BH</th>
<th>BO</th>
<th>LN</th>
<th>LS</th>
<th>ML</th>
<th>NB</th>
<th>T &amp; No of seats</th>
<th>No of voting sect member per deputy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiʿite</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alewite</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr. Orth.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr. Cath.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm. Orth.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm. Cath.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>18,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>100 Average: 20,698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

165 Traboulsi (2007) 245
II.2 Lebanon’s Educational System

Considering the statistics of education in Lebanon, the tiny country can boast of surprising figures. With a total population of barely 4 millions, currently there are ca. one million of its citizens enrolled in one of the country’s numerous stately owned or private educational institutes. The number of these available establishments, especially that of in tertiary education, i.e. at university level, as well as the gross enrolment rate is also remarkably high, the latter one in fact the second highest in the whole region after Libya. Furthermore, with the percentage (9.3% of its GDP - the five-fold of the OECD average) the country invests in education and with a high literacy rate, Lebanon can be considered the most educated Arab state. But its wealth is not only expressed in numbers, as with a palette of different linguistic and religious affiliations, diversity is also one of the main characteristics of Lebanon’s educational landscape. However, this multifarious system has its disadvantages. Many agree that its diversity and variety in sponsors, organisation, objectives and curricula, which are considered to be blessings in pluralistic societies, should be regarded as drawbacks in the case of Lebanon. As Hares puts it: “Instead of creating a common ground for mutual understanding and respect among the Lebanese, the educational systems reflect the same instability and intolerance that characterise life in the nation in general.”

Another characteristic of the Lebanese educational system is the extreme share of private enrolment at every level of education. This is partly because, as Hares argues, education in Lebanon owes its rise and development to French, American, British, Danish, Italian, German or Russian private denominational schools, that speeded up the Lebanese system far beyond what would normally be expected. However, a country plagued by structural, ideological and social discrepancies and antagonisms as well as the dividing powers and developments that have been paralysing the nation as a whole since even before its creation, Lebanon’s educational sector has always “guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo in Lebanon, and

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168 According to the CIA World Factbook, with its total literacy rate of 87.4% Lebanon boasts of the 4th place in the Arab World after Palestine’s estimated 92.4%, Jordan’s 89.9% and Bahrain’s 89%. (cf. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html retrieved 23.01.2010)

169 Hares (1985) 80.

170 cf. ibid. p.80

171 Ibid. p.80.

172 The percentages are 64.7%, 57.8 and 49.3% in the primary, secondary and tertiary education, respectively, while the regional average lies well below with 19.8%, 13.7% and 23.6%, respectively. In: World Bank MENA Report, , p.27.

173 Ibid. p.81.
the reproduction of the existing social structures”. As a matter of fact, the conflict within the educational system (or to be more exact, between the rival educational systems) with its imbedded historical contradictions, is obviously not recent. As a basic principle, the problems are based on the rivalry between two historic components. The centuries-old, well established and hence prestigious and privileged private sector of education, established and still led by foreign missionaries or by one of Lebanon’s many (mainly Christian) sects promotes a variety of philosophies and different outlooks, thus producing a generation foreign in aims, aspirations, loyalties and outlooks to the other. Opposed to these divisive effects, governmental schools are characterised by the unifying attempts of the Lebanese State in order to create a collective identity for its fragmented and divided population. In such a case it is not hard to realise the crucial role education plays in laying down the fundamentals of any kind of commonality or conformity within the frameworks of the artificial Lebanese state.

However, as Hares argues, the cementing of existing social structures is not the only way the educational system divides the Lebanese. In addition, Lebanon is the only country in the Middle East where two complete foreign-language educational systems coexist beside the native Arabic one: a Francophone and an Anglophone, both of them offering instruction at every level of education, from kindergartens and schools of primary level through an abundance of secondary schools to two prestigious universities, the Université Saint Joseph and the American University of Beirut. By promoting foreign languages (as we see mainly French and English) at the expense of Arabic, the system’s language policy is a further hindrance in establishing a single collective loyalty. As a result, many (mainly Christian) Lebanese are more fluent in a foreign language than in their (notionally) native Arabic. En citant Hitti: “...being educated in a foreign language further removed the person from its original environment and rendered him incapable, if not unwilling to share fully the fruits of his learning with his fellow citizens.”

Thus, as we see, an analysis on Lebanese history textbooks would not be complete without spotlighting the complexity of the educational system. Therefore, the following chapter will seek to give an overview of the historical development of education in Lebanon from its possible of origins, but especially beginning with the Ottoman era until up to the present, including its current state and difficulties concerning its form and function in contemporary

175 Ibid. 81-82.
177 as one of my Lebanese acquaintances, a Western-educated elderly gentleman brought it to the point: “You know my son, when I was a young man – and that was well before the Second World War- we adored the French, we wanted to become French and we really believed we can build up a piece of France on Lebanese soil... but these dreams were swept away by the many wars we were forced to fight, and we had to realise that we had failed. So now, we are building our America.” (personal conversation, Beirut, July 2009)
178 Hitti (1957) 454.
(i.e. post-civil war) Lebanese society. At the end of this chapter I will also provide a summary of the recent debates on language policy and of course the inevitable curriculum reform where especially the revision attempts of the history curriculum plays a key role on the way towards a common national identity for Lebanon.
II.2.1 Theories of origin of formal education in Lebanon

The origin of education in Lebanon is an exceedingly controversial issue and depending on ideological and sectarian appartenance it is linked with several historical periods of the country. There are theories assessing a certain educational system as early as in the Phoenician period, based on some archaeological funds confirming the existence of philosophy schools in Ṣaydā/Sidon179 and par excellence highlighted by the “invention and export” of the modern alphabet by the Phoenicians. Even though there is only scarce material evidence providing any detailed information about education of the era, Phoenicians are still regarded by many as “représentants de la culture au vrai sens du mot”180.

Other theories suggest that Lebanon’s educational traditions are rather to be traced back into Greco-Roman times. The Macedonian conquest of the Levant by Alexander the Great in 334 BC181 brought the Hellenistic culture into the region and established Greek as its official language (replacing Phoenician and Aramaic). Consequently, Phoenicia’s coastal towns experienced massive Hellenisation including the adoption of the Hellene administrative system or the establishment of Greek schools, both remaining predominant even after the Roman occupation of the territory in the 1st century BC.182 Under Roman control, the merchant hubs of the Phoenician coast183 enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy that allowed them e.g. the founding of philosophy-schools184, most notably the Roman Law School in Berytus (present-day Beirut) that is often celebrated as the world’s first university thanks to its academic excellence, prestige and crucial role played within the intellectual life of the Roman Empire. However, it is not just official academic education that starts flourishing with the arrival of the Romans. The educational situation of the Republic and of the early Empire is mainly characterised by the absolute dominance of private education; as Saliba puts it:

“La terre libanaise connut dès l’époque romaine les conflits qui n’apparurent en Europe que plus de mille ans plus tard entre les deux types d’enseignement, l’école privé et l’école publique”185.

Although very attempting, the contemporary Lebanese educational system cannot have its roots that deep in history, neither in the Phoenician, nor in the Greco-Roman period. The forms of formal education in later periods, viz. the uninterrupted existence of Roman and Byzantine theological and law schools in the early Islamic era following the Arab conquest of Syria in the

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183 such as Tyre (Gr. Τύρος, Lat. Tyrus, modern Sūr/Tyr), Gebal (Gr. Βύβλος, Lat. Byblus, modern Jubayl/Jbeil) or Berytos (Gr. Βηρυτός, Lat. Berytus, modern Beirut)
7th century, or the significant but short-lived florescence of churchly schools founded by the crusaders and the local Christian communities during the Crusades, or the emergence of the renowned madāris (pl. of madrasa) and Qur’anic schools as centres of Muslim religious teaching (predominantly in Ṭarābulus/Tripoli) or the monasteries of Mount Lebanon as bulwarks of Christian education in the Mamluk period\textsuperscript{186} can also hardly be linked to any modern institutions.

\textsuperscript{186} For further details of the debates of origin as well of the educational situation in the early Islamic, Crusaders’ and Mameluk periods cf. Hanf (1969) 60-62 and Saliba (1974) 37-46.
II.2.2 Education in the Ottoman Era (1516-1920)

The birth of systematic education in the territory what is today’s Lebanon is marked by two significant events. Firstly, the Franco-Ottoman Concordat of 1536, signed by the French king Francis I and Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, granted France what is known as the Capitulation Right in cultural and economic affairs and acknowledged the country as the protecting power of Christians living on Muslim soil. Furthermore, this treaty opened the Ottoman Empire for Christian missions from Europe, and thus enabled Western-style education to be introduced in the Levant.

Secondly, the establishment of a Jesuit-run Maronite College in Rome (Pontificio Collegio Maronita di Roma/ al-Madrasa al-Ḥabrīya al-Mārūnīya fī Rūmā) by Pope Gregory XIII on 21 March 1582 enabled the training of Maronite scholars in the Urbs Æterna by granting them papal scholarships. Even though initially significant for only a tiny stratum of the Maronite clergy, the effects of establishing such tight ties to the core of Christian civilisation were far-ranging, playing a crucial role in the development of the Christian educational system. As Hanf describes:

“die maronitischen Geistlichen, die ihre Ausbildung in Rom beendet hatten, übernahmen nach ihrer Rückkehr fast ausnahmslos neben ihrer seelsorgerischen Tätigkeiten die Leitung von Schulen, wobei sie vielfach auf wissenschaftliche Karrieren in Europa verzichteten, um sich ihrer Erziehungsaufgabe im Libanon zu widmen.”

The return of these Western-educated men of the-cloth enabled the formation of numerous schools that contributed to an educative renaissance of the Mount and paved the way for a direct Occidental influence in the region. A next significant step was taken by the ruler of the by that time autonomous Emirate of Mount Lebanon, Faḵr ad-Dīn II., who, in order to link his country to Europe, allowed Western missionaries to establish their schools in the territory of present-day Lebanon. Following the Capuchins, who arrived in 1625 as first in the region

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189 cf. the official homepage of the Maronite College in Rome: http://www.collegemaronite.com
190 Hanf (1969) 63.
191 As Traboulsi (2009) 3. describes: “Lebanon as a polity begins with the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, constituted in the late 16th century as an autonomous entity within the Ottoman Empire. [...] Within the emirate developed a number of distinguishing characteristics that would greatly impact on the structure and developments of Lebanon in modern times: a sizeable Christian numerical majority; an early conversion to production for the market (silk) and international trade; a long cultural exposure to Europe; and a tradition of intervention by European powers in its internal affairs.”
and founded a number of village schools in the Mount as well as a Seminary in Beirut\textsuperscript{193}, it was the Jesuit Order that largely took advantage of the emir’s religious tolerance and began its missionary work in 1645. Initially, the Jesuits set foot in the coastal towns of Ṭarābulus/Tripoli and Ṣaydā/Saida (Sidon), but their focus was gradually turning on the mainly Maronite-populated regions of Mont Liban, where the order founded – with the permission of the Maronite patriarchs - numerous smaller schools, many of them providing scholarships to Rome for their best disciples\textsuperscript{194}. In addition to these first foreign, initially purely theologically orientated schools, the Maronite community soon began to establish its own village schools. The initiative emanated from the rows of the Western-educated Maronite clergy that encouraged the transformation of several monasteries into schools. Thus, within a short time, the education of the whole Maronite Community was monopolized by foreign, mostly French Jesuit, and the local clergy\textsuperscript{195}, thereby exposing the community and binding the emirate irrevocably to the Occident.

A turning point in the history of Lebanon’s education is the 1736 Maronite synod of al-Luwayza/Louayzé that, apart from enacting a fundamental reform setting the Maronite Church in its modern form, momentous decisions regulating the educational system were made. Concerning the final document of the synod:

«Nous ordons, que dans les villes, les villages et les grands couvents soient ouvertes des écoles où les garçons apprendraient des choses... Nous exhortons et supplions les évêques, les curés et les supérieurs des couvents de s’entraider pour nommer un professeur, là où il n’y a pas, d'inscrire des noms des garçons, capables de faire des études et d’obliger leur parents à les conduire à l’école... Nous ordons à ces maîtres de suivre d’un programme: Ils enseigneront d’abord la lecture et l’écriture dans les langues syriaque et arabe, plus les psaumes, le service de la messe, le bréviaire et le Nouveau Testament... […] Que ses [des écoles] professeurs sachent que le premier devoir de leur mission est l'instruction des enfants... […] Nous ordons aux religieux libanais de St. Antoine de ne pas manquer d'ouvrir des écoles dans leurs couvents pour instruire la jeunesse.»\textsuperscript{196}

As a result, a plethora of educational establishments, especially secondary schools and seminaries were founded immediately, offering education (that included the instruction of modern foreign languages, mainly French in addition to Arabic and Syriac) in the first instance to lower levels of society.

\textsuperscript{194} Hanf (1969) 64.
\textsuperscript{195} Frayha (2003) 78-79.
The Maronite example was soon started to be followed by many of the region’s other Christian sects: Subsequently, Armenian Catholic, Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox schools came to existence, while the Maronite kept on extending their existing system\(^{197}\). In addition to the emerging concurrence between foreign, mostly French missions and the proactive local Christian communities, the region’s educational landscape was further enriched by the appearance of American missioners, highlighted by the formation of the Protestant schools in Beirut in 1823\(^{198}\).

With the weakening of Ottoman power in the 1830-40ies the increasing political influence of the European powers in the Middle East resulted in an intensification of Christian missionary activity especially in the predominantly Christian-inhabited parts of the Ottoman Empire, most notably in Jabal Lubnān, the region with the longest history of European exposure and with a non-hostile population\(^{199}\). The investment into the region’s educational system promised the creation of loyal factors within the Empire’s population as well as of a beachhead for further political influence or intervention. Hence, foreign missionaries were not only receiving financial encouragement to start for the Levant, with the renewal of the 1536 Capitulation Rights between France and Turkey, but they were also granted diplomatic immunity from their governments\(^{200}\). In addition, the Ottoman administrative reforms of 1839, known as at-Tanzimāt, allowed the Christian communities of the by the time autonomous Mount Lebanon to establish their own schools without the guidance and assistance of the civil authorities\(^{201}\). These rights were further extended by the Ḍaṭṭ-i Hümāyūn reforms of 1856\(^{202}\) that gave tax-exemption to the Christian and Jewish communities\(^{203}\). All these factors resulted in an inexperienced boom of the Christian educational sector, characterised by the emerging concurrence between French and American missionaries, but also between the foreign

\(^{197}\) Hanf (1969) 65.

\(^{198}\) Hanf (1969) 66.

\(^{199}\) cf. Kurani (1953) 3: “The moderate and healthy climate of Lebanon and the existence of a relatively large Christian population which was receptive to western ideas proved favourable factors for missionary work. The original purpose of the missionaries was religious conversion, and to this end, they established schools as adjuncts of their religious work. Soon, however, the purely religious aims of most missionary organisations were broadened... Hence, missionary education, while still maintaining its Christian spirit, began to assume an increasingly laic and civic character. One distinguishing features of these missionary school was the excellent preparation, which they gave their students in foreign languages, such as French, English, German, Italian and even Russian.” Cited in Hanf (1969) 66.


\(^{201}\) Frayha (2003) 79.


\(^{203}\) Hanf (1969) 70.
missionaries and the local communities. Apart from these changes, the geographic focus of educational activities was shifted: Hitherto, with its autonomous government guaranteeing the security of Christian communities, Smaller Lebanon was the preferred centre of both missionary activities and local educational initiatives. However, following the stark Christian exodus from the South of Lebanon to Beirut in the 1860s, the heretofore insignificant, Muslim-dominated and for educational purposes unfavourable coastal town (that economically and culturally became increasingly linked to the Mount indeed, but being under direct Ottoman rule, was politically not part of Christian Petit Liban) has gained in importance as centre of foreign education. Already existing schools, such as the School of the Jesuit Order of Ġāzir/Ghazer, or Dr. van Dyke’s American secondary school in ‘Abayh/Abey, were relocated to Beirut. After their relocation, both of these schools were developed into high-quality universities. The former one of these was recognised by the Holy See as a papal university in 1874 and was given the name ‘Université Saint Joseph’. Today, the USJ is the oldest still operating Christian institute of higher education in the Middle East, and one of the most prestigious in Lebanon (with French as language of instruction). Initially, it offered courses in Semitic, Greek and Latin philology; European languages and literatures, natural sciences, mathematics, philosophy and theology, later also in medicine. The latter one, Dr. van Dyke’s American school was reopened as the ‘Syrian Protestant College’ in 1866 (and was created the ‘American University of Beirut’ in 1920). At the beginning, Arabic was intended to be the language of instruction; however, difficulties in the terminology of many disciplines caused the adoption of the English language instead.

In contrary to the unprecedented educational boom experienced by the Christian communities, the Muslim community had little chance keep step with this process; hence Muslim education was still limited to the traditional religious schools. These were divided into ‘kuttāb’ [writers] and ‘al-madrasa’ [the school] schools, the previous group aiming to teach children the Qur’an and the basic principles of Islam, while the latter had the function “to teach Islam in its

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204 as it is noted by Saliba (1974) 93: “Après 1840 et à la suite de l’essor scolaire déclenché par l’arrivée des missionnaires catholiques et protestants, les chefs des communautés religieuses craignaient la menace pour leurs ressortissants d’être attirés et scolarisés dans les écoles des missionnaires, et par conséquent, d’être exposés à se convertir, soit le latinisme, soit le protestantisme.”

205 Following the uprisings and massacres between Christians and the Druze in 1840, 1845 and 1860 and a French-English-Austrian intervention to stop bloodshed in the Shouf (aš-Šūf/Le Chouf), a number of conferences was held by France, Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria and Italy in order to re-establish peace and order in the region. Hence, the s.c. Règlement organique, a treaty guaranteeing Mount Liban’s autonomy led by a non-Lebanese Christian mutaṣṣarīf (governor), was signed by the Great Powers in 1861. The Mutaṣṣarīfiya-system ensured peace and prosperity for the region until its abolition in 1914. (cf. Saliba (1974) 60-61.)


traditional manner, one which had not changed or advanced for centuries.” Unlike their Christian neighbours who could easily accept the West and regarded the Westerner as their coreligionist and also as a champion and protector, Muslims kept their religious or political reservations and considered increasing Western influence as threat to their communities. Even so, many Muslim boys attended Christian schools. The first step towards the establishment of educational institutes for Muslims was taken by the first governor of the newly created Mutasarrīfiya of Jabal Lubnān, Dāwūd Pasha, who in addition to (mainly Druze) primary schools, founded a secondary school in 1862.

However, in the peripheral territories of present-day Lebanon, at the time under direct Ottoman rule, it was only an 1869 decree that enabled the formation of public schools. The act, besides recognising foreign private schools, declared education a state function and hence, compulsory and free of charge. Furthermore, schools in the Ottoman Empire were divided into two distinct categories, viz. “les écoles publiques dont la surveillance et l’administration appartiennent exclusivement à l’État” and “les écoles particulières, qui, placées seulement sur la surveillance du gouvernement, sont fondées et directement gérées par les particuliers ou le Communauté.” As an effect, at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 the Lebanese territories under direct Ottoman rule could boast of the total number of 125 primary and three secondary schools (but even so, it was no real concurrence to the private sector). The syllabus of instruction (with emphasis on foreign languages, natural sciences and mathematics) was modeled after the French system; however, the main language of instruction was Turkish. Hence, thanks to this Turkish character, the Ottoman school system was only beneficial for the children of Turkish public servants and of a small stratum of the turcophile Sunni elite.

Thus, in order to be able to respond to the growing demand for education, Muslims started to draw inspiration from Western and local Christian examples. With the intention to back Lebanon’s Muslim community, a group of Sunni notables from Beirut founded the Jamʿīyā al-maqaṣīd al-ḵayrīya al-islāmīya (Muslim Society of Benevolent Intentions) in 1878. The Society began its work with the establishing of smaller schools in Beirut offering primary and religious education.

209 Salibi, p.142.
210 “Le premier gouverneur, Daoud Pacha (1861-68), fonda pour la communauté druze une école à ‘Abay où les écoles des Missionnaires protestants et catholiques se faisaient concurrence. Il assura à cette école des Waqfs-propriétés pour son financement. En guise de reconnaissance envers le Mutasarrīf, on a donné à cette école son nom, Al-Daoudiyé. Elle continue sa fonction jusqu’à maintenant sous le même nom […]” (Saliba (1974) 100.)
211 roughly the modern muḥāfaẓāt Beirut, al-Šāmāl/Liban-Nord, al-Biqlā’/La Békaa, an-Nabāṭīya/Nabatiyé and al-Janūb/Liban-Sud
212 Schooling was obligatory for girls aged between 6-10 years and boys aged between 6-11 years. The teaching program had to include the Qu’ran for Muslims and the Catechism for Christians. Cf. Saliba (1974) 101.
Later, their activities enabled to set up a number of secondary schools for boys and girls in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. The financing of the Society was assured by the community’s waqf-properties and the generous contributions of the active members. The Maqāṣid schools, while laying emphasis on the Arab and Muslim heritage of the Sunni community and maintaining close connections to the Ottomans, also took positive steps toward western education by employing Christian teachers in their schools and by consulting with foreign establishments on pedagogical questions.

The Maqāṣid schools, while laying emphasis on the Arab and Muslim heritage of the Sunni community and maintaining close connections to the Ottomans, also took positive steps toward western education by employing Christian teachers in their schools and by consulting with foreign establishments on pedagogical questions.

The other Muslim communities, viz. the Druze and the Shi’ites were the only Lebanese sects who remained largely unaffected by the educational progress of the time, none of the both having own denominational schools. Although the communities’ right to establish and maintain their own educational institutions was recognised by the Sultanate since 1869, however, the Shi’ite Muslims were barely benefiting from the regulation, as they were not regarded to be a separate sect by Constantinople. Therefore, they were hindered to develop their own social structures as extensively as other minority and religious groups of the Empire. Other impediments, such as their political persecution at the hands of their long-time political rivals, the Sunni Muslims as well as the remote and isolated regions they have inhabited also cut the community off from outside forces and ideas and were not exposed to the educational influence of foreign missionaries.

The Druze, however, were in a more beneficial position. In addition to the special school established by the first governor of the mutaṣarrifīya, Dāwud Pasha, the Druze, even though not having further educational institutions of their own, also benefited from the Christian educational system by availing themselves of its schools.

In addition to these Christian and Muslim denominational schools as well as the centralised Ottoman school system, the second half of the 19th century brought a third form of educational institutions to existence, namely private schools without any confessional affiliation. The first of these schools, the Collège Nationale (al-kullīya al-waṭaniya) was founded by the scholar and

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214 Saliba (1974) 98
217 As Saliba mentions, Shi’ites indeed had a few private religious schools, but these have not lasted as long as their Christian counterparts as many of them dissolved immediately after the death of their founders. (cf. Saliba (1974) 59.)
220 as well a small number of Beirut Jewish schools operated by the Paris-based Alliance Israélite Universelle, established by Jewish intellectuals from France. Cf. Saliba (1974) 73.
homme de lettres Buṭrus al-Bustānī (Boutros Boustani)\textsuperscript{221} in 1863 with the intention to reconcile Lebanon’s communities after the bloodshed of the 1840s and 1860s and to rescue his fellow citizens from the destructive effects of religious fanaticism. He was determined to forge a secular national identity for the Lebanese that prevents sectarian division and the farfetched exposure to foreign ideas and ideologies. Located in a pleasant Beirut suburb, the Collège Nationale could boast of an excellent staff, own textbooks, written by al-Bustānī himself and a curriculum directly geared to the real needs of society. Although the model that provided a safe haven for intellectuals of any confession and prepared a new generation of Lebanese intelligentsia was proved to be successful, it could do little to change the country’s evolving sectarian structure\textsuperscript{222}. After al-Bustānī’s death in 1883 his school merged into the Syrian Protestant College (the later AUB)\textsuperscript{223}, but despite of its short life “it had a major impact on the education in Lebanon, since it provided a model for a number of national schools that were founded to counteract the religious and foreign schools”\textsuperscript{224}.

Concerning the educational situation of the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Syria (and especially its autonomous mutaṣarrīfiyya) can be considered as the most advanced part of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab World. Western exposure, relative Ottoman liberalism, and proactive local communities all contributed to this educational boom that raised the cultural standard of the region to a relative high level and made the educational sector to a pivotal segment in the country’s modernisation process. However, the various communities were not benefitting equally from this process and thus education cannot be regarded as an unmixed blessing. By dividing the people among religious, communitarian and cultural lines, Western (and Western-inspired) education rather emphasised sectarian divisions, strengthened inequality and deepened social differences.

\textsuperscript{221} Buṭrus al-Bustānī, a prominent figure of pre-WW1 secular Syrianism advocated loyalty to the Ottoman State while at the same time he regarded Greater Syria (stretching from the Taurus Mountains in the north to the Sinai-Peninsula in the south) as his waṭan, or homeland, a region with a common ethno-cultural heritage shared by Muslims, Christians and Jews alike, but within the political framework of the larger Ottoman Empire. Cf. Kaufmann 2004)7.

\textsuperscript{222} Rjaili (1993) 130

\textsuperscript{223} cf. Hanf (1969) 73.

\textsuperscript{224} Rjaili (1993) 131
II.2.3 Education during the French Mandate (1920-1943)

“N’oublions pas que la France a créé votre pays, la France vous a donné les frontières. Nous vous avons enseigné la paix, nous avons préparé votre civilisation et votre constitution. Sachez que l’éducation, l’éducation française en particulier, est le seul chemin pour vous sortir de vos coutumes primitives.”


During the First World War Lebanon sank into one of the darkest eras of its history. Without respecting the *Règlement organique* that served as a basis for its autonomous status, Smaller Lebanon was occupied by Turkish troops and was merged into the neighbouring Damascus wilayet in order to prevent any foreign intervention. Thus, the country was sealed off from the outside world, as communication with Europe and even with the numerous expatriate communities became literally impossible. The four years of direct Ottoman rule, marked by the repressing of any form of resistance against the regime, executions, deportations, famine and diseases cost roughly 100,000 Lebanese their life alone in the territory of the quondam *mutasarrifīya*, although it was spared from direct military operations.

With the seizure and occupation of French, British and Italian missionary schools by the Ottoman army, the elaborate educational landscape suffered the same fate: foreign staffs were forced to leave the country or were detained, school buildings were transformed into barracks or military hospitals, while in the still operating establishments of local communities the instruction of the French language had been replaced by Turkish. Only few the American, and (not surprisingly) German private schools and Turkish governmental schools enjoyed unaffected freedom, however, they could not assume the role of the closed French schools. Ultimately, with the Ottoman capitulation and the withdrawal of Turkish military and civil servants from the region as its result, the majority of these remaining schools were also closed, resulting in the complete collapse of the educational system.

Following the Ottoman defeat, France took possession of the Syrian coast marked as the “Blue Zone” in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement signed between the governments in London and Paris in order to partition their spheres of influence in the Middle East. On September 1st, 1920,

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225 „Let us not forget that France has created your country and gave you your borders. We have thought you peace and provided the basis for your civilisation and your constitution. You should know that education, particularly French education, is the only way for you to leave behind your barbarian customs.” In the opening scene of the movie *West Beyrouth* the teacher of the Lycée français tries to discipline a class by giving this lecture after the main character, Tareq (*Ṭāriq*), interrupted „La Marseillaise“ by singing the Lebanese national anthem through a megaphone. The scene takes place on April 13, 1975.


228 Hanf (1969) 75.
Henri Gouraud, commissar and general of the Armée Française en Orient proclaimed the State of Greater Lebanon (dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr/État du Grand-Liban) in Beirut. Two years later, on July 24, 1922, the League of Nations mandated direct control over Syria and Lebanon to France. However, the French rule was not only set limits by the catastrophic economical situation of the region, but it was also tied by the League of Nations’ Charter that specified the mandate as an interim arrangement on the path to Lebanon’s (and Syria’s) full independence229. Furthermore, Article 8 of the Charter required the mandatory power to guarantee the freedom of education:

“The Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

The Mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.”

In order to construct and anchor loyalty in the local population that best served their interest, officers of the occupant French Army had not been hesitant to issue certain orders concerning education just shortly after entering the Middle Eastern territories of the obsolete Ottoman Empire in October 1918, i.e. well prior the official beginning of the Mandate in August 1922. These acts proclaimed the maintenance of the educational system and the replacement of Turkish with French as the language of instruction.230

Furthermore, in January 1919 the French High Commissioner ordered, “que chaque religion ouvrirait ses principales écoles d’avant-guerre, que le Haut Commissariat donnerait une allocation de 1600 à 1900 francs par professeur et un secours extraordinaire pour subvenir aux frais de première installation; que moyennant ces secours, les enfants pauvres seraient admis gratuitement dans les écoles”231. Thanks to these measures, the number of schools reached the antebellum level, so that at the beginning of the Mandate in 1922, French schools of the reconstructed private

229 Article 1 of the Mandate Charta: „The Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and the Lebanon. This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population inhabiting the said territory. The Mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development of Syria and the Lebanon as independent states. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate. The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.” (League of Nations Official Journal, Genava, August 1922, pp.1013-1017)


system accounted for the majority of existing foreign institutions in the country, and also more than the half of all private schools were francophone.\textsuperscript{232} Accordingly, the French education policy was oriented according to these preconditions. Firstly, in order to reshape education after the French model, French-language schools were to be strengthened further and given a privileged role. Secondly, by leaving the primacy of the private educational sector unchallenged, the system’s pre-war status quo was to be maintained. Thirdly, plans to unify curricula and to introduce a compulsory examination system aimed to centralise education, even though its secondary and tertiary levels were exclusively dominated by foreign and local private institutions\textsuperscript{233}.

To pursue these goals without violating the interests of the various religious communities, the French decided to build up a state-controlled educational system complementary to the already existing structures provided by the private sector. In 1922, the French High Commissariat set up the Service de l’Instruction Publique to enforce French education policy in Syria and Lebanon\textsuperscript{234}. Thus, Lebanon’s new stately educational system was built up as a copy of the French model with the only difference that Lebanese curricula were added additional courses such as Arabic and local history, literature and geography\textsuperscript{235}. Just like in France proper, the system was composed of 4 levels:

1. The \textit{école maternelle}, for children aged between 2-6 years, was comparable to kindergartens and was regarded as a preparatory stage for the elementary school.
2. The \textit{école primaire} took children in the age of 6-12 years and provided classes in Arabic, French, mathematics, history, geography, physical education, art, natural sciences, ethics and religion. The course was to be completed by the ‘\textit{certificat des études primaires}’, an exam composed of an oral and written part that entitled its bearer to enter the secondary level. Children not willing to do so had the possibility to spend two additional years in a \textit{cours complémentaire} that prepared for a profession and was completed by the ‘\textit{brevet élémentaire des études primaires}’\textsuperscript{236}.

Throughout the whole mandate period, the elementary level was that level of the educational system the French High Commissariat’s efforts were mostly focused on: the number of pupils attending stately-founded primary schools increased from 8,611 in 1925 to 17,228 in 1941. However, given the fact that the newly created State of Greater Lebanon included not only the former Christian \textit{mutaṣarrīfīya}, but also predominantly Muslim territories formerly under direct Ottoman rule\textsuperscript{237} that lacked...
any stately or private educational network comparable to that of the Christian regions, the mandatory power’s school-founding activity favoured these disadvantaged territories. Apart from the aim to develop the educational infrastructure in these new (and in many cases towards the mandate hostile) regions, the French authorities used the (re)construction of the educational system to promote and unite a state never existed before and generate loyalty to the country’s French rule, just like as it was practiced in France’s colonies long before.

3. The secondary level received pupils of age 12-18 and was to be completed by the Lebanese baccaulaureát that was made compulsory in whole Syria and Lebanon. In contrary to the primary level, however, not a single new secondary school was established during the 21 years of the mandate-era in Lebanon. Given the excellent network of private, mostly communitarian-affiliated and foreign- or locally-owned secondary education in Mount Lebanon and Beirut dating back to the Mutasarrifiya that met the current needs of the whole of secondary level education, the authorities (initially the SIP, from 1926 the Lebanese Ministry for Education under the auspices of the French High Commissariat) limited themselves to elaborate new, centralised curricula and a unified, stately examining system compulsory for every private institution. In order to create the legal framework to its control over the private educational sector, the French High Commissariat has issued a decree setting the adoption of the French curricular programme as a precondition to new school-establishments. In addition, the autonomy of private secondary schools was further restrained by the introduction of the baccaulaureát as the sole examination confirming a rounded secondary education that allowed the authorities to exercise a certain indirect authority over the de jure independent private sector. According to the same decree, the Haut Commissariat allocated financial means for the subvention of private (both French and national) schools in order to make them accessible for an as broad public as possible. Even so, secondary education remained reserved for the country’s elite.

As Kurani summarises: “With the program at each stage modelled after the French, with external examination controlling the process of education in every stage, and with

of the Ottoman Beirut Wilayet, while the latter one being the integral part of the Damascus Wilayet until 1920. Moreover the majority of the attached regions’ Muslim population objected both the Mandate rule as well as the creation of a separate Lebanese entity detached from Greater Syria. Cf. Daher, Franceline: ‘L’enseignement de la langue française au Liban: Analyse critique des nouveaux programmes du secondaire’, Thèse du doctorat. Strasbourg: Université Marc Bloch (Strasbourg II), 2002, p.29.

239 Hanf (1969) 76.
240 Like in France, the central Lebanese baccaulaureát contained of two separate, an oral and a written part which were to be sit in the penultimate and the last year of secondary education, respectively, optionally in French or in Arabic. As requirement for governmental positions, and following a 1934 decree, as compulsory entry requirement for universities, the obtaining of this certificate meant the major goal of secondary education. cf. Hanf (1969) 78.
242 Abou Moussa (1996) 154
a central body [...] deeply concerned over the educational policy [...] Uniformity in standard and output prevails.²⁴³

4. In the stage of tertiary education the French mandatory power pursued the same policy as in the secondary level: the existing structures remained intact and in the case of the Jesuit-run francophone Université St. Joseph in Beirut that “crowned the whole system as the semi-official state university of Lebanon”²⁴⁴, it was even supported by the authorities. However, with the unification of the lower levels of the Lebanese educational system, the USJ’s American counterpart, the American University of Beirut found itself in a disadvantaged position. Although it was still possible to pursue a complete study program at every four levels based on the Anglo-Saxon system, the AUB had to face the increasing concurrence of the implanted French model.²⁴⁵

So as we see, although Lebanon’s pluralistic educational system was still in the hands of different quarters and was not directly monopolised by the French authorities, the mandatory power found a number of indirect ways to standardise and reshape it:

Besides the unified examination policy and the adoption of the French structure it was the introduction of the French language in public and private institutions alike as one of the official language of instruction on the side of Arabic²⁴⁶. Although the measure was intended to contribute to the harmonisation of the diversified educational landscape, it was, however, proved to be rather counterproductive as it has generated strong resentments and resistance from various sides. The majority of Muslims but also many Christians, especially the traditionally Russophile Greek Orthodox, have regarded the language policy as a clear bias towards the Maronites, the community having the strongest ties to France and thus benefiting the most from it. The non-French private schools were also against this unification which they criticised for creating an unfair vantage-point to French schools already dominating the Lebanese private education sector.²⁴⁷ In fact, proposed official bilingualism in administration and stately examination made the knowledge of the French language indispensable within a short time²⁴⁸. Thus, in order to maintain their number of students, British and American schools had no other choice than to introduce French language instruction to prepare their students to

²⁴⁵ Hanf (1969) 82.
²⁴⁷ Labaki, p.79.
²⁴⁸ As Kurani, p.7. puts it: “The ability to read and speak a foreign tongue is taken as the main criterion for judging the success of elementary education. This emphasis on languages is seen more vividly in the Secondary Schools. The examinations for the baccalaureate demand almost an equal knowledge of two languages and literatures – the Arabic and the French. The standards of examination are not low. This has rendered the Syrian and Lebanese Baccalaureate Diploma rather more difficult to obtain than the French baccalaureate.” (cited in: Hanf (1969) 82)
the Lebanese baccalauréat. The prestigious AUB went even so far to establish an own preparatory school modelled after a French lycée where French was thought as intensively as English.249

Another French attempt to harmonise the educational sector was the elaborating of new curricula with special emphasis on the development of new historical narratives250. As Kaufman explains: “The French authorities were absorbed by the idea that they could use school curricula as an the avenue through which to cast national content into the new petty states they had formed by teaching Syrian, Lebanese, Druze and ‘Alawite children French and European Civilisation, on the one hand, and selective local history, on the other.”251 The teaching of local history, however, was not entirely novel in Lebanon as many confessional and private schools had been offering courses on regional and non-Arab history well before the beginning of the French mandate. The major change was brought by the mandatory nature of the French-based curricula as, with the exception of foreign schools entirely financed by foreign sources without the subvention of the Haut Commissariat, they were to be adopted by both public and private schools. Concerning the proposed history textbooks, the French were aware of the fact that their Syro-Lebanese mandate, as newly created entity separated from its wider Arabic context, can only survive with the support of a rewritten history that gives the region an own individuality and distinct identity based on its local character and culture, besides “attaching the thoughts and the hearts of the local elite to France”. Within this French dominated Syrian framework, however, the novel Greater Lebanon was in a more specific situation. As a new, heterogeneous state it not just had to be differentiated from its Arab environment but also from its Syrian hinterland. Additionally, with its diverse population, the French faced the existence of very different loyalties, both hostile and amicable. Hence, the new curricula both had to convey political messages to reflect the shift from Ottoman to French rule and contribute to the population’s cultural homogenisation.252 Not surprisingly, the first new history manuals designed for Syria and Lebanon were the products of French, French Jesuit253 and to lesser extent Lebanese authors, the latter all being graduates of the Université St Joseph in Beirut and thus were very much reflecting these efforts. According to Hares, these three quarters initially brought out three, thanks to their perfect monopoly position highly decisive, history manuals that were intended to shape the societies of the mandated territories

249 Hanf (1969) 82
250 Not surprisingly, the instruction of history and geography is considered to be most effective means for the dissemination of national sentiments and the creation of collective identities. Thus, by elaborating new curricula for its Syrian and Lebanese mandate, the Haut Commissariat’s efforts were mainly focused on these two fields. Cf. Kaufmann (2004) 110-111
251 Kaufmann (2004) 111
252 Abou Moussa (1996) 156.
253 The French Jesuits, who had been installed in Lebanon since 1831 and have returned there after a brief expulsion during the World War I, played a dominant role not only in Syro-Lebanese education, but in the political life of the mandated countries as well. In order maintain and even expand their power and political influence, the order was not hesitant to put pressure on the French Haut Commissariat and wanted it to pursue its policy seeking to create Lebanon “France d’autre Méditerranée” by strengthening local patriotism and “attaching the thoughts and the hearts of the local elite to France”. Thus, the Jesuits remained interfered into education and state administration during the whole mandate period. Cf. Kaufmann (2004) 113.
in a for the French beneficial way. The first and most influential among them, the French-language ‘Histoire de la Syrie, précis historique’ by the Belgian orientalist scholar Henri Lammens propagated a ‘Syrian nation’ distinguished from its “nomadic and illiterate” Arab (“Hidjâz”) neighbours through its perfect territorial unity and distinct race, regardless of confessional appartenance. Within this historical Syrian framework, however, Lammens maintained the theory of Lebanon as a (Christian) refuge with a long and important pre-Islamic history forming rather the part of the Mediterranean than the Arab World and thus legitimating its separation from Greater Syria by underlining its distinct historical development and traditions as well as its close ties to France. However, he describes Lebanon as a Syrian land and as such; he treats its history tightly attached to that of Syria only distinguishing it in later chapters. As Abou Fadel, editor of contemporary Lebanese history textbooks summarises: “[l’ensemble des manuels inspirés par Lammens n’a pas] traité l’histoire du Liban d’une façon autonome, mais à travers de l’histoire de la grande Syrie, c’est-à-dire les régions sous mandat français”. This treatment of the region’s history follows General Gouraud’s request to emphasise ancient and Frankish history and to “give Arab civilisation a place in history no greater than it deserves”. Despite of the predominant position Lammens’ textbook enjoyed in the first years of the mandate, other manuals, however, were providing a throughout different approach to the region’s history. Seeking to give the newly created state an own identity, history textbooks from francophone or French-educated Maronite historians and politicians were focusing on historical events of primary relevance for the Lebanese entity and thus detached these from their wider regional context. Even though these Lebanon-centric textbooks were mainly written by USJ graduates, they are openly concurring with Lammens’ Histoire de la Syrie by refusing its imposed Syrian national identity and thus, with the preferred French narrative as well. The most notable of these works, ‘Tārīḵ Lubnān al-mūjaz’ (Brief History of Lebanon) by Asad Rustum and Fuʾād Afrām al-Bustānī, was commissioned in 1936 by the at that time Lebanese president of the republic Émile Eddé (Imīl Iddih) who feared the growing desire of the country’s Muslim population to join Syria as the first step to reach Arab unity and hence, felt the necessity of a national narrative to support Greater Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The rewritten narrative that became immediately introduced in public schools and also as primary reference for official examinations, denied the country’s Arab identity (consecrating only 7 pages to Arabic history from its total of 176 and using derogatory terms to the Arab population and Islam) but established the dynasties of the Maʿnī and the Šihāb as founding fathers of the Lebanese state. However, despite having been published 12 times until 1957, the textbook’s usage had been limited to Maronite schools and the Francophile stratum of society, but with its


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Lebanon-centric and heavily Christian dominated national narrative it had met with severe criticism from Muslim, par excellence Sunni intellectuals. These quarters, “made up largely of sympathizers with the Arab cause who like to see the Arabic culture of Lebanon maintained, accuse them of not paying enough attention to Arabic and Eastern cultures, and assert that what is called "Mediterranean culture" is nothing more than a thin veil for the attempt to preserve French Catholic influence and education in Lebanon."²⁵⁹

As a result, two Sunni two historians, `Umar Farrūḵ and Zakī Naqqāš published their “scientific critique” to disprove what they called “historical myths” created by Christian historians to legitimise Lebanon’s existence and separation from Syria and the rest of the Arab-Muslim world. In their oeuvre, titled ‘Ṭārīḵ Sūrīya w-Lūbnān al-muṣawwar’ (Illustrated History of Syria and Lebanon), Lebanon appears as one of the numerous Arab provinces without any special attention or particular significance. By marginalising antiquity (Phoenicia is consecrated only 2 out of its 294 pages), the textbook focuses on Islamic history and the historical development of the Peninsula’s Arab tribes. Furthermore, in order to undermine the country’s Maronite legitimisation, Arab empires are set as historical models in opposition to the Roman and Byzantine Empires and par excellence the Crusaders’ states; the emirs of the Mount are pictured as insignificant betrayers of the Ottoman Empire; and describes Lebanon as integral part of Syria.²⁶⁰

Yet, as we see, these three types of textbooks (French oriented, promoting Lebanese particularity within Syrian frames; Maronite oriented, seeking to justify Greater Lebanon’s right to existence; and Arab-Muslim oriented opposing the country’s forced separation from Syria) offering fundamentally differing identities based on antithetic concepts of history stirred sharp controversy among the various communities. The most disputed historical periods were, however, not those concerning the Phoenicians or the region’s antique past, but rather the chapters describing the role the Arab-Islamic civilisation and the Crusades play in the formation of Lebanese national identity. By the last decade of the French Mandate, the presentation of these historical eras became the most controversial issues of the curricula, laden with contradictory ideological constructs. As Kaufman puts it: “Politically, it [Lebanon] was struggling on two fronts with France and Syria. Culturally, the country experienced internal strife that practically began with its formation and peaked towards the end of the 1930s, dividing Lebanon between supporters and opponents of its political integrity and cultural uniqueness.”²⁶¹

Hence, French attempts to harmonise the newly created mandate’s heterogeneous society through education met with the strong opposition of the country’s fragmentising sectarian reality that did not allow harmonisation or reconciliation imposed from above. This effort, however, cannot be regarded as entirely false. From the very beginning of the mandate period, the French authorities were well aware of the potential role a diversified and thus not cohesive

²⁵⁹ Akrawi (1949) 506.
educational system can play in the strengthening and reproducing of existing social divisions: “A divided country will never be strong, especially when the children cannot forget their rivalry and quarrel for the control of the country. Differences among religious groups have caused a lot of bloodshed in the past. Renewing this conflict would be fatal and disastrous to the nation’s development.”262 Although the Christians, especially the Maronites were considered as the Mandatory’s natural local allies and thus occupied a privileged role in the further decades, numerous measures, for instance the establishment of the stately owned public school system was more beneficial for Muslims and their areas.

3.3.4 Education in the first three decades of independence (1943-1975)

Following the proclamation of Lebanon's independence on November 22, 1943, the recognition of communitarian privileges rooting in centuries-old Ottoman policy-making was regarded to be incompatible with the idea of a centralised, supracommunitarian nation state à la française, the model Lebanon's novel administration saw the key in to the country's unity and territorial integrity severely questioned by its Syrian neighbour. Thus, communitarian allegiance and sectarianism (ar. tā’īfīya), a principle exploited and constitutionally anchored during the French Mandate, were now the main obstacles to the emergence of a desired homogenous nation and a modern Lebanese society. Due to the intact existence of parallelgesellschaften on the territories what were created Grand Liban back in 1920, the transition from a système communautarisé to a système laïcisé was impossible to be achieved within few decades. Sectarian allegiance retained its strength and priority role; hence the idea of Lebanon as a nation was no real alternative to give up sectarianism.\(^{263}\) With the end of her mandate rule, France did not cede to serve as role model for its former Mandate, French culture and education retrained its place de choix in Lebanese society, and secondary education remained the privilege of private institutions with predominantly French affiliation\(^{264}\). Thus, education policy of the young nation turned its focus on two major points: Firstly, in order to “create a sense of social unity and nationhood among the Lebanese based on common principles and values, and not on religious affiliation”\(^{265}\), the curriculum was to be further centralised by the government. Secondly, given the influence, but also the differing interests and loyalties of the private educational sector, the new Lebanese administration's relationship to the private school system was to be rethought and harmonised.

The unwritten National Pact (al-mīṯāq al-waṭānī) of 1943 forced the Maronites to accept Lebanon as an Arab, and not Western affiliated country and not to seek foreign intervention; and Muslims to abandon their aspirations to unite with Syria. As the agreement defined Lebanon as a country with Arab face (balad bi-wajh ‘arabī)\(^{266}\), Arabic became the only national language and was to replace French as language of administration and instruction.\(^{267}\) Even though the independent government’s first official educational programs of 1946 were merely

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\(^{263}\) Abou Moussa (1996) 172.

\(^{264}\) As Daher further explains: “Les institutions scolaires demeuraient réservées à un nombre restreint d’enfants de grands propriétaires et de la bourgeoisie citadine, surtout chrétien.” (Daher, , p.40.)

\(^{265}\) Frayha (2003) 82.


\(^{267}\) From that point, French and English were referred as “langues de culture” and not “langues d’enseignement”, as before. Except for natural sciences and mathematics (which could adopt French or English-language instruction), all subjects were to be thought in Arabic. Cf. Saliba (1974) 119
the modified versions of the 1932 curricula, and as such, strictly followed the French model\textsuperscript{268}, they caused major disagreement and severe critique from the private denominational sector. Furthermore, government policies with the objective to support Lebanese identity through development and unification of official curricula; further centralisation of the educational system; enactment of educational legislation or textbook supervision were also not well-received by private institutions. Hence, the new authority regarded private schools as main obstacle, “perpetuating social, religious and political divisions among the Lebanese youth”.\textsuperscript{269} The opponents, mainly French schools, however, made a clear distinction between “Lebanonisation”\textsuperscript{270}, which they supported, and "Arabisation", which they rejected and pled the freedom of education, the right conserved from the Mandate Charta in the Constitution.\textsuperscript{271} Additionally, by accusing the poor quality of Arabic-language Lebanese textbooks, private, \textit{par excellence} French catholic schools kept on using their French-language manuels.\textsuperscript{272} Thus, they vehemently opposed the Arab character of the government-imposed Lebanese national identity, clearly articulated in the compulsory instruction of history, geography and citizenship education in Arabic.\textsuperscript{273}

In order to assume greater control of the educational system, the government issued a number of decrees seeking to regulate and centralise the sector. Firstly, decree N.7000/1946, regulated the conditions required by the Ministry of Education to establish new private schools. Another decree, issued in 1949, set up a \textit{commission du manuel scolaire} to create a list of conditions for future textbooks as well as to decide upon their adoption and official authorisation; while a law passed in 1950 ordered the governmental monitoring of private schools, however, without defining its exact modalities. In line with the French policy of the mandate period, the

\textsuperscript{268} The new ‘national’ curricula differed from their French counterpart in the language of instruction, which was compulsorily Arabic, as well as in the additional subjects of Lebanese history, Arabic language and philosophy and geography of the Near East. Additionally, the instruction of English as foreign language gained equal rights with French. Cf. Hanf (1969) 84-85.

\textsuperscript{269} Freyha (2003) 82., where he also cites a Lebanese Government Platform: “The time of national awakening in Lebanon’s history shall be when we abolish Taifiyah […] From now on the government will offer the Lebanese youth an appropriate citizenship education and orient them towards freedom, independence and national pride. Therefore, the government will use all necessary means to enhance Arabic, the country’s language, as well as Lebanon’s history and geography in all educational institutions. We do not want our children leaving school and being more educated about other countries rather than their own. Our schools should graduate a generations unified in aims and national feelings.”

\textsuperscript{270} In this context, the term Lebanonisation (AE Lebanonization, from the French libanisation) refers to historical efforts made to create unique and typical Lebanese features in order to distinguish Lebanon from its Arab environment. The contemporary, mainly political usage as “processus de fragmentation d’un État, résultant de l'affrontement entre diverses communautés de confessions par allusion aux affrontements qu’a connus le Liban dans les années [1970-1980. (On dit aussi balkanisation)” is not meant here. (cf. Larousse Dictionnaire de français, online edition, \url{http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires}, retrieved 2.05.2010)

\textsuperscript{271} Saliba (1974) 120.

\textsuperscript{272} Abou Moussa (1996) 175.

\textsuperscript{273} Freyha (2003) 83.
government continued strengthening the state-owned primary school system; and opened the first governmental secondary school in 1949; and finally the Lebanese University (al-ْJāmiʿa al-Lubnāniya/Université Libanaise) in 1951, hence creating a complete network of stately-owned educational institutions of every level. Furthermore, a Lebanese baccalaureate replaced its French imposed counterpart as unitary examination compulsory for public and private schools alike.

Considered as a whole, it appears that the first years of independence brought only the slight shift of focal points, but no path-breaking alternations in the country’s educational policy and landscape. Despite the government’s clear objective to use education as unifying instrument in the quest to provide future generations of Lebanese with the vision of a supracommunitarian and secular nation-state, it has failed to lower the private educational sector’s influence that continued to divide society among confessional and social lines. As Hanf argues, governmental efforts to unify and harmonise the educational landscape remained fruitless, but contributed to conserve all the problems of the mandate period, such as the questions of identity, loyalty and language. In addition to its internal division, the 1948 creation of the State of Israel brought Lebanon into the Middle East conflict assuring constant international political tension and the shift of political focus away from education “as the most important factor in bringing young generations together in order to create a common denominator of shared values and beliefs regarding their coexistence and destiny as members of the same society”.

As a result, by the end of the 1950s Lebanon experienced the exacerbation of internal tensions and political violence, acuminating in a brief civil strife ended by American intervention in 1958. Additionally, the unequally distributed wealth of rapid economic development of the 1960s as well as the catastrophic effects of the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel helped little to stabilise the already fragile social balance still laden with the controversial issue of Lebanese identity and

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274 As before, governmental efforts focused on the amelioration of educational infrastructure in the country’s peripheral, Muslim-dominated regions.


276 Concerning the educational system, just like prior independence, the Ministry of Education classified the country’s educational institutions into three groups, viz. governmental schools, national schools (i.e. private schools supported by Lebanese associations or individuals) and private schools. For a more exact classification, however, Hanf suggest the following groups: governmental schools, private schools of the French type, private schools of the Anglo-Saxon type, and Muslim private schools following the Egyptian system and having Arabic as their sole language of instruction. For an extremely detailed examination of these school types with a complete list of notable schools of each type cf. Hanf (1969) 89-214


279 In accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine and at the request of Lebanese President Camille Chamoun [Kāmīl Šamʿūn] US Marines debark in Beirut to intervene against pan-Arab insurgents opposing his second term as president and seeking Lebanon’s incorporation into Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s [Gamāl ʿAbd an-Nāṣir] United Arab Republic composed of Egypt and Syria. Cf. Fisk (2002) 70-71.
conflicting national ideological orientations. As a reaction to these dramatic regional, social and economic changes, a new curriculum was introduced between 1968 and 1971 that, however, was neglecting current social, civic, political and confessional issues and lacked encouragement for the development of analytical or critical thinking, but instead, provided pupils with a large amount of lexical knowledge. Thus, social cleavage between rich and poor, Christian and Muslim remained largely intact and even exacerbated; and even though curricular change alone would not have been enough to prevent communitarian violence and civil strife, this ill-designed reform contributed little to nothing to support social cohesion and prevent Lebanon’s devastating sectarian Civil War beginning in 1975.  

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II.2.5 Education during the Civil War (1975-1990)

The 15 raging years of the Lebanese Civil War erupted in 1975\(^{282}\) had fundamental impact on the educational landscape of the country. While many Lebanese chose foreign exile, those who remained had to cope with considerable deficits. Although the intensity of war operations fluctuated constantly and it could also lead to months of peace time, the average school year was reduced to just three months.\(^{283}\) Occupation of school buildings, bombings and constantly fluctuating numbers of pupils and teachers could hardly make a normal school day possible. Additionally, for teachers and students the way into and from the school often concealed dangers, especially in the hard-fought urban centres of Beirut and Tripoli. Thus, parents were facing a dilemma: Should they continue to give their children a certain degree of education by sending them to school or should they prefer to keep them safe at home and thus cut them off from formal education and social interaction?\(^{284}\) In this situation it is hardly surprising that a large share of educational activities had been taken on by parents and family during the war, just as social relationships and interaction had often to be restricted to the family and the immediate, in most of the cases confessionally homogenous, neighbourhood.\(^{285}\) With the worsening state of security and the deficiency of stately functions, the civil war had a fundamental and complex impact on the young generation. In contrary to the bleak prospects the failing state could offer, service in a militia provided a sort of perspective and rapid progress for the youth. In addition to frequent forced recruitments in schools, many young joined armed militias voluntarily in the hope to acquire positions and influence within a short time.\(^{286}\) As Bashshur summerises: “\textit{Education was captured and put at the service of the war machine}”.\(^{287}\)

Due to the fact that the Civil War was an internal sectarian and ideological strife and a proxy war steered by Lebanon’s hostile Syrian and Israeli neighbours at the same time, militias frequently changed alliance and loyalty. Consequently, the justification of bloodshed became exceedingly difficult for many of the fighting militias and thus generated tension, resignation, apathy and often threatened the ideological basis of the militant groups.\(^{288}\) In order to avoid internal ideological collapse, beginning from the mid 1980s, militias deliberately generated fear of communitarian existence in order to mobilise as many of their co-religionists as

\(^{282}\) As known, Lebanon’s confessional balance came under significant stress when the PLO substituted Lebanon for Jordan as an operational base for its activities. By and by, the Muslim communities became disgruntled with the old power-sharing arrangements, seeking to enhance their position in the confessional system. As a reaction, the Christians mobilized in defense of the prevailing status quo. After a Phalangist attack on PLO guerrillas in Beirut Christian-Muslim civil war broke out on April 13, 1975 (cf. \textsc{Rabil}, Robert G.: \textit{Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon}. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p.43.)

\(^{283}\) Bashshur (1988) 42.

\(^{284}\) Assal (1992) 281.

\(^{285}\) Ibid. 280


\(^{288}\) Assal (1992) 286.
possible. For instance, the right-wing Maronite Lebanese Forces\textsuperscript{289} warned against the supposedly proposed extinction of Christian presence in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{290} In addition to this blend of ideological and emotional manipulation, militias went on with the confessional “cantonisation” of the country by creating and ruling confessionally homogenous territories. This forced sectarian and social segregation not only deepened the already murderous dividing lines, but by taking on the control on wide segments of public administration, for instance of the educational system, it also contributed to the complete disappearance of governmental authority. Therefore, militia RULED schools frequently functioned as ideal venues to spread the ideology represented by the relative militia.\textsuperscript{291} Once again, the teaching of history came to a throughout important role as an instrument to transmit confessional, apologetic, i.e. in many cases popular science versions of sect-related histories in order to legitimise and support militia ideologies and to strengthen their popular basis. For instance, the Druze leader and warlord Walid Junblat\textsuperscript{292} introduced a series of history textbooks in the areas under his control propagating the country’s history from a Druze point of view.

\textsuperscript{289} The Lebanese Forces (\textit{Al-Quwwāt al-Lubnānīya, Forces Libanaises}) was the civil war’s main Christian militia founded by Bachir Gemayel (\textit{Bašīr Jumayil}) that retrained existing as a political party led by Samir Geagea (\textit{Samir Ja'ja'}) and forms the main Christian component of the March 14 Alliance. Cf. Traboulsi: pp.208-210 and the general information about the March 14 coalition on the Now Lebanon! website (\texttt{http://www.nowlebanon.com}).

\textsuperscript{290} Bashshur (1988) 57.

\textsuperscript{291} Assal (1992) 284.

\textsuperscript{292} Havemann (2002) 88.
II.2.6 The Ṭāʾif Agreement and the Educational Reforms of the 1990s

The Civil War made clear that the educational system cannot be reformed by simply taking up the aborted initiatives of the late 1960s. Additionally, the conflict had not only conserved and exacerbated the sector’s unsolved problems and existing dilemmas, but created a number of novel wounds. As Bashshur remarks, Lebanon’s educational system became a “mirror of a fractured national image.”

Thus, the 1989 Ṭāʾif Agreement (ittifāq aṭ-Ṭāʾif), that put a formal end to the civil strife raging since 1975, included the requirement of educational reforms and called for the continuation of the reform process interrupted by the war. On the other hand, the Ṭāʾif Agreement tried to bring the simultaneous expenditure of the public school system and the maintaining of the private educational sector in line. Moreover, by foreseeing the elaboration of new curricula and the uniting of history and civic textbooks, the importance of formal education had once again been acknowledged.

In order to carry out these developments, the Centre of Educational Research and Development (CERD), a governmental centre responsible for the writing of new textbooks for the public sector, was put in charge by the government. Until 1994, the CERD elaborated the ‘Plan for Educational Reform’ (ḵuṭṭat an-nuhūḍ at-tarbawī) to set the objectives of future reforms: “(a) the strengthening of national affiliation and social cohesion among students; (b) providing the new generation with the basic knowledge, skills and expertise, with emphasis on national upbringing and authentic Lebanese values, such as liberty, democracy, tolerance and rejection of violence.” Moreover, the Plan articulated the following principles: “(a) A belief in humanistic values and principles that respect the human being and consider the importance of reason and stress learning, work and ethics. (b) The Lebanese understanding of the meaning of existence springs fundamentally from the heavenly religions, and the spiritual culture personified in the monotheistic religions.” Concerning the objective of citizenship education, the Plan indicates the following principles:

1. “The supremacy of law over all citizens is the only means of achieving justice and equality among them.

293 Bashshur (1988) 76.
295 Cf. articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Ṭāʾif Agreement concerning education: 2- L’affirmation du principe de la liberté de l’enseignement conformément à la loi et aux règlements en vigueur. 3- La protection de l’enseignement privé et le renforcement du contrôle de l’État sur les écoles privées et sur le livre scolaire. 4- La réforme de l’enseignement public, professionnel et technique, son renforcement et son développement pour s’adapter et répondre aux besoins de construction et de progrès du pays. La réforme de l’Université libanaise, en lui assurant l’aide nécessaire, en particulier à ses facultés des sciences appliquées. 5- La révision et le développement des programmes dans le but de renforcer l’appartenance et l’intégration nationales, et l’ouverture spirituelle et culturelle, ainsi que l’unification du livre scolaire dans les matières d’histoire et d’éducation nationale.” (cf. the complete text of the agreement in French and Arabic in the annex of this paper)
296 Established as early as in 1972 (i.e. well before the outbreak of the Civil War) by the Ministry of Education to unify the public sector’s textbooks, the Center for Educational Research and Development (officially Centre de Recherche et de Développement Pédagogique or Al-marks az-at-tarbawī li-ʾaḥāḥiṣ w-an-nimā’) started the publishing of its own series of pedagogically and didactically high-quality history textbooks. Its enterprise, however, was interrupted soon by the country’s violent political events. For further details on the CERD cf. Abou Moussa (1996) 245-246.
2. The respect of individual and social freedoms, which is guaranteed by the constitution and stated by The Human Rights Charter, is a vital necessity for the continuing existence of Lebanon.

3. The participation of social and political activities within the framework of the Lebanese democratic parliamentary system is the right of every citizen and a responsibility towards the society and the county.

4. Education is a national priority. It is a social necessity and a comprehensive social enterprise.

5. The formation of a citizen who:
   (a) Feels honoured in his country – Lebanon – and is proud of his loyalty and belonging to it.
   (b) Is proud of his Arab identity and kinship, and of his commitment to them.
   (c) Recognises the long national Lebanese history that, emancipated from extremist beliefs, will attain a unified, open and humanistic society.
   (d) Realises the importance of co-existence among all citizens since ‘there is no legality for any authority that contradicts the Document of Co-existence’, which remains a unique guide in the region and to the whole world.
   (e) Respects personal and social freedom and preserves others’ rights and properties.”

Besides, the Plan contains further recommendations concerning the language issue, as it declares Arabic, the national language, to a means of social communication and interaction ensuring social co-existence and considers it as a crucial element of national unity and citizenship. On the other hand, the Plan strongly suggests the student-citizen to “master at least one foreign language as an effective means of interaction with the international cultures, to enrich these cultures and to be enriched by them.”

The government’s further initiative, namely the elaboration of the much-desired new curricula, proved itself to be far more problematic. Albeit for the first time in Lebanese history, curricula and teaching material were to be based on educational research and not on political or religious ideologies, and were even promoted by the UNESCO, it soon became clear that the teaching of history remained the most controversial field. As expected, the religious communities’ vehement opposition prevented the implementation of unified history textbooks. These quarters criticised the objectives of the Educational Plan and accused the new curricular guidelines to be unrealistic and to be a copy of the Jordanian and Syrian curricula. As the Coordinator of Catholic Schools in Lebanon explains: “The plan came from above. It was driven from the Jordanian educational system, embellished and then introduced into Lebanon. They allocated for it a huge budget, which exceeds the capacity of great countries. How can Lebanon with its economic problems secure such an enormous budget? Such a plan aimed to limit the role of private

298 Ibid. p.11-12.
299 Ibid. p.12.
sector and control it. It was a replica of the Syrian educational system.”

Fearing the curtailment of their educational autonomy, Lebanon’s established confessions were in a rare accord with each other against the proposed changes. The increasing pressure finally forced the Lebanese Parliament to withdraw the educational plan in 1994, so schools remained free to use whatever book they like.

Within one year, the plan had been replaced with the “New Framework for Education in Lebanon” (al-haykaliya al-jadida li-ta‘līm fi Lubnān) developed by a joint committee composed of policymakers, representatives of public and religious schools as well as expert delegated by the CERD. Besides setting up new public schools, encouraging teacher training and remodelling the educational ladder, the framework recommended the introduction of civic studies and common inter-faith religious education regardless of confessional appartenance.

While the adoption of civic education can probably be seen as the most important achievement of post-civil war educational policymaking, the proposed inter-faith religious education encountered resistance from the religious communities that perceived the step as interference in their internal affairs. As a compromise, religious instruction was provided in confessionally separated classes.

As for the instruction of history, the concept avoided the much desired unification of history textbooks which means that even manuals dating back to the pre-Civil War era are still reprinted and are in use. Although the CERD indeed finished with the elaboration of a unified history curriculum and the first-ever stately history textbooks, none of the both has been implemented ever since. According to Antoine Misarra, a former member of the CERD committee commissioned to elaborate the history curriculum, the complete series of the final CERD manual was prevented to be published by a direct order of the Education Minister, although they were already printed and only awaited distribution.

The debate over a new history textbook revealed several inherent weaknesses of the education reform and the country’s dysfunctional decision-making system in general. As we saw, despite being an explicit provision in the Ṭā’if Accord, religious communities were still able to torpedo governmental attempts to elaborate a stately narrative as an additional option to the many sectarian narratives. As a result, the nation’s contemporary history including the Civil War is

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302 As a Lebanese policymaker noted: “...for the first time ever in Lebanon all educational institutions were united against the plan...Muslims, Christians, all.” Ibid.
304 Abouncedid et al. (2002) 3.
306 An-Nahār (2.2.2001)
still widely omitted from all sorts of curricula, preventing post-Civil War generations to tackle its events in a formal environment, free from sectarian biases.

Moreover, despite decade-long attempts to reform the educational system and elaborate a unified history textbook serving as a tool to bypass sectarian divides, the supremacy of the private educational sector still prevails. Lebanese parents, regardless of sect or social stratum, still prefer sending their children into private educational establishment if their financial means allow and thereby contribute to the maintenance and reproduction of the country’s omnipresent sectarian dividing lines.
II.2.7 Contemporary aspects of language policy

As it became clearly visible, throughout its long history, the instruction of French and Arabic played a decisive role in Lebanese education. Thanks to its ideological connotations, the language issue has been serving as a source of conflict and set the two concurrent languages antipodes. The post-civil war era, however, brought significant changes and altered the general language situation of Lebanon.

At the side of French that had been enjoying an unchallenged supremacy as the country’s first foreign language for decades, if not centuries, English have been rapidly gaining on importance. The process was accelerated by the growing regional importance of English in the region and its status as contemporary global *lingua franca*. Moreover, Lebanon’s key economic partners such as the UAE or Qatar are having an Anglophone business culture, while traditionally Francophone regions such as the Maghreb have little or no economic contact with the country.\(^{307}\)

Although Lebanon is still regarded to be the sole remaining Francophone bulwark in the Middle East\(^{308}\), where the *bonne connaissance* of French continues to imply good breeding and high economic status, the advantages of English are starting to be exceeding those of its counterpart, as it seems to open more doors, enable more economic opportunities in the industrial and commercial globalization or have a stronger cultural appeal due to the omnipresence of American media and global mainstream culture.\(^{309}\)

As a reaction, the government introduced the obligatory instruction of two foreign languages in 1995, i.e. the teaching of English gained official support. It is worth mentioning that in contrary to several previous reform initiatives, this step encountered little resistance.\(^ {310}\) *Ipso facto*, fluency in English seems to be regarded pragmatically and be free from ideological contents. As Lebanon’s English-language daily remarks: “While French is still the most important second language being taught at Lebanese schools today, it has been losing ground to English. According to statistics from the Education Ministry, 62.5 percent of all Lebanese schools offered French as a second language in the school year 1999-2000. This number decreased to 55.8 percent in 2005-2006. During the same period, schools offering English increased from 19.7 percent to 21.6 percent. The number of schools offering both English and French has also increased. In 1999-2000 17.8 percent of the schools offered both languages; by 2005-2006 that figure had grown to 22.6 percent.”\(^ {311}\) The decline of French in Lebanon can also have its causes in the decreasing presence of the language in society. Although its usage is still officially supported and its deep linguistic effects on colloquial Lebanese are still undeniable, French does not, however, serve as daily means of communication and is only


\(^{308}\) Lebanon is one of the two Middle-Eastern members of the *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie* (along with Egypt) and hosted one of its summits in 2002.

\(^{309}\) Ross (08.10.2007)

\(^{310}\) Daher (2002) 121.

\(^{311}\) Frey (26.09.2008)
represented by one daily newspaper but on the other hand with no French-language television channel in the elaborate Lebanese media landscape. At the present, the usage of French restricts to the traditionally francophone (and as such, Christian) cultural and political elite of the country, among whom many have been educated in France.

However, the gradual shift from French to English as Lebanon’s first foreign language does not necessary mean the mitigation of the decades-old language issue. Parallel to the decline in the quality of French, many also note the extraordinary decline in Arabic. This phenomenon, however, affects largely the standard (non-spoken) version of the Arabic language, while the colloquial Lebanese dialect\textsuperscript{312} enjoys a renaissance, as many, 	extit{par excellence} Maronites, regard it as a distinct manifestation of Lebanese identity that allows them segregation from the Muslim-majority Arab World. As such, the Lebanese dialect seems to take on the former functions of French and plays an increasingly important role in the development of Lebanese identity. As part of this process, the traditional Arabic alphabet is more and more substituted by Latin letters, especially in informal context. This novel and spontaneous Romanisation called ‘Arabish’ or “Arabīzī”\textsuperscript{313} by its, mainly young, users, is becoming more and more present not just on its original domain of internet and telecommunications, but also in commerce and more traditional sectors of media. The tendency has of course its opponents who seek to protect Arabic from westernisation. Whether this new aspect of Lebanon’s ongoing language debate represents a new source of conflict and will be exploited by politics is yet unclear. Although at its current stage of development the question of dialect usage and Romanisation is a rather marginal one and restricts itself to only certain aspects of life, should it, however, continue to spread in usage, it would inevitably cause increased debate and thus gain political significance.

\textsuperscript{312} Similarly to the rest of the Arab World, Lebanon’s linguistic situation is also characterised by the coexistence of Modern Standard Arabic and local dialects, a linguistic phenomenon called diglossy. While Standard Arabic (or \textit{al-lūgā al-`arabiyya al-fushā}) that serves as the sole official language of the country is not spoken as a mother tongue and only appears in written form or in formal context and in the media; the myriad of dialectal variants commonly referred to as Lebanese, Syro-Lebanese or Levantine Arabic (‘ammīya, lahjā or \textit{al-lūmānīya/al-lūmānīye}) are the actual mother tongues of the population and are used as means of communication in various aspects of everyday life. Given Lebanon’s geographical, confessional and ethnic diversity; as well as the high portion of foreign loanwords and terms, the country boasts of a high number of different dialectal varieties and sociolects. Thus, individual language usage reveals much information about the speaker’s social, religious and educational background. Cf. Versteegh (1987) 80-83; 123

\textsuperscript{313} In contrast to previous attempts to Romanise Arabic (such as Sa'id ‘Aql’s infamous initiative to replace Standard Arabic with Lebanese written in Latin script as the country’s official language in the 1960s) the spread of Arabish is the first transliteration effort not imposed from above by an ideologically affiliated elite. Thanks to the historical precedence of English over Arabic in Internet and mobile phones at the beginning of the 21st century, the Arabic language was not supported by the widespread technology, thus Arabish was the only possible way chat or write messages. Although the tendency seems to have its roots in Lebanon and Jordan, it is now ubiquitous in the whole Arab World and is now applied to a myriad of Arabic’s dialectal varieties. As a distinct feature, Arabish uses numerals to represent Arabic sounds absent from the Latin script (e.g. 3 for ʿayn or 7 for ḥā). The system seems to be especially widespread in parts of Lebanon. For a detailed account on Arabish/Arabīzī cf. Yaghani, (2008) 39-52.
III. Textbook Analysis
III.1 Presentation of material

As it was already mentioned, this research on textbooks is foreseen to provide an aspect of Lebanon’s sectarian division and current situation of its own historical narrative(s). Despite the existence of official guidelines issued by Lebanon’s Ministry of Education, the country’s communitarian dividing lines and the high proportion and prestige of private schools in the educational system contribute to the existence of a wide range of accredited school manuals used by the mainly sect-based, non-governmental schools. During my research on textbooks in Europe and especially in Lebanon, I have encountered a surprisingly high number and diverse range of different textbooks, whereas their availability was in many cases determined by region, dominant sect, or socio-demographic status of the given region. For example, history textbooks by the Maktabat Ḥabīb, the publishing house of one of the analyzed manuals, seemed to me, despite being government-approved, literally unavailable and unknown in Sunni-dominated, middle-class West Beirut neighbourhoods or Shi‘ite majority southern suburbs (such as Ra‘s Bayrūt/Ras Beyrouth or ad-Ḍāhiyā /al Dahiyé, respectively), while on the other hand in upscale Christian districts and suburbs (such as al-ʿArāfiyya/Achrāfiyyé or Sinn al-Fil/ Sinn El Fīl313) this textbook was virtually the sole one in stock in many bookshops. Almost all of my informants (booksellers, teachers and students alike) explained this geographic and social distribution of availability with the sectarian affiliation of history textbooks, a feature not being official, but also not uncommon or unknown in Lebanon. Opinions and sect-based views of common history are still divided among Lebanese, as it is reflected in the myriad of different manuals one can find. Given this wealth of potential material, as well as the relative similarity and stark parallels among textbooks affiliated to the same sect, or used in a social milieu or a distinctive region, a selection must have been made in order to keep the objects of an analysis straightforward and manageable. In order to be able to give representative and broad perspective within the frames of this paper, I decided to select three textbooks, each of them affiliated with one of the nation’s three major religious communities: the Christian, the Sunni

314 Despite the emergence of some mixed neighbourhoods since the end of the last civil war, Beirut’s districts and neighbourhoods remain largely segregated among sectarian and social lines. The new electoral division of 2008 created three separate electoral districts (manāṭiq) within Beirut’s municipal borders: Christian-dominated Beirut I in the East, composed of the al-ʿArāfiyya/Achrāfiyyé, ar-Rumayl/Rmeil and as-Ṣayfi/Saifî neighbourhoods (abyā‘); Sunnis-Shi‘ite-Armenian mixed Beirut II in the middle including the al-Bāṣāra/Bachoura, Marfa’/Port and al-Midawwar/Meawar neighbourhoods such as the iconic Wasaṭ al-Madīna/Centre Ville (Downtown) area; and Muslim majority (Sunni-Shi‘ite mixed) Beirut III in the West with the abyā‘ Ra‘s Bayrūt/Ras Beyrouth, ‘Ayn al-Marayyasa/Ain el Minisse, Minā‘ al-Ḥusn/Minet el Hoon, Zuqāq al-Balṭ/Zoukak el Blat, al-Muṣayyib/Mousayibé and al-Maṣrā‘/Maatra. For detailed figures concerning the new electoral districts cf. http://www.nowlebanon.com/Library/Files/EnglishDocumentation/Other%20Documents/IFES%20Briefing%20Document%20on%20New%20Electoral%20Districts.pdf (retrieved 01.03.2010) Further afield, Beirut’s ever-expanding suburbs grow among the same sectarian dividing lines as the municipality itself: banlieues such as luxurious (and Maronite-dominated) Sin al-Fil/ Sin el Fil on the North-East or poverty- and in 2006 IDF-hit (and Shi‘ite-dominated) Southern Suburbs, a stronghold of Ḥabu‘-Ilāh on the South are world apart from each other.
and the Shi’a Muslim. As I was informed, all of the manuals I have finally selected are used in private, i.e. non-governmental schools par excellence. Of course, I was hesitant if a textbook preferred by governmental schools was included in order to provide a more nuanced image. However, given the fact that every single manual available in Lebanon must be approved by the Ministry of Education, and that governmental schools make up not more than one-third of the educational system, and that sectarian-affiliated textbooks are more eligible for an analysis seeking to display the sectarian differences in historical narratives, the original plan of a three-book-analysis will be preferred in this paper.

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III.1.1 The Christian Textbook

The textbook *At-tārik al-ʿilmi al-ḥadīṯ* (The Modern Scientific History) from the authors Yūnis al-ʿIlm, Munir Ilyās Salāmah, Ziyād Ġamrāwī and Christian al-Ḥilw was published by the Beirut based Maktabat Ḥabīb publishing house in 2007. Despite being based in former West Beirut, an associate of the house told me in a telephone interview that their textbooks are primarily ordered and used by Christian private schools in former East Beirut districts (i.e. al-ʿAshrafīya/Achrafié), the North-East suburbs (e.g. Fanār/Fanar) and in the Mount Lebanon area (e.g. Jamhūr/Jamhour). This information was confirmed by a number of East-Beirut bookshops and private secondary schools, among them the prestigious Jesuit-run *Collège Notre Dame de Jamhour*\(^316\). According to a recent study, the textbook is also widely used by Greek Orthodox private schools, as some of the authors are members of this sect.\(^317\)

As the preface indicates, the textbook is the third part of the Modern Scientific History series designed for the faculties of the third class in secondary schools, meeting the requirements of both the 1968 official guidelines issued by the Ministry of Education and that of the official school leaving examinations.\(^318\) It seeks to provide a scientifically based and thus student-friendly approach to curriculum topics, as well as to avoid “narrative-construction” by focusing on the display of causes and effects of historical events.\(^319\)

There are no sources or bibliographies provided in the textbook except for cited historical documents. However, certain passages and interpretations seem to be identical to those of Kamal Salibi’s *House of Many Mansions*.

**Structure**

The textbook is composed of two major parts as well as a short historical timeline of events of WWI provided at the end of the book.

**The First Part** describes Lebanese history from the beginning of WWI to the declaration of Lebanon’s independence in 1943 on 85 pages and in 10 chapters (*durūs*). Each chapter is

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\(^316\) The school’s textbook list is available in the online shop of the Librairie Orientale chain under http://www.librairieorientale.com.lb/schools.php?bid = 16 (retrieved 26.01.10)


\(^318\) Christian Textbook 5

\(^319\) For further details see the Preface of the Christian Textbook, e.g.: و كذلك فإننا ابتدنا فدور الأشكال عن السير الإنسانى : للأحداث التاريخية و ركزنا على أسبابها و نتائجها بشكل خاص فبإدخال الأسئلة سهولة أكثر في توضيح النقاط الأساسية لكل درس من المروس
divided into numbered sections (3-7 in number) and colourfully framed passages labelled “zid ma’lūmātak”, ‘increase your knowledge’, containing additional or background information, summaries, historical documents and statistics. These vary in size from few-line quotations to multi-page cited documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ch.</th>
<th>Al-qism al-‘awwal Lubnān (First part: Lebanon)</th>
<th>p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Lubnān fi ‘l-ḥarb al-‘ālamiyah al-‘ūlā (Lebanon in the WW1)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Lubnān min al-ḥarb ilā ‘l-intidāb (Lebanon from War to the Mandate)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Al-intidāb (The Mandate)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Dawlat Lubnān al-kabīr (The State of Greater Lebanon) 1920-1926</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ad-dustūr al-lubnānī w-naš’at al-Jumhūriya al-Lubnānīya 1926-1939 (The Lebanese Constitution and the Birth of the Lebanese Republic)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Al-aḥdāṯ as-siyāṣīya ḥattā bidāyat al-ḥarb al-‘ālamiyah at-ṭāniya (Political Events till the Outbreak of the WW2)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Lubnān fi ‘l-ḥarb al-‘ālamiyah at-ṭāniya (Lebanon in the WW2)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Al-ḥulafāʾ fi Lubnān wa-Sūriyā (The Allies in Lebanon &amp; Syria) 06.1941</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Al-istiqlāl al-lubnānī (The Lebanese Independence) 1941-1943</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Istilām al-maṣāliḥ w-taḥqīq al-‘askariyya (The takeover of the administration and achieving the withdrawal of military forces)</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Second Part**

The 58-page long Second Part summarizes the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab states from the end of the 19th century to approximately the end of World War II or exceptionally even beyond (e.g. in the case of Egypt or Algeria). In comparison with the First Part we see that Lebanese history is consecrated in a much larger section of the textbook than that of the Arab states and Turkey. Just like in the first part, chapters are divided into numbered sections, however, framed “zid ma’lūmātak” boxes are almost completely absent. This part is divided into the following seven chapters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ch.</th>
<th>Al-qism at-ṭāni: As-salṭana al-‘Uṭmāniyya w-al-buldān al-‘arabīyya (Second Part: The Ottoman rule and the Arab Countries)</th>
<th>p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Al-‘arab w-as-Salṭānuna muṇḍu ‘awākhir al-qarn at-tāṣi‘ ‘aṣr (The Arabs and the Sultanate since the End of the 19th Century)</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Tafakkuk as-Salṭānuna al-‘Uṭmāniyyah w-qiyām al-Jumhūriyyah at-Turtūkiyyah (The Dissolution of the Ottoman Sultanate and the Rise of the Turkish Republic)</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Tārīḵ Miṣr al-ḥadīth (The Modern History of Egypt)</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Tārīḵ Sūriyā al-ḥadīth (The Modern History of Syria)</td>
<td>130</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Al-Mamlaka al-‘Irāqiyya (The Kingdom of Iraq)</td>
<td>138</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya as-Su‘ūdiyya (The Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia)</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Istiqālul bułdân šimālī Ifrīqiyya (Independence of North-African States)</td>
<td>146</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
This part focuses on the histories of key nations of the *Mashreq* with the Ottoman Empire/Turkey in the first line followed by Egypt (the Arab World’s leading nation in many respects), Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Other countries of the *Waṭan* are mentioned summarized (like the Arab states of North Africa in the last chapter) or not mentioned at all (such as the Gulf-states, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and surprisingly, Palestine/Israel).

It is remarkable that despite Lebanon’s geographic unity and strong historical ties with Syria the country is not granted any priority or special extent and is rather neglected. Throughout the whole textbook, Lebanon is displayed as a separate entity (even before the country’s formal detachment from Ottoman Greater Syria by the French), not having any special relation to its Syrian neighbour.\(^3\)

Another interesting point to mention is the complete absence of any detailed information on Palestine, the Palestinian cause, the 1948 *Nakba* or the Zionist movement and the Jewish State. There is no chapter devoted to Palestine; Lebanon’s sole bordering state apart from Syria only occurs marginally and exclusively in connection with Lebanese historical events in the First Part, or as Ottoman territory and later as British mandate-area without any special importance in the Second Part. On the few maps of the Second Part the territory is consequently referred to as *Filaṣṭīn al-muḥṭalla*, i.e. “occupied Palestine”.

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\(^3\) This detail caused major concern among my Syrian informators and was largely regarded as a “typical Lebanese attitude” distinguishing their country from Syria.
III.1.2 The Sunni Textbook

The second textbook, *Al-ḥadīt fi tārīḵ Lubnān w-al-bilād al-ʿarabīya* (The Modern in the History of Lebanon and the Arab Countries) by ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Ḥāwī seems to be published by the author himself, as there is no publisher house or organisation indicated on or in the manual. The first page only states that it is suitable for preparation to the general secondary school leaving exam in all of the classes. According to a number of interviewed schoolteachers and shop assistants, Mr Ḥāwī was a prominent Sunni educator teaching in various West Beirut Sunni private schools during and after the Civil War.

Even though appearing to be dubious, this manual was the sole one available for the last class of the secondary school in a high number West Beirut districts such as middle-class Raʾs Bayrūt/Ras Beyrouth, upscale Verdun or petit-bourgeois al-Mazrʿa/Mazraa. As many of the book shop assistants stated, this manual was the first choice of local schools, and the most requested in the area, regardless of religious affiliation of the school. This information was confirmed by some local schools as well.

Concerning the sources, similarly to the previous textbook, there is no bibliography or literature list provided in this manual.

**Structure**

Contrary to the Christian textbook, the manual I will refer to in the following as the Sunni Textbook, is also divided into distinctive sections for Lebanese and Arab history with Lebanese history considered most important followed by general Arab history including the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the Christian textbook, however, these two parts are collected into separate sequential sections. Moreover, the textbook contains no structures for additional information, extracurricular material or cited historical documents analogous to the Christian textbook, but poses a number of questions concerning the content of the relevant chapter at the end of these, and also provides answers to in a separate section at the end of the manual.

The first part covering Lebanese history is made up of 11 chapters on 55 pages. Hence, in terms of quantity, this narrative is significantly shorter than its Christian counterpart. As for its content, the narrative also begins with the outbreak of WWI and ends with the 1946 French withdrawal from Lebanon.
Second Part

The 46-page long second part summarizes the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab states from the end of the 19th century to approximately the end of the World War II, or in the cases of Egypt or Algeria even beyond. Hence, this narrative is also has a bigger focus on Lebanese history.

Ch. (continued)  p.
12. Al-ʿarab w-ad-dawla al-ʿutmānīya (The Arabs and the Ottoman State)  60
13. Raddat al-fiʿl alʿarabiya ʿalā siyāsat al-ittiḥādīyin (The Arabic reaction to the Unionist policy)  64
14. Aṯ-ṯawra al-ʿarabiya al-kubrā (The Great Arab Revolt)  68
15. Inhiyār al-imbirāṭūrīya al-ʿutmānīya w-qiyyām al-jumhūrīya at-turkīya (The decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish Republic)  73
16. Al-mamlaka al-ʿarabiya as-Sūriya (The Syrian Arab Kingdom)  78
17. Sūriyā ʿalā fi zill al-ʿintidāb al-faransī (Syria under the French Mandate)  83
18. Qiyām al-mamlaka al-ʿirāqiya (The rise of the Kingdom of Iraq)  88
19. Qiyām al-mamlaka al-ʿarabiya as-suʿūdīya (The rise of the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia)  93
20. Fataḥ qaṇāt as-Suwēs (The opening of the Suez-Canal)  97
21. At-tadaḵḵul al-inklīzī w-fard al-himāya ʿalā Miṣr (The English invasion and the imposing of the protectorate of Egypt)  102
22. Istiqālāl buldān šimālī Ifrīqiya (1) (The independence of Northern African countries 1)  106
23. Istiqālāl buldān šimālī Ifrīqiya (2) (The independence of Northern African countries 1)  112
24. Aṯ-ṯawra al-jazāʿirīya al-kubrā (The great Algerian revolution)  117
III.1.3 The Shiʿi Textbook

The textbook *Naḥnu w-at-tārīḵ* (*Us and History*) is published by the *aš-Šarika al-ʿālamiya li-ʿl-kitāb* in Beirut. The author(s) of this textbook is (are) unknown. According to Abou-Moussa, this organisation is a Ḥizbullah-affiliate and its textbooks are the preferred manuals in Ḥizbullah-run Mahdi schools as well as in other private religious institutions based in Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Jabal ‘Āmil, and the Biqā‘ regions. This information has been confirmed in a private correspondence with Professor Jonathan Kriener, a Bochum University lecturer whose his research focuses on Lebanese history textbooks. Moreover, my inquiries *in situ* (in Burj al-Barājnah/Borj el Brajné and Ḥarāt Ḥurayk/Haret Hreik schools and bookshops) also verified these statements.

Similarly to the other examined manuals, there are no sources or bibliographies provided in the textbook except for cited historical documents.

**Structure**

Unlike the other manuals, this textbook is not covering general Arab history, but focuses on Lebanese events from 1840 up until the country’s independence. Consequently, this brief overview of the textbook structure will not reflect the chapters covering pre-WWI events that are not relevant for this paper and the later analysis.

Similarly to its Christian counterpart, this textbook also offers various additional information at the end of each chapter, labelled as *taqāfa tārīḵiya*, or ‘historical culture’ (i.e. cultural history). These boxes – that are never longer than one page – provide original documents, relating additional information on culture, minorities, or economy. It is worth mentioning that many of these topics deal with specifically Shiʿite or regional (Jabal ‘Āmil) history.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ch.</th>
<th>Mawdūʿ ad-dars (Topic of the chapter)</th>
<th>p.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Aṯ-ṯawrā al-ʿarabiya al-kubrā, <em>The great Arab revolt</em></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ḳaṭwāṭ tamhidiya li-ʿl-intidāb, Preliminary steps towards the mandate</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Al-intidāb al-fransī (1), <em>The French mandate (1)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Al-intidāb al-fransī (2) – al-ḥukm al-ʿaskari al-mubāšīr, The French mandate (2) – the direct military governance</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Aḥdāṯ Lubnān fi ẓill al-jumhūriya min 1926 ilā 1939, <em>Lebanon’s events in the shadow of the republic from 1926 to 1939</em></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Lubnān ʿalā abwāb al-istiqlāl, <em>Lebanon at the gates of independence</em></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Maʿrakat istiqlāl Lubnān, <em>The battle Lebanon’s independence</em></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Lubnān wa maʿrakat al-jilāʾ, <em>Lebanon and the battle for withdrawal</em></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III.2 Geographic scope

As we saw in earlier chapters, Lebanon’s historio-geographic structure largely corresponds the geographic distribution of the country’s sectarian communities, i.e. numerous regions, or subregions are often still dominated by a certain sect, or a sect’s geographic distribution is largely delimited to a certain area. Consequently, occurrences of territories as well as their frequency in the narratives are useful indicators for the manuals’ sectarian allegiance and ideological orientation. Thus, an analysis of the manuals’ geographic scope can reveal further important details on the different notions of the country’s geographic extent, regional shifting, international outlook, and position within its regional setting. By the latter two aspects, it is worth keeping in mind that the historical periods analysed above are often not restricted to exclusively Lebanese relevance, thus even though this paper tends to examine Lebanese historical narratives concerning the history of Lebanon proper, overlaps with Middle Eastern (par excellence Syrian and Ottoman) but in a lesser extent also with French historical events – and hence, geographic references – are inevitable.

First and foremost, Lebanon’s history, as it is presented in the three narratives, is not always the history of Lebanon as a whole. Most importantly, the Christian and Sunni narratives tend to put an unchallenged focus on the coastal towns and the Mount. The Shiʿite textbook, while doing so as well, gives additional attention to country’s Shiʿite dominated southern Jabal ʿĀmil region. As for other regions and rural areas in general, the narratives fail to reflect their history and even neglect to include mention of them within the history concentrated around the aforementioned primary regions. As a result, peripheral, out-of-focus regions including the North (with the exception of the coastal city of Tripoli), the Biqāʿ, the cazas of the Anti-Lebanon (ar-Rāsayā and Ḥāṣbayā) as well as the South (except for the Shiʿite textbook) are widely excluded from any level of national memory and are not given a role in the country’s historical identity. Surprisingly, this case also applies to the subregions of the indeed prominent areas; e.g. smaller areas of significant historical importance such as the Šūf, al-Kūra, Kasrawān, or al-Matn (all of them part of Christian-dominated – and in the narratives well represented – Jabal Lubnān) are rarely mentioned in parts of the textbooks other than maps or statistical tables.

In order to display these discrepancies, the following three maps indicate the frequency of the cities’, regions’ and some subregions’ occurrence in the narratives. Concerning the

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321 Lebanon’s division into historio-geographic regions and subregions applied on the maps follow that of to be found in Pipes (1990) 35., and as such, does not necessarily correspond with the country’s current or former administrative divisions.
regional division of the map, they indicate the regions Jabal Lubnān (with the subregions al-Kūra, Kasrawān, al-Matn, and aš-Šūf), the North, the Biqāʿ (subregions include al-Hirmil and the caza of ar-Rāšayā), and the South (divided into the Jabal Ṭāmil and Ḥašbayā subregions) as well as the major cities and towns occurring in the narratives.

**The Christian scope**

As shown in the map, the Christian narrative’s scope is undoubtedly centred on the Mount Lebanon region and the coastal towns, especially Beirut, while concerning Lebanon’s Ottoman-era division, it is the Mutaṣarrīfiya that dominates. The country’s Christian core region, represented by the Mount Lebanon (47 mentions) and the old Mutaṣarrīfiya (32 mentions) – overlapping approximately the same territory – accounts for a total number of 79 occurrences and thus for an unchallenged dominance among Lebanese regions. This feature is not surprising and is well reflected the narrative’s sectarian allegiance. Even though not being predominantly Christian, the coast’s urban centres such as Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre show the highest frequency, followed by Baʿlbul (Shiʿi dominance) and Zaḥla (Greek Catholic dominance) in the Biqāʿ. Mount Lebanon’s towns – being predominantly Christian Maronite – such as the Mutaṣarrīfiya capital Baʿbdā, the administrative centre of Ālayh and Bkerké (Bkirkī), the Maronite Patriarch’s summer residence are also mentioned occasionally.

**The Sunni scope**

Parallel to the Christian narrative’s scope, the Sunni scope is also largely centred on the coastal towns and the country’s core Mount Lebanon region. Moreover, there is no change in Beirut’s leading prevalence as well as in that of the Mutaṣarrīfiya concerning Lebanon’s Ottoman-era division. This preponderance and similarity is little surprising in the mirror of the Sunni
community’s geographical distribution, as it has been mentioned in this paper, Sunnis occupy literally no rural areas and are only concentrated in the Mediterranean coast’s larger urban centres.

The Shiʿi scope

Contrary to the similar scopes of the Christian and Sunni narratives, the Shiʿi scope offers a fundamentally different perspective of the country and its regional history. Although Beirut and the coastal towns still enjoy much attention, there is also emphasis on a region otherwise marginalised by the other two narratives, namely the Jabal ʿĀmil region, a predominantly Shiʿi area having a pivotal role in the community’s identity. Moreover, another Shiʿi dominated region, the Biqāʿ also occurs more frequently in this narrative than in its counterparts. Moreover, because of this focus on otherwise non-prominent and peripheral regions, the Mount Lebanon region has a smaller preponderance. It is also worth mentioning that the term ‘mutaṣarrifiya’ is often omitted from this narrative to be notoriously replaced by ‘Jabal Lubnān’, even in historical context.
III.3 The Analyzed Historical Periods
III.3.1 The First World War and the transitional period (1914-1920)

The beginning of the twentieth century found Lebanon, or more accurately, the territories later forming the state of Lebanon, under Ottoman Turkish rule going back to 1516. Within this larger framework, the Christian-populated areas of the Jabal-Lubnān as well as the Druze-dominated Šūf mountains enjoyed a certain degree of inner autonomy, the result of bloody Christian-Druze clashes ended by intervening French troops in 1861, and guaranteed by an international agreement between the Sublime Port, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Italy. The Règlement Organique (referred to as al-Brūtūkūl, or the Protocol in Arabic) created the legal framework for the establishment of an autonomous mutaṣarrifīya administrated by a non-Lebanese Christian governor appointed by Constantinople. Even though the province included neither Beirut, nor Tripoli, nor Sidon, nor the fertile Biqāʿ, it was gradually developing in economic and human terms, in fact more rapidly than the rest of the empire. This inexperienced growth was not only the result of the region’s traditional exposure and strong ties to Europe, particularly France, but also of its continuous links to Beirut that served as its major port and intellectual hub, even though it was administrated directly as the centre of the homonymous Ottoman wilayet. By the end of the nineteenth century, Mount Lebanon and Beirut were the centres of heavy foreign investment including construction (e.g. Beirut-Damascus railway, extension of the Beirut port), finance (opening of French banks), trade, and education. Furthermore, Ottoman authorities designated the Mount as the empire’s primary silk-producing region encouraging the planting of mulberry trees on the fertile slopes.322 However, the emergence of successful Far Eastern concurrence in the sector beginning from the end of the century put serious social pressure on the Mount’s overpopulated society resulting in successive waves of mass emigration towards the Americas. As a result of foreign educational influences, Beirut became one of the cradles of the nahḍa, the Arab literary renaissance leading to the crystallisation of Arab national consciousness on the one hand, but also of the concept of ‘Lebanonism’, especially among the Maronites. Thus, the outbreak of WWI and the Ottoman Empire’s participation in it on the side of the Axis Powers put an abrupt end of the region’s material and intellectual prosperity. Due to the Mount’s strong ties to the – now hostile – West on the one side, and the British support of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces on the other, the Ottoman army, led by one of the empire’s most prominent generals, Jamāl pasha, had soon occupied the Mutasarrifiya, abolishing both foreign and local privileges, forcing its Christian governor to abdicate, and ceding its territory to the Ottoman-controlled Damascus wilayet in 1915. From that point, Lebanon is seriously hit by war consequences and shortages further aggravated by the Allied naval blockade of the entire Syrian coast, the decline of crucial trade and overseas revenues, the 1915 locust invasion, and the ensuing famine and spread of
epidemics. Meanwhile, the Ottoman army defeated, Lebanon’s fate is largely influenced by series of international events and agreements as well as by three Lebanese delegations, including one led by Maronite patriarch Ilyās al-Ḥuwayyik, attending the Paris Peace Conference to claim the maintenance and even the expansion of the Mutassařiffiya’s territories as “Christian homeland”, resulting in subsequent British, Faisalian, and French military occupations between 1918 and 1920. Ultimately, the San Remo conference placed the whole of Syria, including Lebanon, under a League of Nations mandate entrusted to France. The decision was immediately implemented through French military intervention against King Faiṣal’s Damascus-based Arab Kingdom forcing him into Iraqi exile and permitting the detachment of an enlarged version of Lebanon, the État du Grand Liban, from the rest of Syria.323

III.3.1.1 Formal aspects

Christian Textbook

In the Christian textbook, there are two whole chapters devoted to the events of the First World War and the following transitional period throughout the total of 16 pages. The 9-page 1st chapter, with the title Lubnān fi ʿl-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʿūlā, Lebanon in the First World War analyses Lebanese history in the years between 1914 and 1916 and is divided into three sections; while the 2nd chapter, Lubnān min al-ḥarb ilā ʿl-intidāb, Lebanon from the war to the mandate, consisting of 6 pages is divided into 7 sections:

I. Lubnān fi-ʿl-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʿūlā, Lebanon in the First World War

1) Duḵūl as-saltana al-ʿuṭmānīya al-ḥarb, The Ottoman Empire’s enter into the war
2) Al-waḍʿ as-siyāsi fī Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya al-ʿūlā, The political situation in Lebanon during World War I.

II. Lubnān min al-ḥarb ilā-ʿl-intidāb, Lebanon from the war until the mandate

Muqaddama: Inshiḥāb al-ʿUṭmānīyīn Introduction: The Ottoman withdrawal

1) Al-ḥukūmāt al-maḥālīyya fī Lubnān w-fī Dimāšq The local governments in Lebanon and in Damascus
2) Al-ḥulafāʾ fī bilādān w-an-niẓām al-idārī al-muʿaqqīt The Allies in our country and the provisional administrative system
3) Mawāqīf al-lubnānīyīn min mustaqbal bilādīhīm The attitudes of the Lebanese towards the future of their country
4) Al-wuḏūḏ al-lubnānīya ilā muʿtamār al-ṣuľḥ fī Bāris The Lebanese delegations at the Paris peace conference
5) At-taḥfūm al-inkliẓi – al-faransī w-ittifāq Faiṣal- Clemenceau The Anglo-French accord and the Faisal-Clemenceau agreement
6) Lajnat King-Crane The King-Crane Commission

323 Cf. Lubnān EI²
Sunni Textbook

In the Sunni textbook, there are also two chapters dealing with the events between 1914 and 1920 in the total of 12 pages. The 6 page long first chapter displays events of Lebanese history of the years 1914-1918 and is divided into 6 sections; while the 7 pages of the second chapter accounts the events of the years immediately following World War I, and is divided into 7 sections.

I. Al-waḍ’ as-siyāsī w-iqtiṣādī w-ijtimā’ī fī Lubnān kīlāl al-ḥarb al-ʿālamiya al-ʿūlā

Politics, economy and society in Lebanon during the First World War

1) Waḍ’ Lubnān as-siyāsī qubayl al-ḥarb, Lebanon’s political situation shortly before the war
2) Waḍ’ Lubnān as-siyāsī kīlāl al-ḥarb, Lebanon’s political situation during the war
3) Raddat al-fi’l al-lubnānīyīn (mawqīf al-lubnānīyīn min siyāsat Jamāl pāšā), The Lebanese reaction (attitude of the Lebanese towards Jamāl pasha’s policy)
4) Al-waḍ’ al-iqtiṣādī fī Lubnān kīlāl al-ḥarb, Lebanon’s economical situation during the war
5) Natā’ij al-azma al-iqtiṣādīya w-ṣārha ‘alā ’l-lubnānīyīn, The results of the economic crisis and its effects on the Lebanese
6) Waḍ’ Lubnān al-ijtimā’ī kīlāl al-ḥarb, Lebanon’s social situation during the war

II. Lubnān fī fitrat al-intiqāl min al-iḥtiṭāl ilā-l-intidāb 1918-1920

Lebanon in the transitional period from the occupation to the mandate 1918-1920

1) Lubnān bayn insīḥāb al-ʿutmānīyīn w-majīj al-ḥulafat, Lebanon between the Ottoman withdrawal and the arrival of the Allies
2) ʿKawf al-lubnānīyīn w-tawdīḥ al-ḥulafat Lebanese fears and the Allied explication
3) Mawqīf al-lubnānīyīn min mustaqbal bilādihim The attitudes of the Lebanese towards the future of their country
4) Taškil lajnat King-Crane, The formation of the King-Crane Commission
5) Ittifāq Lloyd George w-Clemenceau, The Lloyd George-Clemenceau agreement
6) Ittifāq Fayṣal Clemenceau, The Faisal-Clemenceau agreement
7) Mu’tamar Sān Rūmū, The San Remo conference

Shiʿi Textbook

In the Shiʿi textbook, the events there are also two chapters dealing with the events between 1914 and 1920 in the total of 12 pages. The 6 page long first chapter displays events of Lebanese history of the years 1914-1918 and is divided into 6 sections; while the 7 pages of the second chapter accounts the events of the years immediately following World War I, and is divided into 7 sections.

IV. Lubnān w-al-ḥarb al-ʿālamiya al-ʿūlā, Lebanon and the First World War

1) Al-waḍ’ as-siyāsī, political situation
2) Al-waḍ’ al-iqtiṣādī Economical situation
3) Al-waḍʿ al-ijtimāʿī Social situation

VI. Қаҩԝат тамҳида лї-л-intidāb Preliminary steps towards the mandate

1) Al-ḥulafāʾ yattaşilūn b-š-Šarīf Ἡsusayn, The Allies contact Šarīf Ἡsusayn
2) Šarīf Ἡsusayn yuʿlin al-ḥarb, Šarīf Ἡsusayn declares the war
3) Ittifāqiyyat Sykes-Picot The Sykes-Picot Agreement
4) Iḥtijāj al-ʿArab Protest of the Arabs
5) Waʿd Balfour Balfour promise

VII. Al-intidāb al-fransi (1) The Frnch mandate (1)

1) Al-ḥulafāʾ w-al-ʿarab fī Lubnān, The Allies and the Arabs in Lebanon
2) Lubnān w-muʿattamarāt aṣ-ṣulḥ, Lebanon and the peace conferences
3) Marāḥil al-intidāb, The stages of the mandate
III.3.1.2 Ottoman Lebanon

For different territorial conceptions of Lebanon cf. pp.X of this paper.

In the textbooks

All of the three books start with the description of the country’s territorial division into the Christian-governed Mutaṣarrīfiyya with inner autonomy (istiqlāl dāqīli) and the Ottoman-governed arḍ al-wilāya under the direct rule of the Sublime Porte, the later peripheral territories of the Lebanese state located in the Beirut and Damascus wilayets\(^{324}\) prior the World War I.

Concerning the two territorial denominations, while the term arḍ al-wilāya is used unanimously in the three textbooks, the Mutaṣarrīfiyya appears as ‘al-mutaṣarrīfiyya aw dawlat Lubnān aṣ-ṣaġīr’ in the Christian textbook, as ‘mutaṣarrīfiyyat Jabal Lubnān’ in the Sunni textbook, while the Shiʿite textbook simply mentions ‘Jabal Lubnān’. Since the word dawla (or daula) designates a “state; country; [or] empire”\(^{325}\), the term dawlat Lubnān aṣ-ṣaġīr, or State of Smaller Lebanon used in the Christian textbook evokes a stately entity bearing independence and international sovereignty.

Although Lebanon never existed before as a polity, the textbooks treat its later territory as a consistent entity prior to its formal establishment. Moreover, none of the textbooks describes the other territories belonging to the related wilayets in today’s Syria, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Territories. As we know, the Beirut wilayet consisted of further territories located in modern Syria, Israel and the West Bank, while the historic Damascus stretched on a territory including Southern Israel, the Gaza Strip, much of modern Jordan, and Southern Syria, but excluded modern Syria’s northern and eastern parts. Hence it seems that none of the three narratives distinguishes between the historical and current territories and denominations of the Middle East’s modern states.

Furthermore, while the Christian and the Shiʿite textbooks make a clear distinction between Lebanese and Syrian, the Sunni textbook occasionally uses the term Arab as a synonym for Lebanese, and defines Lebanon as an Arab nation\(^{326}\), an addition not occurring in the two other textbooks.

Beside its administrative divisions, the Christian textbook also gives a detailed account of Beirut’s and the Mutaṣarrīfiyya’s economic, social, political and cultural development in the late

\(^{324}\) Lit. ‘the land of the wilayet’, i.e. the Biqāʿ, forming the part of the Ottoman Damascus wilayet, as well as the city of Beirut, Sidon and Tyre, and the ‘Akkār and Jabal ‘Amīl regions that were belonging to the Beirut wilayet.

\(^{325}\) Wehr: s.r. d-w-l

\(^{326}\) Sunni 5.
19th century describing Lebanon as the most advanced territory of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab lands.

All in all, it appears that all of the three textbooks treat Lebanon in its modern form as a distinct entity within the Ottoman Empire, regardless of its contemporary subdivisions.

III.3.1.3 Emigration

Among the Arabic countries, it is probably Lebanon that has been the most significantly characterised by ongoing emigration for at least for the last 140 years of its history. With an estimated total of 14 million[^327], the Lebanese diaspora of the Americas, Europe, West Africa, Australia, and the Gulf region, highly outnumbers the country’s current internal population and has a pivotal impact on Lebanon’s economic, political, and cultural life. Furthermore, due to the customary contact with the homeland, remittances sent to charitable, religious, or educational organisations, as well as to relatives and family members contribute largely to Lebanon’s economic growth. As Hitti remarks: “Its [Lebanon’s] people talk of two Lebanons: Lebanon the resident (Lubnān al-muqīm) and Lebanon of the emigrant (Lubnān al-muġtarib).”[^328]

According to Hitti, emigration from Syria, particularly from Mount Lebanon, began as early as in the 1860s; the migrants being predominantly Christians. The first wave of emigration was a result of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the following modernisation in Egypt by Ismāʿīl Pasha who called for a high number of educated Lebanese, such as physicians, clerks, and officials of for the newly established civil administration. By 1907, Egypt’s Lebanese community made up around 30,000 residents, largely constituting the upper educated class of the society, and playing an important economic and cultural role both in their new country of residence, as well as in their native Lebanon. Beginning from the 1880’s, overwhelmingly lower-class Christians of the Mount began to emigrate in relatively large numbers to North and South America establishing massive (Syro-)Lebanese communities in the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. The high rate of this mass exodus encouraged the Sublime Porte to introduce travel regulations, and eventually to prohibit emigration from its Syrian lands in 1889.[^329] The number of emigrants, however, continued to increase resulting in the establishment of a wide Lebanese emigrant infrastructure with hubs in Marseille, New York, Boston, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, as well as in the closing of US immigration gates for Syro-Lebanese from 1924.[^330] During the mandate period, a third great wave of emigration took place, this time increasingly towards the French and British colonies of western Africa such as

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[^328]: Hitti (1957) 476.

[^329]: Cf. ibid. 473-475.

Senegal, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The majority of the estimated 10,000 plus migrants were Muslims. However, mass Christian exodus (of around 70,000) to the Americas, Australia, and Europe prevailed.

The causes of these early emigration waves, however, are less of political or religious than economic nature. Beginning from the 1860s, Mount Lebanon was developed into the Ottoman Empire's primary region for sericulture transforming the majority of the Mount's arable land into orchards for mulberry trees. Consequently, an estimated 70% of the peasant population's income was derived directly or indirectly from silk, resulting in a significant economic but also demographic growth. However, with the entry of other silk producing regions, most notably that of Japan and China into the global silk market put an end to Lebanon's prosperity. The process was further accelerated by the better quality and lower price of Far-Eastern silk, as well as by the opening of the Suez Canal enabling its cheap and rapid transport to Europe. As a result, Lebanon’s impoverished rural population had no other way to deduct its demographic surplus than emigration.331

Further migratory waves in the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by increasing share of Muslim, and non-montagnard emigrants, predominantly from the underprivileged strata of Lebanese society. With the eruption of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, an estimated 300,000 plus332 of Lebanese – regardless of social or sectarian background – fled the country and was granted consideration as refugee in numerous European, American, and African nations.333

Due to Lebanese citizenship laws, a large number of Lebanese or people of paternal Lebanese descent maintain their citizenship rights raising tricky questions of political nature about Lebanon's relation with its diaspora, which remains more than 50% - i.e. over-proportionally in comparison with the Lebanese resident population’s sectarian repartition – Christian. Ipso facto Maronite leaders oppose any alternation of diaspora citizenship rights, while Shi’i and Sunni leaders frown upon potential political participation or even permanent return of people more than a generation removed from Lebanon.334 Thus, emigration, despite of its long history, is still of considerable socio-political importance raising controversial questions not to be answered from a non-sectarian perspective.

In the textbooks

As for the textbooks, emigration and its impact are mentioned in all of the three narratives, mostly in the form of a section within a subchapter. The Christian textbook consecrates two passages to Lebanese emigration movements, depicting it positively. Firstly, a passage in a zid ma'lūmātak box makes a short mention of it, as one of the Mutaṣarrifīya's distinctive
characteristic describing it as: “The Mutaṣarrifiya was known for its political stability and scientific activity as well as for its wide emigration movement. The economic situation improved, political awareness increased, and many wished full independence. Thanks to the cultural renaissance [the nahda], the perspective of the Lebanese widened. Due to this openness to the world, the way of emigration and studying lead the Lebanese into Europe’s schools and universities.”

The second text passage explains the importance of financial and humanitarian aid sent by the American and European diasporas during the sufferings of the WWI. Furthermore, the passage puts emphasis on the internal migration of the region’s Christian minorities such as the Assyrians, Armenians, and the Chaldeans seeking refuge in the Mount, as well as that of the ‘Akkar’s, the Biqā’i’s, and the Ḥawrān’s rural population fleeing Ottoman oppression, famine, and poverty. Thus, the Christian narrative does not fail to draw attention to the role Mount Lebanon played as Christian refuge for persecuted and justifies emigration only with educational motives.

In the Sunni textbook, emigration is only brought up in the context of the World War by, giving the topic a much shorter account than its Christian counterpart. It mentions political and economic difficulties - including military recruitment, forced labour, or political persecution of nationalists - as its reason and names the émigré’s desire for work, security, and stability as primary motives. Furthermore, the Sunni narrative points out wartime internal migration from agriculturally underdeveloped areas into fertile regions and urban centres.

On the first page of the chapter, Shi‘ite textbook starts with a memoir of a Jabal Ṭāmil emigrant titled “The yearning of emigrants” gives an account of the hardships leaving the beloved homeland. In the further parts of the chapter, however, emigration is not mentioned anymore; apart from the humanitarian and financial aid sent by oversee expatriates during the wartime famine.

III.3.1.4 Ottoman measures during the war

The outbreak of the WWI and the Ottoman Empire’s participation in it on the side of the Axis Powers had direct and fundamental impacts on Lebanon. Fearing anti-Ottoman, pro-Arab, and pro-French sentiments, the Sublime Porte installed its Fourth Army in the Levant headed by the commander-in-chief Jamāl Pasha who declared his initial willingness to cooperate with the Arab lands in general and respect Mount Lebanon’s inner autonomy in particular. After the discovery of documents in the French Consulate in Beirut in 1915 incriminating a number

335 Christian textbook: p.11.
336 Christian textbook: p.16.
338 Shi‘ite textbook: p.44.
339 Shi‘ite textbook: p.41.
340 Hitti (1957) 483.
of prominent Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals in subversive activities aiming at the establishment of an independent Arab state, Jamāl pasha adopted a series of countermeasures.341 Firstly, the intellectuals involved in the Beirut document had been publicly hanged (14 of them in Beirut, 7 other in Damascus). The ‘martyrs of 1915’, as they are referred to unanimously in the narratives, included i.a. the brothers Philippe and Farīd al-Ḵāzin, editors of the Maronite-patriotic journal ‘al-Arz’; the journalist Aḥmad Ṭabbāra, and the politicians ʿAbd al-Ḡanni al-ʿArīsī, and Maḥmūd al-Maḥmaṣānī. Moreover, the Ottoman army entered the Mutassarrīfīya, abolished its autonomy; transformed strategically crucial monasteries, schools, and administrative edifices into military barracks and fortresses; and forced the Christian governor, Awhānis Pasha, to abdicate, replacing him with Istanbul-appointed Turkish Muslim officials. By sending Beirut’s Maronite bishop into exile to Anatolia and threatening the patriarch with the same fate, Jamāl Pasha put an enormous pressure on the Maronite clergy and curtailed it of their former privileges. Additionally, a much feared military tribunal installed in ʿĀlayh/Aley took the place of the abolished Mutassarrīfīya’s executive functions; the authorities took control of trade and commerce, expropriated wheat and livestock for the army, and introduced the depreciated Turkish paper currency.345 These measures led to exceptionally high inflation rates and the spread of speculation by usurers and government officials. This severe situation was further worsened by tight Allied blockade of the whole Ottoman coast from 1915. Despite these serious deficiencies, the Ottoman authorities made no efforts to introduce food, medical supplies or clothing from other parts of the Empire or abroad. Being hermetically isolated from the rest of the world, the Mount’s population had difficulties to receive remittances from their emigrated donors in abroad that they until that point heavily relied on. In addition to the spread of epidemics, the remnants of the region’s crop had been destroyed by an invasion of locusts in 1915. Consequently, Lebanon’s population experienced the worst famine of their country’s history in 1916, wiping out large segments of the economically underprivileged classes, and forcing entire Druze communities to flee their ancestral territories in the Šūf for the Ḥawrān. All in all, the war and its direct and indirect consequences, such as compulsory military service, diseases, epidemics, malnutrition, famine, persecution or emigration resulted in a population loss of around 100,000 people alone in Mount Lebanon, nearly a quarter of its pre-war residents of 450,000. Moreover, as Traboulsi argues, “the war revealed the economic insufficiency of Mount Lebanon, which depended on overseas

341 Hourani (1954) 49.
344 Including two of the Maronites’ most prominent monasteries of Mār Yūḥanna and Mār Ǧishāʾyāʾ. Hitti (1957) 483.
345 Ibid. 484.
346 Ibid. 484-485.
trade for over half of its revenues and most fulfilled its needs in cereals and livestock with imports from the Biqāʿ and the Syrian interior.”

In the textbooks

By the construal of these events, the three textbooks show an unexpected unanimity. In all of the narratives, Lebanon’s political, social, and economic development is carefully examined highlighting cause and effect and giving detailed account on the population's suffering. As a further common feature, Ottoman Turkish authorities are made responsible for the war's disastrous impact on Lebanon designating Jamāl Pasha as “slaughterer”348, “tyrant”349 or “corrupt”350. There are, however, differences in the emphasis put on events and their causes. For instance, the suffering of the Maronites, the brave resistance of their patriarch as well the humanitarian aid the Maronite clergy offered during the famine are very much called in attention in the Christian narrative. Moreover, it accentuates exhaustively the importance of financial and military aid sent by overseas Lebanese migrants and underlines their role in the Allied and Faisalian forces351 seeking to liberate Lebanon. Moreover, the abolition of Mount Lebanon’s autonomy, of foreign commercial privileges, and the elimination of the foreign school system are also deplored.

In a more solid form, the Sunni narrative also gives account of numerous elements of the Maronite perspective acknowledging the Patriarchate’s efforts and role during wartime hardships, but at the same time it also underlines the persecution of Arab nationalists and the “despotic oppression of the Lebanese”352 by the occupying Ottoman army.

In comparison to its Christian and Sunni counterparts, the Shi‘ite narrative omits the Maronite perspective as a whole mentioning neither the patriarch’s deeds, nor any of the Christians’ grievances listed in the other two narratives. Instead, it gives an account of the events and their socio-economic consequences.

III.3.1.5 The King-Crane Commission

In order to decide the fate of the populations of the Ottoman Empire and ascertain the wishes of its inhabitants in accordance with the principle of self-determination, President Wilson called for the appointment of an ‘International Commission for Inquiry’ in 1919.353 Boycotted by the French and the British, only the commission’s American members – Chicago

349 Sunni textbook: p.6.
350 Shi‘ite textbook: p.36.
351 As both the Christian and the Sunni narratives commemorate, many Syro-Lebanese volunteers joined the rows of either the Allied or Fayṣal’s Arab forces (cf. Christian textbook. P.15.; Sunni textbook: p.7.)
353 Hourani: 52.
businessman Charles Crane and Henry King, President of the Oberlin College – arrived in the region in June 1919. The King-Crane Commission, as it became known, toured what are today Lebanon, parts of Syria, of Jordan, of Israel-Palestine, and of Turkey (Cilicia) and met delegations from 36 cities and 1,520 villages receiving no fewer than 1,863 petitions. According to Traboulsi, 80 per cent of the respondents voted for a united Syria, 74 per cent supported independence and 60 per cent chose a ‘democratic and decentralised constitutional monarchy’. In the event of the imposition of a foreign mandate on Syria, 60 per cent opted for an American mandate, much smaller number for a British mandate and only 14 per cent, mainly Lebanese Maronites, requested the French as mandatory power. A total of 72 per cent of the respondents were opposed to Zionist ambitions and to the separation of Palestine from the rest of the Arab East.354

Within the later Lebanon355, however, many Christians from the mountain and the coast were opposing the establishment of a Syrian federation and rather reverted to a Greater Lebanon option. As an example, a petition from a Beirut Christian delegation stated that Lebanon’s separation from Syria was supported by history, mores, racial affinities, geographical considerations, language, legislation, and common intellectual thinking; stating that Syria and Lebanon were just simply two different civilisations, as “the coast, which has turned towards the Occident since the days of the Phoenicians, cannot consciously consent to let itself drawn in an intrusive and planned Pan-Arabism.”356 As Kaufman remarks, this and similar petitions indicate, that the vision of Lebanon as a future Western-oriented state, buoyed up by a historical narrative reaching back to the Phoenicians, was widespread among Beirut’s Christian bourgeoisie and was not confined to the Maronites.357

In its report to the peace conference in Paris in 1919, the commission recommended a united state for the whole of natural Syria governed by Prince Faysal under American mandatory power (in addition to a separate Iraq under British mandate). It also emphasised that the Zionist project of unlimited emigration of Jews into Palestine and its final goal, the creation of a Jewish state, required ‘serious modifications’ and concluded: ‘anything else would be tantamount of treason of the Syrian people’. The Commission’s endorsement for ‘Syria within its natural borders’ had a rather negligible impact on the Allies’ peace policy and could little to avoid the partition of the Levant;358 while the report itself was only published

355 Within today’s Lebanon, the commission toured the cities of ’Aynāb, al-Batrūn, Ba’bdā, Ba’lbakk, Beirut, Bkarkī, Sidon, Tripoli, Tyre, and Zahla (cf. New York Times)
three years later\textsuperscript{359}. According to Pipes, the divisions aggravated traditional sectarian differences and introduced new tensions. Reflecting this sentiment, the Commission report argued that “the separation off of the Greater Lebanon ... would intensify the religious differences in Syria.”\textsuperscript{360}

**In the textbooks**

All of the three textbooks give a short report on the King-Crane Commission’s activities and its results. While the Christian and the Sunni textbooks roughly agree on the commission’s goals, route, methods, and importance explaining the rejection of the experts’ results with the previous secret Anglo-French agreements to divide the region in accordance with their own interests, the Shi‘ite narrative has the following conviction: “عادة اللجنة ورغمت نقريراً ولكن زمامه”\textsuperscript{361}, i.e. it accuses ‘the intervention of Zionist leaders’ for the report’s negligence. In addition, the Shi‘ite version reveals no details about the local population’s desires concerning the political appartenance of the region, unlike the other two narratives, where some possible options are listed. Accordingly, the Christian textbook states, that the majority of the ‘Lebanese’ opted for a France-backed independent Lebanon with extended borders, some would have preferred American or British mandate over the country, while only a minority would have supported Mount Lebanon’s autonomy within a Syrian union or the full independence of the mutaṣarrifiya without any affiliation to an Arab polity, nor a Western power.\textsuperscript{362} The Sunni textbook lists up the options of a French mandated, an autonomous but Syrian, and a fully independent Lebanon without mentioning their grade of preference among the population.\textsuperscript{363}

Thus, it seems that both the Christian and the Shi‘ite narrative have their very own conceptions concerning the importance of the King-Crane Commission: while the former one seeks to use it as a pretext to legitimate the later establishment of Greater Lebanon as a French-mandated independent state detached from the Syrian interior, its Shi‘ite counterpart accuses Zionism for persuading the marginalisation of the report’s recommendations resulting in the arbitrary division of the region in accordance with foreign Zionist interest.

\textsuperscript{359} Hourani (1954) 52.
\textsuperscript{361} Shi‘ite textbook: p.65.
\textsuperscript{362} Christian textbook: p. 26. Furthermore, a previous subchapter (pp.22-23.) relates Lebanese attitude towards the future political form of the region in a regional perspective, stating that “the people of Mount Lebanon (most of them Christians) demanded the reunification of the territories that had been detached from the Mutassarifiaty system of the Mount, and the independence of the whole [country]”, while “the people of the wilayet (most of them Muslims) called for inner autonomy with ties to Fayāṣīan rule, and participation on the Syrian Conference in Damascus, and assigned Prince Fayṣal to represent their view in Paris.”
\textsuperscript{363} Sunni textbook: p.15.
III.3.1.6 International accords shaping Lebanon

**Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916):** In order to delimitate the spheres of influence in the Arab territories at that time under Ottoman control claimed by their respective governments, a secret agreement had been signed by the diplomats François George Picot and Sir Mark Sykes representing France and the United Kingdom, respectively. The accord, concluded and embodied in a number of notes exchanged between the French, British, and Russian governments, provided for the division of the Fertile Crescent into zones of direct and indirect rule as follows: France gained direct control over the Levantine coast north from the Raʾs an-Naqūra, including Mount Lebanon and the Anatolian region of Cilicia, as well as indirect control over the Syrian interior including the former Damascus, Aleppo, and Mosul wilayets to be administered by an Arab State or Confederation. Similarly, Britain was to be at liberty to establish a form of direct administration in the wilayets of Basra and Baghdad, and impose its indirect control over a future Arab State stretching through the rest of Iraq and Syrian Desert to the port of ‘Aqaba. In what is now Israel and the Palestinian Territories an international administration was to be established, with Great Britain retaining direct control over the cities of Haifa and Acre. Prior the signing of the agreement, France funded an expedition to ascertain whether the imposition of her control over the Syrian region was serving her colonial interests resulting in a report reaching positive conclusions. Similarly, Britain's strong claim over Palestine as a buffer zone between the Sinai and the Levant to secure the Suez Canal and the road to India was also serving the colonial enterprise, while securing of the Basra and Baghdad regions was mainly due to its oil fields and its strategic location at the Persian Gulf, which had also become a zone of British interest. These colonial aims were, however, justified by the necessary protection of the region’s Christian, but also Druze, ‘Alawī, and even Shi‘ite minorities rooting in, for instance, age-old French self-perception as Protector of the Levant’s Christian communities.

**Lloyd George-Clemenceau Agreement (September 1919):** After having occupied Lebanon and overthrown its Ba‘bdā-based Arab government, France's endeavour was to insure total control and to obtain mandate over the whole of Syria, while Prince Faysal, whose revolt was inspired, armed, advised, and financed by Britain, ruled Damascus, in the belief that Great Britain would use her influence to fulfil her promises made in the 1915-16 Anglo-Arab McMahon–Ḥusayn Correspondence. In order to avoid an Anglo-French clash concerning the future of a British-promised independent Arab state, the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain reached an agreement in September 1919 modifying the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

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364 Hourani (1954) 46-47.
365 Traboulsi (2007) 76.
366 Traboulsi (2007) 76.
according to recent developments. First and foremost, British troops had been withdrawn from Syria (excluding Palestine) and Cilicia to be replaced by the French army on the coast and Cilicia, as well by Arab troops in the interior. Moreover, France received a share in the Anglo-Persian Petroleum Company that had recently been discovered oil in Iraq. In return, France dropped any claim of Palestine, and also ceded the Mosul region – originally considered part of the French sphere of influence – to Britain. As a result, her new position enabled France to extend her direct control over the whole of Syria, and also gained legitimisation from her most prominent ally. Consequently, Fayṣal’s Arab government could do nothing else than to express its protest against the new regional framework and to try to settle its differences with France. With British encouragement Fayṣal travelled to Europe to find a solution with Clemenceau’s France.367

**Fayṣal-Clemenceau Agreement (January 1920):** Following the transfer of military control over the Syrian coast from Great Britain to France, Fayṣal had to recognise that Britain had left him to his fate. Lacking military strength to resist French forces, Fayṣal accepted Lloyd George’s suggestion to negotiate with Clemenceau in Europe in order to try to reach understanding with France. At the outset, Clemenceau refused to receive the Prince, but when they finally met, the two statesmen came to a provisional agreement, by which the right of the Syrian Arabs to an independent state centred in Damascus and led by Fayṣal was acknowledged,368 with the condition that a French high commissioner would be posted in Aleppo, French civil and military advisors as well as French economic, military, and cultural aid would be resorted exclusively. Moreover, Fayṣal had to recognise Lebanon’s independence and territorial integrity under French mandate without Lebanon’s borders having been defined previously.369

**San Remo Conference (April 1920):** To decide the fate of the occupied territories of the former Ottoman Empire, the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan met in the city of Sanremo, Northern Italy, to determine the allocations of type ‘A’ League of Nations mandates. The representatives of these governments allotted the northern part of geographical Syria to France, and the southern half, known as Palestine, to Great Britain, with the obligation of carrying out the policy of the Balfour Declaration370. As a result, historic Syria has been split

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367 Hourani (1954) 52.
368 Hourani (1954) 53.
370 Article C of the San Remo Convention: “Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and
up – among arbitrary borders corresponding neither to Ottoman provincial subdivisions, nor to ethno-religious lines – into mandates ruled by European powers which the local population “found hard to distinguish from colonial rule”\textsuperscript{371}. Fāṣal in turn, heavily rejected the convention, however, without much avail. Shortly after the convention’s announcement, the French army entered Damascus in July 1920 putting an end to Fāṣal’s short-lived Syrian Kingdom and forcing him into Iraqi exile where he had been proclaimed king of the country.\textsuperscript{372}

**In the textbooks**

Although all of the three accords had crucial direct impacts on the territories of the later Lebanese state, most of the narratives do not treat them as a compact series of events, but rather refer them as highly individual conformities not influencing the other. For instance, while making references to the Sykes-Picot Agreement in chapters on Lebanese history at the very beginning of the textbooks, the agreement itself is not given detailed attention earlier than in chapters on general Arab history, neither in the Sunni, nor in the Christian narratives.\textsuperscript{373} Consequently, the Sykes-Picot agreement does not seem to be considered as integral part of Lebanese history or to have a pivotal effect on the creation of the country by the aforementioned narratives. The Shi’ite textbook, on the other hand, gives a chronologically correct account on the current of consecutive international accords beginning with the Sykes-Picot Agreement up until the San Remo Conference, but at the same time fails to cover the 1920 Fāṣal-Clemenceau Agreement.\textsuperscript{374}

Parallel to the differing illustrations of these accords of historical significance, the three narratives offer dissimilar interpretations and views of them, both in particular and in context. For example, while giving a throughout well-founded account on the events both in detail and in context, the Christian textbook retains a somewhat aloof and neutral style by discussing their significance, seeking to avoid siding with neither a biased Arab, nor a “European” point of view. On the other hand, however, the narrative allows literally no critique on French

*whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country” (Laqueur: p.34.)*

\textsuperscript{371} Hourani (1954) 57.

\textsuperscript{372} Pipes (1990) 28.

\textsuperscript{373} The agreement is discussed in Chapter 14 – At-ṭawra al-‘arabiya al-kubrā, or The Great Arab Revolt in the Sunni (pp.70-72) as well as in Chapter 2 of the section of Arabic history – Ṭafakkuk as-Sulta’na al-Ummāniya w-qiyām al-Jumhūriya at-Turkīya, or ‘The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Turkish Republic (pp.114-116) in the Christian textbook.

\textsuperscript{374} Additionally to the agreements, the Christian textbook provides a detailed insight into the personal correspondence between the Maronite patriarch Ilyās al-Ḥuwayyik and French Prime Minister Clemenceau concerning Maronite demands to establish an extended, independent Lebanon with French help. An excerpt from the patriarch’s mémoires (provided in a ‘zadd ma’lūmātak’ box on pp.25) summarises the Maronite clergy’s arguments for Lebanon’s independence and extended territory, while Clemenceau’s answer promises French support to “conserve[Lebanese] traditions and expand its administrative and political system and [to] invest in the country” (pp.25-26.). These details are not given any reference in the two other textbooks.
policies and interest shaping these agreements, and does not condemn or even put negative light on them. At the same time, Arab resentments and political disappointment, i.e. an expected narrative or comment depicting an “Arab” angle is also absent. The same attitude is true to the agreements discussed in the first section of the textbook consecrated exclusively to Lebanese history.

The Sunni narrative, similarly to its Christian counterpart, seeks to adopt an unbiased narrative tone and thus, tries to emphasise economic circumstances as motives for the extension of Franco-British expansion in the region. By doing so, the narrative is not entirely free from information contradicting itself; for instance, concerning the Fayṣal-Clemenceau Agreement, the Sunni textbook states: “Summarizing this agreement, France recognised Syria’s independence, and in return, Syria recognised Lebanon’s independence under French mandate, made the Biqāʿ region to a demilitarised zone between the Arab and French administrations, and let France to represent Syrian interests in abroad.”

Unlike its Christian and Sunni counterparts, the Shiʿi narrative provides a different tune, lacking balanced rhetoric or neutrality. For instance, the Sykes-Picot Agreement is referred to as “secret conspiracy to get the resources and wealth of the Arabs”; the Balfour Declaration (which is discussed extensively as part of Lebanese history) is displayed to have been seeking to establish “a Jewish state in the middle of the Arab lands to serve Britain’s colonial interests”, while the San Remo Conference was nothing more than “the achievement of Anglo-French colonial aspirations through the legalisation of the League of Nations.” With such rhetoric, the Shiʿite narrative avoids the Sunni-Christian attempt to give a balanced view, and thus, seems to prefer to put light on the events from a “local” or “Arab” perspective, and to allow an occasionally anti-European point of view.

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375 As an example, while a subchapter concerning the agreement is consecrated to the post-war modifications of the accord, the French mandate’s extension to the whole of Syria and Lebanon is commented with one single sentence: “waḍaʿ Lubnān w-Sūriyya taḥta al-intidāb al-faransi.” (Christian textbook: p.116)
376 Sunni textbook: p.16.
377 Shiʿi textbook: p.58.
378 Shiʿi textbook: p.60.
III.3.2 The French Mandate and the State of Greater Lebanon (1920-1926)

Throughout the First World War the Lebanese Christians remained convinced that under French occupation their national aspirations would soon be realised; but even when the War was over, it was to take another two years of political upheaval in the Levant before they finally achieved their centuries-old dream of a state of their own. As it had been examined earlier, in the interim period, the *quésition libanaise* became entangled in a larger context of international and regional issues including Anglo-French rivalry in the Middle East, the secret War agreements, Prince Fayṣal’s Arab national movement in Syria, and the relationship of that movement with France and Britain. The establishment of a desired Lebanese state, envisioned as a *foyer chrétiens* by its *par excellence* Maronite partisans, was only possible after the solution of these problems and controversies. True, in the end the French government and its representatives in the Levant did fulfil Lebanese Christian aspirations in creating them a country and giving it generous borders. But this was not merely the automatic outcome of French pledges and traditional ties to Lebanon’s Christians, especially the Maronites; it also reflected France’s current interest in the area as a whole, including its developing relationship with Fayṣal’s Arab government in Damascus and her British ally’s presence in the south and east of the region. Moreover, the new country’s generous borders soon proved themselves to be way too generous as the mainly Muslim population of the newly annexed territories were neither helping to legitimise the Lebanon’s *raison d’être*, nor showed much sympathy and cooperation towards the country’s artificially imposed Christian hegemony or French – i.e. foreign Western Christian – overlords.

Hence, the display of this period in the historical narratives allows a great deal of free space to reflect ideological and sectarian affiliated aspects of common history. The reception of a foreign power, forced detachment from a greater historic region, the establishment of a country never existing before lacking general consensus in and outside, etc. offers a wide range of possible interpretations. As we will see, the presentation of certain sub-topics is anything but free from biases, stereotypes, or judgements leaving only a handful of issues that are reasonably agreed on in all the three narratives.
III.3.2.1 Formal aspects

Christian Textbook

III. Al-intidāb, The Mandate

1) Mabdaʾ al-intidāb w-al-ittifāq ʿalayhi, The begin of the mandate and the agreement on it
2) Muʿattamar Sān Rīmū w-fard al-intidāb, The San Remo conference and the implementation of the mandate
3) Šakk al-intidāb, The Mandate document
4) Raddat fiʿl majlis idārat mutaṣṣarriyyat Jabal Lubnān, The reaction from Mount Lebanon’s Administrative Council
5) Taṭbīq al-intidāb, The application of the mandate


1) Taʿrīf niẓām al-intidāb, Definition of the mandate system
2) Kayf tamm al-ittifāq ʿalā mabdaʾ al-intidāb, How the mandate contract concluded the beginning of the mandate
3) Iʿlānhā, The mandate document
4) Ṣakk al-intidāb, Mandate types
5) Marāḥil ʿahd al-intidāb, Stages of the mandate period

Sunni Textbook

III. Mabdaʾ al-intidāb w-qiyām Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr 1920-1926

The beginning of the mandate and the emergence of the State of Greater Lebanon

1) Taʿrīf niẓām al-intidāb, Definition of the mandate system
2) Qarrārat inšāʾhā, The decisions of its creation
3) Iʿlānhā, Its proclamation
4) Al-mutaṣṣarriyyat allati ʿarafhā Lubnān Lebanon’s The alternations experienced by Lebanon
5) Nizām al-ḥukm fi Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr, Greater Lebanon’s governmental system
6) Lajnat King-Crane, The King-Crane Commission

IV. Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr 1920-1926 (niẓām al-ḥukm w-tanẓīm ad-dawla)

The State of Greater Lebanon 1920-1926 (governmental system and the reorganisation of the state)

1) Nizām al-ḥukm fi Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr, The governmental system in the State of Greater Lebanon
2) Tanẓīm ad-dawla (abraz munjāzāt fi ʿahd Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr), The reorganisation of the state (the most important achievements in the era of the State of Greater Lebanon)
3) Al-muḥawwaddiya al-ʿaliyya al-faransiya, The French High Commissariat
4) Madaʿa taṭbīq šakk al-intidāb fi Dawlat Lubnān al-Kabīr, Duration of the Mandate contract's application in the State of Greater Lebanon

Shiʿi Textbook

VII. Al-intidāb al-faransi (1), The French mandate (1)

1) Al-ḥulafāʾ w-al-ʿarab fl Lubnān, The Allied and the Arabs in Lebanon
2) Lubnān w-muʿattamar aṣ-ṣulḥ, Lebanon and the peace conference
3) Marāḥil al-intidāb, Stages of the Mandate
4) Takrīs al-intidāb, Inauguration of the Mandate
VIII. Al-intidāb al-faransi (2) – al-ḥukm al-ʿaskari al-mubāšir

*The French mandate (2) – the direct military governance*

1) Dawlat Lubnān al-kabīr, *The State of Greater Lebanon*

2) Ṣakk al-intidāb, *The mandate document*

3) Al-ḥukm al-ʿaskari al-mubāšir, *The direct military governance*

4) Idāra fi ʿahd al-intidāb, *Administration in the Mandate era*
III.3.2.2 The mandate system and its implication

The granting of the mandate over Syria to France in the San Remo Conference in April 1920 was an official recognition of France's long-standing ties with the Levant. Apart from the deep-rooting educational influence (that have already been examined in this paper) represented by the presence of French religious orders and a network of educational establishments financed by the French state, France's mission civilisatrice had the clear political goal of strengthening her position in the region in which she had for centuries had an interest. In the Levant, as in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, missionaries had been the first to lay the fundaments of French colonial ambitions, despite the Third Republic's pivotal principle concerning the separation of State and Church. Outside la France métropolitaine, however, this principle did not seriously hamper religious activities and intensive clerical involvement; the French empire had indeed been benefiting from the results of their involvement on the colonies d'outre-mer. Moreover, due to French banks and businesses that had been heavily investing in the Ottoman Empire long before its collapse and partition, France also had extensive economic interests in the Levant. Before the War, 63% of the Ottoman public dept was in French hands, while French companies held an almost complete monopoly of the railway system of what had been created Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, and had also significant shares in ports, gas and electricity companies, chemical plans, silk cultivation as well as various other sectors.\(^{380}\) Thus, France's concerns about protecting these investments had been a major factor in her efforts to secure the region and put it under any form of control. By achieving these goals, France could have hardly found a more reliable natural ally in the region than the Maronites. Ruled by a Francophile and Francophone elite, exposed to Western, and particularly French, influence for centuries, this self-conscious uniate Christian community had been seeking the Third Republic's direct protection since the beginning of the War sending a number of delegations to Paris demanding an own “Christian homeland” mandated to the troisième république and detached from its Arab-Muslim environment. On the other hand, however, Fayṣal's Arab national movement that had emerged after the War as a powerful regional force among the Muslim population of bilād aš-Šām adopted an exceedingly abhorring attitude both towards French efforts to extend the country's influence to Syria, and the Maronite claim for an independent state under French protection. Hence, the Fayṣalian regime regarded Maronite demands not as a legitimate national desire, but rather as a French political tool exploited to prevent the Arab majority from realising its aspirations for an independent, united Syria within its natural borders.\(^{381}\) As a desperate attempt to prevent France (and Britain) from implementing their secret War agreements and the resolution of the 1920 San Remo Conference partitioning the Middle East, an elected Syrian congress proclaimed the independence of the Syrian Arab Kingdom within its ‘natural borders’ (i.e. including the whole of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine),


and with Fayṣal as its king. Following this move, talks had been engaged between Fayṣal and Mount Lebanon’s Administrative Council\textsuperscript{382} the latter one expressing its strong opposition to Arab Syria’s self-declared independence. But as the Arab government recognised Lebanon’s right to territorial expansion and independence, the majority of the AC members accepted, concluding an agreement despite the objection of Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik, who was already won over the idea of the French mandate. Nonetheless, on July 10, 1920, eight AC members set off to Damascus in order to sign a joint declaration denouncing the French mandate in return for Fayṣal’s recognition of Lebanese independence. En route to the capital, the delegation had been intercepted and arrested by French troops, accusing them of planning to accompany Fayṣal to Europe in order to represent Lebanon and claim its inclusion into the Arab Kingdom and finally exiling all of them to Corsica.\textsuperscript{383} Three months later, the French Army of the Orient (however, mainly composing of the units of the Senegalese Colonial Army), under the command of General Henri Gouraud, started to take possession\textsuperscript{384} of its freshly mandated Syrian territories. After crossing the Biqāʿ, they defeated the Arab army at Maysalūn\textsuperscript{385}, marched into Damascus and expelled Fayṣal and his government from Syria. Thus, for the next quarter century, France would control the whole of the country under the terms of the mandate laid down by the League of Nations. As the principle of the mandate system, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stated that:

“To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. […]"

\textsuperscript{382} Being in charge since the Ottoman army’s withdrawal from region, Mount Lebanon’s Administrative Council (al-majlis al-idārī) – representing the cazas of the former Mutasarrifiya – was practically carrying out the policy of the charismatic Maronite Patriarch, Ilyās al-Ḥuwayyik.

\textsuperscript{383} Traboulsi (2007) 78-79.

\textsuperscript{384} Henri Joseph Eugène Gouraud, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner for Syria, Lebanon and Cilicia as early as in September 1919, sent an ultimatum ordering him the unconditional recognition of the French mandate over the whole of Syria, the reduction of the Syrian army, the abolition of conscription, the adoption of a new Franco-Syrian currency, French occupation of the Riyāq-Aleppo railway, and the installment of a French high representative in Aleppo. Despite heavy protest of his supporters, Fayṣal accepted the terms of the ultimatum. However, claiming that the answer came too late, General Gouraud launched an offensive across the Biqāʿ against the Syrian capital on 21 July. Cf. Hourani (1954) 54 et Traboulsi (2007) 79.

\textsuperscript{385} Taking place on July 24, 1920 12 km west of Damascus, the battle of Maysalūn witnessed the pitting of Arab cavalry against French war tanks as well as the killing of commander of the Fayṣalian army and Minister of Defence, Yūṣuf al-ʿAẓma, giving way to the French occupation of the capital and the rest of the country. Traboulsi (2007) 79.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. […]

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.\textsuperscript{386}

In accordance with the previsions of this article, special Mandate contracts had been designed for the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. The respective document for Syria, officially the Mandate contract for Syria and Lebanon, amended on July 24, 1922, recorded the decision of the Principal Allied Powers to entrust Syria and Lebanon to the French Republic charged with the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance to the population\textsuperscript{387}. Among other regulations, the contract ordered the Mandatory power to
(Art.1.) implement a constitution within three years with the participation of local authorities and encourage autonomy;
(Art.2.) maintain its troops in the said territory for its defence, to organise local militias (recruited from local inhabitants) as may be necessary for the defence of the territory and to employ this militias for defence;
(Art.3.) seize exclusive control the foreign relations of Syria and the Lebanon;
(Art. 4.) be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power;
(Art.5.) abobolish former foreign privileges but allowing foreign consulates to continue their work;
(Art.6.) establish a judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights;
(Art.8.) ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality and encourage public instruction by securing the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language;
(Art.9.) refrain from all interference in the administration of religious communities and sacred shrines belonging to the various religions;

\textsuperscript{386} Cited in Hourani (1953) 163.
\textsuperscript{387} Hourani (1953) 164.
(Art. 11.) impose or cause to be imposed by the local governments such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary;
(Art. 12.) adhere, on behalf of Syria and the Lebanon, to any general international agreements already existing;
(Art. 14.) encourage the protection of antiquities;
(Art. 15) adopt French and Arabic as the two official languages of Syria and Lebanon.

In the textbooks

Concerning the mandate system and its particular application in Lebanon, the Christian and Sunni textbooks provide comprehensive explications of the international circumstances and contemporary legal manoeuvres leading to the framework of League of Nations mandates. Both of the two textbooks summarise the most important of the League of Nation Charta’s article 22 on mandates and of the special Mandate Contract for Syria and Lebanon, and describe the mandate system as “compromise between colonialism and the Wilsonian concept of right for self-determination”.

More than its Sunni counterpart, the Christian narrative seeks to present a balanced account. First, it emphasises the negative aspects of the mandate system such as the unenthusiastic reaction of Mount Lebanon’s Administrative Council that had been calling for total and immediate independence and was opposing the mandate; the arrestment and detention of AC members on their way to Damascus by General Gouraud, as well as the French taking hold of the Lebanese economy and building up their monopolies, adding that the exploitation of Lebanon’s sectarian structure made the majority of the population opposing the mandate rule. On the other hand, however, the same narrative praise the French and the mandate period for laying the fundaments of the modern state, its institutions, administrative and monetary systems, constitutional basis, as well as for developing the country’s infrastructure (road network, electricity, port facilities, and irrigation), educational system, and for propagating French language and culture in Lebanon and Syria. Further details of the period, such as the battle of Maysalûn and Syria’s French partition into separate states are mentioned but not commented.

In contrary to this display, the Sunni narrative is rather taciturn on evaluating the mandate period and restricts itself to an uncommented listing of the events leading to the mandate documents and names some of their most important articles. As the narrative lacks the interpretation of events and offers no comment on initial French policies or local reactions, it is hard to detect whether this ineloquence is the result of disinterest or is rather a tool to avoid potentially negative comments. As an interesting detail, the Sunni textbook remarks that the

388 Find the complete document in the annex section of this paper
389 Christian 30.
mandate concept was designed for the tutelage of the former German and Turkish colonies. Hence, it refers to the Ottoman Empire as a colonial power and to Lebanon as its colony.

As for the Shiʿi narrative, it offers a fundamentally different perspective. First, it gives an extremely short summary on the most important articles of the mandate documents describing them as “League of Nations sanctions” and the French mandate as “direct military governance” (al-ḥukm al-ʿaskari al-mubāšır) that “curtailed freedoms and persecuted nationalists”. As it adds, French agents also provoked clashes between Muslims and Christians in the Jabal ʿĀmil region leading to the (Muslim) attack of Christian villages that served “as justification for the French army to enter Islamic villages and burn them down”. Consequently, the Shiʿi narrative seems to be anything but neutral in the evaluation of the French rule (at least of its early years) and, just like the Christian textbook, accuses the mandatory power for exploiting the country’s sectarian structures. These examples show that the Shiʿi narrative, unlike its Christian counterpart, fails to present the period, the mandate as institution and especially the beginnings of the French mandatory rule over Lebanon in a balanced way, but put them in a negative light and underlines their arbitrary characters.

III.3.2.3 The State of Greater Lebanon

Creation and territory: Famine, isolation, and economic inviability during the years of World War I motivated Maronite leaders, especially in the entourage of Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik, to seek the establishment of an agriculturally secure state for their community by the attachment of fertile regions such as the Biqāʿ, ʿAkkār, and the south as well as the key ports of Tripoli and Sidon. By adopting economic viability as a primary argument Maronites faced a serious dilemma: “they could either claim territory which would bring with it a high number of non-Maronites, or they could keep Christians predominant and Lebanon small. Achieving ideal boundaries meant losing the overwhelming Christian majority, while keeping the Christian dominance meant remaining geographically tiny.”\textsuperscript{390} The weight of these concerns is well indicated by the controversies even within the Maronite community. For instance, the idea of an extended Lebanon stretching its territory literally in every direction had been rejected not just by the Administrative Council\textsuperscript{391} but even by Patriarch al-Ḥuwayyik’s brother, Saʿd-Allāh, the vice-president of the council.\textsuperscript{392} But this partial Maronite rejection was just the tip of the iceberg: for the Muslim population of the desired additional territories a detachment from their “Syrian Mother” meant an almost “unimaginable inversion of the natural order of their

\textsuperscript{390} Pipes (1990) 34.
\textsuperscript{391} Harris (1997) 40.
\textsuperscript{392} Traboulsi (2007) 79.
universe” as well as a trauma of losing socio-political supremacy to a Christian political dominance never before experienced.

After all, in line with her *politique minoritaire*, France subdivided the territory of her Syrian mandate into six separate units carrying clear religious connotations, or *états* serving the traditional French colonial *divide et impera* principle. On 1st September 1920, General Gouraud, French High Commissioner of Syria, the Lebanon and Cilicia gave a speech in the presence of local notables in Beirut announcing the creation of the *État du Grand Liban*, or *dawlat Lubnān al-kabīr* as one of the six new separate entities carved out of Syria. By implementing al-Ḥuwayyek’s model, the event put an end to debates concerning the shape of the nascent country and converted the “Little Lebanon” of the former *Mutaṣarrīfiya* into the State of Greater Lebanon. This new entity – roughly twice the size of the *Mutaṣarrīfiya* – included virtually all the Maronites nationalists had ever sought: Tripoli and the ‘Akkār region in the north, the Bīqā’ Valley and the cazaṣ Ḥāšbayā and Rāšayā to the east, Jabal ‘Āmil and the ports of Sidon and Tyre to the south, and Beirut, the new capital, to the west. Demographically, these attachments changed the country’s denominational structure replacing the relative harmony of the *Mutaṣarrīfiya* with the more complicated sectarian mosaic of Greater Lebanon. The Christians, initially foreseeing the new Lebanon as a *foyer chrétien*, now only counted for a slight majority within the new borders. Consequently, from the very beginning of its creation, *Grand Liban* became the subject of further concerns, opposed by many Christians who called for the reduction of its territory, while others emphasising it not only as “a home for the Christian dwelling therein, but also as a refuge for the Christians of neighbouring Muslim countries in case if they should be compelled to flee from the persecution of their neighbours”. Besides the maintenance of the centuries-old Christian refuge-theory, parallels with the Zionist project of a “national home” for the Jews in Palestine cannot be overlooked and were, as Wild argues, intentional.

As for the Muslim population of the new territories, an overwhelming majority of them rejected the new borders as well as the very existence of Lebanon as a separate state under the tutelage of a European Christian Power and called annexation to Syria. After initial attacks on Christian villages, the Muslim opposition formed a block of the *Coast and the Four Cazaṣ* encouraging the population of the new territories to recoil from participation in Lebanese political life, such as elections, or to refuse the obtaining of the Lebanese nationality and passport. As Traboulsi summarises, “the population of the annexed territories mainly expressed their opposition to economic, administrative, and fiscal injustices. In fact, these had a larger population than that of the former *Mutaṣarrīfiya* (380,000 as opposed to 330,000),

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393 Harris (1997) 41.
394 For a detailed description of these units cf. the section on ‘Notes on terminology’ of this paper.
395 Harris (1997) 41.
their financial resources were richer (83 per cent of the fiscal revenues of the new state came from the annexed territories; while 83 per cent of these were spent in Mount Lebanon). Regarding administrative posts, the majority of the functionaries of the administration of Greater Lebanon came from the ancient Mutaṣarrīfīya and replaced the functionaries of the wilaya of Beirut. Last but not least, the coastal cities (Tripoli, Sidon, Beirut, and Tyre) incurred heavy economic losses because their ports had been severed from the Syrian hinterland.\textsuperscript{398}

\textbf{In the textbooks}

Needless to say, that the creation of the country as a separate political entity occupies a prominent position in all of the three narratives. As it has been the case so far, it is still the Christian narrative that covers the topic the most accurately and the most detailed. From here on, Greater Lebanon is often referred to as the waṭan, or the nation, an ambiguous term also designating the whole Arab nation, regardless of its current political borders. The Christian narrative, however, strictly restricts the use of this term to the designation of the Lebanese nation, while in the Sunni and Shiʿi narratives waṭan often occurs in both senses. Apart from this terminological difference, the Christian textbook continues to deliver balanced information on the era by underlining both the French role in the country’s creation through, for instance, citing General Gouraud’s touching proclamation speech, in a positive way, but at the same time it does not forget to mention the annexed territories’ Muslim opposition to the country’s arbitrary borders and their detachment from Syria: “Most of the Christians welcomed the mandate and considered it as a provisional stage that helps to build up the country and establish its independence, while most of the people of the wilayet (especially Muslims) were opposing it and considered it as a forced solution. This opposition decreased but the Muslims participated cautiously in Lebanese politics until the ratification of the National Pact in 1943”\textsuperscript{399}

In the case of discussing the establishment of Grand Liban, the Sunni manual continues to use its reserved narrative restricted to mentioning only what is really necessary. Thereby it designates the French mandatory rule and the country’s new borders as a “forced imposition”, but argues that the attachment of the ‘coast and the four cazas’ only served economic reasons to make the future state economically viable and independent and summarises the solution as: “Lebanon profited from its new situation as a state with human and economic resources. It is also worth mentioning that the mandate and the proclamation of Greater Lebanon were absolutely welcomed by the inhabitants of the Mutaṣarrīfīya, especially the Christians, while it was opposed by the inhabitants of the wilayet, especially the Muslims.”\textsuperscript{400}

\textsuperscript{398} Traboulsi (2007) 81.  
\textsuperscript{399} Christian 34.  
\textsuperscript{400} Sunni 21.
However, the most confusing account on this period is undoubtedly presented in the Shi‘i narrative: While stating that “the Lebanese were happy to get a viable state composed of the restored Mount Lebanon and the cazas, now including crucial agricultural, industrial and touristic regions as well as the ports of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon”, the narrative seems to declare its full support to the Lebanese state. Further remarks such as: In addition of the population’s increase the majority of Mount Lebanon was Druze and Christian while the other religions (Sunni and Shi‘i) returned to play their natural role in the building of Lebanon on the basic principles of truth, justice, and equality” suggesting that the annexed territories had ‘eternal ties’ to Jabal Lubnān that had been cut off in the Ottoman times.

Concerning Lebanon’s new borders and territory, there are significant terminological differences between the three narratives. By referring to Greater Lebanon’s territorial extensions that, as already mentioned, never formed a polity before the country’s 1920 declaration, the Christian textbook consequently denotes them as Lebanon’s “historical territory” that had been “restored”. According to Wild, this wider interpretation of Jabal Lubnān and therefore the claim for a significantly enlarged territory was nevertheless presented as “historical” and was typically coined by Maronites beginning in the 19th century. In contrast, the appellation “the coast and the four cazas” – also used by the numerous congresses calling for the reattachment of the annexed territories to Syria – has deep historical links to the Sunni community’s past. As for the Shi‘i textbook, it avoids using any collective denominations for the attached territories and simply refers to them by their geographic name.

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401 Shi‘i 72.
III.3.3 The Constitution of 1926

As was mentioned before in this paper, the Lebanese Constitution of 1926 – the first Lebanese document of its kind – is of essential importance for the country's legal, constitutional, and political system and still influences a number of aspects in contemporary Lebanon and has a pivotal impact on both local and international politics. Through this document – prescribed by the Mandate Contract - France had given the peoples of her Middle Eastern mandate some Western-style rights and institutions; but on the other hand she failed to grant the country real independence. As Winslow remarks: „One might say that the Constitution of 1926 provided the political machinery for the Lebanese to govern themselves according to French preferences. It would not have worked except that, for many Lebanese, the alternatives were far more dangerous-a smaller Lebanon difficult to defend or a Lebanon dominated by Syrian Arabs."

Even though having experienced a number of modifications since its promulgation in 1926, many of the document's original articles are still in force today. Together with the 1943 unwritten National Pact and the 1990 Ṭāʾīf Accord, it forms Lebanon's government fundament and regulates the country's inter-communitarian relations. Due to this pivotal importance and strong impact, the Constitution bears a prominent place within the different historical narratives and offers numerous possible interpretations.

III.3.3.1 Formal aspects

Christian Textbook

V. Ad-dustūr al-lūbnānī w-našā'at al-Jumhūriya ʿl-Lūbnāniya,
The Lebanese Constitution and the naissance of the Lebanese Republic

1) Žurūf waḍ‘ al-dustūr, Circumstances of the constitution-making the Constitution
2) Niẓām al-ḥukm fl Lūbnān fl daw‘ dustūr sanat 1926, Lebanon's governmental system in the light of the 1926 constitution
3) Ḥayāt ad-dustūr hattā al-istiqlāl fl 1943, The life of the constitution until independence in 1943

Sunni Textbook

V. Naša'at ad-dustūr al-lūbnānī 1926 aw qiyām al-Jumhūriya ʿl-lūbnāniya

The birth of the Lebanese Constitution of 1926 or the emergence of the Lebanese Republic

1) Aẓ-ẓurūf allātī addat ilā waḍ‘ihī (limāḍā wuḍ‘v?)), The circumstances that led to its promulgation (why was it amended?)
2) Kayf tamm waḍ‘hu?, How its promulgation happened?
3) Ḥayāt ad-dustūr bayn at-taḥtīq w-at-ta‘liq, The life of the Constitution between application and suspension
4) Aḥamm bunūd ad-dustūr (dustūr 1926), The most important articles of the constitution (the 1926 Constitution)
5) Niẓām al-ḥukm bi-mūjib ad-dustūr 1926, The governmental system on the basis of the 1926 Constitution
6) At-ta‘dīlāt ad-dustūrīya, Constitutional amendments
7) Dustūr Lūbnān al-jadīd:, Lebanon's new Constitution: (The Document of National Accord)⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰⁴ As an interesting addition, the last subchapter of this section makes mention of the 1990 Ṭāʾīf Agreement (known officially as the Document of National Accord, or waṭīqat al-wifāq al-waṭanī, and referred to as the New Constitution, or
Shi‘i Textbook

IX. Al-jumhūriya ‘l-lubnāniya fi ḟīl al-intidāb al-faransi*

The Lebanese Republic in the shadow of the French mandate

1) Wad‘ ad-dustūr, The making of the Constitution
2) Min bunūd ad-dustūr, From the Constitution’s articles
3) Ta‘dīl ad-dustūr, Modifications of the Constitution

*Further subchapters of this section will be discussed when relevant.

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ad-dustūr al-jadīd in the narrative). Generally, modern – i.e. post 1943 – national history is just simply not part of the Lebanese curriculum, regardless of school type or sectarian affiliation. Thus, by bearing reference to the recent – and highly controversial – event, the Sunni textbook is a rare exception among the available narratives. As for the coverage on the Agreement, it will be discussed later in this section.
III.3.3.2 Promulgation and content

The bloody events of the Syrian revolt erupted in 1925 and the imminence of the League of Nations Mandate Commission drove the French mandatory to grant Lebanon and Syria a constitution, as it was laid down in Article 1 of the Mandate Contract for Syria and Lebanon in 1922. In December 1925, the first civilian High Commissioner, Henri de Jouvenel (1926-29) appointed a parliamentary drafting commission, including Petro Ṭrād, ʿUmar Dāʿūq, Šibl Dammūs and Michel Šīḥā, which was immediately boycotted by majority of Sunni and Shiʿi leaders. Nevertheless, the final version of the constitutional text, adopted on 23 May 1926, renamed Greater Lebanon the Lebanese Republic, defined its flag as the tricolour French flag with the Lebanese cedar in the white strip and adopted French as official language alongside Arabic. Significantly, the Constitution neglected to define Lebanon’s borders, as if to emphasise that they were open to alterations. As for the country’s governmental system, the Representative Council (majlis at-tamṯīliya, Conseil représentatif) – renamed Chamber of Deputies (majlis an-nawāb, Chambre des députés) – was to represent the communities roughly in proportion to their numerical strength; every district elected a number of deputies belonging to the different communities living in it, but every deputy was elected not only by his co-religionists but by the whole electorate of the district. This elective majlis was complemented by a separate and nominated Senate (majlis aš-šuyūḵ, Sénate) representing the 17 official recognised sects and the country’s administrative regions. However, the two chambers were soon merged into a semi-chamber parliament with two-thirds of its members elected, one-third nominated. The Constitution, inspired by the 1875 French and the 1831 Belgian constitutions was a hybrid one: “on a republican body [with strong, French-style presidency], emphasising individual rights and liberties and political and judicial equality were grafted articles concerning communal rights and representation most probably at the initiative of Michel Chiha. Article 95 provided for the (temporary) fair distribution of government and

405 Broken out in 1925 and raging for over two years, insurgencies throughout Syria (mainly in Jabal ad-Durūz, Damascus, Ḥoms, and the south-east of Lebanon) opposing French mandatory presence and the partition of the country was only bloodily put down by the French and resulted the Quai d’Orsay’s more liberal attitude towards the Syrian mandate.

406 Greek Orthodox lawyer, MP, and briefly President of the Republic, Pedro (or Petro) Ṭrād was one of the most prominent pro-French Christian Lebanese politicians of the interbellum era. Cf. Kaufmann (2004) 84.


408 Greek Orthodox representative of the Biqāʿ, head of the drafting committee. Zamir (1988) 205.

409 Offspring of a prominent Greek Catholic Beirut bank dynasty, Michel Chiha was one of Lebanon’s most influential interbellum figures. Beirut’s deputy in the Representative Council and later in the parliament, journalist (owner of the French-language Beirut daily Le Jour and founder of the English-language daily The Eastern Times), philosopher and prominent writer, Chiha is considered to be the main architect of the Constitution. Cf. Zamir (1988) 125; 192; 205, and Kaufmann (2004) 159-60.

410 Hourani (1954) 189.

411 Hourani (1954) 188.

administrative posts (but not of parliamentary seats) among the various sects.”

Implemented into the political sphere, this meant that the relations between the sectarian communities were defined as two constitutionally fixed principles. First, all Lebanese citizens were equal before the law, possessed the same rights and duties, and were equally admissible to all public offices without any restriction or distinction. Secondly, the communities should be equitably represented in public offices and in ministries, in so far as this did not detract from the welfare of the state. The whole political organisation of the state was permeated by these principles, but by the second more than the first. On the other hand, the state relinquished to the religious communities its legislative rights and rulings on personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, adoption, inheritance, etc.) in the name of religious freedom. But most importantly, the Constitution legalised the Mandate, with French control over the country’s foreign and military affairs and public security. The president of the republic was given extensive executive powers, helped by the cabinet whose ministers he had the right to dismiss; yet he was responsible to no one and no institution except the French High Commissioner. Indeed, the High Commissioner, incorporating the mandatory power in person, retained ultimate executive and veto authority in the meantime.

All in all, the Constitution, created as a result of local pressure demanding more independence and rights in the country’s internal affairs, also proved beneficial for the mandatory power, reserving it extensive right, as derived from Article 22 of the Mandate Covenant. Moreover, with its clear provisions of sectarian representation, the document not just legalised political communitarianism, but fixed it as the fundament of the Lebanese State’s architecture. As Hourani remarks, “The maintenance of the balance between the communities was an important and often the most important consideration in the making of appointments in central and local administration alike.”

413 Traboulsi (2007) 90.
414 Article 7: “All the Lebanese are equal before the law. They enjoy equal civil and political rights and are equally subjected to public charges and duties, without any distinction whatever” and article 12: “All Lebanese citizens are equally admitted to all public functions without any other cause for preference except their merit and competence and according to the conditions set by law. A special statute shall govern Civil Servants according to the administrations to which they belong” (cf. Lebanese Constitution)
415 “As a transitory measure and for the sake of even justice and concord, the communities shall be equally represented in public posts and in ministerial composition, without damage to State interest resulting therefrom.” cf. Lebanese Constitution(1926) article 95.
416 “Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to the Almighty, the State respects all creeds and guarantees and protects their free exercise, on condition that they do not interfere with public order. It also guarantees to individuals, whatever their religious allegiance, the respect of their personal status and their religious interests.” Lebanese Constitution (1926) article 9.
418 Hourani (1954) 180.
In the textbooks

Unlike in the case of the previous topics, the three narratives show a surprising accordance in the discussion of the 1926 dustür, its promulgation, significance, and later modifications. As all of the textbooks agree, the Constitution’s promulgation happened in the spirit of Article 20 of the League of Nations Covenant that obliged the mandatory to grant its mandated territories an ‘organic law’, or constitution within three years after the specific mandate contracts came into force. Furthermore, the narratives’ depiction of the country’s new governmental system (dividing the stately apparatus among its legislative, executive, and judiciary functions) inaugurated by the Constitution as well as other details concerning the definition of the nation’s capital, flag, official languages, or the accurate lists of the document’s future suspensions and amendments show little divergence. As a further common feature, the narratives agree that the Constitution, while being a “democratic phenomenon” that created “a republican parliamentary democracy” and as such the “first republic among Arab countries”\(^{419}\), was spoiled by the powers left in the hands of the mandatory\(^{420}\).

However, a considerable number of dissimilarities occur in the narratives, some of which definitely serve as valuable indicators of ideological stance. For instance, while the Christian narrative celebrates the transformation of the former Greater Lebanese State’s “direct mandatory rule” into “national governance”\(^{421}\), the Shiʿi textbook prefers to regard the transition as a missed opportunity to achieve “full independence as aspired by the Lebanese”\(^{422}\). A further detail that is not agreed upon is the impulse that finally made France grant Lebanon a constitution. While according to the Christian narrative, the French authorities’ decision served to calm “forces opposing French policies instigated by the Syrian revolt”, the Sunni narrative describes it as a “reward for their [of the Lebanese] peaceful attitude towards the French during the 1925 Syrian revolt”, and the Shiʿite textbook speaks of a “French imposition to maintain France’s power in the country”.

Overall, it occurs that although the constitution is a topic that allows the hitherto most unanimous description, but at the same time it is still not free from subtle signs of the narratives’ general ideological orientations and biases.

As mentioned before, by discussing later constitutional developments, the Sunni textbook contains a unique addition as at the end of the chapter it consecrates a separate subchapter\(^{423}\) to the Ṭāʾif Agreement that it calls “ad-dustūr al-jadīd”, or the ‘new constitution’ seeking to put an end to political sectarianism by measures such as the abolition of sectarian quotas in the distribution of parliament seats. By linking the country’s first constitutional document with the most recent, the Sunni narrative legitimises the Agreement and also allows a basic document of contemporary importance to occur in the textbook.

\(^{419}\) Cf. Christian 41; Sunni 30.; Shiʿi 80.

\(^{420}\) It is worth mentioning that both the Christian and the Sunni narratives prefer referring to the France as “the mandatory (power)” in all of the cases when it comes to a remark putting negative light on French mandatory policy and powers. However, it remains hard to determine whether such a nuanced distinction is intentional or not.

\(^{421}\) Christian 40.

\(^{422}\) Shiʿi 80.

\(^{423}\) Sunni 31-32.
III.3.4 The Lebanese Republic 1926-1939

III.3.4.1 Formal aspects

Christian Textbook

VI. Al-Jumhūriya ‘l-Lubnāniya (1926-1939) al-ahdāt as-siyāsiya ḫattā ṣidāyat al-ḥarb al-‘alamīya aṭ-ṭanīa

The Lebanese Republic (1926-1939) – political events until the beginning of World War 2

1) Ri’āsat Charles Dabbās, Charles Dabbās’ presidency
2) Ri’āsat Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Sa’īd, Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Sa’īd’s presidency
3) Ri’āsat Imīl Iddīh, Ómīl Eddī’s presidency
4) Mu’āhadat sana 1936 bayn Lubnān w-Faransā, 1936 treaty between Lebanon and France

Sunni Textbook

VI. Aḥdāt Lubnān fi ẓill al-jumhūriya min 1926 ilā 1939

Lebanon’s events in the shadow of the republic from 1926 to 1939

1) Ri’āsat Charles Dabbās, Charles Dabbās’ presidency
2) Ri’āsat Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Sa’īd, Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Sa’īd’s presidency
3) Ri’āsat Imīl Iddīh, Ómīl Eddī’s presidency
4) Mu’āhadat 1936 bayn Lubnān w-Faransā, 1936 treaty between Lebanon and France

Shi‘i Textbook

IX. Al-jumhūriya ‘l-Lubnāniya fi ẓill al-intidāb al-faransī (continued)

The Lebanese Republic in the shadow of the French mandate

4) Al-ḥukm al-waṭanī ba’d il-‘ān ad-dustūr, National governance after the promulgation of the Constitution

4.a) Charles Dabbās (1926-1933)
4.b) Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Sa’īd
4.c) Amīl Idda, Ómīl Eddī

X. Lubnān ‘alā abwāb al-istiqlāl

Lebanon at the gates of independence

1) Mu’āhadat 1936, The 1936 treaty
2) Al-ḥayāt as-siyāsiya fi Lubnān, Political life in Lebanon
3) Al-ḥayāt al-ijtimā‘iyya fi Lubnān, Social life in Lebanon
4) Al-ḥayāt al-iqtiṣādiyya fi Lubnān, Economic life in Lebanon
5) Tawqīm ‘ahd al-intidāb, The calendar of the mandate era

Note difference between the spellings of President Ómīl Eddī’s name in the Christian and Sunni (Imīl Iddīh) and the Shi‘i textbooks (Amīl Idda). Hence, to avoid controversies, the commonly used French transcription of the president’s name is used throughout this paper, as an exception to the transcription guidelines stated to be followed at the beginning of this work.
III.3.4.2 Charles Dabbās’ presidency (September 1926-January 1934)

On May 24, 1926, Lebanon was proclaimed a constitutional republic, however, its first political manoeuvres as such only barely worked; the election of a President at the first joint session of the two freshly created legislative houses proved cumbersome. Finally, Charles Dabbās, a Greek Orthodox, had been elected as a new President, while Auguste Adīb Pasha, himself a Maronite, was appointed the country’s first Prime Minister.

As one of his first actions as president, Dabbās amended some of the Constitution’s articles. In 1927, he abolished the appointed Senate, merging it into the Chamber of Deputies (majlis an-nawāb, Chambre des députés) and renaming it the Representative Assembly (majlis niyābī, Assemblée représentative); a second amendment, in 1929, extended the President’s term from three years to six years but made it non-renewable. President Dabbās, however, whose first term came by appointment, was elected to a second term. From that time, the majlis niyābī was elected on sectarian basis.

Shortly after 1926, a myriad of political parties of various types began to appear on the Lebanese political landscape. Some of these parties, such as Bišāra al-Khūrī’s Constitutional Bloc (al-kutla ad-dustūrīya) and Émile Eddé’s National Bloc (al-kutla al-waṭaniya al-lubnānīya) were political organisations centred on a dominant political figure and committed to supporting the perennial candidates who founded them. Others parties, however, were formed as reactions on purely national issues or followers of existing ideologies. For instance, in order to discipline and rejuvenate Christian youth and develop a sense of solidarity among the Lebanese, Pierre Gemayel (Jumayyil), a Maronite from Bikfayyā, founded the Katā’ib (Phalangist) Party. With the aim of “rebuilding the national character after a millennium of dormancy”, the Katā’ib let itself be inspired by fascist ideologies which were fashionable at the time. As a reaction to the efforts to enforce Christian solidarity, the Sunni Najjāda (Arabic for ‘rescuers’) organization appeared, headed by ʿAdnān al-Ḥakīm. On the other side of the coin, the Lebanese Communist Party (al-ḥizb aš-šuyūʿī al-lubnānī) emerged during this period as did the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (al-ḥizb as-sūrī al-qawmī al-lubnānī) of Anṭūn Saʿda (Antoun Saadé), with its Pan-Syrian doctrines; while Kamāl Junblāṭ, the French-educated chief of the country’s Druze community, organised his Progressive Socialist Party (al-ḥizb at-taqaddumi al-ištirāqī), a party based on ideological, personal and sectarian allegiances. In addition, many Lebanese, both Muslim and Christian, were supporters of one of the Pan-Arab or Greater-Syrian

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425 Although Lebanon’s first President was Greek Orthodox, and its first few Prime Ministers were Maronites, in later years when these offices were reserved to the Maronite and the Sunnis, respectively.


nationalist or unionist groups that were struggling both for independence and the retention of Lebanon as part of Greater Syria.\textsuperscript{429}

The presidency of Dabbās, however, was mostly marked by two crises: the repercussions of the Great Depression of 1929 caused economic and social difficulties and resulted in a number of workers’ strikes due to unemployment and the rise of the cost of living in the ensuing years.\textsuperscript{430} The other crisis was of a political nature: In 1932, Muslims called for an official census of Lebanon, thinking that it would lend substance to Šayḵ Muḥammad al-Jisr’s\textsuperscript{431} candidacy for President. It was al-Jisr’s view, based on extrapolations of the last Ottoman census that a new count would reveal a Muslim majority in the larger Lebanon that the French had created. Because the Ottomans had significantly undercounted the non-Muslims in 1914, the Šeyḵ’s hopes proved to be mistaken. On the other hand, the size of the Muslim community, which the 1932 census revealed, frightened many Christian separatists and also worried the French.\textsuperscript{432} Additionally, to make the point that a Muslim has the right to the post of the head of state, in 1932 al-Jisr submitted his candidature(candidacy for presidency. Řemile Eddé, fearing that he might lose ground to his eternal rival Bişāra al-Ḵūrī, withdrew in favour of Jisr, upon which High Commissioner Auguste-Henri Ponsot (1929-1932), in order to avoid creating such a precedent, suspended the constitution and disbanded the Representative Assembly.\textsuperscript{433}

\textbf{III.3.4.3 Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saad’s presidency (January 1934-January 1936)}

“During the following years, as Winslow remarks, the French were the Constitution of Lebanon, and they were not unhappy to play divide-and-rule while the Lebanese played musical chairs”. To fill the void of the vacant presidency, the High Commission upgraded the office of Secretary of State, making it the key conduit through which they temporarily administered Lebanon. Under the close auspices of the Mandatory, this office was held by members of several sects, both Christian and Muslim.\textsuperscript{434}

Dissatisfied with High Commissioner Henri Ponsot’s demeanour, the Quai d’Orsay replaced him with count Damien de Martel in 1933 authorising him the partial restoration of constitutional life in Lebanon. On January 2, 1934, de Martel published two decrees announcing to accept Dabbās’ resignation from the post of the raʾīs al-jumhūrīya, replacing him with Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saad for a one-year term.\textsuperscript{435} By nominating him, de Martel had sought to

\textsuperscript{429} Winslow (1996) 72-73.
\textsuperscript{430} Traboulsi (2007) 96.
\textsuperscript{431} Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Tripoli’s Sunni leader. Traboulsi (2007) 91.
\textsuperscript{432} Winslow (1996) 64.
\textsuperscript{433} Winslow (1996) 65; 67.
\textsuperscript{434} Traboulsi (2007) 91.
\textsuperscript{435} Winslow (1996) 66.
defuse the political tension fuelled by the rivalry between Eddé’s National and al-Ḵūrī’s Constitutional Blocs by using the 75-year old president – an old functionary from the former Mutaṣarrifīya – as a tool to control the administration. In fact, Saʿd’s appointment added to the political instability, as literally every faction of the political palette campaigned to discredit him and his supporters, portraying him as an old, corrupt politician whose views and methods were shaped by Ottoman-era political practice, therefore unable to address the issues of the modern western-style state, and were thus harmful to both Maronite and Lebanese national interests. Indeed, both the country’s politicians and public opinion regarded as-Saʿd as a French puppet to carry out the High Commissioner’s orders that seemed to prefer the convenience of direct administration. For instance, without consulting the Assembly, de Martel offered the Lebanese a new republican civil code, replacing that of the Ottomans still in force at the time, and ordered parliamentary elections based on a revised electoral law (defining the number of deputies in the majlis niyābī as twenty-five, including seven directly appointed by the High Commissioner). However, the French High Commission attempted steps to gradually move the country back to constitutionalism. The office of President, which at times during this period had been left vacant, was put up for election by the recently reconstituted Chamber. This attempt, by de Martel, led to the election of Emile Eddé by one vote; his rival, Bishāra al-Khūrī, went into opposition.

III.3.4.4 Émile Eddé’s presidency (January 1936-April 1941) and the Franco-Lebanese Treaty of 1936

During the period of the non-constitutional government between 1932 and 1937, the French allowed the Lebanese to return to normal public life in stages, restoring some legislative powers to politicians in 1935. However, although he had been elected President on January 1936, Émile Eddé was unable to form a strong government, so the French continued to rule while making plans for a new stage in Lebanon’s constitutional development.

As a reaction to the region’s turbulent events, seven deputies from al-Ḵūrī’s oppositional Constitutional Bloc addressed a memorandum to High Commissioner de Martel demanding

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436 Zamir (2000) 147-148
439 In line with the insurgencies of the late 1920s, anti-mandate demonstrations in Syria led the French authorities to take steps towards the country’s promised independence. On 24 February 1936 a Franco-Syrian treaty re-established parliamentary life, recognised Syria’s formal independence (but left the Mandatory’s rights to the country’s foreign representation and to the control of its security affairs intact) and backed its admission to the League of Nations. Similarly, the Egyptian nationalist movement reached a treaty with Britain, signed in August of the same year, declaring Egypt’s independence (with restrictions similar to Syria’s conditions), while Palestine was the scene of a
Lebanon’s equal treatment with Syria by the application of the constitution and backing Lebanese ambitions of membership in the League of Nations. As a response, the Quai d’Orsay made plans to conclude a draft treaty with Lebanon, involving new constitutional documents, a full return to parliamentary government, and special rights and privileges for France, similarly to the case with her Syrian mandate in the same year. The concept, modelled on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 through which (in 1932) Iraq became independent and gained membership in the League of Nations, encountered heavy opposition in France, although it was ever finally ratified by the Mandatory. Nevertheless, the Treaty, signed by de Martel and Eddé on 13 November 1936, had been ratified in Lebanon itself and provided it with the essential constitutional structure that governed the independent Republic after 1943. As its text concludes, France recognises Lebanon as an independent state within its 1920 boundaries and undertakes steps to help its admission to the League of Nations. In return, Lebanon guarantees French interests, the continuation of the monetary parity between the two countries, remains France’s ally in the event of war. Ipso facto France is allowed to maintain her military presence (air force and navy) and continues to have her right to use Lebanon’s infrastructure and communication facilities.441 As Winslow summarises: “According to the Franco-Lebanese Treaty, Lebanon was to be sovereign, separate, and closely tied to the French. Though not formally in control of the country, France would have a special status in the “Alliance” and would reserve for itself all the usual privileges - supervision of the armed forces, the currency, and litigation involving foreigners. The French Ambassador was to take precedence over all other diplomats, and the two countries pledged close cooperation in foreign affairs. Pending final ratification by France (which never happened) the French High Commissioner would have remained at his post with his powers unchanged.442

As for Lebanon’s opposition, for them the Treaty, promising a mere ‘alliance of friendship’ and the de facto only formal independence, was a bitter setback with regard to the country’s comparatively good relations with France and created two kinds of interpretations: Christian ‘protectionists’ feared that Lebanon, formally independent from France, would soon be annexed by the also independent, but in every regard more powerful, Syria, while Muslim ‘unionists’ feared that the country’s independence would lead to the legitimisation of the 1920 borders making chances of annexation much slighter.443 As a result, Lebanon’s Muslim-populated peripheral regions were hit by massive waves of demonstrations and strikes which paralysed the country for months in 1936. In March 1936, the Congress of the Coast and the Four Cazas,

large-scale popular uprising, against the British mandate and Jewish immigration, that paralysed the country and led to ongoing clashes between the British Army and local insurgents. Cf. Traboulsi (2007) 97-98.

443 Winslow (1996) 70.
a gathering held by Muslim opponents of Lebanon’s territorial enlargement had called for the re-annexation of these territories to Syria. As a new approach, however, moderate currents, represented by Riyāḍ aṣ-Ṣulḥ⁴⁴⁴ (Riad as-Solh), was accusing the congressmen of ignoring the new realities of the country. As he argued, at the beginning of the mandate, the term Lebanonism was synonymous with Christianity, while ‘unionism’ was inseparable from Islamism. However, after the imposition of the mandate, Christians became increasingly disappointed by France “becoming aware that the great number of economic factors renders their daily life as well as their destinies intimately linked to those of the destinies of the Sons of Syria.”⁴⁴⁵ For aṣ-Ṣulḥ the question of detachment became secondary, rather supporting the emergence of a new Lebanese patriotism that would surpass the detachment/attachment dilemma in favour of a wider vision of Lebanon’s Arab root, but without a merger with Syria.

In September 1937, Emile Eddé – named president for a second term earlier that year – asked a Sunni Muslim, Ḵayr ad-Dīn al-Aḥdab⁴⁴⁶ to form a cabinet. This Sunni Prime Minister set a precedent that was to become an unwritten rule for the future. However, despite Eddé’s changed orientation, the provisions of the 1936 Franco-Lebanese Treaty and rapprochement attempts from Muslim side led by aṣ-Ṣulḥ - regarded to opportunist - convinced many Muslims of a supposed complot between France and Lebanon’s Christians to codify a separate Christian state in the Middle East and left them hostile to the Lebanese State. As Winslow puts it: “By formalising a separate client state, the French had made sure they could always keep one foot in the door; their Christian clients would still need them. Independence might come, but the French would not have to leave.”⁴⁴⁷

In the textbooks

As could have been expected in the case of such a politically interwoven period, the three narratives are especially sensitive indicators to detect sectarian perceptions at this crucial stage of political development and the formation of state structures. To begin with, the presidency and personality of Charles Dabbās is the first controversy that shows no sign of accord. For instance, the Sunni textbook praises him as “famous for integrity and good governance; [and to be] politically moderate and acceptable to all parties and to the French”.⁴⁴⁸ Moreover, his significance as Lebanon’s first ‘constitutional president’ as well as his policies are

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⁴⁴⁴ Coming from a prominent Beiruti Sunni family, Riyāḍ aṣ-Ṣulḥ opened up Sunni dialogue with Christians and advocated for inter-sectarian alliance against the mandate. With his two cousins, Kāẓim and Taqī ad-Dīn, he founded the Republican Party for Independence (ḥizb al-istiqlāl al-jumhūrī), representing a section of the professional middle classes and agitating for the political independence of Syria and Lebanon and their economic unity. Traboulsi (2007) 99.


⁴⁴⁶ Sunni notable from Tripoli, one of the first Muslims to collaborate with the mandate. Traboulsi (2007) 100


⁴⁴⁸ Sunni 33.
acknowledged. Parallel to this tone, the Christian narrative describes him as “educator of the Lebanese” who “defended Lebanese interests and […] not provoked the French”. Moreover, both narratives admire him for commissioning the national anthem, establishing the Beirut National Museum, the elaboration of the Lebanese school system according to the French model, and also positively evaluate the subsequent constitutional amendments that “made stately structures more viable”. In the Shi’ite narrative, Dabbās and his presidency has a completely different image. First of all it is not mentioned at all that he has been appointed for a second term, and his provisions that are attributed so much importance by the other two textbooks are also left out, but adds that “the Lebanese felt betrayed in their aspirations by the French mandate and regarded the president of the state to be a puppet in the hands of the High Commissioner that carries out his policy”. However, the suspension of the constitution is condemned in all narratives, while High Commissioner de Martel is either portrayed as a “moderate, flexible politician”, or as the “actual, authoritarian ruler of Lebanon”. Moreover, the Shi’i narrative also accuses the French mandate and monetary system for the country’s economic difficulties following the 1929 Great Depression.

Concerning Lebanon’s second raʾis al-jumhūrīya, Ḥabīb Bāšā as-Saʿd, the narratives have a surprisingly unanimous verdict, describing him as an honest old bureaucrat serving his waṭan loyally since the time of the Mutaṣarrifiya and balancing well between “French claims and Lebanese rights”. However, the French-style civil code granted to Lebanon in place of the old Ottoman legislation is only welcomed positively by the Sunni and Christian narratives; the Shi’ite one regards it to be “violation of the country’s traditions and customs”.

Another major point of confusion is al-Jisr’s presidential candidacy. While the Sunni textbook argues that al-Jisr enjoyed the support of the majority of the Majlis’ members, the Christian version states that although he was a moderate and respected politician who had been supported and “financed by some of the Majlis members”, the Maronites “rightful demand for a Maronite president of the republic” had to have priority. As for the Shi’ite textbook, this “constitutional crisis” is displayed as a Sunni-Maronite power struggle not having much relevance and only resulting in anther unjust French step that put an end to Lebanon’s
“imaginary independence” and once again highlighted the French mandate’s “colonial nature”, namely the suspension of the constitution.

Concerning Émile Eddé’s presidency, the textbooks provide nothing but a few details on it with certain common points that agreed upon. For instance, although he was a prominent Maronite politician, even the Christian textbook acknowledges that Eddé, as a reliable ally of the French since his Egyptian exile during the World War I, was serving mandatory interests rather than those of the Lebanese. Moreover, the most important event of his presidency, the signing of the 1936 Franco-Lebanese treaty is also welcomed with much skepticism from all sides. For instance, while the Shi’ite narrative evaluates the accord as an “imperialist diktat” in order to “prolong French colonial rule” with a “lie of independence”. Even though the other two narratives are not attacking the accord with such hard words, both criticize its provisions to keep up French military bases, a French high representative and other political and military privileges in Lebanon.

Hence, as we see, this period of Lebanese history is very prone to inspire different approaches of crucial historical issues affecting the country’s independence, relation to France, identity and inter-sectarian struggle. Consequently, the provided narratives are full of differences, contradictions, and altering focal points that make free way to dissimilar historical perceptions and concepts of the country and its alienated communities.
III.3.5 Achieving independence (1939-1943)

Lebanon’s formal independence from France came over a period of time and through a series of cumbersome events. From the Allied proclamation of June 1941, the arrest and release of the government in November 1943, and the protracted diplomacy that rid the country of French forces in 1946, the Lebanese demonstrated surprising talents in pressing their case before the world. They demonstrated both a degree of tenacity and an ability to finesse their way through one of the most difficult periods of international politics as well as the inferno of World War II that affected the country directly not just through the turbulence of France’s metropolitan politics, but also through the raging of direct military operations. This period also witnessed a before and later inexperienced cooperation between the leading elite of the country’s at the time two major sects, the Maronites and the Sunnis, and made the birth of a second fundamental document, the National Pact, possible. Finally, Lebanon’s independence could only be reached with British assistance and with the opposition of the French, regardless of the actual régime (Vichy or Free French) in France. Yet achieving independence – through strikes and protests, inter-communal solidarity, and the Christian opposition of the French – is an ideal framework for forging a myth of the country’s genesis. As later event proved, it was easier to oppose the French than to establish Lebanon. Thus, with British assistance, the Lebanese had removed the French, inherited the façade of a democratic republic with elected parliament, and averted the faith to be integrated into metropolitan France like, for instance, Algeria.

NB: As it will be clear from the tables of contest, all three narratives put considerable emphasis on the display of this period. In comparison with the rest of the contents, the World War II and its direct impacts on Lebanon as well as the country’s struggle for independence is the best-covered era in the textbooks, both in terms of proportional quantity and detailed display of events. Moreover, the three narratives provide extensive information not just on political and military events but also on the country’s socio-economical state and (d)evolution during the war years. Surprisingly, these accounts are roughly corresponding with each other, consequently, they does not require a detailed and in-depth analysis. Instead, this final part concentrates on some crucial details having an inevitable role on the perception of the complete historic period in particular and in that of Lebanon in general, viz., the last years of the French rule, the country’s independence, and the National Pact. Hence, this section, after giving a general outline of the period as usual, will only examine these factors in order to provide a more general overview and to avoid a rather unnecessary study of detailed events.
III.3.5.1 Formal aspects

Christian Textbook

VII. Lubnān fī ‘l-ḥarb al-ʿālamiyah at-ṭāniyah, Lebanon in the Second World War

1) al-awdā‘ fī Lubnān qabla suqūṭ Faransā, Circumstances in Lebanon before France’s fall
2) Lubnān fī ‘ahd ḥuḳumat Vichy, Lebanon in the Vichy-era

VIII. Al-ḥulafā‘ fī Lubnān w-Sūriyā (tammūz 1941), The Allies in Lebanon and Syria (July 1941)

1) ẓurūf w-ḥašibāb ʿiḥtīlāl al-ḥulafā‘ Lubnān w-Sūriyā ‘ām 1941, Circumstances and reasons for Lebanon’s and Syria’s Allied occupation in 1941
2) Sayr al-ḥarb: mahāwir al-ḥujūm, The course of the war: the pivot of attacks
3) Mawqīf al-lubnānīyīn wa-dōr raʾīs Naqqāš, The position of the Lebanese and the role of President Naqqāš (Naccache)
4) Nihāyat al-ḥarb w-ittifāqīyat ʿAkkā, The end of the War and the Acre Agreement
5) Mawqīf kull min al-inklīz w-al-faransīyīn al-ḥrār baʿd ittifāqīyat ʿAkkā, British and Free French positions after the Acre Agreement
6) Al-ṣayf w-ad-dūkhīl al-ḥulafā‘ Lubnān ẓayf 1941, Economic situation after the Allied invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1941.

IX. Al-istiqlāl al-lubnānī (1941-1943), The Lebanese independence (1941-1943)

1) Catroux yaʿlūn istiqlāl Lubnān fī 26 tišrīn aṯ-ṭāni 1941, Catroux proclaims Lebanon’s independence on 26 September, 1941
2) Mawqīf al-lubnānīyīn w-al-ḥayāt ad-dustūriyah, The position of the Lebanese and the claim for the return of the constitutional life.
3) ‘Awdat al-ḥayāt ad-dustūriyah w-intīkābāt an-niyābiyah w-ar-ruʿāsiyah, The return of the constitutional life and the parliamentary and presidential elections.
5) Taʿdīl ad-dustūr fl 8 tišrīn aṯ-ṭāni 1943 w-mawqīf al-faransīyūn, Amendment of the constitution on 8 September, 1943, and the position of the French
6) Raddat faʿl al-lubnānīyīn aš-ṣaʿbiyah w-ar-rasmiyah w-mawāqif ad-duwal, The popular and official reaction of the Lebanese and the states’ positions.
7) Ḥall al-azma w-awdat al-muʿtaqalīn, The solution of the crisis and the return of the detainees.

X. Istilām al-maṣāliḥ w-taḥqīq al-jilā‘ al-ʿaskari, The takeover of the administration and achieving the withdrawal of military forces

1) Qaḍīyah al-maṣāliḥ, The case of the administration
2) Al-faransīyūn yuḥāwilūn al-ḥusūl ‘alā markaz muṁtāz, The French try the obtainment of privileged positions
3) ‘Lubnān yatasallam al-jayysh, Lebanon gets the army.

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Sunni Textbook

VII. Lubnān fī ʿl-ḥarb al-ʿalāmiya aṭ-ṭānîya,  
Lebanon in the Second World War

1) al-wadʿ as-siyāsi fī Lubnān ‘and bidāyat al-ḥarb al-ʿalāmiya aṭ-ṭānîya (min aylūl 1939 ḥattā ḥazīrān 1940), Political situation in Lebanon at the beginning of the World War II (September 1939-June 1940)
2) al-wadʿ al-iqtīsādi fī maṭlaʿ al-ḥarb, The economic situation at the outbreak of the War.
3) waḍʿ Lubnān as-siyāsi baʿd suqūṭ Faransā bi-yad al-almān (fī ʿahd ḥukūmat Vichy min ḥazīrān 1940 ilā ḥazīrān 1941), Lebanon’s political situation after France’s fall in the hands of the Germans (in the era of the Vichy-government from June 1940 until June 1941)
4) al-wadʿ al-iqtiṣādī fī Lubnān fī ʿahd al-Fīṣiyin, The economic situation in Lebanon in the era of the Vichyists

VIII. Duṭḵul al-ḥulafāʾ ilā Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿalāmiya aṭ-ṭānîya  
Allied invasion of Lebanon during the World War II

1) Fī 8 ḥazīrān 1941 wajjah al-ḥulafāʾ (al-inklīz w-al-faranṣiyūn w-al-ahrār) ḥamla ʿaskariyya li-ʾl-ḥilal Lubnān w-Sūriyā, On July 8, 1941 the Allied (the English and the Free French) head a military operation to occupy Lebanon and Syria
2) Sayr al-ḥarb, The course of the war
3) Mawqif al-lubnānīnyin min al-maʿārikī, The share of the Lebanese from the battles
4) Nihāyat al-ḥarb w-wittifāqiyyat ‘Akkā, The end of the war and the Acre Agreement
5) as-širāʿ bayn al-faranṣiyīn w-al-inklīz, The conflict between the French and the English

IX. Duṭḵul al-ḥulafāʾ ilā Lubnān ḵilāl al-ḥarb al-ʿalāmiya aṭ-ṭānîya  
Allied invasion of Lebanon during the World War II

1) Awdāʿ fī Lubnān as-siyāsiyya fī zill al-ḥulafāʾ min sayf 1941 ḥattā ḵarif 1943, Political circumstances in Lebanon in the shadow of the Allies from the summer of 1941 until the autumn of 1943
2) Intiqāl sulṭāt al-intīdāb fī Lubnān ilā ṭ-l-faranṣiyīn al-ahrār, The transfer of the mandate power in Lebanon to the Free French
3) Istiqlāl Catroux fī 26 tišrīn aṭ-ṭānîy 1941, Cartoux’s independence on 26 October 1941
4) Makāsib Lubnān min istiqlāl Catroux, Lebanon’s profits from Cartoux’s independence
5) Al-azma bayn Naqqāš wa Catroux w ʿawdat al-ḥayāt ad-dustūrīyya, The crisis between Naqqāš and Catroux and the return of the constitutional life

X. Taḥqiq al-istiqlāl  
The fulfilment of the independence

1) Taʿlīf ḥukūmat al-istiqlāl, The composition of the independence-government
2) Taḥqiq as-siyāsī aṭ-istiqlālīyya, The implementation of the independence-policy
3) Raddat al-faʿl al-faranṣiya, The French reaction
4) Raddat al-faʿl al-lubnānīya ‘alā taṣṣarraf al-faranṣiyīn, The Lebanese reaction to the behaviour of the French

XI. Maʿrakat al-jilāʾ al-iqtiṣādī w-al-ʿaskarī  
The battle for economic and military withdrawal

1) Al-jilāʾ ʿan al-maṣāliḥ al-iqtiṣādīyya, The evacuation of economic interests
2) Tasallam al-jayš al-lubnānī, The set up of the Lebanese Army
3) Taḥqiq al-jilāʾ al-ʿaskarī, The fulfilment of the military withdrawal

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### XI. Lebanon and the Second World War

1. Masīrat al-ḥarb al-ʿālamīya ʿāt-ṭānīya, *The course of the World War II*
2. Lubnān fī iṭār ḥukūmat Vichy, *Lebanon in the cadre of the Vichy government*
3. An-nufūḍ al-almānī fī ʿš-šarq, *German influence in the East*
4. Al-ḥulafāʾ fi Sūrīya wa Lubnān, *The Allied in Syria and Lebanon*
5. Marāḥil al-istiqlāl, *The stages of independence*

### XII. Maʿrakat istiqlāl Lubnān

**The battle Lebanon’s independence**

1. Ḥukūmat al-istiqlāl al-awwal, *The first government of independence*
2. Al-azma maʿ al-intidāb, *The crisis with the independence*
3. Taʿdīl ad-dustūr, *The amendment of the constitution*
5. al-mawāqif aš-šaʿbīya w-ar-rasmīya, *The popular and the official positions*
6. At-tārāj uʿ al-faransi w-al-istiqlāl, *The French withdrawal and the independence*

### XIII. Lebanon and the battle for withdrawal

**Lebanon and the battle for withdrawal**

1. Al-muṭālaba yatasallam al-maṣāliḥ al-ḥaywīya, *The claim recognises the vital interests*
2. Al-muṭālaba bi-ʿl-jilāʾ al-ajnābī ʿan Lubnān, *The claim for foreign withdrawal from Lebanon*
3. Taškīl nawāt al-jayš al-lubnānī, *The formation of the core of the Lebanese army*
4. Šakwā Lubnān ilā hay’a al-umam, *Lebanon’s protest at the League of Nations*
III.3.5.2 World War II and its impacts on Lebanon

During the last few years of renewed constitutional life, protest died down as war loomed again in Europe. The eruption of World War II created and matured the conditions for Lebanon to obtain its full independence from France. In 1940, France collapsed under German occupation leaving the pro-Nazi Vichy-regime in charge in what was left of France and her oversee territories, thus also in Lebanon. In 1939, High Commissioner Gabriel Puaux declared the state of emergency and suspended the Lebanese Constitution. However, he was soon forced to leave for France, and eventually the office was placed in the hands of General Henri Dentz. In 1941 Free French and British troops attacked from three directions and overthrew the pro-Vichy mandatory administration in Syria and Lebanon. General de Gaulle was increasingly apprehensive that Britain’s intentions were motivated by the “preconceived idea of evicting” France from the entire region. He nominated Georges Catroux as delegate of Free France in Syria and Lebanon, who declared the independence of these countries and invited their respective governments to sign a new treaty with France to terminate the mandate. This initiative found, however, little sympathy within Lebanon: Constitutionalists, independentists, and even the Maronite Church stood up against “that illusory and incomplete independence”, calling for new elections and the complete transfer of power to the Lebanese, including the election of a new president. Thus, the French authorities’ refusal was little surprising, and although Catroux confirmed Alfred Naqqāš as new president, he continued to rule the country as an “all-powerful high commissioner” declaring that war conditions made impossible to exercise full independence.

III.3.5.3 The way to independence

Gradually, the Middle East became more and more involved in military operations making its countries directly affected by the World War and its consequences. To begin with, Lebanon’s financial elite accumulated huge profits through these war conditions establishing strong links with Anglo-Saxon and Arab Gulf-state markets. As a result, the desire grew to seize control over the French Intérêts communs and to liberate the country from the constraints and restrictions of the weak and closed French monetary zone, which Lebanon had been tied to.
since the beginning of the mandate. On the other hand, with a regional military HQ in Cairo controlling the regions transport, economy, agriculture, and finally, politics, Great Britain became indisputably the Middle East’s first and almost sole power. Thus, in the meanwhile it was Cairo where, and the British by whom Lebanon’s independence was negotiated. In June 1942, General Edward Spears, commander of the British army in the Orient, organised a meeting between Bishara al-Kuri and the Syrian nationalist leader Jamil Mardam who agreed on the return to constitutional life and integral independence of their countries, and refused to grant any privileges for France after independence. As Traboulsi remarks, “Kuri was thereby recognised by the Syrian nationalists as the representative of the majority of the Lebanese Christians and Muslims.” Obviously, this British-brokered deal found little sympathy among the French, who had no other choice then to give their grudging agreement to this policy. However, Lebanon’s return to constitutional life was not implemented until late 1942. Instead, after the resignation of President Naqqash, the French appointed Ayyub Tabit, a Protestant politician from Eddé’s National Bloc, to form an interim government strictly supervised by French ‘advisors’. In order to reform the electoral law, Tabit decreed a ratio of 32 Christian to 22 Muslim seats in the parliament and granted emigrants still holding Lebanese nationality (mostly Christians) the right to vote. The provisions were – to little surprise – rejected by Muslim politicians forcing Tabit to abdicate and to be replaced by the prominent Greek Orthodox lawyer and former member of the 1925 constitutional drafting committee, Petro Trad who declared a more moderate version of the draft bill (modifying the parliamentary quota to 30/25, and dropping emigrants’ voting right).

Under General Spears’ pressure, the French allowed elections to be held in 1943, resulting in the net victory of Bishara al-Kuri’s Constitutional Bloc. On 21 September, al-Kuri was elected president of the republic by the Assembly and immediately offered as-Sulh to the new cabinet. This government presented notes to the Free French Delegate General Jean Helleu, requesting changes in the constitutional amendments that would, in a word, award independence to the country and transform the French presence into “what would be appropriate for an embassy”. The Maronite President and the Sunni Prime Minister declared themselves to be elected to lead an independent government and a sovereign state. Lebanon’s and the new government’s sovereignty was right away recognised by Syrian PM Jamil Mardan. In return “Lebanon made the commitment that its territory would not be used as a base or passageway for any foreign force that endangers Syria’s independence or security” and promised close economic and social collaboration between the two countries. Subsequently, the new government demanded

466 Winslow (1996) 80.
467 According to Traboulsi, this quota of 6/5 remained the ratio for Christian-Muslim power-sharing until 1990, when it was replaced by parity according to the Tá’íf Agreement. Traboulsi (2007) 106.
468 Described as a weak career diplomat by his contemporaries, Helleu had been serving the High Commissariat under Poncet. Appointed to be Catroux’s successor as the plenipotentiary of the Free France in the Levant, later he had been removed from this position on the request of the British War cabinet. Hourani (1954) 287-288.
the full transfer of powers to the Lebanese authorities from the Free French. But as France wanted a new treaty to guarantee her privileged economical, military, and cultural position, Helleu refused the Lebanese demand by declaring that the mandate is only to be terminated by a new treaty, regardless of previous documents promising independence.

III.3.5.4 Independence

As a reaction, the Lebanese Assembly passed a series of constitutional amendments in November 1943 in order to obliterate the French mandatory as the only source of political power and jurisdiction, reinstate Arabic as the country’s sole official language, and adopt a new design of the national flag. Subsequently, the French Delegate-General Helleu declared the amendments null and void, declaring them unilateral and as such illegal. On 11 November, PM al-Ḳūrī and some members of his cabinet had been arrested and incarcerated in the ar-Rāşayā fort in the Southern Biqāʿ. Émile Eddé was appointed his successor but had been boycotted by the entire Lebanese political class. A general strike paralyzed the country, and the organized resistance was nearly unanimous. The Christian Katāʿib and the Muslim Najjāda cooperated in leading the opposition to the French action. Pressed by the British, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the event completely isolated France. After Winston Churchill’s personal intervention at de Gaulle and Spears’s ultimatum to the Free French, General Catroux was sent back to Beirut to replace Helleu. Once there, he immediately released President al-Ḳūrī and his colleagues and proclaimed the end of the French mandate over the country on 22 November 1943. All in all, Lebanon’s independence is largely the product of British intervention and opposition of France’s policies seeking to preserve its unlimited power in the region that she had been regarding as a natural French sphere of influence.471

If there is one point in Lebanese history that is more or less agreed upon, then it is the celebration of the country’s independence. Even though this ‘joy’ is not always shared for the same reason by every sect, Lebanese independence is displayed to be a common achievement of the Lebanese, a national success that opened the way for a sovereign republic, membership in international organisations such as the UN and the Arab League and without foreign tutelage or military occupation. More surprisingly, the stages how this success had been realised are also not entirely different. Needless to say the usual rhetoric typical for each narrative is still prevailing, it is solely the result and its evaluation that shows an unusual harmony.

As for the Sunni and Christian narratives, they

III.3.5.5 Constitutional amendments

In order to fit the needs of an independent republic, the country’s 1926 Constitution experienced major amendments following the proclamation of Lebanese independence in 1943. These modifications, however, did little more than scratching the surface of the already existing system. By leaving the articles 9472, 10 and 95 – the pillars of the country’s political sectarianism – virtually untouched they could only barely conceal the Maronites’ political

472 Article 9 on Conscience and Belief; Article 10 on Education and Confessional Schools; Article 95 on National Committee. Lebanese Constitution (1926).
The primacy. “While it establishes the judicial, civic and political equality of all Lebanese as citizens, it institutionalises their judicial and political inequality as subjects belonging to hierarchised religious communities with unequal access to political power and public office.”\textsuperscript{473} Moreover, the French-style presidency – reserved as a Maronite domain – remained literally unaccountable making its bearer to an uncontested head of the executive. Hence, major modifications only affected articles concerning the former mandatory and its privileges; these had been, similarly to the constitutions of other former mandated countries, most notably that of Syria, abolishing every reference to it. “Essentially all that was done, as Winslow argues, was to remove the governmental mechanism France had created from French hands and place it in the hands of the Lebanese. The colonial apparatus was in native hands, but it was still a colonial apparatus.”\textsuperscript{474}

III.3.5.6 The National Pact

Besides the formal written Constitution, it is an unwritten verbal agreement, the National Pact, which serves as Lebanon’s other founding text. As it has been already mentioned in this paper, the National Pact is of pivotal importance for Lebanon’s stately structure, sectarian power-sharing system, and identity. Alone its authors are symbolic figures embodying the two main forces of the nascent republic: Riyāḍ aṣ-Ṣulḥ, independent Lebanon’s first Prime Minister representing the class of traditional Sunni notables from the coast’s urban centres, and Bišāra al-Ḵūrī, the country’s first post-independence President First, personifying a new, less Francophil Maronite bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{475}

By confirming the 6/5 power-sharing formula of the Constitution’s amended Article 95, the National Pact provisioned not just the distribution of administrative and political, but also Grade One posts according this ratio. In case of the latter, it reserves the presidency for the Maronites, the post of the Prime Minister to the Sunni and the post of the Speaker of the parliament to a Shiʿi. Second, the pact contains clear provisions of the country’s long disputed identity, defined Lebanon as “country with Arab face”, and delineated its relations and obligations vis-à-vis the outside world. As for Lebanon’s “Arab face”, this unique formulation was the result of a Christian-Muslim compromise replacing Muslims demands for unification with Syria feared by Christians on the one hand, and the country’s Christian imposed Western protection and orientation criticised by Muslims on the other hand. And lastly, the agreement’s power-sharing principle implied virtual partnership between the Muslim and Christian political elite and secured better Muslim participation in state functions and decision-making in general. Through the 6/5 formula, Muslims were, at least theoretically, awarded equal access of the state’s apparatus, especially in regard to traditional and historically accumulated privileges. However, these conciliatory provisions that aimed to create a viable system without reconstructing the state’s existing fundaments were not incorporated into the amended constitution of 1943.\textsuperscript{476}

\textsuperscript{474} Winslow (1996) 85.
\textsuperscript{475} Corm (2005) 96-97.
III.3.5.7 Aftermath

Although formally independent, Lebanon’s problems with France continued. After the country had been liberated American and British forces, France insisted to regulate her relations with the former mandates through new bilateral treaties and to regain some of her lost privileges. The Lebanese, unwilling to do so, received unexpected support from the side of the USA that recognised the country’s full independence on 19 September 1945. Subsequently, Britain expressed its backing for the Syrian proposal to evacuate Allied troops from Syria and Lebanon. As an answer, France bombarded parts of Damascus in May 1945 and sent supplementary forces into the region. The British protested heavily and immediately ordered the French to evacuate their bases. On 13 December 1945, an US-brokered compromise declared the withdrawal of French and British troops from the two Levantine countries. On 31 December 1946, the last foreign soldier departed from Lebanon.⁴⁷⁷

In line with the country’s commitment to its Arab identity proclaimed in the National Pact, Lebanon needed reorientation in a post-colonial and post-war era. In order to avoid submersion in one of the proposed Arab unity plans, Lebanon enthusiastically became one of the founding member of the Arab League, taking part in the drafting of the league’s charter known as the Alexandria Protocol.⁴⁷⁸

III.3.5.8 In the textbooks

The French

As we saw in the introductory section, the French played a very ambivalent role in this period of Lebanese history. Consequently, the textbooks reflect this role in different ways. As it has been the case so far, the Christian narrative offers the most nuanced picture of the French. To begin with, it provides a deep insight into historical circumstances including detailed information on France's military defeat from Nazi Germany, the occupation, the Vichy-government, the résistance, de Gaulle’s Free French as well the military events in the Middle East, the Anglo-French power-struggle, and French military and economic interests to keep her influence vivid in the region. However, despite the detailed display of the French policy’s background that allows the expression of pro-French (but certainly not anti-French) attitude at a certain degree, the period’s further, Lebanon-specific events leave no doubt about the narrative’s real allegiance. In these cases, the French policy is no longer enjoying any privileged attention or attitude, but is severely criticised for hindering Lebanese independence and exploiting its mandatory power. For instance, even though Catroux’s declaration of independence is neither condemned nor commented enthusiastically, it is described as the “first step towards real independence”, in contrary to its Shiʿite description as “political lie to maintain

⁴⁷⁸ According to Traboulsi, “during the session, at the initiative of the Syrian delegation, a special clause was introduced to the protocol calling upon all the Arab states to respect Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty in its current borders. In 1945, the Alexandria Protocol was to be signed and a decision taken on the federal union project presented by Egypt. Kūrī and his advisers were afraid that as-Ṣulḥ might commit Lebanon to it. […] Henri Pharaon [Faraʿūn], named minister of foreign affairs, threw all his weight into transforming the Arab League from a federal structure into a guardian of the existing Arab entities.” Traboulsi (2007) 112.
their [the French policymakers’] imperialist rule”. Overall, the Christian narrative seems to offer a balanced view of the French and their wartime policy by avoiding black-and-white comments and pointing out the little positive that can be attributed to it. On the other hand, the narrative is definitely allowing opposing comments and partially severe critique.

As for the Sunni textbook, it shows much similarity with the Christian narrative and seeks to offer the same balanced view of events. However, there is a remarkable difference in the perception of the French: their image here is more black-and-white, the amount and dept of background information concerning French metropolitan politics and wartime events are significantly smaller, and unveiled pro-Lebanese tone makes balancing less successful than it is in the case of the Christian narrative. Consequently, the general French image is noticeably more negative and more biased.

As expected, the Shi’ite narrative has a considerably different approach. Representing an opponent attitude to the French mandate, the textbook’s relevant chapters directly speak of “unveiled French military occupation”, “economic exploitation”, and “illegal tyranny”. Consequently, a balanced French image is completely absent, just like background information on French military and political circumstances. French are only referred to in negative terms, as tyrants, occupiers, colonialists, and more or less all of their contribution to this period of Lebanese history are sharply condemned and severely criticised. Besides especially harsh attacks against French policies regarding Lebanon, the Shi’ite narrative has literally no additional or positive remarks on the French.

All in all, the French do not have positive image in any of the textbooks. This rather negative image, however, has different forms and degrees of negativity depending on the basic sectarian allegiance of the narrative. Given the fact that the French, French presence and influence are inevitable components in the formation of historical perceptions, their image is also an exceptionally important one.

The National Pact

Even though not being a written document, the National Pact is still of fundamental importance for the power structure of the Lebanese State both in historical and in contemporaneous terms. However, despite of this significance, it is differently reflected in the three narratives. To begin with, the Sunni narrative describes the National Pact as compromise for Christian Muslim coexistence and lists its most important provisions concerning Lebanon’s identity as ‘part of the Arab World’ and a country with ‘Arab face’. However, it criticises the maintenance and corroboration of political sectarianism describing it as an obstacle for the country’s political development and security⁴⁷⁹ (however, without mentioning the later Civil War).

Similarly to the Sunni narrative, the Christian version also describes the pact as a compromise between Christians “demanding European guaranty” and Muslims seeking the “attachment to the Arab World”, adding that this pact was necessary to maintain the peace and prosperity of the country. It also states that Lebanon is “part of the Arab World” but at the same

⁴⁷⁹ Sunni 52.
time “has strong ties to the Western culture and civilisation”, and addition not emphasised in the Sunni narrative.

As for the Shiʿite textbook, surprisingly, while it mentions some elements from the Pact including the country’s Arab identity, it refers to the agreement as “some of the principles of the ministerial statement” and omits the term National Pact. Moreover, it attributes provision to this ‘ministerial statement’ that were never included in the original agreement, namely that “the government of independence agreed that the country is not willing to be a colony anymore, but a free and independent state”⁴⁸⁰. Hence, this narrative makes no mention on other provisions such as the Christian-Muslim power sharing and compromise.

**Independence**

Unlike in the case of the National Pact, Lebanon’s way to independence has a surprisingly similar coverage in the three textbooks. As it is to be expected, the hitherto used rhetoric is still prevailing, for instance, the Shiʿi narrative still labels many French political and military moves as ‘colonial’ or ‘imperialist’, while its Christian counterpart still seems to avoid too harsh comments on the mandatory power’s policy, although it condemns it often. As for the ‘protagonists’ of the independence movement, Riyāḍ aṣ-Ṣulḥ (Sunni Muslim) and Bišāra al-Ḵūrī (Maronite Christian), it is interesting to mention that while the Sunni narrative celebrates the former as “the father of Lebanese independence”⁴⁸¹, the Maronite version argues that it was the latter one having the most crucial role in its achievement. It is also worth mentioning that with the exception of the Shiʿite textbook, the narratives are putting much attention not solely on the country’s political, but also on its economic and military independence from France, emphasising, e.g. the vital role the Intérêts communs were playing Lebanon’s de facto autonomy on every level. Hence, it is maybe appropriate to remark that these two textbooks.

All things considered, the notions of Lebanese independence in the three narratives have very similar narrative operatives in terms of content and coverage: at the first sight, these features would suggest the existence of a more or less unitary concept about this crucial event that is not affected by sectarian biasing. However, there are a number of factors that still prevent the emergence of a notion free of sectarian perceptions. For instance, the aforementioned prevalence of specific rhetoric allows certain events to be viewed from the relevant narrative’s sectarian perspective. Moreover, linguistic tools emphasising the sectarian divide (e.g. Christian textbook’s baladnā, or ‘our country’ vs. Shiʿite al-balad, or ‘the country’ for referring to Lebanon), as well as major differences between the emphasis on certain topics or events are all hindering the possibility of a similar or harmonious perception of the period and the country as a whole.

⁴⁸⁰ Shiʿi 108.

⁴⁸¹ Sunni 47.
In April 2010, Al Jazeera’s Documentary Channel was the first Arab-language television channel to air Lebanese filmmaker Hady Zaccak’s (Hādī Zakkāk) award-winning documentary “Darsun fi ‘t-tārīkh” (A History Lesson), examining the consequences of differing historical perceptions, national/sectarian identities, allegiances and the way these are shaped through the complexity of contemporary Lebanese history education. As he revealed, deep sectarian divisions and continual disagreements between political factions over the tumultuous series of events that have characterised Lebanon’s more recent history, are still resulting in alternating concepts of the country and its different sects. As the director remarks at the end: “They all [the interviewed students] believe in Lebanon, but the concept of Lebanon differs. It becomes more, for example, a Muslim or a Christian Lebanon first, and then ‘the Lebanon.”

In line with Zaccak’s documentary, this he analysis aimed to reveal that even a crucial historical period that is not only the last one to be covered by the majority of currently available history textbooks, but also the last that is more or less agreed upon by the major sects, conceals various forms of obvious and hidden alienations that still make a large contribution to the maintenance of sectarian differentiation:

**Geographical alienation**

As it has been mentioned before, a country’s territorial evolution poses a number of dilemmas for historical narratives. These dilemmas include the representation of annexed territories vs. the motherland, that of the peripheral regions vs. the country’s core regions10, as well as centralised vs. decentralised narratives. In the case of the Christian and Sunni textbooks, the country’s modern history is overwhelmingly coined by the Maronite community with its core region in the northern part of the Mount Lebanon range. These factors result in the overrepresentation of the coastal cities, par excellence Beirut, and the Lebanese Mount in general. To counter this historical focus, the ‘peripheral’ Shi‘ite community has produced their own regional narrative propagating a Shi‘ite version of Lebanese history with a reduced reference to Mount Lebanon, but with much attention to the Shi‘ite-dominated southern Jabal ʿAmil region. This form of alimentation is an effective tool to undermine a unitary concept of the country as a whole and to strengthen regional (and thus sectarian) allegiances.

**Communitarian alienation**

In line with its geographical counterpart, communitarian alienation is also a major tool of identity making, as besides geography, religious and ethnic communities are the environments or backgrounds an individual the most likely to be attached to. Throughout history, religion, culture, and language were the most successful motors of social segregation, often resulting in various forms of conflicts. Consequently, communitarian alienation is often inevitably linked with geographical alienation. In the case of Lebanon, sectarianism – a form of communitarianism based on religious segregation – is not just a social dividing principle, but through consequent constitutional legalisation in the past, it is also a basic pillar of the current

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482 Zaccak (2009)
political system. Accordingly, textbooks are also seldom free from communitarian
distinguishing including the sectarian labelling of historic figures, narrative on sectarian
history. Consequently, this form of alienation contributes to the maintenance of existing
sectarian dividing lines and prevents the forging of a Lebanese identity loyal to the country and
not only to a single community.

National alienation

Parallel to communitarian alienations, the narratives also tend to put a large emphasis on
the distinction of Lebanon from its Arab environment. Historically, Lebanon’s raison d’être was
its (Christian emphasised and sectarian motivated) particularity from its Muslim-majority
environment and opposition to be the part of it. The most prominent example to illustrate such
divergences is the term watan. While in traditional context (and thus used in the Muslim-
affiliated textbooks), the term refers to the Arab nation as a whole ‘from the Atlantic to the
Indian Ocean’, while (the generally Christian-preferred) watan can also designate a particular
nation, in this case, the ‘Lebanese nation’, particular due to its exposure to Western influences
and role as carrefour of civilisations. Consequently, Lebanon’s Arab identity remains a
prominent and highly controversial issue and as such, gives much space to both ‘self-alienation’
(‘Lebanese as a distinct nationality’483) and segregative forms (‘Lebanese vs. Arabs’). The latter
form is especially true for the narratives’ relation with Syria, as it is constantly referred to as a
different country with different people and different history.

As these forms of alienation show, Lebanon’s communities still see the country’s history
through different glasses. The image what they get is considered to be true, and truth is
considered to be indisputable in a country that witnessed so much inter-sectarian tensions and
clashes. Moreover, the emerging image is seemingly not free from intentional
absentmindedness and marginalisation of certain crucial events. Consequently, national
identity in Lebanon remains a litigious issue across many spheres of society with in the most
cases still sectarian motivated competing memories of “what we were.” In such a context,
history textbooks work to forge memories of events and perceptions of the while at the same
time they create a new consciousness to serve as a major pillar of identity. Accordingly,
textbooks are rather tools of identity making than sources of historical knowledge. Hence,
narratives are not simply mirrors that reflect how a society (let it be a sectarian or a nation-
wide) keeps up the memory of a supposed collective past, they also reproduce social relations,
which are inevitably empowered by politics, ideologies, and sectarian perceptions. Ipso facto
the current educational system is unable to serve as the motor of the much needed
“desectarianisation” of the country, as the prevailing narratives are doing nothing more than
creating altering and competing perceptions of the country’s past. Ironically, the way a nation
remembers its historical past is shaping its future. Consequently, a unified national narrative,
as foreseen by the Ṭāʾif Agreement, would be vital to mitigate Lebanon’s sectarian tensions,

483 For instance, the Shiʿi textbook regards the brief post-World War I Faysalian rule over Lebanon as a form of
occupations and discusses its events in a chapter labelled “Al-ʿarab fi baladnā”, or ‘The Arabs in our county’.

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alter conflicting sectarian and national self-perceptions and the perception of the other, and create a coherent history for future Lebanese generations.
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النذكر: لأهل الولاية (معظمهم من المسلمين)، الذين قانونوا باستقلال الذاتي مع الإرتباط بالحكم الفرنسي، ومنهم من شارك في اجتماع المؤتمر السوري في دمشق وكلناوا للا içerisinde التعزيع عن رأيهم في باريس.

رابعًا: الوعد اللبناني إلى مؤتمر الصلح في باريس

الأول: قرر مجلس إدارة التقسيمية السعي من أجل استقلال لبنان وتوسيع حدوده. بإعادة ما سلّمه نظام التقسيمية وإنشاء مجلس بيائي على أسس التمثيل النسبي لحفظ حقوق الأقليات وطلب مساعدة فرنسا. وقرر المجلس نقل هذه المطالب إلى مؤتمر الصلح في باريس.

ساهم الوعد إلى فرنسا وعرض داود عون مطالب مجلس الإدارة في 12 شباط 1919 أمام المجلس الأعلى المؤتمر الصلح. لكن الوعد لم يلق تأديتاً مناسباً ولم يصل إلى نتيجة ملموسة.

ب - الوعد الثاني:

ظروف سفرية: شغل اللبنانيون تجاه مناورات الحلفاء وتوسيعهم. فاحتفظ مجلس الإدارة (2 إيار 1919) قراراً بإعادة إعلانه، وهو يمثل الطوائف اللبنانية الكبرى المستأذة والفرنسيين والمسيحيين والكاثوليك والمسيحيين والشيعة (ويمكن أن يشمل الطوائف الأخرى)، شارك في إعلان استقلال لبنان وتصひ إعداد المناطق السامية سنة 1911 وعلى تمثيل حكومة لبنانية الديمقراطية وعلى التعامل مع فرنسا قام مجلس الإدارة بزيارة البطريرك الياسمين البابوية. كما قامت نشاطه شعبية في دعم الطلب إلى البطريرك، تلقى هذه المطالب إلى مؤتمر الصلح في باريس فقبل البطريرك البابوية.

حجة: ترأس البطريرك وهذا من رجال الدين من الشخصيات الوطنية وساهم في فرنسا وصول إلى باريس سنة 1919 بعد أن زار الناطفيكات، وكان مؤتمر الصلح قد أُفزَع. كما قال رئيس الجمهورية الفرنسية (ريمانون بونيكان) رئيس الوزراء (جورج كيرينسكي) وزيراً خارجياً وعبداً من النواب والمحاميين. وقد تم متركون بمرض في مطالب اللبنانيين باستقلال لبنان وتوسيع حدوده ومعافاة المسؤولين عن الجرائم في لبنان خلال الحرب والتعويض على اللبنانيين، وكذلك بقبول
VI.3 Sample I: Sunni textbook
VI.4 Sample Shi'i textbook
Curriculum Vitæ: Zsolt Sereghy  [IPA: ʒolt ʃɛˈrɛgi]

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Abstract

Zsolt Sereghy: Sectarian differences in the narrative of Lebanese history textbooks with special regard to the naissance and early years of the Lebanese Republic.

Diploma thesis. Vienna, 2010 (presented at the Institute for Oriental Studies, Vienna University)

The diploma thesis deals with the prevailing problem of the Lebanese educational system by examining the influence of different sectarian-affiliated historical narratives on the development of national or communitarian identities. The educational landscape of Lebanon, a country paralysed by inter-communitarian strives since its creation in 1920, is characterised by the coexistence of two concurring educational systems: a network of private schools of every level owned and maintained by foreign missionaries or one of the numerous local communities and the stately owned system of governmental schools, the former one enjoying a prestigious and influential role in society. However, this multifarious educational situation enables the creation of distinct interpretations of common history, but at the same time it hinders the development of a common national identity and expedites social fragmentation.

In order to demonstrate sectarian differences in the historical narrative, three different school history manuals (a ‘Christian’, a ‘Shiite’ and a ‘Sunni’ one), intended for the last class of secondary school, are analysed in this paper by following historical and political aspects. As the frames of this thesis do not allow a complete analysis of a four-year curriculum, this paper has its focusing exclusively on the first half of the 20th century (from WW1 to Lebanon’s 1943 independence). That era, thanks to its different reception by Lebanon’s various communities as well as it is the most appropriate period to an analysis in this vein.

In order to highlight crucial and inevitable background information, the analytical part is preceded by an introductory part that provides an overview of the country’s religious and ethnic composition. The second part displays both the historical development of the education in Lebanon and its current state, structure and obstacles by highlighting the actual debates on the curricular reform as well as the role of foreign language instruction.

Kurzfassung

Zsolt Sereghy: Konfessionelle Unterschiede in der Narrative libanesischer Geschichtsschulbücher mit besonderer Hinsicht auf die Entstehung und frühen Jahre der Libanesischen Republik.

Diplomarbeit. Wien, 2010 (eingereicht am Institut für Orientalistik der Universität Wien)


Der erste Teil der Einleitung bietet einen Überblick auf die religiöse Zusammensetzung des Landes, während der dem libanesischen Bildungswesen gewidmete zweite Teil behandelt dessen historische Entwicklung bis zur heutigen Zeit, beschreibt dessen Struktur und wirft ein Streichlicht auf die aktuellen Debatten über das Curriculumreform sowie die Stellung und Rolle des Fremdsprachenunterrichts.